Contentious

Code

See also

Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States of America)

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 29 April 1999, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia filed in the Registry of the Court Applications instituting proceedings against Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom and United States of America for alleged violations of their obligation not to use force against another State. In its Applications against Belgium, Canada, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom, Yugoslavia referred, as a basis for the jurisdiction of the Court, to Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court and to Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1948. Yugoslavia also relied upon Article IX of that Convention in its Applications against France, Germany, Italy and United States, but also relied on Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court.

On 29 April 1999, Yugoslavia also submitted, in each case, an Application for the indication of provisional measures to ensure that the respondent State concerned “cease immediately its acts of use of force and . . . refrain from any act of threat or use of force” against Yugoslavia. After hearings on the provisional measures from 10 to 12 May 1999, the Court delivered its decision in each of the cases on 2 June 1999. In two of them (Yugoslavia v. Spain and Yugoslavia v. United States of America), the Court, rejecting the Request for the indication of provisional measures, concluded that it manifestly lacked jurisdiction and consequently ordered that the cases be removed from the List. In the eight other cases, the Court declared that it lacked prima facie jurisdiction (one of the prerequisites for the indication of provisional measures) and that it therefore could not indicate such measures.

In each of the eight cases which remained on the List, the Respondents filed preliminary objections to jurisdiction and admissibility.

In its Judgments of 15 December 2004, the Court observed that the question whether Serbia and Montenegro was or was not a State party to the Statute of the Court at the time of the institution of the proceedings was fundamental; for if Serbia and Montenegro were not such a party, the Court would not be open to it, unless it met the conditions prescribed in Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute.

The Court therefore had to examine whether the Applicant met the conditions for access to it laid down in Articles 34 and 35 of the Statute before examining the issues relating to the conditions laid down in Articles 36 and 37 of the Statute.

The Court pointed out that there was no doubt that Serbia and Montenegro was a State for the purpose of Article 34, paragraph 1, of the Statute. However, the objection had been raised by certain Respondents that, at the time when the Application was filed, Serbia and Montenegro did not meet the conditions set down in Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Statute, because it was not a Member of the United Nations at the relevant time. After recapitulating the sequence of events relating to the legal position of the applicant State vis-à-vis the United Nations, the Court concluded that the legal situation that obtained within the United Nations during the period 1992-2000 concerning the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, following the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, had remained ambiguous and open to different assessments. This situation had come to an end with a new development in 2000. On 27 October of that year, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requested admission to membership in the United Nations, and on 1 November, by General Assembly resolution 55/12, it was so admitted. The Applicant thus had the status of membership in the Organization as from 1 November 2000. However, its admission to the United Nations did not have, and could not have had, the effect of dating back to the time when the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia broke up and disappeared. The Court therefore concluded that the Applicant thus was not a Member of the United Nations, and in that capacity a State party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, at the time of filing its Application to institute the proceedings in each of the cases before the Court on 29 April 1999. As it had not become a party to the Statute on any other basis, the Court was not open to it at that time under Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Statute.

The Court then considered whether it might have been open to the Applicant under paragraph 2 of Article 35. It noted that the words “treaties in force” in that paragraph were to be interpreted as referring to treaties which were in force at the time that the Statute itself came into force, and that consequently, even assuming that the Applicant was a party to the Genocide Convention when instituting proceedings, Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute did not provide it with a basis for access to the Court under Article IX of that Convention, since the Convention only entered into force on 12 January 1951, after the entry into force of the Statute.

In the cases against Belgium and the Netherlands, the Court finally examined the question whether Serbia and Montenegro was entitled to invoke the dispute settlement convention it had concluded with each of those States in the early 1930s as a basis of jurisdiction in those cases. The question was whether the conventions dating from the early 1930s, which had been concluded prior to the entry into force of the Statute, might rank as a “treaty in force” for purposes of Article 35, paragraph 2, and hence provide a basis of access. The Court first recalled that Article 35 of the Statute of the Court concerns access to the present Court and not to its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). It then observed that the conditions for transfer of jurisdiction from the PCIJ to the present Court are governed by Article 37 of the Statute. The Court noted that Article 37 applies only as between parties to the Statute under Article 35, paragraph 1. As it had already found that Serbia and Montenegro was not a party to the Statute when instituting proceedings, the Court accordingly found that Article 37 could not give it access to the Court under Article 35, paragraph 2, on the basis of the Conventions dating from the early 1930s, irrespective of whether or not those instruments were in force on 29 April 1999, the date of the filing of the Application.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Summary of the Order of 2 June 1999

Available in:

English French

Press releases

Hence, the Court considered that the admission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations on 1 November 2000, well after the 1996 Judgment, could not be regarded as a new fact capable of founding a request for revision of that Judgment.

In the final version of its argument, Yugoslavia claimed that its admission to the United Nations and a letter of 8 December 2000 from the Organization’s Legal Counsel simply “revealed” two facts which had existed in 1996 but had been unknown at the time, namely, that it was not then a party to the Statute of the Court and that it was not bound by the Genocide Convention. On that point, the Court considered that, in so arguing, Yugoslavia was not relying on facts that existed in 1996 but “in reality, base[d] its Application for revision on the legal consequences which it [sought] to draw from facts subsequent to the Judgment which it [was] asking to have revised”. Those consequences, even supposing them to be established, could not be regarded as facts within the meaning of Article 61 and the Court therefore rejected that argument of Yugoslavia.

The Court indicated that at the time when the Judgment of 1996 was given, the situation obtaining was that created by General Assembly resolution 47/1. That resolution, adopted on 22 September 1992, stated inter alia :

“The General Assembly . . . considers that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations ; and therefore decides that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United Nations and that it shall not participate in the work of the General Assembly.”

In its Judgment of 2003, the Court observed that

“the difficulties which arose regarding the FRY’s status between the adoption of that resolution and its admission to the United Nations on 1 November 2000 resulted from the fact that, although the FRY’s claim to continue the international legal personality of the former Yugoslavia was not ‘generally accepted’ . . . , the precise consequences of this situation were determined on a case-by-case basis (for example, non-participation in the work of the General Assembly and ECOSOC and in the meetings of States parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, etc.)”.

The Court specified that resolution 47/1 did not affect Yugoslavia’s right to appear before the Court or to be a party to a dispute before the Court under the conditions laid down by the Statute, nor did it affect the position of Yugoslavia in relation to the Genocide Convention. The Court further stated that resolution 55/12 of 1 November 2000 (by which the General Assembly decided to admit Yugoslavia to membership of the United Nations) could not have changed retroactively the sui generis position which that State found itself in vis-à-vis the United Nations over the period 1992 to 2000, or its position in relation to the Statute of the Court and the Genocide Convention. From the foregoing, the Court concluded that it had not been established that Yugoslavia’s Application was based upon the discovery of “some fact” which was “when the judgment was given, unknown to the Court and also to the party claiming revision” and accordingly found that one of the conditions for the admissibility of an application for revision laid down by Article 61, paragraph 1, of the Statute had not been satisfied.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

24 April 2001

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Written Observations of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the Admissibility of the Application

3 December 2001

Available in:

English

Judgment of 3 February 2003

Available in:

English French

Press releases

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 14 April and 5 June 1972, respectively, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany instituted proceedings against Iceland concerning a dispute over the proposed extension by Iceland, as from 1 September 1972, of the limits of its exclusive fisheries jurisdiction from a distance of 12 to a distance of 50 nautical miles. Iceland declared that the Court lacked jurisdiction, and declined to be represented in the proceedings or file pleadings. At the request of the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic, the Court in 1972 indicated, and in 1973 confirmed, provisional measures to the effect that Iceland should refrain from implementing, with respect to their vessels, the new regulations regarding the extension of the zone of its exclusive fishing rights, and that the annual catch of those vessels in the disputed area should be limited to certain maxima. In Judgments delivered on 2 February 1973, the Court found that it possessed jurisdiction ; and in Judgments on the merits of 25 July 1974, it found that the Icelandic regulations constituting a unilateral extension of exclusive fishing rights to a limit of 50 nautical miles were not opposable to either the United Kingdom or the Federal Republic, that Iceland was not entitled unilaterally to exclude their fishing vessels from the disputed area, and that the Parties were under mutual obligations to undertake negotiations in good faith for the equitable solution of their differences.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

5 June 1972

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Request for the Indication of Interim Measures of Protection submitted by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany

21 July 1972

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Order of 18 August 1972

Fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Joint Dissenting Opinion by Judges Bengzon and Jiménez de Aréchaga

English French Bilingual

Order of 15 February 1973

Fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French

Order of 12 July 1973

Continuance of interim measures of protection

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Declaration by Judge Ignacio-Pinto (as appended immediately after the order)

English French Bilingual

Judgment of 25 July 1974

Merits

French

Press release 1974/10 (French version only)

25 July 1974

Compétence en matière de pêcheries (République fédérale d'Allemagne c. Islande) - La Cour rend son arrêt sur le fond du différend (French version only)

Available in:

French

Correspondence

14 April 1972

Correspondence

Available in:

English French

See also

Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. United Kingdom)

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

In each of the eight cases which remained on the List, the Respondents filed preliminary objections to jurisdiction and admissibility.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Summary of the Order of 2 June 1999

Available in:

English French

Press releases

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 21 September 1999, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan filed an Application instituting proceedings against the Republic of India in respect of a dispute concerning the destruction, on 10 August 1999, of a Pakistani aircraft. By letter of 2 November 1999, the Agent of India notified the Court that his Government wished to submit preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court, which were set out in an appended note. On 19 November 1999, the Court decided that the written pleadings would first address the question of the jurisdiction of the Court and fixed time-limits for the filing of the Memorial of Pakistan and the Counter-Memorial of India, which were duly filed within the time-limits so prescribed. Public hearings on the question of the jurisdiction of the Court were held from 3 to 6 April 2000.

In its Judgment of 21 June 2000, the Court noted that, to establish the jurisdiction of the Court, Pakistan had relied on Article 17 of the General Act for Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, signed at Geneva on 26 September 1928, on the declarations of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court made by the Parties and on Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute. It considered those bases of jurisdiction in turn.

The Court pointed out first that, on 21 May 1931, British India had acceded to the General Act of 1928. It observed that India and Pakistan had held lengthy discussions on the question whether the General Act had survived the dissolution of the League of Nations and whether, if so, the two States had become parties to that Act on their accession to independence. Referring to a communication addressed to the United Nations Secretary-General of 18 September 1974, in which the Indian Government indicated that, since India’s accession to independence in 1947, they had “never regarded themselves as bound by the General Act of 1928 . . . whether by succession or otherwise”, the Court concluded that India could not be regarded as party to the said Act on the date the Application had been filed by Pakistan and that the Convention did not constitute a basis of jurisdiction. The Court then considered the declaration of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court made by the two States. It noted that India’s declaration contained a reservation under which “disputes with the government of any State which is or has been a member of the Commonwealth of Nations” was barred from its jurisdiction. The Court recalled that its jurisdiction only existed within the limits within which it had been accepted and that the right of States to attach reservations to their declarations was a recognized practice. Consequently, Pakistan’s arguments to the effect that India’s reservation was “extra-statutory” or was obsolete could not be upheld. Pakistan being a member of the Commonwealth, the Court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to deal with the Application on the basis of the declarations made by the two States.

Considering, thirdly, the final basis of jurisdiction relied on by Pakistan, namely Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute, according to which “the jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations”, the Court indicated that neither the United Nations Charter nor Article 1 of the Simla Accord of 2 July 1972 between the Parties conferred jurisdiction upon it to deal with the dispute between them.

Lastly, the Court explained that there was “a fundamental distinction between the acceptance by a State of the Court’s jurisdiction and the compatibility of particular acts with international law” and that “the Court’s lack of jurisdiction [did] not relieve States of their obligation to settle their disputes by peaceful means”.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

21 September 1999

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Memorial of the Government of Pakistan on Jurisdiction

7 January 2000

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Available in:

English

Counter-Memorial of the Government of India - Preliminary Objections to the Jurisdiction of the Court

28 February 2000

Procedure(s):Questions of jurisdiction and/or admissibility

Available in:

English

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

Order of 19 November 1999

Decision regarding content of written proceedings; fixing of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Summary of the Judgment of 21 June 2000

Available in:

English French

Press releases

Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States of America)

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

In each of the eight cases which remained on the List, the Respondents filed preliminary objections to jurisdiction and admissibility.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

29 April 1999

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Request for the indication of Provisional Measures

29 April 1999

Written Statement of the Observations and Submissions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the Preliminary Objections made by the Federal Republic of Germany

20 December 2002

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French

Summary 1999/7

Summary of the Order of 2 June 1999

Available in:

English French

Summary 2004/6

Summary of the Judgment of 15 December 2004

Available in:

English French

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 23 June 1999, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) filed in the Registry of the Court Applications instituting proceedings against Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda “for acts of armed aggression committed . . . in flagrant breach of the United Nations Charter and of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity”. In addition to the cessation of the alleged acts, Congo sought reparation for acts of intentional destruction and looting and the restitution of national property and resources appropriated for the benefit of the respective respondent States.

In its Applications instituting proceedings against Burundi and Rwanda, the DRC referred, as bases for the Court’s jurisdiction, to Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute, the New York Convention of 10 December 1984 against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Montreal Convention of 23 September 1971 for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation and, lastly, Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court. However, the Government of the DRC informed the Court on 15 January 2001 that it intended to discontinue the proceedings instituted against Burundi and Rwanda, stating that it reserved the right to invoke subsequently new grounds of jurisdiction of the Court. The two cases were therefore removed from the List on 30 January 2001.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

23 June 1999

Available in:

English French

Annexes to the Application instituting proceedings, Livre blanc (Volumes I and II)

23 June 1999

Press releases

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

In May 1973, Pakistan instituted proceedings against India concerning 195 Pakistani prisoners of war whom, according to Pakistan, India proposed to hand over to Bangladesh, which was said to intend trying them for acts of genocide and crimes against humanity. India stated that there was no legal basis for the Court’s jurisdiction in the matter and that Pakistan’s Application was without legal effect. Pakistan having also filed a Request for the indication of provisional measures, the Court held public sittings to hear observations on this subject; India was not represented at the hearings. In July 1973, Pakistan asked the Court to postpone further consideration of its Request in order to facilitate the negotiations which were due to begin. Before any written pleadings had been filed, Pakistan informed the Court that negotiations had taken place, and requested the Court to record discontinuance of the proceedings. Accordingly, the case was removed from the List by an Order of 15 December 1973.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Dissenting Opinion of Judge Petrén (translation)

English French Bilingual

Order of 29 September 1973

Extension of time-limits: Memorial and Counter-Memorial

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 15 December 1973

Removal from the list

Procedure(s):Discontinuance

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Press releases

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

On 2 March 1999, the Federal Republic of Germany filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceedings against the United States of America in a dispute concerning alleged violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963. Germany stated that, in 1982, the authorities of the State of Arizona had detained two German nationals, Karl and Walter LaGrand, who were tried and sentenced to death without having been informed of their rights, as is required under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention. Germany also alleged that the failure to provide the required notification precluded Germany from protecting its nationals’ interest provided for by Articles 5 and 36 of the Vienna Convention at both the trial and the appeal level in the United States courts. Germany asserted that although the two nationals, finally with the assistance of German consular officers, did claim violations of the Vienna Convention before the federal courts, the latter, applying the municipal law doctrine of “procedural default”, decided that, because the individuals in question had not asserted their rights in the previous legal proceedings at State level, they could not assert them in the federal proceedings. In its Application, Germany based the jurisdiction of the Court on Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court and on Article I of the Optional Protocol of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.

Germany accompanied its Application by an urgent request for the indication of provisional measures, requesting the Court to indicate that the United States should take “all measures at its disposal to ensure that [one of its nationals, whose date of execution had been fixed at 3 March 1999] [was] not executed pending final judgment in the case . . .”. On 3 March 1999, the Court delivered an Order for the indication of provisional measures calling upon the United States of America, among other things, to “take all measures at its disposal to ensure that [the German national] [was] not executed pending the final decision in [the] proceedings”. However, the two German nationals were executed by the United States.

Public hearings in the case were held from 13 to 17 November 2000. In its Judgment of 27 June 2001, the Court began by outlining the history of the dispute and then examined certain objections of the United States of America to the Court’s jurisdiction and to the admissibility of Germany’s submissions. It found that it had jurisdiction to deal with all Germany’s submissions and that they were admissible.

Ruling on the merits of the case, the Court observed that the United States did not deny that, in relation to Germany, it had violated Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention, which required the competent authorities of the United States to inform the LaGrands of their right to have the Consulate of Germany notified of their arrest. It added that, in the case concerned, that breach had led to the violation of paragraph 1 (a) and paragraph 1 (c) of that Article, which dealt respectively with mutual rights of communication and access of consular officers and their nationals, and the right of consular officers to visit their nationals in prison and to arrange for their legal representation. The Court further stated that the United States had not only breached its obligations to Germany as a State party to the Convention, but also that there had been a violation of the individual rights of the LaGrands under Article 36, paragraph 1, which rights could be relied on before the Court by their national State.

The Court then turned to Germany’s submission that the United States, by applying rules of its domestic law, in particular the doctrine of “procedural default”, had violated Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Convention. That provision required the United States to “enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded [under Article 36] [were] intended”. The Court stated that, in itself, the procedural default rule did not violate Article 36. The problem arose, according to the Court, when the rule in question did not allow the detained individual to challenge a conviction and sentence by invoking the failure of the competent national authorities to comply with their obligations under Article 36, paragraph 1. The Court concluded that, in the present case, the procedural default rule had the effect of preventing Germany from assisting the LaGrands in a timely fashion as provided for by the Convention. Under those circumstances, the Court held that in the present case the rule referred to violated Article 36, paragraph 2.

With regard to the alleged violation by the United States of the Court’s Order of 3 March 1999 indicating provisional measures, the Court pointed out that it was the first time it had been called upon to determine the legal effects of such orders made under Article 41 of its Statute — the interpretation of which had been the subject of extensive controversy in the literature. After interpreting Article 41, the Court found that such orders did have binding effect. In the present case, the Court concluded that its Order of 3 March 1999 “was not a mere exhortation” but “created a legal obligation for the United States”. The Court then went on to consider the measures taken by the United States to implement the Order concerned and concluded that it had not complied with it.

With respect to Germany’s request seeking an assurance that the United States would not repeat its unlawful acts, the Court took note of the fact that the latter had repeatedly stated in all phases of those proceedings that it was implementing a vast and detailed programme in order to ensure compliance, by its competent authorities, with Article 36 of the Convention and concluded that such a commitment must be regarded as meeting the request made by Germany. Nevertheless, the Court added that if the United States, notwithstanding that commitment, were to fail again in its obligation of consular notification to the detriment of German nationals, an apology would not suffice in cases where the individuals concerned had been subjected to prolonged detention or convicted and sentenced to severe penalties. In the case of such a conviction and sentence, it would be incumbent upon the United States, by whatever means it chose, to allow the review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence taking account of the violation of the rights set forth in the Convention.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

2 March 1999

Available in:

English French

Written proceedings

Judgment of 27 June 2001

Mertis

Summary of the Order of 5 March 1999

Available in:

English French

Summary 2001/2

Summary of the Judgment of 27 June 2001

Available in:

English French

Press releases

The Court held hearings from 2 to 11 March 1998 on the preliminary objections raised by Nigeria. In its Judgment of 11 June 1998, the Court found that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the merits of the dispute and that Cameroon’s requests were admissible. The Court rejected seven of the preliminary objections raised by Nigeria and declared that, as the eighth did not have an exclusively preliminary character, it should be settled during the proceedings on the merits.

Nigeria filed its Counter-Memorial, including counter-claims, within the time-limit extended by the Court. On 30 June 1999, the Court adopted an Order declaring Nigeria’s counter-claims admissible and fixing 4 April 2000 as the time-limit for the filing of the Reply of Cameroon and 4 January 2001 as the time-limit for the filing of the Rejoinder of Nigeria. In its Order, the Court also reserved the right of Cameroon to present its views in writing a second time on the Nigerian counter-claims in an additional pleading which might be the subject of a subsequent Order. The Reply and the Rejoinder were duly filed within the time-limits so fixed. In January 2001, Cameroon informed the Court that it wished to present its views in writing a second time on Nigeria’s counter-claims. As Nigeria had no objection to that request, the Court authorized the presentation by Cameroon of an additional pleading relating exclusively to the counter-claims submitted by Nigeria. That pleading was duly filed within the time-limit fixed by the Court.

On 30 June 1999, the Republic of Equatorial Guinea filed an Application for permission to intervene in the case. Each of the two Parties having filed its written observations on that Application and Equatorial Guinea having informed the Court of its views with respect to them, the Court, by Order of 21 October 1999, authorized Equatorial Guinea to intervene in the case pursuant to Article 62 of the Statute, to the extent, in the manner and for the purposes set out in its Application. Equatorial Guinea filed a written statement and each of the Parties filed written observations on the latter within the time-limits fixed by the Court. Public hearings on the merits were held from 18 February to 21 March 2002.

In its Judgment of 10 October 2002, the Court determined as follows the course of the boundary, from north to south, between Cameroon and Nigeria :

In the Lake Chad area, the Court decided that the boundary was delimited by the Thomson-Marchand Declaration of 1929-1930, as incorporated in the Henderson-Fleuriau Exchange of Notes of 1931 (between Great Britain and France) ; it found that the boundary started in the Lake from the Cameroon-Nigeria-Chad tripoint (whose co-ordinates it defined) and followed a straight line to the mouth of the River Ebeji as it was in 1931 (whose coordinates it also defined) and thence ran in a straight line to the point where the river today divided into two branches.
Between Lake Chad and the Bakassi Peninsula, the Court confirmed that the boundary was delimited by the following instruments :
- from the point where the River Ebeji bifurcated as far as Tamnyar Peak, by the Thomson-Marchand Declaration of 1929-1930 (paras. 2-60), as incorporated in the Henderson-Fleuriau Exchange of Notes of 1931 ;
- from Tamnyar Peak to pillar 64 referred to in Article XII of the Anglo- German Agreement of 12 April 1913, by the British Order in Council of 2 August 1946 ;
- from pillar 64 to the Bakassi Peninsula, by the Anglo-German Agreements of 11 March and 12 April 1913.
The Court examined point by point seventeen sectors of the land boundary and specified for each one how the above-mentioned instruments were to be interpreted.
In Bakassi, the Court decided that the boundary was delimited by the Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 1913 (Arts. XVIII-XX) and that sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula lay with Cameroon. It decided that in that area the boundary followed the thalweg of the River Akpakorum (Akwayafe), dividing the Mangrove Islands near Ikang in the way shown on map TSGS 2240, as far as a straight line joining Bakassi Point and King Point.
As regards the maritime boundary, the Court, having established that it had jurisdiction to address that aspect of the case — which Nigeria had disputed —, fixed the course of the boundary between the two States’ maritime areas.

In its Judgment the Court requested Nigeria, expeditiously and without condition, to withdraw its administration and military or police forces from the area of Lake Chad falling within Cameroonian sovereignty and from the Bakassi Peninsula. It also requested Cameroon expeditiously and without condition to withdraw any administration or military or police forces which might be present along the land boundary from Lake Chad to the Bakassi Peninsula on territories which, pursuant to the Judgment, fell within the sovereignty of Nigeria. The latter had the same obligation in regard to territories in that area which fell within the sovereignty of Cameroon. The Court took note of Cameroon’s undertaking, given at the hearings, to “continue to afford protection to Nigerians living in the [Bakassi] peninsula and in the Lake Chad area”. Finally, the Court rejected Cameroon’s submissions regarding the State responsibility of Nigeria, as well as Nigeria’s counter-claims.

This overview is provided for information only and in no way involves the responsibility of the Court.

Institution of proceedings

Application instituting proceedings

29 March 1994

Available in:

English French

Additional Application to the Application Instituting Proceedings brought by the Republic of Cameroon

6 June 1994

Available in:

English French

French

Oral proceedings

Verbatim record 1996/2 (bilingual version)

Public sitting held on Tuesday 5 March 1996, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Bedjaoui presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Original Language

Verbatim record 1996/3 (bilingual version)

Translation

(bilingual version) Translation

Orders

English French Bilingual

Order of 21 October 1999

Decision on intervention; fixing of time-limits: Written Statement and Written Observations

Procedure(s):Intervention

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Order of 20 February 2001

Authorizing of submission of pleading relating to Counter-claims and fixing of time-limit therefor

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Judgments

Judgment of 11 June 1998

Preliminary Objections

Procedure(s):Preliminary objections

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Procedure(s):Counter-claims

Available in:

English French Bilingual

Summaries of Judgments and Orders

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Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium)

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Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. France)

Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Germany)

Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Italy)

Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Netherlands)

Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Portugal)

Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. United Kingdom)

Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States of America)

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

Institution of proceedings

29 April 1999

Available in:

Written proceedings

29 April 1999

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Oral proceedings

Public sitting held on Monday 10 May 1999, at 10.00 a.m., at the Peace Palace, Vice-President Weeramantry, Acting President, presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Tuesday 11 May 1999, at 12.15 p.m., at the Peace Palace, Vice-President Weeramantry, Acting President, presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Wednesday 12 May 1999, at 10.00 a.m., at the Peace Palace, Vice-President Weeramantry, Acting President, presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Translation

Public sitting held on Wednesday 12 May 1999, at 16.25 p.m., at the Peace Palace, Vice-President Weeramantry, Acting President, presiding

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

Available in:

Translation

Orders

Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures (Removal from List)

Procedure(s):Provisional measures

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Declaration of Judge Shi

Declaration of Judge Koroma

Declaration of Judge Vereshchetin

Separate opinion of Judge Oda

Separate opinion of Judge Higgins

Separate opinion of Judge Parra-Aranguren

Separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans

Separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Kreca

Summaries of Judgments and Orders

Summary of the Order of 2 June 1999

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Press releases

29 April 1999

Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Spain) - Hearings on provisional measures to open on Monday 10 May 1999

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4 May 1999

Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Spain) - Hearings of Monday 10 and Tuesday 11 May 1999 - Exceptional admission procedure

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7 May 1999

Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Spain) - Provisional Measures - Programme of the hearings opening on Monday 10 May 1999

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12 May 1999

Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Spain) - Conclusion of the hearings on provisional measures - The Court ready to consider its decision

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28 May 1999

Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Spain) - Provisional measures - Court to give its decisions on Wednesday 2 June 1999 at 10.00 a.m.

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2 June 1999

Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Spain) - The Court rejects the requests for the indication of provisional measures submitted by Yugoslavia

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2 June 1999

Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Spain) - The Court rejects the request for the indication of provisional measures submitted by Yugoslavia and dismisses the case

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Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

Institution of proceedings

24 April 2001

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Written proceedings

3 December 2001

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Contentious