SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE GREENWOOD

Procedural obligations under the Statute of the River Uruguay — Whether

Uruguay has violated those obligations — Duty to inform CARU of proposed
works — Duty to notify Argentina — Duty to negotiate in good faith —
Whether steps taken or authorized by Uruguay violate those obligations — Evi-
dence before the Court — Burden of proof — Standard of proof — Relationship
between experts, witnesses and counsel — Continuing obligations of the Parties.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION OF JUDGE YUSUF

1. I concur in the Judgment, but have some reservations regarding the

manner in which the Court decided to handle the abundant factual mat-
erial presented by the Parties. I am of the view that the Court should
have had recourse to expert assistance, as provided in Article 50 of its
Statute, to help it gain a more profound insight into the scientific and
technical intricacies of the evidence submitted by the Parties, particularly
with regard to the possible impact of the effluent discharges of the Orion

SEPARATE OPINION

OF JUDGE CANÇADO TRINDADE

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Paragraphs

I. PROLEGOMENA 3-7

II. “GENERAL PRINCIPLES OFLAW”: THE L EGISLATIVH ISTORY OF

THEPCIJ/ICJ STATUTER EVISITED 8-16

III. GNERAL PRINCIPLES OLAW AS AF ORMAL “SOURCE”OF
NTERNATIONAL LAW :THEIRA UTONOMY 17-19

DECLARATION OF JUDGE SKOTNIKOV

1. I have voted in favour of all the operative paragraphs of the Judg-

ment. However, I cannot fully concur with the Court’s interpretation of
the 1975 Statute of the River Uruguay.
I certainly agree that a Party planning activities referred to in Article 7
of the 1975 Statute, namely, “to construct new channels, substantially
modify or alter existing ones or carry out any other works which are
liable to affect navigation, the régime of the river or the quality of its

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE KEITH

1. In this opinion
(a) I address certain aspects of the fact-finding process in which the
Court engaged in reaching its conclusion that Uruguay was not in

breach of its substantive obligations under the Statute (para. (2) of
the dispositif ); I do that in support of the Court’s reasoning and
conclusion.
(b) I provide my understanding of the extent of the breaches by
Uruguay of its procedural obligations under the Statute (para. (1) of

JOINT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES
AL-KHASAWNEH AND SIMMA

The Court has evaluated the scientific evidence before it in a methodologically

556

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE AD HOC KREC uA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. GENERAL ISSUES 557
1. The consistency as a purported principle of the majority reason-
ing 557

549

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE AD HOC VUKAS

Capacity of the Respondent — Application of the Genocide Convention —
Jurisdiction of the Court ratione temporis — Existence of Serbia as a State —
Nature of the acts of genocide —Missing Croatian citizens.

While fully subscribing to the Court’s conclusions in the operative
clause (Judgment, para. 146), I would like to make clear my own reason-
ing that led me to those conclusions.

1. THE CAPACITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA TOPARTICIPATE IN THE

546

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE SKOTNIKOV

1. In my view, the Court should have upheld the first preliminary
objection submitted by Serbia in so far as it relates to the capacity of the
Respondent to participate in the proceedings instituted by Croatia. There-
fore, I voted against paragraph 1 of the operative clause.

I disagree with the Court’s reasoning and its conclusion that Serbia’s
lack of jus standi at the time of institution of the proceedings has been
cured by its subsequent admission to the United Nations.

543

DECLARATION OF JUDGE BENNOUNA

[Translation]

I have voted in favour of the operative part of the Judgment and, sub-
ject to the limits expressed therein, I am of the opinion that the Court has
jurisdiction to entertain Croatia’s Application on the merits. However, I
do not agree with all of the reasoning on which the Court bases its deci-