Culminated

Code

See also

Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States of America)

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 29 April 1999, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia filed in the Registry of the Court Applications instituting proceedings against Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom and United States of America for alleged violations of their obligation not to use force against another State. In its Applications against Belgium, Canada, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom, Yugoslavia referred, as a basis for the jurisdiction of the Court, to Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court and to Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1948. Yugoslavia also relied upon Article IX of that Convention in its Applications against France, Germany, Italy and United States, but also relied on Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court.

On 29 April 1999, Yugoslavia also submitted, in each case, an Application for the indication of provisional measures to ensure that the respondent State concerned “cease immediately its acts of use of force and . . . refrain from any act of threat or use of force” against Yugoslavia. After hearings on the provisional measures from 10 to 12 May 1999, the Court delivered its decision in each of the cases on 2 June 1999. In two of them (Yugoslavia v. Spain and Yugoslavia v. United States of America), the Court, rejecting the Request for the indication of provisional measures, concluded that it manifestly lacked jurisdiction and consequently ordered that the cases be removed from the List. In the eight other cases, the Court declared that it lacked prima facie jurisdiction (one of the prerequisites for the indication of provisional measures) and that it therefore could not indicate such measures.

In each of the eight cases which remained on the List, the Respondents filed preliminary objections to jurisdiction and admissibility.

In its Judgments of 15 December 2004, the Court observed that the question whether Serbia and Montenegro was or was not a State party to the Statute of the Court at the time of the institution of the proceedings was fundamental; for if Serbia and Montenegro were not such a party, the Court would not be open to it, unless it met the conditions prescribed in Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute.

The Court therefore had to examine whether the Applicant met the conditions for access to it laid down in Articles 34 and 35 of the Statute before examining the issues relating to the conditions laid down in Articles 36 and 37 of the Statute.

The Court pointed out that there was no doubt that Serbia and Montenegro was a State for the purpose of Article 34, paragraph 1, of the Statute. However, the objection had been raised by certain Respondents that, at the time when the Application was filed, Serbia and Montenegro did not meet the conditions set down in Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Statute, because it was not a Member of the United Nations at the relevant time. After recapitulating the sequence of events relating to the legal position of the applicant State vis-à-vis the United Nations, the Court concluded that the legal situation that obtained within the United Nations during the period 1992-2000 concerning the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, following the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, had remained ambiguous and open to different assessments. This situation had come to an end with a new development in 2000. On 27 October of that year, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requested admission to membership in the United Nations, and on 1 November, by General Assembly resolution 55/12, it was so admitted. The Applicant thus had the status of membership in the Organization as from 1 November 2000. However, its admission to the United Nations did not have, and could not have had, the effect of dating back to the time when the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia broke up and disappeared. The Court therefore concluded that the Applicant thus was not a Member of the United Nations, and in that capacity a State party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, at the time of filing its Application to institute the proceedings in each of the cases before the Court on 29 April 1999. As it had not become a party to the Statute on any other basis, the Court was not open to it at that time under Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Statute.

The Court then considered whether it might have been open to the Applicant under paragraph 2 of Article 35. It noted that the words “treaties in force” in that paragraph were to be interpreted as referring to treaties which were in force at the time that the Statute itself came into force, and that consequently, even assuming that the Applicant was a party to the Genocide Convention when instituting proceedings, Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute did not provide it with a basis for access to the Court under Article IX of that Convention, since the Convention only entered into force on 12 January 1951, after the entry into force of the Statute.

In the cases against Belgium and the Netherlands, the Court finally examined the question whether Serbia and Montenegro was entitled to invoke the dispute settlement convention it had concluded with each of those States in the early 1930s as a basis of jurisdiction in those cases. The question was whether the conventions dating from the early 1930s, which had been concluded prior to the entry into force of the Statute, might rank as a “treaty in force” for purposes of Article 35, paragraph 2, and hence provide a basis of access. The Court first recalled that Article 35 of the Statute of the Court concerns access to the present Court and not to its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). It then observed that the conditions for transfer of jurisdiction from the PCIJ to the present Court are governed by Article 37 of the Statute. The Court noted that Article 37 applies only as between parties to the Statute under Article 35, paragraph 1. As it had already found that Serbia and Montenegro was not a party to the Statute when instituting proceedings, the Court accordingly found that Article 37 could not give it access to the Court under Article 35, paragraph 2, on the basis of the Conventions dating from the early 1930s, irrespective of whether or not those instruments were in force on 29 April 1999, the date of the filing of the Application.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

29 April 1999

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Request for the indication of Provisional Measures

29 April 1999

Written Statement of the Observations and Submissions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the Preliminary Objections made by the Federal Republic of Germany

20 December 2002

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French

Summary 1999/7

Summary of the Order of 2 June 1999

Available in:

English French

Summary 2004/6

Summary of the Judgment of 15 December 2004

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 23 June 1999, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) filed in the Registry of the Court Applications instituting proceedings against Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda “for acts of armed aggression committed . . . in flagrant breach of the United Nations Charter and of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity”. In addition to the cessation of the alleged acts, Congo sought reparation for acts of intentional destruction and looting and the restitution of national property and resources appropriated for the benefit of the respective respondent States.

In its Applications instituting proceedings against Burundi and Rwanda, the DRC referred, as bases for the Court’s jurisdiction, to Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute, the New York Convention of 10 December 1984 against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Montreal Convention of 23 September 1971 for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation and, lastly, Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court. However, the Government of the DRC informed the Court on 15 January 2001 that it intended to discontinue the proceedings instituted against Burundi and Rwanda, stating that it reserved the right to invoke subsequently new grounds of jurisdiction of the Court. The two cases were therefore removed from the List on 30 January 2001.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

23 June 1999

Available in:

English French

Annexes to the Application instituting proceedings, Livre blanc (Volumes I and II)

23 June 1999

Press releases

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

In May 1973, Pakistan instituted proceedings against India concerning 195 Pakistani prisoners of war whom, according to Pakistan, India proposed to hand over to Bangladesh, which was said to intend trying them for acts of genocide and crimes against humanity. India stated that there was no legal basis for the Court’s jurisdiction in the matter and that Pakistan’s Application was without legal effect. Pakistan having also filed a Request for the indication of provisional measures, the Court held public sittings to hear observations on this subject; India was not represented at the hearings. In July 1973, Pakistan asked the Court to postpone further consideration of its Request in order to facilitate the negotiations which were due to begin. Before any written pleadings had been filed, Pakistan informed the Court that negotiations had taken place, and requested the Court to record discontinuance of the proceedings. Accordingly, the case was removed from the List by an Order of 15 December 1973.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Dissenting Opinion of Judge Petrén (translation)

English French Bilingual

Order of 29 September 1973

Extension of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 15 December 1973

Removal from the list

Procedure(s):Discontinuance

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Press releases

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 2 March 1999, the Federal Republic of Germany filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceedings against the United States of America in a dispute concerning alleged violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963. Germany stated that, in 1982, the authorities of the State of Arizona had detained two German nationals, Karl and Walter LaGrand, who were tried and sentenced to death without having been informed of their rights, as is required under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention. Germany also alleged that the failure to provide the required notification precluded Germany from protecting its nationals’ interest provided for by Articles 5 and 36 of the Vienna Convention at both the trial and the appeal level in the United States courts. Germany asserted that although the two nationals, finally with the assistance of German consular officers, did claim violations of the Vienna Convention before the federal courts, the latter, applying the municipal law doctrine of “procedural default”, decided that, because the individuals in question had not asserted their rights in the previous legal proceedings at State level, they could not assert them in the federal proceedings. In its Application, Germany based the jurisdiction of the Court on Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court and on Article I of the Optional Protocol of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.

Germany accompanied its Application by an urgent request for the indication of provisional measures, requesting the Court to indicate that the United States should take “all measures at its disposal to ensure that [one of its nationals, whose date of execution had been fixed at 3 March 1999] [was] not executed pending final judgment in the case . . .”. On 3 March 1999, the Court delivered an Order for the indication of provisional measures calling upon the United States of America, among other things, to “take all measures at its disposal to ensure that [the German national] [was] not executed pending the final decision in [the] proceedings”. However, the two German nationals were executed by the United States.

Public hearings in the case were held from 13 to 17 November 2000. In its Judgment of 27 June 2001, the Court began by outlining the history of the dispute and then examined certain objections of the United States of America to the Court’s jurisdiction and to the admissibility of Germany’s submissions. It found that it had jurisdiction to deal with all Germany’s submissions and that they were admissible.

Ruling on the merits of the case, the Court observed that the United States did not deny that, in relation to Germany, it had violated Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention, which required the competent authorities of the United States to inform the LaGrands of their right to have the Consulate of Germany notified of their arrest. It added that, in the case concerned, that breach had led to the violation of paragraph 1 (a) and paragraph 1 (c) of that Article, which dealt respectively with mutual rights of communication and access of consular officers and their nationals, and the right of consular officers to visit their nationals in prison and to arrange for their legal representation. The Court further stated that the United States had not only breached its obligations to Germany as a State party to the Convention, but also that there had been a violation of the individual rights of the LaGrands under Article 36, paragraph 1, which rights could be relied on before the Court by their national State.

The Court then turned to Germany’s submission that the United States, by applying rules of its domestic law, in particular the doctrine of “procedural default”, had violated Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Convention. That provision required the United States to “enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded [under Article 36] [were] intended”. The Court stated that, in itself, the procedural default rule did not violate Article 36. The problem arose, according to the Court, when the rule in question did not allow the detained individual to challenge a conviction and sentence by invoking the failure of the competent national authorities to comply with their obligations under Article 36, paragraph 1. The Court concluded that, in the present case, the procedural default rule had the effect of preventing Germany from assisting the LaGrands in a timely fashion as provided for by the Convention. Under those circumstances, the Court held that in the present case the rule referred to violated Article 36, paragraph 2.

With regard to the alleged violation by the United States of the Court’s Order of 3 March 1999 indicating provisional measures, the Court pointed out that it was the first time it had been called upon to determine the legal effects of such orders made under Article 41 of its Statute — the interpretation of which had been the subject of extensive controversy in the literature. After interpreting Article 41, the Court found that such orders did have binding effect. In the present case, the Court concluded that its Order of 3 March 1999 “was not a mere exhortation” but “created a legal obligation for the United States”. The Court then went on to consider the measures taken by the United States to implement the Order concerned and concluded that it had not complied with it.

With respect to Germany’s request seeking an assurance that the United States would not repeat its unlawful acts, the Court took note of the fact that the latter had repeatedly stated in all phases of those proceedings that it was implementing a vast and detailed programme in order to ensure compliance, by its competent authorities, with Article 36 of the Convention and concluded that such a commitment must be regarded as meeting the request made by Germany. Nevertheless, the Court added that if the United States, notwithstanding that commitment, were to fail again in its obligation of consular notification to the detriment of German nationals, an apology would not suffice in cases where the individuals concerned had been subjected to prolonged detention or convicted and sentenced to severe penalties. In the case of such a conviction and sentence, it would be incumbent upon the United States, by whatever means it chose, to allow the review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence taking account of the violation of the rights set forth in the Convention.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

2 March 1999

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Judgment of 27 June 2001

Mertis

Summary of the Order of 5 March 1999

Available in:

English French

Summary 2001/2

Summary of the Judgment of 27 June 2001

Available in:

English French

Press releases

The Court held hearings from 2 to 11 March 1998 on the preliminary objections raised by Nigeria. In its Judgment of 11 June 1998, the Court found that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the merits of the dispute and that Cameroon’s requests were admissible. The Court rejected seven of the preliminary objections raised by Nigeria and declared that, as the eighth did not have an exclusively preliminary character, it should be settled during the proceedings on the merits.

Nigeria filed its Counter-Memorial, including counter-claims, within the time-limit extended by the Court. On 30 June 1999, the Court adopted an Order declaring Nigeria’s counter-claims admissible and fixing 4 April 2000 as the time-limit for the filing of the Reply of Cameroon and 4 January 2001 as the time-limit for the filing of the Rejoinder of Nigeria. In its Order, the Court also reserved the right of Cameroon to present its views in writing a second time on the Nigerian counter-claims in an additional pleading which might be the subject of a subsequent Order. The Reply and the Rejoinder were duly filed within the time-limits so fixed. In January 2001, Cameroon informed the Court that it wished to present its views in writing a second time on Nigeria’s counter-claims. As Nigeria had no objection to that request, the Court authorized the presentation by Cameroon of an additional pleading relating exclusively to the counter-claims submitted by Nigeria. That pleading was duly filed within the time-limit fixed by the Court.

On 30 June 1999, the Republic of Equatorial Guinea filed an Application for permission to intervene in the case. Each of the two Parties having filed its written observations on that Application and Equatorial Guinea having informed the Court of its views with respect to them, the Court, by Order of 21 October 1999, authorized Equatorial Guinea to intervene in the case pursuant to Article 62 of the Statute, to the extent, in the manner and for the purposes set out in its Application. Equatorial Guinea filed a written statement and each of the Parties filed written observations on the latter within the time-limits fixed by the Court. Public hearings on the merits were held from 18 February to 21 March 2002.

In its Judgment of 10 October 2002, the Court determined as follows the course of the boundary, from north to south, between Cameroon and Nigeria :

In the Lake Chad area, the Court decided that the boundary was delimited by the Thomson-Marchand Declaration of 1929-1930, as incorporated in the Henderson-Fleuriau Exchange of Notes of 1931 (between Great Britain and France) ; it found that the boundary started in the Lake from the Cameroon-Nigeria-Chad tripoint (whose co-ordinates it defined) and followed a straight line to the mouth of the River Ebeji as it was in 1931 (whose coordinates it also defined) and thence ran in a straight line to the point where the river today divided into two branches.
Between Lake Chad and the Bakassi Peninsula, the Court confirmed that the boundary was delimited by the following instruments :
- from the point where the River Ebeji bifurcated as far as Tamnyar Peak, by the Thomson-Marchand Declaration of 1929-1930 (paras. 2-60), as incorporated in the Henderson-Fleuriau Exchange of Notes of 1931 ;
- from Tamnyar Peak to pillar 64 referred to in Article XII of the Anglo- German Agreement of 12 April 1913, by the British Order in Council of 2 August 1946 ;
- from pillar 64 to the Bakassi Peninsula, by the Anglo-German Agreements of 11 March and 12 April 1913.
The Court examined point by point seventeen sectors of the land boundary and specified for each one how the above-mentioned instruments were to be interpreted.
In Bakassi, the Court decided that the boundary was delimited by the Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 1913 (Arts. XVIII-XX) and that sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula lay with Cameroon. It decided that in that area the boundary followed the thalweg of the River Akpakorum (Akwayafe), dividing the Mangrove Islands near Ikang in the way shown on map TSGS 2240, as far as a straight line joining Bakassi Point and King Point.
As regards the maritime boundary, the Court, having established that it had jurisdiction to address that aspect of the case — which Nigeria had disputed —, fixed the course of the boundary between the two States’ maritime areas.

In its Judgment the Court requested Nigeria, expeditiously and without condition, to withdraw its administration and military or police forces from the area of Lake Chad falling within Cameroonian sovereignty and from the Bakassi Peninsula. It also requested Cameroon expeditiously and without condition to withdraw any administration or military or police forces which might be present along the land boundary from Lake Chad to the Bakassi Peninsula on territories which, pursuant to the Judgment, fell within the sovereignty of Nigeria. The latter had the same obligation in regard to territories in that area which fell within the sovereignty of Cameroon. The Court took note of Cameroon’s undertaking, given at the hearings, to “continue to afford protection to Nigerians living in the [Bakassi] peninsula and in the Lake Chad area”. Finally, the Court rejected Cameroon’s submissions regarding the State responsibility of Nigeria, as well as Nigeria’s counter-claims.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

29 March 1994

Available in:

English French

Additional Application to the Application Instituting Proceedings brought by the Republic of Cameroon

6 June 1994

Available in:

English French

French

Oral proceedings

Verbatim record 1996/2 (bilingual version)

Public sitting held on Tuesday 5 March 1996, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Bedjaoui presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Original Language

Verbatim record 1996/3 (bilingual version)

Translation

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Order of 21 October 1999

Decision on intervention; fixing of time-limits: Written Statement and Written Observations

Procedure(s):Intervention

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 20 February 2001

Authorizing of submission of pleading relating to Counter-claims and fixing of time-limit therefor

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

Judgment of 10 October 2002

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

English French

English French

Press releases

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 28 December 1998, Guinea filed an Application instituting proceedings against the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in respect of a dispute concerning “serious violations of international law” alleged to have been committed upon the person of Mr. Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, a Guinean national. In its Application, Guinea maintained that

“Mr. Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, a businessman of Guinean nationality, was unjustly imprisoned by the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, after being resident in that State for thirty-two (32) years, despoiled of his sizable investments, businesses, movable and immovable property and bank accounts, and then expelled.”

Guinea added:

“[t]his expulsion came at a time when Mr. Ahmadou Sadio Diallo was pursuing recovery of substantial debts owed to his businesses [Africom-Zaire and Africontainers-Zaire] by the [Congolese] State and by oil companies established in its territory and of which the State is a shareholder”.

To found the jurisdiction of the Court, Guinea invoked in the Application the declarations whereby the two States have recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court.

On 3 October 2002, the DRC raised preliminary objections in respect of the admissibility of Guinea’s Application. In its Judgment of 24 May 2007 on these preliminary objections, the Court declared the Application of the Republic of Guinea to be admissible “in so far as it concerns protection of Mr. Diallo’s rights as an individual” and “in so far as it concerns protection of [his] direct rights as associé in Africom-Zaire and Africontainers-Zaire”. However, the Court declared the Application of the Republic of Guinea to be inadmissible “in so far as it concerns protection of Mr. Diallo in respect of alleged violations of rights of Africom-Zaire and Africontainers-Zaire”.

In its Judgment of 30 November 2010 on the merits, the Court found that, in respect of the circumstances in which Mr. Diallo had been expelled on 31 January 1996, the DRC had violated Article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 12, paragraph 4, of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The Court also found that, in respect of the circumstances in which Mr. Diallo had been arrested and detained in 1995-1996 with a view to his expulsion, the DRC had violated Article 9, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Covenant and Article 6 of the African Charter. The Court further decided that “the Democratic Republic of the Congo [was] under obligation to make appropriate reparation, in the form of compensation, to the Republic of Guinea for the injurious consequences of the violations of international obligations referred to in subparagraphs (2) and (3) [of the operative part]”, namely the unlawful arrests, detentions and expulsion of Mr. Diallo. In addition, the Court found that the DRC had violated Mr. Diallo’s rights under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. It did not however order the DRC to pay compensation for this violation. In the same Judgment, the Court rejected all other submissions by Guinea relating to the arrests and detentions of Mr. Diallo, including the contention that he had been subjected to treatment prohibited by Article 10, paragraph 1, of the Covenant during his detentions. Furthermore, the Court found that the DRC had not violated Mr. Diallo’s direct rights as an associé in the companies Africom-Zaire and Africontainers-Zaire. Finally, the Court decided, with respect to the question of compensation owed by the DRC to Guinea, that “failing agreement between the Parties on this matter within six months from the date of [the said] Judgment, [this] question . . . shall be settled by the Court”.

The time-limit of six months thus fixed by the Court having expired on 30 May 2011 without an agreement being reached between the Parties on the question of compensation due to Guinea, it fell to the Court to determine the amount of compensation to be awarded to Guinea as a consequence of the unlawful arrests, detentions and expulsion of Mr. Diallo by the DRC, pursuant to the findings of the Court set out in its Judgment of 30 November 2010. By an Order of 20 September 2011, the Court fixed 6 December 2011 and 21 February 2012 as the respective time-limits for the filing of the Memorial of Guinea and the Counter-Memorial of the DRC on the question of compensation due to Guinea. The Memorial and the Counter-Memorial were duly filed within the time-limits thus prescribed. The Court delivered its Judgment on 19 June 2012.

In its Memorial, Guinea valued the mental and moral damage suffered by Mr. Diallo at US$250,000. The Court considered various factors in its assessment of that injury, notably the arbitrary nature of Mr. Diallo’s arrests and detentions, the unjustifiably long period of his detention, the unsubstantiated accusations of which he was the victim, his wrongful expulsion from a country where he had resided for 32 years and where he had engaged in significant business activities and the link between his expulsion and the fact that he had attempted to recover debts which he believed were owed to his companies by the Zairean State or companies in which that State held a substantial portion of the capital. It also took account of the fact that there was no evidence that Mr. Diallo had been mistreated. On the basis of equitable considerations, the Court found that the amount of US$85,000 would provide appropriate compensation for the non-material injury suffered by Mr. Diallo.

Finally, in its Memorial, Guinea valued the loss of earnings suffered by Mr. Diallo during his unlawful detention and following his unlawful expulsion at almost US$6.5 million. The Court ruled that Guinea had failed to prove the existence of any such loss. Consequently, it awarded no compensation on that basis.

The Court concluded that the total sum to be awarded to Guinea was thus US$95,000, to be paid by 31 August 2012. It decided that, should payment be delayed, post-judgment interest on the principal sum due would accrue as from 1 September 2012 at an annual rate of 6 per cent. The Court ruled that each Party would bear its own costs.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

28 December 1998

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

English French Bilingual

Judgment of 19 June 2012

Compensation owed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the Republic of Guinea

English French

Summary 2010/3

Summary of the Judgment of 30 November 2010

Available in:

English French

Summary 2012/3

Summary of the Judgment of 19 June 2012

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 2 November 1998, the Republic of Indonesia and Malaysia jointly notified the Court of a Special Agreement between the two States, signed at Kuala Lumpur on 31 May 1997 and having entered into force on 14 May 1998. In accordance with that Special Agreement, they requested the Court to determine, on the basis of the treaties, agreements and any other evidence furnished by them, to which of the two States sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan belonged.

Shortly after the filing by the Parties of the Memorials, Counter-Memorials and Replies, the Philippines, on 13 March 2001, requested permission to intervene in the case. In its Application, the Philippines indicated that the object of its request was to

“preserve and safeguard the historical and legal rights [of its Government] arising from its claim to dominion and sovereignty over the territory of North Borneo, to the extent that those rights [were] affected, or [might] be affected, by a determination of the Court of the question of sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan”.

The Philippines specified that it was not seeking to become a party in the case. Further, the Philippines specified that “[its] Constitution . . . as well as its legislation ha[d] laid claim to dominion and sovereignty over North Borneo”. The Application for permission to intervene drew objections from Indonesia and Malaysia. Among other things, Indonesia stated that the Application should be rejected on the ground that it had not been filed in time and that the Philippines had not shown that it had an interest of a legal nature at issue in the case. Meanwhile, Malaysia added that the object of the Application was inadequate. The Court therefore decided to hold public sittings to hear the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia, before ruling on whether to grant the Application for permission to intervene. Following those sittings, the Court, on 23 October 2001, delivered a Judgment by which it rejected the Application by the Philippines for permission to intervene.

After the holding of public sittings in June 2002, the Court delivered its Judgment on the merits on 17 December 2002. In that Judgment, it began by recalling the complex historical background of the dispute between the Parties. It then examined the titles invoked by them. Indonesia asserted that its claim to sovereignty over the islands was based primarily on a conventional title, the 1891 Convention between Great Britain and the Netherlands.

After examining the 1891 Convention, the Court found that, when read in the context and in the light of its object and purpose, that instrument could not be interpreted as establishing an allocation line determining sovereignty over the islands out to sea, to the east of the island of Sebatik, and that as a result the Convention did not constitute a title on which Indonesia could found its claim to Ligitan and Sipadan. The Court stated that that conclusion was confirmed both by the travaux préparatoires and by the subsequent conduct of the parties to the Convention. The Court further held that the cartographic material submitted by the Parties in the case did not contradict that conclusion.

Having rejected that argument by Indonesia, the Court turned to consideration of the other titles on which Indonesia and Malaysia claimed to found their sovereignty over the islands of Ligitan and Sipadan. The Court sought to determine whether Indonesia or Malaysia obtained a title to the islands by succession. In that connection, it did not accept Indonesia’s contention that it retained title to the islands as successor to the Netherlands, which had allegedly acquired it through contracts concluded with the Sultan of Bulungan, the original title-holder. Nor did the Court accept Malaysia’s contention that it had acquired sovereignty over the islands of Ligitan and Sipadan following a series of alleged transfers of the title originally held by the former sovereign, the Sultan of Sulu, that title having allegedly passed in turn to Spain, to the United States, to Great Britain on behalf of the State of North Borneo, to the United Kingdom and finally to Malaysia.

Having found that neither of the Parties had a treaty-based title to Ligitan and Sipadan, the Court next considered the question whether Indonesia or Malaysia could hold title to the disputed islands by virtue of the effectivités cited by them. In that regard, the Court determined whether the Parties’ claims to sovereignty were based on activities evidencing an actual, continued exercise of authority over the islands, i.e., the intention and will to act as sovereign.

In that connection, Indonesia cited a continuous presence of the Dutch and Indonesian navies in the vicinity of Ligitan and Sipadan. It added that the waters around the islands had traditionally been used by Indonesian fishermen. In respect of the first of those arguments, it was the opinion of the Court that from the facts relied upon in the case “it [could] not be deduced . . . that the naval authorities concerned considered Ligitan and Sipadan and the surrounding waters to be under the sovereignty of the Netherlands or Indonesia”. As for the second argument, the Court considered that “activities by private persons [could] not be seen as effectivités if they [did] not take place on the basis of official regulations or under governmental authority”.

Having rejected Indonesia’s arguments based on its effectivités, the Court turned to the consideration of the effectivités relied on by Malaysia. As evidence of its effective administration of the islands, Malaysia cited inter alia the measures taken by the North Borneo authorities to regulate and control the collecting of turtle eggs on Ligitan and Sipadan, an activity of some economic significance in the area at the time. It relied on the Turtle Preservation Ordinance of 1917 and maintained that the Ordinance “[had been] applied until the 1950s at least” in the area of the two disputed islands. It further invoked the fact that the authorities of the colony of North Borneo had constructed a lighthouse on Sipadan in 1962 and another on Ligitan in 1963, that those lighthouses still existed and that they had been maintained by Malaysian authorities since its independence. The Court noted that

“the activities relied upon by Malaysia . . . [we]re modest in number but . . . they [we]re diverse in character and include[d] legislative, administrative and quasi-judicial acts. They cover[ed] a considerable period of time and show[ed] a pattern revealing an intention to exercise State functions in respect of the two islands in the context of the administration of a wider range of islands.”

The Court further stated that “at the time when these activities were carried out, neither Indonesia nor its predecessor, the Netherlands, [had] ever expressed its disagreement or protest”.

The Court concluded, on the basis of the above-mentioned effectivités, that sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan belonged to Malaysia.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Special Agreement

2 November 1998

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

English French

Observations of the Government of Indonesia on the Philippines's Application for Permission to Intervene

2 May 2001

Procedure(s):Intervention

Available in:

English

Observations of the Government of Malaysia on the Philippines's Application for Permission to Intervene

2 May 2001

Procedure(s):Intervention

Available in:

English

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Judgments

Judgment of 23 October 2001

Application by the Philippines for Permission to Intervene

Procedure(s):Intervention

Separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Franck

English French Bilingual

Judgment of 17 December 2002

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Declaration of Judge Oda

English French Bilingual

Dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Franck

English French Bilingual

Summaries of Judgments and Orders

Summary 2001/3

Summary of the Judgment of 23 October 2001

Available in:

English French

Summary 2002/2

Summary of the Judgment of 17 December 2002

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

A certain quantity of monetary gold was removed by the Germans from Rome in 1943. It was later recovered in Germany and found to belong to Albania. The 1946 Agreement on Reparation from Germany provided that monetary gold found in Germany should be pooled for distribution among the countries entitled to receive a share of it. The United Kingdom claimed that the gold should be delivered to it in partial satisfaction of the Court’s Judgment of 1949 in the Corfu Channel case. Italy claimed that the gold should be delivered to it in partial satisfaction for the damage which it alleged it had suffered as a result of an Albanian law of 13 January 1945. In the Washington statement of 25 April 1951, the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, to whom the implementation of the reparations agreement had been entrusted, decided that the gold should be delivered to the United Kingdom unless, within a certain time-limit, Italy or Albania applied to the Court requesting it to adjudicate on their respective rights. Albania took no action, but Italy made an Application to the Court. Later, however, Italy raised the preliminary question as to whether the Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the validity of its claim against Albania. In its Judgment of 15 June 1954, the Court found that, without the consent of Albania, it could not deal with a dispute between that country and Italy and that it was therefore unable to decide the questions submitted.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application Instituting Proceedings (bilingual version)

19 May 1953

Available in:

Bilingual

Written proceedings

English French Bilingual

Order of 3 November 1953

Fixing of time-limit: Written Statement on Preliminary Objection and Written Statements of observations and submissions on Preliminary Objection

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 26 January 1954

Extension of time-limit: Written Statements of observations and submissions on Preliminary Objection

Summary of the Judgment of 15 June 1954

Available in:

English French

See also

Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States of America)

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

In each of the eight cases which remained on the List, the Respondents filed preliminary objections to jurisdiction and admissibility.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

29 April 1999

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Request for the indication of Provisional Measures

29 April 1999

Written Statement of the Observations and Submissions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the Preliminary Objections made by the Italian Republic

18 December 2002

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Order of 2 June 1999

Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Judgments

Judgment of 15 December 2004

Preliminary Objections

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Summaries of Judgments and Orders

Summary 1999/8

Summary of the Order of 2 June 1999

Available in:

English French

Summary 2004/7

Summary of the Judgment of 15 December 2004

Available in:

English French

Subscribe to Culminated

Culminated

Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium)

Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Canada)

Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. France)

Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Italy)

Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Netherlands)

Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Portugal)

Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Spain)

Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. United Kingdom)

Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States of America)

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

Institution of proceedings

29 April 1999

Available in:

Written proceedings

29 April 1999

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

5 January 2000

Available in:

5 July 2000

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

20 December 2002

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

Oral proceedings

Public sitting held on Monday 10 May 1999, at 10.00 a.m., at the Peace Palace, Vice-President Weeramantry, Acting President, presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Tuesday 11 May 1999, at 10.00 a.m., at the Peace Palace, Vice-President Weeramantry, Acting President, presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Wednesday 12 May 1999, at 10.00 a.m., at the Peace Palace, Vice-President Weeramantry, Acting President, presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Wednesday 12 May 1999, at 3.40 p.m., at the Peace Palace, Vice-President Weeramantry, Acting President, presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Tuesday 20 April 2004, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Shi presiding

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Wednesday 21 April 2004, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Shi presiding

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Thursday 22 April 2004, at 3.40 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Shi presiding

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Friday 23 April 2004, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Shi presiding

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

Translation

Other documents

26 February 2003

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

28 February 2003

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

27 February 2004

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

Orders

Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Declaration of Vice-President Weeramantry

Declaration by Judge Shi

Declaration by Judge Koroma

Declaration by Judge Vereshchetin

Separate opinion by Judge Oda

Separate opinion by Judge Parra-Aranguren

Dissenting opinion by Judge ad hoc Kreca