Public sitting held on Tuesday 23 April 2024, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Salam presiding, in the case concerning Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Azerbaijan v. Armenia)

Non corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2024/22
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THE HAGUE LA HAYE
YEAR 2024
Public sitting
held on Tuesday 23 April 2024, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Salam presiding,
in the case concerning Application of the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Azerbaijan v. Armenia)
____________________
VERBATIM RECORD
____________________
ANNÉE 2024
Audience publique
tenue le mardi 23 avril 2024, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Salam, président,
en l’affaire relative à l’Application de la convention internationale sur l’élimination
de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale (Azerbaïdjan c. Arménie)
________________
COMPTE RENDU
________________
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Present: President Salam
Vice-President Sebutinde
Judges Tomka
Yusuf
Xue
Bhandari
Iwasawa
Nolte
Charlesworth
Brant
Gómez Robledo
Cleveland
Aurescu
Tladi
Judges ad hoc Daudet
Koroma
Registrar Gautier

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Présents : M. Salam, président
Mme Sebutinde, vice-présidente
MM. Tomka
Yusuf
Mme Xue
MM. Bhandari
Iwasawa
Nolte
Mme Charlesworth
MM. Brant
Gómez Robledo
Mme Cleveland
MM. Aurescu
Tladi, juges
MM. Daudet
Koroma, juges ad hoc
M. Gautier, greffier

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The Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan is represented by:
HE Mr Elnur Mammadov, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Republic of Azerbaijan,
as Agent;
HE Mr Rahman Mustafayev, Ambassador of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Mr Vaughan Lowe, KC, Emeritus Chichele Professor of Public International Law, University of
Oxford, member of the Institut de droit international, Essex Court Chambers, member of the Bar
of England and Wales,
Mr Samuel Wordsworth, KC, Essex Court Chambers, member of the Bar of England and Wales,
member of the Paris Bar,
Ms Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Professor of International Law and International Organization
at the University of Geneva, member of the Institut de droit international, member of Matrix
Chambers,
Mr Stefan Talmon, Professor of International Law, University of Bonn, Barrister, Twenty Essex
Chambers,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr Stephen Fietta, KC, Fietta LLP, Solicitor Advocate of the Senior Courts of England and Wales,
Ms Oonagh Sands, Fietta LLP, member of the Bars of the State of New York and the District of
Columbia, Solicitor Advocate of the Senior Courts of England and Wales,
Mr Luke Tattersall, Essex Court Chambers, member of the Bar of England and Wales,
Ms Eileen Crowley, Fietta LLP, member of the Bar of the State of New York, solicitor of the Senior
Courts of England and Wales,
Mr Gershon Hasin, JSD, Fietta LLP, member of the Bar of the State of New York,
Ms Mercedes Roman, Fietta LLP, member of the Bar of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,
Mr Sean Aughey, Essex Court Chambers, member of the Bar of England and Wales,
Mr Aditya Laddha, PhD candidate and assistant, Faculty of Law, University of Geneva,
Ms Miglena Angelova, Fietta LLP, member of the Paris Bar, Solicitor Advocate of the Senior Courts
of England and Wales,
as Counsel;
Mr Nurlan Aliyev, Counsellor, Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
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Le Gouvernement de la République d’Azerbaïdjan est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Elnur Mammadov, ministre adjoint aux affaires étrangères de la République
d’Azerbaïdjan,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Rahman Mustafayev, ambassadeur de la République d’Azerbaïdjan auprès du Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
M. Vaughan Lowe, KC, professeur émérite de droit international public (chaire Chichele) à
l’Université d’Oxford, membre de l’Institut de droit international, Essex Court Chambers,
membre du barreau d’Angleterre et du pays de Galles,
M. Samuel Wordsworth, KC, Essex Court Chambers, membre du barreau d’Angleterre et du pays de
Galles, et du barreau de Paris,
Mme Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, professeure de droit international et organisation
internationale à l’Université de Genève, membre de l’Institut de droit international, membre de
Matrix Chambers,
M. Stefan Talmon, professeur de droit international à l’Université de Bonn, barrister, Twenty Essex
Chambers,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. Stephen Fietta, KC, cabinet Fietta LLP, avocat et solicitor près les juridictions supérieures
d’Angleterre et du pays de Galles,
Mme Oonagh Sands, cabinet Fietta LLP, membre des barreaux de l’État de New York et du district
de Columbia, avocate et solicitor près les juridictions supérieures d’Angleterre et du pays de
Galles,
M. Luke Tattersall, Essex Court Chambers, membre du barreau d’Angleterre et du pays de Galles,
Mme Eileen Crowley, cabinet Fietta LLP, membre du barreau de l’État de New York, solicitor près
les juridictions supérieures d’Angleterre et du pays de Galles,
M. Gershon Hasin, JSD, cabinet Fietta LLP, membre du barreau de l’État de New York,
Mme Mercedes Roman, cabinet Fietta LLP, membre du barreau de la République bolivarienne du
Venezuela,
M. Sean Aughey, Essex Court Chambers, membre du barreau d’Angleterre et du pays de Galles,
M. Aditya Laddha, doctorant et assistant à la faculté de droit de l’Université de Genève,
Mme Miglena Angelova, cabinet Fietta LLP, membre du barreau de Paris, avocate et solicitor près
les juridictions supérieures d’Angleterre et du pays de Galles,
comme conseils ;
M. Nurlan Aliyev, conseiller, ambassade de la République d’Azerbaïdjan au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
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Ms Sabina Sadigli, First Secretary, Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Mr Vusal Ibrahimov, First Secretary, Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Mr Badir Bayramov, Second Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan,
Mr Shahriyar Hajiyev, Second Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan,
as Advisers.
The Government of the Republic of Armenia is represented by:
HE Mr Yeghishe Kirakosyan, Representative of the Republic of Armenia on International Legal
Matters,
as Agent;
Mr Lawrence H. Martin, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of the District of
Columbia and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
Ms Alison Macdonald, KC, Barrister, Essex Court Chambers, London,
Mr Constantinos Salonidis, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of the State of
New York and Greece,
Mr Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, Professor of International Law, Dean of the Faculty of Law of the
University of Athens, member of the Institut de droit international, member of the Permanent
Court of Arbitration,
Mr Pierre d’Argent, Full Professor, Université catholique de Louvain, member of the Institut de droit
international, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bar of Brussels,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr Sean Murphy, Manatt/Ahn Professor of International Law, The George Washington University
Law School, associate member of the Institut de droit international, member of the Bar of
Maryland,
Mr Joseph Klingler, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of the District of
Columbia and the State of New York,
Mr Peter Tzeng, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of the District of Columbia
and the State of New York,
Ms Iulia Padeanu Mellon, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of the District of
Columbia and Illinois,
Mr Amir Ardelan Farhadi, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bar of the State of New
York,
Ms Yasmin Al Ameen, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bar of the State of New
York,
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Mme Sabina Sadigli, première secrétaire, ambassade de la République d’Azerbaïdjan au Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
M. Vusal Ibrahimov, premier secrétaire, ambassade de la République d’Azerbaïdjan au Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
M. Badir Bayramov, deuxième secrétaire, ministère des affaires étrangères de la République
d’Azerbaïdjan,
M. Shahriyar Hajiyev, deuxième secrétaire, ministère des affaires étrangères de la République
d’Azerbaïdjan,
comme conseillers.
Le Gouvernement de la République d’Arménie est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Yeghishe Kirakosyan, représentant de la République d’Arménie chargé des affaires
juridiques internationales,
comme agent ;
M. Lawrence H. Martin, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux du district de
Columbia et du Commonwealth du Massachusetts,
Mme Alison Macdonald, KC, barrister, Essex Court Chambers (Londres),
M. Constantinos Salonidis, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux de l’État de
New York et de Grèce,
M. Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, professeur de droit international, doyen de la faculté de droit de
l’Université d’Athènes, membre de l’Institut de droit international, membre de la Cour
permanente d’arbitrage,
M. Pierre d’Argent, professeur titulaire à l’Université catholique de Louvain, membre de l’Institut
de droit international, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre du barreau de Bruxelles,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. Sean Murphy, professeur de droit international titulaire de la chaire Manatt/Ahn à la faculté de
droit de l’Université George Washington, membre associé de l’Institut de droit international,
membre du barreau du Maryland,
M. Joseph Klingler, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux du district de
Columbia et de l’État de New York,
M. Peter Tzeng, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux du district de Columbia
et de l’État de New York,
Mme Iulia Padeanu Mellon, avocate au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux du district de
Columbia et de l’Illinois,
M. Amir Ardelan Farhadi, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre du barreau de l’État de
New York,
Mme Yasmin Al Ameen, avocate au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre du barreau de l’État de
New York,
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Ms Diem Huong Ho, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of England and Wales
and the State of New York,
Mr Harout Ekmanian, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bar of the State of New
York,
Ms María Camila Rincón, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bar of Colombia,
as Counsel;
HE Mr Viktor Biyagov, Ambassador of the Republic of Armenia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
HE Mr Andranik Hovhannisyan, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Armenia to the
United Nations Office and other international organizations in Geneva,
Mr Liparit Drmeyan, Head of the Office of the Representative of the Republic of Armenia on
International Legal Matters, Office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia,
Mr Aram Aramyan, Head of the Department of Protection of the Interests of the Republic of Armenia
in Interstate Disputes, Office of the Representative of the Republic of Armenia on International
Legal Matters, Office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia,
Ms Kristine Khanazadyan, Head of the Department for Representation of the Interests of the
Republic of Armenia before International Arbitral Tribunals and Foreign Courts, Office of the
Representative of the Republic of Armenia on International Legal Matters, Office of the Prime
Minister of the Republic of Armenia,
Ms Zoya Stepanyan, Head of the International Human Rights Cooperation Division, Department for
Human Rights and Humanitarian Issues, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ms Viviana Kalaejian, Third Secretary, Embassy of the Republic of Armenia in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Ms Nanami Hirata, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP,
as Advisers;
Ms Jennifer Schoppmann, Foley Hoag LLP,
Ms Deborah Langley, Foley Hoag LLP,
as Assistants.
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Mme Diem Huong Ho, avocate au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre du barreau d’Angleterre et du
pays de Galles ainsi que du barreau de l’État de New York,
M. Harout Ekmanian, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre du barreau de l’État de New York,
Mme María Camila Rincón, avocate au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre du barreau de Colombie,
comme conseils ;
S. Exc. M. Viktor Biyagov, ambassadeur de la République d’Arménie auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
S. Exc. M. Andranik Hovhannisyan, représentant permanent de la République d’Arménie auprès de
l’Office des Nations Unies et des autres organisations internationales à Genève,
M. Liparit Drmeyan, chef du bureau du représentant de la République d’Arménie chargé des affaires
juridiques internationales, cabinet du premier ministre de la République d’Arménie,
M. Aram Aramyan, directeur du département de la protection des intérêts de la République
d’Arménie dans les différends interétatiques, bureau du représentant de la République d’Arménie
chargé des affaires juridiques internationales, cabinet du premier ministre de la République
d’Arménie,
Mme Kristine Khanazadyan, directrice du département chargé de la représentation des intérêts de la
République d’Arménie devant les tribunaux arbitraux internationaux et les juridictions étrangères,
bureau du représentant de la République d’Arménie chargé des affaires juridiques internationales,
cabinet du premier ministre de la République d’Arménie,
Mme Zoya Stepanyan, cheffe de la division de la coopération internationale en matière des droits de
l’homme, département des droits de l’homme et des affaires humanitaires, ministère des affaires
étrangères,
Mme Viviana Kalaejian, troisième secrétaire, ambassade de la République d’Arménie au Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
Mme Nanami Hirata, avocate au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP,
comme conseillers ;
Mme Jennifer Schoppmann, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP,
Mme Deborah Langley, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP,
comme assistantes.
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Le PRÉSIDENT : Veuillez vous asseoir. L’audience est ouverte.
Pour des raisons dont il m’a dûment fait part, M. le juge Abraham n’est pas en mesure
de participer à l’audience de ce jour. La Cour se réunit ce matin pour entendre le premier
tour de plaidoiries de la République d’Azerbaïdjan sur les exceptions préliminaires soulevées
par la défenderesse en l’affaire relative à l’Application de la convention internationale sur
l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale (Azerbaïdjan c. Arménie). Je
donne à présent la parole à l’agent de l’Azerbaïdjan, S. Exc. M. Elnur Mammadov.
Excellence, vous avez la parole.
M. MAMMADOV : Merci bien, Monsieur le président.
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
1. Mr President, Madam Vice-President, Members of the Court, it is an honour to appear
before you again and to do so on behalf of my country, the Republic of Azerbaijan. Last week,
Azerbaijan explained that Armenia’s CERD Application falls outside your jurisdiction, either wholly
because Armenia rushed to file its Application before giving negotiations a chance, or in large part
because it misuses the CERD in an attempt to bring before the Court a kaleidoscope of international
humanitarian law and other allegations arising out of armed conflict. As is clear on its face, and as
Azerbaijan will explain this week, Azerbaijan’s CERD Application is completely different.
2. Yesterday, Armenia’s counsel accused Azerbaijan of having “reformulated” its CERD
complaint in response to Armenia’s preliminary objections. So let me set the record straight now.
I will start by reiterating what exactly is Azerbaijan’s CERD complaint, as advanced in its Memorial
and accompanying submission, before Armenia submitted any preliminary objections.
3. Azerbaijan’s CERD complaint goes to the very heart of the Convention. It centres upon a
30-year campaign of ethnic cleansing and related cultural erasure by Armenia of the Azerbaijani
population and culture in the formerly occupied territories, following Armenia’s illegal invasion
in 1991. In open defiance of multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions, Armenia
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implemented a systemic campaign to drive the Azerbaijani population from their ancestral homes,
install a mono-ethnic Armenian population in its place and deny Azerbaijanis any ability to return.
4. The facts and evidence that Azerbaijan has submitted with respect to the targeted
deployment of landmines, booby traps and environmental destruction form just part of that
systematic, racially motivated campaign.
5. Yesterday, Armenia’s Agent “vigorously denie[d]” that Armenia had ever “endorsed racist
ideologies, illegally occupied Azerbaijan’s territory, or controlled the authorities in
Nagorno-Karabakh”1. This is sophistry on the part of Armenia. It ignores the overwhelming response
of the international community to Armenia’s invasion and occupation of Azerbaijan, which rejected
Armenia’s conveniently created self-determination narrative. Not a single State in the world bought
into this fairy tale. The United Nations Security Council issued multiple resolutions demanding
immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of the occupying Armenian forces from the
sovereign territories of Azerbaijan. It also ignores the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights confirming Armenia’s effective control over those territories, and the Trilateral Statement of
10 November 2020 by which Armenia committed to withdraw its troops from, and thereby relinquish
its control over, those sovereign territories of Azerbaijan. And it ignores the fact that Armenia’s
culpable conduct was driven by an openly racist and nationalist ideology known as Tseghakron, or
“race-religion” in Armenian.
6. Last week, the Agent of Armenia dismissed Tseghakron as “an early twentieth century
national ideology . . ., which has nothing to do with the mainstream political realities in Armenia
today”. But it was striking that Armenia did not dispute the fact that Tseghakron was and is a racist
ideology, or the fact that Tseghakron had everything to do with Armenia’s political realities during
its campaign in the formerly occupied territories throughout the years of occupation.
7. Throughout most of its occupation, Armenia was ruled by the Republican Party of Armenia,
or the RPA. The RPA was, and remains, a staunch follower of Tseghakron ideology and idolizes its
founder, Garegin Nzhdeh. Even today, it proudly proclaims on its website that it is “the ideological
1 CR 2024/21, p. 13, para. 6 (Kirakosyan).
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and political successor of Nzhdeh Tseghakron Professios and National United Party” whose
“ideological basis is Garegin Nzhdeh’s teaching”.
8. I invite the Court to reflect on some of Nzhdeh’s teachings, quotations from which appear
on the screen. Central to them is the notion of a superior Armenian “Aryan” race, the consequential
racial inferiority of Azerbaijanis (called in his teachings “Turks”) and the unification of all ethnic
Armenians within a single, mono-ethnic State extending into Azerbaijan’s and neighbouring States’
sovereign territories. The teachings call Azerbaijanis those “who for centuries had more dog traits in
themselves than human”. For more detailed extracts from Nzhdeh’s teachings, I refer you to tab 2 of
the judges’ folder.
9. Garegin Nzhdeh remains a national hero in Armenia. On the slide you see two statues of
him in Armenia erected in 2016, one of which was unveiled by the then President of Armenia.
10. Nzhdeh is also venerated by fascist groups in Armenia. Here, you can see a recent parade
by one such group on the main square in Yerevan, which ended in a collective Nazi salute to his
statue. I pause to note that Armenia failed to take any measures to prevent this openly racist event,
despite the Court’s provisional measures Order dated 7 December 2021. For a State supposedly
committed to the eradication of racial discrimination, I wonder why Armenia allows such parades to
take place in its capital in broad daylight today?
11. Mr President, Members of the Court, last week, when addressing Azerbaijan’s CERD
claim, the Agent for Armenia also asserted that Azerbaijan is unable to present any hate speech or
video evidence of racist atrocities2. That, again, is patently false.
12. My next slide shows just a few examples of the hate speech that drove Armenia’s culpable
conduct in the formerly occupied territories, taken from Azerbaijan’s Application and Memorial.
They include statements about the “ethnic incompatibility” of Armenians and Azerbaijanis,
describing even the idea of coexistence as a “tragedy” and the labelling of Azerbaijanis as being at a
“different level of civilization”.
13. The level of Armenian hate speech against Azerbaijanis was such that, in 2021, as you can
see on the screen, Twitter identified over thirty accounts, all associated with the Armenian
2 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Armenia v.
Azerbaijan), CR 2024/18, p. 11, para. 4 (Kirakosyan).
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Government. These accounts were either spreading hate speech against Azerbaijanis or were fake
accounts pretending to broadcast Azerbaijani hate speech against Armenians. Armenia seems to have
been so concerned with hate speech against Armenians that it took great efforts to create more.
14. And as far as video evidence is concerned, contrary to the assertion made by the Agent for
Armenia, Azerbaijan’s Application alone was accompanied by no less than 17 videos showing
appalling racist atrocities committed against Azerbaijanis.
15. Azerbaijan’s CERD case against Armenia manifestly falls within the substantive scope of
the Convention. Having illegally invaded and occupied Azerbaijan’s territory, Armenia proceeded
to execute, over the following decades, the pervasive racist agenda that is the subject of Azerbaijan’s
complaint. Armenia’s campaign was multifaceted, comprising an array of conduct  including the
laying of booby traps and landmines and a devastating assault on the natural environment and
resources of the formerly occupied territories  all of which targeted the local Azerbaijani
population or the prevention of their return.
16. This last point is critical. Yesterday, Armenia’s counsel made the extraordinary and
extremely misleading submission that Azerbaijanis had no intention of returning to those territories,
while Armenia was busy laying its landmines and booby traps, looting resources and reaping
environmental devastation3. I could hardly believe my ears and I had to review the transcript to be
sure.
17. No doubt Armenia’s Agent knows that it was widely expected and widely demanded that
Armenia must withdraw from the occupied territories and allow the many hundreds of thousands of
displaced Azerbaijanis to return to their homes as part of any peaceful settlement of the conflict.
18. Azerbaijan consistently demanded the return of its displaced persons. Its demand was
recognized by international bodies. The UN Security Council consistently recognized that any
resolution of the conflict would entail such return. It was always a critical component of any
negotiations. To be sure, it was always understood that key principles of any agreed settlement would
include: (1) the return of the territories surrounding Garabagh to Azerbaijani control; and (2) the right
3 CR 2024/21, p. 61, para. 44 (Macdonald).
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of Azerbaijani displaced persons to return to their former places of residence. It is therefore puzzling
that Armenia did not expect Azerbaijanis to return to the areas Armenia intentionally pillaged.
19. The map on the slide depicts the formerly occupied territories of Azerbaijan. You can see
the purple lines show the former Nagorno-Karabagh Autonomous Oblast of the Azerbaijani USSR,
which had been majority populated by ethnic Armenians prior to the invasion. The yellow lines depict
the additional seven occupied districts whose population was 99 per cent Azerbaijani before the
invasion4. As Professor Boisson de Chazournes will explain, and the Court can see on the map, the
vast majority of the environmental destruction by Armenia was deliberately targeted at those seven
districts. Again, these were districts to which everyone, including Armenia itself, was aware that a
majority Azerbaijani population was expected to return if a settlement were to be reached. This
explains the pattern of environmental destruction in those specific areas where Armenians did not
live and Azerbaijanis were expected to return.
20. Armenia was determined to frustrate the return of Azerbaijanis to their homes, and thereby
to preserve the racial purity of its occupied territories. Armenia’s claim that it could not anticipate
the return of displaced persons or that Azerbaijan gave it up is simply nonsensical.
21. Even today, the return of Azerbaijanis previously displaced from the formerly occupied
territories remains inhibited by Armenia’s misconduct, as Azerbaijan works to reinstate critical
infrastructure, identify and remove landmines and booby traps and restore the natural environment.
Hundreds of Azerbaijanis, mostly civilians, have lost their lives or suffered horrific life-changing
injuries due to the landmines and booby traps which Armenia placed in order to prevent their return.
22. Armenians even continue to celebrate such tragedies. Some recent Armenian social media
posts are on my next slide. Not only does Armenia refuse to provide Azerbaijan with detailed maps
of its landmines, but it has failed to abide by its obligation to prevent and punish such blatant hate
speech. Armenia’s time would have been better spent combating online racism by its own nationals
than browsing the web for fake Azerbaijani army badges.
23. Mr President, Members of the Court, there is one additional aspect of Armenia’s invasion
and 30-year occupation of Azerbaijan’s territories that warrants attention. Armenia’s misconduct
4 Figure 3 to the Memorial of Azerbaijan.
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included many infamous examples of grave breaches of international humanitarian law and other
international human rights norms by Armenia’s armed forces. Armenia has resolutely refused to
investigate or prosecute them. Importantly, though  and in contrast to Armenia’s approach 
Azerbaijan does not claim individual breaches of CERD with respect to that misconduct. Rather,
Azerbaijan treats these acts as elements composing Armenia’s wholesale racist campaign. Similarly,
Azerbaijan does not claim that the placement of landmines and environmental destruction constitute
individual breaches of CERD, but rather as integral components of Armenia’s campaign.
24. Mr President, Members of the Court, Armenia presents three jurisdictional objections to
Azerbaijan’s CERD complaint, each of which is designed to exclude aspects of its racist campaign
from analysis by the Court at the merits stage.
25. First, it makes a ratione temporis objection with respect to claims concerning events prior
to 15 September 1996, when Azerbaijan became a CERD party. Second, it submits a ratione
materiae objection with respect to the targeted placement of landmines and booby traps. Third, it
submits another ratione materiae objection with respect to Azerbaijan’s claims concerning deliberate
environmental harm.
26. Azerbaijan is confident that you will dismiss each of Armenia’s three objections to
jurisdiction at this stage, and thereby allow Azerbaijan’s CERD complaint to proceed to the merits.
27. Armenia also submits a separate objection to admissibility, arising out of what it calls
“Azerbaijan’s three-decade delay in bringing its claims”. If accepted, this would prevent the Court
from assessing Azerbaijan’s CERD complaint at all. Armenia tries to use its 30 years of unlawful
occupation, during which it prevented access by Azerbaijan, by the UN agencies and other
international organizations, as a means of precluding Azerbaijan from complaining about Armenia’s
racist occupation campaign following liberation of its territories. Armenia cannot benefit from its
unlawful conduct.
28. In this context, it is imperative to note that Azerbaijan has brought its Application based
on evidence which it has discovered, and continues to discover, following the liberation of the
territories in 2020. Thus, for example, following the liberation of our territories, we have discovered
ruined cities, destroyed cultural monuments and a devastated environment. And in the last few weeks,
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Azerbaijan has continued to find new evidence of the deployment of booby traps to inhibit the return
of ethnic Azerbaijanis to their homes.
29. In tabs 7 and 10 of your judges’ folder you will find references to the multitude of evidence
Azerbaijan presented to the Court, and keeps uncovering, subsequent to the liberation of its territories
in late 2020.
30. Accordingly, Azerbaijan’s Application arises out of a timely and orthodox invocation of
the ICJ’s jurisdiction under Article 22 of the Convention. If Armenia got its way, Azerbaijan would
have been compelled to bring a CERD claim before the liberation of its territories and without access
to much of the evidence on which it now relies. This is plainly disingenuous. Professor Talmon will
address you further on Armenia’s flawed admissibility complaint.
31. Ironically, if any Party delayed its CERD complaint, it was Armenia itself. Last week,
Armenia’s Agent described Armenia’s complaint as “the culmination of decades of racial
discrimination against ethnic Armenians”5. And yet, Armenia never communicated any CERD
complaint to Azerbaijan over that “many decades” period. Instead  as Armenia itself admits in its
Application  it waited until 11 November 2020  more than 24 years after Azerbaijan’s accession
to the CERD but just one day after the end of the Second Garabagh War  just one day  before
notifying Azerbaijan of its CERD complaint. Clearly, this timing was no coincidence. One can only
wonder why Armenia had waited until it lost control of the territories of Azerbaijan as a result of the
Second Garabagh War before rushing to the Court with its CERD application against Azerbaijan?
32. Mr President, Members of the Court, Azerbaijan’s oral submissions this morning will
proceed as follows: Mr Stephen Fietta will provide an overview of Azerbaijan’s CERD complaint;
Professor Vaughan Lowe will explain why Armenia’s preliminary objection ratione temporis should
be rejected; Professor Stefan Talmon will then explain why Armenia’s admissibility objection fails;
Mr Sam Wordsworth and Mr Sean Aughey will each rebut the legal and factual aspects of Armenia’s
preliminary objection with respect to landmines and booby traps; and finally, Professor Laurence
Boisson de Chazournes will refute Armenia’s objection with respect to the environmental damage it
caused during its occupation of Azerbaijan’s sovereign territories.
5 CR 2024/18, p. 11, para. 4 (Kirakosyan).
- 17 -
33. Mr President, Members of the Court, I thank you for your attention and I kindly ask that
you invite Mr Stephen Fietta to the podium, who will provide an overview of Azerbaijan’s CERD
complaint.
The PRESIDENT: I thank the Agent of Azerbaijan for his statement. I now invite Mr Stephen
Fietta to take the floor. You have the floor, Sir.
Mr FIETTA:
OVERVIEW OF AZERBAIJAN’S CASE
1. Mr President, Members of the Court, it is a privilege to appear before you and to present
this introductory overview of Azerbaijan’s CERD case.
2. I have a number of overarching points to make, bearing in mind last week’s hearing in this
Court, before my colleagues address you on the specific issues before you this week. The two cases
before you — Armenia v. Azerbaijan and Azerbaijan v. Armenia — arise, of course, out of broadly
the same factual background. But Azerbaijan’s case has been carefully framed and presented in a
manner different from that presented by Armenia; and the difference bears directly on the question
of preliminary objections.
3. As the Court will recall, there are three main phases in the history relevant to this case. The
first phase, Armenia’s territorial claims over Azerbaijan, led to armed hostilities in 1991. By the time
a ceasefire was established in 1994, Armenia was, illegally, in occupation of the Garabagh region
and seven surrounding districts of Azerbaijan — for brevity, I shall refer to the occupied area as the
“Garabagh region”. The UN Security Council called for the complete, immediate and unconditional
withdrawal of the Armenian occupying forces6. The 1994 ceasefire ended the First Garabagh War,
and thus the first phase. However, Azerbaijan was unable to liberate its occupied territories within
which the so-called “illegally installed régime” — controlled by Armenia — was established.
4. Phase two comprises the illegal Armenian occupation of Garabagh, which continued for
almost thirty years. The occupying Armenian forces did not withdraw until the 44-day Second
Garabagh War, which lasted from 27 September to 10 November 2020. Following mediation, a
6 UN Security Council resolutions 822 (30 April 1993), 853 (29 July 1993), 874 (14 October 1993), 884
(12 November 1993).
- 18 -
ceasefire agreement — known as the Trilateral Statement — was signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan and
Russia. But even then, Armenia continued to deploy military units in part of the Garabagh region,
posing a serious threat to regional peace and stability. It was only through the counter-terror operation
on 19 and 20 September 2023 — which began phase three — that Azerbaijan was able fully to
restore its sovereignty and control over the formerly occupied areas.
5. You heard much last week about atrocities allegedly carried out by Azerbaijanis. Many
people watching these proceedings in Azerbaijan and elsewhere will feel anger at this one-sided
account. They will recall not only the violent expulsion by Armenia of over one million Azerbaijanis
from their homes7 and episodes such as the Khojaly genocide, which is recognized by 17 States as
such8, and the razing to the ground of the city of Aghdam, later described as the “Hiroshima of the
Caucasus”9. Their recollection will extend also to the whole range of Armenia’s campaign of ethnic
cleansing, from individual acts of egregious cruelty to the clinical, systematic use of landmines in
particular locations to prevent the return of displaced Azerbaijanis to their homes10. Many people
watching these proceedings will be frustrated that Azerbaijan’s counsel are not setting the record
straight on all of this. But now is not the time for that work.
6. The discussion about individual atrocities last week arose because Azerbaijan was
illustrating its basic point that not every alleged action by an Azerbaijani against an Armenian could
be assumed to be motivated by racial animosity. The mere fact of deploying a landmine or a cluster
bomb does not always, and in all circumstances, violate the CERD: something more is required, such
as evidence that particular racial or ethnic groups have been targeted. In much of its case, Armenia
has not shown that “something more”. It simply presumes that everything done to Armenians was
motivated by racial hatred. Hence Azerbaijan’s preliminary objection last week. This ratione
materiae question does not arise this week because Armenia has made no equivalent objection to
Azerbaijan’s case — and rightly so, because Azerbaijan’s case was carefully framed to avoid that
fault.
7 Memorial of Azerbaijan, para. 51, referencing Annex 51 and 91.
8 Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, Large-scale Massacres, Acts of Genocide, https://president.az/en/pages/view/
azerbaijan/karabakh.
9 “‘They destroyed everything’: Inside the war-torn lands of Azerbaijan’s ‘Hiroshima’” (8 April 2023), The
Express, https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1756223/azerbaijan-armenia-conflict-nagorno-karabakh-aghdam.
10 Memorial of Azerbaijan, paras. 116, 223, 273, 275-277.
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7. Azerbaijan wishes to make clear to the Court during this week the crucial differences
between the CERD cases brought by Armenia and Azerbaijan respectively, especially for purposes
of jurisdiction.
8. The myriad claims that comprise Armenia’s case, as you heard last week and can see from
Armenia’s Memorial11, are rooted in the conduct of armed hostilities and their immediate aftermath.
They are bound up with questions about the applicability of international humanitarian law between
belligerent States, which Armenia tries to shoehorn into its CERD complaint.
9. Turning to Azerbaijan’s CERD case, the legal position of an occupying Power is
fundamentally different. Armenia was the occupying Power in Garabagh for three decades12. As such
it had international responsibility for public order and safety throughout the territory13. That included
responsibility for compliance with the CERD. Yet far from securing that compliance, Armenia used
its occupation to mount a wide-ranging, sustained and systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing and
cultural erasure against Azerbaijanis. As Azerbaijan reported to the CERD Committee in 2005: “as
a result of Armenian aggression and ethnic cleansing . . . there are now some 1 million refugees and
displaced persons in Azerbaijan”14.
10. The extent and nature of Armenia’s efforts to impose and maintain ethnic purity throughout
the parts of Azerbaijan that it illegally occupied started to become clear only in 2020, when many of
the obstacles placed by Armenia to the gathering of evidence were overcome by Azerbaijan’s
liberation of large parts of the formerly occupied territory. Hence the timing of Azerbaijan’s
Application to the Court the next year, in 2021.
11. Mr President, Members of the Court, this is a paradigmatic case of racial discrimination
perpetrated on a mass scale, of precisely the kind that the CERD was put in place to prevent. As the
11 Paragraph 6 of its Application asserts, referring to the Second Garabagh War, that “during that armed conflict,
Azerbaijan committed grave violations of the CERD”, and paragraph 7 asserts that “even after the end of hostilities,
Azerbaijan has continued to engage in the murder, torture and other abuse of Armenian prisoners of war, hostages and
other detained persons”.
12 A. Clapham, P. Gaeta, M. Sassòli, The 1949 Geneva Conventions. A Commentary (2015), p. 1458 (M. Bothe).
13 Ibid.; Article 43 Hague Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annexed to Convention
(IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 1907.
14 The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Considers Report of Azerbaijan (7 March 2005)
https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2009/10/committee-elimination-racial-discrimination-considers-report-azerbaijan-0;
United Nations General Assembly, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, doc. A/49/380
(13 September 1994), 8-9; Memorial of Azerbaijan, paras. 52-53.
- 20 -
preamble to the Convention provides, the States parties are resolved to “prevent and combat racist
doctrines and practices”. Such doctrines and practices lie at the heart of Azerbaijan’s complaint.
Armenia’s case, by contrast, contains, in large part, a plethora of individual actions allegedly
committed during armed hostilities.
12. Mr President, Members of the Court, I thank you for your attention and ask that you now
call on Professor Vaughan Lowe, King’s Counsel, who will address you on jurisdiction ratione
temporis.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Mr Fietta for his statement. I now invite Professor Vaughan Lowe
to take the floor. You have the floor, Sir.
Mr LOWE:
TEMPORAL JURISDICTION
ARMENIA’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTION  RATIONE TEMPORIS
1. Thank you, Mr President, Members of the Court, it is a privilege to appear before you and
an honour to have been entrusted with this part of Azerbaijan’s submission.
2. I shall address Armenia’s first objection, that Azerbaijan’s claims relating to the First
Garabagh War, which ended in 1994, are outside the jurisdiction of the Court ratione temporis15.
3. The Court will recall that Armenia acceded to CERD on 23 June 1993 and Azerbaijan
acceded on 16 August 1996; and in accordance with Article 19, the Convention entered into force
for each of them 30 days after its accession. CERD thus entered into force for Armenia on 23 July
1993 and for Azerbaijan on 15 September 1996.
4. It is common ground that the Court has no jurisdiction over matters prior to July 199316, and
Azerbaijan makes no such claims. It is also agreed that the Court does have jurisdiction in respect of
Azerbaijan’s claims relating to the period after September 199617.
15 Preliminary Objections of Armenia, para. 5.
16 CR 2024/21, p. 19, para. 6 (Martin).
17 CR 2024/21, p. 19, para. 7 (Martin).
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5. Thus, when Armenia says that “the Court’s jurisdiction ratione temporis under Article 22
of the CERD does not and cannot extend to the period prior to its entry into force between the Parties
on 15 September 1996”18, the jurisdictional dispute is in fact confined to a 38-month period between
July 1993 and September 1996, and it covers only a part of Azerbaijan’s claims.
6. Azerbaijan’s position on this comes down to three propositions.
(a) First, there is a distinction between (i) the question of the date on which the Court has jurisdiction
and is seised of a dispute, and (ii) the question of the dates of the facts that the Court can
adjudicate upon in the exercise of that jurisdiction. One might call it the distinction between the
temporal scope of procedural rights and duties, related to dispute settlement procedures, and the
temporal scope of substantive rights and duties under the CERD. Here the dispute concerns only
the latter. The Court certainly had jurisdiction over at least some of Azerbaijan’s claims and was
seised of the dispute when Azerbaijan filed its Application in 2021.
(b) Second, Azerbaijan says that the Court can exercise its jurisdiction ratione temporis over claims
that Armenia breached its substantive obligations under the CERD in respect of any conduct
occurring on or after 23 July 1993 — the date on which those substantive CERD provisions
entered into force for Armenia19.
(c) Third, even if 15 September 1996 were the critical date as Armenia argues (quod non), all of
Azerbaijan’s claims would still be within the Court’s jurisdiction ratione temporis. Jurisdiction
over Armenia’s breaches of CERD obligations originating in conduct after 15 September
1996 — the cultural and environmental destruction are examples — is not contested; and while
some of the breaches may have begun between 23 July 1993 and 15 September 1996, they are
what the ILC has characterized as continuing or composite breaches of international law, which
extend in time and remain breaches after 15 September 199620.
7. All of these propositions are straightforward; and all will be well known and understood by
the Court, because they concern questions that have arisen and been decided by the Court before.
18 Preliminary Objections of Armenia, para. 18.
19 Observations of Azerbaijan, para. 3.
20 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (hereinafter “ARSIWA”), Articles 14, 15.
- 22 -
8. Armenia provides five grounds or arguments for its jurisdictional objections concerning the
period from July 1993 to September 199621: but each is without foundation and should be rejected.
Armenia’s first ground: a “dispute” relates to acts when both States
are party to the Convention
9. Armenia’s first ground is that CERD Article 22, by referring to “disputes ‘between two or
more States Parties with respect to the interpretation or application’ of the CERD, makes clear that
it does not apply to acts or facts that preceded the CERD’s entry into force as between the States
parties concerned”22. But CERD Article 22 does not say any such thing, either clearly or obscurely.
Armenia is imposing its own interpretation upon Article 22.
10. Armenia suggests that its interpretation of Article 22 is supported by the principle of the
non-retroactivity of treaties, reflected in Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
But that is incorrect. Article 28 reads as follows:
“Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established,
its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any
situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with
respect to that party”.
11. As you can see, Article 28 does not refer to the date of entry into force as between the
States parties concerned: it refers to the date of entry into force of the treaty with respect to that
party — in this case, Armenia. And the passages quoted by Armenia23 from the work of the ILC on
what became Article 28 are directed at a different point: that the substantive provisions of a treaty
cannot bind a State before it has acceded to the treaty, and the non-retroactivity principle therefore
precludes the use of a dispute settlement clause in the treaty in respect of claims relating to acts and
omissions prior to the alleged wrongdoing State’s accession. We invite you to read all five paragraphs
of the ILC Commentary on what was then numbered draft article 2424.
12. The key point is that retroactivity is relevant in two distinct contexts: procedurally, where
the question is, did the States consent to the Court’s jurisdiction at the material time; and
21 Preliminary Objections of Armenia, para. 23.
22 Ibid., paras. 24-29 (emphasis added).
23 Ibid., para. 25.
24 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with commentaries, Reports of the Commission to the General Assembly
(1966), pp. 211-213.
- 23 -
substantively, where the question is, was the State bound by a substantive provision of the CERD at
the material time. And the material times are different.
The “procedural” question
13. The answer to the procedural question is clear. It is an elementary principle of international
law that the jurisdiction of international tribunals derives from the consent of States parties to submit
a particular dispute to the tribunal, as of the date on which the dispute settlement mechanism is
invoked25.
14. Azerbaijan could invoke the dispute resolution clause in the CERD and file an application
in respect of a dispute with another State party to the CERD, at any time following the date on which
the Convention came into effect for Azerbaijan and that other State party. The Court’s jurisdiction
depends on the consent of the parties on the date that the dispute is put before it. In this case, both
Parties had consented to the Court’s jurisdiction by 15 September 1996. And the Court’s jurisdiction
was actually invoked by Azerbaijan’s Application 25 years later, on 23 September 2021. There is no
element of retroactivity here.
15. The dates of the alleged violations of substantive provisions of international law is an
entirely separate point. This was established in the Bosnian Genocide case. There, Yugoslavia —
like Armenia here — argued that the Court, once seised, could only deal with events subsequent to
the date on which the Genocide Convention became applicable as between the parties. The Court
held, however, that the Genocide Convention — and in particular its compromissory clause in
Article IX — does not contain any provision which limits the Court’s jurisdiction ratione temporis
in that way. Nor did the Parties make any reservation to that effect. Therefore, the Court had
jurisdiction to adjudicate on the application of the Genocide Convention to facts which occurred prior
to the Convention entering into force between the Parties26.
25 Observations of Azerbaijan, paras. 19, 24.
26 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 595, para. 34. Cf.,
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Judgment No. 2, 1924, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2, p. 35: “The Court is of opinion that,
in cases of doubt, jurisdiction based on an international agreement embraces all disputes referred to it after its
establishment”.
- 24 -
16. The same is true in respect of Article 22 of the CERD. It contains no limitation ratione
temporis confining the Court’s jurisdiction to facts or situations arising after a certain date; nor has
either Party purported to make any reservation having a similar effect. Complaints of breaches that
have arisen out of facts occurring during or in relation to the First Garabagh War are within the
jurisdiction of the Court, once it became validly seised.
17. That is, of course, not to say that the Court can treat the substantive provisions of the CERD
as if it had always been in force for both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Obviously, no State party can be
bound by a treaty provision that has not entered into force for it. I turn to that question next.
The “substantive” question
18. The substantive question is whether Armenia was at the material time — the time when
the conduct complained of occurred — obliged to act in a certain way.
19. Armenia accepted yesterday that it was bound to comply with the provisions of the CERD
from 23 July 1993, when the CERD entered into force for Armenia27.
20. Azerbaijan was well aware of the importance of questions of temporal jurisdiction and has
deliberately not presented any claims based on atrocities committed by Armenia prior to 23 July
1993. All of Azerbaijan’s claims arise after 23 July 1993, when Armenia became bound by the
CERD28. Indeed, in its Memorial Azerbaijan separated out the facts occurring before and after 23 July
1993 so that it is clear what facts can give rise to operative breaches by Armenia of the CERD29.
21. Where Azerbaijan’s Memorial refers to events before 1993, it does so only as background,
in order to cast light on the context and as evidence of Armenia’s purpose in carrying out its
post-1993 breaches of the CERD. This is consistent with this Court’s guidance in Croatia v. Serbia,
where it said that “what happened prior to 8 October 1991”, the critical date in that case, is “pertinent
to an evaluation of whether what took place after that date involved violations of the Genocide
Convention”30.
27 CR 2024/21, p. 26, para. 42 (Martin).
28 Observations of Azerbaijan, paras. 32-33.
29 Memorial of Azerbaijan, pp. 21-81, paras. 42-119, and pp. 81-199, paras. 82-245.
30 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015 (I), p. 58, para. 119. See also the separate opinion of President Tomka at p. 165, para. 26,
where he stated that “the Court could have looked at the events occurring prior to that date in order to determine whether
the later acts fell within a particular pattern from which the intent could be inferred”.
- 25 -
22. Azerbaijan’s case involves no retroactive application of the CERD. In Belgium v. Senegal,
the Court held that the principle of non-retroactivity is satisfied whenever a convention is applied to
“facts having occurred after its entry into force for the State concerned”, as opposed to “acts . . . that
took place prior to [the Convention’s] entry into force for that State”31.
23. The erga omnes partes and jus cogens character of the obligations under the CERD and
similar treaties supports the principle that those obligations are engaged for every party from the date
that the treaty comes into force for that party32. The Court’s reasoning in Belgium v. Senegal is again
on point33. Obligations in conventions such as the Convention against Torture, in that case, or the
CERD in the present case, are owed to all States parties. It is not a matter of reciprocity or of the
standing of particular States parties. As the Court has said, “the contracting States do not have any
interests of their own; they merely have, one and all, a common interest, namely, the accomplishment
of those high purposes which are the raison d’être of the Convention”34. Ratifications of conventions
of this kind are binding commitments to observe the Convention rules; and any State party can call
out those who break the commitment. Armenia has known for over thirty years that another State
party could bring a claim against it; and it knew that when it chose to ratify the CERD.
24. Indeed, the point goes further. In its 2012 Judgment in the Nicaragua v. Colombia case,
the Court held that in light of the object and purpose of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea,
which was to establish a legal order for the oceans, Colombia was entitled to invoke Nicaragua’s
obligations as a State party to the UNCLOS, even though Colombia itself never became a party to
the UNCLOS35.
31 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2012 (II), p. 457, para. 100 (emphasis added).
32 Observations of Azerbaijan, para. 21.
33 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2012 (II), pp. 449-450, paras. 68-70.
34 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2012 (II), p. 449, para. 68; cf., Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 611, para. 22,
citing Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion,
I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23.
35 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), pp. 668-669,
para. 126.
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25. There is no question of retroactivity in the present case because the relevant conduct
underpinning Azerbaijan’s claims of breach occurred after CERD’s entry into force for Armenia in
199336.
26. I turn to the third point: the relevance of continuing and composite breaches of international
law.
Continuing and composite breaches
27. Mr Martin referred yesterday to “discrete acts or omissions constituting immediate
breaches” or “simple breaches” of international law37. The ILC called them “completed acts”38. A
violation of a State’s airspace and a violation of the immunity of a diplomat are examples. Mr Martin,
seeking to make a point about exactly when a breach occurs, contrasted them with composite acts,
where cumulative or aggregated conduct constitutes the essence of the wrongful act39. “[A]partheid
is different in kind from individual acts of racial discrimination”, he said, rightly40. But the relevant
contrast here is not between completed acts and composite acts, but between completed acts and
continuing acts, such as unlawful occupations of territory or continuing failures to fulfil a duty to
bring an end to racial discrimination41.
28. As the ILC said,
“conduct which has commenced some time in the past, and which constituted (or, if the
relevant primary rule had been in force for the State at the time, would have constituted)
a breach at that time, can continue and give rise to a continuing wrongful act in the
present”42.
That is the situation here. Armenia’s continuing failure to take steps to eradicate racial discrimination
and organizations based on ideas of racial superiority43, for example, may have begun years before
it ratified CERD; but, as the ILC put it, “[t]he breach of an international obligation by an act of a
36 Observations of Azerbaijan, para. 20.
37 CR 2024/21, p. 29, para. 52 (Martin).
38 ARSIWA, Article 14 (2).
39 CR 2024/21, p. 29, para. 52 (Martin).
40 Ibid.
41 ARSIWA, Article 14, Commentary, passim, YILC, 2001, Vol. II, Part 2.
42 Ibid., para. 12.
43 CERD, Article 4.
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State having a continuing character extends over the entire period during which the act continues and
remains not in conformity with the international obligation”44.
29. Composite acts are just one kind of continuing act. A single, isolated refusal on grounds
of race to allow a person access to a public park is a completed act in breach of the CERD: but a
sustained practice of refusing access on racial grounds is a composite act — it is apartheid. It arises
from “a series of actions or omissions defined in aggregate as wrongful”45; and as the ILC explained,
a composite act “extends over the entire period starting with the first of the actions or omissions of
the series and lasts for as long as these actions or omissions are repeated and remain not in conformity
with the international obligation”46.
30. Mr Martin obscures that point by referring repeatedly to the date of “crystallization” of
composite acts47. That is looking at the wrong end. That is when the composite breach starts: but the
important point here is that the breach continues and “lasts for as long as these actions or omissions
are repeated”48.
31. Azerbaijan’s claims point to two aspects of Armenia’s conduct. First, all of the Armenian
acts and omissions of which Azerbaijan complains either originated after 23 July 1993, or they
continued after 23 July 1993 — the date on which the CERD entered into force for Armenia. None
of Azerbaijan’s claims alleges a breach of international law that was completed before July 1993.
32. Second, Azerbaijan says that Armenia’s cumulative or aggregated acts and omissions
amount to a practice of ethnic cleansing which, like apartheid, is itself a distinct breach of the CERD.
If Armenia wants a definition of the elements of the delict49, one might start with that framed by the
UN Commission of Experts: “a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to
remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious
group from certain geographic areas”50.
44 ARSIWA, Article 14 (2).
45 Ibid., Article 15 (1).
46 Ibid., Article 15 (2).
47 CR 2024/21, p. 28, para. 48, p. 29, para. 54, p. 30, para. 55 (Martin).
48 ARSIWA, Article 15 (2).
49 CR 2024/21, p. 29, para. 54 (Martin).
50 UN doc. S/1994/674, 27 May 1994, para. 130.
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33. Azerbaijan says that Armenia expelled Azerbaijanis from their homes, incited hatred
towards them, destroyed their cultural heritage and public buildings in order to deprive them of a
homeland and a base for their culture, and then mined and booby-trapped their homes in order to
prevent them returning. That is what Azerbaijan understands by ethnic cleansing: a wholesale
repudiation of all of the principles that the CERD was established to secure. It is more than the sum
of its parts: and as a continuous, and continuing, policy and pattern of behaviour, it is a violation of
the CERD.
34. As I noted earlier, the dispute over the Court’s jurisdiction ratione temporis is limited to a
contested period of 38 months. In fact, even that overstates the case. Even if the Court were to accept
Armenia’s argument that the critical date in this case is the date of the CERD’s entry into force for
Azerbaijan, 15 September 1996 (rather than July 1993), Azerbaijan’s claims still remain within the
Court’s jurisdiction.
35. Acts and omissions fall outside the temporal scope of the Court’s jurisdiction only if they
were completed before the date of the entry into force of the treaty for the acting State. The ongoing
and systematic nature of Armenia’s claim of ethnic cleansing, spanning three decades, can in no
sense be considered to have been “completed” before September 1996, let alone before July 1993.
Mines and booby traps were still being laid within the past four years.
36. All of Azerbaijan’s claims are based on acts or omissions that either occurred or continued
after 15 September 1996, and Azerbaijan’s submissions in paragraph 97 of its Application and
paragraph 591 of its Memorial are to be understood in that light51. These are continuing breaches.
Azerbaijan’s claims, and the “dispute” under Article 22, relate to conduct that occurred when both
States were party to the Convention.
37. Again, in its Memorial and Observations on Armenia’s Preliminary Objections, Azerbaijan
has identified the breaches of the CERD which occurred or extend after the 15 September 1996 date
for which Armenia contends52.
51 Observations of Azerbaijan, para. 35; Austria v. Italy, ECtHR Application No. 788/60, Decision of 11 January
1961 (1962), pp. 20-21.
52 See Observations of Azerbaijan, paras. 37-42, which reference the relevant sections of Azerbaijan’s Memorial
and the facts to which they relate concerning continuing and composite acts.
- 29 -
38. I can deal with Armenia’s other arguments more swiftly, because they all derive from the
mistaken analysis of the temporal limitations that I have tried to unpack this morning.
Armenia’s second ground: non-retroactivity of CERD
39. Armenia’s second objection53 is that the CERD parties never intended its provisions to be
applied retroactively. But they are not being applied retroactively.
40. The substantive obligations run from the date the treaty is binding on the offending State;
and the procedural rights and obligations under Article 22 run from the date that the treaty is in force
between both States parties.
41. And that perhaps explains why no States have considered it necessary to make reservations
concerning the retroactive application of the CERD54. It obviously cannot be applied retroactively to
events occurring prior to their becoming bound by the CERD.
Armenia’s third ground: Article 22 only applies to acts subsequent
to when the State joined the Convention
42. Armenia’s third objection55, that CERD Article 22 cannot be understood to confer rights
on States corresponding to a time during which they were not parties to the CERD is no more than
another rewording of the same point, and it has the same answer.
43. The CERD does not confer rights on States before they became parties to it. Azerbaijan
gained the procedural right to invoke the CERD through the dispute settlement mechanism in
Article 22 only when Azerbaijan became a party to the CERD and the CERD entered into force for
it.
44. The substantive provisions are not conditional on the compromissory clause, but are rather
dependent on the date on which the offending State entered into the CERD, and the CERD became
effective for that State56. Armenia was obliged to comply with the CERD from 23 July 1993 when
the CERD entered into force for it.
53 Preliminary Objections of Armenia, para. 30.
54 CR 2024/21, p. 22, paras. 24-25 (Martin).
55 Preliminary Objections of Armenia, paras. 31-34.
56 Observations of Azerbaijan, para. 22.
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Armenia’s fourth ground: opening the floodgates to historic claims
45. The suggestion that Azerbaijan’s interpretation “would open up a vast universe of potential
historic claims” and “even create reluctance to include provisions giving jurisdiction to the Court in
future treaties” is Armenia’s fourth objection57.
46. The answer to this is that no claims can ever arise in respect of any conduct occurring
before the CERD entered into force for its first 27 parties, on 4 January 1969, or the later dates on
which it took effect for each of the other 155 parties.
47. For example, Angola and Dominica acceded to the CERD in 2019: no case could be
brought against them under the CERD for any alleged breach of the CERD occurring before 2019.
48. The CERD has been in force for more than half a century, and the Court has so far had
cases emanating from only four situations — Ukraine v. Russia, Georgia v. Russia, Qatar v. United
Arab Emirates and Azerbaijan v. Armenia . This is hardly a vast universe of historic claims.
Armenia’s fifth ground: reciprocity as a condition to Article 22
49. Armenia’s fifth and final objection58 is that extending the application of Article 22 to
events prior to the entry into force of the CERD as between itself and Azerbaijan would ignore the
element of reciprocity inherent in compromissory clauses.
50. Again, there is a simple answer. There is no reference at all to reciprocity in CERD
Article 22, of the kind that is present in Article 36 (3) of the Court’s Statute.
51. Armenia says: “Whenever a compromissory clause is contained in an international
agreement . . . in accordance with Article 36, para. 1, it applies obviously to all the parties concerned
in a like manner”59. That is plainly correct, but it does not advance Armenia’s case. It is necessary to
separate the substantive and procedural questions. Reciprocity only goes to the question of whether
or not there is mutual consent between the parties to the International Court of Justice’s jurisdiction
under Article 22.
52. Azerbaijan accepts, of course, that Article 22 applies to all CERD parties in a like manner.
But it is sufficient for reciprocity purposes that both States parties could file claims under Article 22
57 Preliminary Objections of Armenia, paras. 35-36.
58 Ibid., paras. 37-39.
59 Ibid., para. 38, fn. 56.
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after 15 September 1996, as indeed both Parties have done. And as for Armenia’s curious observation
that “if Azerbaijan were right, that would mean that Armenia would be entitled to present
counter-claims in this case”60, let it do so. Why has it not done so already?
53. There does not need to be identity in terms of the critical date for the application of
substantive obligations under a treaty in order for there to be reciprocity over the ability to bring
claims under the compromissory clause61. All multilateral treaties that remain open for accession by
other States necessarily contemplate that some States will become bound by substantive obligations
earlier than others. That is how multilateral conventions work. As the Court itself has said, “in a
Convention of this type one cannot speak of individual advantages or disadvantages to States, or of
the maintenance of a perfect contractual balance between rights and duties”62.
Armenia’s ratione temporis ground is not suitable
for preliminary determination
54. For all these reasons, Azerbaijan’s position is that the Court can dismiss Armenia’s ratione
temporis objection now. If, however, the Court wishes to hear Azerbaijan’s case pleaded out before
it decides the question definitively, then the matter will require detailed consideration of the facts
and evidence in the case, only some of which Armenia has addressed63. In such circumstances, the
question would not have an “exclusively preliminary character” and could not be resolved at this
preliminary objections stage of the proceedings64, not least because Azerbaijan’s claim is not that
each of a host of individual acts and omissions constituted a breach of the CERD but rather that
Armenia was engaged in a systematic pattern and practice of discrimination contrary to the CERD,
evidenced by the aggregate of its conduct over an extended period of occupation.
55. Armenia accepts that the Court has jurisdiction over post-1996 conduct. There is no
suggestion that the whole of Azerbaijan’s claims fall outside the Court’s temporal jurisdiction, and
60 CR 2024/21, p. 30, para. 58 (Martin).
61 Observations of Azerbaijan, para. 27.
62 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 611, para. 22, citing
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.
Reports 1951, p. 23.
63 Preliminary Objections of Armenia, paras. 41-57.
64 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015 (I), p. 55, para. 110.
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only when the evidence is considered can it be finally decided if any individual facts must be
disregarded and, if so, what the effect on Azerbaijan’s case might be. That is a matter for the hearing
on the merits65.
56. Azerbaijan’s respectful submission is therefore that for the reasons that I have set out,
Armenia’s preliminary objections to the Court’s jurisdiction ratione temporis fall to be dismissed.
57. Mr President, Members of the Court, this concludes my submissions. I thank you for your
attention, and ask that you now call on Professor Stefan Talmon, who will address you on the issue
of admissibility.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Professor Lowe for his statement. I now invite Professor Stefan
Talmon to take the floor. You have the floor, Sir.
Mr TALMON:
ADMISSIBILITY OF AZERBAIJAN’S CLAIMS RELATING TO EVENTS
PRIOR TO 15 SEPTEMBER 1996
I. Introduction
1. Monsieur le président, Madam Vice-President, distinguished Members of the Court, my
task today is to respond to Armenia’s admissibility objection.
2. Armenia here simply recycles and repackages its objection to the Court’s jurisdiction
ratione temporis under a different heading66.
3. Let me note at the outset that Armenia’s admissibility objection is of limited scope. Armenia
does not object to the admissibility of Azerbaijan’s Application as a whole, but only to what it calls
“Azerbaijan’s historical claims”67; that is claims based on events before 15 September 199668. Even
65 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015 (I), p. 58, para. 119; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 465, para. 145;
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (New Application: 1962) (Belgium v. Spain), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1964, p. 43.
66 See Preliminary Objections of Armenia, paras. 20, 38.
67 Ibid., heading before para. 58, para. 60.
68 See ibid., paras. 63, 64.
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if this objection were upheld, it would bring the proceedings to an end only with respect to these
specific claims69.
4. However, as Professor Lowe has shown, Azerbaijan’s claims cannot be neatly separated
into claims pertaining to events before and after 15 September 1996. Many of the claims concern
continuing or composite violations of the CERD which began before 15 September 1996 and
continued thereafter. Whether there are any self-contained claims prior to 15 September 1996 will
invoke an examination of the substance of the claims and thus be a question for the merits.
5. No such examination will be necessary, however, as Armenia’s admissibility objection
already fails on legal grounds.
6. Armenia puts forward two arguments: first, it alleges that Azerbaijan’s purported delay in
asserting its historical claims was detrimental to Armenia; and, second, that these claims supposedly
created procedural inequalities between the Parties.
II. Alleged delay in bringing claims being detrimental to Armenia
7. Mr President, let me begin with the allegation that Azerbaijan’s purported delay in bringing
its claims was detrimental to Armenia.
8. Before addressing this argument, let me note at the outset that Armenia itself brings
numerous claims with regard to events between “the late 1990s and 2005”70. Armenia first raised
these claims in November 2020, but it seems to have no problem with a delay of more than 23 years
here, but, as we heard yesterday: “what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander”71.
9. Azerbaijan did not object to the admissibility of these claims because delay is not an issue
in the present case.
10. It is correct that the Court recognized in the Nauru case that “delay on the part of a claimant
State may render an application inadmissible”72. But the Court immediately went on to note:
69 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 456, para. 120.
70 Memorial of Armenia, para. 3.124, and paras. 3.122, 3.127. See also ibid., paras. 3.2, 3.6, 3.11, 3.19 n. 237, 3.69,
3.128, 3.149, 3.147, 3.154, 6.83 and Annexes 1, 20.
71 CR 2024/21, p. 27, para. 45 (Martin).
72 Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992,
pp. 253-254, para. 32. See also Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2004 (I), p. 37, para. 44.
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“[I]nternational law does not lay down any specific time-limit in that regard. It is
therefore for the Court to determine in the light of the circumstances of each case
whether the passage of time renders an application inadmissible.”73
11. Inadmissibility must thus be determined in light of the circumstances. The circumstance
seized upon by Armenia is whether the respondent State has been seriously disadvantaged by a
delay74. As the ILC noted in its commentary to the Articles on State Responsibility:
“The decisive factor is whether the respondent State has suffered any prejudice
as a result of the delay in the sense that the respondent could have reasonably expected
that the claim would no longer be pursued.”75
12. There is no basis on which Armenia could have developed a reasonable expectation that
Azerbaijan would no longer pursue its claims.
13. The mere passing of time does not give rise to such an expectation.
14. Azerbaijan regularly made Armenia aware of its grievances with regard to the
subject-matter of CERD. For example, in August 1993, shortly after Armenia acceded to CERD,
Azerbaijan accused it of “ethnic cleansing”76. Azerbaijan also stated that “full responsibility for the
consequences of the said actions is borne by official circles in the Republic of Armenia”77. As there
were no diplomatic relations between the Parties, these grievances were conveyed in letters to the
United Nations. Azerbaijan regularly asked for these letters to be circulated as UN documents. These
letters did not go unnoticed, as Armenia responded to some of the accusations in letters of its own78.
Like in the Nauru case, Armenia was thus aware of Azerbaijan’s grievances throughout all these
years.
15. That Azerbaijan did not expressly refer to the CERD in these letters could not give rise to
a reasonable expectation that no claims for the grievances would be pursued. As the Court noted in
Georgia v. Russia, an “express reference to the treaty” is not required to bring the matter under
73 Ibid.
74 ARSIWA, Commentary to Article 45, YILC, 2001, Vol. II, Part 2, p. 123, para. 11.
75 Ibid.
76 Letter dated 5 August 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to
the President of the Security Council, UN doc. S/26271, 7 August 1993. See also UN docs. S/26583, 14 October 1993;
S/1994/155, 11 February 1994; UN doc. S/1994/147, 14 February 1994, S/1994/688, 9 June 1994; S/1994/1339,
25 November 1994; S/1995/413, 24 May 1995; A/C.3/51/9, 30 October 1996; S/1997/662, 25 August 1997.
77 Letter dated 25 November 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN doc. S/1994/1339, 25 November 1994, Annex.
78 Letter dated 30 August 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to
the Secretary-General, UN doc. S/26386, 31 August 1993.
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CERD79. What is important is that the grievances raised “relate to the subject-matter of the treaty”80.
There is no subject-matter more clearly within the CERD than ethnic cleansing.
16. Armenia also claims that a reasonable expectation was created because Azerbaijan
allegedly had all the material to bring a claim upon its accession to the Convention in 1996, but did
not do so. However, this is incorrect.
17. Azerbaijan only learnt of the full extent of the CERD violations and was only able to gather
the necessary evidence for bringing the present claims in November 2020 upon liberating its territory
that had been under Armenian occupation since 1994. It must be remembered that neither Azerbaijan
nor the United Nations had access to the occupied territory before81.
18. Armenia is deliberately trying to reduce Azerbaijan’s claims to forcible expulsion by
claiming that testimonies of the displaced persons could have been secured since the 1990s.
Azerbaijan’s claims, however, also encompass the deployment of landmines and booby traps in
civilian areas, environmental degradation and cultural erasure  to prove these violations, physical
access to the formerly occupied territory was essential.
19. It is also wrong to state  as Armenia did  that Azerbaijan’s Memorial draws only on
documents available for years. As a quick perusal of the Memorial will show, there are numerous
references to material that has become available only after the liberation of the territory82.
20. Mr President, Armenia tries to introduce disadvantage as another, separate circumstance
to be considered when determining whether the passage of time renders an application inadmissible.
The ILC, however, assumed that the respondent State was disadvantaged only if it could reasonably
have expected that the claim would no longer be pursued83.
21. In any case, there is no disadvantage on the part of Armenia.
79 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v.
Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), p. 133, para. 161.
80 Ibid.
81 UNESCO, Report on the Implementation of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property
in the Event of Armed Conflict and its Two 1954 and 1999 Protocols, Report on the Activities from 1995 to 2004 (2005),
p. 7.
82 See, e.g., Memorial of Azerbaijan, paras. 136, 137, 138, 143, 146, 147, 155, 156, 158-163, 168-169, 173, 204,
220, 223, 275, 276-280, 330, 538, 539.
83 ARSIWA, Commentary to Article 45, YILC, 2001, Vol. II, Part 2, p. 123, para. 11.
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22. Armenia’s access to witnesses and documentary evidence is a non-issue here. According
to the jurisprudence of the Court, it is “the party which alleges a fact in support of its claims to prove
the existence of that fact”84  in the present case it thus falls to Azerbaijan to “submit the relevant
evidence to substantiate its claims”85.
23. In any case, Armenia, being aware of Azerbaijan’s grievances, would have had 26 years
of occupation to collect all the relevant evidence for its defence. In addition, it must be recalled that
Azerbaijan fully liberated the occupied territory only in September 2023. Armenia thus had two years
since the filing of the present claims to gather evidence in the territory still under its control.
III. Alleged procedural inequality between the Parties
24. Mr President, Members of the Court, I can be brief with regard to Armenia’s second
argument that the historical claims are inadmissible because they would create a procedural
inequality between the Parties. It is argued that while Azerbaijan could submit claims under CERD
pertaining to facts prior to 15 September 1996, Armenia could not submit counter-claims with regard
to these facts.
25. However, this is not a question of admissibility but a consequence of the Court’s rules on
counter-claims requiring that the counter-claim comes within the jurisdiction of the Court86. This is
not the first case where the Court finds that its jurisdiction is not limited to “facts subsequent to the
date when the Convention became applicable between the parties”87, thus allowing one of the Parties
to bring a claim with regard to these facts.
26. This is also not a question of procedural inequality but a consequence of the operation of
the substantive law. A State is bound by a treaty only from the date it has become a party to the
treaty. The fact that Armenia had been bound by CERD for some three years longer than Azerbaijan
84 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Compensation,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2018 (I), p. 26, para. 33.
85 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010 (I), p. 71, para. 163.
86 Rules of Court, Article 80 (1).
87 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 458, para. 123. See also Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 617, para. 34, and Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 194,
para. 370. See further ibid., Memorial of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 15 April 1994,
paras. 2.1.0.1, 2.1.0.5.
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has nothing to do with procedural equality or the good administration of justice, but is a consequence
of States being free to decide when to become a party to a multilateral treaty.
27. The procedural equality of the Parties under CERD is guaranteed by Armenia and
Azerbaijan being able to institute proceedings against each other under Article 22 only from the
moment that they are both parties to the Convention.
IV. Submissions
28. Let me conclude: there is no legal basis for finding that Azerbaijan’s claims would be
inadmissible.
29. First, Armenia has not suffered any prejudice in the sense that it could have reasonably
expected that the claims would no longer be pursued.
30. Second, Armenia is in no way disadvantaged.
31. Third, there is no question of procedural inequality between the Parties.
32. For those reasons, Armenia’s admissibility objection should thus be dismissed.
33. I thank the Court for its kind attention and, Mr President, it may now be a convenient time
for a short break. Otherwise, I may ask you to call on Mr Wordsworth to respond to Armenia’s second
preliminary objection.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Professor Talmon for his statement. Before I invite the next speaker
to take the floor, the Court will observe a 10-minute break. The sitting is suspended.
The Court adjourned from 11.25 a.m. to 11.40 a.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is resumed. I now invite Mr Samuel
Wordsworth to address the Court. You have the floor, Sir.
Mr WORDSWORTH: Thank you, Sir.
AZERBAIJAN’S RESPONSE TO ARMENIA’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTION CONCERNING
“AZERBAIJAN’S CLAIMS AND CONTENTIONS CONCERNING LANDMINES
AND BOOBY TRAPS” (LEGAL ISSUES)
1. Mr President, Members of the Court, I will be dealing with Armenia’s misconceived
objection ratione materiae concerning what it calls “Azerbaijan’s claims and contentions concerning
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landmines and booby traps”88, and I start by making two responsive points on the applicable legal
test.
A. The applicable test with respect to objections ratione materiae
2. First, Armenia seeks, inappropriately, to turn Article 1 (1) into a rigid two-step test, pursuant
to which the Court should, it is said, ask:
(a) whether there is a distinction, exclusion or preference which is “based on race, colour, descent
or national or ethnic origin” and, only “if so”, ask
(b) whether that distinction, exclusion or preference has had the “purpose or effect” of nullifying or
impairing the equal recognition, enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental
freedoms89.
3. This interpretation then feeds into a broad-brush and notably simplistic argument, which
you heard repeated yesterday, that Azerbaijan’s case on landmines and booby traps inevitably fails
because these “are indiscriminate weapons that are incapable of making a distinction based on
national or ethnic origin”90. That makes no sense at all because, of course, all depends on how and
for what reason any given weapon is being used and, consistent with this basic observation, it should
be obvious that the question of “purpose or effect” may shed light on the question of whether the
impugned measure is “based on . . . national or ethnic origin”  or vice versa.
4. Unsurprisingly, and notwithstanding Armenia’s current contentions, the Qatar v. United
Arab Emirates case does not suggest the contrary91, while, in its recent Judgment in Ukraine v.
Russia, the Court demonstrated how the stated purpose or the effects of a measure may show that it
is “based on” a prohibited ground, explaining, as you can see in the last sentence on your screens:
88 Preliminary Objections of Armenia, p. 41, heading, and para. 80.
89 Ibid., para. 72.
90 Ibid., paras. 84-86; CR 2024/21, pp. 43-44, para. 5 (Salonidis).
91 Cf. Preliminary Objections of Armenia, paras. 74-76, quoting Application of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2021, pp. 107-109, paras. 109, 112.
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“racial discrimination may result from a measure which is neutral on its face, but whose effects show
that it is ‘based on’ a prohibited ground”92.
5. Thus the Court provides an example of how the two elements of Article 1 (1) do interrelate,
and there is no assistance to be gained from Armenia’s inaccurate suggestion of a rigid two-step
approach.
6. Second, it still has to be emphasized that there is no test of plausibility to be applied at the
jurisdictional phase. The Court could scarcely have made this more clear in the Ukraine v. Russia
case concerning the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
(hereinafter the “ICSFT”). At the provisional measures phase, the Court rejected Ukraine’s request
on the basis that it had not put forward a plausible case on the requisite mental element, that is,
knowledge or intent93. By contrast, in its subsequent Judgment on preliminary objections, the Court
explained that: “At the present stage of the proceedings, an examination by the Court of the alleged
wrongful acts or of the plausibility of the claims is not generally warranted”94.
7. Russia’s objections ratione materiae were then rejected without any consideration of
plausibility at all, with the Court’s basic position being that questions largely of a factual matter were
properly for the merits95.
8. It was therefore a little surprising to see again yesterday, just as in Armenia’s written
objections, a repeated reliance on the findings on plausibility in the Orders of December 2021 and
February 2023  with just an assertion as to these being “highly relevant”, and without any close
focus into what the Court was actually saying96.
92 Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation),
Judgment of 31 January 2024, para. 196.
93 Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation),
Provisional Measures, Order of 19 April 2017, I.C.J. Reports 2017, pp. 131-132, para. 75.
94 Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2019 (II), p. 584, para. 58.
95 Ibid., p. 586, para. 63.
96 Preliminary Objections of Armenia, paras. 82, 87, 97-99; CR 2024/21, p. 44, paras. 6-7 (Salonidis).
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9. Looking, then, at paragraph 53 of the December 2021 Order, on which Armenia has placed
such great weight, the Court explains97 — and I will take this in stages:
“With regard to rights under CERD asserted by Azerbaijan with respect to
Armenia’s alleged conduct in relation to landmines, the Court recalls that Azerbaijan
claims that this conduct is part of a longstanding campaign of ethnic cleansing. The
Court recognizes that a policy of driving persons of a certain national or ethnic origin
from a particular area, as well as preventing their return thereto, can implicate rights
under CERD and that such a policy can be effected through a variety of military
means.”98
10. And pausing there, that is a correct reflection of how Azerbaijan puts its case, and it is a
statement useful to the Court at this jurisdictional phase as to how such a case can implicate rights
under CERD. In other words, the case relevant to landmines  as correctly identified by the Court 
concerns a long-standing campaign of ethnic cleansing effected through a variety of military means,
that is indeed capable of having an adverse effect on the enjoyment of certain rights protected under
the CERD. It was puzzling that, yesterday, Mr Salonidis should spend so much time seeking to
persuade you that Azerbaijan, by contrast, has a wholly free-standing claim of breach of CERD in
relation to landmines and booby traps, without taking you to either how the claim is put in
Azerbaijan’s Memorial or how the Court itself has understood the claim. I will return to that point in
a moment.
11. The Court’s Order then continues: “However, the Court does not consider that CERD
plausibly imposes any obligation on Armenia to take measures to enable Azerbaijan to undertake
demining or to cease and desist from planting landmines.”
12. This is concerned with the plausibility of obligations of Armenia with respect to the
specific interim remedies that were being sought by Azerbaijan at paragraphs (a) and (b) of its
Request for provisional measures99. The current issue, by contrast, is whether an act or subset of
acts  here, planting landmines and booby traps  is capable of forming part of a broader
systematic practice  ethnic cleansing  in breach of a given treaty. The Court is no longer
concerned with remedies, the availability of which is not decisive of whether CERD may be engaged.
97 Preliminary Objections of Armenia, para. 97; CR 2024/21, p. 44, para. 6 (Salonidis).
98 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Azerbaijan v. Armenia), Provisional Measures, Order of 7 December 2021, I.C.J. Reports 2021, p. 425, para. 53
(emphasis added).
99 Ibid., p. 408, para. 5.
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13. Turning to the final sentence in this passage:
“Azerbaijan has not placed before the Court evidence indicating that Armenia’s
alleged conduct with respect to landmines has ‘the purpose or effect of nullifying or
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing’, of rights of
persons of Azerbaijani national or ethnic origin.”
14. This is concerned with plausibility by reference to the evidence then before the Court. But
now the Court is assessing jurisdiction, not considering plausibility and specific interim remedies,
and by reference to the facts as they have developed. On its past jurisprudence, it would plainly be
inappropriate to determine in the course of preliminary objections that a State cannot assert rights
that are capable of falling within a given treaty. And this is all the more so when the Court has already
indicated that a policy of driving persons of a certain national or ethnic origin from a particular area,
as well as preventing their return thereto, can implicate rights under CERD, and that such a policy
can be effected through a variety of military means, which must in principle include the laying of
landmines and booby traps100.
B. The nature of Azerbaijan’s case
15. This takes me to the question of what Azerbaijan is in fact claiming  a claim that has
been correctly understood by the Court as concerning a long-standing campaign of ethnic cleansing,
with the conduct of laying mines and booby traps being the means of achieving ethnic cleansing,
rather than breaches of the CERD per se101.
16. As the Court will recall, the relevant claim of Azerbaijan is as stated at
paragraph 591 (1) (a) of its Memorial, in its submissions:
“Armenia, through its State organs, State agents and [so on], is responsible for
violations of Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of CERD by the following actions:
(a) The ethnic cleansing and cultural erasure of Azerbaijanis from the then-occupied
territories, and establishment of an ethnically pure Armenian settlement in those
territories, including by [and then you see the relevant sub-provision dealing with
the conduct]:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
100 See also Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Azerbaijan v. Armenia), Provisional Measures, Order of 22 February 2023, paras. 22-23.
101 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Azerbaijan v. Armenia), Provisional Measures, Order of 7 December 2021, I.C.J. Reports 2021, p. 425, para. 53.
- 42 -
(iv) barring of Azerbaijanis from access to the then-occupied territories and from
Armenia, including frustration of the right of internally displaced Azerbaijanis
and Azerbaijani refugees to return home”.
17. There are then four other instances in which Azerbaijan alleges that there has been a
separate breach of Articles 2-7 CERD, as listed out at subparagraphs 591 (1) (b)-(e), concerning the
promotion of hatred and the like, none of which are subject to ratione materiae objections by
Armenia.
18. There are three points to draw out.
19. First, the relevant claim at paragraph 591 (1) (a) is one of breach through ethnic cleansing
and cultural erasure. There is no separate plea for breach with respect to the laying of landmines and
booby traps. This is merely part of the conduct on which Azerbaijan relies to demonstrate ethnic
cleansing and cultural erasure, and it is not even conduct that is expressly mentioned within the
submissions. It merely falls within the broader conduct of barring access to the formerly occupied
territories at subparagraph (iv).
20. Armenia spent a good deal of time yesterday trying to persuade you of the contrary,
suggesting for example that because Azerbaijan had used the term “landmine” 73 times in its
Memorial that there must be a discrete claim in relation to landmines, and taking you to isolated
passages from pleadings and oral submissions to the same end102. We refer to how the claim is in fact
put in the formal submissions, and ask you, in so far as considered necessary or helpful, to refer to
passages from past oral submissions that you were not taken to yesterday103, but which are reflected
in how the Court itself understood Azerbaijan’s case in its prior Orders. And, another useful reference
to that effect is paragraph 21 of the December 2021 Order, where the Court summarized as follows:
“Azerbaijan specifically alleges that, following the end of the 2020 Conflict,
Armenia ‘actively continues to prevent’ the return of displaced ethnic Azerbaijanis to
the areas formerly under Armenian control by refusing to share information about the
minefields in the area where their former homes were located so as to allow for mine
clearance operations, and by ‘continu[ing] to plant new mines on Azerbaijan’s territory’
(emphasis in the original). Azerbaijan considers that the Applicant’s conduct in this
regard is ‘a continuation of Armenia’s decades-long ethnic cleansing campaign’ against
persons of Azerbaijani national or ethnic origin.”104
102 CR 2024/21, p. 45, paras. 10-11 (Salonidis).
103 See Armenia’s judges’ folder, tab CS4 (Salonidis), referring to CR 2021/24, p. 30, paras. 2, 4 (Amirfar), but
not paras. 16 and 22; also judges’ folder, tab CS7 (Salonidis), referring to CR 2023/3 p. 27, para. 2 (Amirfar), but e.g. not
paras. 9-14, or to Lowe at paras. 12-13, or to Reid at e.g. paras. 2 and 10, 19, 27-28.
104 See also para. 44.
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21. So whereas Armenia may wish to identify and seek to object to what it calls the “claims
and contentions concerning landmines and booby traps”, this cannot be a valid jurisdictional
objection. There is no jurisdictional objection ratione materiae to Azerbaijan’s actual claim of ethnic
cleansing. If the Court has  as is accepted  jurisdiction over that claim, it has jurisdiction ratione
materiae, full stop.
22. Second, if Azerbaijan were considered as having individual claims for breach with respect
to each of the individual lines of conduct listed at paragraph 591 (1) (a) (i)-(v) of its Memorial, it
would make no difference. There is no jurisdictional objection with respect to the relevant conduct,
that is subparagraph (iv) on the “barring of Azerbaijanis from access to the then-occupied
territories . . . including frustration of the right . . . to return”. The differing means by which the
barring is said to have been achieved can only be a matter for assessment at the merits105. However,
it appears obvious that the barring of access, that is, steps taken to ensure that territory ethnically
cleansed of Azerbaijanis remains ethnically cleansed, can be achieved through the laying of mines
and booby traps.
23. Third, it is not open to a respondent to accept the Court’s jurisdiction over a claim but then
to assert the existence of certain subdivisions of the claim with a view to seeking to persuade the
Court that individual aspects of conduct relied upon could not amount to a breach of CERD.
(a) It is for the claimant State to formulate its claim as it chooses. If jurisdiction is not challenged in
relation to the claim, but part of the conduct relied on is not considered by the respondent to be
in breach or even capable of amounting to a breach, that is a matter for the merits. There is no
provision in the Court’s Statute or Rules that allows for what is, in effect, the attempted striking
out at the jurisdictional phase of one of many lines of allegation and evidence that a claimant
submits in order to demonstrate the existence of a given breach. Indeed it would be extraordinary
if it were otherwise, as the Court cannot be in a position to evaluate one element of conduct relied
upon without seeing the entirety of the evidence relied upon with respect to the specific allegation
of breach106.
105 Memorial of Azerbaijan, Chapter III, section C (c).
106 Cf. CR 2024/21, pp. 47-48, paras. 20-21 (Salonidis).
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(b) Reliance was placed yesterday on the Court’s undoubted authority to determine the nature of the
dispute before it in order to assess whether there is indeed a dispute as to interpretation or
application of a given treaty107. But that is of no relevance in the current context. A dispute as to
whether there has been ethnic cleansing, or even as to whether there has been a barring of access
and frustration of the ability to return, is plainly within CERD, and this is not even contested.
There is nothing in the Court’s jurisprudence to say that it must, or even could, go further and
see whether, objectively, the actual claim could be dissected and substituted by a series of
narrower claims, one of which could be said to be outside jurisdiction. The reference yesterday
to Equatorial Guinea v. France was notably unhelpful as, there, the Court was merely identifying
that it did not have jurisdiction over one aspect of the dispute, that is the claim in so far as it
concerned rules of customary international law: such rules were not incorporated by the specific
treaty provision relied on by the claimant, namely Article 4 of the Palermo Convention. That is
simply a matter of treaty interpretation, not the slicing up of a claim, as it was put by the claimant,
into a series of subclaims made up of discrete allegations of fact.
C. Armenia’s objection
24. I turn now to say a few words on the more fact-based contentions made by Armenia.
25. Armenia contends that, even accepting Azerbaijan’s factual allegations as true, Armenia’s
alleged use of landmines and booby traps would not constitute a distinction within Article 1 (1) that
is based on national or ethnic origin108. It makes just two points:
(a) First, Armenia says that landmines and booby traps are “indiscriminate by nature” and are
“incapable of making a distinction based on national or ethnic origin”109. This appears facile and
is, moreover, inconsistent with what Armenia is saying in its Observations on Azerbaijan’s
objections110. Like any weapon, landmines and booby traps are generally used in a targeted way
and can thus be used to target specific groups of civilians based on national or ethnic origin111.
107 Ibid., pp. 46-47, paras. 16-18 (Salonidis).
108 Preliminary Objections of Armenia, para. 83.
109 Ibid., paras. 84-86; CR 2024/21, pp. 43-44, para. 5 (Salonidis).
110 See Written Observations of Armenia, para. 56.
111 Memorial of Azerbaijan, para. 451.
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As such, it should be indisputable that landmines and booby traps can be deployed to pursue a
programme of ethnic cleansing.
(b) Second, and related to this, Armenia asserts that “any placing of landmines was done exclusively
for defensive military purposes and only along the line of contact between military forces”112.
Well, that is Armenia’s case. Azerbaijan challenges this and for good reason, as we will come
back to. For now, however, the point is that, unsurprisingly, it is not the practice of the Court to
approach jurisdictional objections on the basis that the assertions of fact by the respondent State
are true.
26. Mr Aughey will shortly take you to what the documents show so far as concerns landmines,
that is, they provide a more than sufficient evidentiary basis for Azerbaijan’s contention that: “[t]he
landmines Armenia planted were a critical element . . . of its campaign to create and maintain an
ethnically pure Armenian settlement on Azerbaijan’s territory by barring the return of displaced
Azerbaijanis”113.
27. Once such factual allegations by the claimant are assumed as true on the face of the relevant
documents, and it is to be recalled that Armenia last week advocated for a measurably weaker test
than that114, the allegations with respect to landmines  forming, as they do, part of a much wider
case of ethnic cleansing  must inevitably be capable of falling within CERD.
28. The same applies to the allegations with respect to booby traps, which Azerbaijan explains,
by reference to specific evidence, were placed, inter alia, by Armenian forces in houses and villages
to which Azerbaijanis would be returning115. Armenia’s contrary case that booby traps were planted
only by civilians can only be resolved at the merits phase.
29. In addition, just as in the ICSFT case between Ukraine and Russia, the question of whether
alleged acts fall within the scope of the treaty is closely tied-up with the mental element of the
perpetrator, in this case the basis and purpose of the alleged acts. As the Court explained in Ukraine v.
Russia, such fact- and evidence-heavy matters are not suitable for consideration at a jurisdictional
112 Preliminary Objections of Armenia, paras. 85 and 87; CR 2024/21, p. 44, para. 5 (Salonidis).
113 Memorial of Azerbaijan, para. 273.
114 See e.g. Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Armenia v. Azerbaijan), CR 2024/18, p. 36, para. 10, and p. 43, para. 30 (Murphy); CR 2024/16, p. 48, para. 21
(Macdonald). See also CR 2024/19, p. 20, para. 14 and p. 24, para. 25 (Wordsworth).
115 Memorial of Azerbaijan, para. 281.
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phase116, and all the more so given that it is Armenia that knows precisely when and where and why
it planted landmines, or whether Azerbaijan is right to say that Armenian forces planted booby traps.
These are all matters for the merits.
30. I conclude by dealing with three further points made by Armenia.
31. First, it contends that, even accepting Azerbaijan’s factual allegations as true, Armenia’s
alleged use of landmines and booby traps did not have the requisite discriminatory purpose or
effect117. This makes no sense. Azerbaijan’s case, to recall, is that: “The landmines Armenia planted
were a critical element . . . of its campaign to create and maintain an ethnically pure Armenian
settlement on Azerbaijan’s territory by barring the return of displaced Azerbaijanis”118. That is a
factual allegation supported by evidence. If the allegation is accepted as true, then the existence of
the requisite discriminatory purpose or effect is manifest so far as concerns jurisdiction, and all the
more so in circumstances where there is no challenge to jurisdiction over the relevant CERD claim,
which is of the attempted creation and maintenance of an ethnically pure Armenian settlement on
Azerbaijani territory.
32. Second, Armenia says that: “To the extent that the placement of landmines and booby traps
could be said to specifically affect a particular group, that group could only be Azerbaijani nationals
who are members of the Armed Forces”119. Yet that is mere assertion, and a self-serving one, as all
depends on the disputed issues of where and why landmines and booby traps were planted. And the
assertion is inconsistent with the evidence, such as the location of booby traps in civilian houses120.
33. Third, it was also said by Armenia yesterday that there could be no jurisdiction with respect
to landmines or booby traps so far as concerns the Court’s 7 December 2021 Order on provisional
measures, which requires the Parties to “refrain from any action which might aggravate or extend the
dispute”121. Armenia accepts the binding nature of the Order and the corresponding jurisdiction of
116 Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2019 (II), p. 584, paras. 57-58.
117 Preliminary Objections of Armenia, para. 93.
118 Memorial of Azerbaijan, para. 273.
119 Preliminary Objections of Armenia, para. 96.
120 Memorial of Azerbaijan, para. 281.
121 CR 2024/21, p. 48, para. 22 (Salonidis), referring to Written Observations of Azerbaijan, para. 92.
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the Court. However, it says that Azerbaijan cannot assert a claim for non-aggravation by virtue of
conduct that did not justify the indication of the substantive provisional measures requested, and it
also says that there is anyway no evidence at all to support a case on breach122.
34. Neither point can be made good. Suppose that Azerbaijan is able to show on the merits
that, despite the Court’s Order of December 2021, certain booby traps were later set by Armenian
military personnel in civilian areas, or that Armenia’s continuing refusal to provide reliable maps of
its minefields and booby traps has led to further deaths or injury to civilians? Aggravation and
extension of the dispute would appear clear. As to the facts, including as to the purpose and effect of
Armenia’s landmines and booby traps, and developments since the Orders on provisional measures,
with your leave, I will now hand over to Mr Aughey.
35. Mr President, Members of the Court, that concludes my remarks, and I thank you for your
attention.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Mr Wordsworth for his statement. I now invite Mr Sean Aughey to
take the floor. You have the floor, Sir.
Mr AUGHEY:
AZERBAIJAN’S RESPONSE TO ARMENIA’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTION CONCERNING
“AZERBAIJAN’S CLAIMS AND CONTENTIONS CONCERNING LANDMINES
AND BOOBY TRAPS” (FACTUAL POINTS)
1. Mr President, Members of the Court, I will address Azerbaijan’s evidence concerning
landmines and booby traps. Yesterday, Mr Salonidis said nothing about this evidence, instead merely
repeating Armenia’s assertion that the “placement of such weapons, to the extent that it was done by
Armenia, was done exclusively for defensive purposes”123.
2. According to Azerbaijan’s evidence, as the Armenian forces withdrew from the territories
liberated in November 2020, landmines were placed in locations such as agricultural fields,
graveyards and gardens in order to inflict as much human loss as possible on the returning
122 CR 2024/21, pp. 48-49, paras. 23-26 (Salonidis).
123 CR 2024/21, p. 44, para. 5 (Salonidis).
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Azerbaijani population124. It is also Azerbaijan’s case that Armenia deliberately planted landmines
and booby traps in Azerbaijani civilian areas, including after it had agreed to return those areas to
Azerbaijan under the 2020 Trilateral Statement125.
3. In December 2020, the United Nations undertook an inter-agency mine action assessment
and concluded that there were “indications that some houses might have been booby trapped (IED)
as the Armenians withdrew”126. We have a copy of that report, which is not in the public domain,
and we hope that Armenia will agree that it may be put before the Court.
4. In June 2021, the head of Azerbaijan’s Mine Action Agency (known as “ANAMA”), a very
well-respected Azerbaijani agency that has been operating for almost thirty years with the support of
the United Nations Development Programme, reported  and you can see this on the screen: “Most
of the mines found outside of the former line of contact have been buried in fields utilised in the past
3-5 years for agricultural purposes”127. And ANAMA concluded that Armenia’s forces “deliberately
mined” these areas “during the forced withdrawal”128.
5. More recently, after almost three years of further de-mining activities, on 12 February 2024,
ANAMA stated:
“When we look at the statistics of mine actuation incidents, we can see that areas
are heavily contaminated with mines, not only along the former line of contact, but also
in residential areas, crop fields, river banks, forests and cemeteries. 247 of 345 victims
124 Memorial of Azerbaijan, para. 223, referring to Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission (IPHRC)
of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Report of the OIC-IPHRC Fact Finding Visit to the Territories Previously
Occupied by Armenia to Assess Human Rights & Humanitarian Situation, 22-26 September 2021 (14 November 2021)
https://oic-iphrc.org/home/post/35, paras. 24-25.
125 Memorial of Azerbaijan, paras. 273, 277-278; Mine Action Agency of the Republic of Azerbaijan, “Assistance
Required for the Republic of Azerbaijan in the Humanitarian Mine Action for Safe Reconstruction and Return of IDPs to
the Conflict Affected Territories of Azerbaijan” (2021), p. 2 (Annex 32 to Azerbaijan’s Request for provisional measures,
23 September 2021); Letter from Vugar Suleymanov, Chairman of the Board of the Mine Action Agency of the Republic
of Azerbaijan, to Fuad Alasgarov, Head of the Department of Work with Law Enforcement Bodies of the Presidential
Administration of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 11 June 2021, No. 414/M, p. 5 (certified translation) (Annex 36 to
Azerbaijan’s Request for provisional measures, 23 September 2021).
126 See Letter dated 8 February 2023 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General, p. 3, https://un.mfa.gov.az/files/shares/Letters/77session/Letter%20to%20UNSG%20
in%20reply%20to%20Armenia's%20letter%20on%20mines%20A-77-726%20Eng.pdf.
127 Letter from Vugar Suleymanov, Chairman of the Board of the Mine Action Agency of the Republic of
Azerbaijan, to Fuad Alasgarov, Head of the Department for Work with Law Enforcement Bodies of the Presidential
Administration of the Republic of Azerbaijan, dated 11 June 2021, No. 414/M (Certified Translation) (with enclosure), p. 4
(Annex 36 to Azerbaijan’s Request for Provisional Measures dated 23 September 2021).
128 Ibid.
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of mine incidents after the Second Garabagh War were killed or received various bodily
injuries in the areas away from the former line of contact.”129
6. There are various photos in your judges’ folders at tab 7 to illustrate how, by way of
example, landmines have been placed in a desecrated cemetery so as to explode when attempts are
made to restore toppled gravestones. Is it really being said that this can only have been done for
defensive purposes?
7. Even by reference to the still incomplete picture that the Court now has, there is important
evidence of the planting of landmines “to create and maintain an ethnically pure Armenian settlement
on Azerbaijan’s territory by barring the return of [ethnic] Azerbaijanis”130. In this respect, on the
screen you can see from an updated map of minefields found by ANAMA and locations where mines
have exploded that these are not confined to the line of contact, which is marked by the brown
diagonal lines running along the top and then down the east side, as is alleged by Armenia in its
Memorial.
8. A little more orientation is needed on this map:
(a) The location of minefields found by ANAMA based on records provided by Armenia are
indicated by solid red circles.
(b) Additional minefields found by ANAMA are marked in purple and by the symbol “MF”.
(c) Starting at the bottom of the map, the districts of Gubaldy, Zangilan and Jabrayil were liberated
during the Second Garabagh War. ANAMA has found numerous minefields in these areas  all
far from the former line of contact and in civilian areas where internally displaced Azerbaijanis
once lived and were expected to return  and Azerbaijan contends that those mines were laid by
Armenia’s forces as they withdrew from those territories.
(d) Pursuant to the Trilateral Statement, Armenia’s forces also withdrew from the districts of
Kalbajar, Lachin and Aghdam in late 2020. Again, Azerbaijan contends that Armenia’s forces
laid landmines in civilian areas as they withdrew. You can see that ANAMA has found minefields
in the west of Kalbajar and Lachin districts, away from the line of contact.
129 ANAMA, Facebook post, 12 February 2024, https://www.facebook.com/anama.gov.az/posts/pfbid031dtV5
xrEALDiJZzexSnWM39jJz73Saim3LU3fgHLNYzk2337okMK3MGvLPw7QsN5l, certified translation (emphasis added)
(judges’ folders, tab 10).
130 Memorial of Azerbaijan, para. 273.
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(e) Armenia had access to the city of Lachin and the villages of Sus and Zabukh until August 2022
when, pursuant to the Trilateral Statement, those settlements were returned to Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan’s Memorial contends that Armenian forces laid landmines and booby traps as they
withdrew, that is, after the Court’s Order of December 2021131. Notably, Mr Salonidis ignored
this when he baldly asserted “Azerbaijan literally provided no evidence  not a single citation
or source” to support an allegation that landmines and booby traps were placed since 7 December
2021132.
9. In this respect, you can see on your screens now two booby traps that were found in
October 2022 in houses and other civilian buildings in the villages of Sus and Zabukh, one set to
blow up when a threshold is crossed, the other when a door is opened. Internally displaced
Azerbaijani families once lived and worked in these buildings, and they were expected to return. As
regards the second image, please note that nails have been packed around the explosive so as to inflict
as much physical injury as possible133. The Court has seen these images before but it is also important
to understand the context in which these explosives were set. As recorded in a formal inspection in
November 2022: “23 out of 33 private residential houses, 122 ancillary buildings, libraries,
elementary schools and store buildings in Sus village are fully and deliberately destroyed,
plundered”134.
10. In a further recent example  published on 19 April, as one of ANAMA’s regular updates
on its de-mining activities  it stated that “a significant amount of explosive material has been
discovered in [a] farm-type building associated with [a] residential building”. ANAMA explained:
“improvised explosive devices, explosive materials, both electric and non-electric
detonators, numerous explosive charges prepared for powerful explosions, as well as
improved explosive devices installed using D1 hand grenades manufactured in
Armenia, were discovered on the site”135.
131 Ibid., paras. 278, 280-281.
132 CR 2024/21, p. 49, para. 26 (Salonidis).
133 Memorial of Azerbaijan, para. 281, fn. 662.
134 Letter from Elchin Mammadov, First Deputy Prosecutor General of the Republic of Azerbaijan, to Elnur
Mammadov, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 19 Jan. 2023, No. 03/222006229, with enclosures
(certified translation), p. 188 (Annex 24 to Azerbaijan’s Request for provisional measures, 4 January 2023). See also p. 142
regarding Zabukh village.
135 Mine Action Agency of the Republic of Azerbaijan, “Explosive materials have been discovered in Khojavand
region”, 19 April 2024, https://anama.gov.az/news/217.
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And you can see that equipment on the screen.
11. It is important also for the Court to have firmly in mind Armenia’s refusal to hand over
maps of where mines and booby traps have been set, even following the cessation of hostilities. If
the explosives really were just for defensive purposes, as Armenia contends136, what possible
justification could there be for Armenia not to hand over comprehensive and accurate information as
to their placement after November 2020?
12. To give something of an insight to this, on 6 April 2021, the Armenian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs called Azerbaijan’s request for landmine maps a “fake agenda”137. That was plainly wrong,
and the international community  including the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe138, the European Parliament139 and the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs140  continues to call
on Armenia to release all maps.
13. Armenia eventually shared a limited number of maps of around 97,000 landmines planted
along certain sections of the former line of contact in the Aghdam region141. It did this only in
June 2021 and only in exchange for the return of 15 detainees. At the time Azerbaijan said, and this
may be thought to have been stating the obvious142, “[o]btaining mine maps will save the lives and
136 Memorial of Azerbaijan, para. 275. Cf. Preliminary Objections of Armenia, paras. 85-86, 89, 91, 94-95;
CR 2024/21, p. 44, para. 5 (Salonidis).
137 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, “The answer of the MFA Spokesperson Anna
Naghdalyan to the questions of the journalists regarding the Azerbaijani allegations on minefield maps”, 6 April 2021,
https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2021/04/06/spox_journalists_answer/10885.
138 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Humanitarian consequences of the conflict between Armenia
and Azerbaijan / Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, resolution 2391 (2021), https://pace.coe.int/en/files/29483/html.
139 European Parliament, Prisoners of war in the aftermath of the most recent conflict between Armenia and
Azerbaijan, doc. P9_TA(2021)0251 (20 May 2021), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2021-
0251_EN.html; European Parliament, Joint statement by the Chair of the Delegation for relations with the South Caucasus,
MEP Marina Kaljurand, the European Parliament’s Standing Rapporteur on Armenia, MEP Andrey Kovatchev, and the
European Parliament’s Standing Rapporteur on Azerbaijan, MEP Zeljana Zovko, Delegation for relations with the South
Caucasus, doc. 2019-2024 (8 June 2021), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/235661/20210608_Joint%20
Statement_Kaljurand-Kovatchev-Zovko_AM-AZ_landmines.pdf.
140 OSCE Minsk Group, “Statement by the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group”, 13 April 2021,
https://www.osce.org/minsk-group/483416; OSCE Minsk Group, “Statement by the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk
Group”, 5 May 2021, https://www.osce.org/minsk-group/485558. See also “Armenia obliged to hand over minefield maps
to Azerbaijan under int’l humanitarian law: Matthew Bryza”, News.az (4 June 2021), https://www.news.az/news/armeniaobliged-
to-handover-minefield-maps-to-azerbaijan-under-intlhumanitarian-law-matthew-bryza.
141 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, press release No. 217/21, Information of the Press
Service Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan (12 June 2021),
https://mfa.gov.az/en/news/no21721-information-of-the-press-service-department-of-the-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-ofthe-
republic-of-azerbaijan.
142 Ibid.
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health of tens of thousands of our citizens, including mining workers, and accelerate reconstruction
projects . . . and the return of [internally displaced persons]”.
14. Nonetheless, Armenia’s Prime Minister’s position was as follows143: “maps of mined areas
have been provided to Azerbaijan. However, they want to give the impression that we have given
everything we have. However, this is not the case; instead, a tiny part is provided.”
15. As the casualties continued to mount, including among Azerbaijani civilians who have
returned, Azerbaijan called on Armenia, repeatedly, to provide all maps in its possession of where it
set explosives. An updated list of such statements is included in your judges’ folders at tab 8.
16. Between July and December 2021, Armenia provided minefield records for a total of over
1,000 minefields containing around 390,000 mines its forces had placed along certain additional
sections of the former line of contact, as well as records for just eight minefields laid in Zangilan,
Gubaldy and Jabrayil districts, all far from the contact line.
17. Also in November 2021, following a fact-finding visit to the liberated territories, the
Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
reported that there is “sufficient evidence to conclude that purposeful measures were undertaken by
the Armenian side” to impede the return of “hundreds of thousands of [internally displaced persons]
desperately waiting to return to their homes in safety and dignity”, including “massive contamination
of the liberated territories with mines” and “massive militarization of the occupied territories by
laying multilayer military obstacles”144.
18. As to the utility of the limited maps that were provided by Armenia in 2021, Azerbaijan
subsequently explained in a letter to the United Nations Secretary-General dated 24 August 2022145:
143 Extract from Speech by Nikol Pashinyan, posted on YouTube channel of NEWS AM (13 June 2021),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7lbPymz14zQ (certified translation) (Annex 33 to Azerbaijan’s Application and
Request for provisional measures, 21 September 2021). See also Tass, “Yerevan transfers only a fraction of minefield maps
to Baku, says Pashinyan”, 13 June 2021, https://tass.com/world/1302267.
144 Memorial of Azerbaijan, para. 220, referring to Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission (IPHRC)
of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Report of the OIC-IPHRC Fact-Finding Visit to the Territories
Previously Occupied by Armenia to Assess Human Rights & Humanitarian Situation, 22-26 September 2021 (14 November
2021) https://oic-iphrc.org/home/post/35, paras. 41-43.
145 Letter dated 24 August 2022 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Azerbaijan to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, https://journal.un.org/en/new-york/documents/2022-09-13. See also
ANAMA press release No. 493/22, Press release on ongoing threats as a result of planting of landmines in the territories
of Azerbaijan by Armenia, 25 October 2022, https://mfa.gov.az/en/news/no49322; ANAMA press release No. 031/24,
Commentary on the statement of the Armenian side on the intention to hand over set of landmine maps to Azerbaijan, 25
January 2024, https://mfa.gov.az/en/news/no03124.
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“[O]nce examined by field specialists, it turned out that the mine formularies were
incomplete, covering only part of the liberated territories, and a significant part of them
were unreliable, while others contained no information pertinent to demining. The
practical utility of the records of the minefield maps handed over by Armenia is around
25 per cent”.
19. In October 2022, ANAMA reiterated that “about 55% of recent landmine explosions
occurred in the territories outside the areas where maps were provided by Armenia”146. This can also
be seen from the map on the screen.
20. In October 2021, Armenia’s Agent told this Court: “we stand ready to provide any more
maps in our possession regarding minefields located behind the lines currently held by Azerbaijani
armed forces, which now present solely humanitarian concerns”147.
21. And, despite its statements148  including its statement to this Court on 31 January
2023149  that all maps in its possession have been handed over, maps for 13 minefields in Shusha
and Lachin districts were subsequently provided in October 2023. Further, on 25 January 2024,
Armenia announced that it was providing to Azerbaijan an additional eight sets of records on the
location of landmines. This statement is in your judges’ folder at tab 9 and also on the screen150:
“Recently, after several publications by the Azerbaijani media about injuries
received by citizens of the Azerbaijan Republic from a mine explosion, and in
continuation of the agreement reached as a result of negotiations . . ., the [Republic of
Armenia] National Security Service resumed survey work among former NK military
personnel, as a result of which 8 new records appeared.”
22. This of course begs the question why there had ever been any halt in gathering information
from “former NK military personnel”, especially since Armenia has had to recognize that this is
purely a “humanitarian” issue151. And please do recall that landmines within the formerly occupied
territories have caused 65 deaths and 287 injuries since November 2020, of which 50 deaths and
146 ANAMA press release No. 493/22, Press release on ongoing threats as a result of planting of landmines in the
territories of Azerbaijan by Armenia, 25 October 2022, https://mfa.gov.az/en/news/no49322.
147 CR 2021/25, p. 13, para. 9 (Kirakosyan).
148 See e.g. Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, “If anyone thinks that the peace agenda is the ‘peaceful
annihilation’ of the Republic of Armenia or Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, they are seriously mistaken”, Prime
Minister’s speech at the Cabinet meeting, 10 November 2022, https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-andmessages/
item/2022/11/10/Cabinet-meeting-Speech/.
149 CR 2023/4, p. 31, para. 66 (Murphy).
150 National Security Service, Republic of Armenia, 25 January 2024, https://www.sns.am/en/news/view/920
(emphasis added).
151 See e.g. CR 2021/25, p. 13, para. 9 (Kirakosyan).
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123 casualties were civilians. And this includes the deaths of 14 civilians and the maiming of
33 more since the Court’s Order of 22 February 2023.
23. Further, as ANAMA explained in a statement of 12 February 2024, which is in the judges’
folder at tab 10, these eight reports “mainly consist of notes on the mine-planted areas covering the
[former contact line in] Kalbajar region” and, as regards this limited area:
“as it was before, the information in the recently submitted contours has been reflected
inaccurately, unreliabl[y] and incompletely. The analysis and processing of the
contours defined that the information contained in the documents is not consistent with
the real minefields, the reference coordinates are incorrect and useless.”
24. ANAMA also stated:
“In general, the contours submitted by the Armenian side cover part of the area
along the former line of contact. Information about the part of the former line of contact
passing through the territories of Khojavend, Tartar and Goranboy districts, as well as
the areas mined by the Armenian military units during the time they retreated in
November 2020, has not yet been provided.”
25. I conclude. Azerbaijan has put forward more than sufficient evidence which, on its face,
shows that Armenia’s forces placed landmines and booby traps in civilian areas, far from the former
line of contact, setting these lethal devices in places from which Azerbaijanis had been displaced and
to which they were expected to return. This can have had no defensive purpose. And likewise,
Armenia’s continued refusal to share complete and accurate information on the location of the
minefields and booby traps, long after the cession of hostilities, can have had no defensive purpose.
This is why, as Mr Wordsworth has explained, Armenia’s conduct is put forward as an element of
Azerbaijan’s claim for ethnic cleansing.
26. Mr President, Members of the Court, I thank you for your attention and may I ask that you
call on Professor Boisson de Chazournes.
The PRESIDENT : I thank Mr Aughey for his statement. Je donne maintenant la parole à
Mme la professeure Laurence Boisson de Chazournes. Madame, vous avez la parole.
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Mme BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES :
LA COUR A COMPÉTENCE RATIONE MATERIAE SUR LES DEMANDES DE L’AZERBAÏDJAN
CONCERNANT LA DESTRUCTION ET LA DÉGRADATION DIFFÉRENTIELLES DE
L’ENVIRONNEMENT NATUREL DANS LES ZONES OÙ LES AZERBAÏDJANAIS
RÉSIDAIENT AVANT LE NETTOYAGE ETHNIQUE ET L’OCCUPATION
PAR L’ARMÉNIE
I. Introduction
1. Monsieur le président, Madame la vice-présidente, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de
la Cour, c’est un honneur pour moi de me présenter à nouveau devant vous au nom de la République
d’Azerbaïdjan.
2. Je traiterai de la deuxième objection préliminaire de l’Arménie à la compétence ratione
materiae de la Cour sur les demandes de l’Azerbaïdjan concernant les actes et les omissions
discriminatoires de l’Arménie ayant causé la destruction et la dégradation de l’environnement à
l’encontre des Azerbaïdjanais.
3. À ce stade, la Cour n’est pas tenue de déterminer si les actes illicites de l’Arménie violent
les dispositions de fond de la CIEDR152. Votre juridiction doit seulement vérifier « si les actions ou
les omissions dont le demandeur fait grief au défendeur entrent dans le champ d’application d[e la
CIEDR] »153.
4. Votre juridiction a également récemment précisé dans son arrêt Ukraine c. Russie que
« [l]a “discrimination raciale” au sens du paragraphe 1 de l’article premier de la CIEDR
comporte donc deux éléments. En premier lieu, une “distinction, exclusion, restriction
ou préférence” doit être “fondée sur” l’un des motifs prohibés, à savoir “la race, la
couleur, l’ascendance ou l’origine nationale ou ethnique”. En second lieu, une telle
différence de traitement doit avoir “pour but ou pour effet de détruire ou de
compromettre la reconnaissance, la jouissance ou l’exercice, dans des conditions
d’égalité, des droits de l’homme”. »154
152 Application de la convention internationale pour la répression du financement du terrorisme et de la convention
internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale (Ukraine c. Fédération de Russie),
exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2019 (II), p. 595, par. 94.
153 Allégations de génocide au titre de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide
(Ukraine c. Fédération de Russie ; 32 États intervenants), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt du 2 février 2024, par. 136.
154 Application de la convention internationale pour la répression du financement du terrorisme et de la convention
internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale (Ukraine c. Fédération de Russie), arrêt du
31 janvier 2024, par. 195.
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5. C’est à la lumière de ce test juridique que tant l’établissement de la compétence de la Cour
que la définition de la discrimination raciale à l’article premier, paragraphe 1, de la CIEDR doivent
être compris, et non autrement ainsi qu’a voulu le prétendre l’Arménie155.
6. En guise d’introduction, permettez-moi également de préciser que les revendications de
l’Azerbaïdjan portent sur des actes de destruction et de dégradation de l’environnement constitutifs
de racisme environnemental156.
7. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, prenant en compte
ce qui vient d’être dit, je vais présenter les raisons pour lesquelles la Cour est compétente ratione
materiae au titre de la CIEDR à l’égard du comportement illicite de l’Arménie en matière de
destruction de l’environnement. Mon propos s’articulera autour de deux points :
a) Tout d’abord, la destruction discriminatoire de l’environnement par l’Arménie a été fondée sur
l’origine ethnique ou nationale ; et
b) deuxièmement, la destruction discriminatoire de l’environnement par l’Arménie a porté atteinte
à l’égalité d’exercice et de jouissance des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales des
Azerbaïdjanais.
8. J’en viens au premier point.
II. La destruction discriminatoire de l’environnement par l’Arménie
a été fondée sur l’origine ethnique ou nationale
9. L’Arménie soutient dans ses exceptions préliminaires que les actes de destruction de
l’environnement dont se plaint l’Azerbaïdjan ne constituent pas une discrimination fondée sur
l’origine nationale ou ethnique. Permettez-moi  cela étant nécessaire à ce stade  de rappeler à
votre attention les éléments de preuve présentés par l’Azerbaïdjan dans son mémoire, lesquels
démontrent que la destruction de l’environnement dans ce différend est bien « fondée sur » l’origine
ethnique ou nationale des Azerbaïdjanais.
10. L’ensemble de ces preuves montrent clairement que l’objectif de discrimination raciale de
l’Arménie est manifestement évident dans son traitement différencié des districts azerbaïdjanais qui
155 Voir CR 2024/21, p. 52-58, par. 9-34 (Macdonald).
156 Voir MA, p. 237-275, par. 291-344.
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entourent la région du Garabagh. Ce traitement est en fort contraste avec celui que l’Arménie a
réservé aux zones habitées par des personnes d’origine arménienne.
11. Pendant l’occupation illégale des districts azerbaïdjanais et de la région du Garabagh par
l’Arménie, les Azerbaïdjanais ont été systématiquement privés de l’accès à des ressources naturelles
telles que les ressources en eau, en raison de leur origine ethnique ou nationale, alors que les
Arméniens étaient favorisés.
12. Cette discrimination ciblée n’est pas une simple allégation ; l’Azerbaïdjan l’a étayée par
des preuves concrètes qui nourrissent des plaintes pour discrimination directe et discrimination
indirecte.
13. Le rapport et les conclusions des experts indépendants de la société Industrial Economics
(IEcexperts) sur l’évaluation des dommages causés à l’environnement dans les territoires libérés, de
même que le rapport du Programme des Nations Unies pour l’environnement (PNUE), sont examinés
en détail dans le mémoire de l’Azerbaïdjan157.
14. Le mémoire de l’Azerbaïdjan énumère les actes de destruction de l’environnement qui ont
eu lieu dans les districts d’Aghdam, de Fuzuli, de Gubadly, de Jabrayil, de Kalbajar, de Latchine et
de Zangilan. Ces sept districts entourent la région du Garabagh. La région du Garabagh avait une
population en majorité arménienne. Les sept districts, eux, étaient majoritairement peuplés
d’Azerbaïdjanais158. Ainsi que vous pouvez le voir à l’écran, si on prend en compte la répartition
ethnique de ces districts, moins de 1 % de la population totale est composée d’Arméniens. Ces
districts ne peuvent donc pas être considérés comme arméniens159.
15. Ces districts, historiquement dominés par les Azerbaïdjanais, sont restés en grande partie
non habités pendant les trois décennies d’occupation arménienne, à l’exception de quelques
personnes d’origine arménienne originaires de pays tiers.
16. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, comme le montre
la carte affichée à l’écran, la différence de traitement exercée par l’Arménie entre les Azerbaïdjanais
et les Arméniens est claire. Les atteintes portées à l’environnement, comme la construction de
157 MA, p. 237-275, par. 291-344.
158 MA, p. 24-26, par. 46-49.
159 MA, p. 27, fig. 3.
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centrales hydroélectriques, la déforestation et l’abandon des terres agricoles, ont été réalisées de
manière disproportionnée dans des zones majoritairement peuplées d’Azerbaïdjanais pendant
l’occupation. Ces zones sont indiquées en jaune sur la carte.
17. Les zones délimitées en violet, en revanche, étaient les zones habitées par les personnes
d’origine arménienne. Il n’est donc pas surprenant qu’il n’y ait pas eu d’actes de destruction de
l’environnement dans ces zones.
18. Ainsi, les deux districts comptant une population arménienne importante avant
l’occupation, à savoir Khojaly et Khojavand, comptaient des dizaines de milliers d’hectares de forêts
et d’arbres en 1994160. Chacun de ces districts a subi une perte de forêt inférieure à 1 % pendant
l’occupation, alors que les districts azerbaïdjanais de Fuzuli, Aghdam et Jabrayil ont perdu à jamais
entre 31 et 50 % de leurs forêts161.
19. La tentative de l’Arménie d’affirmer que les actes de destruction de l’environnement ont
été uniformément répartis dans les territoires occupés ne repose sur aucune base probante et contredit
les preuves accablantes présentées par l’Azerbaïdjan. Je vous réfère au rapport du PNUE, que vous
trouverez en annexe du mémoire de l’Azerbaïdjan. Il a documenté le traitement différencié des
populations azerbaïdjanaise et arménienne pendant l’occupation illégale par l’Arménie, ainsi que la
privation délibérée de ressources essentielles subie par les Azerbaïdjanais au profit des Arméniens162.
20. Monsieur le président, à ce stade, tous ces éléments sont plus que suffisants pour prouver
que les actes de destruction de l’environnement commis par l’Arménie sont susceptibles de relever
de la CIEDR.
21. Ce constat me conduit à évoquer les prétendues « features » du présent différend que
l’Arménie a dépeintes. L’Arménie a fait valoir que les Azerbaïdjanais d’origine ethnique n’étaient
pas présents dans les territoires azerbaïdjanais où des actes de discrimination raciale ont été commis.
Cet argument, si je puis dire, évite la question ou, pour utiliser une autre langue de la Cour, « misses
the point ».
160 Voir MA, p. 257, par. 316.
161 Voir MA, p. 356-357, par. 466.
162 Voir MA, p. 244-275, par. 300-344.
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22. Comme l’Azerbaïdjan l’a fait valoir dans son mémoire, les actes de destruction et de
dégradation de l’environnement commis par l’Arménie font partie de sa revendication plus large
selon laquelle l’Arménie a mené une campagne de nettoyage ethnique contre les Azerbaïdjanais
d’origine ethnique. Et l’un des traits importants de cette campagne a été de changer complètement
les attributs des territoires azerbaïdjanais que l’Arménie a illégalement occupés. Les territoires
azerbaïdjanais en question sont les sept districts entourant la région du Garabagh que je viens
d’évoquer. Ces sept districts étaient historiquement peuplés d’Azerbaïdjanais d’origine ethnique, et
non d’Arméniens. Cela signifie qu’après l’expulsion brutale des Azerbaïdjanais de leurs foyers,
l’Arménie a poursuivi sa campagne de nettoyage ethnique, notamment en dégradant l’environnement
naturel des territoires azerbaïdjanais à un point tel que cet environnement est devenu non soutenable
et malsain, rendant impossible la vie des Azerbaïdjanais d’origine ethnique lors de leur retour.
23. Il importe peu, par conséquent, de savoir si les Azerbaïdjanais d’origine ethnique étaient
présents dans les territoires lorsque l’Arménie a détruit et dégradé l’environnement des territoires
azerbaïdjanais, puisque la campagne brutale de nettoyage ethnique de l’Arménie visait à garantir que
les Azerbaïdjanais d’origine ethnique seraient privés, lors de leur retour, de leur droit de jouir de leur
patrie, y compris de l’environnement et des ressources naturelles qui en font partie. C’est dans ce
contexte de déplacement des Azerbaïdjanais d’origine ethnique et de création d’obstacles à leur
retour que l’Arménie a commis des préjudices environnementaux discriminatoires sur le plan racial.
24. De même, une autre prétendue « feature » décrite par l’Arménie est que les Azerbaïdjanais
d’origine ethnique ont été exclus par l’Arménie de ces territoires par la force militaire. Une fois de
plus, l’Arménie ne traite pas du problème.
25. L’expulsion des Azerbaïdjanais d’origine ethnique de leurs maisons et de leurs territoires
par la force militaire n’a constitué que la première étape de la campagne de nettoyage ethnique menée
par l’Arménie. Cette campagne s’est poursuivie tout au long de son occupation des territoires
azerbaïdjanais. Comme l’agent l’a expliqué, la restitution des sept districts azerbaïdjanais autour de
la région du Garabagh faisait partie des négociations entre l’Arménie et l’Azerbaïdjan. Et qu’a fait
l’Arménie ? L’Arménie a fait en sorte que les négociations échouent, l’Arménie a maintenu son
contrôle illégal sur les territoires azerbaïdjanais et l’Arménie a continué de commettre des actes de
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destruction et de dégradation de l’environnement, cela aboutissant au fait que, le jour venant pour les
Azerbaïdjanais d’origine ethnique de retourner chez eux, ils n’avaient pas de foyer où aller.
26. L’Arménie a toujours eu connaissance du fait que ces districts abritaient des
Azerbaïdjanais qui ont le droit de retourner dans leurs foyers et de jouir de leurs droits fondamentaux
en vertu de la CIEDR et du droit international. L’Arménie a utilisé ces districts azerbaïdjanais et
leurs ressources comme des biens sujets à pillage, à la destruction et à la pollution. Ceci inclut les
forêts, les « Natural Monuments Trees », les infrastructures hydrauliques, les terres cultivées et les
vignobles essentiels à la vie et aux moyens de subsistance des Azerbaïdjanais.
27. La différence de traitement est donc évidente si l’on compare l’environnement naturel des
sept districts azerbaïdjanais entourant la région du Garabagh avec l’environnement naturel de la
région du Garabagh.
28. Hier, l’Arménie a également fait valoir que « Azerbaijan does not suggest that the harms
it complains of were “based on” any of the protected grounds, in the sense that that was their stated
purpose »163. Deux points doivent être formulés en réponse.
29. Tout d’abord, pour déterminer si le comportement environnemental illégal de l’Arménie
peut constituer une discrimination raciale, il importe peu que l’objectif des actes illégaux soit déclaré
ou non. Le but peut être établi par déduction, ainsi que l’a précisé la Cour. Ainsi dans son récent arrêt
Ukraine c. Russie, la Cour a examiné l’allégation de l’Ukraine selon laquelle « des Tatars de Crimée
et [les Ukrainiens de souche] ont été [soumis à des actes] de violences physiques en raison de leur
origine ethnique », elle l’a examinée sur la base de « présomptions de fait, [d’]indices ou [de] preuves
circonstancielles »164. Deuxièmement, sur un point connexe, la Cour a également déclaré dans ce
même arrêt « qu’un État qui n’est pas en mesure d’apporter la preuve directe de certains faits doit
pouvoir “recourir plus largement aux présomptions de fait, aux indices ou preuves circonstancielles
(circumstantial evidence)” »165. Ceci s’applique à l’Azerbaïdjan. Au moment du dépôt de son
163 Voir CR 2024/21, p. 53, par. 14 (Macdonald).
164 Application de la convention internationale pour la répression du financement du terrorisme et de la convention
internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale (Ukraine c. Fédération de Russie), arrêt du
31 janvier 2024, par. 217.
165 Ibid., par. 169.
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mémoire, l’Azerbaïdjan n’avait pas un accès complet aux territoires occupés. Il a donc dû s’appuyer
sur des déductions pour établir le but couvert par la CIEDR.
30. Il en découle que l’Azerbaïdjan a raison de soutenir que les actes discriminatoires de
destruction et de dégradation de l’environnement commis par l’Arménie ont été « fondés sur »
l’origine ethnique ou nationale, car les actes illicites de l’Arménie ont été délibérément concentrés
dans des zones qui étaient majoritairement peuplées et habitées par des Azerbaïdjanais d’origine
ethnique avant leur occupation par l’Arménie.
31. L’argument de l’Arménie selon lequel l’Azerbaïdjan ne fournit aucune preuve pour
justifier le but des actes illicites de cette dernière ignore tout simplement les faits et les preuves
fournis par l’Azerbaïdjan dans son mémoire. La campagne illégale de nettoyage ethnique et de
ségrégation raciale menée par l’Arménie depuis des décennies est bien documentée. La destruction
des infrastructures hydrauliques, la pollution des sols et de l’eau et la restriction de l’accès aux terres
agricoles fertiles, pour ne citer que quelques-unes des pratiques, ont affecté de manière
disproportionnée le droit des Azerbaïdjanais à la santé, y compris l’accès à leurs terres d’origine.
32. Comme l’Azerbaïdjan l’a expliqué dans son mémoire, l’environnement naturel des
territoires libérés était indissociable des aspects culturels, sociaux et économiques de la vie des
Azerbaïdjanais. Par exemple, des hectares de mûriers ont été détruits par l’Arménie. Ces arbres sont
historiquement importants pour les Azerbaïdjanais car ils sont utilisés pour l’élevage des vers à soie,
un moyen de subsistance traditionnel pour eux166.
33. De même, les « National Monument Trees », qui revêtent une importance culturelle pour
les Azerbaïdjanais167, ont été détruits pendant l’occupation arménienne. Tous les arbres détruits se
trouvaient dans des districts dont la population était majoritairement azerbaïdjanaise avant
l’occupation168.
166 MA, p. 264, par. 326.
167 MA, annexe 65, Industrial Economics, Inc. and RESPEC, Inc., Report on Environmental and Natural Resource
Harms During the Period of the Republic of Armenia’s Invasion and Occupation of Sovereign Lands of the Republic of
Azerbaijan, for Use in Proceedings Before the International Court of Justice in Application of the International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Azerbaijan v. Armenia) (hereinafter “IEc Environmental Expert
Report”), p. 23.
168 Ibid., Annex D.
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34. Avant l’occupation arménienne, l’Azerbaïdjan avait créé deux réserves naturelles et quatre
sanctuaires naturels dans la région du Garabagh, dans le but de protéger et de conserver des zones
environnementales historiquement importantes. Cependant, l’Arménie n’a pas protégé ces zones
sensibles sur le plan environnemental et culturel.
35. Par exemple, en raison des actes discriminatoires de destruction de l’environnement
commis par l’Arménie, les districts de Jabrayil et de Gubadly ont subi de « sévères » dommages
forestiers169. Les experts soulignent que « [m]ore than two-thirds of the quantified harm,
745 hectares, occurred within Gubadly State Nature Sanctuary, a place of special importance for
protection of natural resources »170.
36. Autre exemple : les arbres dénommés « [rare] Eastern Plane » ont été coupés dans la
réserve naturelle nationale de Basitchay, à Zangilan171.
37. En outre, l’Arménie a délibérément détourné et géré de manière négligente les eaux du
réservoir de Sarsang afin de priver les Azerbaïdjanais qui vivaient dans les zones adjacentes aux
territoires occupés de l’accès à l’eau nécessaire à la consommation humaine, à l’assainissement et à
l’irrigation des cultures172. En réaction à ce comportement, l’Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de
l’Europe a adopté en 2016 la résolution 2085, demandant « aux autorités arméniennes de ne plus
utiliser les ressources en eau comme outils d’influence politique ou instruments de pression
bénéficiant à une seule des parties au conflit »173. La résolution note entre autres que
« la création délibérée d’une crise environnementale artificielle doit être considérée
comme “une agression environnementale” et doit être jugée comme un acte hostile d’un
État envers un autre, visant à créer des zones de catastrophe écologique et à rendre
impossible la vie normale de la population concernée … dont sont victimes les citoyens
azerbaïdjanais habitant la vallée du Bas-Karabakh »174.
38. Les termes de la résolution ne laissent place à aucune équivoque. Le comportement de
l’Arménie dénoncé par le Conseil de l’Europe visait les Azerbaïdjanais en les privant de l’égalité de
169 Ibid., Annex C.
170 Ibid., Annex C.
171 MA, p. 250, par. 309.
172 MA, p. 269-273, par. 333-342.
173 Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l’Europe, résolution 2085 (2016), Les habitants de régions frontalières
de l’Azerbaïdjan sont délibérément privés d’eau, accessible à l’adresse suivante : https://pace.coe.int/fr/files/22429/html,
par. 7.2.
174 Ibid., par. 3 et 4 (les italiques sont de nous).
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jouissance et d’exercice de leurs droits fondamentaux. Ajoutons que le propos de l’Arménie selon
lequel le réservoir a été endommagé et n’a jamais été réparé ne l’aide d’aucune manière. Ce propos
montre plutôt que, bien que contrôlant le réservoir, l’Arménie n’a jamais pris de mesures nécessaires
pour le réparer et a donc privé les Azerbaïdjanais de l’accès à l’eau jusqu’en 2022175.
39. Monsieur le président, j’en viens maintenant au deuxième point. Les revendications
avancées par l’Azerbaïdjan soulignent une dure réalité : celle d’une différence de traitement qui a eu
non seulement pour but mais aussi pour effet de porter atteinte aux droits fondamentaux des
Azerbaïdjanais, en particulier à leurs droits à la santé et à la propriété.
III. La destruction de l’environnement par l’Arménie a porté atteinte à
l’égalité d’exercice et de jouissance des droits de l’homme et
des libertés fondamentales des Azerbaïdjanais
40. L’Arménie tente de discréditer ces allégations en faisant valoir que les droits à la santé et
à la propriété ne relèvent pas de la CIEDR176. Pourtant, ces droits comme d’autres droits
fondamentaux relèvent bien de la CIEDR. En outre, les allégations de l’Azerbaïdjan selon lesquelles
l’Arménie a traité différemment les Azerbaïdjanais en fonction de leur origine ethnique ou nationale,
ce qui a eu pour but et pour effet de compromettre la reconnaissance, la jouissance ou l’exercice de
leurs droits fondamentaux, ne se limitent pas au droit à la santé et à la propriété ; elles impliquent
aussi d’autres droits qui leur sont liés, tels le droit à l’eau et le droit au retour177. Il est à peine besoin
de rappeler que la destruction de l’environnement, qu’elle soit intentionnelle ou non, a des
répercussions considérables sur la santé et le bien-être des individus et leurs droits fondamentaux178.
a) Droit à la santé
41. Selon les termes on ne peut plus clairs de la CIEDR, la Cour est compétente pour juger du
comportement discriminatoire de l’Arménie en matière de destruction de l’environnement, lequel
affecte le droit à la santé des Azerbaïdjanais. Le texte de l’article 5 de la CIEDR fait explicitement
175 Voir « Azerbaijani experts inspect Sarsang reservoir in Karabakh economic region », AZERNEWS (23 August
2022), accessible à l’adresse suivante : https://www.azernews.az/nation/198404.html.
176 Voir EPA, p. 65-66, par. 131.
177 MA, p. 353-355, par. 460-463.
178 Voir Nations Unies, note du Secrétaire général sur les obligations relatives aux droits de l’homme se rapportant
aux moyens de bénéficier d’un environnement sûr, propre, sain et durable, doc. A/73/188 (19 juillet 2018).
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référence aux droits économiques et sociaux, incluant le « [d]roit à la santé » reconnu à
l’article 5 e) iv) comme droit fondamental devant être protégé sans distinction de race, de couleur ou
d’origine nationale ou ethnique. Ce droit doit être interprété comme signifiant
« “the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health” … embrac[ing] a wide
range of socio-economic factors that promote conditions in which people can lead a
healthy life [including] food[,] nutrition [and] sanitation, [housing and] work[]
conditions, and a healthy environment »179.
42. L’Arménie se méprend lorsqu’elle affirme qu’il n’est porté atteinte à ce droit que lorsque
le groupe protégé subit des effets néfastes sur son état de santé ou lorsqu’il est confronté à des risques
potentiels pour la santé dans la région où il est physiquement résident180. L’Arménie affirme
également à tort que des actes de destruction de l’environnement se sont aussi produits dans des
zones où les Azerbaïdjanais ne vivaient pas181.
43. Monsieur le président, l’Arménie veut imposer sa propre interprétation restrictive de
l’article 5 de la CIEDR. Or rien dans la CIEDR ne justifie cette restriction, surtout si l’on garde à
l’esprit que l’Arménie a mené de manière délibérée des actions dans les zones azerbaïdjanaises afin
de créer un environnement malsain qui empêche le retour des Azerbaïdjanais dans leurs foyers182.
44. L’Arménie a affirmé à tort que la décision du Comité CIEDR invoquée par l’Azerbaïdjan
ne concernait que les populations autochtones, lesquelles continuaient à utiliser et à occuper leurs
terres. Il s’agit là d’une lecture tronquée de la décision, le Comité ayant noté que les activités menées
par les États-Unis entravaient « l’accès et l’utilisation » à ces zones183.
45. Un autre aspect doit être pris en considération. Le déni du droit d’un individu à retourner
dans son foyer, tel qu’il est consacré à l’article 5 de la CIEDR et d’autres instruments de droits de
179 P. Thornberry, The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: A
Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 374 ; voir aussi, Nations Unies, Comité des droits économiques, sociaux
et culturels, Question de fond concernant la mise en oeuvre du pacte international relatif aux droits économiques, sociaux
et culturels  Observation générale no 14 (2000)  Le droit au meilleur état de santé susceptible d’être atteint (art. 12 du
Pacte international relatif aux droits économiques, sociaux et culturels), doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (11 août 2000), par. 4 (les
italiques sont de nous).
180 EPA, p. 67-68, par. 136-139.
181 EPA, p. 68, par. 139 ; voir MA, p. 269-275, par. 333-344.
182 MA, p. 256, par. 313 ; p. 260-261, par. 319 ; p. 263-264, par. 325 ; p. 266, par. 328 ; p. 361, par. 473.
183 Nations Unies, Comité pour l’élimination de la discrimination raciale, Mesures d’alerte rapide et procédure
d’action urgente  Décision 1 (68)  États-Unis d’Amérique, CERD/C/USA/DEC/1 (11 avril 2006), par. 7-8.
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l’homme184, constitue une violation fondamentale des droits de l’homme. Et ce déni devient encore
plus flagrant lorsque l’État ou la situation de l’État occupé rend l’habitat non soutenable et malsain.
46. En outre, les liens entre les conditions environnementales et la santé publique sont
largement reconnus par le droit international. Ainsi, j’évoquerai le Comité des droits économiques,
sociaux et culturels, qui a réaffirmé dans son observation générale no 14 que le droit à la santé inclut
l’accès à un environnement sain en tant que facteur déterminant de la santé185. Lorsque les actions
d’un État occupant entraînent des dommages environnementaux qui rendent le domicile impropre à
l’habitation, il s’agit d’une violation non seulement du droit au retour, mais aussi du droit à la santé.
Cette violation aux multiples facettes souligne l’interconnexion des droits de l’homme et la nécessité
d’un cadre juridique intégré pour relever les défis complexes auxquels sont confrontées les personnes
touchées par les conflits armés et les régimes d’occupation.
b) Droit à la propriété
47. L’Arménie interprète également de manière erronée le droit à la propriété qui relève lui
aussi de la CIEDR. Elle affirme que les actes discriminatoires de destruction de l’environnement ne
peuvent mettre en cause le droit à la propriété que dans les cas impliquant des « indigenous peoples
resident on their traditional lands »186.
48. Dans le cadre de la CIEDR, le droit à la propriété est protégé par l’article 5 d) v). Son
exercice est prétérité par des comportements qui dégradent ou menacent l’intégrité de
l’environnement naturel sur la base d’une discrimination raciale. La CIEDR n’impose pas la
limitation revendiquée par l’Arménie. Elle ne crée pas de catégorie spéciale pour les populations
autochtones en tant que groupe protégé. Le champ de l’article premier, paragraphe 1, de la CIEDR
est large et inclut toute discrimination fondée sur « la race, la couleur, l’ascendance ou l’origine
nationale ou ethnique ».
184 Voir Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques (23 mars 1976), art. 12.
185 Voir Nations, Unies, Comité des droits économiques, sociaux et culturels, Question de fond concernant la mise
en oeuvre du pacte international relatif aux droits économiques, sociaux et culturels  Observation générale no 14
(2000)  Le droit au meilleur état de santé susceptible d’être atteint (art. 12 du Pacte international relatif aux droits
économiques, sociaux et culturels), doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (11 août 2000).
186 Voir EPA, p. 69, par. 141.
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49. En outre, le Comité CIEDR a spécifiquement reconnu « [l]e droit à la propriété et à
l’utilisation, la conservation et la protection des terres qu’elles occupent traditionnellement, ainsi
qu’aux ressources naturelles lorsque leur mode de vie et leur culture sont liés à l’utilisation des terres
et ressources »187. Comme l’Azerbaïdjan l’a souligné dans son mémoire, les territoires azerbaïdjanais
en question revêtaient une signification particulière pour les Azerbaïdjanais d’origine ethnique, en
termes d’importance culturelle et vitale.
50. Le comportement discriminatoire de l’Arménie a empêché les Azerbaïdjanais d’exercer
leurs droits d’accès, d’utilisation et de jouissance de leurs biens, de leurs terres et de leurs ressources.
Les allégations de l’Azerbaïdjan selon lesquelles l’Arménie a détruit et dégradé l’environnement
naturel sont susceptibles de relever de la compétence de la Cour au titre de la CIEDR.
51. Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, les faits et arguments juridiques présentés par
l’Azerbaïdjan ont bien démontré que la destruction de l’environnement a été fondée sur l’origine
ethnique ou nationale et a porté atteinte à l’égalité d’exercice et de jouissance des droits
fondamentaux des Azerbaïdjanais.
52. Cette objection préliminaire doit être rejetée.
53. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, je vous remercie
de votre attention. Ma présentation clôt le premier tour de plaidoiries de l’Azerbaïdjan. Je vous
remercie.
Le PRÉSIDENT : Je remercie Mme la professeure Boisson de Chazournes, dont l’exposé
conclut donc cette audience. La Cour se réunira de nouveau demain, mercredi 24 avril, à 16 h 30,
pour entendre l’Arménie en son second tour de plaidoiries, au terme duquel celle-ci donnera lecture
de ses conclusions finales. L’Azerbaïdjan présentera son second tour de plaidoiries lors d’une
audience qui se tiendra le vendredi 26 avril, à 10 heures, à l’issue de laquelle il donnera également
lecture de ses conclusions finales. Chacune des Parties disposera, lors de ce second tour, d’un
maximum d’une heure et demie pour présenter ses arguments.
187 Nations Unies, Comité pour l’élimination de la discrimination raciale, Recommandation no 34 adoptée par le
Comité – Discrimination raciale à l’égard des personnes d’ascendance africaine, CERD/C/GC/34 (3 octobre 2011),
par. 4 a).
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Je rappellerai que, conformément au paragraphe 1 de l’article 60 du Règlement de la Cour, les
exposés oraux du second tour devront être aussi succincts que possible. Le second tour des plaidoiries
a pour objet de permettre à chacune des Parties de répondre aux arguments avancés oralement par
l’autre Partie. Il ne doit par conséquent pas constituer une répétition des présentations déjà faites par
les Parties, lesquelles ne sont, au demeurant, pas tenues d’utiliser l’intégralité du temps de parole qui
leur est alloué. L’audience est levée.
L’audience est levée à 13 heures.
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