Provisional measures

Code

See also

Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) (Mexico v. United States of America)

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 9 January 2003, Mexico brought a case against the United States of America in a dispute concerning alleged violations of Articles 5 and 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963 with respect to 54 Mexican nationals who had been sentenced to death in certain states of the United States. At the same time as its Application, Mexico also submitted a request for the indication of provisional measures, among other things so that the United States would take all measures necessary to ensure that no Mexican national was executed and no action was taken that might prejudice the rights of Mexico or its nationals with regard to any decision the Court might render on the merits of the case. After hearing the Parties at public hearings on the provisional measures held on 21 January 2003, the Court, on 5 February 2003, made an Order, by which it decided that the :

“United States of America sh[ould] take all measures necessary to ensure that Mr. Cesar Roberto Fierro Reyna, Mr. Roberto Moreno Ramos and Mr. Osvaldo Torres Aguilera [three Mexican nationals] [we]re not executed pending final judgment in these proceedings”,

that the “United States of America sh[ould] inform the Court of all measures taken in implementation of [that] Order”, and that the Court would remain seised of the matters which formed the subject of that Order until the Court had rendered its final judgment. The same day, it issued another Order fixing 6 June 2003 as the time-limit for the filing of the Memorial by Mexico and 6 October 2003 as the time-limit for the filing of the Counter-Memorial by the United States of America. The President of the Court subsequently extended those dates respectively to 20 June 2003 and 3 November 2003. Those pleadings were filed within the time-limits thus extended.

After holding public hearings in December 2004, the Court rendered its Judgment on 31 March 2004. Mexico had amended its claims during the written phase of the proceedings and again at the oral proceedings, so that the Court ultimately ruled on the cases of 52 (rather than 54) Mexican nationals.

The Court first considered four objections by the United States to its jurisdiction and five objections to admissibility. Mexico had argued that all of these objections were inadmissible because they had been submitted outside the time-limit prescribed by the Rules of Court, but the Court did not accept this. The Court then dismissed the United States objections, whilst reserving certain of them for consideration at the merits stage.

Ruling on the merits of the case, the Court began by considering whether the 52 individuals concerned were solely of Mexican nationality. Finding that the United States had failed to show that certain of them were also United States nationals, the Court held that the United States was under an obligation to provide consular information pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention in respect of all 52 Mexican nationals. Regarding the meaning to be given to the phrase “without delay” in Article 36 (1) (b), the Court further held that there is an obligation to provide consular information as soon as it is realized that the arrested person is a foreign national, or that there are grounds for thinking that he is probably a foreign national. The Court found that, in all of the cases except one, the United States had violated its obligation to provide the required consular information. Taking note of the interrelated nature of the three subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, the Court then went on to find that the United States had, in 49 cases, also violated the obligation to enable Mexican consular officers to communicate with, have access to and visit their nationals and, in 34 cases, to arrange for their legal representation.

In relation to Mexico’s arguments concerning paragraph 2 of Article 36 and the right of its nationals to effective review and reconsideration of convictions and sentences impaired by a violation of Article 36 (1), the Court found that, in view of its failure to revise the procedural default rule since the Court’s decision in the LaGrand case, the United States had in three cases violated paragraph 2 of Article 36, although the possibility of judicial re-examination was still open in the 49 other cases.

In regard to the legal consequences of the proven violations of Article 36 and to Mexico’s requests for restitutio in integrum, through the partial or total annulment of convictions and sentences, the Court pointed out that what international law required was reparation in an adequate form, which in this case meant review and reconsideration by United States courts of the Mexican nationals’ convictions and sentences. The Court considered that the choice of means for review and reconsideration should be left to the United States, but that it was to be carried out by taking account of the violation of rights under the Vienna Convention. After recalling that the process of review and reconsideration should occur in the context of judicial proceedings, the Court stated that the executive clemency process was not sufficient in itself to serve that purpose, although appropriate clemency procedures could supplement judicial review and reconsideration. Contrary to Mexico’s claims, the Court found no evidence of a regular and continuing pattern of breaches of Article 36 by the United States. The Court moreover recognized the efforts of the United States to encourage compliance with the Vienna Convention, and took the view that that commitment provided a sufficient guarantee and assurance of non-repetition as requested by Mexico.

The Court further observed that, while the present case concerned only Mexican nationals, that should not be taken to imply that its conclusions did not apply to other foreign nationals finding themselves in similar situations in the United States. Finally, the Court recalled that the United States had violated paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 36 in the case of the three Mexican nationals concerned by the Order of 5 February 2003 indicating provisional measures, and that no review and reconsideration of conviction and sentence had been carried out in those cases. The Court considered that it was therefore for the United States to find an appropriate remedy having the nature of review and reconsideration according to the criteria indicated in the Judgment.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

9 January 2003

Available in:

English

Written proceedings

Oral proceedings

Verbatim record 2003/1 (bilingual version)

Public sitting held on Tuesday 21 January 2003, at 9.30 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Original Language

Translation

(bilingual version) Translation

Verbatim record 2003/3 (bilingual version)

Public sitting held on Tuesday 21 January 2003, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Original Language

Translation

(bilingual version) Translation

Translation

(bilingual version) Translation

Verbatim record 2003/2 (bilingual version)

Public sitting held on Tuesday 21 January 2003, at 11.30 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Public sitting held on Friday 19 December 2003, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Shi presiding

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Available in:

Original Language

Translation

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Extension of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Judgments

Judgment of 31 March 2004

Merits

Summary of the Order of 5 February 2003

Available in:

English French

Summary 2004/1

Summary of the Judgment of 31 March 2004

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 12 August 2008, the Republic of Georgia instituted proceedings before the Court against the Russian Federation relating to “its actions on and around the territory of Georgia in breach of CERD [the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination]”. Georgia claimed that

“the Russian Federation, through its State organs, State agents, and other persons and entities exercising governmental authority, and through the South Ossetian and Abkhaz separatist forces and other agents acting on the instructions of, and under the direction and control of the Russian Federation, is responsible for serious violations of its fundamental obligations under CERD, including Articles 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6”.

As a basis for the jurisdiction of the Court, Georgia relied on Article 22 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

Georgia’s Application was accompanied by a Request for the indication of provisional measures in order “to preserve [its] rights under CERD to protect its citizens against violent discriminatory acts by Russian armed forces, acting in concert with separatist militia and foreign mercenaries”.

On 15 August 2008, having considered the gravity of the situation, the President of the Court, acting under Article 74, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court, urgently called upon the Parties “to act in such a way as will enable any order the Court may take on the request for provisional measures to have its appropriate effects”.

Following public hearings that were held from 8 to 10 October 2008, the Court issued an Order on the Request for the indication of provisional measures submitted by Georgia. The Court found that it had prima facie jurisdiction under Article 22 of CERD to deal with the case and it ordered the Parties,

“within South Ossetia and Abkhazia and adjacent areas in Georgia, [to] refrain from any act of racial discrimination against persons, groups of persons or institutions; [to] abstain from sponsoring, defending or supporting racial discrimination by any persons or organizations; [to] do all in their power . . . to ensure, without distinction as to national or ethnic origin, (i) security of persons ; (ii) the right of persons to freedom of movement and residence within the border of the State; (iii) the protection of the property of displaced persons and of refugees . . . [and to] do all in their power to ensure that public authorities and public institutions under their control or influence do not engage in acts of racial discrimination against persons, groups of persons or institutions”.

The Court also indicated that “[e]ach Party shall refrain from any action which might prejudice the rights of the other Party in respect of whatever judgment the Court may render in the case, or which might aggravate or extend the dispute before the Court or make it more difficult to resolve”. Finally, the Court ordered each Party to “inform [it] as to its compliance with the . . . provisional measures”.

On 1 December 2009, the Russian Federation filed four preliminary objections in respect of jurisdiction.

In its Judgment of 1 April 2011, the Court began by considering the Russian Federation’s first preliminary objection, according to which there had been no dispute between the Parties regarding the interpretation or application of CERD at the date Georgia filed its Application. It concluded that none of the documents or statements provided any basis for a finding that there had been a dispute about racial discrimination by July 1999. However, the Court concluded that the exchanges between the Georgian and Russian representatives in the Security Council on 10 August 2008, the claims made by the Georgian President on 9 and 11 August and the response on 12 August by the Russian Foreign Minister established that by that day, the day on which Georgia submitted its Application, there had been a dispute between Georgia and the Russian Federation about the latter’s compliance with its obligations under CERD as invoked by Georgia in the case. The first preliminary objection of the Russian Federation was accordingly dismissed.

In its second preliminary objection, the Russian Federation had argued that the procedural requirements of Article 22 of CERD for recourse to the Court had not been fulfilled. According to this provision,

“[a]ny dispute between two or more States parties with respect to the interpretation or application of this Convention, which is not settled by negotiation or by the procedures expressly provided for in this Convention, shall, at the request of any of the parties to the dispute, be referred to the International Court of Justice for decision, unless the disputants agree to another mode of settlement”.

First of all, the Court noted that Georgia did not claim that, prior to seising the Court, it had used or attempted to use the procedures expressly provided for in CERD. The Court therefore limited its examination to the question of whether the precondition of negotiations had been fulfilled.

In determining what constitutes negotiations, the Court observed that negoti-ations are distinct from mere protests or disputations.

The Court observed that negotiations had taken place between Georgia and the Russian Federation before the start of the relevant dispute. However, in the absence of a dispute relating to matters falling under CERD prior to 9 August 2008, those negotiations could not be said to have covered such matters, and were thus of no relevance to the Court’s examination of the Russian Federation’s second preliminary objection. The Court accordingly concluded that neither requirement contained in Article 22 had been satisfied. Article 22 of CERD thus could not serve to found the Court’s jurisdiction in the case. The second preliminary objection of the Russian Federation was therefore upheld.

Having upheld the second preliminary objection of the Russian Federation, the Court found that it was required neither to consider nor to rule on the other objections to its jurisdiction raised by the Respondent and that the case could not proceed to the merits phase. Accordingly, the Order of 15 October 2008 indicating provisional measures ceased to be operative upon the delivery of the Judgment of the Court.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application Instituting Proceedings

12 August 2008

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures of Protection submitted by the Government of Georgia

14 August 2008

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

English French

Amended Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures of Protection submitted by the Government of Georgia

25 August 2008

Written Statement of Georgia

1 April 2010

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English

Fixing of time-limit

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 11 December 2009

Fixing of time-limits

English French

Summary 2011/2

Summary of the Judgment of 1 April 2011

Available in:

English French

Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States of America)

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 29 April 1999, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia filed in the Registry of the Court Applications instituting proceedings against Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom and United States of America for alleged violations of their obligation not to use force against another State. In its Applications against Belgium, Canada, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom, Yugoslavia referred, as a basis for the jurisdiction of the Court, to Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court and to Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1948. Yugoslavia also relied upon Article IX of that Convention in its Applications against France, Germany, Italy and United States, but also relied on Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court.

On 29 April 1999, Yugoslavia also submitted, in each case, an Application for the indication of provisional measures to ensure that the respondent State concerned “cease immediately its acts of use of force and . . . refrain from any act of threat or use of force” against Yugoslavia. After hearings on the provisional measures from 10 to 12 May 1999, the Court delivered its decision in each of the cases on 2 June 1999. In two of them (Yugoslavia v. Spain and Yugoslavia v. United States of America), the Court, rejecting the Request for the indication of provisional measures, concluded that it manifestly lacked jurisdiction and consequently ordered that the cases be removed from the List. In the eight other cases, the Court declared that it lacked prima facie jurisdiction (one of the prerequisites for the indication of provisional measures) and that it therefore could not indicate such measures.

In each of the eight cases which remained on the List, the Respondents filed preliminary objections to jurisdiction and admissibility.

In its Judgments of 15 December 2004, the Court observed that the question whether Serbia and Montenegro was or was not a State party to the Statute of the Court at the time of the institution of the proceedings was fundamental; for if Serbia and Montenegro were not such a party, the Court would not be open to it, unless it met the conditions prescribed in Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute.

The Court therefore had to examine whether the Applicant met the conditions for access to it laid down in Articles 34 and 35 of the Statute before examining the issues relating to the conditions laid down in Articles 36 and 37 of the Statute.

The Court pointed out that there was no doubt that Serbia and Montenegro was a State for the purpose of Article 34, paragraph 1, of the Statute. However, the objection had been raised by certain Respondents that, at the time when the Application was filed, Serbia and Montenegro did not meet the conditions set down in Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Statute, because it was not a Member of the United Nations at the relevant time. After recapitulating the sequence of events relating to the legal position of the applicant State vis-à-vis the United Nations, the Court concluded that the legal situation that obtained within the United Nations during the period 1992-2000 concerning the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, following the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, had remained ambiguous and open to different assessments. This situation had come to an end with a new development in 2000. On 27 October of that year, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requested admission to membership in the United Nations, and on 1 November, by General Assembly resolution 55/12, it was so admitted. The Applicant thus had the status of membership in the Organization as from 1 November 2000. However, its admission to the United Nations did not have, and could not have had, the effect of dating back to the time when the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia broke up and disappeared. The Court therefore concluded that the Applicant thus was not a Member of the United Nations, and in that capacity a State party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, at the time of filing its Application to institute the proceedings in each of the cases before the Court on 29 April 1999. As it had not become a party to the Statute on any other basis, the Court was not open to it at that time under Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Statute.

The Court then considered whether it might have been open to the Applicant under paragraph 2 of Article 35. It noted that the words “treaties in force” in that paragraph were to be interpreted as referring to treaties which were in force at the time that the Statute itself came into force, and that consequently, even assuming that the Applicant was a party to the Genocide Convention when instituting proceedings, Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute did not provide it with a basis for access to the Court under Article IX of that Convention, since the Convention only entered into force on 12 January 1951, after the entry into force of the Statute.

In the cases against Belgium and the Netherlands, the Court finally examined the question whether Serbia and Montenegro was entitled to invoke the dispute settlement convention it had concluded with each of those States in the early 1930s as a basis of jurisdiction in those cases. The question was whether the conventions dating from the early 1930s, which had been concluded prior to the entry into force of the Statute, might rank as a “treaty in force” for purposes of Article 35, paragraph 2, and hence provide a basis of access. The Court first recalled that Article 35 of the Statute of the Court concerns access to the present Court and not to its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). It then observed that the conditions for transfer of jurisdiction from the PCIJ to the present Court are governed by Article 37 of the Statute. The Court noted that Article 37 applies only as between parties to the Statute under Article 35, paragraph 1. As it had already found that Serbia and Montenegro was not a party to the Statute when instituting proceedings, the Court accordingly found that Article 37 could not give it access to the Court under Article 35, paragraph 2, on the basis of the Conventions dating from the early 1930s, irrespective of whether or not those instruments were in force on 29 April 1999, the date of the filing of the Application.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

29 April 1999

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Request for the indication of Provisional Measures

29 April 1999

Written Statement of the Observations and Submissions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the Preliminary Objections made by Canada

18 December 2002

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French

Summary 1999/5

Summary of the Order of 2 June 1999

Available in:

English French

Summary 2004/4

Summary of the Judgment of 15 December 2004

Available in:

English French

Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States of America)

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

In each of the eight cases which remained on the List, the Respondents filed preliminary objections to jurisdiction and admissibility.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

29 April 1999

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Request for the indication of Provisional Measures

29 April 1999

Written Statement of the Observations and Submissions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the Preliminary Objections made by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

20 December 2002

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French

Summary 1999/12

Summary of the Order of 2 June 1999

Available in:

English French

Summary 2004/10

Summary of the Judgment of 15 December 2004

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 9 December 2002, the Republic of the Congo filed an Application instituting proceedings against France, seeking the annulment of the investigation and prosecution measures taken by the French judicial authorities further to a complaint concerning crimes against humanity and torture allegedly committed in the Congo against individuals of Congolese nationality filed by various human rights associations against the President of the Republic of the Congo, Mr. Denis Sassou Nguesso, the Congolese Minister of the Interior, General Pierre Oba, and other individuals including General Norbert Dabira, Inspector-General of the Congolese armed forces, and General Blaise Adoua, Commander of the Presidential Guard.

In its Application, the Congo indicated that it sought to found the jurisdiction of the Court, pursuant to Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court, “on the consent of the French Republic, which [would] certainly be given”. In accordance with that provision, the Congo’s Application was transmitted to the French Government and no action was taken in the proceedings. By a letter dated 8 April 2003, France indicated that it “consent[ed] to the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the Application pursuant to Article 38, paragraph 5”, and the case was thus entered in the Court’s List. It was the first time, since the adoption of Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court in 1978, that a State thus accepted the invitation of another State to recognize the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain a case against it.

The Application of the Congo was accompanied by a request for the indication of a provisional measure seeking “an order for the immediate suspension of the proceedings being conducted by the investigating judge of the Meaux Tribunal de grande instance”, and hearings on that request were held on 28 and 29 April 2003. In its Order of 17 June 2003, the Court concluded that no evidence had been placed before it of any irreparable prejudice to the rights in dispute and that, consequently, circumstances were not such as to require the exercise of its power to indicate provisional measures.

Hearings were scheduled to open in the case on 6 December 2010, when, by a letter dated 5 November 2010, the Agent of the Congo, referring to Article 89 of the Rules of Court, informed the Court that his Government was “withdraw[ing] its Application instituting proceedings” and requested the Court “to make an Order officially recording the discontinuance of the proceedings and directing the removal of the case from the List”. A copy of that letter was immediately communicated to the French Government, which responded in a letter dated 8 November 2010 that it had no objection to the discontinuance of the proceedings by the Congo. Accordingly, by an Order of 16 November 2010, the Court placed on record the discontinuance of the proceedings by the Congo and ordered that the case be removed from the List.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Annexes

English French

Counter-Memorial of France

11 May 2004

Available in:

English French

Available in:

English French

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Order of 17 June 2003

Request for the Indication of a Provisional Measure

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Joint Separate Opinion by Judges Koroma and Vereshchetin

English French Bilingual

Summary 2003/3

Summary of the Order of 17 June 2003

Available in:

English French

Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States of America)

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

In each of the eight cases which remained on the List, the Respondents filed preliminary objections to jurisdiction and admissibility.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Summary of the Order of 2 June 1999

Available in:

English French

Press releases

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 14 April and 5 June 1972, respectively, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany instituted proceedings against Iceland concerning a dispute over the proposed extension by Iceland, as from 1 September 1972, of the limits of its exclusive fisheries jurisdiction from a distance of 12 to a distance of 50 nautical miles. Iceland declared that the Court lacked jurisdiction, and declined to be represented in the proceedings or file pleadings. At the request of the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic, the Court in 1972 indicated, and in 1973 confirmed, provisional measures to the effect that Iceland should refrain from implementing, with respect to their vessels, the new regulations regarding the extension of the zone of its exclusive fishing rights, and that the annual catch of those vessels in the disputed area should be limited to certain maxima. In Judgments delivered on 2 February 1973, the Court found that it possessed jurisdiction ; and in Judgments on the merits of 25 July 1974, it found that the Icelandic regulations constituting a unilateral extension of exclusive fishing rights to a limit of 50 nautical miles were not opposable to either the United Kingdom or the Federal Republic, that Iceland was not entitled unilaterally to exclude their fishing vessels from the disputed area, and that the Parties were under mutual obligations to undertake negotiations in good faith for the equitable solution of their differences.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

5 June 1972

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Request for the Indication of Interim Measures of Protection submitted by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany

21 July 1972

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Order of 18 August 1972

Fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Joint Dissenting Opinion by Judges Bengzon and Jiménez de Aréchaga

English French Bilingual

Order of 15 February 1973

Fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French

Order of 12 July 1973

Continuance of interim measures of protection

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Declaration by Judge Ignacio-Pinto (as appended immediately after the order)

English French Bilingual

Judgment of 25 July 1974

Merits

French

Press release 1974/10 (French version only)

25 July 1974

Compétence en matière de pêcheries (République fédérale d'Allemagne c. Islande) - La Cour rend son arrêt sur le fond du différend (French version only)

Available in:

French

Correspondence

14 April 1972

Correspondence

Available in:

English French

See also

Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. United Kingdom)

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

In each of the eight cases which remained on the List, the Respondents filed preliminary objections to jurisdiction and admissibility.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Summary of the Order of 2 June 1999

Available in:

English French

Press releases

Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States of America)

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

In each of the eight cases which remained on the List, the Respondents filed preliminary objections to jurisdiction and admissibility.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

29 April 1999

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Request for the indication of Provisional Measures

29 April 1999

Written Statement of the Observations and Submissions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the Preliminary Objections made by the Federal Republic of Germany

20 December 2002

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French

Summary 1999/7

Summary of the Order of 2 June 1999

Available in:

English French

Summary 2004/6

Summary of the Judgment of 15 December 2004

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

In May 1973, Pakistan instituted proceedings against India concerning 195 Pakistani prisoners of war whom, according to Pakistan, India proposed to hand over to Bangladesh, which was said to intend trying them for acts of genocide and crimes against humanity. India stated that there was no legal basis for the Court’s jurisdiction in the matter and that Pakistan’s Application was without legal effect. Pakistan having also filed a Request for the indication of provisional measures, the Court held public sittings to hear observations on this subject; India was not represented at the hearings. In July 1973, Pakistan asked the Court to postpone further consideration of its Request in order to facilitate the negotiations which were due to begin. Before any written pleadings had been filed, Pakistan informed the Court that negotiations had taken place, and requested the Court to record discontinuance of the proceedings. Accordingly, the case was removed from the List by an Order of 15 December 1973.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Dissenting Opinion of Judge Petrén (translation)

English French Bilingual

Order of 29 September 1973

Extension of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 15 December 1973

Removal from the list

Procedure(s):Discontinuance

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Press releases

Press release 1973/35 (French version only)

Provisional measures

Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) (Mexico v. United States of America)

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

Institution of proceedings

9 January 2003

Available in:

Written proceedings

9 January 2003

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

20 June 2003

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Available in:

2 November 2003

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Available in:

Oral proceedings

Public sitting held on Tuesday 21 January 2003, at 9.30 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Tuesday 21 January 2003, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Translation

Translation

Public sitting held on Tuesday 21 January 2003, at 11.30 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Translation

Translation

Public sitting held on Tuesday 21 January 2003, at 6 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Monday 15 December 2003, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Shi presiding

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Monday 15 December 2003, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Shi presiding

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Tuesday 16 December 2003, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Shi presiding

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Tuesday 16 December 2003, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Shi presiding

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Thursday 18 December 2003, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Shi presiding

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Friday 19 December 2003, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Shi presiding

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Available in:

Translation

Other documents

26 November 2003

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Available in:

10 December 2003

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Available in:

Orders

Fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Declaration of Judge Oda

Extension of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

Judgments

Merits

Available in:

Declaration of President Shi

Declaration of Vice-President Ranjeva (translation)