Public sitting held on Wednesday 24 April 2024, at 4.30 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Salam presiding, in the case concerning Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Azerbaijan v. Armeni

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Uncorrected
CR 2024/23
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THE HAGUE LA HAYE
YEAR 2024
Public sitting
held on Wednesday 24 April 2024, at 4.30 p.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Salam presiding,
in the case concerning Application of the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Azerbaijan v. Armenia)
____________________
VERBATIM RECORD
____________________
ANNÉE 2024
Audience publique
tenue le mercredi 23 avril 2024, à 16 h 30, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Salam, président,
en l’affaire relative à l’Application de la convention internationale sur l’élimination
de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale (Azerbaïdjan c. Arménie)
________________
COMPTE RENDU
________________
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Present: President Salam
Vice-President Sebutinde
Judges Tomka
Abraham
Xue
Bhandari
Iwasawa
Nolte
Charlesworth
Brant
Gómez Robledo
Cleveland
Aurescu
Tladi
Judges ad hoc Daudet
Koroma
Registrar Gautier

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Présents : M. Salam, président
Mme Sebutinde, vice-présidente
MM. Tomka
Abraham
Mme Xue
MM. Bhandari
Iwasawa
Nolte
Mme Charlesworth
MM. Brant
Gómez Robledo
Mme Cleveland
MM. Aurescu
Tladi, juges
MM. Daudet
Koroma, juges ad hoc
M. Gautier, greffier

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The Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan is represented by:
HE Mr Elnur Mammadov, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Republic of Azerbaijan,
as Agent;
HE Mr Rahman Mustafayev, Ambassador of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Mr Vaughan Lowe, KC, Emeritus Chichele Professor of Public International Law, University of
Oxford, member of the Institut de droit international, Essex Court Chambers, member of the Bar
of England and Wales,
Mr Samuel Wordsworth, KC, Essex Court Chambers, member of the Bar of England and Wales,
member of the Paris Bar,
Ms Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Professor of International Law and International Organization
at the University of Geneva, member of the Institut de droit international, member of Matrix
Chambers,
Mr Stefan Talmon, Professor of International Law, University of Bonn, Barrister, Twenty Essex
Chambers,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr Stephen Fietta, KC, Fietta LLP, Solicitor Advocate of the Senior Courts of England and Wales,
Ms Oonagh Sands, Fietta LLP, member of the Bars of the State of New York and the District of
Columbia, Solicitor Advocate of the Senior Courts of England and Wales,
Mr Luke Tattersall, Essex Court Chambers, member of the Bar of England and Wales,
Ms Eileen Crowley, Fietta LLP, member of the Bar of the State of New York, solicitor of the Senior
Courts of England and Wales,
Mr Gershon Hasin, JSD, Fietta LLP, member of the Bar of the State of New York,
Ms Mercedes Roman, Fietta LLP, member of the Bar of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,
Mr Sean Aughey, Essex Court Chambers, member of the Bar of England and Wales,
Mr Aditya Laddha, PhD candidate and assistant, Faculty of Law, University of Geneva,
Ms Miglena Angelova, Fietta LLP, member of the Paris Bar, Solicitor Advocate of the Senior Courts
of England and Wales,
as Counsel;
Mr Nurlan Aliyev, Counsellor, Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
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Le Gouvernement de la République d’Azerbaïdjan est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Elnur Mammadov, ministre adjoint aux affaires étrangères de la République
d’Azerbaïdjan,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Rahman Mustafayev, ambassadeur de la République d’Azerbaïdjan auprès du Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
M. Vaughan Lowe, KC, professeur émérite de droit international public (chaire Chichele) à
l’Université d’Oxford, membre de l’Institut de droit international, Essex Court Chambers,
membre du barreau d’Angleterre et du pays de Galles,
M. Samuel Wordsworth, KC, Essex Court Chambers, membre du barreau d’Angleterre et du pays de
Galles, et du barreau de Paris,
Mme Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, professeure de droit international et organisation
internationale à l’Université de Genève, membre de l’Institut de droit international, membre de
Matrix Chambers,
M. Stefan Talmon, professeur de droit international à l’Université de Bonn, barrister, Twenty Essex
Chambers,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. Stephen Fietta, KC, cabinet Fietta LLP, avocat et solicitor près les juridictions supérieures
d’Angleterre et du pays de Galles,
Mme Oonagh Sands, cabinet Fietta LLP, membre des barreaux de l’État de New York et du district
de Columbia, avocate et solicitor près les juridictions supérieures d’Angleterre et du pays de
Galles,
M. Luke Tattersall, Essex Court Chambers, membre du barreau d’Angleterre et du pays de Galles,
Mme Eileen Crowley, cabinet Fietta LLP, membre du barreau de l’État de New York, solicitor près
les juridictions supérieures d’Angleterre et du pays de Galles,
M. Gershon Hasin, JSD, cabinet Fietta LLP, membre du barreau de l’État de New York,
Mme Mercedes Roman, cabinet Fietta LLP, membre du barreau de la République bolivarienne du
Venezuela,
M. Sean Aughey, Essex Court Chambers, membre du barreau d’Angleterre et du pays de Galles,
M. Aditya Laddha, doctorant et assistant à la faculté de droit de l’Université de Genève,
Mme Miglena Angelova, cabinet Fietta LLP, membre du barreau de Paris, avocate et solicitor près
les juridictions supérieures d’Angleterre et du pays de Galles,
comme conseils ;
M. Nurlan Aliyev, conseiller, ambassade de la République d’Azerbaïdjan au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
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Ms Sabina Sadigli, First Secretary, Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Mr Vusal Ibrahimov, First Secretary, Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Mr Badir Bayramov, Second Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan,
Mr Shahriyar Hajiyev, Second Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan,
as Advisers.
The Government of the Republic of Armenia is represented by:
HE Mr Yeghishe Kirakosyan, Representative of the Republic of Armenia on International Legal
Matters,
as Agent;
Mr Lawrence H. Martin, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of the District of
Columbia and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
Ms Alison Macdonald, KC, Barrister, Essex Court Chambers, London,
Mr Constantinos Salonidis, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of the State of
New York and Greece,
Mr Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, Professor of International Law, Dean of the Faculty of Law of the
University of Athens, member of the Institut de droit international, member of the Permanent
Court of Arbitration,
Mr Pierre d’Argent, Full Professor, Université catholique de Louvain, member of the Institut de droit
international, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bar of Brussels,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr Sean Murphy, Manatt/Ahn Professor of International Law, The George Washington University
Law School, associate member of the Institut de droit international, member of the Bar of
Maryland,
Mr Joseph Klingler, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of the District of
Columbia and the State of New York,
Mr Peter Tzeng, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of the District of Columbia
and the State of New York,
Ms Iulia Padeanu Mellon, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of the District of
Columbia and Illinois,
Mr Amir Ardelan Farhadi, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bar of the State of New
York,
Ms Yasmin Al Ameen, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bar of the State of New
York,
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Mme Sabina Sadigli, première secrétaire, ambassade de la République d’Azerbaïdjan au Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
M. Vusal Ibrahimov, premier secrétaire, ambassade de la République d’Azerbaïdjan au Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
M. Badir Bayramov, deuxième secrétaire, ministère des affaires étrangères de la République
d’Azerbaïdjan,
M. Shahriyar Hajiyev, deuxième secrétaire, ministère des affaires étrangères de la République
d’Azerbaïdjan,
comme conseillers.
Le Gouvernement de la République d’Arménie est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Yeghishe Kirakosyan, représentant de la République d’Arménie chargé des affaires
juridiques internationales,
comme agent ;
M. Lawrence H. Martin, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux du district de
Columbia et du Commonwealth du Massachusetts,
Mme Alison Macdonald, KC, barrister, Essex Court Chambers (Londres),
M. Constantinos Salonidis, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux de l’État de
New York et de Grèce,
M. Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, professeur de droit international, doyen de la faculté de droit de
l’Université d’Athènes, membre de l’Institut de droit international, membre de la Cour
permanente d’arbitrage,
M. Pierre d’Argent, professeur titulaire à l’Université catholique de Louvain, membre de l’Institut
de droit international, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre du barreau de Bruxelles,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. Sean Murphy, professeur de droit international titulaire de la chaire Manatt/Ahn à la faculté de
droit de l’Université George Washington, membre associé de l’Institut de droit international,
membre du barreau du Maryland,
M. Joseph Klingler, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux du district de
Columbia et de l’État de New York,
M. Peter Tzeng, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux du district de Columbia
et de l’État de New York,
Mme Iulia Padeanu Mellon, avocate au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux du district de
Columbia et de l’Illinois,
M. Amir Ardelan Farhadi, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre du barreau de l’État de
New York,
Mme Yasmin Al Ameen, avocate au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre du barreau de l’État de
New York,
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Ms Diem Huong Ho, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of England and Wales
and the State of New York,
Mr Harout Ekmanian, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bar of the State of New
York,
Ms María Camila Rincón, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bar of Colombia,
as Counsel;
HE Mr Viktor Biyagov, Ambassador of the Republic of Armenia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
HE Mr Andranik Hovhannisyan, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Armenia to the
United Nations Office and other international organizations in Geneva,
Mr Liparit Drmeyan, Head of the Office of the Representative of the Republic of Armenia on
International Legal Matters, Office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia,
Mr Aram Aramyan, Head of the Department of Protection of the Interests of the Republic of Armenia
in Interstate Disputes, Office of the Representative of the Republic of Armenia on International
Legal Matters, Office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia,
Ms Kristine Khanazadyan, Head of the Department for Representation of the Interests of the
Republic of Armenia before International Arbitral Tribunals and Foreign Courts, Office of the
Representative of the Republic of Armenia on International Legal Matters, Office of the Prime
Minister of the Republic of Armenia,
Ms Zoya Stepanyan, Head of the International Human Rights Cooperation Division, Department for
Human Rights and Humanitarian Issues, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ms Viviana Kalaejian, Third Secretary, Embassy of the Republic of Armenia in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Ms Nanami Hirata, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP,
as Advisers;
Ms Jennifer Schoppmann, Foley Hoag LLP,
Ms Deborah Langley, Foley Hoag LLP,
as Assistants.
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Mme Diem Huong Ho, avocate au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre du barreau d’Angleterre et du
pays de Galles ainsi que du barreau de l’État de New York,
M. Harout Ekmanian, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre du barreau de l’État de New York,
Mme María Camila Rincón, avocate au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre du barreau de Colombie,
comme conseils ;
S. Exc. M. Viktor Biyagov, ambassadeur de la République d’Arménie auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
S. Exc. M. Andranik Hovhannisyan, représentant permanent de la République d’Arménie auprès de
l’Office des Nations Unies et des autres organisations internationales à Genève,
M. Liparit Drmeyan, chef du bureau du représentant de la République d’Arménie chargé des affaires
juridiques internationales, cabinet du premier ministre de la République d’Arménie,
M. Aram Aramyan, directeur du département de la protection des intérêts de la République
d’Arménie dans les différends interétatiques, bureau du représentant de la République d’Arménie
chargé des affaires juridiques internationales, cabinet du premier ministre de la République
d’Arménie,
Mme Kristine Khanazadyan, directrice du département chargé de la représentation des intérêts de la
République d’Arménie devant les tribunaux arbitraux internationaux et les juridictions étrangères,
bureau du représentant de la République d’Arménie chargé des affaires juridiques internationales,
cabinet du premier ministre de la République d’Arménie,
Mme Zoya Stepanyan, cheffe de la division de la coopération internationale en matière des droits de
l’homme, département des droits de l’homme et des affaires humanitaires, ministère des affaires
étrangères,
Mme Viviana Kalaejian, troisième secrétaire, ambassade de la République d’Arménie au Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
Mme Nanami Hirata, avocate au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP,
comme conseillers ;
Mme Jennifer Schoppmann, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP,
Mme Deborah Langley, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP,
comme assistantes.
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Le PRÉSIDENT : Veuillez vous asseoir. L’audience est ouverte.
Pour des raisons dont il m’a dûment fait part, M. le juge Yusuf n’est pas en mesure de
participer à l’audience de ce jour. La Cour se réunit cet après-midi pour entendre le second tour de
plaidoiries de la République d’Arménie sur les exceptions préliminaires qu’elle a soulevées en
l’affaire relative à l’Application de la convention internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes
de discrimination raciale (Azerbaïdjan c. Arménie). Je donne à présent la parole à M. Lawrence
Martin. You have the floor, Sir.
Mr MARTIN:
THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION RATIONE TEMPORIS OVER AZERBAIJAN’S
CLAIMS RELATING TO THE PERIOD BEFORE 15 SEPTEMBER 1996
1. Mr President, distinguished Members of the Court, good afternoon.
2. As I did on Monday, I will address Armenia’s preliminary objection concerning the scope
of the Court’s jurisdiction ratione temporis. I will focus only on certain key points.
3. The first such one is a general point that touches on all the speeches we heard yesterday,
very much including, but not limited to, Professor Lowe’s intervention on jurisdiction ratione
temporis. In what was clearly a co-ordinated effort, all of yesterday’s speakers made repeated
reference to a so-called “ethnic cleansing campaign” that was said to be ongoing even now, 30 years
since the end of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War1. Professor Lowe said, for example, “[t]he ongoing
and systematic nature of Armenia’s campaign of ethnic cleansing, spanning three decades, can in no
sense be considered to have been ‘completed’ before September 1996”2. All of his colleagues got in
on the action too3. Even the questions of landmines and the environment were said to be elements of
this so-called “campaign”.
4. The purpose of this co-ordinated effort was undoubtedly to make it seem that the issue of
the critical date in this case is unimportant because what happened more than three decades ago is
1 See e.g. CR 2024/22, p. 10, para. 3 (Mammadov); p. 18, para. 5 (Fietta); p. 28, para. 35 (Lowe); p. 40, para. 12,
(Wordsworth); p. 54, para. 25 (Aughey); p. 59, para. 22 (Boisson de Chazournes).
2 CR 2024/22, p. 28, para. 35 (Lowe).
3 See e.g. CR 2024/22, p. 18, para. 5 (Fietta); p. 28, para. 35 (Lowe); p. 33, para. 4 (Talmon); p. 40, para. 12,
(Wordsworth); p. 54, para. 25 (Aughey); p. 59, para. 22 (Boisson de Chazournes).
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all bound up together with what is still happening now in a single package encompassing the entire
period. Our friends’ effort, however, is seriously misguided.
5. There can be no doubt on this matter. As I said on Monday, Armenia roundly rejects
Azerbaijan’s ethnic cleansing accusations, but that is not the point now. What matters now is that
even on Azerbaijan’s own factual allegations, any alleged ethnic cleansing was completed by 1994,
well before the critical date in September 1996.
6. On Monday, I observed that Azerbaijan had not provided a definition of ethnic cleansing.
Yesterday, Professor Lowe obliged by providing one. It is, he said, “a purposeful policy designed by
one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population
of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas”4. “To remove . . . the civilian
population . . . from certain geographic areas.” This, of course, is just a different formulation of the
Court’s definition from the Bosnia case5. Both come from the UN Commission on the Former
Yugoslavia6, and under both definitions, the point is that once the civilian population of an area has
been removed, once everyone has left, the ethnic cleansing is over. To be sure, the effects may
continue afterwards but the act is completed.
7. The Court should not be tempted by Azerbaijan’s transparent ploy of relabelling what are
obviously subsequent, discrete events as part of this supposedly continuing “campaign of ethnic
cleansing”. The acts alleged by Azerbaijan may or may not constitute discrete breaches of the CERD,
but they are certainly not part of a purported wrong that took place, and ended, 30 years ago.
8. Turning then more specifically to the question of the Court’s jurisdiction ratione temporis,
on Monday I discussed how the only sensible interpretation of Article 22 is that it should be
temporally limited to acts and facts that occurred at a time when the parties to a dispute are both
parties to the Convention; in other words, when the Convention is in force between them.
4 CR 2024/22, p. 27, para. 32 (Lowe) (emphasis added).
5 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 43, para. 190.
6 UN Commission on the Former Yugoslavia, Interim Report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant
to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), UN doc. S/25274 (10 February 1993), p. 16; UN Commission on the Former
Yugoslavia, Final Report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992),
UN doc. S/1994/674 (27 May 1994), p. 33, paras. 129-130.
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9. To find otherwise risks creating serious irregularities that the drafters of the CERD cannot
have intended. Could the drafters really have intended that States that only later accepted their
obligations under the Convention should somehow acquire a procedural advantage over States that
accepted those same obligations at an earlier moment in time? Professor Lowe notably had nothing
to say about the absurdity of such an approach.
10. As we also explained on Monday, allowing Azerbaijan to raise claims relating to the
pre-1996 period would raise serious retroactivity issues. Yesterday, Professor Lowe responded
confidently that “[t]here is no question of retroactivity in the present case because the relevant
conduct underpinning Azerbaijan’s claims of breach occurred after CERD’s entry into force for
Armenia in 1993”7. With respect, this misconstrues the nature of the problem. This is not the
retroactivity issue we are talking about.
11. The retroactivity issue here is that Azerbaijan is trying to use Article 22 to reach back in
time and claim the right to raise questions about Armenia’s compliance with its obligations under
the CERD in relation to a period of time when Armenia did not owe those obligations to Azerbaijan.
In our view, Article 22 simply cannot be used that way.
12. The character of the CERD’s substantive obligations only underscores the impermissibility
of what Azerbaijan is trying to do.
13. Yesterday, for the first time, Azerbaijan acknowledged that the substantive obligations at
issue in this case are not obligations erga omnes, but obligations erga omnes partes. These
obligations, sometimes also referred to as obligations erga omnes contractantes, are owed by States
parties to a treaty to other States parties. In his remarks yesterday, Professor Lowe appeared to agree.
He stated:
“The erga omnes partes and jus cogens character of the obligations under the
CERD and similar treaties supports the principle that those obligations are engaged for
every party from the date that the treaty comes into force for that party. The Court’s
reasoning in Belgium v. Senegal is again on point. Obligations in conventions such as
the Convention against Torture, in that case, or the CERD in the present case, are owed
to all States parties . . . and any State party can call out those who break the
commitment.”8
7 CR 2024/22, p. 26, para. 25 (Lowe).
8 Ibid., p. 25, para. 23 (Lowe).
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14. This is fine, so far as it goes. The issue lies in what Professor Lowe does not say.
Obligations erga omnes partes are indeed owed “to all States parties”. They are not, however, owed
to non-States parties.
15. Thus, from July 1993 to September 1996, Armenia owed its obligations erga omnes partes
to those 140 or so States parties that were in fact partes to the CERD at that time. But because
Azerbaijan was not then a party to the Convention, Armenia did not owe it any obligations erga
omnes partes.
16. As from the entry into force of CERD for Azerbaijan in 1996, Armenia and Azerbaijan
owed each other procedural rights under Article 22. But the creation of that procedural right did not
transform the character of the substantive obligations that Armenia owed under the Convention prior
to that date. Armenia’s obligations from 1993 to 1996 remain as they were before Azerbaijan became
a party to the Convention — that is to say, they were owed to all of the States then parties to the
CERD. Azerbaijan’s ratification of the CERD three years later did not expand — retroactively —
the pool of States to whom Armenia owed the substantive obligations under the CERD before that
date. To argue otherwise distorts basic logic and the principle of intertemporal law.
17. The fact that erga omnes partes obligations are owed only to States that are actually partes
is reflected in the language the Court used in Belgium v. Senegal. As you can see on the screen, the
Court stated that “[t]hese obligations may be defined as ‘obligations erga omnes partes’ in the sense
that each State party has an interest in compliance with them in any given case”9.
18. Support for all this can also be found in the resolution of the Institut de droit international
on “Obligations and rights erga omnes in international law”, for which Judge Gaja was rapporteur.
You can find that resolution at tab 2 of your judges’ folder. As you can see, the resolution addresses
both obligations erga omnes and obligations erga omnes partes. The latter are defined in
paragraph (b) of the first article as:
“an obligation under a multilateral treaty that a State party to the treaty owes in any
given case to all the other States parties to the same treaty, in view of their common
9 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2012 (II), p. 449, para. 68 (emphasis added).
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values and concern for compliance, so that a breach of that obligation enables all these
States to take action”10.
19. In other words, the obligation is owed to a group of States, such that a breach of that
obligation enables all those same States to take action. Such a breach, of course, occurs at a specific
moment in time. And that moment in time defines the States to which the obligation is owed and for
which the breach creates a cause of action.
20. This comes through unmistakably in the next article in the resolution, which states: “When
a State commits a breach of an obligation erga omnes, all the States to which the obligation is owed
are entitled . . . to claim.”11
21. Professor Lowe stated yesterday that “[i]t is not a matter of . . . the standing of particular
States”12. But that is precisely what it is. Article 3 of the resolution states:
“In the event of there being a jurisdictional link between a State alleged to have
committed a breach of an obligation erga omnes and a State to which the obligation is
owed, the latter State has standing to bring a claim to the International Court of
Justice.”13
22. Little more need be said. The extent of the erga omnes partes obligation is assessed at the
time of the putative breach. It is owed to the States then party to the multilateral treaty containing the
obligation. When there is a jurisdictional link, those States — and only those States — have standing
to claim for that breach. The obligation itself, the identity of the States to which it is owed and the
standing of those States does not change, retroactively, when other States adhere to the convention
years or decades later.
23. Much the same point can be made using a different lens. Yesterday, Professor Lowe took
you to Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. It is worth looking at it again; it
is on the screen before you.
24. It says, if I may paraphrase, the provisions of a treaty do not bind a party in relation to any
act or fact which took place before entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party. That, of
course, makes perfect sense. But there is a corollary. Treaty rights and obligations are a package
10 Institut de droit international, Resolution: Obligations and rights erga omnes in international law (G. Gaja,
Rapporteur) (Krakow, 2005), Art. 1 (emphases added).
11 Ibid., Art. 2.
12 CR 2024/22, p. 25, para. 23 (Lowe).
13 Institut de droit international, Resolution: Obligations and rights erga omnes in international law (G. Gaja,
Rapporteur) (Krakow, 2005), Art. 3 (emphasis added)
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deal14. And in our case, if a State has no obligations with respect to any fact or act which took place
before the treaty enters into force for it, neither can it have any rights with respect to such acts or
facts. That means that Azerbaijan should not be permitted to use the right it acquired to access ICJ
jurisdiction under Article 22 of the CERD in 1996 to raise complaints in relation to acts or facts
which allegedly took place before that date. They are, in short, outside the scope of the Court’s
jurisdiction ratione temporis.
25. I explained on Monday that Azerbaijan cannot save its claims relating to the pre-1996
period by relying on a theory of composite breach. Yesterday, Azerbaijan appeared to change its
position. Professor Lowe said yesterday that “the relevant contrast here is not between completed
acts and composite acts, but between completed acts and continuing acts”15.
26. Assuming that this is indeed now Azerbaijan’s primary theory, it too is insufficient to save
Azerbaijan’s case in so far as it relates to acts and facts alleged to have occurred in the pre-1996
period. Armenia, of course, does not dispute that an act can be continuing and can start before the
critical date and continue thereafter. But that fact is of no assistance to Azerbaijan. The ILC
commentary to the Draft Articles on State Responsibility makes clear that when an act continues in
such a way as to straddle the critical date, the elements of the act that occurred before the critical date
are outside a court or tribunal’s jurisdiction. Only the elements that occurred after the critical date
come within the jurisdiction ratione temporis. I refer you in particular to paragraphs 9 through 11 of
the ILC’s commentary to Article 14 of the Draft Articles.
27. Professor Lowe also offered a curious new theory that “[c]omposite acts are just one kind
of continuing act”16. He reminded us that “a composite act ‘extends over the entire period starting
with the first of the actions or omissions of the series and lasts for as long as these actions or
omissions are repeated and remain not in conformity with the international obligation’”17.
28. But both of these new theories fail for the reason I already addressed at the outset. In
concluding his discussion of Azerbaijan’s theory of continuing breaches, Professor Lowe stated:
14 ILC, Fourteenth report on reservations to treaties, by Mr Alain Pellet, Special Rapporteur, UN doc. A/CN.4/614
(2009), p. 49, paras. 273, 274, available at: https://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_614.pdf.
15 CR 2024/22, p. 26, para. 27 (Lowe).
16 CR 2024/22, p. 27, para. 29 (Lowe).
17 Ibid.
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“Azerbaijan says that Armenia’s cumulative or aggregated acts and omissions amount to a practice
of ethnic cleansing which, like apartheid, is itself a distinct breach of the CERD”18. He then stated
the definition of ethnic cleansing I quoted earlier. This argument fails because, as I said, even on
Azerbaijan’s own case, the alleged expulsion of civilians (which Armenia denies) was complete no
later than May 1994, the date of the ceasefire ending the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. Whatever
may have happened thereafter was conduct of a different character that cannot genuinely be
characterized as a continuing act. Nor can it be a “continuing composite” breach spanning the critical
date for the same reason.
29. Professor Lowe asked yesterday why Armenia has not yet raised counter-claims in this
case19. Well, the answer is simple: it is found in Article 80, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, which
states that counter-claims “shall” be made in the Counter-Memorial. Lest there be any doubt, if the
Court upholds Azerbaijan’s theory that the displacement of populations before the critical date can
be swept into the Court’s jurisdiction by virtue of other acts of racial discrimination after the critical
date, Armenia will have no shortage of claims to bring.
30. Mr President, distinguished Members of the Court, two other quick points about a couple
of cases Professor Lowe cited. First, the Bosnia Genocide case. Yesterday, he argued that Armenia
is in the same position as Yugoslavia in that case, and that, in response to Yugoslavia’s objection
ratione temporis, the Court established a general rule that compromissory clauses under multilateral
treaties grant jurisdiction over “facts which occurred prior to the Convention entering into force
between the Parties”20. But that 1996 Judgment does not, in fact, establish any such clear-cut rule.
31. Azerbaijan hangs a lot of its case on a single sentence in which the Court “confine[s] itself”
to the “observation” in question21. There is no analysis establishing a general principle that can be
applied neatly to all situations. And as I mentioned on Monday and Azerbaijan ignored, this same
issue continues to be the subject of debate by parties before the Court. Belgium v. Senegal is
instructive. Members of the Court may recall that Judge Donoghue posed pointed questions on this
18 Ibid., para. 32 (Lowe).
19 Ibid., p. 31, para. 52 (Lowe).
20 CR 2024/22, p. 23, para. 15 (Lowe).
21 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 617, para. 34.
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issue from the Bench, and that Belgium then took care to formulate its claims in such a way that
would avoid retroactive application of the compromissory clause22.
32. I also mentioned on Monday several layers of complicating and distinguishing factors from
Bosnia, including the fact that both States were successors to the Convention; there were contested
issues of recognition; and there was temporal equality between the parties23. Azerbaijan had nothing
to say about any of that.
33. Professor Lowe also curiously cited the Court’s 2012 Judgment in the first Nicaragua v.
Colombia case for the proposition that “Colombia was entitled to invoke Nicaragua’s obligations as
a State party to the UNCLOS, even though Colombia itself never became a party to the UNCLOS”24.
Now, I know that Professor Lowe and I both have a fondness for that case, but I confess I do not
understand what use he is trying to make of it. All the Court said in that case is the fact that Colombia
was not a party to UNCLOS did not relieve Nicaragua of its obligation under the convention to
submit its claim to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles to the Commission on the Limits of
the Continental Shelf25.
34. And that, Mr President, brings me to my final point. Armenia’s objections concerning
jurisdiction ratione temporis have an exclusively preliminary character and are ripe for determination
now. Yesterday, Professor Lowe seemed to invite you to join the objections to the merits, suggesting
they may not have an exclusively preliminary character. He is mistaken. The first issue on which we
request a ruling — that concerning the critical date — could not be a purer question of law. There is
no reason it cannot be decided now and Azerbaijan has not pointed to any.
35. The second issue — whether Azerbaijan’s pre-1996 claims can be saved by the assertion
that they constitute part of a so-called continuing campaign of ethnic cleansing — is equally ripe for
determination at this stage. The Parties agree on the definition of ethnic cleansing and there is no
allegation that any Azerbaijani population was removed or displaced after 1994. There is therefore
no impediment to deciding the issue as a preliminary matter.
22 See CR 2012/5, p. 44 (Donoghue); CR 2012/5 (Wood), p. 52, para. 52.
23 CR 2024/21, p. 30, para. 58 (Martin).
24 CR 2024/22, p. 25, para. 24 (Lowe).
25 See Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), pp. 668-669,
paras. 126, 127.
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36. Mr President, distinguished Members of the Court, thank you again for allowing me the
privilege of appearing before you. Would you kindly invite Professor d’Argent to the podium?
The PRESIDENT: I thank Mr Martin for his statement. J’invite maintenant M. le professeur
Pierre d’Argent à prendre la parole.
M. D’ARGENT : Merci, Monsieur le président.
LES DEMANDES DE L’AZERBAÏDJAN RELATIVES À LA PREMIÈRE GUERRE
DU HAUT-KARABAKH ET SES SÉQUELLES ANTÉRIEURES À 1996
SONT IRRECEVABLES
1. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, je répondrai au professeur Talmon
au sujet de l’irrecevabilité des demandes de l’Azerbaïdjan en commençant par relever que les Parties
s’accordent sur le test juridique applicable en la matière, lequel ressort de la jurisprudence de la Cour
dans l’affaire de Nauru et des travaux de la CDI. À la lumière de ces derniers travaux, l’Azerbaïdjan
affirme que le désavantage résultant d’une demande tardive pour le défendeur existe « only if it could
reasonably have expected that the claim would no longer be pursued »26. L’Azerbaïdjan accepte donc
que le défendeur est nécessairement désavantagé par l’introduction d’une réclamation tardive dès
l’instant où il est établi qu’il pouvait raisonnablement s’attendre à ce qu’elle ne soit pas poursuivie.
2. Et puisque le test juridique est celui-là, l’analyse doit porter sur trois questions qu’il
appartient à la Cour de trancher à ce stade :
 La première est celle de savoir si et quand l’Azerbaïdjan a présenté à l’Arménie une « claim » à
proprement parler.
 La deuxième question est celle de savoir si le délai s’étant écoulé entre les faits dont il est tiré
grief et la formulation de cette « claim » a pu raisonnablement donner à penser à l’Arménie
qu’elle ne ferait pas l’objet d’une procédure contentieuse, de telle manière à la considérer tardive
et irrecevable pour cette raison.
 La troisième question est celle de savoir si les circonstances peuvent excuser le retard du
demandeur dans la présentation de sa demande.
26 CR 2024/22, p. 35, par. 20 (Talmon).
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3. S’agissant de la première question, l’Arménie considère que l’Azerbaïdjan ne lui a jamais
présenté de réclamation juridique au titre de la convention à propos des événements de la première
guerre du Haut-Karabakh avant le 8 décembre 2020. L’Azerbaïdjan prétend au contraire qu’il a fait
connaître à l’Arménie ses « grievances » à de multiples reprises27.
4. Je relève tout d’abord que l’Azerbaïdjan n’a pas contesté ce que j’ai dit au sujet de sa lettre
du 8 décembre 2020 et des documents mentionnés dans ses observations écrites analysés devant vous
lundi28. Le professeur Talmon a dès lors inséré en note de plaidoirie29 une série de documents
communiqués entre 1993 et 1997 aux Nations Unies où il est affirmé que ses citoyens auraient été
victimes d’un nettoyage ethnique durant la première guerre du Haut-Karabakh. Deux points à ce
sujet :
 Les « grievances » formulées dans ces documents portent sur un « nettoyage ethnique » qui
aurait eu lieu et qui était déjà achevé en 1994. Ces documents ne font en rien mention d’un
nettoyage ethnique qui se poursuivrait au-delà. Et ceci confirme, Mesdames et Messieurs les
juges, que la manière dont l’Azerbaïdjan a configuré sa réclamation devant la Cour est artificielle
et purement opportune. Le nettoyage ethnique continu durant 30 ans a été inventé à partir de
décembre 2020, en réponse à la réclamation de l’Arménie afin de contourner d’évidents obstacles
en termes de compétence, tant matérielle que temporelle.
 Deuxième point : l’Arménie ne conteste pas avoir eu à faire face aux « grievances » de
l’Azerbaïdjan. Mais telle n’est pas la question. Pour les besoins de l’exception d’irrecevabilité
déduite du retard mis à présenter une réclamation, la question est de savoir si les « grievances »
de l’Azerbaïdjan constituent une réclamation juridique. Le professeur Talmon a soutenu qu’il
suffisait que « the grievances raised “relate to the subject-matter” of the treaty »30 et qu’il
importait peu, dès lors, que la convention n’ait pas été mentionnée comme telle. La jurisprudence
invoquée par le professeur Talmon concerne la survenance d’un différend, et non la formulation
d’une réclamation juridique. Ainsi, avant même de savoir si la convention se cachait derrière les
27 CR 2024/22, p. 34, par. 14 et 15 (Talmon).
28 CR 2024/21, p. 35-36, par. 13-17 (d’Argent).
29 CR/2024/22, p. 34, par. 14, notes 76 et 77 (Talmon).
30 CR 2024/22, p. 34-35, par. 15 (Talmon).
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« grievances » de l’Azerbaïdjan, la question fondamentale est de savoir si, avant le 8 décembre
2020, l’Azerbaïdjan avait présenté à l’Arménie une quelconque réclamation juridique en tant
que telle, c’est-à-dire une demande articulant une prétention juridique fondée sur la mise en cause
de la responsabilité internationale de l’Arménie et non sur la responsabilité politique ou morale
de ses dirigeants31. Monsieur le président, tous les jours, des dizaines d’États formulent les uns
envers les autres des doléances, des reproches, des accusations  bref, des « grievances »  et
les accusations ad personam hélas se multiplient aussi. Mais pour que des « grievances »
comptent au regard des principes applicables au contentieux en matière d’irrecevabilité des
demandes tardives, il faut qu’elles constituent une « claim », une réclamation juridique à
proprement parler. Et cela fut le cas dans l’affaire de Nauru, le demandeur ayant formulé à quatre
reprises une prétention juridique en termes de responsabilité internationale32. Dès lors se posait
la question de savoir si le demandeur pouvait s’attendre, après un certain temps, à ce que la
réclamation ne soit plus poursuivie. Il ne suffit donc pas qu’une situation factuelle soit exposée,
ni même qu’une qualification que le droit connaît également soit utilisée pour résumer ou
déplorer une telle situation factuelle ; il faut plus fondamentalement qu’une prétention juridique,
une demande, soit formulée. Sans une telle demande juridique, sans une mise en cause de
responsabilité internationale de l’État, il peut bien sûr y avoir un différend, mais il n’y a pas de
« claim » à proprement parler. Et c’est ce que j’indiquais déjà lundi en soulignant que l’Arménie
pouvait  je me cite !  « raisonnablement s’attendre à ce qu’aucune réclamation au titre de la
convention ne fût formulée et, a fortiori, poursuivie »33. Avant le 8 décembre 2020, aucune
réclamation juridique, je le répète, mettant en cause la responsabilité internationale de l’Arménie
pour les faits de la première guerre du Haut-Karabakh n’avait été présentée par l’Azerbaïdjan. Il
ne pourrait donc être question du « renouvellement »34 d’une réclamation inexistante. L’Arménie
31 CR 2024/22, p. 34, par. 14 (Talmon).
32 Certaines terres à phosphates à Nauru (Nauru c. Australie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1992,
p. 254, par. 33 et suiv.
33 CR 2024/21, p. 34, par. 10 (d’Argent). Voir aussi CR 2024/21, p. 32, par. 2 ; p. 36, par. 16 ; p. 40, par. 28
(d’Argent).
34 Institut de droit international, « La prescription libératoire en droit international public », Rapporteurs :
MM. Nicolas Politis et Charles De Visscher, accessible à l’adresse suivante : https://www.idi-iil.org/app/uploads/
2017/06/1925_haye_01_fr.pdf.
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considère que le retard mis par l’Azerbaïdjan à cet égard lui est préjudiciable car elle pouvait
raisonnablement s’attendre à ce qu’une telle réclamation ne soit pas présentée.
5. J’aborde la deuxième question. Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, en admettant même que
ces « grievances » communiquées par lettres adressées à l’ONU puissent compter au titre de
réclamation juridique, l’Arménie pouvait raisonnablement penser qu’elle ne serait pas poursuivie par
voie judiciaire plus de 23 ans plus tard puisque la lettre la plus récente, déposée hier par
l’Azerbaïdjan, date du 25 août 199735.
6. La première raison est que la convention n’était pas en vigueur entre Parties au moment de
la première guerre du Haut-Karabakh. Même postérieures à 1996, les « grievances » devaient donc
avoir un autre fondement juridique que la convention. La seconde raison découle de cette réalité
juridique et elle est essentielle : depuis le cessez-le-feu de 1994 et la médiation sous les auspices de
l’OSCE, l’Azerbaïdjan s’était engagé à résoudre les conséquences de la première guerre du
Haut-Karabakh par la négociation. Et il réitéra solennellement cet engagement en adhérant au
Conseil de l’Europe36. L’Azerbaïdjan viola cet engagement 20 ans plus tard en déclenchant la
seconde guerre du Haut-Karabakh en septembre 2020.
7. Ainsi, l’Azerbaïdjan ne donna jamais à penser, durant cette longue période, que ses
« grievances » feraient un jour l’objet d’une réclamation juridique articulant des prétentions au titre
de la convention et du droit de la responsabilité internationale.
8. En revanche, puisque la seconde guerre du Haut-Karabakh mit, selon le président Aliyev,
fin au processus diplomatique37 et qu’elle constitua l’apogée des pratiques discriminatoires de
l’Azerbaïdjan ainsi que l’occasion de nouvelles violations de la convention, l’Arménie formula sa
réclamation juridique et invita l’Azerbaïdjan à négocier au titre de l’article 22, le lendemain même
de la déclaration trilatérale. La fausse équivalence que le professeur Talmon a essayé d’établir en
recyclant « what is sauce for the goose » est donc totalement déplacée38.
35 Letter dated 23 August 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed
to the Secretary-General, S/1997/662 (25 August 1997), accessible à l’adresse suivante : https://digitallibrary.un.org/
record/242618?ln=ru&v=pdf.
36 Demande d’adhésion de l’Azerbaïdjan au Conseil de l’Europe, Assemblée parlementaire, Conseil de l’Europe,
accessible à l’adresse suivante : https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=16816.
37 Ilham Aliyev, « War Was Inevitable; Minsk Group Dead », Hetq, accessible à l’adresse suivante :
https://hetq.am/en/article/145646.
38 CR 2024/22, p. 33, par. 8 (Talmon).
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9. J’aborde la troisième question : l’Azerbaïdjan peut-il être excusé de n’avoir présenté sa
réclamation juridique au titre de la convention qu’après avoir eu accès au Nagorno-Karabakh ?
10. Selon le professeur Talmon, l’Arménie prétendrait qu’une « reasonable expectation was
created because Azerbaijan allegedly had all the material to bring a claim upon its accession to the
Convention in 1996, but did not do so »39. Ce que j’ai soutenu lundi est pourtant très différent et bien
plus simple, à savoir que l’Azerbaïdjan avait, bien avant 2020, tous les éléments de preuve à sa
disposition pour formuler une réclamation juridique au titre de la convention en bonne et due forme
et que son excuse fondée sur son absence d’accès au Haut-Karabakh durant 30 ans n’en est pas une.
Pourquoi, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges ? Parce que sa réclamation concerne, ainsi que son agent
l’a affirmé, « a 30-year campaign of ethnic cleansing »40. Mais, si la réclamation de l’Azerbaïdjan
porte sur une campagne et non des faits spécifiques, on voit mal en quoi l’accès au territoire pour
récolter des preuves particulières aurait été nécessaire. L’excuse du non-accès n’en est pas une,
n’explique par le retard, et la prétendue campagne de nettoyage ethnique durant 30 ans a pour seul
but de grossir le dossier avec les prétentions relatives aux mines terrestres et à l’environnement afin,
je l’ai dit, de contourner les limites temporelles et matérielles de votre compétence.
11. J’aborde enfin la question des désavantages pour l’Arménie.
12. Le professeur Talmon se réfugie derrière l’adage actori incumbit probatio pour soutenir
que l’extrême retard de l’Azerbaïdjan ne serait en rien préjudiciable à l’Arménie41. C’est oublier que
l’Arménie a le droit de se défendre et que cela suppose d’être en mesure de le faire, preuves à l’appui.
Le professeur Talmon soutient que l’Arménie aurait eu 26 ans pour collecter des preuves pour sa
défense et encore près de trois ans entre 2020 et 202342. C’est oublier, d’une part, que, selon le
principe juridique qu’il admit lui-même, le désavantage existe dès l’instant où le défendeur « could
reasonably have expected that the claim would no longer be pursued »43 et j’ajoute, puisque tel est le
cas ici, « or would no longer be made ». Pendant 26 ans, l’Azerbaïdjan n’a formulé aucune
réclamation juridique et il a légitimement donné à penser qu’il n’en formulerait pas ou qu’il ne la
39 CR 2024/22, p. 35, par. 16 (Talmon).
40 CR 2024/22, p. 10, par. 3 (Mammadov) ; p. 13, par. 15 (Mammadov) ; p. 59, par. 25 (Boisson de Chazournes).
41 CR 2024/22, p. 36, par. 22 (Talmon).
42 CR 2024/22, p. 36, par. 23 (Talmon).
43 CR 2024/22, p. 35, par. 20 (Talmon).
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poursuivrait pas. Malgré cela, l’Arménie aurait dû préparer sa défense ?! C’est oublier, d’autre part,
que durant la période séparant le 8 décembre 2020 de l’attaque finale de septembre 2023, le corridor
de Lachine était contrôlé par le contingent russe avant d’être finalement bloqué pendant 9 mois par
l’Azerbaïdjan. C’est oublier, enfin, que l’Azerbaïdjan fit main basse sur les archives du
gouvernement indépendantiste qui dut fuir précipitamment et dont les principaux dirigeants furent
arrêtés.
13. S’agissant de l’inégalité procédurale dénoncée lundi au sujet des demandes
reconventionnelles, je relève enfin que le professeur Talmon a confirmé que ce problème existait tout
en trouvant la chose normale, étant la conséquence du Règlement de la Cour (on le savait) ou du fait
que les obligations conventionnelles naissent à partir de leur acceptation (on le savait aussi). Bref,
alors qu’il aurait pu et qu’il peut toujours formuler des demandes reconventionnelles dans l’autre
affaire, l’Azerbaïdjan assume parfaitement sa tactique procédurale dans celle-ci et ne nie en rien qu’il
en résultera une justice historique à sens unique. Il serait  me semble-t-il  étonnant que la Cour
n’y voie pas un problème.
14. Monsieur le président, Madame la vice-présidente, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, je
vous remercie pour votre bienveillante attention tout au long de ces deux semaines et puis-je vous
demander, Monsieur le président, de bien vouloir appeler mon collègue Me Salonidis à la barre ?
Le PRÉSIDENT : Je remercie M. d’Argent pour son intervention, and I now invite
Mr Salonidis to take the floor. You have the floor, Sir.
Mr SALONIDIS:
THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION RATIONE MATERIAE OVER AZERBAIJAN’S CLAIMS
CONCERNING LANDMINES AND BOOBY TRAPS
1. Mr President, Madam Vice-President, distinguished Members of the Court, I will be
responding today to the points raised by Mr Wordsworth and Mr Aughey yesterday concerning
Armenia’s preliminary objection with respect to Azerbaijan’s claims and contentions concerning
landmines and booby traps.
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I. The proper characterization of Azerbaijan’s claims and contentions
2. I begin with my first point, which concerns the proper characterization of Azerbaijan’s
claims and contentions.
3. Mr Wordsworth yesterday insisted that Azerbaijan is not alleging a free-standing claim of
breach of the CERD in relation to landmines and booby traps44. In support of this position,
Mr Wordsworth pointed to the Court’s December 2021 Order, where the Court stated “Azerbaijan
claims that this conduct” — that is, Armenia’s alleged placement of landmines — “is part of a
longstanding campaign of ethnic cleansing”45. Our response is that this statement by the Court in no
way undermines its powers to interpret for itself the submissions of the parties46 and to identify what
Azerbaijan is claiming on an objective basis47 — powers that Mr Wordsworth did not contest
yesterday.
4. Mr Wordsworth also did not address the abundance of evidence that I pointed to on
Monday — in Azerbaijan’s Application, in Azerbaijan’s first Request for provisional measures and
at the hearing on that Request, in Azerbaijan’s second Request for provisional measures and at the
hearing on that Request, and in Azerbaijan’s Memorial — all showing that Azerbaijan does in fact
allege that Armenia’s alleged laying of landmines and booby traps violates the CERD48.
5. Instead, Mr Wordsworth jumped straight to the submissions at the end of Azerbaijan’s
Memorial and noted that they do not expressly isolate the alleged placement of landmines and booby
traps as an independent violation of the CERD49. But the Court is by no means bound by the framing
44 CR 2024/22, p. 40, para. 10 (Wordsworth).
45 Ibid., para. 9 (citing Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Azerbaijan v. Armenia), Provisional Measures, Order of 7 December 2021, I.C.J. Reports 2021, p. 425,
para. 53).
46 Dispute over the Status and Use of the Waters of the Silala (Chile v. Bolivia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2022 (II),
p. 614, para. 43; Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Islamic
Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2021, p. 9, para. 52;
Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court’s Judgment of 20 December
1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case, Order of 22 September 1995, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 288, para. 56.
47 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v.
United Arab Emirates), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2021, p. 71, para. 42. See also Immunities and
Criminal Proceedings (Equatorial Guinea v. France), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2018 (I), p. 292,
para. 48; Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Islamic Republic of
Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2021, p. 9, para. 59; Application of
the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2019 (II), p. 558, para. 24.
48 CR 2024/21, pp. 45-46, paras. 10-15 (Salonidis).
49 CR 2024/22, p. 42, paras. 19-20 (Wordsworth).
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adopted by the applicant in its submissions50. Otherwise, as the Court has held in another context,
“parties would be in a position themselves to control [the Court’s] competence, which would be
inadmissible”51. That is, if Azerbaijan were correct that the Court must defer to its framing of its
claims in the submissions, then Azerbaijan could throw any and all allegations — even those entirely
unrelated to racial discrimination — into its bucket of “ethnic cleansing”, without giving Armenia
any chance to exclude them from the Court’s consideration at the preliminary objections stage. This
cannot be correct.
II. The Court’s power to dismiss subdivisions of claims
6. This brings me to my second point, which is that even if Azerbaijan were correct that its
claims and contentions in relation to landmines and booby traps are only a “subdivision” — to use
Mr Wordsworth’s term52 — of its overarching claim of ethnic cleansing, the Court may still uphold
Armenia’s preliminary objection with respect to this so-called subdivision.
7. In Certain Iranian Assets, for example, Iran in the submissions of its Memorial asserted that
the United States had breached its obligations under many provisions of the bilateral Treaty of Amity
by allegedly engaging in a wide variety of conduct53. In response, the United States observed “[u]nder
almost every article of the Treaty [Iran] invokes, Iran complains that rules of State immunity have
been disregarded”54 and the United States filed a preliminary objection asking the Court to dismiss
“as outside the Court’s jurisdiction all claims, brought under any provision of the Treaty
of Amity, that are predicated on the United States’ purported failure to accord sovereign
immunity . . . to the Government of Iran, Bank Markazi, or Iranian State-owned
entities”55.
50 Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, para. 32
(citing Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 262, para. 29; Fisheries (United Kingdom v.
Norway), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 126; Minquiers and Ecrehos (France/United Kingdom), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1953, p. 52; Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1955, p. 16).
51 Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v. Pakistan), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1972,
p. 61, para. 27.
52 CR 2024/22, p. 43, para. 23 (Wordsworth).
53 Certain Iranian Assets (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Memorial of the Islamic Republic
of Iran (1 February 2017), p. 126, para. 8.1 (a).
54 Certain Iranian Assets (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections of the
United States of America (1 May 2017), p. 78, para. 8.1.
55 Certain Iranian Assets (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2019 (I), p. 25, para. 48.
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The Court upheld the objection56, thereby dismissing, at the preliminary objections stage, the
subdivision of each of Iran’s claims predicated on its sovereign immunity contention.
8. Another example of the Court upholding a preliminary objection with respect to a
subdivision of a claim may be found in the Diallo case. There, Guinea, in the submissions of its
Memorial, stated, as a single claim, that the Democratic Republic of the Congo was responsible for,
among other things, not respecting Mr Diallo’s rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, mistreating him and depriving him of his rights of ownership and management over his
companies57. At the preliminary objections stage, the Court upheld the Democratic Republic of the
Congo’s objection regarding Guinea’s lack of standing but only “in so far as it concerns protection
of Mr. Diallo in respect of alleged violations of rights of [his companies]”58. This, again, was a
dismissal of a subdivision of a claim.
9. In summary, regardless of whether the Court exercises its power to characterize
Azerbaijan’s claims or not, it has the power to uphold Armenia’s jurisdiction ratione materiae with
respect to Azerbaijan’s claims and contentions concerning the alleged placement of landmines and
booby traps.
III. The relevance of the Court’s findings of implausibility
10. My third point relates to Mr Wordsworth’s remarks regarding the relevance of the Court’s
finding of implausibility at the provisional measures stage.
11. Mr Wordsworth yesterday unsurprisingly sought to rely on the Court’s decision in the
Ukraine v. Russia case with respect to claims under the International Convention for the Suppression
of the Financing of Terrorism59. There, the Court found at the provisional measures stage that the
presence of the requisite elements of intention and knowledge was not plausible60. But then, at the
56 Ibid., p. 44, para. 126 (2).
57 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Memorial of the Republic of
Guinea (23 March 2001), p. 108, para. 5.1 (1).
58 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 617, para. 98 (1) (b).
59 CR 2024/22, p. 39, paras. 6-7 (Wordsworth).
60 Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation),
Provisional Measures, Order of 19 April 2017, I.C.J. Reports 2017, pp. 131-132, para. 75.
- 27 -
preliminary objections stage, the Court considered that ascertaining these elements was “properly a
matter for the merits”61.
12. The Court in that case did not, however, say that a finding of implausibility at the
provisional measures stage is never relevant for ascertaining its jurisdiction ratione materiae at the
preliminary objections stage.
13. Mr Wordsworth gave the impression otherwise by quoting from paragraph 58 of the
Court’s Judgment in that case. What the Court stated: “At the present stage of the proceedings, an
examination by the Court of the alleged wrongful acts or of the plausibility of the claims is not
generally warranted”62. But aside from the fact that the Court was careful to not state an absolute
exclusion, there the Court was speaking of the plausibility of claims, not the plausibility of rights.
Only the latter is determined by the Court at the provisional measures stage. If the rights invoked by
the applicant under the treaty are not even plausible, then there is serious doubt indeed as to whether
the Court has jurisdiction ratione materiae over the claims based on those very rights.
14. At the end of the day, the Court has already twice found that the alleged rights asserted by
Azerbaijan with respect to landmines and booby traps are not plausible63. The measures of which
Azerbaijan complains — that is, the placement of landmines and booby traps — are therefore not
capable of having an adverse effect on rights protected under the CERD, such that the Court does
not have jurisdiction ratione materiae with respect to those measures.
15. The Court should feel comforted in this conclusion considering the evidence Azerbaijan
has sought to rely on, to which I now turn.
61 Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2019 (II), p. 586, para. 63.
62 CR 2024/22, p. 39, para. 6 (Wordsworth) (quoting Application of the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2019 (II), p. 584,
para. 58).
63 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Azerbaijan v. Armenia), Provisional Measures, Order of 7 December 2021, I.C.J. Reports 2021, p. 425, para. 53;
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Azerbaijan v.
Armenia), Provisional Measures, Order of 22 February 2023, para. 23.
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IV. Azerbaijan has not placed before the Court evidence indicating that Armenia’s
alleged conduct amounts to racial discrimination
16. Mr Aughey’s presentation yesterday morning was the first time that Azerbaijan attempted
an evidentiary showing at this stage of the proceedings64, and we welcome the opportunity to remind
the Court why Azerbaijan’s claims are not capable of falling under the CERD.
17. Mr Aughey argued yesterday that Azerbaijan has put forward “more than sufficient
evidence” showing two things65. First, that what he calls Armenia’s forces “placed landmines and
booby traps in civilian areas, far from the former line of contact”66. And second, that Armenia
“continued [to] refus[e] to share complete and accurate information on the location of the minefields
and booby traps, long after the cessation of hostilities”67. I shall address the two points in turn by
focusing on the evidence that Mr Aughey relied on in his presentation.
18. First, the argument on the alleged placement of mines and booby traps. For the sake of
argument, I will accept that it was Armenia’s armed forces that planted mines and not Azerbaijan’s
or Nagorno-Karabakh’s armed forces. I will also accept that it was Armenia’s armed forces that
planted booby traps, and not Nagorno-Karabakh’s armed forces or persons with military experience
who were being forced to leave their homes. I will further accept that mines and booby traps existed
where Azerbaijan says they did. For the avoidance of any doubt, Armenia does not accept any of
these points68, but we recognize that they belong to the merits.
19. I will, however, test Mr Aughey’s assertion that the evidence shows, on its face, that the
alleged conduct “ha[s] had no defensive purpose”69. I will do that by starting with Azerbaijan’s
update to Figure 3 of Annex 22 of its “Additional Annexes for the Hearing on its Request for
Provisional Measures” of 31 January 2023, which Azerbaijan submitted to the Court a couple of days
ago70. Let us look at this map, which is now on your screens. Yesterday, Mr Aughey made much of
64 CR 2024/22, p. 54, para. 25 (Aughey).
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 See CR 2021/25, p. 13, para. 13 (Kirakosyan); CR 2023/4, p. 11, paras. 7-8 (Kirakosyan); CR 2021/25,
pp. 20-32, paras. 5-38 (Murphy); CR 2023/4, pp. 12-33 (Murphy).
69 CR 2024/22, p. 54, para. 25 (Aughey) (emphasis added).
70 Letter from Elnur Mammadov, Agent of the Republic of Azerbaijan, to HE Mr Philippe Gautier, Registrar of the
International Court of Justice (19 April 2024).
- 29 -
this map for the point that the locations where mines have exploded were not confined to the line of
contact71. This may be taken as true in the current phase of the proceedings, but it does not prove in
and of itself that Azerbaijan’s claims are capable of falling under the CERD, for the reason I will
explain shortly.
20. The next slides will show to the Court the progression of Azerbaijani forces during the
Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and the consequent retreat of the Armenian forces. The first slide
shows the situation that prevailed on 27 September 2020, just before the outbreak of the Second
Nagorno-Karabakh War. The area shaded in red represents the areas under Nagorno-Karabakh’s
control. Then, on 10 October 2020, you can start seeing in blue the advancement of Azerbaijani
forces into the territory. Finally, at the end of the war, a month later on 10 November 2020, you can
see most of the area now in blue and under Azerbaijan’s control.
21. Now, let us compare the map on your screens to the one Mr Aughey showed you yesterday.
I kindly ask the Court to focus its attention on the bottom half of the map, depicting locations where
mines have reportedly exploded away from the line of contact. As you can see, they match very
closely the areas that were progressively falling under Azerbaijan’s control, as ethnic Armenian
defence lines were collapsing and Armenian forces were retreating in haste. Armenian forces
retreated across the very area where you can see the red dots depicting minefields. Those minefields
would have protected the armed forces retreating from the advancing army.
22. Now let us focus on the red dots depicting minefields on the top half of the map.
23. The next slide shows the situation prevailing on the ground just before Azerbaijan’s most
recent aggression on Nagorno-Karabakh, as of 19 September 202372. Again, the area shaded in red
is the one remaining under Nagorno-Karabakh’s control and the one shaded in blue is the one which
fell under Azerbaijan’s control pursuant to the Trilateral Statement. I should pause here to note that
the Trilateral Statement did not defuse the military situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, as there were
repeated violations of the ceasefire, notwithstanding the presence of the Russian peacekeeping
71 CR 2024/22, pp. 49-50, paras. 7-8 (Aughey).
72 “Azerbaijani forces strike Armenian-controlled Karabakh, raising risk of new Caucasus war”, Reuters
(19 September 2023), available at https://www.reuters.com/article/armenia-azerbaijan-idCAKBN30P0L9 (Application of
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Armenia v. Azerbaijan), Request
for provisional measures of Armenia (28 September 2023), Annex 56).
- 30 -
forces73. The next slide shows the situation prevailing after 20 September 2023, with the entire
Nagorno-Karabakh region now under Azerbaijan’s control74.
24. Now, let us compare the map on the eve of last September’s attack with the one Mr Aughey
showed you yesterday. As you can see on your screens now, the red areas to which ethnic Armenians
retreated pursuant to the Trilateral Statement also very closely match the remaining red dots on
Azerbaijan’s updated map.
25. And what of the remaining sporadic dots to the left side of the map? These are remnants
of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, per Azerbaijan’s own evidence which I list in footnote75.
26. Mr President, Members of the Court, I need not belabour a point which should be obvious
to everyone in this room. This comparison, based on Azerbaijan’s own evidence and objective facts,
should be sufficient to show that any landmines — new or old — were placed there for defensive
purposes only, including during the retreat of military forces76. Landmines planted to obstruct the
progress of the enemy and protect the retreat of armed forces cannot possibly amount to racial
discrimination.
27. Mr Aughey cited to a number of other documents which, on their face, similarly do not
establish the Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae over Azerbaijan’s claim. Annexes 32 and 36 to
Azerbaijan’s first Request for provisional measures were thoroughly addressed by Professor Murphy
at the first hearing on provisional measures and the relevant references are included in footnote77.
The Court examined this evidence in its Order on Azerbaijan’s first request, holding that it failed to
indicate that Armenia’s alleged conduct constituted racial discrimination78.
73 CR 2021/25, pp. 23-24, paras. 9-10 (Murphy).
74 “Last bus of fleeing Armenians leaves Nagorno-Karabakh to bring end to exodus: ‘It’s a ghost town’”,
Independent (2 October 2023), available at https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/armenia-flee-nagornokarabakh-
azerbaijan-b2422474.html.
75 Extract from Mine Action Agency of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Assistance Required for the Republic of
Azerbaijan in Humanitarian Mine Action for Safe Reconstruction and Return of IDPs to the Conflict Affected Territories
of Azerbaijan (2021), p. 2 (Request for provisional measures of Azerbaijan (23 September 2021) (Annex 32)). See also
CR 2021/25, pp. 20, para. 5, pp. 22-23, para. 8, p. 27, para. 22 (Murphy); CR 2021/27, p. 14, para. 7 (Murphy); CR 2023/4,
p. 29, para. 57 (Murphy).
76 CR 2021/25, pp. 29-31, paras. 26-34 (Murphy); CR 2021/27, pp. 14-16, paras. 7-12 (Murphy); CR 2023/4,
pp. 17-26, paras. 20-48 (Murphy).
77 CR 2021/25, pp. 30-31, paras. 31-32 (Murphy); CR 2021/27, p. 14, para. 7 (Murphy); CR 2021/25, p. 28,
para. 23 (Murphy); CR 2021/25, p. 31, para. 33 (Murphy); CR 2021/27, pp. 14-17, paras. 7-16 (Murphy).
78 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Azerbaijan v. Armenia), Provisional Measures, Order of 7 December 2021, I.C.J. Reports 2021, p. 405, para. 53.
- 31 -
28. You were also shown some photos from Azerbaijan’s Annex 10 and heard some references
to Azerbaijan’s Annex 24, this time to the second Request for provisional measures regarding booby
traps. Those too were thoroughly addressed by Professor Murphy at the second hearing on
provisional measures and the relevant references are included in footnote79. The Court has examined
the evidence already when reaffirming its conclusion that Azerbaijan’s allegations relating to booby
traps were as implausible as those relating to landmines80.
29. You also heard a reference to a December 2020 UN “inter-agency mine action assessment”
in a letter Azerbaijan sent to the United Nations Secretary-General. It is quite telling that the best
quote from that assessment Azerbaijan was able to muster in its letter refers to “indications” that
“some” houses might have been booby trapped, and here is the important part, as “the Armenians
withdrew”81. It is pure despair to bring this forward as “important evidence”82, and yet this is what
Azerbaijan did yesterday.
30. What remains? A report issued by an international organization of which Armenia is not a
member and prepared solely on the basis of Azerbaijan’s allegations and two statements by
Azerbaijan’s Mine Action Agency, issued after the scheduling of this hearing83. None of these
documents add anything to the evidence that the Court has already thoroughly examined twice, nor
does it detract from the reality of the situation which is that landmines and booby traps were planted
for defensive purposes, including during the withdrawal of armed forces84.
31. I now turn to Mr Aughey’s second point that Armenia’s “continued refusal to share
complete and accurate information on the location of the minefields and booby traps, long after the
79 CR 2023/4, pp. 20-21, para. 28-31 (Murphy); CR 2023/4, pp. 30-31, para. 63 (Murphy).
80 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Azerbaijan v. Armenia), Provisional Measures, Order of 22 February 2023, para. 23.
81 CR 2024/22, p. 48, footnote 126 (Aughey) (citing Letter from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (8 February 2023), p. 3, available at https://un.mfa.gov.az/files/
shares/Letters/77session/Letter%20to%20UNSG%20in%20reply%20to%20Armenia's%20letter%20on%20mines%20A-
77-726%20Eng.pdf) (emphasis added).
82 CR 2024/22, p. 49, para. 7 (Aughey).
83 CR 2024/22, pp. 48-49, para. 5 (Aughey) (citing ANAMA, Facebook post (12 February 2024) (certified
translation) (emphasis added) (tab 10 of Azerbaijan’s judges’ folder)) and pp. 50-51, para. 10 (citing Mine Action Agency
of the Republic of Azerbaijan, “Explosive materials have been discovered in Khojavand region” (19 April 2024), available
at https://anama.gov.az/news/217).
84 See e.g. ANAMA Facebook post (12 February 2024) (certified translation) (tab 10 of Azerbaijan’s judges’
folder).
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[cessation] of hostilities, can have had no defensive purpose”85. For the sake of argument, I will again
accept that Armenia has withheld information on the location of landmines and booby traps. For the
avoidance of any doubt, however, Armenia strongly rejects any such allegation86.
32. I will, however, venture to answer Mr Aughey’s question yesterday as to “what possible
justification could there be for Armenia not to hand over comprehensive and accurate information as
to [the] placement [of landmines and booby traps] after November 2020?”87 Well, there are many
possible justifications and none of them is because Armenia allegedly racially discriminated against
Azerbaijanis.
33. One justification may be, for example, that information was not simply at Armenia’s
disposal and it became available only after Armenia received the forcibly displaced from
Nagorno-Karabakh. In fact, the document Mr Aughey relied yesterday shows precisely that when
noting that “the transferred maps were received through [Nagorno-Karabakh] military personnel”88.
34. Or maybe the answer to Mr Aughey’s rhetorical question is even simpler than that. Tens
of thousands of ethnic Armenians still lived in Nagorno-Karabakh after the conclusion of the Second
Nagorno-Karabakh War. Maybe the landmines were used precisely for the reason they are intended
to be used the world over: as a means to defend military positions. Maybe handing over maps would
have compromised the security of the ethnic Armenian population. And the constant deadly
violations of the ceasefire Azerbaijan purported to agree to under the Trilateral Statement, as well as
the events of last September, prove that any such concern would have been well founded.
35. In short, Mr President and Members of the Court, the evidence before the Court, on its
face, does not show that Armenia has laid mines and booby traps or withheld maps for any purpose
or effect relating to racial discrimination, let alone as a part of a “30-year campaign of ethnic
cleansing”89. As such, Azerbaijan has not shown good reason why the Court should treat its claims
any different than it did in its two Requests for provisional measures. The Court does not have
85 CR 2024/22, p. 54, para. 25 (Aughey).
86 See CR 2021/25, p. 13, para. 9 (Kirakosyan); CR 2021/25, pp. 24-25, paras. 12-14 (Murphy); CR 2021/27,
pp. 16-18, paras. 13-18 (Murphy).
87 CR 2024/22, p. 51, para. 11 (Aughey).
88 National Security Service of the Republic of Armenia, Report (25 January 2024), available at https://www.sns.am/
en/news/view/920 (tab 9 of Azerbaijan’s judges’ folder).
89 CR 2024/22, p. 10, para. 3 (Mammadov).
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jurisdiction ratione materiae with respect to those claims and Armenia respectfully asks you that you
reject them in limine at this phase of the proceedings. This brings my presentation to an end,
Mr President, and I would kindly ask you to call upon Ms Macdonald to continue Armenia’s
submissions.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Mr Salonidis for his statement. I now invite Ms Alison Macdonald
to take the floor. You have the floor, Madam.
Ms MACDONALD:
THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION RATIONE MATERIAE OVER AZERBAIJAN’S
CLAIMS CONCERNING ALLEGED ENVIRONMENTAL HARM
I. Introduction
1. Mr President, Madam Vice-President, Members of the Court, I will respond to Azerbaijan’s
oral submissions on its claims of environmental harm.
II. The legal framework
2. Starting with the legal framework, Professor Boisson de Chazournes cited90 the two-fold
test applied by the Court in the first Ukraine v. Russia case91. The Court will recall that Armenia also
cited this passage on Monday92, along with the paragraph which followed it, which I showed you on
screen93 and which we have here. So it is not quite clear to us why Professor Boisson de Chazournes
said yesterday that Armenia has sought to argue something else94.
3. Be that as it may, remaining with the legal framework a moment longer, on Monday I set
out three propositions, derived from the Court’s case law95:
90 CR 2024/22, p. 55, para. 4 (Boisson de Chazournes).
91 Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation),
Judgment of 31 January 2024, para. 195.
92 CR 2024/21, p. 52, para. 10, fn. 140 (Macdonald).
93 Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation),
Judgment of 31 January 2024, para. 196, referring to Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2021,
p. 71, para. 112.
94 CR 2024/22, p. 56, para. 5 (Boisson de Chazournes).
95 CR 2024/21, pp. 55-56, para. 22 (Macdonald).
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(a) the showing of “disparate effects” must still be directed at establishing that the conduct
complained of was “based on” a prohibited ground;
(b) the showing of a disparate effect will not suffice if there is an objective and reasonable
explanation for the disparity that does not relate to the prohibited grounds;
(c) mere collateral or secondary effects on a particular group are not enough. And I showed you on
Monday that this was expressly accepted by Azerbaijan in its submissions last week96.
4. These propositions were not mentioned, let alone disputed, by Professor Boisson de
Chazournes. And yet in light of the submissions she did make, they take on some significance. It is
not enough, even at jurisdiction stage, just to point to an alleged differential effect and then ask the
Court to indulge in speculation to fill the  as Azerbaijan likes to call it  “something more”.
5. Now Professor Boisson de Chazournes made a point on permissible inferences, based on
the Court’s recent Judgment on the merits in the first Ukraine v. Russia case97. There, citing the
Corfu Channel case, the Court stated that “a State that is not in a position to provide direct proof of
certain facts ‘should be allowed a more liberal recourse to inferences of fact and circumstantial
evidence’”98. In that case, the “more liberal recourse” was because of Ukraine’s lack of access to
evidence in Crimea.
6. Counsel for Azerbaijan sought to draw an analogy between that situation and what she said
was Azerbaijan’s lack of access, at the time of filing its Memorial, to the so-called “occupied
territories”99. But there is no analogy, for two reasons:
(a) The Ukraine case was dealing with the proof of facts at the merits stage. Azerbaijan does not
need to prove facts at jurisdiction stage because Armenia must  and does  accept its factual
allegations as true. So the issue of proof, and consequently of inferences, liberal or otherwise,
does not arise.
96 CR 2024/21, p. 56, para. 22 (c) (Macdonald).
97 CR 2024/22, pp. 60-61, para. 29 (Boisson de Chazournes).
98 Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation),
Judgment of 31 January 2024, para. 169, citing Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1949, p. 18.
99 CR 2024/22, pp. 60-61, para. 29 (Boisson de Chazournes).
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(b) In any event, on Azerbaijan’s case most of the environmental harm occurred in the seven districts
over which it has had control since the conclusion of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in late
2020. And indeed it commissioned its own experts, Industrial Economics, who went to the
“Formerly Occupied Area” in 2021100, although as Armenia sets out in its Preliminary
Objections, the resulting report takes Azerbaijan’s discrimination case no further forward, and in
fact undermines it in a number of respects101.
III. The factual context in which the alleged harms occurred
7. Moving on, then, to the facts, you will recall that Armenia took some time on Monday to
work through the structure of Azerbaijan’s case102. Having heard Azerbaijan yesterday, it does not
seem to be in dispute that, on Azerbaijan’s case:
(a) all the harm allegedly occurred in the three decades in which it describes Armenia as having
“occupied” the territory103;
(b) Armenia controlled the relevant area104;
(c) ethnic Armenians lived in that area105;
(d) ethnic Azerbaijanis did not live in that area106.
8. One thing that Azerbaijan seems to have become confused about, however, is its own factual
case about Armenia’s intentions. You will recall that on Monday I referred you to passages of
Azerbaijan’s Memorial, where its case is set out very clearly. It speaks of Armenia “violat[ing]
CERD by preventing Azerbaijanis from accessing those territories throughout the entire course of its
almost thirty-year occupation”107. How was this done? Well, Azerbaijan goes on to allege that
100 Industrial Economics, Inc. and RESPEC, Inc., Report on Environmental and Natural Resource Harms During
the Period of the Republic of Armenia’s Invasion and Occupation of Sovereign Lands of the Republic of Azerbaijan, for
Use in Proceedings Before the International Court of Justice, in Application of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Azerbaijan v. Armenia) (Memorial of Azerbaijan, Annex 65), p. ES-3,
p. 3.
101 Preliminary Objections of Armenia, paras. 107, 115.
102 CR 2024/21, pp. 50-52, paras. 2-8 (Macdonald).
103 See CR 2024/22, p. 57, para. 11 (Boisson de Chazournes).
104 See ibid., pp. 59-60, para. 25 (Boisson de Chazournes).
105 See ibid., pp. 56-57, para. 10 (Boisson de Chazournes).
106 See ibid., p. 57, para. 15 (Boisson de Chazournes).
107 Memorial of Azerbaijan, para. 446.
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“the Armed Forces of Armenia, including its Installed Regime, sealed off the
then-occupied territories from the rest of Azerbaijan, using physical barriers, military
fortifications, landmines, and snipers, and deploying threats and intimidation along the
Line of Contact and beyond to reinforce the message that Azerbaijanis could never
return to those territories”108.
9. Azerbaijan’s Agent yesterday said that “Armenia’s counsel made the extraordinary and
extremely misleading submission that Azerbaijanis had no intention of returning to those
territories”109. He then gave a one-sided description of the process of negotiations as to a potential
resolution of the situation110.
10. But it is abundantly clear that the submissions to which he took exception, including the
passage he footnotes111, were summarizing Azerbaijan’s own case as to Armenia’s intentions, namely
that — again according to Azerbaijan — Armenia did not intend the Azerbaijanis to return to the
area. You have just seen that case set out clearly on the screen: Armenia, says Azerbaijan, was
determined to use military means “to reinforce the message that Azerbaijanis could never return to
those territories”.
11. So when Azerbaijan’s Agent finds it “puzzling that Armenia did not expect Azerbaijanis
to return to the areas Armenia intentionally pillaged”112, unfortunately that puzzlement arises from
Azerbaijan’s own pleadings, on which its case on jurisdiction ratione materiae must stand or fall.
12. To be sure, the case pleaded by Azerbaijan on this issue is not a remotely fair or accurate
characterization of Armenia’s actual intentions towards the many persons  Armenian and
Azerbaijani  who had been displaced by the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. If this part of the case
went to the merits, Armenia would have abundant evidence to show you about its good-faith
engagement in the Minsk process, through which Armenia strongly hoped to reach a resolution
allowing return of all those who were displaced by the conflict. But at jurisdiction stage, Armenia
has scrupulously taken Azerbaijan’s factual allegations as true, and Azerbaijan must of course do the
same.
108 Ibid., para. 449.
109 CR 2024/22, p. 13, para. 16 (Mammadov).
110 See ibid., pp. 13-14, paras. 17-18 (Mammadov).
111 See CR 2024/21, p. 61, para. 44 (Macdonald).
112 CR 2024/22, pp. 13-14, para. 18 (Mammadov).
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IV. The alleged harm, even if true, does not fulfil any of
the criteria for racial discrimination
13. Turning to the legal requirements that Azerbaijan has to meet, counsel yesterday did not
address the first argument put forward by Armenia, namely that the acts and omissions it complains
of were not capable of amounting to “a differentiation of treatment” of human beings113.
14. Moving on to the requirement that the conduct in question be “based on” a prohibited
ground, which Azerbaijan did address, its submissions focused on what it says to have been different
treatment of the seven so-called “occupied” districts which had previously been populated by
Azerbaijanis, when compared with the territory which was occupied by ethnic Armenians. This
alleged difference, or, as Azerbaijan put it in the Memorial, the “purposeful concentration” of
environmental harm114, is central to Azerbaijan’s case at every stage of the discrimination analysis.
15. And you will recall that, to make its case on this point, counsel for Azerbaijan showed you
a map.
16. Counsel then noted that the yellow areas were formerly Azerbaijani, while the areas
outlined in purple were those inhabited by people of Armenian origin, and she boldly claimed that
there were no acts of environmental destruction in these purple areas115. We can see, though, that this
is contradicted by the map itself, which plainly shows alleged environmental harms in the purple
areas too.
17. Then when it comes to Armenia’s case, counsel for Azerbaijan claimed that Armenia’s
position is that the environmental harm was evenly distributed throughout the occupied territories116.
One searches in vain, though, for a footnote to point us to such a submission, written or oral, by
Armenia. On the contrary, as you have seen, Armenia has been scrupulous to accept, at jurisdiction
stage, Azerbaijan’s factual case about  as I put it on Monday  what was done and where.
18. So let us look at the map. As you can see, it claims to depict four types of environmental
harm: construction of hydropower, mining activities, forest harm and agricultural abandonment.
113 CR 2024/21, pp. 52-53, paras. 9-11 (Macdonald).
114 Observations of Azerbaijan, para. 77.
115 CR 2024/22, p. 58, para. 17 (Boisson de Chazournes).
116 Ibid., para. 19 (Boisson de Chazournes).
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19. To take the example of hydropower, as you see to the left, the hydroelectric stations are
built in Kalbajar and Lachin districts, which are also, according to Azerbaijan’s own experts, the
districts with the highest levels of precipitation117. As you see to the right, the Tartar, Hakari and
Aghavno Rivers also run through these districts. And as you can see when we overlay the two maps,
the hydropower plants allegedly constructed closely follow the flow of these rivers. Is Azerbaijan’s
case that these rivers flow in a discriminatory manner? Or that the rain in Nagorno-Karabakh falls in
a discriminatory way?
20. Turning to mining activities, on Azerbaijan’s map, these took place throughout what it calls
the “Liberated Territories”, including in areas that were allegedly populated by ethnic Armenians,
ringed here in dark blue118. Unsurprisingly, areas where Azerbaijan alleges that there were mining
activities are also the areas with large mineral reserves. In particular, Zangilan, ringed in red at the
bottom, has gold, copper, faced stone, limestone and building stone, while Lachin, ringed to the left,
and Kalbajar, ringed in green at the top left, have large chromite and mercury deposits119. And so to
state the obvious, mines can only be built where the deposits are. Again, the argument cannot surely
be that the mineral resources were distributed in a discriminatory fashion.
21. Azerbaijan’s claim that the “abandonment of agricultural land” constitutes differential
treatment is similarly illogical. We can see this from the report that Azerbaijan cited yesterday, which
it calls a report of the UN Environment Programme120. At the outset we note that the report explicitly
states that it “does not constitute an official publication” and that the views expressed in it “do not
necessarily reflect the view of the United Nations Environment Programme”121. Elsewhere, the report
notes that its findings were restricted not only by the objectives pursued by the Government of
117 Industrial Economics, Inc. and RESPEC, Inc., Report on Environmental and Natural Resource Harms During
the Period of the Republic of Armenia’s Invasion and Occupation of Sovereign Lands of the Republic of Azerbaijan, for
Use in Proceedings Before the International Court of Justice in Application of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Azerbaijan v. Armenia) (Memorial of Azerbaijan, Annex 65), p. 25.
118 Memorial of Azerbaijan, p. 245, footnote 717.
119 “The potential of natural resources in the occupied territories”, Karabakh.org, available at
https://karabakh.org/conflict/occupied-territories/the-potential-of-natural-resources-in-the-occupied-territories/.
120 See CR 2024/22, p. 58, para. 19 (Boisson de Chazournes).
121 Report of the UNEP Environmental Scoping Mission to the Conflict-Affected Territories of Azerbaijan
(April 2022), available at http://eco.gov.az/frq-content/plugins/pages_v1/entry/20221223145000_59496900.pdf, p. I.
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Azerbaijan122, but also by the fact that the sites visited were specifically selected by the
Government123.
22. In any event, on the farming issue the report does not help Azerbaijan at all, since it makes
clear that under-farming is due to depopulation because of the conflict124. Interestingly, the report
even notes that “[t]he resulting decline in agricultural activity may have inadvertently supported
some ecological benefits in terms of ecosystem services and biodiversity”125. And again we ask, is
not farming agricultural land in a depopulated war zone really capable of being racial discrimination?
23. Interestingly, also, the same report makes clear that Azerbaijan has itself caused significant
damage to forests, so we see: “New road construction  launched as part of the reconstruction drive
in January 2021  is also having a significant impact on forest cover; particularly the
approximately ~80-kilometer highway segment between Fuzuli and Shusha.”126
24. Counsel for Azerbaijan also relied on the 2016 Resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe127, but did not address the key points I made about this on Monday,
including:
(a) Firstly, the fact that the reservoir  which is located in Nagorno-Karabakh and which was
damaged in the First Nagorno-Karabakh War128, supplied water to the ethnic Armenian
population of Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as people downstream in Azerbaijan129.
(b) Secondly, that the war damage meant that “water from the Sarsang reservoir cannot be used for
irrigation by anyone until the canal has been repaired”130.
122 See ibid., p. 3.
123 Ibid., p. 5.
124 Ibid., p. 10.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid., p. 14.
127 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 2085, Inhabitants of frontier regions of
Azerbaijan are deliberately deprived of water (26 January 2016).
128 CR 2024/21, pp. 56-57, paras. 25-26 (Macdonald); Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Committee on
Social Affairs, Health and Sustainable Development, Inhabitants of frontier regions of Azerbaijan are deliberately deprived
of water, Doc.13931 (12 December 2015), available at https://pace.coe.int/en/files/22290, para. 19.
129 CR 2024/21, pp. 56-57, paras. 25-26 (Macdonald); Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Committee on
Social Affairs, Health and Sustainable Development, Inhabitants of frontier regions of Azerbaijan are deliberately deprived
of water, Doc.13931 (12 December 2015), available at https://pace.coe.int/en/files/22290, para. 9.
130 CR 2024/21, p. 56, para. 25 (Macdonald); Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Committee on Social
Affairs, Health and Sustainable Development, Inhabitants of frontier regions of Azerbaijan are deliberately deprived of
water, Doc.13931 (12 December 2015), available at https://pace.coe.int/en/files/22290, para. 19 (emphasis added).
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(c) Thirdly, that the Resolution characterizes the alleged mismanagement of the reservoir as a “tool[]
of political influence”131.
25. So we are no further forward in understanding how Armenia is said to have discriminated
against Azerbaijanis in this regard when ethnic Armenians needed the water just as much.
26. As I discussed on Monday, the overall case that Azerbaijan makes here is the “purposeful
concentration” argument, or as counsel put it yesterday, the idea that environmental harm was
“deliberately concentrated” in areas formerly populated by Azerbaijanis132. But after yesterday’s
submissions the Court still has no sense of why this is more than just secondary or collateral
effects  if even that, given that, on Azerbaijan’s case, nobody lived in those areas. Azerbaijan has
offered you no basis at all to conclude that there was any racial discrimination involved in, for
example, situating hydroelectric power activity in areas where there was water, or mining in areas
where there were the resources to mine.
27. And as to how the Azerbaijani population could be discriminated against when they were
not there to experience any of the impacts of this alleged activity, Azerbaijan falls back on the
argument that the alleged environmental harm was all part of a campaign of ethnic cleansing133.
28. The ethnic cleansing allegation is doing a lot of work here. Counsel argued that Armenia’s
alleged ethnic cleansing was intended to ensure that Azerbaijanis would be deprived, upon their
return, of their right to enjoy their homeland, including the environment and natural resources that
form part of it134. The problem with that is that the whole point of ethnic cleansing is that the
perpetrator does not intend the displaced population to return. And as you have seen, that is exactly
Azerbaijan’s pleaded case on the facts and the law135.
131 CR 2024/21, pp. 54-55, para. 19 (Macdonald); Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution
2085(2016), Inhabitants of frontier regions of Azerbaijan are deliberately deprived of water (26 January 2016) (emphasis
added).
132 CR 2024/22, p. 61, para. 30 (Boisson de Chazournes).
133 Ibid., pp. 59-60, paras. 22-25 (Boisson de Chazournes).
134 Ibid., p. 59, para. 23 (Boisson de Chazournes).
135 See ibid., p. 27, para. 32 (Lowe).
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V. Azerbaijan does not establish the applicability of
the rights it relies on
29. Turning briefly to the various specific rights which Azerbaijan invokes in support of its
claims, Professor Boisson de Chazournes stated yesterday that Armenia argues that the rights of
health and property do not fall within the scope of the CERD136. That is, of course, not Armenia’s
position  its position is, rather, that Azerbaijan’s case does not fall within the scope of those rights.
30. And we saw yesterday how loosely they are being invoked. This includes the assertion that
the destruction of the environment, whether intentional or not, has repercussions on the health and
well-being of individuals and their fundamental rights137. Now that may be unobjectionable as an
abstract statement, but the idea of unintentional harm being the basis for a CERD claim is rather
difficult to understand, given among other things the requirement that the relevant acts be “based on”
a protected characteristic.
31. In this regard, counsel for Azerbaijan did not engage with the points I made on Monday
about:
(a) Azerbaijan’s inaccurate presentation of the Western Shoshone case138;
(b) the complete absence of any reference in the work of the CERD Committee to the alleged right
to “return to a healthy environment”139;
(c) the fact that the legal sources on property rights cited by Azerbaijan relate to the collective land
rights of indigenous, tribal or minority communities, and one recommendation of the CERD
Committee on racial discrimination against people of African descent140. And Azerbaijan still,
rightly, stops short of claiming that the former Azerbaijani population of the so-called “occupied
territories” falls into any of these categories, despite gesturing in this general direction by
referring to what it describes as the cultural importance of the territories in question141.
32. Instead of responding to these points, Azerbaijan made a series of scattershot references to
general principles contained in instruments such as the Rio Declaration on Environment and
136 Ibid., p. 63, para. 40 (Boisson de Chazournes).
137 Ibid.
138 CR 2024/21, p. 59, para. 38 (Macdonald).
139 Ibid., p. 60, para. 40 (Macdonald); Memorial of Azerbaijan, para. 473.
140 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General recommendation No. 34: Racial
discrimination against people of African descent, UN doc. CERD/C/GC/34 (3 October 2011).
141 CR 2024/22, p. 61, para. 32 (Boisson de Chazournes); ibid., p. 66, para. 49.
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Development and General Comment No. 14 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights142. But again, none of these general statements of principle gives Azerbaijan the slightest
assistance in establishing the complex blend of rights that it now seeks to rely on. And so its case
also fails, we say, for lack of the engagement of any specific rights in the contorted factual situation
which forms the basis of its discrimination claim.
VI. Conclusion
33. In conclusion, Mr President, Members of the Court, Armenia submits that nothing you
heard yesterday helps Azerbaijan to establish its claim of racial discrimination. So Armenia
respectfully asks you to uphold its jurisdictional objection in this regard.
34. Mr President, that concludes my submissions. I thank you for your attention, and I ask you
to call upon the Agent of Armenia, His Excellency Mr Kirakosyan, to present Armenia’s final
submissions.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Ms Macdonald for her statement. I now invite the Agent of
Armenia, His Excellency Mr Kirakosyan, to take the floor. You have the floor, Excellency.
Mr KIRAKOSYAN:
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FINAL SUBMISSIONS
1. Mr President, Madam Vice-President, distinguished Members of the Court, thank you, once
again, for your kind attention throughout the course of Armenia’s submissions. Counsel showed that
Armenia’s preliminary objections are all properly before you and we look forward to the Court’s
judgment. Before reading Armenia’s final submissions, I would like, however, to make four brief
points responding to some of the allegations made against Armenia in the course of Azerbaijan’s
opening submissions yesterday. These allegations are not the proper province of this phase. The same
holds true for our responses but with the Court’s indulgence I will raise them now for the record.
2. First, Azerbaijan’s Agent referred yesterday to nearly 100-year-old statements, claiming
that Armenia has “endorsed racist ideologies”143. Let me be clear: the author of those statements,
142 Ibid., p. 65, para. 46 (Boisson de Chazournes).
143 CR 2024/22, pp. 11-12, paras. 7-9 (Mammadov).
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Garegin Nzhdeh, is a prominent figure in Armenian history. He is known for his role as a military
leader and statesman, and is widely credited, among other things, for playing a key role in preventing
the severing of the Syunik region of Armenia during 1920-1921144, as well as for defending Armenian
people following the Armenian genocide which the world commemorates today and Azerbaijan
denies. He is not, however, venerated for the statements Azerbaijan placed on the screen yesterday.
3. Azerbaijan’s Agent also showed images of what he called a “parade” which allegedly
“ended in a collective Nazi salute” in front of the statue of Garegin Nzhdeh. But as is clear from
Azerbaijan’s own slides, the so-called “parade” was attended by fewer than 15 individuals145. It
should not be surprising that fringe groups occasionally abuse freedom of expression in a democratic
society. Armenia is no different from any other democratic society in that regard. It is not long ago
that Azerbaijan sought to convince you that freedom of expression in Azerbaijan could only be
exercised in the Lachin Corridor, and my hope is that the irony is lost on the Court.
4. Azerbaijan’s Agent further referred to a statement by Twitter asserting that it had “removed
35 accounts that had ties to the Government of Armenia”146. The Members of the Court will recall
that, in its first Request for provisional measures, Azerbaijan relied on the same statement to request
the Court to order Armenia to “cease and desist incitement based on the fabrication of public and
private hate speech attributed to Azerbaijanis on Twitter and other social media and traditional media
channels”147. But the Court declined to make such an order. And while Azerbaijan is free to seek to
revive that unfounded argument on the merits, Armenia will — once again148 — address it at that
stage.
5. The second point I wish to address concerns Azerbaijan’s criticism of my statement on
Monday denying that Armenia ever “illegally occupied Azerbaijan’s territory, or controlled the
144 See e.g. Richard G. Hovannisian, The Republic of Armenia: Between Crescent and Sickle: Partition and
Sovietization, Vol. 4., Berkeley, University of California Press (1996), p. 239; “Armenian Embassy Condemns Attack On
Nzhdeh Memorial In Russia”, Azatutyun (13 November 2019), available at https://www.azatutyun.am/a/
30269739.html.
145 “The Response To The ‘Neo-Fascist’ March In Yerevan”, Media.am (11 January 2024), available at
https://media.am/en/verified/2024/01/11/37437.
146 Ibid.
147 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Azerbaijan v. Armenia), Request for provisional measures of Azerbaijan (23 September 2021), para. 39 (c).
148 CR 2021/25, pp. 33-36, paras. 2-14 (Kirakosyan).
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authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh”149. According to Azerbaijan’s Agent, Armenia “ignores the
overwhelming response of the international community to Armenia’s invasion and occupation . . .,
which rejected Armenia’s conveniently created self-determination narrative”150.
6. Azerbaijan places much emphasis on the European Court of Human Rights’ judgment in
the Chiragov case, which determined that Armenia had jurisdiction under Article 1 of the European
Convention over Nagorno-Karabakh151. Azerbaijan, however, glosses over the fact that the Court’s
jurisdictional determination, in the Court’s own words, “has never been equated with the test for
establishing a State’s responsibility for an internationally wrongful act”152. To be clear, the European
Court has never found Armenia to have occupied Nagorno-Karabakh.
7. Nor did any of the UN Security Council resolutions relating to the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict the Agent and counsel for Azerbaijan misrepresented yesterday. The Security Council has
called on Armenia to “continue to exert its influence to achieve compliance by the Armenians of
Nagorno-Karabakh”153, but has never referred to Armenia as an occupying Power, let alone an
aggressor. It instead referred to the “local Armenian forces” of Nagorno-Karabakh as the “occupying
forces” and urged the parties “immediately to resume negotiations for the resolution of the conflict
within the framework of the peace process of the Minsk Group”154. That is exactly what Armenia
and the authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh did. Azerbaijan, in contrast, unilaterally decided — in
President Aliyev’s own words — that “war was inevitable” and that the “Minsk Group was dead”155.
149 CR 2024/21, p. 13, para. 6 (Kirakosyan).
150 CR 2024/22, p. 11, para. 5 (Mammadov).
151 Chiragov v. Armenia [GC], European Court of Human Rights, Application no. 13216/05, Judgment (16 June
2015), paras. 169-187.
152 Christian Religious Organization of Jehovah’s Witnesses in the NKR v. Armenia, European Court of Human
Rights, Application no. 41817/10, Judgment (22 March 2022), paras. 47-48. See also Georgia v. Russia (II) [GC],
European Court of Human Rights, Application no. 38263/08, Judgment (21 January 2021), para. 162; Loizidou v. Turkey,
European Court of Human Rights, Application no. 15318/89, Judgment (Preliminary Objections) (23 March 1995),
para. 64; Catan and Others v. Moldova and Russia, European Court of Human Rights, Application nos. 43370/04, 8252/05
and18454/06, Judgment (19 October 2012), para. 115.
153 UN Security Council, resolution no. 853 (29 July 1993), available at http://unscr.com/files/1993/00853.pdf.
154 Ibid.
155 “Ilham Aliyev attended the opening of the IX Global Baku Forum”, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan
Ilham Aliyev (16 June 2022), available at https://president.az/en/articles/view/56442; Ilham Aliyev @presidentaz, X
(1 July 2022), available at https://twitter.com/presidentaz/status/1542805435845066752.
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And it was Azerbaijan that — again in President Aliyev’s words — then “started” the Second
Nagorno-Karabakh War156, which Azerbaijan’s Agent did not dare to deny yesterday.
8. This brings me to the third point I wish to make. Azerbaijan’s Agent accused Armenia’s
counsel yesterday of having misleadingly submitted that Azerbaijanis “never intended to return” to
the so-called formerly occupied territories157. As Ms Macdonald has explained, that is decidedly not
what Armenia’s counsel said. In any event, like the Minsk Group Co-Chairs, Armenia has always
been committed to the reciprocal return of refugees, and Armenia agrees with Azerbaijan’s Agent
that their return was a “critical component of any negotiations”158. But as I have already noted, it was
Azerbaijan that abandoned the Minsk Group Co-Chairs negotiation format.
9. Moreover, the Basic Principles proposed by the Minsk Group’s Co-Chairs did not just call
for the reciprocal return of refugees and the “return of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh
to Azerbaijani control” — the two bullets from the Basic Principles that Azerbaijan selectively
highlighted on your screens159. They also called for “an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh
providing guarantees for security and self-governance”; “a corridor linking Armenia to
Nagorno-Karabakh”; the “future determination of the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh through
a legally binding expression of will”; and “international security guarantees that would include a
peacekeeping operation”160. In addition, the Co-Chairs explicitly based their Basic Principles on,
among others, the principle of “Equal Rights and Self-Determination of Peoples”161. In such
circumstances, it is difficult to see how Azerbaijan’s Agent could bring himself to claim before this
Court that the international community “rejected Armenia’s conveniently created self-determination
narrative”162.
156 “Ilham Aliyev attended an event organized on the occasion of Victory Day in Shusha”, President of the Republic
of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev (8 November 2022), available at https://president.az/en/articles/view/57801, “The CNN Turk
TV channel has interviewed Ilham Aliyev”, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev (14 August 2021),
available at https://president.az/en/articles/view/52736.
157 CR 2024/21, p. 61, para. 44 (Macdonald).
158 CR 2024/22, p. 13, para. 18 (Mammadov).
159 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Azerbaijan v. Armenia), hearing on preliminary objections, presentation of Azerbaijan (23 April 2024), slide 11.
160 Ibid.
161 “Statement by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries”, OSCE Minsk Group (10 July 2009), available at
https://www.osce.org/mg/51152.
162 CR 2024/22, p. 11, para. 5 (Mammadov).
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10. My fourth and final point relates to Azerbaijan’s Agent’s assertion that, during the course
of the so-called “occupation”, Armenia “prevented access by Azerbaijan, by the UN agencies and
other international organizations, as a means of precluding Azerbaijan from complaining about
Armenia’s racist occupation campaign following liberation of its territories”163. As Azerbaijan
knows, however, neither Armenia nor the local representatives in Nagorno-Karabakh ever prevented
the United Nations from accessing Nagorno-Karabakh, and Azerbaijan’s Agent conspicuously cited
nothing in support of his statement asserting that they did. In reality, it was Azerbaijan that impeded
UN access, and it is Azerbaijan that continues to do so today164. It was also Azerbaijan that repeatedly
refused to co-operate with the ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, including with respect to
issues of environmental protection and the Sarsang Reservoir165.
11. I will now read Armenia’s final submissions.
“On the basis of its written and oral submissions, the Republic of Armenia
respectfully requests that the Court:
a. Uphold the preliminary objection raised by the Republic of Armenia concerning the
jurisdiction ratione temporis of the Court, and adjudge and declare that it lacks
jurisdiction with respect to Azerbaijan’s claims and contentions concerning events
that transpired prior to the entry into force of the CERD as between the Parties on
15 September 1996;
b. In the alternative, uphold the preliminary objection raised by the Republic of
Armenia concerning the admissibility of the claims, and adjudge and declare that
Azerbaijan’s claims and contentions concerning events that transpired prior to the
entry into force of the CERD as between the Parties on 15 September 1996 are
inadmissible;
c. Uphold the preliminary objection raised by the Republic of Armenia concerning the
jurisdiction ratione materiae of the Court, and adjudge and declare that it lacks
jurisdiction with respect to Azerbaijan’s claims and contentions concerning the
alleged placement of landmines and booby traps; and
d. Uphold the preliminary objection raised by the Republic of Armenia concerning the
jurisdiction ratione materiae of the Court, and adjudge and declare that it lacks
163 CR 2024/22, p. 15, para. 27 (Mammadov).
164 “UNESCO is awaiting Azerbaijan’s Response regarding Nagorno-Karabakh mission”, UNESCO (21 December
2020), available at https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/unesco-awaiting-azerbaijans-response-regarding-nagorno-karabakhmission;
“Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General”, United Nations (12 May
2021), available at https://press.un.org/en/2021/db210512.doc.htm. See also Application of the International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Azerbaijan v. Armenia), Memorial of Armenia (23 January
2023), paras. 3.458-3.467.
165 See e.g. “Azerbaijan rejects Karabakh’s call for joint use of river resources - spokesman”, Tert.am (16 August
2013), available at https://www.tert.am/en/news/2013/08/16/davit-babayan1/841598; Karabakh, “Azerbaijan can jointly
use Sarsang Reservoir resources”, News.am (10 April 2019), available at https://news.am/eng/news/506318.html.
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jurisdiction with respect to Azerbaijan’s claims and contentions concerning alleged
environmental harm.”
12. Mr President, Members of the Court, this concludes Armenia’s submissions on its
preliminary objections. With your kind indulgence, I wish only to thank the interpreters and the
Registry for their professional assistance throughout these proceedings and, of course, thank you,
Members of the Court, for your kind attention.
The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency Mr Kirakosyan. La Cour prend note des conclusions
finales dont vous venez de donner lecture au nom de votre gouvernement. La Cour se réunira de
nouveau le vendredi 26 avril, à 10 heures, pour entendre l’Azerbaïdjan en son second tour de
plaidoiries.
L’audience est levée.
L’audience est levée à 18 h 5.
___________