Reply of the Federal Republic of Germany

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

CASE CONCERNING

JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF THE STATE

(GERMANY V. ITALY)

REPLY

OF

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

5 OCTOBER 2010 I. The Subject-Matter of the Disp(u sec1ions

II. IntroductoryObservations(sec 3tions

III. Reparation Issues concerning Italy and Italian

Citizens (sec1ion2s)

GeO1eselrv(to1ti-ns)
2) The Waiver Clause in Article 77(4) of the Peace

Treaty (sec1ion7s)

3) The Waiver Clauses in the Two Treaties of
1961 (secti)on

Rep4a)atomnents (sec2ion1s)

Justif5)al (secti)on

IV. New Developments in the Field of State

Immunity? (sec 3ion6s)

1) The Anachronistic Nature of Italy’s Arguments (section 34)
2) Rules on State Immunity Are Substantive Rules (sections 35-36)

3) No Individual Reparation Claims Arising from

VIiolotises3i-ns)

4) Waiver of Individual Reparation Claims (sections 42-47)
TeTrit)aiale(se4ti-ns)

6) Jus cogens (se5ti-ns)

V. Requests (secti)on

VI. List of Annexes 3

I. The Subject-Matter of the Dispute

1. In its Counter-Memorial (CM) of 22 December 2009, Italy
argues that the instant dispute cannot be confined to the issue of whether

Italy has respected and is respecting Germany’s jurisdictional immunity.

Already in the introduction of the CM it contends that ratione materiae

and ratione temporis the alleged breach by Ge rmany of the obligation
“to make reparation for the extremely severe violations of international

humanitarian law” must be seen as an integral element of the factual and

legal factors to be ruled upon by the Court (p. 6, para. 1.3). This
contention is reiterated in the Conclusions. Italy points out that the

counter-claim, which it felt entitl ed to introduce because of its

expansive interpretation of the subject -matter of the dispute, “is based

on Germany’s denial of effective reparation to Italian victims of the
grave violations of international humanitarian law committed by Nazi

Germany during the Second World War” (p. 133, para. 7.14).

2. It stands to reason that this attempt to extend the scope of
the dispute has failed. In its deci sion of 6 July 2010 the Court made

unmistakably clear that under the European Convention for the Peaceful

Settlement of Disputes of 29 Apr il 1957 only facts occu rring after 18
April 1961, the date of the entry into force of the Convention as between

the two Parties, may be legitimatel y brought before it as the source or

real cause of the dispute. The horrendous events of World War II, when

German occupation forces perpetrated indeed serious violations of the
laws of war, lie therefore outside the jurisdiction of the Court.

Accordingly, the only issue to be discussed at the present merits stage is

the observance or non-observance by Italy of its commitments under
general international law to respect Germany’s jurisdictional immunity.

Germany’s wrongdoing during World War II does not allow Italy to set

aside the principle of consent wh ich provides the foundation of the

settlement of international disputes. No legal justification can be found 4

that would bring events predating 1961 within the juri sdiction of the

Court. Italy’s “grand design”, its in tent to construe a complex and

indissoluble package of facts r eaching from September 1943 to the
present day, is an artful but futile construction. It has not survived the

Court’s decision on the counter-claim.

II. IntroductoryObservations

3. As already demonstrated in the Memorial, the principle of

State immunity has kept its full validity and effectiveness for the
purposes of the instant case. It is true that regarding commercial

activities States have lost their former absolute immunity. One of the

prominent judicial bodies to buttress this fundamental change of the
1
legal position was the German Constitutional Court. However, with

regard to sovereign acts, the tradit ional rule stands unaffected. Recent
developments in the field of human rights, in particular the emergence

of the concept of jus cogens , have not overturned the regime of

jurisdictional immunity. States derive their exemption from the

jurisdiction of the courts of other States from th e principle of sovereign
equality, which constitutes one of th e basic pillars of the international

legal order (UN Charter, Art. 2 (1)) and may also be regarded as a rule

of jus cogens. By disregarding immunity, foreign courts arrogate to

themselves powers which are denied to them under the fundamental
rules of the international community. Notwithstanding the growing

importance of human rights in international law, the collective

framework of equal sovereignties provides the essential framework for

the effective functioning of the international legal order. Unilateral

departures from the consolidated le gal regime threaten the mechanisms
of peaceful settlement of disputes which the international community

has evolved by consensus over many decades since the Hague Peace

Conferences more than 100 years ago.

1Judgment of 30 April 1963, 16 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 27;
English translation: 45 ILR 57. 5

4. In particular in respect of international armed conflict,

immunity has kept its justification as a rule of reason which permits, in
the relationship between States at the international level, settlement of

harm caused in a well-pondered manner, through negotiation and treaty.

Wars could never be brought to an e nd if after the actual cessation of
hostilities every individual injured by a violation of international

humanitarian law (IHL) were able to raise a personal claim against the

State whose armed forces have to s houlder responsibility for the injury

caused. Thousands or even millions of claims could not be adequately
dealt with by the domestic judges of either one of the parties. Following

the Italian viewpoint, World War II would not yet be closed in legal

terms. Victims on both sides woul d be entitled to initiate civil
proceedings before their own national courts, notwithstanding any

agreements concluded by their home countries with the adversaries of

the time which now lies 65 years back.

5. Unfortunately, Italy does not reflect on the consequences of

the views which it defends in the present proceedings. If any major

violation of IHL had entailed an individual right to compensation during

the time of World War II, a right untouchable for the home States of the
victims, a huge legal battleground would be re-opened. Apart from the

population of the former adversaries of Germany and Italy, all other

victims of unlawful acts of war perpetrated by any of the powers
involved in World War II would also enjoy the same rights. One only

needs to read any book on the history of this war in orde r to realize the

dimensions of the barbarity that pe rmeated those years. Suits could be

brought all over Europe before do mestic courts, notwithstanding
settlements that were reached years and decades ago. Germany

dismisses resolutely such a horren dous vision of interminable legal

battles that would produce unrest and enmity without any legal borders.

6. No lengthy comments are needed to explain that States

would hardly be prepared to comply with decisions dealing with their

governmental functions, handed down against them by judges of another 6

country – judges who notwithstanding th eir best intentions to proceed

impartially and objectively can hardly be free from any bias, viewed in

an institutional perspective. It should be reiterated that sovereign States

are not subject to the jurisdiction of other sovereign entities, except on

the basis of their clear and unres erved consent. Accordingly, the

settlement of war damages is gene rally effected through the usual

mechanisms of international diplomacy. At the inter-State level, a
careful balancing of the reciprocal rights and obligations can be

effected, taking into account, inter alia, the economic capacity of the

responsible State.

7. In fact, the internationa l practice has overwhelmingly

remained faithful to the traditional rule of State immunity. The CM has

not been able to show that a new ru le has emerged that would have set

aside the customary norm with its deep foundations in the general
conduct of States. The one and only exception is the judgment of the

Greek Areios Pagos in the Distomo case of 4 May 2000, 2which was

later rejected in the Margellos case as not reflecting the actual position

under international law by the Special Supreme Court under Art. 100 of
3
the Greek Constitution, which in Greece discharges the functions of a

Constitutional Court. Thus, not even in Greece has the new line of

jurisprudence been acknowledged as a valid precedent. The same is true
of the courts of other countries. Nowhere have the Distomo decision and

later the Ferrini decision of the Italia n Corte di Cassazione 4 found

followers. Quite visibly, the Ferrini decision has remained an isolated

incident.

5
8. In its more recent decisions of 29 May 2008, the Italian

Corte di Cassazione has attempte d to justify its position by invoking

paramount principles of justice encapsulated in the body of human

2
3German Memorial (GM), ANNEX 9.
4Judgment of 17 September 2002, 129ILR 526.
5GM, ANNEX 1.
GM, ANNEX 13. 7

rights norms. But it has not succeeded to produce a single foreign

judgment that would support its views. In order to hide the emptiness of

its reasoning, it observes that the nu mber of cases and decisions taking

the same direction cannot be decisive. It may well be that a pure

counting of decisions would not do ju stice to the complexity of the

issue. However, it is more than tell ing that the Corte di Cassazione is
ostensibly alone. It does not have a single supporter. Implicitly, it

recognizes its isolation by observing that the rule it is a pplying is a rule

“in the process of formation”. 7The absolute lack of supporting practice

becomes also apparent through a peru sal of the CM. Since the Corte di

Cassazione stands in splendid isolat ion, the CM is not in a position to

point to any factual element that c ould be characterized as a piece of
evidence susceptible of founding a new customary rule derogating from

the established principle of State immunity regarding sovereign acts. In

the brief of the Procura Generale della Repubblica of 31 December 2009
8
in the case of Ugo Bonaiuti v. Germany the arguments relied upon by

the Corte di Cassazione to find civil suits against Germany based on

events of World War II admissible, are meticulously examined and
convincingly rejected one by one. Germ any has little to add to that

careful review of the legal position. Never has the erroneous position

adopted by the Corte di Cassazione b een exposed more drastically not

by some academic voice, but by one of the institutions of the Italian

judicial system itself.

9. Germany is of the view that the Italian defence has virtually
collapsed as a consequence of the Court’s decision of 6 July 2010. Italy

has not been able to demonstrate that the well-established rule of

jurisdictional immunity has yielded to any new tendencies that would

make it retrospectively inapplic able. Accordingly, Germany could

confine itself to referring to its Memorial where the relevant legal issues

have been discussed in depth. None theless, Germany feels it necessary

6
Without saying so explicitly, the Corte di Cassazione implicitly follows the doctrine
7f jus cogens.
8GM, ANNEX 13, translation, p. 6; Italian: “in via di formazione“.
ANNEX 1. 8

to deal with a number of contentions and allega tions contained in the

CM that do not correspond to the true position. Some of the

observations in the CM deserve indeed a definite rejection because they
distort the state of the relationshi p between the two Parties. It is

precisely in the interest of main taining the good neighbourly friendship

currently existing between Germa ny and Italy that Germany feels

impelled to set the record straight with regard to a number of misleading

contentions in the CM.

10. However, before taking up a number of specific details,

Germany wishes to put on record its strong misgivings about the

observation, reiterated several times and serving as the title of an entire

section of the CM and therefore not an accidental slip of tongue, that
“immunity cannot mean impunity”. 9 Italy refers in this connection to a

passage in the Court’s judgment in the Arrest Warrant case. 10 But the

Court’s words are completely taken out of context. The Court had to

deal with the immunity of an individual, th e Congolese Minister for

Foreign Affairs, who, according to credible allegations, had committed
serious violations of human right s through various speeches inciting

racial hatred. It stands to reason that immunity before foreign courts

does not amount to impunity tout court. The Congolese Minister could

be prosecuted, above all, before the courts of his own country.

11. Through using, in the present context, the words said by the

Court in respect of a case where in dividual criminal responsibility was

in issue, Italy manifests a regrettable misunderstanding of the object and

purpose of litigation regarding reparation for war damages. Italian

citizens have brought civil claims against Germany as a sovereign State.
None of the plaintiffs has denounc ed Germany as a defendant under

criminal prosecution. Germany may be allowed to recall that there is no

international regime of criminal law operating against States. This lack

of criminal sanctions to be impos ed on a State relies on good reasons

9
10ee heading of Section IV, p. 80.
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium),
Judgment, ICJ Reports 2002, p. 3, at 25 para. 60. 9

since it would necessarily be based on the assumption of collective guilt

of an entire people. Of course, af ter World War II war criminals were
pursued and convicted in Germany, fi rst of all through the International

Military Tribunal at Nürnberg in 1945/1946 and later in a multitude of

domestic trials. Criminal guilt is al ways individual guilt. On the other
hand, international responsibility of a State amounts indeed to collective

responsibility of the entire nati onal community. But it does not cast a

shadow of criminal guilt on the pe ople concerned. Accordingly, a State

liable to make reparation enjoys a large measure of discretion as to ways
and means to discharge its duty. In any event, Germany is confident that

in the further course of the proceedings before this Court the general

climate of the legal controversy will be free from such unfortunate
overtones.

III. Reparation Issues Concerning Italy and Italian Citizens

1) GeneraO l bservations

12. One of the leitmotivs of the Italian argumentation as

presented in the CM is the complain t that Germany has never made any
effort to compensate the Italian victims of the violations of IHL that

occurred during the period when Italy was subjected to German

occupation from September 1943 to April/May 1945. In the introductory
paragraphs already, this line of re asoning finds a vivid expression. In

para. 1.3 (p. 6), it is stated that

“the victims have suffered, and continue to suffer, a flagrant denial of
justice, since every attempt over a span of over 60 years to secure
compliance by Germany with the peremptory principle of international
law imposing an absolute obligation of reparation in such cases has
failed”.

A few lines further down (p. 6, pa ra. 1.4, p. 6) the CM speaks of a

“blatant denial of justice”. In similar terms, Italy charges Germany with
not having complied with its obligations of reparation so that recourse to 10

domestic procedures was the only way to obtain the requisite redress (p.

8, para. 1.9):

“since every other way has been tried without success or is in any case
precluded as a consequence of postwar Germany’s choice not to provide

compensation to a multitude of Italian victims of horrendous crimes
committed by the German Reich.”

Essentially, Italy presents the violation of Germany’s sovereign

immunity as a remedy of last resort , as a measure of self-help designed
to remedy a situation fundamentally in disharmony with fundamental

principles of the international legal order.

13. Obviously, these submissions ignore a number of basic
facts. First of all, there is no escap ing the conclusion that, in any event

during the time of World War II, violations of IHL did not entail

individual reparation claims to the benefit of persons harmed by serious

violations of the regime of jus in bello. The entire system of reparation
for damages caused during World Wa r II, as it was determined and

shaped by the victorious Allied Powers originally through the Potsdam

Accord, relied on the assumption that reparation had to be effected on

the inter-State level through traditional mechanisms. Never was it

imagined that, additionally, reparation claims could accrue to individual
victims. In addition, Germany cannot avoid emphasizing that Italy was

involved in the postwar reparation scheme and that it received

appreciable amounts of compensation from Germany. Lastly, victims

were never denied access to the German judicial system. Nor did Italy
as the power entitled to bring claims on behalf of its citizens make the

slightest effort for almost four decades to vindicate such claims after the

conclusion of the two Agreements of 1961. It is only after the adoption

of the 2000 German law on the “R emembrance, Responsibility and
11
Future” Foundation that Italy made representations to Germany on
account of the exclusion of the Italia n military internees (“IMIs”) from

the scope ratione personae of that law. As prisoners of war, this group

11CM, ANNEX 7. 11

of persons was not taken into account for the purposes of that belated

reparation scheme.

2) The Waiver Clause in Article 77(4) of the Peace Treaty

14. It was pointed out in the German Memorial (GM) that under
the Peace Treaty concluded with the victorious Allied Powers Italy

renounced all claims against Germany “on its own behalf and on behalf

of Italian nationals” (Article 77(4)). There is no need for Germany to set

out at great length the reasons underlyi ng this contractual stipulation. It
is a matter of public knowledge that for many years Italy had been an

ally of Nazi Germany. On the other hand, the economic and financial

capacity of Germany to make good the damages it had caused during the
war was limited. Therefore, priority was given to the nations which

could be considered innocent vi ctims of German aggression.

Apparently, the Allied Powers saw no justification for Italy’s

participation in the reparation scheme as a quasi-victorious power.

15. In this connection, regard must be had to the fact that Article

77(4) of the Peace Treaty constitutes a standard clause which was

included, in more or less identical terms, in the peace treaties of 10
February 1947 concluded by the Allied Powers with the other former

allies of Nazi Germany, namely Bulgaria (Article 26 (4)), Hungary

(Article 30 (4)) and Romania (Ar ticle 28 (4)). Under all of these
provisions, those nations had to re nounce any claims against Germany

and German nationals outstanding on 8 May 1945. Two purposes were

pursued by the victorious Allied Powers, which had much leeway in

designing the contents of the treaties they wished to bring about. On the
one hand, their intention was to clea r up the rubble caused by the war,

putting a brake on endless juridical fighting over reparation for war

damages that otherwise would have had to be expected. On the other
hand, as already hinted, the imposed waiver was also meant as a kind of

sanction against the States that ha d formed an Alliance with Germany

and Italy, the so-ca lled “Axis”. Those Stat es could not hope to

overcome the end of the war totally unscathed. In the same way as 12

Germany had to renounce any claims against them, they also had to

waive, on their part, any claims against Germany.

16. Evidently,theconsiderations regarding the interpretation of
the waiver clauses just exposed apply in respect of Article 77(4) of the

Peace Treaty with Italy as well. Si nce the intention was to lay the

foundations for a fresh start in a peaceful Europe, the nature of the

waiver had to be general and comprehensive.

17. The question remains to be addressed whether Germany can
derive any rights from the Peace Treat y with Italy to which it was not a

party. It is clear that according to the plain language of the text Germany

is the beneficiary of the waiver cl ause in Article 77(4). In accordance

with the object and purpose of that clause, the conclusion seems

inescapable that indeed the waiver cl ause is not confined to bestowing
only a gratuity or mere benefit on Germany, instead of conferring on it a

true entitlement which can be invoked in the present proceeding.

12
18. Germany relies on the customary rule reflected in Article

36 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provides for

rights for third States. According to that provision, a right arises for a
third party from a treaty concluded between other parties if those parties

intended to create a right for the th ird party and if the beneficiary

assents to that transaction. There can be no doubt that Germany has

given such assent, both implicitly and explicitly. A renewed implicit

manifestation of that assent is, for instance, the present action. One may
also see in the conclusion of the Pe ace Treaty itself a manifestation of

Germany’s consent inasmuch as the Allied Powers, with whom Italy

had to negotiate, held at the same time “supreme authority with respect

to Germany”, which they had assumed by virtue of the Berlin
13
Declaration of 5 June 1945. When two years later they concluded the

12
See Mark E. Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
13eaties (Leiden – Boston, 2009), p. 488.
Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme
Authority by the Allied Powers, reprinted in: Ingo von Münch (ed.),Dokumente des
geteilten Deutschland (Stuttgart, 1968), p. 19. 13

Treaty of Peace with Italy, they acte d at the same time as trustees

safeguarding Germany’s interests.

19. Therefore, the only question is whether the parties to the

Peace Treaty of 1947 had the intention of according a genuine right to
Germany, as provided for in Article 36(1) of the Vienna Convention on

the Law of Treaties. In this regard, one should first of all re-emphasize

that Germany was specifically mentioned by its name. If indeed a State

is identified in that way, it would se em to be illogical not to allow it to
invoke a stipulation which in any ev ent has been esta blished in its

favour. Essentially, this would depr ive the clause of its object and

purpose, namely, as already pointed out, to clear the ground in the midst
of the ruins left by the war and to make a fresh start possible for the

former enemy which, in 1947, was in a dire situation. The deplorable

economic conditions obtaining in post-war Germany directly affected

the Allied Powers who at that time, as occupation forces, had to take
care of Germany and the German popul ation. In particular, the Allied

Powers did not want their own re paration claims, which had been

determined by the Potsdam Accord, to be affected by reparation claims

originating from former allies of Nazi Germany. In other words, they
wanted the stipulations laid down in the peace treaties to be effective. A

waiver which could not be invoked by its beneficiary would have made

absolutely no sense.

20. The conclusion reached is buttressed by the official

commentary of the ILC on the draft ar ticles on the law of treaties. The

ILC finalized its work in 1966. In the commentary on Article 32, the
draft provision which dealt with trea ties providing for rights for third

States, the ILC specifically referred to the waiver clauses in peace

treaties, presenting them as examples of treaties establ ishing rights for
third States:

“In some instances, [the stipulation] is in favour of a group of States, as
in the case of the provisions in th e Peace Treaties after the two world
wars which stipulated that the def eated States should waive any claims 14

arising out of the war in favour of certain States no t parties to the

treaties ... Examples of stipulations in favour of individual States,14
groups of States or States generally have already been mentioned”.

Hence, the ILC was convinced that the peace treaties concluded after

World War II, including the Peace Tr eaty with Italy, had to be

acknowledged as treaties that go be yond setting forth only benefits that
are not legally enforceable, but ha ve brought into being true legal

entitlements for their beneficiaries.

21. In the case of an Italian ship, the S.S. Fausto, the third-party

effect of the waiver clauses of th e Peace Treaty with Italy was indeed

recognized. The former Italian owner of the ship instituted a claim for
reparation in the Uruguayan courts because Uruguay had requisitioned

the ship during the war. Although Uruguay was not a party to the Peace

Treaty, the courts found that the gove rnment was entitled to invoke the

waiver clause contained in Articl e 76 of the Treaty as a bar to the
15
claim.

22. Doubts have been raised by the Respondent regarding the

scope of the waiver clause. It contends that the focus of the clause is on

private-law relationships arising out of commercial and contractual

obligations. This entails according to its reading that claims arising from

violations of the laws of war and IH L attributable to the German Reich
16
were not included in the scope of Article 77 (4). Italy’s views can

neither be reconciled with the plain text of the clause nor with its
objective.

23. It is true that the first sentence deals primarily with private

rights. On the other hand, the second sentence changes the perspective.

The text mentions “all intergovernmental claims in respect of

arrangement entered into in the course of the war”, and ultimately, in the

14
15Yearbook of the ILC (YILC) 1966, Vol. II, p. 228 para. 2, p. 229 para. 7.
Sir Humphrey Waldock, Third Report on the Law of Treaties, UN doc. A/CN.4/167,
16LC 1964, Vol. II, p. 24 para. 18.
CM, p. 105 s. para. 5.49. 15

last phrase, it includes also “all claims for loss or damage arising during

the war”. No differentiation is intro duced regarding specific categories

of claims. The waiver clause has a sweeping character. Any conceivable

claims against Germany are encompassed. To split the unity of the text

up into different segments stands in contradiction to established rules of

interpretation.

24. If the view defended by th e Respondent were followed, the

waiver could not have reached its ob jective. Clearly, the authors of the

Peace Treaty had no intention of allo wing Italy or Italian citizens to
assert and enforce claims agains t Germany, given the precarious

economic situation of the defeated country. For that purpose, it was

necessary to establish a wall shield ing Germany from such demands. It

must have been clear to the parties concerned that claims for reparation

of war damages constituted the main bulk of any outstanding claims to

be settled.

25. Judicial authorities in both countries have confirmed that the

waiver clause produced indeed the effects it was intended to do. In a
judgment of 2 February 1953 the Corte di Cassazione acknowledged

that no claim could be brought agains t Germany or German citizens by

persons of Italian nationality. 17 On the German side, contrary to the

allegations to the Respondent, 18 the Federal Supreme Court

(Bundesgerichtshof) came to the same conclusion. 19It dismissed an

application by an Italian citizen against the German Reich through

which the plaintiff sought reparation for the requisitioning of a private

car, holding that by virtue of the waiver clause, which had become
20
applicable in Germany on the basis of Article 5(4) of the London

17Giurisprudenza Italiana 1953, Section I, p. 317; ANNEX 2.
18CM, p. 108 para. 5.53.
19Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen (BGHZ) 19, 258, 14
December 1955; ANNEX 3.
20“Claims against Germany or German nationals by countries which were, before 1
September 1939, incorporated in, or which were, on or after 1 September 1939, allied
to, the Reich, and of nationals of such countries, arising out of obligations undertaken
or rights acquired between the date of incorporation (or, in the case of countries allied

to the Reich, 1 September 1939) and 8 May 1945, shall be dealt with in accordance
with the provisions made or to be made in the relevant treaties. To the extent that, 16

Agreement on German External Debts, 21 the plaintiff had lost his claim

against Germany. In other words, the full effect of the waiver clause was

confirmed.

26. The reservation made by the victorious Allied Powers in the

introductory sentence of Article 77(4) of the Peace Treaty does not alter

the conclusion that the waiver wa s definitive and final in the
relationship between the two countries as long as the Allied Powers did

not make use of the authority they ha d reserved to themselves. No such

determinations have been made. Ar ticle 77(4) of the Peace Treaty has

remained unchanged to this very da te. Accordingly, the waiver clause
continues to deploy its full effect.

27. Not a single one of the other waiver clauses contained in the

peace treaties with the former allies of the Axis Powers has been

interpreted in the narrow sense now suggested by the Respondent. No
claims for the reparation of war damages have been directed against

Germany from Bulgaria, Hungary or Ro mania. In all of these countries

the view has prevailed to this very date, more than 60 years after the

Paris Conference of 1947, that the clauses bar any attempt to require
Germany to make compensation paym ents. As the only country, Italy

departs from this consensus.

28. That Italy has embraced a wrong interpretation of the waiver
clause contained in its Peace Treaty re sults also from the fact that the

Allied Powers themselves, who also suffered breaches of IHL

committed by German armed forces, renounced exactly in the same way

any reparation claim against Germany not only for themselves, but also

on behalf of their nationals. They did so on account of the reparations
imposed on Germany by virtue of the Potsdam Accord and implemented

by the Paris Agreement on reparation from Germany, on the

under the terms of such treaties, any such debts may be settled, the terms of the present
Agreement shall apply.”
21Of 27 February 1953, 333 UNTS 2. 17

establishment of an inter-allied reparation agency and on the restitution

of monetary gold (Article 2 (A)):

”The Signatory Governments agr ee among themselves that their
respective shares of reparation, as determined by the present Agreement,
shall be regarded by each of them as covering all its claims and those of

its nationals against the former Ge rman Government and its Agencies,
of a governmental or private nature, arising out of the war (which are
not otherwise provided for), including costs of German occupation,
credits acquired during occupation on clearing accounts and claims
22
against the Reichskreditkassen.”

The Preamble to this Agreement clarif ies explicitly that the instrument
23
is designed to settle the reparation issue. It would be outright absurd to

maintain that those nations which su stained even more serious damage
during World War II should have definitely abandoned any

corresponding claims whereas Italy, a former ally of Nazi Germany,

should be free to raise such claims. In fact, the States Parties to the Paris

Agreement have abstained from making any further demands for

compensation of war time injuries.

29. In other words, the Peace Treaty of 1947 did away with any

reparation claims against Germany in favour of Italy and Italian
nationals. For this reason alone, the Italian contention that there has

been a continuous denial of justice is devoid of any substance.

22Agreement of 14 January 1946,
http://www.mzv.cz/jnp/en/foreign_relations/neverejne/second_world_war_a…
pact/documents/agreement_on_reparation_from_germany.html.
23“The Governments of Albania, the United States of America, Australia, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Egypt, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, Greece, India, Luxembourg, Norway, New Zealand, the Netherlands,
Czechoslovakia, the Union of South Africa and Yugoslavia, in order to obtain an
equitable distribution among themselves of the total assets which, in accordance with
the provisions of this Agreement and the provisions agreed upon at Potsdam on 1
August 1945 between the Governments of the United States of America, the United

Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics,[1] are or may be declared to be available as reparation from Germany
(hereinafter referred to as German reparation), in order to establish an Inter-Allied
Reparation Agency, and to settle an equitable procedure for the restitution of monetary
gold, have agreed as follows:” 18

3) The Waiver Clauses in the Two Treaties of 1961

30. Furthermore,Germanywishes to recall once again the two
agreements that were signed on 2 June 1961 (GM, para. 11). Under both

agreements, considerable payments we re made to Italy. From today’s

viewpoint the amounts stipulated almo st half a century ago (twice 40
million DM) do not seem to be considerable. This is a wrong

impression, however. In 1961, the budge t of the Federal Republic of

Germany amounted to less than 48 billion DM, roughly a thirteenth of

today’s figures (2010: 319,5 billion Euros). Acco rdingly, in order to
obtain a figure that can be comp ared with today’s economic and

financial situation, the amounts should at least be multiplied by a factor

between 12 and 14. Yet whatever the assessment of the appropriateness
of the sums agreed upon, the fact is that Italy accepted these payments

to which it was not entitle d under any legal rule or principle, given the

waiver in the Peace Treaty. Moreove r, as the consideration for the

payment pledged by Germany, Ital y accepted two further waiver
clauses, the first one of which (Treaty on the Settlement of Certain

Property-Related, Economic and Fi nancial Questions) is framed

categorically and permits of no doubts. Italy declared in Article 2 (1) of

that agreement:

“all outstanding claims on the part of the Italian Republic or Italian
natural or juridical persons against the Federal Republic of Germany or
German natural or juridical persons to be settled to the extent that they
are based on rights and circumstan ces which arose during the period

from 1 September 1939 to 8 May 1945”.

4) Reparation Payments

31. Accordingly, monies were pr ovided to Italy for reparation

purposes, and Italy apparently felt th at any expectations it may had had
were adequately satisfied. Otherwise, it would not have subscribed to

the waiver clause. No reservation was made. In fact, as already hinted,

the Italian Government remained absolutely passive for almost 40 years
after the conclusion of the two agreements. Its conduct permits the

inference that indeed it regarded the settlement of 1961 as a 19

considerable achievement since under the Peace Treaty it had not been

left with any claims against Germany. On the part of Germany, the
conclusion of the two agreements was indeed a gesture of good will

with the intent to definitively norm alize the relations with Italy, a

country that had in the meantime b ecome a close ally and friend within
the framework of the three European Communities.

32. This is not the place to provide a complete balance sheet of

all the reparations which the Allied Powers received from Germany
after 1945. We confine ourselves to briefly mentioning that huge

amounts of goods in natura were taken out of the four occupation zones

and that all German foreign assets were confiscated. Furthermore, it
cannot go unmentioned that Germa ny had to renounce more than

114,000 square kilometres of its te rritory. Lastly, German domestic

legislation has introduced regulations for the injuries caused by the Nazi

regime on a case-by-case basis. No blanket norms were enacted, taking
into account, in particular, that Germany had been compelled, as just

indicated, to make reparations in a global fashion at the inter-State level.

33. The preceding observations solely serve to dispel the
erroneous impression created by Italy in the sense that Germany has not

done anything to compensate the victims. Because of the waiver clause

in Art. 77(4) of its Peace Treaty, It aly’s share of the reparation scheme
established on the basis of the Potsdam Agreements was originally

reduced to nil. However, on grounds of equity, the Federal Republic of

Germany later agreed to provide at least partial compensation to Italy, to

the full satisfaction of its Governme nt. Therefore, the charge that
Germany did not bother to compensate the victims is totally misplaced

and misleading. It distorts the truth.

5) Denial of Justice?

34. Lastly, Germany wishes to point out that Italy falls prey to a

misinterpretation of basic concepts when it speaks of a “flagrant” or

“blatant” denial of justice. Italian citizens have never been denied access 20

to the German judicial system on acc ount of the grievances they held

against Germany. Access to the cour ts is guaranteed to everyone
according to Article 19(4) of the German Basic Law, to German citizens

and to aliens alike, the na tionality being irrelevant in this respect. It is

another matter, however, whether a pl aintiff has a genu ine legal claim
which he/she can assert. On the one hand, general international law did

not, at the time of World War II, bestow individual reparation claims on

persons victims of violations of IHL. On the other hand, German

domestic legislation has nonetheless included several specific groups of
victims of war injuries in reparation programmes. Civilian victims of

forced labour were compensa ted, among them roughly 4,000 Italian

citizens, and in particular the vict ims of persecution on racist grounds
benefited from such programmes. Ot herwise, war injuries were not

made good by Germany on an individual basis, given the fact, outlined

above, that large material sacrif ices were imposed on it through the

traditional mechanisms of war repara tion. Thus, individual claims filed
with German courts could generally not be successful. But their failure

does not reflect a basic unwillingn ess of Germany to remedy the

damages it caused during World War II. Germany is of the view that

through the different mechanisms of reparation, in pa rticular through
collective reparations, it has lived up to its duty of reparation in a fully

satisfactory manner.

IV. New Developments in the Field of State Responsibility and State

Immunity?

35. In the following passages, Germany will confine itself to

providing short answers to the It alian observations concerning the

alleged new configuration which the law of international responsibility
and State immunity has taken in r ecent years. Essentially, Germany

refers to its submissions in the Me morial where the true legal position

was set out. None of the arguments advanced by the Respondent permits

the inference that individuals harmed by the armed conflict between the 21

German Reich and Italy are entitled to bring individual claims which

Italian courts are empowered to adj udicate. The Italian judiciary has no

jurisdiction over such claims.

1) The Anachronistic Nature of Italy’s Arguments
36. In the first place, Germany wishes to point out that the

Italian argumentation relies entirely on developments that have taken

place after World War II, where the dramatic turning point was the

United States “Tate letter” wri tten by the Legal Adviser of the
24
Department of State in 1952. Before that date, there existed broad

consensus as to the absolute character of the jurisdictional immunity
enjoyed by States. Germany is well awar e of the fact that Italian courts

had followed the new tendency for many decades long before that date.

However, their jurisprudence remained controversial. In any event, it

was never contended that there could be any justification for restricting

immunity also with regard to acts jure imperii . The debate centred

exclusively on acts jure gestionis – or commercial acts. Eventually, the
consolidation of the new regime came about in the fifties and sixties of

the last century, and even later. 25 Up to 1945, not even hints could be

found anywhere that individuals should be allowed to sue foreign States

before their own courts on account of sovereign acts.

2) Rules on State Immunity as Substantive Rules

37. In its Memorial, Germany shows that the customary rules on
jurisdictional immunity do not primarily pertain to the class of

procedural rules that fall to be applied in accordance with the specific

scope and content they have reached at the time when the judge of the
26
forum has to deliver his decision. Jurisdictional immunity is an

outflow from the principle of sovereign equality of States. It regulates to

what extent a State is subject to th e jurisdiction of another State. The
regime thus established does not va ry continuously over the years. The

24
25GM, para. 49.
26GM, paras. 49-51.
GM, paras. 91 et seq. 22

commission of an internationally wrongful act brings into being a

specific configuration between th e States involved, the wrongdoing

State and the victim State. That configuration comprises not only the
well-known substantive secondary right s of the victim State as they

have been defined in the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility, 27 but

also the ways and means defining the relevant mechanisms for the

assertion of those rights. In fact, th e manner in which injury caused can

and must be repaired constitutes a key element of any reparation regime.
As underlined in the Memorial, the victorious Allied Powers proceeded

from the conviction that Germany had to face up to its responsibility for

causing huge damages through its war operations by way of reparations

to be provided to all of the States that had defeated the Axis States. The

mechanism that was put into place was a classic inter-State mechanism.
No provision was made for parallel provision of reparations in favour of

individual victims. The contention that pursuant to the general rules of

procedural law State immunity should be applied in accordance with the

development of its legal regime at the time of the delivery of the

relevant judgment would lead to absurd result s. Essentially, it would
mean that with regard to one and the same injurious occurrence a claim

could be dealt with differently, depending on the point of time when the

plaintiff has introduced his/her cl aim. Germany sees its viewpoint
28
furthermore buttressed by the UK State Immunity Act 1978, which

provides explicitly in section 23, para . 3, that the Act does not apply to
“proceedings in respect of matters that occurred before the date of [its]

coming into force”. Accordingly, Germany holds the relevant

observations in the Italian Count er-Memorial (p. 56-59, paras. 4.43-

4.50) to be unfounded.

38. However, there is no need fo r Germany to discuss this issue

in greater detail. The basic fact is that the rules on State immunity

regarding sovereign acts have not changed during the last decades in the

sense contended by Italy. Even taking the law as it stands today, the

Italian courts should have dismissed the claims introduced before them
27
28Taken note of by General Assembly resolution 56/83, 12 December 2001.
17 ILM 1123 (1978). 23

because the relevant customary rules deny them the requisite

jurisdictional powers.

3) No Individual Reparation Clai ms Arising from Violations of

IHL

39. The CM shows (p. 90-94, paras. 5.7-5.14) that violations of

IHL lead to international responsibi lity. This principle was already laid
down in Art. 3 of Hague Convention IV and finds today its reflection in

Art. 91 AP I. Germany does not call into question this part of Italy’s

argumentation. State responsibility is a cornerstone of the entire edifice

of international law. However, the observations put forward are
irrelevant for the purposes of the present proceeding. First of all,

Germany’s responsibility deriving from the occupation of Italy and its

capturing Italian military agents outside Italy lies outside the scope of

the Court’s task. Second, the submi ssions do not suppor t the allegation

that Germany has failed to satisfy i ndividual claims of Italian victims.
Indeed, the relevant instrument s do not provide for individual

entitlements. This was the communis opinio in 1907, and even after the

conclusion of the four Geneva conventions of 1949 the legal position

had not changed. Without any modify ing nuance, the official Pictet
Commentary of the ICRC states:

“As regards material compensation for breaches of the Convention, it is
inconceivable, at least as the law st ands today, that claimants should be
able to bring a direct action for damages against the State in whose
service the person committing the breach was working. Only a State can
29
make such claims on another State …”.

Not even in 1977 had such a structur al revolution come to completion.
Reference may be made to the Commentary of the ICRC:

“Apart from exceptional cases, persons with a foreign nationality who
have been wronged by the unlawful c onduct of a Party to the conflict
should address themselves to thei r own government, which will submit
their complaints to the Party or Parties which committed the violation.

29Jean Pictet (ed.), III Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War (Geneva, 1960), Art. 131, p. 630. 24

However, since 1945, a tendency has emerged to recognize the exercise
30
of rights by individuals”.

One cannot fail to note with what degree of caution the remarks on the
present legal position have been formulated. The Commentary speaks of

a “tendency”, and it stresses that this “tendency” has not emerged earlier

than 1945.

40. Germany refers furthermore, in this connection, to the

decision of the European Court of Human Rights of 4 September 2007

in the case of Associazione Nazionale Reduci dalla Prigionia, dall
Internamento e dalla Guerra di Liberazione. 31 In very clear terms, the

European Court observes several times that the persons transferred to

Germany to perform forced labour enjoyed no individual right to

reparation under international law. Consequently, they could not

plausibly complain of a violation of the right to the protection of

“possessions” under Art. 1 of the [F irst] Protocol to the European
Convention of Human Rights by bei ng not included in the scope the

Law on the Creation of the Foundati on “Remembrance, Responsibility

and Future” that was adopted by Germany in 2000.

41. Germany is well aware of the resolution adopted by the

General Assembly on 16 December 2005 on “Basic Principles and
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of

Gross Violations of Internati onal Human Rights Law and Serious

Violations of International Humanitarian Law”. 32 This resolution

recommends that States should provid e victims of serious violations of

IHL and international human rights law with “adequate, effective and

prompt reparation for harm suffered” (para. 11(c)). However, this

resolution does not add anything to the legal yardsticks against which
the present dispute must be measured. On the one hand, the resolution is

generally couched in language which discloses its hortatory character.

30
Jean Pictet et al., Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the
31neva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Geneva, 1987), p. 1056 margin number 3657.
32CM, ANNEX 10.
UN General Assembly resolution 60/147, 16 December 2005. 25

The General Assembly did not engage in codifying existing customary

law, but was intent on progressively developing the law as it currently

stands. Second, the resolu tion reflects trends an d tendencies that have
emerged at the earliest in the last two decades. Accordingly, the “Basic

Principles and Guidelines” lack an y relevance for the legal assessment

of the instant case.

42. Another attempt to progressi vely develop the law as it

stands has been made by the Comm ittee on “Reparation for victims of
33
armed conflict” of the International Law Association. In a draft report

submitted to the forthcoming session of this Committee in August 2010
in The Hague, the Co-Rapporteur, Professor Rainer Hofmann from

Frankfurt/Main, suggests that the following proposition should be

adopted as part of a declaration on the topic (Article 6):

“Victims of armed conflict have a right to reparation from the
responsible parties.”

It is clear from the explanations given by the Rapporteur that his
proposal is meant to introduce new rules, rules that to date have no firm

foundation in international law. This is also corroborated by Article

15(1) of the draft declaration ac cording to which the rights and

obligations reflected in the text shall have no retroactive effect.

Whatever the justifiability of th e suggested reform, the reformers
themselves acknowledge quite openly th at they would turn a historic

page in the history of international law.

43. Further support for the slow emergence of a new rule may
also be derived from the Advisory Opinion in the Wall case where the

Court held that

“Israel has the obligation to make reparation for the damage caused to
all the natural or legal persons concerned”

33See http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1018. 26

on account of the requisition and destruction of homes, businesses and
34
agricultural holdings. However, this observa tion cannot really be

considered as a general breakthrough to a new concept of reparation in
situations of armed conflict since the Palestinian territories are still

placed under Israeli occupation. The Pa lestinian National Authority has

been endowed with certain powers; but it does not have the full status of

a government that could claim reparation for its citizens by way of
diplomatic protection. In any event, however, the holding of the Court

cannot be applied retrospectively to occurrences that took place during

World War II.

4) Waiver of Individual Reparation Claims

44. Germany cannot agree with the subsequent observations

advanced by Italy to the effect th at reparation claims can under no

circumstances be waived (pp. 94-97, paras. 5.15-5.21). This contention

comprises two elements. On the one hand, Italy argues that individual
entitlements may not be restricted by the responsible home State of the

person concerned. On the other hand, It aly also maintains that States

may not renounce the reparation claims that have accrued to them.

45. Regarding the first element of its submission, Italy is right in

drawing attention in particular to Art. 6 of Geneva Convention III and

Art. 7 of Geneva Convention IV. It is true that these provisions may be

seen as precursors of the current concept of jus cogens, intended to
secure the status of the persons under the protection of the two

Conventions. However, it should be pointed out that no individual

entitlements arose from the breaches of IHL perpetrated by Germany.

Therefore, the relevant instruments – first the Peace Treaty of 1947 and

thereafter the two Agreements of 1961 – did not encroach upon legal
rights protected against any kind of interfer ence. Second, the two

provisions operate as a shield against any rest riction of the primary

rights which are granted to the protected persons. States are prevented

from lowering the standard of treatm ent of prisoners or of civilians

34Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 136, at 198 para. 152. 27

below the level peremptorily determined by the clauses of the applicable

regime. Within the present context, another configuration must be
analyzed. When the Peace Treaty was concluded in 1947, the war was

over by definition, and the same holds true of the two agreements of

1961. The objects of the contractual s tipulations were reparation claims
that might – or might not – have arisen. Neither in 1947 nor in 1961 was

any attempt made to go against the letter and the spirit of the applicable

regime of armed conflict.

46. It is clear, on the other ha nd, that claims to reparation can

indeed be disposed of by States for the benefit or to the detriment of

their nationals. All the treaties concluded after World War II are
premised on that assumption. Intern ational practice had no doubts, at

that time, that when settling the financial consequences of armed

conflicts it is necessary to estab lish general regimes, comprehending

both governmental and private assets and liabilities. There is not a single
case in which an international judici al body would have declared that a

State is juridically prevented from di sposing of assets of its nationals

when such measures are necessary for the conclusion of a peace treaty.

Such measures have a specific nature. They cannot be characterized as
unlawful confiscation contrary to the guarantee of property as it exists in

some international instruments for the protection of human rights, the

African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Art. 14), the American
Convention on Human Rights (Art. 21) , and the European Convention

on Human Rights ([First] Protocol, Art. 1). Peace treaties are almost

unavoidably required to address a general situation of death and

destruction. Only courageous and forw ard-looking decisions are able to
bring about redress by laying the groundwork for peace and

reconciliation between former enemies. If every single violation had to

be accounted for as an occurrence requiring separate treatment, that
paramount aim would be frustrated. I ndeed, Italy has not been able to

refer to hard international practice to buttress its contention. 28

47. Even less convincing is the reference to the common clause

contained in the four Geneva Conventions establishing a prohibition for
States to absolve themselves from liability incurred by breaches of the

applicable regime of IHL (GC I, Art. 51; GC II, Art. 52; GC III, Art.

131; GC IV, Art. 148). These clause s bear no relationship with the
subject-matter of the present dispute. They relate to international

reparation claims held by States against other States. Therefore, they do

not fit into the intellectual framework discussed here where the main

argument advanced by Italy is that Germany did not satisfy individual
reparation claims – claims which never arose, as has been shown.

48. Second, Italy was not a vanquished State at the time it
concluded the Peace Treaty with the Allied Powers. Obviously, it was in

a somewhat delicate position. On the one hand, it had joined the alliance

of the victorious powers in 1943; on the other hand, it could not totally

shed its past of an ally of Nazi Germany. For this reason, the conclusion
of a peace treaty proved indispensable. However, given its ambiguous

situation, Italy did not meet the crit eria of a “vanquished” State. Since

its rupture with Nazi Germany, it had left the Axis long before its final

defeat.

49. Lastly, Art. 131 GC III and 148 GC IV contemplate an

entirely different factual configuration. The two provisions are intended
to prevent the abusive exploitation of a position of superior military

strength at the end of a war. They prohibit a victor to shed its own

responsibility by compelling the def eated nation to renounce all of its

claims. The Peace Treaty of 1947 did not purport to protect the alliance
of the victorious nations with whom Italy established a peace settlement

from being made accountable by Italy. The victors did not seek any such

advantages for themselves. Instead, they acted on behalf of Germany for
the well-founded reasons set out above. They wanted to achieve nothing

else than to lay the groundwork for a fresh start between the two nations

who had first been close allies and th ereafter declared enemies. That at

the same time they were concerned to protect German assets for their 29

own reparation purposes is a motivation which is irreproachable and

does not, in any event, come within the purview of the two provisions.

5) The Territorial Clause

50. Germany has discussed the meaning and scope of the

territorial clause at great length in its Memorial (paras. 71-82). The
arguments raised by Italy to rebut that interpretation of the legal position

do not seem to be convincing. The territorial clause opens up only a

rather narrow window in respect of factual configurations which

essentially consist of specific, is olated incidents. Organized armed

hostilities have never been subsumed under the territorial clause.

51. In the first place, Germany reca lls that the terr itorial clause

is a child of recent times. Italy has dr awn the attention to a resolution of

a learned society, the Institut de droit international, which advocated the
th
introduction of such a clause already at the end of the 19 century (CM,
35
para. 4.28, p. 51). But the Institut clearly was intent on engaging in

progressive development. It proclaimed (Art. 4 (6)):

« Les seules actions recevables contre un Etat étranger sont:

….
6. Les actions en dommages-intérêts nées d’un délit ou d’un quasi-délit,
commis sur le territoire. »

At that time, this assertion mean t a courageous leap into an unknown

future. At the same time, Franz v. Liszt, reflecting the unanimous

opinion of his time, wrote:

“It results from the mutual independence of States that no State may be

sued before the courts of another State, except if the suit concerns
immovable property or if it [the State] voluntarily submits to the
domestic jurisdiction.” 36

35
Hans Wehberg (ed.), Tableau général des résolutions (1873-1956) (Basel, 1957), p.
36.
“Aus der gegenseitigen Unabhängigkeit der Staaten voneinander folgt, dass kein
Staat vor die Gerichte eines andern Staates gestellt werden kann, es sei denn, dass es
sich … um dingliche Klagen in Bezug auf unbewegliches Gut handelt oder er sich
freiwillig der inländischen Gerichtsbarkeit unterwirft“, Das Völkerrecht (Berlin 1898),
p. 39. 30

In fact, the CM cites as the first in ternational instrument in which the

territorial clause has found acceptance the European Convention on
37
State Immunity of 16 May 1972 (Art. 11). Being aware of the dangers
inherent in this provision, the drafte rs took care to exclude from its

scope ratione materiae any proceedings relating to the armed forces of a

State party (Art. 31):

“Nothing in this Convention shall affect any immunities or privileges
enjoyed by a Contracting State in respect of anything done or omitted to
be done by, or in relation to, its arme d forces when on the territory of

another Contracting State.”

All the other territorial clauses, in particular the clause contained in Art.

12 of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and
38
Their Property, pertain to a more recent pa st. Again, Italy attempts to
apply retrospectively to the occurrences of World War II legal rules that

have arisen in a slow process of progressive development after the

founding of the United Nations.

52. It can hardly be said that th e territorial clause has led to the
disappearance of the former distinction between acts jure gestionis and

acts jure imperii . In particular, attention is drawn once again to the

commentaries on the two relevant provi sions. Art. 11 of the European

Convention has been unmistakably confined to conf igurations like

traffic accidents (GM, p. 44, para. 72), and the same philosophy

underlies Art. 12 of the UN Convention. It is true that the commentary
on the draft prepared by the ILC mentions also

“intentional physical harm such as assault and battery, malicious
damage to property, arson or even homicide, including political
assassination.”

37
38CETS No. 74.
Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 59/83, 2 December 2004, not yet in force. 31

This enlargement of the scope ratione materiae should not be overrated.

The examples given are far away from armed conflict. They presuppose

a generally peaceful relationship where the good climate of mutual
understanding is disturbed only by so me incidents that were either

unplanned and unforeseen or were perp etrated in secrecy by agents of

the wrong-doing State. It is visibly in particular the Letelier case that

has inspired the explanatory comment on the extension of the clause to
“assassinations”. No matter how de spicable the murder of general

Letelier in Washington was, the relationship between Chile and the

United States had by no means evolved to a situation of armed conflict.

53. Mass phenomena like armed conflicts cannot be measured

by the same yardstick as minor incidents. To entrust the settlement of

armed conflicts to judicial settle ment through individual actions would

inevitably destroy the well-woven texture of time-honoured and well-

proven institutions and mechanisms of international law. Domestic
judges are not sufficiently equipped for handling such complex

situations which require the best expe rtise not only in la w, but also in

respect of the historical circumstan ces of the conflic t concerned. Thus,

the two territorial clauses are not appropriate as precedents in the
present dispute.

54. Lastly, Germany refers again to the statement made by Mr.

Gerhard Hafner, chairman of the working group of the Sixth Committee
of the General Assembly entrusted with examining the draft of the ILC

before its adoption by the Genera l Assembly itself. Hafner was

authorized to make a statement in respect of the applicability of the

Convention to military activities. B ecause of its importance, that

statement may be reiterated. It was phrased as follows:

“One of the issues that had been ra ised was whether military activities
were covered by the Convention. The general understanding had always
prevailed that they were not.” 39

39UN Doc. A/C.6/59/SR.13, para. 36. 32

This was not a personal comment by Mr. Hafner. In consonance with

usual diplomatic practices, he was sp ecifically empowered to make that
comment, which may be decisive for many States when considering the

suitability of ratifying the Convention. Precisely States that normally

offer their assistance very generously to other States, including military

assistance in the form of UN conti ngents, the prospect of having to
endure being sued before the domestic courts of the countries where

such troops are deployed could be an enormous deterrent. This

consideration may have been of de cisive importance for the European

Court of Human Rights when, in Behrami and Saramati v. France,
Germany and Norway , 40 it held that an arrest effected in Kosovo had

not taken place under the jurisdicti on of the three troop-contributing

countries against which the application had been directed, but under the

jurisdiction of the UN Security Council.

55. In fact, when depositing its in strument of ratification of the

UN Convention on 23 December 2009, Sweden made the following

declaration:

“Recalling inter alia resolution 59/38, adopted by the General Assembly
on 16 December 2004, taking into account inter alia the statement of the
Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee introducing the report of the Ad

Hoc Committee to the General Assembly, as well as the report of the Ad
Hoc Committee, Sweden hereby decl ares its understa nding that the
Convention does not apply to military activities, including the activities
of armed forces during an armed conf lict, as those terms are understood
under international humanitarian la w, and activities undertaken by
military forces of a State in the exercise of their official functions.”

It thereby followed the example of Norway which had made the same

declaration when it handed over its in strument of ratification to the

Secretary-General of the United Nations. The two declarations evidence

that there can be no question of opinio juris supporting a new rule to the
effect that military operations are not shielded from judicial scrutiny

before domestic courts in foreign countries. The exercise of military

power pertains indeed to the core elements of sovereign powers. The

40Decision of 2 May 2007, Applications 71412/01 and 78166/01. 33

Corte di Cassazione itself was right when in the Markovic case 41it held

that the discharge of military functions constitutes an “act of

government” (“atto di Governo”). However, Germany may be allowed
to express once again its amazement over the fact that the Corte di

Cassazione considers actions brought ag ainst Italy before Italian courts

to be inadmissible to the extent that military activities are concerned,

while on the other hand it has no scruples to rule on the merits of claims
brought against Germany on account of military activities on Italian

soil. In the CM, not a single word e xplaining this inconsistency can be

found.

6) Jus cogens

56. Regarding the issue of jus cogens, hardly any enlightenment

can be derived from the CM (pp. 60-70, paras. 4.54-4.77). Germany

does not challenge the concept of jus cogens , quite to the contrary.

Germany is of the view that the concept of jus cogens has added an
important new element to the international legal order. Jus cogens

provides a hard backbone to th e new value orientation which

international law has received unde r the impact of the UN Charter.

Whereas international law, as from its inception, was always designed to
promote peace and good order among nati ons, it did not protect directly

the values that secure a civilized st ate of affairs in the international

community. Since the individual made his/her appearance on the

international stage as bearer of rights that even the home State must
respect, the ground is prepared for denying absolute sovereignty to

transactions between, and unilateral actions of, St ates. Undeniably, this

new philosophy has become part and parcel of present-day international

law.

57. The Respondent is right in recalling that in the legal

literature early voices claimed already in past centuries that international

law had a hard core of fundamental values that should enjoy protection

under any circumstances (CM, pp. 60-64, paras. 4.56-4.66). However,

41GM, ANNEX 28. 34

these academic invocations of the ethical and moral underpinnings of

international law were never ackno wledged in actual State practice.
Until the outbreak of World War II, the most horrendous treaties were

concluded by States without any gr eat hesitation, and never were such

treaties challenged as being invalid. It is only the Vienna Convention on

the Law of Treaties of 1969 which introduced the concept of jus cogens

into the body of positive international law (Art. 53, 64), first against a
42
large measure of resistance which was overcome only slowly. During

many years, the Court shrank away from speaking of jus cogens. In the

advisory opinion on Nuclear Weapons it coined the term
43
“intransgressible principles of international law”. Only in the most

recent past has it overcome its inhibition to recognize jus cogens as a
44
class of norms that form part of the general body of international law.

In other words, jus cogens , taken as a concept of positive international
law, is an offspring of the last f our decades, long after the occurrences

of World War II from which Italy deri ves its claims. In this regard, the

Vienna Convention on the Law of Tr eaties does not reflect customary

law that existed already existed in 1969, but makes a qualitative leap

forward. 45

58. The “evidence” which the Respondent has gathered to

support its claims about the impact of jus cogens on the law of State

immunity do not corroborate its contentions. There is not a single

precedent that would confirm that State immunity must yield in case an

applicant pursues a claim based upon an alleged infringement of jus

cogens.

42To this very day, France has refrained from ratifying the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties; see Hélène Ruiz-Fabri, « La France et la Convention de Vienne sur le
droit des traités : éléments de réflexion pourune éventuelle ratification », in : Gérard
Cahin et al. (eds.), La France et le droit international (Paris, 2007), p. 137, at 139-150.
43Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports
1996, p. 226, at 257 para. 79.
44Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002)
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility,
Judgment, ICJ Reports 2006, p. 6, at 32 para. 64.
45
See Villiger, op. cit (above note 12), p. 676. 35

59. The excerpt from the article written in 1989 by Professors

Belsky, Merva and Roht-Arriaza (CM, p. 65, para. 4.69,) should be

reproduced at greater length. It reads:

“The existence of a system of rules that states may not violate implies

that when a state acts in violatio n of such a rule, the act is not
recognized as a sovereign act. When a state act is no longer recognized
as sovereign, the state is no longer entitled to invoke the defence of
sovereign immunity. Thus, in recognizing a group of peremptory norms

states are implicitly consenti46 to waive their immunity when they
violate one of these norms.”

Obviously, the observation by the three authors is based on a

hypothetical assumption that has nothing to do with the realities of
international practice. It is no more than an unfounded speculation to

maintain that States, by rec ognizing peremptory norms or jus cogens as

a special class of rules of international law, thereby implicitly waive

their immunity. A waiver cannot be construed on a fictitious basis. A

waiver is a declaration of will that unequivocally expresses the intention

to renounce certain rights or entitl ements which the State concerned
possesses under conventional or custom ary law. What the authors wish

to achieve is to undermine a basic rule of internati onal law through an

argument that sounds convincing at face value, but lacks any real

foundation in State practice, thereby completely distorting the concept

of waiver.

60. It is true that German author Juliane Kokott suggested a few

years ago that a loss of immunity might be entailed by an abuse of
47
sovereignty (CM, p. 66 para 4.69). This affirmation has not found any

positive echo in later legal writings or in the judicial practice anywhere

in the world. It should also be added that Kokott’s suggestion was
derived from an extremely narrow field of observation, namely US

judicial practice which was not really relevant for the inferences she

46
Adam C. Belsky, Mark Merva & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “Implied Waiver Under the
FSIA: A Proposed Exception to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory Norms of
47ternational Law”, 77 California Law Review 365, at 394 (1989).
“Missbrauch und Verwirkung von Souveränitätsrechten bei gravierenden
Völkerrechtsverstößen“, in: Recht zwischen Umbruch und Bewahrung. Festschrift für
Rudolf Bernhardt (Berlin et al., 1995), p. 135, at 148 s. 36

drew therefrom. In order to beco me the point of departure for the

crystallization of a new rule of inte rnational law, her views would have

needed some support which simply has not been forthcoming. On the

whole, the article is the fruit of theoretical speculation, born on the spur
of the moment, without any regard for the wider implications of the

propagated views.

61. A similar comment is deserv ed by the observations in the

CM which refer to the Princz case that was adjudicated in the United

States a few years ago (CM, p. 66 para. 4.70). Although the court of first

instance declared a suit against Germany admissible, 48 the Court of

Appeals rejected the application, poin ting to the fact that the United
49
States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) did not allow for an

exception to the rule of immunity in cases where allegation of serious
50
violations of human rights are in issue. It is only in a dissenting voice

(Judge Wald) that the argument was emphasized that a State engaging in
51
serious misconduct implicitly waives its immunity. This was a view

not shared by the majority of the judges on the bench. Judge Ginsburg,

who delivered the opinion of the court, clearly stated that waiver must

be intentional. “In sum, an implied waiver depends upon the foreign
52
government's having at some point indicated its amenability to suit.”
Accordingly, the Princz case cannot serve as a precedent in the present

proceedings.

62. Once again, when referring to the Al-Adsani case before the

European Court of Human Rights, 53 the Respondent relies essentially on

a minority opinion. In that case, a Kuwaiti/British citizen was denied

access to court in the United Kingdom regarding an application he

wished to pursue against the State of Kuwait, claiming compensation in

respect of injury to his physical a nd mental health caused by torture in

48Judgment of 23 December 1992, 103 ILR 598.
4915 ILM 1388 (1976).
50Judgment of 1 July 1994, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994); 33ILM 1483.
51Ibid., at 1497.
52Ibid., at 1492.
53Judgment of 21 November 2001, Application 35763/97. 37

Kuwait in May 1991 and threats against his life and well-being made

after his return to the United Kingdom. Having failed to obtain redress

by judicial means in the United Kingdo m, he complained in Strasbourg
of a violation of his rights under Art. 6 (1) of the European Conventi
on

on Human Rights. Indeed, this prov ision grants everyone access to a

judicial body for the vindication of his “civil rights and obligations”.

However, the guarantee of access to a judge does not stand alone; it is
enmeshed in the general framework of international law, which is

explicitly emphasized by Art. 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the

Law of Treaties. It seems worthwhile to cite the relevant passages of the

decision where the European Court of Human Rights explains why State
immunity falls to be respected:

“It reiterates that the Convention has to be interpreted in the light of the
rules set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May
1969, and that Article 31 § 3 (c) of that treaty indicates that account is to

be taken of “any relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties”. The Convention, including Article 6,
cannot be interpreted in a vacuum. The Court must be mindful of the
Convention’s special character as a human rights treaty, and it must also
take the relevant rules of inte rnational law into account (see, mutatis
mutandis, Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), judgment of 18 December 1996,

Reports 1996-VI, p. 2231, § 43). The Convention should so far as
possible be interpreted in harmony w ith other rules of international law
of which it forms part, including t hose relating to the grant of State
immunity.
56. It follows that measures take n by a High Contracting Party which

reflect generally recognised rules of public international law on State
immunity cannot in principle be regarded as imposing a
disproportionate restriction on the right of access to a court as embodied
in Article 6 § 1. Just as the right of access to a court is an inherent part
of the fair trial guarantee in that Ar ticle, so some restrictions on access
must likewise be regarded as inherent, an example being those

limitations generally accepted by the co mmunity of nations as part of
the doctrine of State immunity.”

63. The wisdom of this decision, which is determinative of the
54
jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court up to this very date, has sensible
foundations. States that would open their courts and tribunals to

applicants seeking redress for injustices they have suffered abroad might

54See, for instance, Cudak v. Lithuania, application 15869/02, 23 March 2010. 38

be overflooded with claims against third States. On the one hand, such

claims are not easily manageable. The taking of evidence with regard to
occurrences that have taken place ab road encounters regularly serious

obstacles. On the other hand, very understandable, such “liberal”
States

would unavoidably create serious po litical tensions by trying to
investigate the offences complained of. Regarding the prosecution of

criminal perpetrators under the prin ciple of universal jurisdiction, these

inconveniences are accepted by the in ternational community. However,

proceedings against a foreign State w ould generally discredit that State,
creating resentment and enmity. It turns out, once again, that the

principle of State immunity is a device that secures orderly co-existence

in the relationship between sovereign States.

64. In the final analysis, when trying to prove that the legal

position has changed, the Respondent has no other piece of evidence

than the jurisprudence of the Corte di Cassazione itself (CM, p. 67 par
a.
4.73). The logic of the argument put forward by that court in the

Mantelli case is highly debatable:

“it would be quite paradoxical for the international legal system, which
allows the exercise of civil jurisdiction vis-à-vis foreign States in the
event of violations of contractual obligation, to exclude it when faced
with much graver violations, such as those which constitute crimes
against humanity and which mark th e breaking point of the tolerable
exercise of sovereignty. To state the contrary would mean to use a
merely procedural rule to achieve an aim of paramount injustice”.

It is not by accident that since many decades a distinction is drawn

between acts jure imperii and acts jure gestionis. When performing acts

jure imperii, States act in the exercise of their sovereign powers. By
contrast, when they conclude commercial contracts, they enter the

market place and act as merchantmen. To argue a maiore a minus in

comparing these two different situations, overlooks their basic structural

differences. Being sued on account of a commercial contract does not
put in jeopardy the sovereignty of a State. However, when its acts jure

imperii are reviewed by judges in another country not only incidentally, 39

but as the main subject-matter of a dispute, such assessment amounts

inevitably to interference in its reserved sovereign space.

65. Summing up our argument, it should be said that jus cogens

is entirely made up of primary rule s, rules of conduct that prohibit
specific conduct. Jus cogens is intended to avert occurrences that are

commonly rejected as being incompatible with the basic moral and

ethical foundations of the internati onal community. Just to give a few

examples: States are prohibited from agreeing in an international treaty
on the extermination of an ethnic gr oup, they cannot divest themselves

of the rules of IHL, and any trea ty providing for the occupation and

carving up of a third country woul d be considered null and void.
However, the character of a rule as jus cogens does not determine what

consequences are entailed by its br each. Modern international law has

brought into operation quite a number of special consequences in

particular with regard to persons who are individually responsible for
the breaches that have been committed by them in their capacity as State

agents: criminal prosecution is the most prominent example of the new

emphasis on minimum world order.

66. In general, however, a jus cogens rule remains essentially

part and parcel of th e common body of interna tional law. One does not

have to conceive of tw o chapters of international law, one that deals
with “ordinary” rules and another one, to be newly invented, dealing

with jus cogens and its specific legal fram ework. The most significant

statement about the legal position is the provision which the ILC has

devoted to “Particular consequences of a serious breach of an obligation
under this chapter” (Art. 41), namely serious breaches of obligations

under peremptory norms of general international law. The provision

confines itself to requiring that St ates shall “cooperate” to bring to an
end through lawful means any such breach (1) and that, additionally,

States shall not “recognize as lawful” a situation created by such a

breach (2). No further, more far-r eaching consequences are mentioned.

Obviously, the ILC proceeded with great caution, recommending above 40

all that through a cooperative proce ss of negotiation a sensible solution

should be found in such instances. Ar t. 41 does not provide a victim

State with extra-legal remedies that would allow it to assert the rights it

believes to have by way of self-help, resorting for that purpose to its

judicial machinery. The Respondent would have to show that the

codification drawn up by the ILC does not correctly reflect the actual
position under international law. Howe ver, no clue could be found for

such a departure from the legal framework which, since its adoption by

the ILC in 2001, has been generally acknowledged as a faithful

embodiment of the relevant regime of State responsibility.

67. It results also from the cons tant jurisprudence of the Court
that a sharp distinction between prim ary rules pertaining to the class of

jus cogens and the secondary rules govern ing the legal consequences of

their breach is necessary. Indeed, the requirement of consent to

jurisdiction applies without any exception, even in instances where the
55
applicant bases its claims on a violation of jus cogens. A State which

has allegedly been the victim of an act of aggression cannot simply
submit its claims for reparation to the Court, arguing that because of the

gravity of the violation suffered by it it should not be prevented from

instituting legal proceed ings before the highes t judicial body of the

international community. And the same is true for other alleged

infringements of jus cogens rules. Reference should be made in this

connection to the careful attention which the Court devoted to the issue

of jurisdiction in the case concerning Application of the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide .56 Bosnia-

Herzegovina was required to show that indeed its application came

under the jurisdiction of the Court and was admissible, and the Court

55See ultimately Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application:

2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility,
Judgment, ICJ Reports 2006, p. 6, at 32 para. 64. It is well known that the application
brought against Rwanda was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction notwithstanding the
gruesome character of the atrocities upon which the application was founded. For the
former jurisprudence see references in Andreas Zimmermann, Christian Tomuschat &
Karin Oellers-Frahm (eds.), The Statute of the International Court of Justice. A
56mmentary (Oxford, 2006), p. 606 margin number 25.
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 595; judgment of
26 February 2007, 46 ILM 188 (2007). 41

scrutinized its reasoning in a punctilious manner. Even a case of alleged

genocide does not amount to an exception from the rule of consent.

68. It should be reiterated that the relationship between

sovereign States is governed by the principle of equality. No single State
can sit as an arbitrator over othe r States. Even a State that has

committed a breach of fundamental norm of the international

community remains a sovereign entity. It does not forfeit its right to see

its sovereign prerogatives respected. No international procedure for that
purpose has ever been put into place. At the United Nations, the

expulsion of a State (Art. 6 UN Char ter) is surrounded by elaborated

procedural guarantees. Obviously, to de prive a State of the status rights
which it enjoys by virtue of its sovereignty cannot be left to the whims

and fancies of another State, acting alone. The aim of securing

international peace and justice must be pursued by the international

community within the framework of well-ordered mechanism, but not
through unilateral, uncoordinated steps.

V. Requests

69. Germany maintains all of its requests as they are set out in

its Memorial (p. 83, para. 132).

Berlin, 5 October 2010

ChrTitiSusanasem-Rainer

Agent of the Government of the Director General for Legal Affairs
Federal Republic of Germany and Agent of the Government of the

Fedeealaliy 42

List of Annexes

Annex 1 Procura Generale della Repubblica, Brief of 31 December 2009 in the case
of Ugo Bonaiuti v. Germany

Annex 2 Corte di Cassazione, Judgment No. 285, 2 February 1953, 17 Zeitschrift
für ausländisches Recht und Völkerrecht 317

Annex 3 Bundesgerichtshof, Judgment of 14 December 1955, Entscheidungen des
Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen (BGHZ) 19, 258

English Translation: 22 ILR 611