SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE ROBINSON
1. An interesting and not esoteric question has been raised in this case. It was not necessary
for the Court to pronounce on it in explicit terms. However, the question may have implications for
the functioning of what the Preamble to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(hereinafter “the UNCLOS” or “the Convention”) calls “a legal order for the seas and oceans”1, the
establishment of which was the primary goal of the Convention.

DECLARATION OF JUDGE SEBUTINDE

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE XUE
1. Notwithstanding my vote on subparagraph (4) of the operative part of the Judgment, I
wish to place on record my disagreement with the reasoning in relation to the location of the
starting-point of the land boundary between the Parties and the way in which this issue is treated in
the Maritime Delimitation case.
2. First of all, I am of the view that, under the 1858 Treaty of Limits, the Cleveland Award
and the Alexander Awards, the starting-point of the land boundary should be located on the

DECLARATION OF JUDGE TOMKA
Search for an equitable solution in the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelf  Need to avoid a pronounced cut-off effect of the maritime boundary line 
Adjustment of the provisional equidistance line  Appropriate balancing of the entitlements of the
Parties.
1. Although I have voted in favour of all of the findings of the Court, I am not fully satisfied
with the way in which the Court has determined the maritime boundary between the Parties in the

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE AD HOC DUGARD
Unable to accept methodology of quantification as accepted by the Court  Increased
valuation of impairment to environmental goods and services  Court should have had regard to
considerations such as protection of the environment, climate change and gravity of respondent
State’s conduct  Erga omnes nature of obligation not to harm gas regulation services.
Table of contents
I. The methodology employed by the Court in arriving at compensation for

DECLARATION OF JUDGE AD HOC GUILLAUME
[Translation]
1. In its Judgment of 16 December 2015, the Court found “that Nicaragua has the obligation to compensate Costa Rica for material damages caused by Nicaragua’s unlawful activities on Costa Rican territory” (para. 229, subpara. (5) (a)). Since the Parties failed to reach an agreement on the amount of compensation due, “the question of compensation . . . will [now] be settled by the Court” (para. 229, subpara. (5) (b)).

DECLARATION OF JUDGE GEVORGIAN
Environmental damage  No punitive or exemplary damages in international law 
Holistic approach to environmental damage  Burden of proof  Costa Rica’s evidence was not
persuasive  The extent of the damage can be established “as a matter of just and reasonable
inference”, but not the damage itself.
1. I voted in favour of all paragraphs of the dispositif, including the amounts for the
compensation due from the Republic of Nicaragua to the Republic of Costa Rica for environmental

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE BHANDARI
Relationship between compensation and restitution in the present case  Costa Rica chose
compensation as an appropriate method for reparation in the present case  Insufficiency of
evidence submitted by the Parties on the quantification of environmental damage  Necessity to
quantify the damage based on equitable considerations  Relevance of the precautionary
approach  Punitive or exemplary damages are justified where a State has caused serious injury

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE DONOGHUE
Compensation for “pure” environmental damage — Valuation of damage to environmental
goods and services — Unsupported award for the value of restoration of the wetland.
1. I submit this separate opinion in order to set out the reasons for my votes with respect to
compensation for the impairment or loss of environmental goods and services (Judgment,
para. 157 (1) (a)) and restoration costs (ibid., para. 157 (1) (b)).
I. COMPENSATION FOR THE IMPAIRMENT OR LOSS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
GOODS AND SERVICES

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE CANÇADO TRINDADE
Table of contents
I. Prolegomena. ........................................................................................................................... 1
II. The Principle Neminem Laedere and the Duty of Reparation for Damages. ........................... 2
III. The Indissoluble Whole of Breach and Prompt Reparation. .................................................... 3
IV. Duty of Reparation: A Fundamental, rather than “Secondary”, Obligation. ........................... 4