APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

(UKRAINE v. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)

REJOINDER
Submitted by the Russian Federation

VOLUME IX

(ANNEXES 217 - 293)

10 MARCH 2023
Annex 217

Annex 218

Annex 219

Annex 220

Annex 221
TASS, Ukraine Banned 780 Russian Movies and Series Since 2014 (5 October 2018).

Annex 222
MK, Kiev Schools to Abandon Study of Russian (12 August 2022).

Annex 223

Annex 224
TASS, Ukraine Imposes Fines for Breach of State Language Law (16 July 2022).

Annex 225
DW, Ukraine bans music, books from Russia, Belarus (29 June 2022).

Annex 226

Annex 227
CNE, Ukrainian ban on Russian language forces Christian radio to move to Hungary (8 September 2022).

Annex 228
Wikipedia, Demolition of monuments to Alexander Pushkin in Ukraine.

Annex 229
Mosregtoday, Ukraine continues to dismantle monuments linked to Russian history and culture (22 April 2022).

Annex 230

Annex 231
Lenta.ru, Pushkin Monument Dismantled in Zaporozhye (27 July 2022).

Annex 232
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annex</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annex 218</td>
<td>Lenta.ru</td>
<td><em>Kyrym Khanlygy: Crimea Remembers Its Local Statehood</em></td>
<td>12 January 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex 219</td>
<td>TASS</td>
<td><em>How the Use of the Russian Language in Ukraine Was Restricted in Ukraine</em></td>
<td>15 July 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex 221</td>
<td>TASS</td>
<td><em>Ukraine Banned 780 Russian Movies and Series Since 2014</em></td>
<td>5 October 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex 222</td>
<td>TASS</td>
<td><em>How Russian Was Restricted in Ukraine</em></td>
<td>1 August 2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex 223</td>
<td>MK</td>
<td><em>Kiev Schools to Abandon Study of Russian</em></td>
<td>12 August 2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex 224</td>
<td>RT</td>
<td><em>“The Spirit of Intimidation and Terror”: How Ukraine Is Fighting Russian</em></td>
<td>12 November 2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex 225</td>
<td>TASS</td>
<td><em>Ukraine Imposes Fines for Breach of State Language Law</em></td>
<td>16 July 2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex 226</td>
<td>DW</td>
<td><em>Ukraine bans music, books from Russia, Belarus</em></td>
<td>29 June 2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex 227</td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td><em>Ukraine restricts Russian books and music in latest step of ‘derussification’</em></td>
<td>20 June 2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex 228</td>
<td>CNE</td>
<td><em>Ukrainian ban on Russian language forces Christian radio to move to Hungary</em></td>
<td>8 September 2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex 229</td>
<td>Wikipedia</td>
<td><em>Demolition of monuments to Alexander Pushkin in Ukraine</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex 230</td>
<td>Mosregtoday</td>
<td><em>Ukraine continues to dismantle monuments linked to Russian history and culture</em></td>
<td>22 April 2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex 231</td>
<td>MK</td>
<td><em>From Pushkin to Suvorov: How Many Monuments Have Already Been Demolished in Ukraine</em></td>
<td>2 December 2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex 232</td>
<td>Lenta.ru</td>
<td><em>Pushkin Monument Dismantled in Zaporozhye</em></td>
<td>27 July 2022</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 234  Babel, *A monument to Marshal Zhukov, which has been the subject of controversy for years, was dismantled in Kharkiv* (17 April 2022).


Annex 246  The Independent, *To see what Ukraine's future may be, just look at Lviv's shameful past* (9 March 2014).


Annex 248  Resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland on paying tribute to the victims of the genocide committed by Ukrainian nationalists against citizens of the Second Republic of Poland in the years 1943 to 1945, 22 July 2016.

Annex 249  Interfax.ua, *Anti-Terrorist Measures to be Taken Against Separatists – Turchynov* (7 April 2014).

Annex 251 The Economist, *Ukraine’s top soldier runs a different kind of army from Russia’s* (15 December 2022).


Annex 259 Ternopol City Council, *From now on, the Ternopol City Stadium will bear the name of UPA Commander-in-Chief Roman Shukhevych* (5 March 2021).


Annex 266 Wikipedia, *Yury Lipa Street*.


Annex 269  UKRINFORM, Nationalists Succeed in Protecting Petlyura Street in Poltava Region (28 February 2017).


Annex 281  Azov.org, About Azov.

Annex 282  SPIEGEL, Ukraine: German mercenaries join far-right volunteer battalion (11 November 2017).

Annex 283  Gazeta.ua, Biletskiy: "Azov" will become a party" (28 May 2016).

Annex 284  Newsweek, Ukrainian Nationalist Volunteers Committing 'ISIS-Style' War Crimes (10 September 2014).

Annex 285  Amnesty International Briefing, Ukraine: Abuses and war crimes by the Aidar Volunteer Battalion in the north Luhansk region, 8 September 2014.


Annex 287  UK Government Official Site, Protests and marches: letting the police know.

Annex 288  Right to Assembly, The right of peaceful assemble in France.
Annex 289   Zpravy, Law on rallies flawed, Prague officials plan amends (29 April 2008).

Annex 290   AA, German court upholds ban on pro-Palestine protest in Berlin (30 April 2022).

Annex 291   France 24, Pro-Palestinian rally in Paris banned amid rising Israel-Gaza tensions (13 May 2021).


Annex 217

Euro 2012: Ukraine's festering football racism

Rajeev Syal

In a crumbling corridor in a university in Ukraine, a Nigerian student nods in agreement as he listens to Sol Campbell's comments that black football fans should stay at home rather than join the crowds at Euro 2012 matches in the eastern European country.

He should know. The student, known as J, plays amateur football in Lviv, one of eight host cities for the tournament which starts next Friday. He said spectators sometimes come armed with bananas even when the game is for fun and played in front of a crowd of a few dozen. "It has happened to me – the monkey chants, racist comments and the fruit. I try to ignore it or turn it into a joke by eating the fruit."

Black and Asian students in the city told the Guardian that racism here is rarely challenged and racist violence lies just below the surface. There are random beatings, pepper spray muggings and a liberal dose of insults – as well as an unsympathetic response from the police.

The students leave their campus for home before dark, seldom go into the city centre unless in a group and stay away from gangs of men.

No-one supports them from Ukraine's authorities, J said. "It is difficult to stop racism here because the police are corrupt, the authorities don't want to know. We try to be invisible."

The biggest sporting event in Eastern Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall appears to be in crisis over reports of racism within the host countries of Ukraine and Poland.

In Lviv, allegations that the authorities have allowed racism to fester have prompted incredulity and soul-searching among councillors and government officials.

Few in the city believe that the tournament will experience high profile racist incidents – each match will be heavily policed and monitored while many hardcore hooligans show little interest away from club football.

The authorities admit, though, that they have previously given little thought to the concept of racism until prompted to do so by intense media scrutiny.

A BBC Panorama programme on Monday broadcast brutal footage of "fans" on the terraces of Ukrainian and Polish club teams involved in criminal, racist acts. Hooligans were filmed attacking non-white fans as police stood by; others unfurled giant anti-Semitic banners; some fans including those of the local team Karpaty Lviv whooped monkey noises at black players while others appeared to give Nazi salutes during matches.

Before Campbell's comments, the families of two of England's black players Theo Walcott and Alex
Oxlade-Chamberlain said they would probably not attend the 16-team tournament, fearing abuse or violence in Ukraine, where England will play their first three matches.

Ukraine’s president Viktor Yanukovych on Friday was forced to release a statement defending the tournament and saying there would be no racism from the terraces.

J, a second year student, was one of five minority ethnic students who spoke to the Guardian anonymously, for fear of reprisals. Each, while quick to praise most Ukrainians as well meaning and polite, had personal stories of unreconstructed racism that have had a long-lasting effect on their lives.

One football lover went to watch local team Karpaty Lviv play Seville in the Europa League in October 2010. He was forced to run from the ground after a black player scored and he was threatened by fellow Karpaty supporters.

Another had a cigarette flicked into his eye as he walked to McDonalds in the city centre. He fought back and was beaten to the ground by a gang of five men.

Last year, two men, an Indian and a Moroccan, were assaulted with pepper spray before being beaten up outside their accommodation.

J, his friends and a growing influx of non-white workers know they have a tough task to change attitudes in this beautifully preserved city, known as "little Paris" because of its curved, cobbled streets and baroque architecture.

The city's ruling party, Svoboda, whose slogan is "one race, one nation, one fatherland", has been variously described as fascist, neo-Nazi and extreme. Members prefer to say they are nationalists and friends of Marine Le Pen’s Front National.

Andriy Khomytskyy, 29, a Svoboda councillor in Lviv, said that there are no issues of race to confront within the city because there are so few foreigners.

"There is no problem here, not like other Ukrainian cities. In Kerch [in eastern Ukraine] they have a problem because of illegal Chinese and Koreans.

Khomytskyy, a one-time regular on the terraces of Kapaty Lviv, is now a lead member of the council's economic and foreign affairs committee.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, he remains resistant to confronting racism either on the terraces or on the streets where students have been beaten. He said of the fans at Kapaty: "They are patriotic, not racist." Of the apparent Nazi salutes filmed by Panorama, he said: "It [the salute] is not from the Nazis, it is from the Roman empire."

A father of one who teaches at a college, Khomytskyy said he bears no ill will towards people for the colour of their skin. When told of how black students said they feared for their safety, he shrugged and said that racist incidents are difficult to prove: "It is nuanced. It is difficult to say if it is racism if a black man is attacked. Often, it is just banditism."
Khomytskyy said that the best way to limit racist incidents is to limit immigration and ensure that the resident culture prevails, adding that he has spoken at length about race "problems" with his associates in the Front National.

"They tell me that they cannot go to certain [Arab] areas in France because you would get beaten and they might take your white girl," he said.

The profile of Svoboda, which now has more than 50 councillors in Lviv, has risen as the Orange revolution and its peaceful protests failed amid recriminations and allegations of corruption. There is a groundswell of anti-semitism, which campaigners said could be seen on walls around the football ground before a pre-tournament clean up. Some commentators have claimed that the right here have successfully linked anti-semitism and anti-communism.

For the more thoughtful members of the city council's administration, the allegations of casual racism in the media and on the terraces are an embarrassment which they are now trying to confront. Citizens who have volunteered to help fans during the championship have been given race relations training.

Oleh Berezuk, who is head of the mayor's office, said that the city and the country were trying to develop strategies to educate local people and allay the fears of immigrants.

"Lack of knowledge presents a problem for us. One has to remember our history – the Nazis killed or deported most of the Jewish population in the 1940s and we were under Russia and the Soviet Union until 1991. These issues are relatively new for us," he said.

Some have swung towards the extreme right because of a belief that the left let them down during the Soviet era, he claimed. Ukraine has not had the benefit of experiencing what it is like to adapt to a generation of immigrants in the same way as Britain and France.

"The brutality of the Soviets was something that we were told about by our parents and grandparents. We still feel it, in the same way that people in the west still feel the lessons about race. We need some time and understanding as we learn," he said.

One experienced anti-fascist campaigner believes cities such as Lviv are taking their first steps into the tricky area of race relations and are having to do so in public. Rafal Pankowski, of the Warsaw-based Never Again Association and co-ordinator of the anti-racist programme for Euro 2012, said it should be remembered that this is the first major football event to be held in eastern Europe in the modern era.

"These countries are beginning to talk about these issues. We have started a dialogue. We have already achieved something before the tournament has started," he said.
Annex 218

Lenta.ru, Kyrym Khanlygy: Crimea Remembers Its Local Statehood (12 January 2012)

<translation>
Kyrym Khanlygy: Crimea Remembers Its Local Statehood

Just before the New Year, the press service of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis issued a statement which, in addition to the traditional congratulations to compatriots on the upcoming holiday, called on all Tatars to continue the struggle for “the restoration of statehood in our land”. While some fringe elements called for the revival of the “Kyrym Khanlygy” (Crimean Khanate) even before, this year will see elections of the Kurultai and the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People the behaviour of whose leadership has long been subjected to sharp criticism from opponents. And it can be assumed that the nationalist and separatist cards will be played in full as part of the pre-election struggle.

“The coming 2012 calendar year requires each of us to show even greater dedication and concentration of will in the name of the future of the Crimean Tatar people and the restoration of our statehood in our land for a happy future for all people living in Crimea”, the Mejlis said in its New Year’s greetings.

Summing up the results of the outgoing year, Mustafa Dzhemilev, the Mejlis’ permanent speaker, stated one curious figure – according to his information, about 2,500 representatives of the Tatar nationality died and about 4,500 were born on the peninsula in 2011, that is the birth rate exceeded the death rate by almost twice. No other nationality in the former USSR can boast of such an achievement. Currently, about two million people live in Crimea, with the share of Tatars amounting to 13%, and, given the demographic trends, this figure is constantly growing.

“I have grown old and want to give way to the young”, the Chairman of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis said last November in an interview with Kommersant-Ukraine. Mr. Dzhemilev has already tried twice to resign as head of the Mejlis in 2007 and 2009, but most of the Kurultai delegates did not accept his resignation since the statutory documents did not allow voluntary resignation from that position. However, this time the leader of the Crimean Tatars found a way out: “The only way out is not to run for Kurultai delegates as the Chairman is chosen from among the delegates”.

In his New Year’s speech, Mr. Dzhemilev, who announced his upcoming retirement from politics last autumn, repeatedly mentioned Turkey whose centuries-old patronage over the peninsula seems to be reviving these days. According to the head of the Mejlis, in the face of the weak financial support from Kiev, the Crimean Tatars are increasingly forced to turn to Ankara for help.

Mr. Dzhemilev said the Ukrainian authorities last year cut the funding for “improvements for our people to a minimum”. In particular, instead of the planned UAH 127 mln (about RUB 500 mln), only UAH 23 mln were allocated from the state budget. For this year, they initially planned to allocate UAH 142 mln, but, according to Mr. Dzhemilev, only UAH 25 mln were included in the adopted budget. “This money is not enough to build even half of one general education school”, he noted. So, schools instructing in the Crimean Tatar language and the national cultural centre will now be built with Turkish money.

By the way, not only schools. Information surfaced last November that the Turks intend to
invest in the Crimea’s holy of holies – its tourism sector. This year, the peninsula will receive a delegation of Turkish investors interested in building hotels and boarding houses of the type well known to everyone who prefers the all-inclusive services. The delegation will arrive as part of the “Go to Crimea” project – a joint programme of the Crimean Ministry of Resorts and Tourism and Turkish Airlines. A presentation of the Crimea was also held last year in four Turkish cities and towns – Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and Antalya as part of this project.

The interest of Turkish businesspeople in Crimea is understandable, just as it is understandable that the local Tatars will only benefit if it will be the Turks with whom the indigenous population is connected by language, faith and customs who will eliminate the monopoly of Russians and Ukrainians in the tourism sector, this “gold mine” of autonomy. Such financial intervention is very welcome when it comes to, albeit purely hypothetically, the “restoration of statehood”.

Mustafa Dzhemilev at a rally of his supporters. Photo: qtmm.org

But most Ukrainian experts still see nothing dangerous in such statements. In an interview with Novy Region, Rostislav Ishchenko, a political scientist, recalled that the Mejlis had missed no opportunity to make such statements over the past 20 years. He also believes that the Crimean Tatars have no prospects of gaining independence since not only does the Russian-speaking majority having close ties with Russia live in Crimea but the factor of the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet also plays. “Therefore, a forceful struggle for independence is impossible, and no one will let them go peacefully”, Mr. Ishchenko concluded.

Another political scientist, Vladimir Kornilov, also believes the Mejlis’ statement will unlikely “result in something bigger because the Mejlis has lost significant support from the Crimean Tatar population and is only trying to attract attention with such calls”. Indeed, Mr. Dzhemilev’s joyful statements about the support of the Mejlis by 82% of the Crimean Tatars, a split has been recently observed in the ethnic parliament itself. Last November, those dissatisfied with the leadership of the Mejlis even held a rally in Simferopol, which Mr. Dzhemilev’s supporters hastened to declare a provocation by the Russian special services. They allege Moscow is trying to eliminate the Mejlis, which, according to Nedim Useinov, a political scientist, is “the only trump card of the Ukrainian government in the struggle for Crimea”.

However, the opponents of Mr. Dzhemilev and his constant deputy Refat Chubarov continue to insist that the current Mejlis only serves the interests of its Chairman and a narrow circle of his close associates. Dissatisfied people also call for an end to the speculations around the 1944 deportation and the FSB’s current insidious plans in respect of the peninsula.
As Ruslan Balbek, a delegate of the Kurultai of the Crimean Tatar People and the head of the public organisation “Generation Crimea” wrote in Ukrayinska Pravda, there is currently a consolidation of all forces oppositional to the leadership of the Mejlis in Crimea. Mr. Balbek also said Mr. Dzhemilev’s key drawbacks include the fact that “Crimean Tatars today are perceived as eternally dissatisfied, constantly demanding something and threatening mass riots”. “It is time for the Mejlis to stop blackmailing the population and authorities with false threats. It is necessary to create legitimate institutions of people’s self-government adapted into the state”, he believes.

At the upcoming Sixth Kurultai of Crimean Tatars, 250 delegates of this representative body and then a new composition and a new Chairman of the Mejlis will be elected. The authorities in Kiev have already got used to, and have learned to work with, Mr. Dzhemilev, even in most extreme situations. However, it is no secret that Hizb ut-Tahrir, an organisation that has been banned in many countries all over the world and whose ideas to build an Islamic state (Caliphate) largely echo the pan-Islamist sentiments in Turkey, operates in Crimea almost openly. If the Islamists gain influence in the Crimean Tatar official structures, the situation on the peninsula may change dramatically. No one is talking about Wahhabi gangs on Ai-Petri, but the tension on the Kiev-Simferopol-Moscow line can grow massively.
Annex 219

TASS, *How the Use of the Russian Language Was Restricted in Ukraine* (15 July 2021)

(translation)
On the 16th of July, the Law “On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language” will come into force in Ukraine. The Law will ukrainise the film industry, require cultural events to be held in the Ukrainian language, and introduce exams for proficiency in the state language.

TASS describes how and in what areas the use of the Russian language was restricted in Ukraine.

Repeal of the Language Policy Law

On 23 February 2014, immediately after the coup d’état took place and the opposition came to power in Kiev, the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine voted to repeal the Law “On the Fundamentals of the State Language Policy”, which had been in force since 10 August 2012. The Law granted the Russian language and those of national minorities the status of regional ones in those areas where they are native to at least 10% of the population. The repeal of the Law sparked protests in Eastern Ukraine where the Russian-speaking population predominates. As a result, Acting President Alexander Turchynov refused to approve the Rada’s decision. The Law “On the Fundamentals of the State Language Policy” had been under consideration by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine since 2016. On 28 February 2018, the Court found it to be inconsistent with the Ukrainian Constitution. Following the Court’s verdict, the language issue had been actually governed only by Article 10 of the Ukrainian Constitution, which says the state language in Ukraine is Ukrainian and guarantees free development, use and protection for Russian and other languages of national minorities.

Introduction of Language Quotas for Radio and Television
On 16 June 2016, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted amendments to the Law “On Television and Radio Broadcasting” (which entered into force on 8 November 2016) introducing language quotas for radio. TV and radio companies were obliged to make available at least 60% of the daily volume of their broadcasting for news, analytical and entertainment programmes in the state language. The share of songs in Ukrainian was set at no less than 35% of the volume of daily broadcasting for any radio stations or at least 25% for those radio stations playing songs in languages of the European Union to the extent of more than 60% of their daily broadcasting volume. At the same time, songs in the state language were to be played in prime time from 07:00 to 14:00 and from 15:00 to 22:00.

On 23 May 2017, upon the initiative of President Pyotr Poroshenko (2014-2019), the Verkhovnaya Rada adopted amendments to the Law “On Television and Radio Broadcasting” requiring that the share of broadcasting in Ukrainian be at least 75% per week for national and regional television channels and radio stations and at least 60% for local ones (during the time intervals from 07:00 to 18:00 and from 18:00 to 22:00). The share of news programmes in Ukrainian was increased to 75%. A fine of 5% of the total amount of the licence fee payable by TV and radio companies was imposed for a breach of that rule. All companies broadcasting in languages of national minorities must make available at least 30% of the volume of their broadcasting for the Ukrainian language. National TV channels were obliged to broadcast foreign-produced films and programmes only in the state language. The only exception was made for those programmes and films created before 1 August 1991, which must be accompanied by Ukrainian subtitles.

**Ban on Russian in Education**

On 5 September 2017, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted a new version of the Law “On Education” (which was signed by the President on 25 September 2017 and entered into force on 28 September 2017). It provided for a phased ban on the use of Russian and the languages of other national groups in Ukraine in the educational system. The education process in secondary schools and higher educational institutions should be carried out only in Ukrainian. Since 2018, those classes with instruction in Russian and other languages could only be retained in elementary schools. Beginning from 1 September 2020, those schools instructing in a language other than Ukrainian had to virtually cease to exist. Beginning from 1 September 2023, those schools instructing in languages of national minorities of the EU countries should switch to Ukrainian.

The Law caused a negative reaction in Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and other Eastern European countries whose expatriates had communities in Ukraine. In particular, Budapest stated that Hungary would block all international initiatives of Kiev until an agreement on language issues was reached between the Ukrainian authorities and the Hungarians of Transcarpathia. On 27 September 2017, the State Duma of the Russian Federation issued a statement “On the Inadmissibility of Violations of the Fundamental Right of Indigenous Peoples and National Minorities of Ukraine to Study in Their Native Languages”. The Russian parliamentarians pointed out that the new Law fails to meet the principles and rules of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international treaties and constitutes an “act of ethnocide” of the Russian people in Ukraine.

On 13 March 2020, Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky (elected in 2019) signed the Law “On Complete General Secondary Education”, which came into force on the 18th of March of
that year. It provides for a gradual reduction of teaching in the languages of national minorities, including Russian. Those national minorities whose languages are related with Ukrainian as well as those living mainly in the speech environment of their native languages were allowed to study in primary schools in their own languages, provided that that would also study Ukrainian. Beginning from the fifth grade, at least 80% of the study time should be dedicated instruction to the state language.

Beginning from 1 September 2020, in accordance with the Law “On Education”, all Russian-language schools in Ukraine switched to instruction in the state language. The opportunity to continue studying in Russian at the primary level of education has only been reserved for those students who went to school before 1 September 2018.

**Adoption of the Language Law**

On 25 April 2019, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Law “On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language”, which significantly limited the possibility of using Russian and the languages of national minorities in the country. On 15 May 2019, it was signed by Pyotr Poroshenko, whose presidential powers expired in five days. On 16 July 2019, the Law entered into force, with the exception of certain provisions.

According to the Law, the only state official language in Ukraine is Ukrainian. Attempts to introduce multilingualism are considered as actions aimed at forcibly changing or overthrowing the constitutional order. In addition, the Law prohibited any distortion of the state language in official texts and documents, including “intentional violation of the requirements of Ukrainian spelling”.

According to the requirements imposed by the Law, all governmental officials and employees as well as all people engaged in trade, services, education, medicine, culture, etc. must know and use Ukrainian in performing their duties. The only areas not subject to the Law are religious rites and private communications. The National Commission for Ukrainian Language Standards (established by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers on 6 November 2019) was charged with determining the level of language proficiency for holding governmental and other offices and positions.

All cultural events in Ukraine must be only held in the state language, and theatrical performances in other languages should be accompanied by subtitles in the state language. In addition, Ukrainian is established as the main language for the film industry, printing, and publishing.

According to the Law, Ukrainian is mandatory for all media, including online publications. Beginning from mid-July 2024, the share of the state language will have to be at least 90% instead of the current 75% on national channels and at least 80% instead of 60% on regional ones. All programmes in other languages must be dubbed in Ukrainian. Those print media published in national minority languages, including Russian, are required to issue an additional print run in Ukrainian, with the content of all issues required to be completely identical. Ukrainian companies must create a version of their websites and pages on social networks in the state language as a start page. Those persons wishing to obtain Ukrainian citizenship will have to pass an exam in the state language.
On 14 July 2021, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine found the Language Law consistent with the Ukrainian Constitution. That decision was made in response to an appeal in June 2019 by a group of Opposition Bloc deputies of the previous Verkhovnaya Rada.

**Effect of the Language Law**

The Law is being introduced in stages. The advertisement sector has switched to the state language from 16 January 2020. The scientific and medical sectors (all scientific publications must be issued in Ukrainian or in English and an official language of the European Union) and the transport one (all airport, port, station and stop names must be written in the state language) have done so from 16 July 2020.

Businesses of all ownership patterns in the service sector, including online stores, have switched to Ukrainian from 16 January 2021. Services in any other language can now only be provided upon request of customers. Information concerning the services offered may also be duplicated in other languages.

A language exam has been introduced from 16 July 2021 for future civil servants and applicants for Ukrainian citizenship. The requirements to hold all cultural events, serve all tourists (except for foreigners) and to print and sell at least 50% of all printed publications in the state language are coming into force. In addition, all movies and serials in foreign languages will have to be shown in the state language in Ukraine.

Language quotas for nationwide print media will become effective from 16 January 2022, those for television will be increased from 16 July 2024.

**Liability for Compliance with the Law**

Beginning from 16 July 2022, breaches of the Language Law will be punished by fines ranging from 200 to 700 tax-free minimum personal revenues (UAH 3,400 to UAH 11,900). In addition, various penalties will be imposed for “public humiliation or insult to the state language” from 2024.

The so-called “Language Ombudsman” (appointed by the government) should monitor the implementation of the Law. On 27 November 2019, Tatyana Monakhova was appointed to hold that office.

However, she resigned on 24 April 2020 due to the lack of “proper funding” for her activities. On 8 July 2020, Taras Kremen was appointed the new “Language Ombudsman”.
Annex 220

Vedomosti, Ukraine Legislatively Bans Screening of Russian Movies Filmed after January 2014
(21 April 2016)

(translation)
Ukraine Legislatively Bans Screening of Russian Movies Filmed after January 2014

Ukrainian President Pyotr Poroshenko signed a law banning the screening of Russian movies filmed after 1 January 2014, according to the Verkhovnaya Rada’s official website. The bill was adopted by the Ukrainian parliament on the 29th of March. The ban concerns “broadcasting of films made by individuals and legal entities of the aggressor state, which contain no popularisation or propaganda [of the bodies of the aggressor state and their individual actions]”. Those films containing such propaganda may not be shown in Ukraine if they had been made after 1 August 1991. Non-propaganda films include feature ones as well as TV series, programmes and shows.

As follows from the explanatory note to the document, “the purpose of the bill is to improve the legal mechanism for protecting the national security of Ukraine in the information sphere by limiting any form of propaganda used by the occupying state in Ukraine”.

In late 2015, the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture published a list of 83 Russian and world cultural figures posing a threat to the national security of the country. It includes directors Karen Shakhnazarov and Pavel Lungin as well as actors Vasily Lanovoy, Valentin Gaft and Oleg Tabakov. The “white list” drawn up by the Ukrainian authorities includes, in particular, Andrei Makarevich, Liya Akhedzhakova, Arnold Schwarzenegger, and George Clooney.

In total, the distribution certificates for 431 movies have been cancelled in Ukraine.
Annex 221

TASS, *Ukraine Banned 780 Russian Movies and Series Since 2014* (5 October 2018)

(translation)
Ukraine Banned 780 Russian Movies and Series Since 2014

The Ukrainian State Film Agency said the ban had caused financial losses to Russian movie and series producers.

KIEV, 5th of October, TASS. The press service of the Ukrainian State Film Agency (Derzhkino) announced on Facebook on Friday that the Agency had banned the demonstration of 780 Russian-made movies and series.

“In general, from August 2014 to the present day, Derzhkino has banned 780 movies and series popularising or propagandising bodies of the aggressor state and punitive bodies of the USSR, featuring those persons on the list of persons posing a threat to the national security or produced by the aggressor state after 1 January 2014”, Derzhkino said.

The Agency added such ban changed the situation in the Ukrainian movie and TV market, “led to the clearing of the Ukrainian information space from Russian propaganda and contributed to the emergence of mass production of domestic content”. In addition, the press service claims the ban has caused “significant financial losses to Russian movie and TV series producers”.

Six seasons of the series titled “Matchmakers” and the movie titled “Matchmakers. Life Without Makeup” were banned in Ukraine as featuring Russian actor Fyodor Dobronravov who has been blacklisted as “posing a threat to the national security of the country”. The list of banned movies also includes “The Case of Dead Souls” directed by Pavel Lungin, “To the Real You” featuring Dmitry Kharatyan, “Attraction” featuring Valentin Gaft and “Divination by Candlelight” featuring Vladimir Gostyukhin.

Another 21 films have been banned based on the findings made by Derzhkino’s Expert Commission on the Distribution and Demonstration of Movies. These include “Oles Buzina: Life Out of Time”, “Officers’ Wives”, “A Task of Particular Importance. Operation Typhoon”, “Still I Love” and others.

Ten movies were blacklisted under the law on cinematography, i.e. have been screened for the first time after 1 January 2014. These include “The Exclusion Strip”, “Tankman”, ”Love in the City 3” and others.

Derzhkino has revoked the official permit for distributing and screening, and cancelled the official registration of, the television films titled “My Other Children” (directed by V. Netetsky), “A Call from the Past” (directed by S. Vaskovsky) and “You Can’t Deceive Love” (directed by A. Zadvorny).

The screening of the Russian TV titled “The Heart is Not a Stone” as well as the TV films titled “Still I Love” (Russian production) and “Happy Family Tariff” (Russian-Ukrainian production) has also been prohibited in Ukraine.
Annex 222

TASS, *How Russian Was Restricted in Ukraine* (1 August 2022)

(translation)
TASS, *How Russian Was Restricted in Ukraine* (1 August 2022), available at: https://tass.ru/info/15358089.

How Russian Was Restricted in Ukraine

On the 1\(^{st}\) of August, a ban on the teaching of the Russian language and literature comes into force in the Odessa Region.

TASS-DOSSIER. On the 1\(^{st}\) of August, a ban on the teaching of the Russian language and literature in educational institutions of the Odessa Region will come into force. All Russian writers have been removed from the curriculum for the 2022-2023 academic year and will be replaced by authors from other countries.

TASS describes how and in what areas the use of the Russian language was restricted in Ukraine.

Situation in 1990s and 2000s

Following the declaration of independence of Ukraine, its authorities have set a course to recreate the Ukrainian-speaking environment, especially in the central, eastern and southern regions where the Russian-speaking population historically predominated. The authorities have implemented a number of initiatives to switch education, media, etc. to Ukrainian. Those initiatives were met with mixed reactions in Ukraine, especially in the traditionally Russian-speaking regions. A significant part of the population preferred to use Russian, which was not recognised as an official language but to which the Constitution guaranteed free development, use and protection, as well as to the languages of national minorities.

After Viktor Yushchenko came to power in 2005, the situation changed. During his election campaign, he promised that if he wins the elections, he will ensure the steadfast observance of Article 10 of the Ukrainian Constitution guaranteeing free development and protection of the Russian language as well as its use on an equal basis with Ukrainian in areas densely populated by the Russian-speaking people, including in education. In addition, Mr. Yushchenko published his draft decree “On the Protection of the Rights of Citizens to Use Russian and Other Languages of the National Minorities of Ukraine in the Provision of Public Services”, which he undertook to sign immediately after his inauguration. His election promises allowed him to
enlist the support of Russian organisations in the Crimea as well as in the Odessa, Nikolaev and Kherson Regions. However, after he was elected, none of the measures he promised to take to protect the rights of the Russian-speaking population were implemented.

A process of ousting the Russian language from various spheres of governmental and public life has begun in Ukraine. The number of Russian-language schools has been reduced, and legal proceedings have been switched to the state (Ukrainian) language. TV and radio broadcasting quotas (valid until 2012) were set for the state language at 75% in 2006 and at 80% two years.

In 2006, the municipal councils of the Kharkov, Donetsk, Lugansk, Nikolaev, Zaporozhye, Kherson and Odessa Regions, the cities of Sevastopol, Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk, Lugansk, Kryvoy Rog and others passed resolutions giving Russian the status of a regional language. They were guided not only by the Ukrainian Constitution but also by the European Charter for Regional Languages, which was ratified by Ukraine in 2003 and entered into force in 2006. However, their resolutions provoked a protest from the official Kyiv who regarded them as “threatening national security”. Nationalist political forces also opposed them by organising a number of pickets and protests across the country. The prosecutors’ offices challenged those resolutions, so that many of them were eventually cancelled.

**Law on the Fundamentals of State Language Policy of 2012**

In 2012, during the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych, a draft Law “On the Fundamentals of the State Language Policy” was submitted to the Verkhovnaya Rada. It granted Russian the status of a regional language in those areas where it was native to at least 10% of the local population and gave it equal rights on a par with the state Ukrainian language. The bill was opposed by Ukrainian people’s deputies Vadim Kolesnichenko and Sergey Kivalov as well as representatives of human rights organisations representing the Russian, Jewish, Hungarian and Romanian ethnic minorities.

The bill caused a wide public outcry. Various events were held in the country by both opponents and supporters of its adoption. In the Rada, its consideration was accompanied by demarches and brawls between deputies and even a resignation of parliamentary speaker Vladimir Lytvyn (which was not accepted). Many governmental, political and public figures opposed it. The authorities of a number of regions stated they would refuse to comply with the new Law should it be adopted. The National Commission for the Protection of Public Morality demanded that President Viktor Yanukovych veto the bill, noting that, among other things, it “generates separatist sentiments”, contradicts the interests of Ukraine’s national security and leads to the displacement of the Ukrainian language from all spheres of public life. Nevertheless, the Law was passed by the Rada and signed by the President on 8 August 2012.

As a result, Russian has begun to enjoy protection as a regional language in those areas of Ukraine where the number of its speakers exceeded 10%. According to the All-Ukrainian Census of 2001, 13 of the 27 constituent entities in Ukraine met that criterion, with the highest percentages of all Russian speakers being recorded in Sevastopol (90.6%), the Crimea (77%), the Donetsk Region (74.9%) and the Lugansk Region (68.8%).

**Repeal of the Language Policy Law**
After the coup d’État took place and supporters of European integration came to power in Ukraine on 22 February 2014, the official Kiev began pursuing an active policy of suppressing the rights of the Russian-speaking population.

On the 23rd of February, the day after the coup d’état, the Verkhovnaya Rada passed a resolution repealing the Law “On the Fundamentals of the State Language Policy” of 2012. The Council of Europe expressed its regret over this issue, and Astrid Tours, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, said the Rada’s resolution could lead to “a subsequent aggravation” in the country. The repeal of the Law caused violent protests in Eastern Ukraine – in the Crimea, Donbass, Odessa and other regions where the Russian-speaking population predominated. In order to prevent the escalation, Acting President Alexander Turchynov refused to sign the resolution until the Parliament passes a new law on language. However, this has never happened. In 2016, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine initiated proceedings on the proposal of 57 people’s deputies to check if the Law complies with the Constitution. Those proceedings lasted almost two years. On 28 February 2018, the Court declared the Law inconsistent with the Constitution, so it became null and void.

In fact, through all the years that the Constitutional Court was conducting proceedings on the language Law, the official Kiev continued its policy of ousting the Russian language from all spheres of political and public life and discriminating against the Russian-speaking population. This policy, which was started under President Pyotr Poroshenko who came to power in 2014, was continued under President Vladimir Zelensky who was elected in 2019.

**Introduction of Language Quotas for TV and Radio in 2016-2017**

On 16 June 2016, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted amendments to the Law “On Television and Radio Broadcasting” (which entered into force on 8 November 2016) introducing language quotas for radio. TV and radio companies were obliged to make available at least 60% of the daily volume of their broadcasting for news, analytical and entertainment programmes in the state language. The share of songs in Ukrainian was set at no less than 35% of the volume of daily broadcasting for any radio stations or at least 25% for those radio stations playing songs in languages of the European Union to the extent of more than 60% of their daily broadcasting volume. At the same time, songs in the state language were to be played in prime time from 07:00 to 14:00 and from 15:00 to 22:00.

On 23 May 2017, on the initiative of President Pyotr Poroshenko, the Verkhovnaya Rada adopted amendments to the Law “On Television and Radio Broadcasting” requiring that the share of broadcasting in Ukrainian be at least 75% per week for national and regional television channels and radio stations and at least 60% for local ones (during the time intervals from 07:00 to 18:00 and from 18:00 to 22:00). The share of news programmes in Ukrainian was increased to 75%. A fine of 5% of the total amount of the licence fee payable by TV and radio companies was imposed for a breach of that rule. All companies broadcasting in languages of national minorities must make available at least 30% of the volume of their broadcasting for the Ukrainian language. National TV channels were obliged to broadcast foreign-produced films and programmes only in the state language. The only exception was made for those programmes and films created before 1 August 1991, which must be accompanied by Ukrainian subtitles.

In addition, the broadcasting of Russian TV channels and programmes was stopped, the screening of Russian movies and the import of Russian publishing products with “anti-
Ukrainian content” were prohibited in Ukraine. Those artists included on the “List of Persons Posing a Threat to National Security” were also banned. For the other artists from the Russian Federation, a special procedure for touring was established, requiring them to get a permit from the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) as to perform in Ukraine.

**Ban on Russian in Education**

On 5 September 2017, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted a restated version of the Law “On Education” (which was signed by the President on 25 September 2017). According to it, since 2018, those classes with instruction in Russian and other languages could only be retained in elementary schools and all students of the fifth and higher grades should be switched to instruction in Ukrainian. Beginning from 2020, the entire education system should be switched to Ukrainian.

The Law caused a negative reaction both in Russia and in those Eastern European countries whose expatriates had communities in Ukraine. In particular, Budapest stated that Hungary would block all international initiatives of Kiev until an agreement on language issues was reached between the Ukrainian authorities and the Hungarians of Transcarpathia. On 27 September 2017, the State Duma of the Russian Federation issued a statement “On the Inadmissibility of Violations of the Fundamental Right of Indigenous Peoples and National Minorities of Ukraine to Study in Their Native Languages”. The Russian parliamentarians pointed out that the new Law fails to meet the principles and rules of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international treaties and constitutes an “act of ethnocide” of the Russian people in Ukraine. On the 12th of October, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted a resolution recommending Kiev to revise its Law that was intended to ukrainise the Ukrainian education. As a result, some amendments were made to the Law in 2018: for example, the complete transition of schools instructing in EU languages to Ukrainian was postponed until 2023.

In continuation of the new policy in education, the Verkhovna Rada on 16 January 2020 adopted the Law “On the Complete General Secondary Education” (which was signed by President Vladimir Zelensky on 13 March 2020), providing for a reduction in teaching in Russian and languages of national minorities beginning from the fifth grade of secondary-school students. The Russian-speaking population was subjected to the most discrimination as at least 80% of their education should now take place in Ukrainian. Those ethnic minorities speaking languages of EU member states were required to get at least 20% of the educational process in Ukrainian, with a gradual increase in that degree to 60% for high-school students. The only exception was made for “indigenous peoples” who were permitted to study in their native languages along with the study of Ukrainian (the Law “On Indigenous Peoples” adopted on 21 July 2021 excluded Russians as well as most other ethnic minorities from the list of indigenous peoples of Ukraine, granting this status only to Crimean Tatars, Karaites and Krymchaks).

Since 1 September 2020, Russian-language schools in Ukraine have switched to the state language in accordance with the Law. The opportunity to continue study in Russian is only reserved for those primary-school students who entered school before 1 September 2018.

**Law on Total Ukrainisation**
On 25 April 2019, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Law “On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language”, which significantly limited the possibility of using Russian and the languages of national minorities in the country. This Law, which caused criticism from both the Russian-speaking population and ethnic minorities, was called the “Law on total Ukrainisation”. It was adopted four days after the presidential elections where Pyotr Poroshenko, who was the main lobbyist for the new Law, conceded victory to Vladimir Zelensky. Before taking the presidential office, Mr. Zelensky promised to conduct a “thorough review” of the Law for compliance with the constitutional rights and interests of all citizens of Ukraine. However, the authorities later concluded that the fundamental provisions of the Law “do not need to be adjusted”.

The requirement to switch to Ukrainian applies to all spheres of governmental and public life, with the only exception of religious rites and private communications. The Law established that the only state official language in Ukraine is Ukrainian and obliged the citizens to use it in all spheres of public life. TV channels were required to air at least 90% of their programmes in Ukrainian, applicants for Ukrainian citizenship were obliged to pass a language exam, a ban was imposed on the use of Russian and the languages of national minorities in education, etc. At the same time, any attempts to introduce multilingualism are considered under the new Law as actions aimed at forcibly changing or overthrowing the constitutional order and are strictly punished.

**Situation in 2022**

Following the recognition by the Russian Federation of the independence of the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics and the beginning of the Russian special military operation in Ukraine in February 2022, a new campaign to ban the Russian language in educational and culture began there.

On 16 April 2022, Taras Kremen, Commissioner for the Protection of the State Language, proposed to replace the study of the Russian language in Ukrainian schools with other subjects and to revise the foreign literature curriculum that pays much attention to Russian writers. In June, the working group for updating the foreign literature curricula under the Ukrainian Ministry of Education decided to eliminate all literary works by Russian and Soviet authors from Ukrainian schools. The Ukrainian Ministry of Culture and Information Policy has begun developing recommendations to withdraw from libraries those Russian books it considers as propaganda. According to representatives of the Ministry, the publications withdrawn from libraries “will be recycled as wastepaper to print Ukrainian books”. Furthermore, a law prohibiting the import of books and publishing products from Russia was adopted in 2022.

The Kiev City Council on 1 July 2022 said it would impose a complete ban on the public use of any books, performances and concerts in Russian as well as and other “Russian-speaking cultural products” in the Ukrainian capital. A similar moratorium was earlier imposed in the Khmelnytskyi Region, and the authorities of Ivano-Frankovsk, Ternopol and Konotop prohibited songs in Russian to be performed and listened to in public places.

The local authorities in the Odessa, Nikolaev and Lvov Regions have imposed a complete ban on the study of Russian at schools, and the Kharkov University has closed its Department of Russian Language and Literature.
Annex 223

MK, *Kiev Schools to Abandon Study of Russian* (12 August 2022)

(translation)

Kiev Schools to Abandon Study of Russian

By Natalia Trushina

In the years 2022 and 2023, Kiev schoolchildren will not study Russian either as a subject or optionally. This is stated in the response of the Standing Commission on Education, Science, Family, Youth and Sports of the Kiev City Council, which was given to the request by the public organisation “Youth Club of Jura”. The news was published on Friday, the 12th of August, in the Telegram channel “Politics of the Country”.

Translation
Attached to the publication was a scanned copy of the official response by the Kiev Commission.

The policy of gradually ousting the Russian language from education in Ukraine became obvious after the coup d’état in 2014. Since 24 February 2022, when Russia began its special military operation in Ukraine, the government has actually launched a total de-Russification campaign in the country. For example, the Kiev City Council announced on the 1st of July their intention to impose a complete ban on the public use of books, performances and concerts in Russian as well as other “Russian-language cultural products” in the Ukrainian capital. The authorities of the Khmelnytskyi Region did the same thing. And in Ivano-Frankovsk, Ternopol and Konotop, songs in Russian were prohibited to be performed and listened to in public places. Ukrainian local authorities are gradually imposing a complete ban on the teaching of Russian at schools. Such decisions have been made in the Odessa and Nikolaev Regions. The Kharkov University has liquidated its Department of Russian Language and Literature. The Mayor of the traditionally Russian-speaking town of Kryvoy Rog has also stated the need to abandon Russian.
Annex 224

RT, “The Spirit of Intimidation and Terror”: How Ukraine Is Fighting Russian
(12 November 2022)

(translation)
“The Spirit of Intimidation and Terror”: How Ukraine Is Fighting Russian

By Alexei Latyshev and Yelizaveta Komarova

In Kiev, the Russian language has been eliminated from the curricula of preschool and general secondary education institutions. This decision has been made by the city council allegedly in order to protect Kiev’s educational space from “hybrid influences” by the Russian Federation. Earlier, the Russian language was banned in Nikolaev, and Alexei Danilov, the head of the Ukrainian Security Council, said Russian is an element of “hostile propaganda” that should disappear. Discrimination of Russian began in Ukraine immediately after the coup d’état in 2014 and is carried out with the connivance of the West, experts point out.

The Kiev City Council has eliminated Russian from the curricula of the capital’s preschool and general secondary education institutions. The news was posted on the City Council’s website in the evening of 10 November 2022. This decision was made by 64 City Council deputies (out of the 120) at the plenary meeting of the City Council’s Second Session.

“The Russian language will be completely eliminated from the curricula of communal preschool and general secondary education institutions in the capital”, the press release said.
According to Vadim Vasylchuk, the head of the City Council’s Standing Commission on Education, Science, Family, Youth and Sports, in the context of the conflict with the Russian Federation, it would be inappropriate and incorrect to carry out the educational process and to study the Russian language in preschool and general secondary education institutions.

“The leaders of the Russian Federation have repeatedly stated that “Russia is going as far as the Russian language is widespread”. In this regard, the Kiev City Council has made a decision that will help avoid escalation of tension in the society and strengthen the protection of Kiev’s educational space from the hybrid influences by the aggressor state. Language matters, and in times of war, it is a matter of national security”, Mr. Vasylchuk said.

He added that the draft decision provides for the implementation of certain organisational and legal steps aimed at switching groups and classes from Russian to the state language.

A similar decision was earlier made by the City Council of Nikolaev where a ban on the use of Russian in general secondary education institutions began to operate from 1 September 2022. As noted by Ekaterina Stokolyas, a member of the Nikolaev City Council’s Executive Committee, the measure applies, inter alia, to various electives, courses and junior classes with instruction in Russian and the Russian design of the educational environment.

In turn, Alexei Danilov, Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council (NSDC), told reporters that the Russian language should disappear from Ukraine “as an element of hostile
propaganda and brainwashing for our population”. According to him, only Ukrainian and English should be mandatory in Ukraine.

Sergey Aksyonov, the head of the Crimea, commented on his words.

“It is not the Russian language that will disappear, but Ukraine, which is led by such characters. Danilov is a clear example of what a former Russian man who has sold his dignity and the memory of his ancestors for a rotten Banderite pottage can turn into”, Mr. Aksyonov wrote in his Telegram channel.

**Struggle with Russian**

Recall that the consistent eradication of the Russian language in Ukraine began immediately after the coup d’état in 2014. One of the first decisions made by the Verkhovnaya Rada after the “Maidan” was the abolition of the Law “On the Foundations of the State Language Policy”, which had been in force since 2012.

That Law endowed the languages of national minorities, which Russian was also attributed to, with the status of regional ones. An attempt to repeal this law provoked mass protests in the eastern regions of Ukraine. The harsh reaction by the society forced the Ukrainian authorities to leave the Law in force, but not for long: in 2018, the Ukrainian Constitutional Court found it inconsistent with the Constitution.

In parallel with this, the Ukrainian language began to be artificially implanted in Ukraine. In 2017, Pyotr Poroshenko, who then held the office of the President of Ukraine, signed the Law
“On Education”, which marked the beginning of drastic changes in the national educational system. One of its key provisions was the restriction of the use of minority languages at schools.

Then this Law was clarified by the Law “On Complete General Secondary Education” adopted under President Vladimir Zelensky, which divided the languages of national minorities into three categories, implying a different amount of use in the educational process. Russian was assigned to the third category, which assigned the minimum amount of teaching hours to the languages of national minorities. In particular, at least 80% of the teaching time was to be dedicated to studies in Ukrainian beginning from the fifth grade.

In addition, it was under Zelensky when the phased implementation of the Law “On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language” began, which was signed by President Poroshenko before his resignation. According to that Law, only the Ukrainian language must be used in the public sphere, including culture and education.

Advertising, transport, science, medicine, and services were all consistently switched to Ukrainian. At the same time, penalties were imposed for breach of the Law. The new rules led to numerous conflicts with employees of various organisations accustomed to using the Russian language refusing to serve customers in Ukrainian.

In July 2021, President Zelensky signed a scandalous law that did not include Russians among the indigenous peoples of Ukraine despite the fact that, as analysts note, Ukraine had remained largely a Russian-speaking country throughout its existence.

“Ukraine Is a Nazi State”

According to Vladimir Olenchenko, a senior researcher at the Centre for European Studies of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations under the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Kiev City Council’s decision runs counter to the needs of the population and “is aimed at strengthening discrimination against Russian-speaking citizens who, according to some estimates, make up to half of the Ukrainian population”.

“Russian-speaking people will have to adapt artificially. Most likely, the Russian language will be studied further, but already privately, unofficially”, the analyst suggested in an interview with RT.
In turn, Vladimir Shapovalov, Deputy Director of the Institute of History and Politics of the Moscow State Pedagogical University, recalled that the persecution of the Russian language has a long history in Ukraine.

“All this began after the ‘Orange Revolution’ of 2004 and even earlier in some aspects. Zelensky is especially aggressive in the fight against the Russian language, although he promised his voters just the opposite. Such policy, of course, does not fit into any norms of democracy and indicates that Ukraine is a Nazi state that grossly violates the rights of a significant part of its population because the Russian language is native to millions of Ukrainian citizens”, the expert said in an interview with RT.

Mr. Shapovalov also drew attention to the fact that international human rights organisations had turned a blind eye to discrimination against Russian-speaking citizens throughout all these years.

“Unfortunately, all international human rights organisations depend on the West and participate in the fight against Russia. Therefore, they condone the violation of the rights of citizens of Ukraine”, the analyst said.

But Russian-speaking Ukrainians did not protest against such policy because they were intimidated by the repressions from the new authorities after the “Maidan”, Mr. Shapovalov said.

“An absolutely repressive government is now operating in Ukraine. For example, the party “Opposition Platform – For Life”, which was considered to represent the interests of the Russian-speaking population of the country, had been consistently among the leaders in recent public opinion polls, but it was banned and one of its leaders was sent to prison in the end.
Many other politicians have also been repressed or even killed and TV channels shut down. In Ukraine, the spirit of intimidation and terror reigns, so there is no resistance”, Mr. Shapovalov said.

According to Vladimir Olenchenko, the Russophobic policy of the Ukrainian authorities “once again proves that the Crimea and Donbass made the right choice in 2014”.

“The population of those regions does not accept the imposition of the Ukrainian language, nor will it accept it. The Russian language was used there historically, it was not introduced from the outside. It was, is and will be spoken there”, the analyst concluded.
Annex 225

TASS, *Ukraine Imposes Fines for Breach of State Language Law* (16 July 2022)

(translation)
Translation


Ukraine Imposes Fines for Breach of State Language Law

A failure to comply with the law will entail a fine of up to UAH 8,500 (about $300), which will be increased for repeated breaches.

KIEV, 16th of July, TASS. The next stage of the implementation of the Law “On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language” will come into force in Ukraine on Saturday. From now on, a failure to comply with the Law will entail a fine of up to UAH 8,500 (about $300), which will be increased in the event of repeated breaches.

According to the new Law, which was adopted in April 2019 and introduced in stages, Ukrainian citizens should use the Ukrainian language in all spheres of public life. Currently, public administration, science, education, medicine, services, advertising, print media and Internet websites must completely switch to Ukrainian. All cultural events must only be held in the state language. A 75% quota for programmes in Ukrainian is set for TV channels. Foreign movies and TV series can only be shown in the state language.

The imposition of language fines, according to experts, will primarily affect the service sector as it is in the communications of sellers, waiters and hairdressers with customers that most violations will occur. The Law will be monitored by the Commissioner for the Protection of the State Language and language inspectors. Taras Kremen, Ukrainian Language Ombudsman, has already advised Ukrainians to send denunciations to his office should they reveal any breach of the Law, attaching a video or audio record of the incident. Language inspectors can also attend meetings in any government bodies, demand documents from any public organisations and political parties, and charge fines.

Taras Kremen recently accused Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky and several other officials of breaching the language Law. Mr. Zelensky, who has already been reproached for switching to Russian in some interviews, spoke English this time.

New Rules

The provisions of the Law on the state language are primarily aimed at fighting the right to use Russian. For example, the requirement for publishers of newspapers and magazines to publish at least 50% of their circulations in the Ukrainian language does not apply to printed publications in The Crimean Tatar and other languages of the so-called indigenous peoples of Ukraine (Crimean Tatars, Karaites and Krymchaks) as well as English and other official languages of the EU. The main target of the restrictions is the Russian language, which, according to the All-Ukrainian Population Census of 2001, was called native by 29.6% of the respondents.

After the new Law was adopted, a number of deputies of the Verkhovnaya Rada filed a complaint about discrimination against the Russian language with the Ukrainian Constitutional Court. However, the Court found the Law to be constitutional.
Ban on the Russian Language in Education

After the 2014 events in Ukraine, the government took a course to gradually reduce the use of the Russian language in education. The new version of the Law “On Education”, which was adopted in September 2017, provided for a switch to Ukrainian from 2018 for secondary schools and universities, from 2020 for primary schools and from 2023 for schools instructing in the languages of national minorities of the EU countries.

After the Law caused a negative reaction in Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and other Eastern European nations having their expat communities in Ukraine, the Law “On Complete General Secondary Education” was adopted in March 2020, which allowed national minorities living mainly in the speech environment of their native languages to study in their own language at primary school, but along with the study of Ukrainian. At least 80% of their teaching time must be devoted to the state language beginning from the fifth grade.

De-Russification Campaign

In accordance with the new Law, the last stage of its implementation should be the year 2024. Beginning from 16 July 2024, the share of the Ukrainian language on national TV channels should be at least 90%, all regional newspapers and magazines will have to completely switch to the state language, and the punishment for “public humiliation or insult to the state language” will be toughened.

However, long before the year 2024, a campaign of total de-Russification has seized the country since the beginning of the Russian special military operation in Ukraine. On the 1st of July, the Kiev City Council announced their intention to introduce a complete ban on the public use of books, performances and concerts in Russian and other “Russian-speaking cultural products” in Kiev. A similar moratorium was earlier imposed in the Khmelnytskyi Region, and songs in Russian were prohibited from being performed and listened to in public places in Ivano-Frankovsk, Ternopol and Konotop.

Local authorities impose a complete ban on the teaching of the Russian language at schools. Such decision was made in the Odessa and Nikolaev Regions, and the Kharkov University closed its Department of Russian Language and Literature. The Mayor of the traditionally Russian-speaking town of Kryvoy Rog also said the Russian language should be abandoned.
Annex 226

DW, Ukraine bans music, books from Russia, Belarus (29 June 2022)
As war rages, Ukraine’s parliament is defending itself against the invaders with new laws banning Russian music and literature. Which authors can still be read? Who can still perform there? And what exceptions exist?

In Ukraine, it is now illegal to play Russian music in public or import large numbers of books from Russia and Belarus. The new ban passed by Kyiv’s parliament covers “products from artists or authors who are or were citizens of the aggressor nation.” Artists who fit that bill are also prohibited from performing in Ukraine.

Ukrainian television presenter and film producer Ihor Korondyv collected more than 25,000 signatures for a petition banning concerts featuring Russian artists in Ukraine even before Russia’s February 24 invasion. For him, the new law seems like a logical next step to protecting the country.

“It’s just as much a part of defending Ukraine as what our fighters are doing in the struggle against the aggressor. Russian artists should be unwelcome in Ukraine until relations with Russia are once again friendly,” he tells DW. The
No more books from Russia or Belarus

Another law was passed as well. Ukraine's parliament has determined that it is illegal to import and sell books from publishers in Russia or Belarus, as well as those in occupied parts of Ukraine.

The ban pertains not only to works written in any of those places but also applies to works by authors who are Russian citizens. Books published before the occupation are exempted from the ban.

Russian-language literature published in other countries, however, may still be imported as long as it has been approved. According to the law, a new literary council of experts will first scour works looking for anti-Ukrainian propaganda.

In addition, books by authors who hold or held Russian passports can no longer be printed in Ukraine. "That, too, is a natural societal reaction to the war. Neither 'good' nor 'bad' Russians will be given access to the Ukrainian book market," says Oleksandr Krasovytsky — owner and director of Folio Publishers — who helped write the law. The publishing ban will not, however, apply to Russian-language books that are to be published in Ukraine before January 1, 2023.

How will the ban be enforced?

That ban is focused, above all, on authors with Russian passports, says Krasovytsky. The publisher says Ukraine's council of experts will review each case individually. According to the law, works by Alexander Pushkin or Leo Tolstoy, for instance, can no longer be imported into Ukraine if they are printed in Russia; but if they are printed in other countries they may.

That means things will become complicated for some authors in the future — authors like Boris Akunin, who no longer...
There are also import exceptions for private individuals. Those who are carrying fewer than 10 copies of a work not on the council of experts’ list of banned books and having no intention of selling these are free to bring them into the country.

Moscow’s reaction to the law was predictable — anchoring the Ukrainian language in everyday life is a violation of the rights of Russian-speaking Ukrainians, according to the Kremlin.

**No more Russian classics on school syllabi?**

The next step could be banning classic Russian literature from Ukrainian classrooms. An Education Ministry working group has already advised striking some 40 Russian or Soviet authors and poets — among them Leo Tolstoy, Alexander Pushkin, Fyodor Dostoyevsky and Michail Bulgakov — from school curricula. Authorities have yet to issue a final decision on the matter.

Author Rostyslav Semkiv supports striking Russian literature from lesson plans entirely. “At the moment, I really don’t see how we can excite pupils about the beauty of Russian poetry. Classrooms are full of children whose homes have been destroyed, who have been forced to flee, have been shot at, or who have lost relatives,” said Semkiv while speaking on Ukrainian television. German literature did not return to Soviet classrooms until 1960, for instance, 15 years after victory over Nazism. Goethe’s “Faust” was the first to reappear.

Andriy Hirnyk, professor of psychology and pedagogy at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy, says Russian literature and culture had an outsized presence in Ukraine before the invasion. Now, he says, greater importance will simply be given to English, German, French, Chinese and Ukrainian literature.

*This article was originally written in Russian*
The Guardian, *Ukraine restricts Russian books and music in latest step of ‘derussification’*  
(20 June 2022)
Ukraine restricts Russian books and music in latest step of ‘derussification’

Ukraine’s parliament has voted through two laws that will place severe restrictions on Russian books and music as Kyiv seeks to break many remaining cultural ties between the two countries following Moscow’s invasion.

One law will forbid the printing of books by Russian citizens, unless they renounce their Russian passport and take Ukrainian citizenship. The ban will only apply to those who held Russian citizenship after the 1991 collapse of Soviet rule.

It will also ban the commercial import of books printed in Russia, Belarus and occupied Ukrainian territory, while also requiring special permission for the import of books in Russian from any other country.

Another law will prohibit the playing of music by post-1991 Russian citizens on media and on public transport, while also increasing quotas on Ukrainian-language speech and music content in TV and radio broadcasts.

The laws need to be signed by president Volodymyr Zelenskiy to take effect, and there is no indication that he opposes either. Both received broad support from across the chamber on Sunday, including from lawmakers who had traditionally been viewed as pro-Kremlin by most of Ukraine’s media and civil society.

Ukraine’s culture minister, Oleksandr Tkachenko, said he was “glad to welcome” the new restrictions.

“The laws are designed to help Ukrainian authors share quality content with the widest possible audience, which after the Russian invasion do not accept any Russian creative product on a physical level,” the Ukrainian cabinet’s website quoted him as saying.

The new rules are the latest chapter in Ukraine’s long path to shedding the legacy of hundreds of years of rule by Moscow.

Ukraine says this process, previously referred to as “decommunisation” but now more often called “derussification”, is necessary to undo centuries of policies aimed at crushing Ukrainian identity.

Moscow disagrees, saying Kyiv’s policies to entrench the Ukrainian language in day-to-day life oppress Ukraine’s large number of Russian speakers, whose rights it claims to be upholding in what it calls its “special military operation”.

This process gained momentum after Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea and support for separatist proxies in Ukraine’s Donbas, but took on new dimensions after the start of the full-scale invasion on 24 February.
Hundreds of locations in Ukraine's capital, Kyiv, have already been earmarked for renaming to shed their associations with Russia, and a Soviet-era monument celebrating the friendship of the Ukrainian and Russian people was torn down in April, eliciting cheers from the assembled crowd.
Annex 228

CNE, Ukrainian ban on Russian language forces Christian radio to move to Hungary
(8 September 2022)
Ukrainian ban on Russian language forces Christian radio to move to Hungary

Ukrainian legislation forces New Life Radio to move to Hungary. From there, the Christian radio station can continue to broadcast in the Russian language, which is forbidden in Ukraine.

In July, Ukraine’s parliament (“Verkhovna Rada”) passed a law that bans radio and TV stations from playing “Russian music” as well as distributing “printed material” in the language, according to Ukraine’s English publication, Kyiv Post. While not all “Russian-language music” is prohibited, the law has stopped some Christian radio stations from airing music in Russian.

New Life Radio (NLR), an Evangelical Christian radio station in Odesa, Ukraine, has felt the effects of the ruling, since at least 40 per cent of its airtime is dedicated to worship music in Russian, according to an Evangeliques Info article.

As the war with Russia continues to ravage Ukraine, the battle in what language to use continues to hit areas with large Russian populations in the country’s eastern Donbas region and throughout southern coastal cities such as Odesa.

Bible in Russian

“I don’t want our staff busted on the air for reading the Bible in Russian. We were expecting bombs to wreck our radio operations, but it turned out to be this law,” said Dan Johnson, Director of Christian Radio for Russia (New Life Radio’s parent company) in a Christianity Today (CT) article.

Johnson, who manages the operations at NLR, says that it currently broadcasts its content by satellite and online.

Now that the new ruling has gone into effect, Johnson and his team have registered in Hungary and have now secured a facility in Budapest. They plan to start a full-time, satellite transmission of NLR’s Russian service beginning September 12th, which will legally allow them to broadcast into Russia and Ukraine. This will be his fourth move to escape the restrictions that have threatened free speech and his ministry.

Continuing in Ukrainian

As they set up in Budapest, Johnson still has his eyes on Odesa. He told CNE that he has started a Ukrainian-only radio service with the existing staff there. Although the concept is still in its infancy, much work remains in providing Bible teachings and music in the Ukrainian language, so it can operate on a 24/7 basis.

“If the Christians of Europe could help us support a single programming person to oversee this effort, it would be an answer to prayer,” he said to CNE.
Although an uncertain future remains, Johnson remains confident that the Gospel will continue to be on the airwaves for both Ukrainian and Russian speakers.

“It’s just another chapter in our long story of working to broadcast the Gospel, so we don’t worry about anything and trust God to get us through the troubles yet again. The devil doesn't like what we do, as usual, and employs all his tricks. We have the victory in Christ,” he said.
Annex 229

Wikipedia, *Demolition of monuments to Alexander Pushkin in Ukraine*
The **demolition of monuments to Alexander Pushkin in Ukraine** started during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. During the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine it has become a widespread phenomenon and dubbed by Ukrainians **Pushkinopad** (Пушкінопад), a pun literally translated as "Pushkinfall". This wave of dismantling is part of the process of derussification in Ukraine.

### History

According to Volodymyr Yermolenko, Russian literature has been a vehicle of the country's imperial project and nationalist world-view.[1] Pushkin’s poem *Poltava* recounts the revolt of Ukrainian Cossack *hetman* Ivan Mazepa against Tsar Peter the Great from the Russian point of view and portrays Mazepa as a lecherous traitor.[1] Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Pushkin’s situation turned out to be quite similar to the destruction of monuments to Lenin known as Leninopad.[2] The phenomenon was dubbed "Pushkinopad" (Пушкінопад) by Ukrainians, a pun literally translated as "Pushkinfall", with the coinage of "-пад" being akin to English words suffixed with "fall" as in "waterfall", "snowfall", etc.

The first event that became widely known was the dismantling of the monument to Pushkin in Mukachevo on April 7, 2022.[3] Monuments to the Russian poet were dismantled in Uzhhorod[4] and Ternopil on April 9.[5][6] Serhiy Nadal, mayor of Ternopil, commented:

> The crimes of Russians against the Ukrainian people: murder, torture of people, rape of women and children, destruction of Ukrainian cities have crossed out the entire culture of the Russian people. There is no explanation for these crimes. They leave us no choice. Everything Russian must be dismantled. Including the monument to the Russian writer.[7]

On March 22, 2022, a resident of Ternopil painted a Pushkin monument red and wrote "stop war" on it. With his action he drew attention to the need to dismantle the monument. In Ternopil, the monument to the poet was erected in 1961. The first initiatives to demolish it appeared in 2014, after the start of the Russo-Ukrainian War.[8]

On April 7, 2022, a monument to Pushkin was demolished in Mukachevo. The very next day, the Uzhhorod City Council also decided to dismantle the monument to Alexander Pushkin[6]
On April 11, 2022, a bust of Pushkin was dismantled in the village of Zabolotivtsi, Lviv Oblast.[10]

On April 19, 2022, in Kropyvnytskyi, they proposed to remove the monument to Pushkin, which currently stands near the Pedagogical University.[11] The monument was dismantled on July 8, 2022.[12]

On April 26, 2022, a monument to Alexander Pushkin was torn down in the village of Pushkino in the Berehove Raion of the Zakarpattia Oblast, and meetings began to rename the village.[13]

On April 28, 2022, a monument to Pushkin was dismantled in Konotop. The head was torn off during the dismantling of the monument.[14]

On April 30, 2022, a Pushkin monument was destroyed in Chernihiv.[15]

On May 5, 2022, a memorial plaque to Pushkin was dismantled in Vinnytsia.[16]

On May 8, 2022, the bust was dismantled in Deliatyn, Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast.[17]

On May 13, 2022, a bust of Pushkin was dismantled from the entrance gate of the Oleksandriia Dendrological Park in Bila Tserkva.

On May 21, 2022, a monument to Pushkin was dismantled in Mykolaiv.[18]

On June 1, 2022, a monument to Alexander Pushkin was damaged in Nikopol.[19]

On June 3, 2022, the "Ukrainian People's House" society proposed to remove the bust of Pushkin from the building of the Olha Kobylyanska Drama Theater in Chernivtsi and replace it with the bust of Yurii Fedkovych. The director of the theater supported the proposal but stressed that all legal requirements and regulations had to be met before removing the bust.[20]

On June 16, 2022, a working group of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine decided to remove more than 40 works by Soviet and Russian authors, including Alexander Pushkin, from school textbooks.[21]

On July 26, 2022, a bust of Pushkin was dismantled in Zaporizhzhia. The bust made of forged copper stood in the city for more than 20 years and was dismantled with the permission of the mayor's office.[22]

On September 1, 2022, a bust of Pushkin was dismantled in Kyiv on the territory of gymnasium No. 153 (named after Pushkin).[23]

On October 11, 2022, unknown persons dismantled the second bust of Pushkin in front of the National Transport University in Kyiv. The co-founder of the "Decommunization Ukraine" project said that the dismantling was dedicated to Lieutenant of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Denys Antipov, alias "Buk" - a well-known public activist, teacher of the Korean language at the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, who had died in May 2022 in a battle with Russian invaders.[24]
On November 9, 2022, a bust of Pushkin, which stood on Poetry Maidan in Kharkiv, was dismantled and sent for safekeeping. The Kharkiv City Council stated that this monument, and possibly others, should be preserved, but the residents will decide this issue in peacetime. [25][26][27]

On November 11, 2022, a monument to Pushkin was dismantled in Zhytomyr.[28]

On November 11, 2022, a monument to Pushkin in the city of Zhmerynka was dismantled.

On November 16, 2022, Pushkin Avenue in Dnipro was renamed Lesia Ukrainka Avenue.[29] A monument to Pushkin that stood there was dismantled on December 16, 2022.[29]

On November 17, 2022, a statue of Pushkin was dismantled in Chernivtsi.[30]

On November 20, 2022, unknown persons overthrew a bust of Pushkin in Nikopol.[31]

On November 21, 2022, a monument to Pushkin in Kremenchuk was dismantled.[32]

On November 29, 2022, a memorial plaque to Pushkin was dismantled in Mykolaiv.[33]

On November 29, 2022, a monument to Pushkin was dismantled in Ananiv.[34]

On December 9, 2022, the monument to Pushkin in the city of Tulchyn was dismantled.[35]

The monument to Pushkin in the Dnipro was dismantled on December 16, 2022.[35]

On December 23, 2022, the second sculpture of Pushkin was dismantled in the city of Chernivtsi.[36]

On December 24, 2022, it was dismantled in the city of Krolevets.[37]

On December 27, 2022, the bust of Pushkin was dismantled from the facade of the Chernivtsi Drama Theater named after Olha Kobylianska.[38]

On December 29, 2022, the bust was dismantled in Polonne.[39]

On December 29, 2022, the second memorial plaque to Pushkin was dismantled in the city of Mykolaiv.

On December 30, 2022, a monument to Pushkin was dismantled in Kramatorsk.[40]

**See also**

- Demolition of monuments to Vladimir Lenin in Ukraine

**References**


8. Бугаенко, Тетяна (9 April 2022). "У Тернополі демонтували пам'ятник Алекссандру Пушкіну" (https://zaxid.net/u_ternopoli_demontuvvaly-pamyatnik_alyeksandru_pushkinu_n1540656) [Monument to Alexander Pushkin dismantled in Ternopil]. ZAXID.NET.


27.02.2023, 23:28
17. На Прикарпатті демонтували погруддя Пушкіна та комісара Руднева (https://vikna.if.ua/news/category/all/2022/05/08/133267/view)


External links

- Special operation "Derusification". Interview with Vakhtang Kipiani, Editor-in-Chief of Historical Truth (https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2022/04/25/7341708/)

Annex 230

Mosregtoday, *Ukraine continues to dismantle monuments linked to Russian history and culture* (22 April 2022)

(translation)
Ukraine continues to dismantle monuments linked to Russian history and culture

09:09, 22 April 2022

Kharkov, Kremen, Odessa, Temopol, Uzhgorod: dozens of busts and monuments dedicated to Soviet liberator soldiers, Russian writers and political figures have already been demolished in these and other Ukrainian cities. We and experts from the Moscow region are going to tell you how the memory cast in bronze suffers because of aggressive derussification.

TO ERASE HISTORY?

"Memory wars" - battles over interpretations of history and views on culture - have been waged around the world for a long time. Some of them go in parallel with overt armed conflicts, while other ones can unfold independently and smoulder quietly, fanning the flames of discontent. In April, monuments are demolished in Ukrainian cities almost every day. Some do it defiantly, while others do it quietly. For example, the monument to commander Georgy Zhukov in Kharkov and the monument to the Soviet soldier in Kremenets were dismantled loudly and pompously. The monument to NKVD officers who defended the city from Nazi invaders during the Great Patriotic War was demolished in Odessa at night time.

The "monumental wars", when it is decided which monument should stand and which should not, is a special trend. During regime changes, monuments from previous eras are often demolished," Vardan Bagdasaryan, Dean of the Faculty of History, Political Science and Law at Moscow State Regional University, Chairman of the regional branch of the Russian Society "Knowledge" in the Moscow region, says.

Now everything that was historically linked to Russia is unquestioningly removed in Ukraine. And above it is monuments.

"The demolition of monuments and the rewriting of history have unfortunately become a mainstream trend for Ukraine and several other countries," Oleg Rozhnov, a deputy of the Moscow Regional Duma and a member of the Committee on Education, Culture, Science, Tourism, Sports and Youth Policy, believes. – "This is a crime against the generations of the twentieth century, who defeated fascism on the planet, and against the future of their countries and their children. As the recent history shows, states that falsify history turn into anti-people puppet regimes."
THINGS THAT MAKE US WHO WE ARE

Over the past 20 days, there have been three less monuments to Pushkin in three Ukrainian cities. In Uzhgorod, Ternopol and Mukachevo, busts of the genius of Russian literature have disappeared. Although many people dispute that Pushkin belongs to a certain nation and rightly consider him a world heritage. One can even consider Alexander Pushkin as an unofficial PR man for Ukraine. After all, it was he who wrote the lines "The night in Ukraine is serene, stars glow in the translucent sky...", and also "Outline of the History of Ukraine" which remained unfinished. Nevertheless, the monuments to Pushkin in Ukraine are torn down too.

"Pushkin visited many Ukrainian towns and admired the local nature without separating Ukraine and Russia," Vladimir Sizov, a researcher at the Pushkin State Historical and Literary Museum-Reserve, says. – "When a nation and a new people are being formed, they need their own heroes and ideals. For Ukrainians, Pushkin is the embodiment of Russian culture, against which they fight actively and which they do not want to be identified with. At the same time, Alexander Pushkin is not a foreigner for Ukrainians. It is just that his language and image are unacceptable for the new ethnos that is forming".

Sizov also explained that works of Pushkin have long been taught in Ukrainian schools as part of foreign world literature and that he is included in the general curriculum as a foreign writer.

Affected monuments in Ukraine
1. 2013, Kiev. The monument to Lenin was thrown down from the pedestal and smashed with sledgehammers.

2. 2015, Odessa. The monument to Nicholas II's brother Konstantin Konstantinovich was demolished.

3. 2016, Zhytomyr. The monument to the leader of the underground guerrilla movement which was active during the Great Patriotic War, Hero of the Soviet Union Grigory Shelushkov, was demolished.

4. 2016, Kiev. The bust of the legendary guerrilla commander, twice Hero of the Soviet Union Sidor Kovpak, was destroyed.

5. 2019, Kiev. The monument to Alexander Suvorov was dismantled.

6. 2017-2019, Lvov. Dismantling of the memorial on the Glory Hill in Lvov. The centrepiece of the ensemble were the 'Motherland' and 'Warrior'. The memorial also included a 30-metre high pylon and a granite stele with high reliefs.


8. 2020, Ternopol region. The head of the monument to a Soviet soldier was ripped off.

9. 2022, Chernigov. The monument to Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya was demolished

10. 2022, Ternopol. The monument to Pushkin was dismantled.

11. 2022, Mukachevo. The monument to Pushkin was dismantled and a plaque was removed from the school that bore the poet's name.

12. 2022, Uzhgorod. The monument to Pushkin was demolished

13. 2022, Odessa. The monument to the soldiers who defended the city from fascist invaders was demolished

14. 2022, Kremenets. The monument to a Soviet soldier at the Memorial of Glory was demolished

15. 2022, Ivano-Frankivsk region. Star was torn off the Soviet memorial to fallen soldiers.

17. 2022, Lvov region (town of Stryi). Demolition of the Monument to a Soviet Liberator Soldier

Apropos

In the Polish city of Siedlce, the monument to the liberator soldiers was also demolished. It is already known that the Polish authorities are planning to destroy 60 such Soviet monuments.

Linara Samedinova, Chairwoman of the Committee on Education, Culture, Science, Tourism, Sports and Youth Policy at the Moscow Regional Duma:

- What is happening now with monuments to outstanding personalities of the Soviet Union and heroes of the Great Patriotic War in Ukraine is a desecration of the memory of their people and their grandfathers and great grandfathers. This is a desire to isolate themselves from Russians. Such events arouse bewilderment: the civilized educated society of the XXI century obviously does not act in such a way. This is sheer wickedness.

Author: Margarita Ivanova
Annex 231

MK, From Pushkin to Suvorov: How Many Monuments Have Already Been Demolished in Ukraine (2 December 2022)

(translation)
From Pushkin to Suvorov: How Many Monuments Have Already Been Demolished in Ukraine

Their number is reckoned at hundreds

On Thursday, the monument to Russian military commander Alexander Suvorov was dismantled in Izmil, Ukraine. In fact, not a week goes by that something is not demolished somewhere in Ukraine. According to various sources, more than eighty monuments, busts and memorials related to Russian or Soviet history have been destroyed since the start of the special military operation in Ukraine. And since 2014, there have been hundreds of them. These include monuments to poets and writers, generals and politicians. MK has remembered the most famous cases of demolition and vandalism.

One of the most sensational and scandalous examples is the sculptural composition "To the Founders of Odessa" situated in this city, which consists of a monument to Catherine II and her associates standing at her feet: Grigory Potemkin, José de Ribas, Platon Zubov and the city's first architect Franz de Vollan. The long-suffering monument has been desecrated in many ways: it was doused with paint and covered with inscriptions. In October, Vladislav Balinsky, head of the Green Sheet NGO, climbed up a huge ladder to the empress's head and put a red rag on it and hung a noose on her arm.

The monument to the empress and her associates was proposed for demolition on several occasions, but that was never accomplished. And then the authorities in Odessa decided to put an end to this story by approving the dismantling of the monument. First, the officials were assuring that the monuments would be moved to a museum, then they were planning to store them in a special warehouse belonging to the local cemetery and were even discussing the idea of a new location for the installation of the sculptural composition. However, monuments to Russian heroes could only stand in specialized museums in Ukraine: there was, for example, an idea to create a Museum of Totalitarianism, where demolished sculptures would be kept.

Recently, the monument to Suvorov in Poltava as well as the bust in honour of Marshal Georgy Zhukov in Kharkov were demolished. The Suvorov statue in Poltava stood in the Poltava Museum of Heavy Bombardment Aviation and, before that, in the courtyard of Ivan Bogun Military Lyceum in Kiev. The demolition was initiated by Anton Drobovich,
Director of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory. He considered the monument to be “an element of Soviet propaganda”.

Both Balinsky and Drobovich are condemned by many Ukrainians on social media, as is the mockery of history. The destruction of historical treasures is advocated by visiting radicals from western Ukraine, while the local population cannot stand up to armed men supported by the Security Service of Ukraine. “They have dealt with the monuments, but when will they provide light and heat to residents?” - Odessa residents are outraged on social media.

Many of the monuments which have been demolished in Ukraine are on the cultural heritage list. In November, the monument to Soviet soldiers called “From Ukraine to Liberators” was demolished in Uzhgorod. This monument, which features a bronze figure of a soldier with an assault rifle and a banner, was erected in 1970 to mark the 25th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War. A winch was tied to the monument and it was pulled down which destroyed the sculpture.

According to local officials, the monument was allegedly in critical condition and a monument to Transcarpathian stormtroopers will be erected in its place. Also, at the very beginning of the special military operation, the monument to the 300th anniversary of Ukraine’s reunification with Russia erected in 1961 was destroyed near Kiev. The local authorities argued that there could be no more friendship between the two countries.

Now, the Kiev regime is not only ruthlessly erasing everything associated with Russian history, but is also trying to alienate Ukrainians from Slavic culture as much as possible. Back in 2014, it was Vladimir Lenin, a politician, who suffered heavily, as a huge number of his monuments were demolished in Ukraine, but since the start of the special military operation it is Pushkin who has taken the heat.

In 2022, Ukraine embarked on real “depushkinisation”, massively demolishing all known monuments to the poet, especially in the western part of the country. The first known demolition took place in April in Mukachevo, followed by demolitions in Uzhgorod, Ternopil, Lviv region, Vinnitsa and many other cities. A bust of Pushkin in Kharkov was first covered with bags, ostensibly to protect it from splinters, and then dumped and taken away in an unknown direction. The poet’s busts are also often damaged by vandals who spray paint and write curse words on them. Moreover, in the village of Pushkino in the Transcarpathian region, after destroying the monument they thought of renaming the village.

In addition to Pushkin, Maxim Gorky was also affected. A monument to him, which was located on the school grounds, was demolished in summer in Kirovograd region. Now, Ukrainians want to demolish the monument to Soviet writer Nikolai Ostrovsky in Khmelnytsky region.

But sturdy Soviet monuments built to last for centuries are not always possible to knock down. And when it is too difficult to do so, Ukraine acts differently by simply changing and distorting the essence of the monument. This happened to the Friendship Arch built
in 1982 to symbolise the friendship between Kiev and Moscow. The Kiev regime was unable to destroy the massive arch, so they simply repainted it in rainbow colours in 2017 and called it the 'Arch of Diversity'...
Annex 232

Lenta.ru, *Pushkin Monument Dismantled in Zaporozhye* (27 July 2022)

(translation)
Translation


Pushkin Monument Dismantled in Zaporozhye

*A monument to the poet Alexander Pushkin was dismantled in the Ukrainian city of Zaporozhye*

The local authorities of the Ukrainian city of Zaporozhye dismantled a monument to the Russian poet Alexander Pushkin, *Ukrinform* reports with reference to the Zaporozhye City Council.

Photo: AP

“The monument has now been dismantled and placed in storage. We do not disclose where exactly it is stored. It will be stored there until a decision is made on its further fate”, the Zaporozhye City Council said.

The Pushkin monument was erected more than 20 years ago “as a sign of the great poet’s stay on the Zaporozhye land in May 1820”.

In May 2022, the Kiev authorities decided to dismantle more than 40 monuments associated with Russia. On the 7th of July, it became known that a monument to the 300th anniversary of the reunification of Russia and Ukraine had been demolished near the Ukrainian capital.

A week later in Poltava, unknown persons damaged the monument to the Russian Emperor Peter I. The vandals caused scratches and left the inscription “Occupier” at the base of the structure [the author's spelling is preserved]. On the 21st of July, it was reported that about 85% of Ukrainians were in favour of replacing the coat of arms of the USSR on the “Motherland” monument in Kiev with the trident, the state emblem of Ukraine.
Annex 233

Urdupoint, Ukraine Dismantles Monument to Soviet Writer Maksim Gorky – Reports
(14 November 2022)
Ukraine Dismantles Monument to Soviet Writer Maksim Gorky - Reports

Muhammad Irfan

MOSCOW (UrduPoint News / Sputnik - 14th November, 2022) A monument to the Russian and Soviet writer, Maksim Gorky, was dismantled in the Ukrainian city of Odesa, local media reported on Monday.

"The monument to Russian writer Maxim Gorky was dismantled on November 13 in Odesa on the territory of the Gorky sanatorium. Such a decision was made by the management of the facility," local broadcaster Suspilne Odesa said on Telegram.

According to the media, the decision to dismantle the monument was made under the Ukrainian law on decommunization.

The dismantling of monuments associated with Soviet history, as well as the renaming of streets, began in Ukraine in 2015, when a controversial law on decommunization was passed. Recently, the Ukrainian authorities began to attack not only Soviet history, but also everything related to Russia.

On November 5, the mayor of Odesa, Gennadiy Trukhanov, said that he supported the initiative to remove the historic monument to the founders of the city, commonly known as the monument to Russian Empress Catherine II, despite previously stating that he was concerned over mounting hate toward all things related to Russia. In October, the city council announced the results of an online vote to determine the future of the monument, claiming that a majority of residents wanted the monument removed.

On November 9, Chairman of the Investigative Committee of Russia Alexander Bastrykin instructed the relevant agencies to give a legal assessment regarding the facts of demolition and desecration of monuments in Ukraine.
Annex 234

Babel, *A monument to Marshal Zhukov, which has been the subject of controversy for years, was dismantled in Kharkiv* (17 April 2022)
A monument to Soviet Marshal Georgy Zhukov, which has been the subject of controversy for years, was dismantled in Kharkiv.

This was reported by "Suspilne" (Ukraine National Broadcaster).

The head of the Nemyshlyansky district administration, Tetiana Topchiy, said the military had done so. "Everything happened instantly, around 11:00. Two cars with military arrived. They took off the bust, took everything somewhere. Now everything is quiet, as far as we understand," Topchiy said.

Later, Koatiantyn Nemichev, an ex-combatant of the Azov Regiment and head of the Kharkiv branch of the National Corps, published a video of the demolition of the monument, stating that it had been dismantled by KRAKEN special forces. The video shows Zhukov being taken to a landfill.

Local authorities, including the mayor Ihor Terekhov, for years, opposed the dismantling of this monument and the decommunization of the avenue in honor of Zhukov. The trial lasted two years. Representatives of nationalist organizations tried to demolish the monument several times.
Annex 235

Gazeta.Ru, “The Bloody Russian”: a Monument to Vatutin Demolished in Ukraine
(16 July 2022)

(translation)
“The Bloody Russian”: a Monument to Vatutin Demolished in Ukraine

A monument to the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front during the Great Patriotic War, Nikolai Vatutin, was demolished in Ukraine by radical nationalists who called the combat leader a “bloody Russian general”. Vatutin played an active role in the liberation of Kiev and the Right-Bank Ukraine and died on 15 April 1944 from the effects of a severe wound suffered during a skirmish with militants of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army* banned in Russia.

A monument to the famous military commander of the Great Patriotic War, Army General Nikolai Vatutin, was demolished in one of the towns in the Chernigov Region in Ukraine. The incident occurred on the day of the 75th anniversary of General Vatutin’s death from the effects of a wound suffered on 28 February 1944 as a result of an ambush attack by a sabotage group of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (banned in Russia).

According to a post on the Facebook public group of VGO Sokil, members of this radical organisation, which positions itself as a “military sports society” adhering to “Ukrainian social nationalism”, were involved in the attack on the monument. In their message, the nationalists mention that General Vatutin has been put on the list of persons “involved in the struggle against the independence of Ukraine” by the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory. As a consequence, the monument to the “bloody Russian general” was demolished about 30 km from the Russian border as part of the decommunisation process, the Sokil clarified.

“The destruction of symbols of the Soviet-Moscow totalitarianism appears to be extremely painful for the neighbouring country,” the statement emphasizes. “We can promise our enemies that they’ll feel even more pain, and Ukrainians will see the final cleansing of our territory from hostile symbols.”

The statement also lists the “crimes” of which General Vatutin is guilty according to the radical nationalists. In September 1920, as a simple Red Army soldier, he fought against the remnants of Nestor Makhno’s rebel formations; in 1921, he was involved in battles against the Ukrainian rebels in the Poltava Region and joined the Russian Communist Bolshevik Party in the same year. Nonetheless, General Vatutin’s opponents say that his main “atrocity” was the crossing of the Dnieper and the assault on the Bukrin bridgehead in the autumn of 1943, leading to heavy losses.

“They say that German machine gunners were losing their minds from having to shoot continuously at unarmed people in civilian clothes, with new ranks taking place of the dead. Troop commanders seized all the Ukrainian children aged 16 to 18 they could get their hands on and forced them to advance, unarmed and without military uniforms, under the German machine-gun fire,” as the Sokil activists interpret those events.

General Vatutin is one of the Soviet combat leaders most hated by modern Ukrainian nationalists.
In 1943-1944, as Commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, he played an active role in the liberation of Kiev and the Right-Bank Ukraine. Apart from the occupant forces, his soldiers and officers had to fight against underground militant outfits of ethnic Ukrainians.

Vatutin came from a peasant family in the Voronezh Province. He was not involved in the revolutionary events of 1917; he was drafted into the Red Army during mobilisation in April 1920. In the army, Vatutin found himself showing military potential and went on to make a brilliant career. In the mid-1920s, the former villager was already in charge of a company, and by 1931 he rose to the chief of staff of the 28th Mountain Rifle Division. Since then, Vatutin consistently held commanding positions. When the war began, the Lieutenant General held the post of first deputy to Georgy Zhukov, Chief of the General Staff.

After 30 June 1941, Vatutin’s positions were: the Chief of Staff of the North-Western Front, Deputy Chief of the General Staff for the Far East region, Commander of the Voronezh Front, then of the South-Western Front, and back to the Voronezh Front. From 20 October of that year until his death, the General led the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front.

A rare example among top ranking military officers, Vatutin was highly regarded by his peers.

For instance, Nikita Khrushchev, a member of the Military Council of the South-Western Front, listed a sober lifestyle, high work capacity and very good military training among Vatutin’s positive traits.

Alexander Vasilevsky, Chief of the General Staff, stated that General Vatutin “has deservedly earned wide recognition and the love of the people”. In his memoirs, Georgy Zhukov called his former deputy a “highly erudite and courageous military commander” who was distinguished by his “exceptional diligence and broad strategic thinking” and “an enviable ability to express his thoughts concisely and clearly”. Marshal Zhukov also noted that Vatutin’s “handwriting was exceptionally attractive and neat”.

During a sudden attack by a UPA outfit of at least 100 men while coming into a village in the south of the Rovno Region, General Vatutin, who had had an opportunity to retreat by two vehicles, decided to take on the fight and took part in the shootout along with several other officers. As a result of the firefight, the commander suffered a severe thigh wound and bone fragmentation.

General Vatutin was promptly taken to Kiev and placed in the care of the urgently called out chief surgeon of the Red Army, Nikolai Burdenko. Despite the measures taken, the military commander developed gas gangrene. A council of doctors determined that the only way to save the general’s life was to amputate his leg.

However, Vatutin flatly refused the amputation and died of sepsis on 15 April, a month and a half after the injury.

Two days later, he was solemnly buried in Kiev's Mariinsky Park; in 1948, an 8.5-meter tall monument by Evgeny Vuchetich was erected on the gravesite. In recent years, the monument has been routinely attacked by vandals: on memorial dates for Vatutin or the Red Army, the statue would be splashed with red paint or have boards with profanities about the General hung on it.
Monuments to Vatutin have been attacked in other places as well. In the spring of 2018, for instance, nationalists used sledgehammers to smash the monument in Berdichev, while in the Sumy Region the statue was taken down and carried away to an unknown location. In March of this year, a monument to Vatutin was destroyed in the village of Feskovka, Chernigov Region. Four years ago, Vatutin's daughter requested the Russian authorities to have her father's gravesite relocated to the Mytishchi military cemetery near Moscow.

* The organisation is banned in Russia
Annex 236

TASS, Soviet Soldier-Liberator Monument Demolished in Western Ukraine (23 June 2022)

(translation)

**Soviet Soldier-Liberator Monument Demolished in Western Ukraine**

All the five monuments to Soviet soldiers in Verkhovyna have now been destroyed.

KIEV, 23rd of June, TASS. The monument to the Soviet soldier-liberator was demolished in the village of Verkhovyna in the Ivano-Frankovsk Region of Ukraine, *Ukrinform* reported on Thursday.

“In Outer Subcarpathia, in the territory of the Verkhovyna village council, the last monument to the liberator of the Soviet era was dismantled”, the report said. In total, there were five monuments to Soviet soldiers, in Verkhovyna. All of them have now been destroyed.

It was reported earlier that the monument to the Soviet soldier was demolished in the village of Verkhniy Yasenov in the Ivano-Frankovsk Region.

Following the coup d’état in 2014, Ukraine has adopted the so-called “decommunisation” law, which provides for the demolition of monuments and the renaming of topographic objects associated with Soviet history. In eight years, the Ukrainian authorities changed the names of more than 900 settlements and about 50,000 streets. Ukraine recently began to fight everything related to Russia. Streets bearing the names of Russian writers, artists, scientists and travellers are renamed and their monuments demolished throughout Ukraine. In addition, any references to the role of the Soviet people in the victory in the Great Patriotic War are also eliminated.
Annex 237


(translation)
Soviet Army's Glory Monument Demolished in Ukraine

The Monument of Glory of the Soviet Army, which was opened in 1970, was dismantled in Lvov, Ukraine, Zaxid.net reported on the 24th of July.

The monument figures were transported to the Terror Territory Museum. The Monument of Glory of the Soviet Army is dedicated to the victory over Nazism and depicts a soldier and the Motherland.

Proposals to demolish the Monument appeared as early as in 2007. In 2016, the local deputies said the existence of the Monument contradicts the decommunisation law. In 2018, the inscription “Monument to the Occupiers” appeared on the Monument.

The works to dismantle the Monument were started in April 2021. In January, the last monument to Vladimir Lenin was demolished in Ukraine. It was located in the Odessa Region.

In November 2020, the public movement “Decolonization of Ukraine” held an event in Odessa, demanding that the monument to the Russian Empress Catherine II be dismantled. In response to that initiative, Sergey Tsekov, a member of the Russian Federation Council’s Committee on International Affairs and Senator from the Crimea, proposed to the Ukrainian authorities to also abandon their southern regions should the monument to the Russian Empress be demolished.

Since 2015, Ukraine has been pursuing a decommunisation policy in line with its Law “On...

**Soviet Army’s Glory Monument Demolished in Ukraine**

The Monument of Glory of the Soviet Army, which was opened in 1970, was dismantled in Lvov, Ukraine, *Zaxid.net* reported on the 24th of July.

The monument figures were transported to the Terror Territory Museum.

The Monument of Glory of the Soviet Army is dedicated to the victory over Nazism and depicts a soldier and the Motherland.

Proposals to demolish the Monument appeared as early as in 2007. In 2016, the local deputies said the existence of the Monument contradicts the decommunisation law. In 2018, the inscription “Monument to the Occupiers” appeared on the Monument.

The works to dismantle the Monument were started in April 2021.

In January, the last monument to Vladimir Lenin was demolished in Ukraine. It was located in the Odessa Region.

In November 2020, the public movement “Decolonization of Ukraine” held an event in Odessa, demanding that the monument to the Russian Empress Catherine II be dismantled.

In response to that initiative, Sergey Tsekov, a member of the Russian Federation Council’s Committee on International Affairs and Senator from the Crimea, proposed to the Ukrainian authorities to also abandon their southern regions should the monument to the Russian Empress be demolished.

Since 2015, Ukraine has been pursuing a decommunisation policy in line with its Law “On
Condemnation of the Communist and Nazi Regimes”. The Law provides for the renaming of all topographic objects which names remind of the USSR and for the demolition of the related monuments.
Annex 238

Lenta.ru, Ukrainians Dismantled Suvorov Monument (4 February 2022)

(translation)
Ukrainians Dismantled Suvorov Monument

In Poltava, the monument to Russian commander Alexander Suvorov has been dismantled due to his negative reputation in Ukraine.

A monument to Alexander Suvorov, a great Russian military commander of the 18th century, has been dismantled in Poltava, Ukraine. It was earlier moved to a museum, but the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance (UINR) insisted that it should be closed. This is reported by Poltava with reference to a City+ TV channel broadcast.

Oleg Pustovgar, a regional representative of the UINR, justified the dismantlement by Suvorov’s negative reputation in Ukraine. “For us as a country confronting the Russian aggression, this is not just a matter of symbolism but a fundamentally important historical issue. Suvorov is part of the pantheon of the heroes of the Russian Empire, the USSR and now Putin’s Russia. Ukraine has its own historical heroes”, he said. Every Ukrainian is sure that it is impossible to glorify Suvorov in Poltava.

The monument was reportedly made by an amateur sculptor in 1974. It stood in the courtyard of the Kiev Military Lyceum named after Ivan Bohun (the former Kiev Suvorov Military School) but was dismantled on the initiative of its management and sent to the Poltava Heavy Bomber Aviation Museum (a branch of the National Military Historical Museum) in 2019. However, those persons responsible for the policy of Ukrainian historical memory were not happy to see the monument in its new place.

Alexander Suvorov is one of the key historical figures of Imperial Russia in the 18th century and the only person in Russia’s history who received the title of Generalissimo. Under him, Russia defeated the Ottoman Empire several times and annexed the Crimea and other territories. As a commander, Suvorov did not lose a single military battle and brought up a galaxy of outstanding Russian military commanders. He became especially revered in the army for his careful attitude to soldiers and personal participation in their life and needs. One of his famous victories was the capture of the Turkish fortress of Izmail, now a Ukrainian city.

Earlier, in this January, Artym Ryabchuk, a Ukrainian conscript soldier born in Izmail, shot four colleagues and one employee of the Yuzhmash Plant in Dnepr. According to some reports, he committed the crime because of a bad attitude in his unit.
Annex 239

RIA, Suvorov's Monument in Nikolaev is Covered in Paint (3 December 2022)

(translation)
Suvorov's Monument in Nikolaev is Covered in Paint

"NikVesti: Monument to Russian military commander Suvorov in Nikolaev doused in red paint

MOSCOW, 3 December - RIA Novosti.

The monument to Russian military commander Aleksandr Suvorov in Nikolaev in southern Ukraine was doused with red paint, local newspaper NikVesti has reported.

Previously, a monument to Suvorov was dismantled in the city of Izmail, Odessa Region, Ukraine

The dismantling of monuments related to Soviet history and the renaming of streets began in Ukraine in 2015, when the law on decommunization was passed. Recently, the Ukrainian authorities have started fighting not only against Soviet history, but also against everything related to Russia.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov earlier said that the Ukrainian authorities had for years pursued a course of aggressive derussification and forced assimilation.
Annex 240

TASS, Kutuzov Monument Dismantled in Western Ukrainian Town of Brody (25 February 2014)

(translation)
Kutuzov Monument Dismantled in Western Ukrainian Town of Brody

The bust was removed from its pedestal by a crane.

KIEV, 25th of February, ITAR-TASS. The bust of the famous Russian military commander Mikhail Kutuzov was dismantled on Monday in the town of Brody (Lvov Region) in Western Ukraine. The event was reported by local TV channels.

The bust was removed from its pedestal by a crane. Local deputies and residents watched the dismantling while shouting the mottos of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army: “Glory to Ukraine!” and “Glory to the heroes!”.

At its session on 10 December 2013, the Brody Town Council decided to move the bust of Kutuzov from the square opposite the Pedagogical College named after Markiy Shashkevych to the territory of the communal enterprise “Brody”.

War on Monuments

On the 24th of February, the Blue Shield Ukrainian National Committee appealed to the residents of Ukraine with a request to stop the uncontrolled demolition of monuments and not to destroy those monuments registered as having national or local importance.

The war on monuments in Ukraine began after protesters in Kiev demolished and smashed a monument to Lenin on the 8th of December. Residents of various cities and towns in the Republic began to dismantle monuments to the leader of the October Revolution and other figures of Russian history.
Annex 241

Vzglyad-Info, Journalists Found Demolished Kutuzov Monument in Ukrainian Landfill
(15 March 2014)

(translation)
The monument to Mikhail Kutuzov demolished in the town of Brody (Lvov Region, Ukraine) (/news/2014/02/26/saratovskie-mecenaty-gotovy-vykypit-snesennyi-na-ykraine-pamyatnik-ktyzovy.html) was found in a landfill. The video evidencing that, as filmed by journalists of the Russian youth TV channel “O2TV”, was published on YouTube the day before.

The authors of the video hope the monument will be restored on the Walk of Fame in the territory of the 16th Separate Army Aviation Brigade stationed in Brody. According to some media reports, an agreement in this regard with the military unit has already been reached.

It is worth reminding that the monument to the famous Russian military commander Mikhail Kutuzov was dismantled in the town of Brody, Lvov Region, on the 24th of February. The dismantling took place to the cheers of local residents and deputies who shouted the motto of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army: “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the heroes!”

This event caused extreme indignation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia.

In turn, the Saratov foundation “Orthodoxy and Modernity” (presided by Father Superior Nektary (Morozov) and directed by Sergey Kurikhin, a deputy of the Saratov Regional Duma) proposed to buy out the monument to Field Marshal General Kutuzov (/news/2014/02/28/ykrainskie-depytaty-rassmotryat-vopros-o-perenose-pamyatnika-ktyzova-v-saratov.html) in order to install it in Saratov.

The Brody Town Council will consider the proposal by Saratov patrons following the 20th of March.
Thirteen streets related to Russia or the USSR will be renamed in the Ukrainian town of Ternopol. An appropriate decision was made by the Town Council, according to its website.

It is noted that Chekhov Street will be renamed in honour of Elena Teliga – a Ukrainian poetess and a member of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN; banned in Russia). Pushkin Street will be renamed in memory of the defenders of Ukraine, and Tolstoy Street will change its name to Yevgeny Meshkovsky Street in honour the UPR Army. Dostoevsky, Lomonosov, Gagarin and Glinka Streets will also be renamed.

Igor Terekhov, Mayor of Kharkov, earlier criticised calls for renaming Pushkin Street and the Pushkinskaya Metro Station in the city. Prior to this, the Kharkov Town Council was reported to have decided to rename the Pushkin Academic Drama Theatre. The decision was explained by need to “de-Russify and replace the Soviet and Russian heritage with the Ukrainian one”.

Translation


Chekhov, Pushkin and Gagarin Streets Change Names in Ternopol

By Maxim Yermolov

© Oleh Snitovskyi/Global Look Press
Annex 243

RIA Novosti, *Leo Tolstoy Street Renamed in Honour of Bandera in Vinnytsia*  
(25 November 2022)  

(translation)
Translation


**Leo Tolstoy Street Renamed in Honour of Bandera in Vinnytsia**

The Town Council of Vinnytsia voted to rename Leo Tolstoy Street to Stepan Bandera Street

© AP Photo / Emilio Morenatti
Passers-by on a street in Vinnytsia, Ukraine. Archival photo

MOSCOW, 25th of November, RIA Novosti. Leo Tolstoy Street in the town of Vinnytsia was renamed in honour of Stepan Bandera, the leader of Ukrainian nationalists, the Town Council’s press service said.

“Today, the Town Council made a landmark decision marking the completion of the process to decolonize the toponyms in our community. <...> The latest decisions include the following: Leo Tolstoy Street will now bear the name of OUN* leader Stepan Bandera, and an unnamed street stretching from Nemirovskoye Highway to the Vinnytsia Airport was named in honour of Ivan Treyko, one of the nine generals of the UPA*”, according to the relevant statement published on the Town Council’s website.

The authorities also decided to rename the streets, alleys and passages named after Nikolai Vatutin, Yuri Gagarin, Alexander Pushkin, Ivan Michurin, and Ivan Chernyakhovsky.

Stepan Bandera (1909-1959) was the leader of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and one of the main initiators of the creation of its combat wing, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) whose proclaimed purpose was the struggle for the independence of Ukraine.
The UPA was formed in October 1942 and operated mainly in Western Ukraine, fighting against Soviet troops and collaborating with the Hitlerites. The OUN and UPA have committed a lot of crimes, including the Volyn Massacre – the mass extermination of the Polish population in 1943.

On 15 October 1959, KGB agent Bohdan Stashynsky killed Stepan Bandera in Munich. In 2010, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko awarded the OUN-UPA’s former leader the title of Hero of Ukraine, but a Ukrainian court later found his decree to be illegal. In May 2015, President Pyotr Poroshenko gave the OUN-UPA the status of “fighters for the independence” of Ukraine and entitled their members to social guarantees.

*A terrorist organisation banned in Russia.*
Annex 244

HHRF, *New Ukrainian Law on National Minorities Misses the Mark* (19 December 2022)
New Ukrainian Law on National Minorities Misses the Mark

by hhrfAdmin

Hungarian Minority Parties Issue Critical Statement

Political parties representing the interests of the 150,000-strong Hungarian national minority in Ukraine published the following joint statement, expressing their disappointment with the Ukrainian Parliament’s new law on national minorities. The law “fails to guarantee adequate institutional foundations or legal mechanisms for implementing and protecting the rights of national minorities.”

We ask the United States Congress and Administration, NATO, the EU, and all other stakeholders to heed the concerns of the affected communities, and to urge the Ukrainian government to fulfill its international and Constitutional commitments to protect the rights of national minorities.

Hungarian Human Rights Foundation

_________________

Joint statement of the Cultural Alliance of Hungarians in Sub-Carpathia (KMKSZ) and the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Ukraine (UMDSZ) Regarding the Law on National Minorities (Communities) of Ukraine

On December 13, 2022, by a vote of 324, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the law “On National Minorities (Communities) of Ukraine” in the second reading. Legislators completely ignored the constructive proposals that were made earlier by Hungarian and other minority group organizations. The legislation not only strengthens all the restrictions that were previously codified in the Education and State Language Acts, but implements new ones as well. For example, it does not guarantee the preservation of compact ethnic settlement areas, or the use of one’s national symbols. The law interprets minority rights exclusively as rights that can be exercised individually by persons belonging to a minority group, which deprives national minorities (their communities, organizations) of any institutionally exercisable political, educational, and language rights, and therefore the ability to influence their own destiny.

In our opinion, the law in its current form is not suitable as an acceptable Ukrainian legislative instrument to implement neither the Constitution’s provisions, nor Ukraine’s international legal obligations as regards the protection of the rights of national minorities. The adopted law does not guarantee adequate institutional foundations or legal mechanisms for the implementation and
Annex 244

New Ukrainian Law on National Minorities Misses the Mark

https://hhrf.org/2022/12/19/new-ukrainian-law-on-national-minorities...

protection of the rights of national minorities.

Uzhhorod, December 14, 2022

______________

READ Original in Hungarian

Download PDF here

Please follow and like us:
Annex 245

FIFTY-SIXTH DAY  
Monday, 11 February 1946

Morning Session

COL. POKROVSKY: The Tribunal has at its disposal the diaries of the Defendant Frank.

In the one marked "Diary of the Year 1943, V," we find on Pages 1070-1072 an important entry: in the Russian translation this passage is on Page 5 of the addenda to the "Excerpts from Frank's Diaries," and on Page 321 of your document book, marked in pencil. I quote this passage:

"Krakow, 23 October 1943.

"The Governor General makes a report at the Administrative Academy on 'The Leadership Principle in Government.' From the point of view of constitutional and international law, the Governor General, as an appendage to Greater Germany, constitutes a part of the territory over which the power of Greater Germany in Europe extends. The sovereignty over this territory belongs to the Fuehrer of Greater Germany and on his behalf it is exercised by the Governor General who, as the deputy of the Fuehrer, possesses all his powers."

I would like to inform you, Your Honors, of two more documents of a strictly official nature.

In the Reichsgesetzblatt for 1939, Part I, Page 2077-Page 333 of your document book presented by us as Exhibit Number USSR-296 (Document Number USSR-296) is published the "Fuehrer's and Reich Chancellor's Decree on the Administration of the Occupied Polish Territory," dated 12 October 1939.

I shall read into the record Paragraph 2 of this decree. It consists of two subparagraphs:

"Paragraph 2:

"1. I appoint Reich Minister Dr. Frank as Governor General of the occupied Polish territories.

"2. I appoint Reich Minister Dr. Seyss-Inquart as Deputy Governor General."

In the same Reichsgesetzblatt but this time for 1940, Part I, Page 399, is published a decree regarding the power to grant pardons in the occupied Polish territories. It is registered with the Reichspresseblatt but this time for 1940, Part I, Page 336 of your document book presented by us as Exhibit Number USSR-289 (Exhibit Number USSR-289) and is on Page 336 of the document book. It reads:

"In the occupied Polish territories I delegate to the Governor General of occupied Polish territories the power to confirm death sentences as well as pardons or to reject applications for pardons, with the right further to delegate his powers."

The power of life and death, the sovereign prerogative, was entrusted in a Poland occupied by the Hitlers, to the Defendant Frank.

It would not be misplaced to recall that it was this same Hitler who had said that he would show, by the concrete example of a mutual relationship between the Polish and the German peoples, that such a form of intercourse had been found "which would usefully serve the cause of peace as well as the welfare of both nations."

I have spoken of the kind of example that was intended, and what the welfare was to which reference had been made.

The 6 April 1941 was marked by a new crime planned and carefully prepared beforehand by the Hitlers conspirators. Without any warning or declaration of war, they attacked Yugoslavia.

The attack on Yugoslavia was a gross breach of Article 3 of the Hague Convention of 18 October 1907, and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 27 August 1928. The Delegations of Great Britain and of the United States have already submitted to the Tribunal a considerable number of documents referring to the subject of the inhumanous attack on Yugoslavia. I have only to submit a few new proofs and to establish a connection between these new documents and those already read into the record. Official German documents enable us to reconstrue events with exceptional vividness. In this case German pedantry turns against the authors of the criminal plan.

On 27 March 1941 Adolf Hitler held a special conference regarding the situation in Yugoslavia. On the same day he signed a top-secret Directive 025, for the High Command (Oberbefehlshaber) only. Both documents, filed under Document Number 1745-P5, are among the evidence already accepted by the Tribunal.

Subparagraph 2 of Directive 025 has already been quoted in full in the speech of the Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. The first subparagraph of this document was also read into the record on 7 December 1945. I should like to add a few more lines and read Paragraph 3 into the record. This passage is on Page 337 of the document book. It states as follows:

"In detail I order the following:

229

11 Feb. 46

"a) As soon as the concentration of sufficient forces is concluded and meteorological conditions permit, all Yugoslav antiaircraft and Belgrade must be destroyed by continuous day and night air attacks."

"b) If possible, simultaneously, but under no circumstances sooner, Operation Marta must be started, with the primary limited objective to seize the harbor of Salonika."

I believe that these points should be stressed here:
1) The intention of carrying out the total destruction of the capital of the state;
2) The correlation between the aggression against Yugoslavia and the aggression against another country, Greece—the aggression against Greece was coded, as the Tribunal knows, under the name of Operation Marita;
3) The necessity to complete the concentration of German forces as well as meteorological conditions were the factors that determined the time limits for the attack.

As in all previous cases of criminal fascist aggression, we see one and the same thing—the criminal intent of the predatory invader, treachery, and cold calculation.

Preparations for the successive acts which had been carried on over a very long period followed the customary Hitler routine, already disclosed by the prosecutors:

Fifth Column activities, the use of the protection of the German minority as a slogan and the lying practice of peaceable declarations combined with unceasing preparations for invasion. As I have already stated, the preparation of the crime was carried on over a very long period and followed the customary Hitler routine already disclosed by the prosecutors.

On 27 March 1941, on the very day when Hitler signed Directive 025, he personally conducted, in Berlin, a special conference on the situation in Yugoslavia. The minutes of this conference were presented by the United States Prosecution on 4 December 1945 as Document Number 1746-PS.

Other documents relating to this conference have also been registered under the same number. At the conference, the objective was determined with absolute precision and a plan of action was presented. You will, Your Honors, find the passage I have quoted on Page 349.

Hitler declared:

"...we are not going to wait for any declarations of loyalty by the new government, but to carry out all preparations for the destruction of the Yugoslav armed forces and of Yugoslavia itself as a national unit."

The operational staff of the OKW, meticulously following Hitler's directive regarding a cruel and rapid destruction of Yugoslavia, speedily worked out a detailed plan for co-ordinated operations of the German and Italian Armies. It was issued as an official operational directive dated 23 March 1941. I consider it essential to reread Paragraph 4 of this document into the record.

"...The German task is to attack Yugoslavia with the greatest possible concentration of forces, to smash its armed forces and destroy it as a state."

Thus, Hitler was not in the least interested in the factual attitude of one or the other Yugoslav Government toward Germany, but in the factual destruction of Yugoslavia as a state; and he strove to accomplish this destruction with cruelty and lightning speed.

The documents relating to the crimes against Yugoslavia will prove that, in attacking that country, the fascist conspirators strictly followed their customary methods. Even in detail they repeated their earlier crimes perpetrated against Poland, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. Even in case we did not know who actually organized the attack on Yugoslavia, the very nature of the facts, the sequence of events, the manner in which the crimes were perpetrated, would unmistakably indicate the culprits.

I turn to Document USSR-36, (Exhibit Number USSR-36) under which number I offer in evidence the Official Report of the Yugoslav Government.

The first section, entitled "The Systematic Preparation of the Conspiracy for the Enslavement and the Destruction of Yugoslavia," contains a series of valuable information. I wish to cite that excerpt from this document which you will find on Page 355 of the document book, Paragraph 4 on Page 3 of the Russian text, 3rd paragraph from the top reads:

"...It is especially important from the political point of view that the blow against Yugoslavia should be carried out with the utmost violence and that its military destruction should be effected with lightning speed."

And a little further back in the document is stated:

"No diplomatic inquiries will be made and no ultimatum presented. ...The attack will start as soon as the necessary supplies and troops are ready."

The task of the next representative of the U.S.S.R. Prosecution will be to show Your Honors that the fundamental purpose of these criminals, the main link in the center of all of the Hitlerite conspiracies, the Nazi Party created a political and military organ for the destruction of Yugoslavia."

I believe I can skip several lines without loss and quote further:

"In Yugoslavia, the Nazi Gauve were secretly formed and Gauleiter appointed. Under the guise of various physical training and sport associations, Hitlerite units were organized half a million strong. Numerous ‘tourists,’ 'travellers,' 'businessmen,' and ‘relatives’ came from the Reich in reality they were Nazi instructors and organizers."

I skip a number of details which can be disregarded, and pass to the second paragraph of the same section on Page 4—that would be Page 356 in your document book—where the manner is described in which the Fifth Column was further strengthened. I now shall read into the record Paragraph 2, beginning with the second subparagraph:

"...The Hitlerites drew into their orbit all the separatist and chauvinistic elements, as for instance, Pavelich's Ustasha; the Zbor, a movement headed by Ljotec; the MFRO (the Macedonian fascist movement), headed by Vanca Mihajlovic; and organized them as terrorist organizations with headquarters in Berlin. On the other hand, acting through their agents, Prince Paul, Stojadinovic, Cvjetkovic, and Cinzar-Marovic,
Further, the report emphasizes the fact that, while organizing numerous branches of the Fifth Column, the Hitlerites continually gave newer and more perilous assurances about their ostensibly friendly intentions with regard to Yugoslavia. This is discussed in Paragraph 3 on Page 5 of the Russian text; our Document Number USSR-36. You will find this passage, Your Honors, on Page 357 of the document book:

"At the time when both the Hitlerite Government and the Party were so thoroughly and with such versatility preparing their conspiracy to invade and occupy Yugoslavia, Hitler seized every opportunity to declare to the whole world, on behalf of the same Government, the same Party, and the whole of Germany, that Yugoslavia could count on them as devoted friends."

On 17 January 1938, that is, some weeks before the occupation of Austria, Hitler had a meeting with the then Prime Minister of Yugoslavia at which the Defendants Goering and Von Neurath were present. The original document from which I shall quote certain passages was submitted to the tribunal as Document Number TC-92. The extract which I shall quote further on as documentary evidence, is dated 4 December 1945. You will find it on Page 411 of the document book.

On 4 December 1945 a printed collection of German documents dealing with the conflict with Yugoslavia and Greece was offered to you in evidence. In the listing of documentary evidence it is referred to as Document Number TC-92.

On Page 68-and you will find it as I have already stated on Page 411 in your document book, as Document Number 28 of that collection-we have a transcript of the conversations which took place during the conference of 17 January 1938. I consider there is no need to read the entire document into the record. I shall limit myself to the following three remarks made by Hitler on that occasion, "As regards Yugoslavia, Germany is highly interested in the existence of a strong Yugoslavia." Somewhat later in the course of the same conversation Hitler spoke the second sentence, "Whatever may happen there, Yugoslavia's present boundary will remain as inviolable as the border on the Brenner is today." In addition Hitler, at this meeting, made the following statement, "... the German nationality group in Yugoslavia was loyal to the Yugoslav Government...."

11 Feb. 46.

On 30 January 1939, some weeks before the occupation of the Czechoslovak Republic, Hitler made the following declaration about Yugoslavia in his speech before the Reichstag; this quotation is to be found on Page 412 in your document book:

"... a state which since the Great War has more and more attracted the attention of our people, in Yugoslavia. The respect which the German soldier felt for that valiant people in the past, has grown ever stronger and developed into sincere friendship,..."

The fascist conspirators considered it useful to include this speech as Document Number 32 in the book from which I just have quoted and presented to the Tribunal as Document Number TC-92.

On 1 June 1939, that is, before the fascist attack on Poland, Prince Paul of Yugoslavia, whom the official report of the Yugoslav Government calls a Hitlerite agent, paid a visit to Hitler. On this occasion, Hitler stated in Berlin-you will find the passage on Page 413 in your document book:

"... Germany's friendship with the Yugoslav nation did not spring up suddenly. It was deepened and strengthened by the tragic complications of the World War."

Then, after having made a few more statements which are of no interest to the Tribunal, he continued:

"I am all the more confident that now when, as a result of the historic events, we have become neighbors with common frontiers established forever, the friendly relations between Germany and Yugoslavia, trustful and steadfast, will not only secure lasting peace between both our peoples and countries, but moreover will serve as a calming element for our nervous, excitable continent."

I repeat once more that I quote from the book, Document Number TC-92.

In his next customary speech after the defeat of Poland, before the Reichstag on 6 October, Hitler reassured Yugoslavia of his love of peace and of his friendly attitude in the following words:

"... after the annexation had taken place, I assured Yugoslavia in the same manner that her frontier with this country shall be regarded as inviolable by Germany from this moment on, and that we want to live in peace and friendship with her...."

I am now going to read into the record a few paragraphs from Subparagraph 2 on the first section of the report of the Yugoslav State Commission for the investigation of the crimes perpetrated by the aggressors. The excerpts in question begin in Paragraph 3.

11 Feb. 46.

On page 6 of Exhibit Number USSR-36 (Document Number USSR-36). In your document book it is Volume I, Section I.

Thus, Hitler regularly gave assurances about friendly relations with Yugoslavia and about the inviolability of her boundaries while, at the same time, his band of conspirators and enslavers were already tightening the ring of war around Yugoslavia. When Yugoslavia was completely surrounded by Hitler's Panzer divisions, and when the government of the Central Fifth Column of Prince Paul, Cvetovic, and Macek was ready to join the Tripartite Pact on 28 March 1941, that is, 10 days before the attack on Yugoslavia, the Defendant Ribbentrop stated as follows on Page 413 of your document book you will find it in Document Number 2450-FPS:

"Germany herself-and I solemnly state this-has neither territorial nor political interests in this region."

The Tribunal has already been handed a certified extract from Document Number 72 of the above-mentioned German book.

An official note from the Reich Government of the same date reads as follows-you will find this on Page 415 of the document book:

"Mr. Prime Minister: On behalf and on the direction of the German Government, I have the honor to report to Your Excellency as follows:

"In connection with today's adherence of Yugoslavia to the Tripartite Pact, the German Government affirms its resolution to respect at all times the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia...."

"Signed, Joachim von Ribbentrop."

The culminating point in the execution of the breach of faith so cunningly prepared by the fascists is the following statement made by Hitler on 6 April 1941, that is, at the moment when the perfidious and treacherous attack on Yugoslavia had already begun. It is under Document Number TC-92 in your book of documents, on Page 414:

"The German people feel no hatred towards the Serbian people. Above all, the German people see no reason to start a war against the Croats and Slovenes; they want nothing from these peoples."

Certified excerpts have been handed to the Tribunal from the documents of the German book already quoted on Pages 1 and 4.

At the same time when he was speaking in this manner, the occupation, annexation, and dismemberment of the Yugoslav State was already taking place. Soon after began the bombing of undefended cities, towns, and settlements; forcible evictions; deportations to camps; punitive expeditions; and hundreds of other acts.
11 Feb. 46

that were a part of the planned extermination of the Yugoslav people, which resulted in the death of 1,850,000 Yugoslav men, women, and children.

On the question of the preparation for the attack on Yugoslavia and the individuals who directly supervised this crime, we have at our disposal two very valuable pieces of evidence.

The first is the original affidavit of the German General Lohr. Prior to and at the time of the aggression against Yugoslavia, he was in command of the 4th Air Fleet. It was precisely his air units which carried out the raids on Belgrade. He is undoubtedly a man well acquainted with the course of operations and its leaders.

On 24 May 1945 General Lohr was taken prisoner by the Yugoslav forces. During interrogations to which he was subjected between 24 May and 6 June 1945 he states— you will find the respective excerpts on Page 416, as excerpts from our Document Number USSR-253 (Exhibit Number USSR-253). We submit the originals of these excerpts to the Tribunal:

"I and my staff went on March 26 to Sofia as the campaign against Greece was about to begin.

"On the following day, 27 March 1941, the coup d'etat took place in Yugoslavia. I was called unexpectedly to Berlin, where I received orders from Reich Marshal Goering to prepare for air operations against Yugoslavia...

"After this, preparations against Yugoslavia were begun. At my first meeting with Goering I was not told of the date of the beginning of the war against Yugoslavia. At Vienna, I received a written order in which the beginning of the operations was fixed for 6 April."

Passing over the rest of the statement, I proceed to read into the record excerpts from the minutes of the interrogation of the former Field Marshal of the German Army, Friedrich Paulus. In accordance with the wish of the Tribunal, we submit the original of this interrogation.

Friedrich Paulus was interrogated on 12 January 1946 by the Chief Prosecutors of the U.S.S.R. His testimony is registered with us as Exhibit Number USSR-182 (Document Number USSR-182). You will find the passage quoted on Page 419 of your document book. My colleagues of the Soviet Delegation will probably revert to this document when dealing with subsequent matters. I shall therefore merely quote that part which refers to the preparations for the attack on Yugoslavia.

"It was clear to both German and Hungarian officers that these military preparations must have— been based on the preparation of military collaboration between Germany and Hungary."

236

11 Feb. 46

The President: Colonel Pokrovsky, the Tribunal understand that the first interrogatory to which you refer—General Lohr's— which is contained in Document Number USSR-253, is an official document?

Colonel Pokrovsky: Yes.

The President: The official document of your Government. The other interrogatory to which you refer, of Field Marshal Paulus, is not an official document, is it?

Colonel Pokrovsky: The minutes of the interrogation of Field Marshal Paulus have been compiled in compliance with all legal standards of procedure applying to such interrogations by judicial organizations in the U.S.S.R. He is interrogated as a witness with the warning that he must tell the truth, in accordance with Articles 95 and 92 of our penal code. These documents, in the U.S.S.R., are considered as absolutely official documents, of full probative value, to be submitted to the Tribunal when necessary.

The President: Could you tell us where the interrogation was made?

Colonel Pokrovsky: Paulus was interrogated in person in Moscow, on 12 January 1946. This, Sir, must have been pointed out at the beginning of the interrogation.

The President: The date is on the document, but not the place. Go on, Colonel.

Colonel Pokrovsky: With your permission, I shall continue my quotation from the minutes of the interrogation of Field Marshal Paulus, submitted to you:

"It was clear to the Hungarians that Germany's assistance was in order to prepare the Hungarian Army in good time and in advance for future combined military operations, thus incorporating an ally into its ranks.

"With the later attack on Yugoslavia, which followed this, there was no need for special explanations as to the object of these military preparations.

"It was clear that armed forces were being made ready for war with the U.S.S.R., as the attack on Yugoslavia was part of the operational plan for the attack on the U.S.S.R.

"With the defeat of Yugoslavia, the right flank, which was to be formed at the beginning of military operations against Russia, was secured."

I shall leave out one paragraph which deals with another subject, and continue to quote:

"The preparation of the combined German-Hungarian attack on Yugoslavia was entrusted to me. On 27 or 28 March 1941 237 11 Feb. 46

I was called before Hitler at the Reich Chancellery where, besides Hitler, Keitel, Jodl, Halder, and Brauchitsch were present. Halder met me with the following words:

"The Fuehrer has decided to attack Yugoslavia in order to eliminate the threat to the flank during the offensive against Greece and to seize the main Belgrade-Nish railway line which runs in a southerly direction. But the main objective of the attack on Yugoslavia is to have our right flank secure when later on the Plan Barbarossa shall be carried out.

"Your task is to go to Vienna immediately in my special train, and to transmit the orders and explain the situation to Field Marshal List (12th Army Group), General Von Kleist (Panzer group), and Colonel Von Wittelben (Chief of Staff of the 25th Army), who have been called there.

"From Vienna you are to proceed to Budapest and there to co-ordinate with the Hungarian General Staff the strategic employment of the German forces on Hungarian territory and the participation of the Hungarian forces in the invasion of Yugoslavia."

The participation of Hitlerite generals of the very highest rank in the treacherous attack on Yugoslavia simply does not fit, in any way at all; into the execution of purely military tasks only.

I shall read one more document into the records, Document Number 1195-PS. You will find it in your document book on Page 423.

On 9 January 1946 four lines were read here from the second section. The time has now come to read it in full:

"Copy, Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Operational Staff, Section L, (IV/QU), Number 00630/41; top secret, commanders only, Fuehrer's headquarters, 12, 4. 1941.

"Reference: OKW/L, (IV/QU), Number 4434/41; top secret, commanders only, of 3 April 1941.

"Provisional Directives for the Partition of Yugoslavia.

1. The Fuehrer has issued the following directives for the partition of Yugoslavia:

1) Former territory of Styria and Carniola.

The territory of the former Styria, extended to the south by a strip of about 90 kilometers in breadth and 10 to 15 kilometers in depth, will go to Gau Styria.
"The northern part of Carniola, with a borderline running south only as far as the river Sava but north of Ljubljana, according to the attached OKH map, is to become part of Carninia.

11 Feb. 46

The High Command of the Army (OKH) is to hand over the territory occupied by the German troops, to the competent Gauleiter, subarea by subarea, as soon as the pacification of the country permits.

The handing over of the territory occupied by the Italians will be prepared by a letter from the Fuehrer to the Duca and carried out under direct orders from the Foreign Office. Until that time no measures whatever are to be taken on the German side. (Telegram OKH-General Quartermaster, Abt. Kf. Ver-v., A., Ob. Kdo. 2, I. Number 80141, top secret, is hereby executed.)

2) The territory beyond the River Mur (i.e. bermur-Gebiet).

The territory beyond the River Mur borders closely upon Hungary, conforming with the historic boundary. A later colonization of the German population living in the northwestern part of this territory has been taken into consideration. The handing over of this territory to the Hungarians will be regulated by the High Command of the Army.

3) Banat.

The territory from the point where the River Drava cuts the Hungarian boundary to the confluence of the River Tisa with the Danube is to go to Hungary. The territory east of the Tisa will be at first under German protection, as will the territory south of the Danube and east of the general line: confluence of the River Morava and the Danube-Pozarevac-Petrovac-Bujlava-Krijazavac-Kalna. This territory includes the Bör copper mines and the adjoining coal district in the southeast. The above line is considered as the basis and provisional demarcation line. At first, German military government is to be established under the High Command of the Army.

4) Southern Serbia.

The territory inhabited by Bulgarian Macedonians goes to Bulgaria, in conformity with the ethnographical boundary. Preliminary delimitation of the frontier, from the military viewpoint, will be carried out by the Supreme Command of the Army, which will prepare the handing over to Bulgaria.

5) Old Serbia.

The territory of old Serbia will be placed under German military administration under the High Command of the Army.

6) Croatia.

Croatia becomes an independent state within its ethnographical boundaries. There will be no interference on the part of Germany with its internal policy.

11 Feb. 46

7) Remaining territories including Bosnia and Montenegro.

The political organization of these territories will be left to Italy. Here also the restoration of an independent state of Montenegro can be considered.

II. The Demarcation of Boundaries:

1) As far as the demarcation of boundaries has not been laid down in Part I, it will be carried out through the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces in agreement with the Foreign Office, the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan, and the Reich Minister of the Interior.

The Operational Staff of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (L IV QU) is the executive organ for the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

2) The High Command of the Army will forward as soon as possible to the Operational Staff, Supreme Command of the Armed Forces its military recommendations relative to the drawing up of boundaries outside the territory of the protectorate south of the Danube, where this has not been already laid down by the Fuehrer.

3) The War Economic and Armament Office of the OKW will forward as soon as possible to the Operational Staff (Section L) its recommendations regarding the boundaries of the territory of the protectorate south of the Danube (Part I, Paragraph 3).

4) As far as the Italians are concerned, the tactical boundaries between the armies hold good in the meantime.

"Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, signed, Keitel." This document, signed by the Defendant Keitel, smashes to pieces the mendacious statement of the nonparticipation of the OKW in the political side of the fascist plan or conspiracy. The German generals, as a body, were not merely an obedient tool in Hitler's hands.

The OKW, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the Gestapo were interwoven into one sole entity. This is also borne out by the next document.

Before reading into the record a few excerpts from his depositions, I must say a few words concerning four Germans, whom Medic mentions by name. He speaks of General Nedic, ex-Prime Minister of the quisling Yugoslav Government, in his depositions gives some interesting information on this question.

Dr. Kraus was chief of the Gestapo South East, with central offices in Belgrade. Dr. Kiesel was Dr. Turner's deputy. Kronholz held no official post. He had lived in Yugoslavia even before the war and was director of the German transport firm Schenker A.G. Subsequently he turned out to be an important German intelligence agent. This information is certified by the Yugoslav Extraordinary Commission for the investigation of German atrocities. After this explanation, I shall read into the record a short excerpt from the evidence of the Serbian quisling, General Medic. A true copy of the interrogation or rather excerpts from his minutes are registered by us as Document Number USSR-288; I am able to submit to you now, for your perusal, the original of these minutes with Nedic's signature. Unfortunately I am not in a position to leave it with you in its entirety because it refers to a case concerning Yugoslavia which has not yet been finished, but I can hand it to you for perusal by the Tribunal, while the certified excerpts remain with us as evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, the Tribunal understand that you wish to put this document in as evidence and then to withdraw it for the purpose of its being used in some other cases; is that right?

COL. POKROVSKY: I should like to submit to you as evidence in this case, the excerpts from the minutes, duly certified by the Yugoslav Extraordinary Commission, in order that the minutes now, in your hands, that is the original minutes may be returned to Belgrade where they will be presented as a document needed in another case which is still under investigation. I would therefore request you to keep a copy for the Tribunal after you have satisfied yourselves that this copy tallies with the original.
I came to know Kronholz during the occupation period, before I became Prime Minister. As far as I can remember, he was brought to me by the Chief of the Gestapo, Dr. Kraus. ... Then Kronholz insisted that I should accept the proposed post.

"I noticed that at the meeting with the Defendant Ribbentrop, a demand was made that I should place all the spiritual and material resources of Serbia at the disposal of the German Reich for the continuation of the war."

Speaking of this meeting with Hitler, Nedic stated:

"He shouted at me, emphasizing that the order concerning 100 for one not only would have to be altered, but that it should have been increased to 1000 for one. He added also that he was prepared to exterminate the entire population if the Serbians continued to act like rebels."

The head of fascist Germany wished to control the Slav countries as if they were his own patrimony. Here he was helped by generals, diplomats, industrialists, and intelligence officers. All the acts of aggression were prepared and realized with their direct participation.

Dr. Nenchevski submitted to the Tribunal a document which contains statements by generals and statesmen, without these statements being accompanied by an official remark by the Soviet authorities. The documents which have been given to me today, USSR-149, 150, and 294, are only photostats of handwritten manuscripts. They contain neither a remark which could qualify them as affidavits, nor do they represent testimonies taken before a Soviet official or officer, nor do they represent governmental or official declarations. I should be grateful to the Tribunal if it would make a decision on this question in accordance with Article 21 of the Charter. The opinion of the Defense Counsel is that such statements have only the value of a personal presentation by the Prosecution but no probative value.

THE PRESIDENT: Well then, if that is so, we must ask you to deposit with this Tribunal a photostatic copy of this document, because, of course, all the documents or photostatic copies which are put in evidence must be deposited with the General Secretary of this Tribunal. So, if you will undertake to have a photostatic copy made of this document and left with the General Secretary, I think the Tribunal is agreed that you may do so, that you may use this document.

Dr. Nelte: Mr. President, I would like to ask the Tribunal for a ruling as to a general question of submission of evidence. The Russian Delegation has submitted books which contain statements by generals and statesmen, without these statements being accompanied by an official remark by the Soviet authorities. The documents which have been given to me today, USSR-149, 150, and 294, are only photostats of handwritten manuscripts. They contain neither a remark which could qualify them as affidavits, nor do they represent testimonies taken before a Soviet official or officer, nor do they represent governmental or official declarations. I should be grateful to the Tribunal if it would make a decision on this question in accordance with Article 21 of the Charter. The opinion of the Defense Counsel is that such statements have only the value of a personal presentation by the Prosecution but no probative value.

THE PRESIDENT: May I see the documents?

[The documents were presented to the Tribunal.]

The Tribunal have no objection to the course taken by Dr. Nelte in drawing their attention to these documents at this stage. But they think it will be better for them to wait until the documents are actually offered in evidence before they consider whether or not they will admit them. If and when the documents are offered in evidence, they will then consider whether they will admit them or not.

Dr. Laternsen: I should like to point out that the decision of the Tribunal, that every defendant’s counsel should receive, sufficiently in advance, a copy of all documents which are to be submitted as evidence in the course of the proceedings, has not been complied with. It is, therefore, difficult for the Defense to follow the proceedings because the documents submitted have not been distributed in sufficient quantity.

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think the Tribunal have ever imposed upon the Prosecution the duty of supplying a copy of every document to every member of defendants’ counsel. You no doubt have before you a copy of the Tribunal’s order upon the subject, and I believe that the order is posted upon the board in the defendants’ Information
Center. If I remember correctly, it is that a certain number of originals or photostatic copies shall be deposited in the Information Center, and that a certain number of copies of the documents shall be supplied to the defendants' counsel, and that, for the rest, the defendants' counsel must rely upon the fact that every document or part of a document which is put in evidence is read in open court and, therefore, comes my way through the earphones to defendants' counsel, and will appear in the shorthand notes. We have provided that copies of the shorthand notes shall be supplied to defendants' counsel as soon as possible after the day on which the evidence is given. Beyond that we have not thought it right to impose a duty upon the Prosecution to supply documents to the defendants' counsel.

Is that not in accordance with your recollection?

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, the American Prosecution, the British Prosecution, and also the French Prosecution, in the course of the proceedings, handled this in such a way that enough copies of all documents were made available to the Defense for each defendant's counsel to have one copy before him. I believe that what is possible for the other Prosecutions should also be possible for the Soviet Prosecution, in order to facilitate the work.

THE PRESIDENT: That is a belief on your part which is not strictly in accordance with the Tribunal's orders. The Tribunal has not made that order, and it may be that the United States and Great Britain have gone beyond the Tribunal's orders, and have supplied a copy to each defendant's counsel. But, as I say, the

11 Feb. 46

Tribunal has not as yet seen fit to impose that duty upon the Prosecution.

I suppose you don't really know exactly how many copies of these Soviet documents have been deposited in the Information Center?

DR. LATERNSER: I don't know the exact number. At any rate, there were not enough for each defendant's counsel to get a copy of each document, as was the case, so far, with the other Prosecutions.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you no doubt understand the very great difficulties of making translations and making copies. I am sure that the Soviet prosecutors will do everything in their power to assist defendants' counsel, but, as I say, we have not imposed upon the Prosecution the duty of supplying one copy of a translation into German of each document for each defendants' counsel. I can only express the hope that the Soviet prosecutors will do the best they can.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I remember, when the fact became known that the press had received 250 copies of the documents, you, Mr. President, expressed the opinion that it should then also be possible to distribute 25 copies to the defendants' counsel. That was, at that time, the opinion of the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal's orders on this subject are in writing and you will find them in the defendants' Information Center. I have stated my recollection of them: if I am wrong, you can bring me a copy of the document and I will withdraw my statement. If I am right, I hope you will agree to do what the Tribunal has instructed you to do.

MAJOR GENERAL N. D. ZORYA (Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): May it please Your Honors, it is my task to present the documentary evidence dealing with the aggression against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, organized by the fascist war criminals now sitting in the dock.

This charge of the crime, mentioned in Subparagraph a, Article VI of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, was formulated in Paragraph 6, Section 4, Count One of the Indictment in the present case, and in Section IV of the opening statement by the Chief Prosecutor from the U.S.S.R., General Rudenko.

Among the many criminal wars which German fascism, with predatory aim, waged against the freedom-loving nations, the attack on the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics occupies a place by itself.

It can be safely said that the predatory war against the Soviet Union was the keynote of the entire fascist conspiracy against peace. The aggressive actions on the part of German fascism committed

11 Feb. 46

prior to the attack on the U.S.S.R., and in part the German aggression against Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia, were, as has been demonstrated by my colleague, Colonel Pokrovsky, merely stages on the road to the attack on the Soviet Union.

Ukrainian wheat and coal from the Don Basin, nickel from the Kola Peninsula, and oil from the Caucasus, the fertile steppes of the pre-Volga region and the forests of Bialorusia all played a decisive part in the criminal schemes of the fascist aggressors.

The war against the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics Divas also waged by fascist Germany with the intent of enslaving and exploiting the Soviet peoples.

In the war of fascist Germany against the Soviet Union, the animal hatred of the Hitlerites against the Slav peoples found its full horrifying expression.

And finally, German imperialism, appearing in its fascistic edition, saw in the seizure of the wealth of the Soviet Union and its incalculable resources of food and raw materials a base for the realization of their far-reaching aggressive aims to achieve, first, ascendancy over Europe, and, later on, ascendency over the whole world.

The well-known formula of German imperialism, "Drang nach Osten," mentioned in the opening statement of the Chief Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R., was at different times and in many different ways disguised by the fascist criminals, but always, in all their aggressive plans, pride of place was given to the attack on the Soviet Union.

"If new territory is desired"-wrote Hitler in his book, Mein Kampf-"in substance it can be secured at the expense of Russia. The new empire must move along the paths trodden by the knights of old." (Hitler, Adolf, Mein Kampf, Munich edition, 1930, Page 742.)

The fact that having definitely brought fascist aggression to a head in 1939, Hitler began the war in the West, did not substantially change anything in this basic conception of fascism.

Under Document Number 789-PS the United States Prosecution submitted to the Tribunal the transcript of the conference held on 23 November 1939 between Hitler and the members of the German Supreme Command.

At this conference, Hitler, according to his own expression, gave a "survey of the thoughts dominating him in connection with the events to come."

In the course of this survey he declared-you will find the passage I am now reading on Page 3 in the document book lying on the table of the Tribunal, Page 2 of the Russian text:

11 Feb. 46

"For a long time I hesitated whether I should not begin with an attack in the East, and only then with the one in the West. It came about by force of events that for the nearest future the East dropped out of the picture."

This statement by Hitler bears witness to the fact that the attack on the Soviet Union remained within the plans of fascist aggression, and the whole question was reduced only to the problem of selecting the most favorable moment for this attack.

It should be noted that this western version of the start of fascist aggression was not considered as the most favorable version by the authors of the aggression.

This same Hitler, exactly 5 months prior to the above-mentioned conference, at another conference of 23 May 1939 (Document Number 789), while briefing his colleagues on the present situation and political aims, had said-the passage I am now quoting is Page 6 of the document book, "If fate forces us into a conflict with the West, it would be desirable that we, by that time, possess more expanses in the East."

THE PRESIDENT: In the course of this survey he declared-you will find the passage I am now reading on Page 3 in the document book lying on the table of the Tribunal, Page 2 of the Russian text:

11 Feb. 46

"For a long time I hesitated whether I should not begin with an attack in the East, and only then with the one in the West. It came about by force of events that for the nearest future the East dropped out of the picture."

This statement by Hitler bears witness to the fact that the attack on the Soviet Union remained within the plans of fascist aggression, and the whole question was reduced only to the problem of selecting the most favorable moment for this attack.

It should be noted that this western version of the start of fascist aggression was not considered as the most favorable version by the authors of the aggression.

This same Hitler, exactly 5 months prior to the above-mentioned conference, at another conference of 23 May 1939 (Document Number 789-PS), while briefing his colleagues on the present situation and political aims, had said-the passage I am now quoting is Page 6 of the document book, "If fate forces us into a conflict with the West, it would be desirable that we, by that time, possess more expanses in the East."

THE PRESIDENT: In the course of this survey he declared-you will find the passage I am now reading on Page 3 in the document book lying on the table of the Tribunal, Page 2 of the Russian text:
The vast expanses in the East, according to the aspirations of Hitler's conspirators; were to play a decisive part during the conflict in the West.

Therefore, when the fascist hordes were unable to force the Channel, stopped at its shores, and were obliged to find new ways of aggression, the conspirators immediately began to prepare for an attack on the Soviet Union. This attack was the basis of all their plans of aggression, without which they could not be realized.

I believe it is not necessary to refer to documents of an earlier period, and particularly to quote any further from Hitler's book, Mein Kampf, where questions connected with the predatory attack on the Soviet Union were formulated long before 1939.

This book has already been presented to the Tribunal, and relevant passages from it were quoted as evidence by our United States and British colleagues.

The Soviet Prosecution desires to submit to the Tribunal a series of documents which bear witness to the fact that the aggression of fascist Germany against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was committed with malice aforethought.

Among these documents there are files from various archives captured by units of the advancing Red Army, statements by fascist leaders published in the press, including those by several of the defendants, and depositions by persons who were in possession of reliable information as to how the preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union were actually carried out.

11 Feb. 46

The documents of the Soviet Prosecution are presented under the following sections:

1. Preparations for war in Germany itself. 2. Assuring the security of the preparations for war by the intelligence activities. 3. The securing by the fascist conspirators of the participation of the satellite countries in the aggression against the Soviet Union.

I shall begin with Section 1, which I shall call, "Preparations for War in Germany Himself."

The statements of Hitler and his accomplices demonstrate that the idea of a criminal attack on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had for a long time been ripe in the minds of the fascist conspirators. But apart from this fact, we are also interested in the question as to when this intention began to take on the concrete form of direct military preparations for the predatory war against the Soviet Union.

On 18 December 1940 the directive known to the Tribunal as directive Number'21, Plan Barbarossa-the document of the United States Prosecution numbered 446-PS-was put into its official form. The moment when the signature of the Supreme Command appears on such a document is the moment which crowns long and intensive work by all who formed the links in the chain of military administration.

This work may not have been governed by written orders. The secrecy camouflaging this work often made it necessary to have recourse to verbal orders. And, on the other hand, many orders of a routine nature, on the strength of an already existing strategic project, became correlated, although outwardly they seemed to have no connection with it.

It therefore appears that, with regard to establishing the actual moment at which military plans for the attack on the Soviet Union began...
Further on in his statement, Warlimont said that Plan Barbarossa, originally called “Fritz,” was presented to Hitler on 5 December 1940, after which it Divas re-edited and issued on 18 December.

I think that the testimony of a man like Friedrich Paulus, a former field marshal of the German Army, who, as is known, was directly concerned both in the preparations and in the execution of Plan Barbarossa, can give considerable help in investigating the preparation of this plan.

I present the testimony of Friedrich Paulus, dated 9 January 1946, given in a camp for prisoners of war, and marked Document Number USSR-156, and request that it be accepted as evidence.

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I just wanted to remark that I do not possess a copy of the document concerning Paulus. But it seems to be the same statement which it has not yet been possible to give to the defendants’ counsel. If the Soviet Prosecution could give me the statement now, I would then decide if I could present my protest for decision now in the form in which I raised it at the beginning of this session.

[Copies of the document were submitted to Dr. Nelte.]

According to the original before me now, this is a similar statement by Field Marshal Paulus. Paulus has expressed his opinion in a letter to the Government of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Delegation has, I assume, now presented the original to you. This photostat bears no official certification by the Soviet authorities, nor is the statement an affidavit which could be admitted as evidence.

Therefore, I ask the Tribunal in this particular case to give a general decision on the question which I raised at the beginning of this session as well, so that in the future the Soviet Prosecution will be familiar with the treatment of such statements by the Tribunal.

250

11 Feb. 46

THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to make any answer to what Dr. Nelte has said?

GEN. ZORYA: Yes, I do.

In accordance with the wish of the Tribunal, as expressed in a previous session, the Soviet Prosecution has taken the necessary measures for originals of all the documents of the Soviet Prosecution, or else documents certifying the authenticity of these documents to be placed at the disposal of the Tribunal through the good offices of the General Secretary, with indications of the places where they are to be found.

Moreover, bearing in mind that certain witnesses, whose evidence will be presented in a forthcoming session by the Soviet Prosecution, are of considerable interest and that it is possible that the Defense may wish to cross-examine them, the Soviet Prosecution will take all necessary measures to bring some of these witnesses to Nuremberg in order to hear their verbal evidence. Special interest attaches to the deposition of Paulus, extracts from which I propose to quote in my report, and which must be checked no later than this evening, after which Friedrich Paulus will be brought to the courtroom.

THE PRESIDENT: Then I understood from what you said, General, that as far as the photostatic copy of Field Marshal Paulus’ statement is concerned, a certificate will be furnished as we indicated the Tribunal wishes—that the photostatic copy is a true copy of the original, and so far as the question of producing witnesses of importance is concerned, Field Marshal Paulus will be produced as a witness for the defendants’ counsel to cross-examine.

That meets your objection, I think, Dr. Nelte.

DR. NELTE: The basic principle of this question, as it appears to me, lies in the fact that official proof should be given that the statements contained in the documents submitted really represent what the persons who made them meant to say. Written statements are never more than a dubious substitute for a personal examination of a witness.

The Defense is fully aware of the difficulties encountered, particularly by the Soviet Prosecution, in producing witnesses where, for instance, reports are to be found. The Defense realizes the fact, but in those cases in which the individuality of the witness and the importance of certain questions really do matter, the personal examination of witnesses should be preferred to any statement. Wherever this is impossible, for reasons which we are unable to judge, it would however, at any rate, be desirable that those people who have made these statements should make them in the form of an affidavit or an interrogatory.

11 Feb. 46

If the Soviet Delegation should produce a certificate to the effect that these statements are corresponding to the original statements, it would not mean that the documents would acquire an increased value in our eyes. We do not doubt for one moment that statements of this kind are in the possession of the Soviet Delegation. The Defense is interested not so much in the formal confirmation of the statements as in the possibility of increasing the material evidence. If the Soviet Prosecution could assist us in this respect, we should be grateful.

THE PRESIDENT: You can go on, General.

GEN. ZORYA: I repeat, I believe that the testimony of Friedrich Paulus can be of great assistance to us in our investigation. I present the testimony of Friedrich Paulus to which I have just referred and shall now read into the Record that part of his testimony which refers to the history of the preparation of Plan Barbarossa.

I request you to open the bundle of documents submitted to the Tribunal on Page 27, and there, in the text of Paulus’ testimony, on Page 2, you will find the passages underlined in pencil, which I now intend reading into the Record. From 3 September...

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps, General, since it is now a quarter to one you had better not begin this document before the adjournment.

GEN. ZORYA: I obey, Mr. President.

[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]

11 Feb. 46

Afternoon Session

GEN. ZORYA: Mr. President, in pursuance of the statement made by the Soviet Delegation, I will ask for permission to bring before the Tribunal for direct examination the field marshal of the former German Army, Friedrich Paulus, who will be examined by the Chief Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R., General Rudenko.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well; the witness may be brought in.

[Friedrich Paulus took the stand.]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you please tell me your name?

FRIEDRICH PAULUS (Witness): Friedrich Paulus.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: “I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.”

[Friedrich Paulus repeated the oath.]

THE PRESIDENT: Would you like to sit down?
PAULUS: From personal experience, I can state the following: On 3 September 1940 I took office with the High Command of the Army as Chief Quartermaster I of the General Staff. As such I was deputy to the Chief of the General Staff, and had in addition to carry out the instructions of a general operational nature which he delegated to me.

When I took office I found in my sphere of work, among other things, a still incomplete operational plan dealing with an attack on the Soviet Union. This operational plan had been worked out by the then Major General Marx, Chief of the General Staff of the 18th Army, who for this purpose had been temporarily transferred to the High Command of the Army.

The Chief of the General Staff of the Army, General Oberst Halder, turned over to me the continuation of the work which was ordered by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, on the following basis:

An investigation was to be made as to the possibilities of an attack against the Soviet Union, with regard to the terrain, the points of the attack, the manpower needed, and so forth. In addition it was stated that altogether about 130 to 140 German divisions would be available for this operation. It was furthermore to be taken into consideration that from the beginning Romanian territory was to be utilized for the deployment of the German southern army. On the northern flank the participation of Finland in the war was taken into account, but was ignored in this operational plan of the army.

Then, in addition, as a basis for the plan which was to be worked out, the aims, the instructions of the OKW, were given: First, the destruction of those parts of the Russian Army stationed in the west of Russia, to prevent the units which were fit for fighting from escaping deep into Russia; second, the reaching of a line from which the Russian air force would be unable to attack German territory effectively, and the final aim was the reaching of the Volga-Archangel line.

The operational plan which I just outlined was completed at the beginning of November and was followed by two military exercises with the command of which the General Staff of the Army entrusted me. Senior officers of the General Staff of the Army were also assigned. The basic strength requirements assumed in these military exercises were: The launching of one army group south of the Pripet territory, specifically from southern Poland and from Romanian territory, with the aim of reaching the Dnieper-Kiev line and south of it; north of the Pripet territory another army group, the strongest, from the area around Warsaw and northward, with the general direction of attack being the Minsk-Smolensk line, the intention of which was to direct it against Moscow later; then a further army group, namely Army Group North, from the area of East Prussia, with the initial direction of attack being through the Baltic States toward Leningrad.

The conclusion which was drawn from these military exercises was at that time that in case of actual hostilities provision should be made firstly for reaching the general line Dnieper-Smolensk-Leningrad, and then the operation was to be carried forward if the situation developed favorably, supply lines, etcetera being adjusted accordingly. In connection with these military exercises and for the evaluation of the theoretical experience gained therefrom, there was a further conference of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army and the chiefs of the general staffs of the army groups which had been planned for the East. And further, in connection with this conference, there was a speech about Russia by the then chief of the section Foreign Armies East, Colonel Kinsel, describing Russia's geographic and economic conditions, the Red Army, etcetera. The most significant point here was that no preparations whatever for an attack by the Soviet had come to our attention.

With these military exercises and conferences that I have just described the theoretical considerations and plans for this offensive were concluded. Immediately thereafter, that is on 18 December 1940, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces issued Directive Number 21. This was the basis for all military and economic preparations which were to be carried out. In the Supreme Command of the Army this directive resulted in going ahead with the drafting and working out of directions for troop deployments for this operation. These first directions for troop deployment were authorized on 3 February 1941 by Hitler after a report by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army at the Oberalzberg, thereupon they were forwarded to the troops. Later on several supplements were issued. For the beginning of the attack the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces had calculated the time which would make it possible for large troop movements to be made on Russian territory. That was expected from about the middle of May on. Preparations were made in accordance with this. Then at the end of March this date underwent a change, when Hitler decided, due to the development of the situation in Yugoslavia, to attack this country. Consequently, in the orders issued at the beginning of April 1941 this tentative date for the start of the operation...

THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid you are a little too fast. I think you had better begin again where you said that at the end of March Hitler made a change in the plan.

PAULUS: (Continuing) Because of his decision to attack Yugoslavia, the date foreseen for the beginning of the attack had to be postponed about five weeks, that is to the last half of June. And, indeed, this attack then did take place on 22 June 1941.
In conclusion, I confirm the fact that the preparation for this attack on the Soviet Union, which actually took place on 22 June 1941, dated back to the autumn of 1940.

GEN. RUDENKO: In what way and under what circumstances... .

THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Did the witness give the date? He said that preparations for this attack had been made, and what I want to know is, did he give the date from which it had been prepared?

[To the witness] Did you give the date from which the preparations went forward?

PAULUS: I gave it at the beginning: From the time my personal observations began, when I entered office, on 3 September 1940.

GEN. RUDENKO: In what way and under what circumstances was the participation of the satellite states secured?

PAULUS: From personal observation, I can say the following regarding this:

About September 1940, just at the time when I had received this operational study for the attack on the Soviet Union there was planned from the outset the use of Romanian territory for the deployment of the German right or, that is to say, south wing, and that was taken into consideration from the outset. A military mission headed by the then Lieutenant General of Cavalry, Hansen, was sent to Romania. A whole panzer division, the 13th, was transferred to Romania as a training unit. To those who knew about the plans for the future it was obvious that this step could only serve the purpose of preparing the future partner in the war for the task intended for him.

Further, in regard to Hungary:

In December 1940 Colonel Lazslo, the chief of the operational group of the Hungarian General Staff, came to the headquarters of the Army High Command at Zossen. He asked for a conference regarding questions of organization. The Hungarian Army at that time was concerned with the question of regrouping its units, which were organized in brigades, into divisions and also with the setting up of motorized troops and of panzer units. The chief of the Organization Division of the General Staff of the Army, then Major General Buhle, and myself advised Colonel Lazslo. At the same time, several Hungarian military commissions were in Berlin, and with them also the Hungarian Minister of War, General Von Barth, and they discussed armament deliveries to Hungary with German authorities.

11 Feb. 46

It was clear to all of us who were informed as to future plans that all these measures, including the supplying of arms to other armies, were only conceivable at that time if these weapons were to be employed in future military projects.

Regarding Hungary there is a further point:

Due to the development of events in Yugoslavia, Hitler, at the end of March 1941, decided to attack Yugoslavia. On 27 or 28 March I was called to the Reich Chancellery in Berlin, where there had just been a conference between Hitler, Keitel, and Jodi, in which the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of Staff of the Army had participated, that is, had been ordered to be present.

When I arrived I was advised by the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Halder, that Hitler had decided to attack Yugoslavia in the first place to eliminate a threat to the flank of the intended operation against Greece, and get hold of the rail line going from Belgrade southward through Dush, and then also with an eye to the future-to Plan Barbarossa-to go the right flank free from the outset.

I was instructed to go to Vienna, taking with me a number of competent General Staff officers of the Army, to deliver and explain pertinent orders to German commanders, and then to travel on without fail to the Hungarian General Staff in Budapest, and to reach an understanding with it on the deployment of German troops on Hungarian territory and the participation of Hungarian troops in the attack on Yugoslavia.

On 30 March, early in the morning, I arrived in Budapest and had a conference with the Chief of the Hungarian General Staff, General Werth, of the infantry and then with the chief of the operational group of the Hungarian General Staff, Colonel Lazslo. These conferences went along in good order and ended very quickly, and the desired result was achieved. This result was then put down on maps. The map that I received from the Hungarian General Staff contained not only the deployment of the troops intended for the attack against Yugoslavia, but also forces on the Carpatho-Ukrainian border, which were to be placed there to protect our rear against the Soviet Union.

The fact of the creation and existence of this force is a sign that even on the side of Hungary there was the realization that an attack by Germany against Yugoslavia would have to be considered as an aggressive action by the Soviet Union.

As regards the principle of calling upon Hungary in the preparation and later in the execution of the planned operations, I learned Hitler's view at that time. He was of the opinion that Hungary was anxious, through German help, to recapture and expand the areas lost in 1918; and in addition, that she was afraid of falling behind Romania which was allied with Germany. Hitler saw Hungary from this point of view also with regard to his policy. But he was, as I could observe in many instances myself, very reserved toward Hungary, and for two reasons. For one, he did not believe Hungary could guarantee secrecy with regard to future war plans, due to her close connections with foreign countries hostile to Germany, and secondly, he did not want to make Hungary too many premature promises of territory.

As regards the principle of calling upon Hungary in the preparation and later in the execution of the planned operations, I learned Hitler's view at that time. He was of the opinion that Hungary was anxious, through German help, to recapture and expand the areas lost in 1918; and in addition, that she was afraid of falling behind Romania which was allied with Germany. Hitler saw Hungary from this point of view also with regard to his policy. But he was, as I could observe in many instances myself, very reserved toward Hungary, and for two reasons. For one, he did not believe Hungary could guarantee secrecy with regard to future war plans, due to her close connections with foreign countries hostile to Germany, and secondly, he did not want to make Hungary too many premature promises of territory.

The fact of the creation and existence of this force is a sign that even on the side of Hungary there was the realization that an attack by Germany against Yugoslavia would have to be considered as an aggressive action by the Soviet Union.

Regarding Hungary there is a further point:

Due to the development of events in Yugoslavia, Hitler, at the end of March 1941, decided to attack Yugoslavia. On 27 or 28 March I was called to the Reich Chancellery in Berlin, where there had just been a conference between Hitler, Keitel, and Jodi, in which the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of Staff of the Army had participated, that is, had been ordered to be present.

When I arrived I was advised by the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Halder, that Hitler had decided to attack Yugoslavia in the first place to eliminate a threat to the flank of the intended operation against Greece, and get hold of the rail line going from Belgrade southward through Dush, and then also with an eye to the future-to Plan Barbarossa-to go the right flank free from the outset.

I was instructed to go to Vienna, taking with me a number of competent General Staff officers of the Army, to deliver and explain pertinent orders to German commanders, and then to travel on without fail to the Hungarian General Staff in Budapest, and to reach an understanding with it on the deployment of German troops on Hungarian territory and the participation of Hungarian troops in the attack on Yugoslavia.

On 30 March, early in the morning, I arrived in Budapest and had a conference with the Chief of the Hungarian General Staff, General Werth, of the infantry and then with the chief of the operational group of the Hungarian General Staff, Colonel Lazslo. These conferences went along in good order and ended very quickly, and the desired result was achieved. This result was then put down on maps. The map that I received from the Hungarian General Staff contained not only the deployment of the troops intended for the attack against Yugoslavia, but also forces on the Carpatho-Ukrainian border, which were to be placed there to protect our rear against the Soviet Union.

The fact of the creation and existence of this force is a sign that even on the side of Hungary there was the realization that an attack by Germany against Yugoslavia would have to be considered as an aggressive action by the Soviet Union.

As regards the principle of calling upon Hungary in the preparation and later in the execution of the planned operations, I learned Hitler's view at that time. He was of the opinion that Hungary was anxious, through German help, to recapture and expand the areas lost in 1918; and in addition, that she was afraid of falling behind Romania which was allied with Germany. Hitler saw Hungary from this point of view also with regard to his policy. But he was, as I could observe in many instances myself, very reserved toward Hungary, and for two reasons. For one, he did not believe Hungary could guarantee secrecy with regard to future war plans, due to her close connections with foreign countries hostile to Germany, and secondly, he did not want to make Hungary too many premature promises of territory.

As regards the principle of calling upon Hungary in the preparation and later in the execution of the planned operations, I learned Hitler's view at that time. He was of the opinion that Hungary was anxious, through German help, to recapture and expand the areas lost in 1918; and in addition, that she was afraid of falling behind Romania which was allied with Germany. Hitler saw Hungary from this point of view also with regard to his policy. But he was, as I could observe in many instances myself, very reserved toward Hungary, and for two reasons. For one, he did not believe Hungary could guarantee secrecy with regard to future war plans, due to her close connections with foreign countries hostile to Germany, and secondly, he did not want to make Hungary too many premature promises of territory.

The fact of the creation and existence of this force is a sign that even on the side of Hungary there was the realization that an attack by Germany against Yugoslavia would have to be considered as an aggressive action by the Soviet Union.

As regards the principle of calling upon Hungary in the preparation and later in the execution of the planned operations, I learned Hitler's view at that time. He was of the opinion that Hungary was anxious, through German help, to recapture and expand the areas lost in 1918; and in addition, that she was afraid of falling behind Romania which was allied with Germany. Hitler saw Hungary from this point of view also with regard to his policy. But he was, as I could observe in many instances myself, very reserved toward Hungary, and for two reasons. For one, he did not believe Hungary could guarantee secrecy with regard to future war plans, due to her close connections with foreign countries hostile to Germany, and secondly, he did not want to make Hungary too many premature promises of territory.
would have meant the destruction of the armed forces of the Soviet Union. With the winning of the line I have mentioned the main areas of Soviet Russia with the capital, Moscow, would have been conquered and subjugated, together with the leading political and economic center of the Soviet Union. Economically, the winning of this line would have meant the possession of important agricultural areas, the most important natural resources, including the oil wells of the Caucasus and the main centers of production in Russia, and also the main network of communications in European Russia.

How much Hitler was bent on taking economic objectives in this war can best be shown from an example out of my personal experience.

On 1 June 1942, on the occasion of a conference of commanders-in-chief in the region of Army Group South in Poltava, Hitler declared, "If I do not get the oil of Maikop and Grozny, then I must end this war."

For the utilization and the administration of the territories to be conquered, economic and administrative organizations had already been formed and were kept in readiness long before the beginning of the war.

To summarize I should like to state that the objectives given indicate the conquest of the Russian territories for the purpose of colonization with the utilization and spoliation of and with the resources of which the war in the West was to be brought to a conclusion, with the aim of finally establishing domination over Europe.

GEN. RUDENKO: And one last question: Whom do you consider as guilty of the criminal initiation of the war against Soviet Russia?

PAULUS: May I please have the question repeated?

GEN. RUDENKO: I repeat the question...

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is about to address an observation to General Rudenko. The Tribunal thinks that a question such as you have just put, as to who was guilty for the aggression upon Soviet territory, is one of the main questions which the Tribunal has to decide, and therefore is not a question upon which the witness ought to give his opinion.

THE PRESIDENT: Any member of the defendants' counsel?

UNITED STATES PROSECUTOR: No.

THE PRESIDENT: The British?

FRENCH PROSECUTOR: No.

THE PRESIDENT: The British?

BRITISH PROSECUTOR: No.

THE PRESIDENT: The United States?

UNITED STATES PROSECUTOR: No.

THE PRESIDENT: Any member of the defendants' counsel?

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, as Counsel for the General Staff, I ask you to afford me the opportunity to examine the witness tomorrow morning. The presentation of the witness by the Prosecution came as a surprise to the defendants' counsel, at any rate, and I think a consultation about the questions to be asked, especially in view of the importance of the testimony, is absolutely necessary. Therefore ask to be permitted to conduct the cross-examination at the beginning of tomorrow morning's session.

THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, if the Prosecution has no objection, the Tribunal thinks that this application ought to be granted.
GEN. ZORYA: I am hardly in a position to say more than I have already. If the Tribunal will permit me, I can consult my colleagues, make inquiries, and report to the Tribunal as soon as possible on the general's whereabouts.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well. I don't know whether any other member of the defendants' counsel would prefer to cross-examine now.

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I assume that all defendants' counsel may conduct their cross-examination of the witness, General Paulus, tomorrow morning?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. I was only asking whether any other member of the defendants' counsel would prefer to cross-examine now.

DR. NELTE: I personally would be able to put my questions after the recess.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then the witness can retire and the case will go on. He will be recalled tomorrow morning and in the meantime you will go on with your case.

[The witness left the stand, and Major General Zorya approached the lectern.]

THE PRESIDENT: General, you won't, I presume, think it necessary to read any more of Field Marshal Paulus' statement, will you?

GEN. ZORYA: No.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on, then.

GEN. ZORYA: Referring to the explanation concerning the beginning of the criminal attack of Fascist Germany on the Soviet Union, I should like to remind the Tribunal that in the morning session of the Tribunal on 30 November 1945, the witness, Lahousen, was interrogated and gave evidence of sufficient interest in our case.

Among other things, this witness, when enumerating the more intimate members of the inner circle of Admiral Canaris, Chief of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services of the German Army, mentioned Pieckenbrock by name.

I present to the Tribunal as Document Number USSR-220, the testimony of the former chief of Section I of the German Military Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services, Lieutenant General of the former German Army, Hans Pieckenbrock, former chief and colleague of Lahousen. Pieckenbrock gave this testimony in the order prescribed by the laws of the Soviet Union, in Moscow, on 12 December 1945.

For the moment I should like to read a few lines only into the record from Pieckenbrock's testimony, relating to the matter which we are now investigating. These lines are on Page 1 of the Russian text of his testimony and they are marked with a red pencil. This Page 1 corresponds to Page 34 of the document book.

"Canaris said to me that these plans of Hitler's had now begun to take concrete form. This was evident from the fact that divisions of the German Army were being forwarded in large numbers from the West to the eastern frontiers and, in accordance with a special order by Hitler, were taking up positions from which to start the coming invasion of Russia."

These are the first two paragraphs of Bentivegni's testimony. And finally, in order to finish with the question of the actual time of fascist Germany's military preparations for the treacherous attack on the Soviet Union, I should like to dwell for a moment on the testimony of General Muller. This testimony, dated 8 January 1946, was written in a camp for prisoners of war. I present it to the Tribunal as Document Number USSR-148.

GEN. RUDENKO: If the Tribunal so wishes, the Prosecution will not object.

11 Feb. 46

THE PRESIDENT: Has this document got any authenticating signature on it at all? So far as we are concerned, isn't it simply a photostatic copy of a writing by somebody?

GEN. ZORYA: Mr. President, this document, like all other documents which have been submitted so far by the Soviet Delegation, is a noncertified photostatic copy.

Taking into consideration the wish of the Tribunal and in execution of this wish the Soviet Prosecution took measures to ensure that only the originals of these documents or documents whose authenticity is certified will be presented in complete order to the General Secretary. This will be done in the course of several days and all the material will be given in best order to the General Secretary.

THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell us where the writer of the document is now?

GEN. ZORYA: I am hardly in a position to say more than I have already. If the Tribunal will permit me, I can consult my colleagues, make inquiries, and report to the Tribunal as soon as possible on the general's whereabouts.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we will adjourn now. That will enable you to consult your colleagues.

[An recess was taken.]

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, to my regret I must present the same objections to this document submitted by the prosecutor of the Soviet Union under USSR-149, and must submit the same request.

11 Feb. 46

which I made this morning. As far as I know, the High Tribunal have not yet made a decision in regard to this question.

THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon, Dr. Nelte. The Tribunal has already made a decision.

I think it would be better if, when defendants' counsel go to the place from which they wish to speak, they would arrange these earphones before they speak.

I say the Tribunal has already made a decision which governs this case. They pointed out the other day to counsel for the Soviet Union that documents which were not identified as authentic documents, must be identified as authentic, and the Soviet prosecutor at that time undertook to certify that all documents which he made use of were certified as authentic documents. And if they are not so certified, they will be struck out of the record. That ruling applies to this document.

This document is a document which appears to be a document, a letter, or report to the Government of the Soviet Union, but it does not contain upon its face any certification showing that it is an authentic document. The Counsel for the Soviet Union said before we adjourned, that he undertook as he had already undertaken, to produce a certificate that the document was an authentic document; that is to say, that it was written by the person who purported to write it, and in those circumstances, the Tribunal accepts the document provisionally.

If no such certificate is forthcoming, then the document will be stricken from the record.

DR. NELTE: If I understand you correctly, the Tribunal will accept a letter written to the Soviet Government or a statement as documentary evidence for the contents of this statement.

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly. I have already said provided that it is certified as an authentic document. I have said that more than once.

DR. NELTE: In this way, every letter sent to the Prosecution or the Government of the Soviet Union or to any other Prosecution would become documentary evidence by the certification that it has actually been written by the person who signed it, which would make it impossible for the Defense to cross-examine the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: That depends on where the witness is. We are dealing with witnesses who are scattered all over the globe, and as we are informed that it is not the practice in the Soviet Union for affidavits to be made in such cases, the Tribunal considers such a document to fall within Article 19 provided it is an authentic document.

11 Feb. 46

We are affording the defendants' counsel the greatest assistance in bringing witnesses to this Court, but we cannot undertake to bring witnesses from all over the world upon questions which are very often of very little importance.

DR. NELTE: I quite appreciate the difficulties, and I am grateful to the Tribunal for their willingness to assist us. Therefore I only request to ascertain in each case where the person, who has made that statement, has his residence, so that the Defense may try to reach him.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. If the witness is in, or in the immediate vicinity of, Nuremberg, the Tribunal would think that it was only fair, if such a document as this were to be put in evidence, that he should be produced for examination or cross-examination by the defendants' counsel, but we do understand that the man who wrote this letter is not in the vicinity of Nuremberg. We have no reason to think he is, and I am reminding defendants' counsel that they can always apply, if they think right, to issue interrogatories which would be put to any such person as this who has written such a document as this.

DR. NELTE: Thank you.

GEN. ZORYA: I have availed myself of the recess to make inquiries about General Muller. General Muller is in a prisoner-of-war camp, Number 27, in Krasnogorsk, in the MOSCONV region. May I continue my statement?

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.

GEN. ZORYA: All the material, Your Honors, which I have mentioned to date emanated from circles of fiche Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces. If I can so express myself. General Muller belonged to the middle category of German generals. He was Chief of Staff of an army; he commanded an army group. His testimony reflects a series of events which may be considered worthy of attention, since they explain the circumstances accompanying Germany's preparations against the Soviet Union.

I wish to refer to Page 40 of the document book. There you will find the first page of General Muller's statement. The first paragraph, Page 1, of the statement is marked with red pencil. I now proceed to quote from it.

"The preparation for the attack on the Soviet Union began as early as July 1940. At that time I was first general staff officer in the staff of Army Group C at Djion in France. General Field Marshal Von Leeb was commander-in-chief. This army group consisted of the 1st, 2d, and 7th Armies, which were occupation armies in France. Besides this, Army Group A (Rundstedt), whose task was to prepare 'Case Sea Lion' (the invasion of England by Army Group B-Von Bock) was also in France. The staff of Army Group B was transferred to the East (Poser) during July and was given the following forcers, transferred from France-part of the armies of occupation: The 12th Army Command (List), 4th Army Command (don Kluge), and 18th Army Command (don Kuchler), plus several general commands and about thirty divisions. A greater part of this number was taken from Army Group C (don Leeb).

"Directly after the campaign in the West, the OKH gave the order for the demobilization of 20 divisions. This order was cancelled, and the 20 divisions were not demobilized. Instead of this, after their return to Germany they were sent on leave, and thus kept ready for rapid mobilization.

"Both measures, the transfer of about five hundred thousand men to the Russian frontier and the cancellation of the order disbanding about three hundred thousand men, show that already in July 1940 plans existed for war operations in the East.

"The next order which gives evidence of Germany's preparations for attacking the Soviet Union, was the written OKH order issued in September 1940 regarding the formation in Leipzig of a new army command (A.O.K. 11) of several general commands and about forty divisions and panzer divisions. The forming of these units was carried out from September 1940 onwards by the commander of the reserve army (Generaloberst Fromm), partly in France, but mainly in Germany. Towards the end of September 1940 the OKH called me to Fontainbleau. The Chief Quartermaster in the General Staff of the Army, then Lieutenant General (afterwards Field Marshal) Paulus, informed me, at first orally, of this order that my staff (Army Group C) was to be transferred to Dresden by 1 November and that Army High Command II (Generaloberst Weichs) which was under the command of the staff, should be transferred at the same time to Munich. The task was the leading of training of the above mentioned 40 divisions which were to be newly created.

"In accordance with this order, confirmed later by signature by the Chief of the General Staff Halder, the transfer of these units was carried out on time. These 40 divisions were put into action in the invasion of the Soviet Union."

264

265

266
Thus initiated, the preparation for the military attack on the
Soviet Union was carried out at a heightened tempo and with customary German pedantry.

11 Feb. 46

I would, Your Honors, remind the Tribunal that the witness, Paulus, stated at this session that in August 1940 the elaboration of the previous plan of attack on the
Soviet Union, known as Plan Barbarossa, was already so far advanced as to render possible the conduct of preparatory military exercises under the direction of Paulus. THE
PRESIDENT: General, I don't think it is necessary to read the statement of Field Marshal Paulus, as he has already given the evidence to the witness box.

GIEL, ZORYA: I am not reading into it the record. I am merely referring to a circumstance which will enable me to proceed to General Mueller's statement that this
system of military exercises, which originated in the General Staff of the German Army, eventually spread over the entire Army and that the entire armed forces
participated in the execution of these games which, per se, were already a preparation for the attack on the Soviet Union. I am reading into the record that passage of
the statement which is underlined in blue pencil, Page 41 of the bundle of documents: “Insosfar—General Muller states—” as in the future the Army was to attack the Soviet
Union, the first plan was to train soldiers and general staff officers.

"Towards the end of January 1941 I received telegraphic orders from the Chief of the General Staff Halder to attend the military exercises of Rundstedt's army group at St.
Germain, near Paris. The object of this military exercise was the attack and advance from Romania and South Poland in the direction of Kiev and southwards. The
plan had in mind the intention also of the participation of Romanian troops. In the main this military exercise anticipated the conditions of the future operation concerning the
strategic deployment of forces, to which I will refer later.

"The director of the military exercises was the Chief of the General Staff of the Rundstedt group. There were present: Rundstedt, Halder, the Chiefs of the
General Staff of the 6th Army, Colonels Heim, of the 11th Army, Colonel Wohler, and of Kleist's tank group, Colonel Zwickler and several generals of the panzer forces.
The military exercises were held at the place occupied by Rundstedt's army group, approximately between the 31st January and 2d February 1941. The exercise
demonstrated the necessity for a strong concentration of tank forces.”

The documents I have presented to date characterize the measures of the military command of the German Armed Forces for the preparation of the strategic
deployment of the German armies for launching an attack against the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics.

11 Feb. 46

As for time, these measures embraced a considerable period of 1940 and were put into action at least 6 months prior to the appearance on the scene of Directive
Number 21 concerning the Plan Barbarossa.

I shall now proceed to the second group of documents presented by the Soviet Prosecution which characterize the espionage measures undertaken by the fascist
conspirators in preparation for war against the Soviet Union.

Trend and task of espionage work in connection with Plan Barbarossa were, as we know, determined by a directive from the Supreme Command of the German
Armed Forces, addressed to counterintelligence on 6 September 1940 and signed by the Defendant Jodl.

This document was presented by the American Prosecution under Number 1229-PS: it is to be found on Pages 46 and 47 of our document bundle. I do not intend to
quote this document again, but I do consider it essential to remind you that in it the intelligence organizations demand that the regrouping of armies on Germany's
Eastern front should be camouflaged in every possible way and that the Soviet Union should remain under the impression that action of some kind Divas brewing
against the Balkans.

The activities of the intelligence organizations were strictly regulated. These activities included measures for concealing, as far as possible, the number of German
forces in the East and of giving an impression of insignificant concentrations in the north of the Eastern provinces, at the same time conveying the impression of very
considerable concentrations of forces in the southern part, in the Protektorate and in Austria.

The necessity was pointed out of creating an exaggerated impression of the number of anti-aircraft units and of the insignificant extent of roadbuilding activities.

I here take the liberty of, making two pertinent observations. According to Pieckenbrock’s testimony, the intensification of the work of this intelligence organization
against the Soviet Union began prior to the appearance of this directive in August 1940. And this work, of course, was not limited to the spreading of false information on
the regrouping of forces from West to East.

I beg you, Your Honors, to revert to the testimony, which I have already presented, of the former Chief of Department III of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence
Services of the German Armed Forces, Von Bentivegni.

On Pages 1, 2, and 3 of the Russian text of Bentivegni's deposition, it is said—I quote the passage underlined in blue pencil—beginning at the last paragraph, Page 1
of the document which corresponds to Page 37 of the document book:

11 Feb. 46

"In connection with this, as early as November 1940 I received from Canaris orders to intensify the work for counterintelligence in the localities where concentration
of the German armies on the Soviet German frontier was taking place.”

On Page 2 of the statement, Page 38 of the document book, Paragraph 1, Bentivegni continues:

"In accordance with this order, I immediately gave a corresponding order to the German Abwehr agencies, Danzig, Königsberg, Posen, Krakau, Breslau, and
Vienna.”

And finally, on Page 3 of the statement, which corresponds to Page 39 of the document book, I read:

"In March 1941 I received from Canaris the following directives for the preparations for the execution of the Plan Barbarossa.

a) Preparation of all links of Abwehr III for carrying out active counterintelligence work against the Soviet Union, as for instance the creation of the necessary
counterintelligence groups, their distribution among various fighting units intended for taking part in the operations on the Eastern front, and paralyzing the activity of the
Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence organs.

b) Spreading false information via their foreign intelligence agencies, partly by creating the semblance of an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union and of
preparations for a blow against Great Britain.

c) Counterintelligence measures to keep secret the preparations being made for war with the Soviet Union and to ensure that the transfer of troops to the East be
kept secret.”

The same question is touched upon in the minutes of the interrogation of the Chief of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Department I of the German Army,
Pieckenbrock, which I have already presented in evidence. This statement contains the following passage regarding the activities of the intelligence service of the
German Army in connection with the preparations for the realization of Plan Barbarossa. I would refer you to Page 35 of the document book and to Paragraph 2 from the
top. This corresponds to Page 2 of Pieckenbrock's testimony. Pieckenbrock states

"In March 1941 I was present at a conversation between Canaris and the chief of the espionage detachment (Abwehr II), Colonel Lahousen, about measures
connected with Plan Barbarossa. During this conversation they kept referring to a written order on this subject, which Lahousen had. I, personally, as head of Abwehr I,
beginning in February 1941 and up to 22 June 1941, more than once had official..."
talks with the Chief Quartermaster IV, Lieutenant General Tippelskirch, and with the head of the detachment Foreign Armies East, Colonel Klitzend. These conversations dealt with the more precise definition of tasks assigned to Abwehr, with regard to the Soviet Union, and in particular with the verification of old intelligence data about the Red Army, and also details about the dislocation of the Soviet armies during the period of preparation of the attack on the Soviet Union.

I now skip one paragraph of Pleckenbrock's statement and read further:

"All Abwehrstellen which were working with the espionage against Russia were given the task of intensifying the dispatch of agents to the U.S.S.R. A similar task - the intensification of espionage work against Russia - was given to an intelligence орган existing in the armies and army groups. For the more successful direction of these specific Abwehr organs, a special intelligence staff was created in May 1941 under the code name of Wally I. This staff was in the vicinity of Warsaw in the village Sulajewek. Major Bau, as the best specialist on work against Russia, was appointed chief of the staff of Wally I. Later, when following our example, Abwehr II and Abwehr III had also established staffs Wally II and Wally III, this organ became known as a whole staff Wally, and directed the entire intelligence, counterintelligence, and diversionary work against the U.S.S.R. as a staff had to become active in the front line. At the head of staff 'Wally' was Lieutenant Colonel Schmalschläger."

I now pass on to the last paragraph of Pleckenbrock's statement on Page 36 of the document book:

"From numerous reports given by Colonel Lahousen and Canaris, at which I was also present, I know that a great amount of preparatory work for the war with the Soviet Union was carried out by this department. In the period of February to May 1941 many conferences of the leaders of Abwehr II took place at the quarters of Jodi's deputy, General Warlimont. They were held in a cavalry school in Krampitz. One particular question settled at these conferences in accordance with the needs of the war with Russia, was that of increasing the special task units, Brandenburg 800, and of distributing contingents of these units among the individual army groups."

In Pleckenbrock's testimony which has just been read into the record, special attention is drawn to his references to the special tasks with which Lahousen's department had been entrusted, and

...
"Most honorable Herr Reich Minister: We have made direct contact with Iran and have received information on the possibilities of exercising German influence on the course of the imminent Iranian parliamentary elections."

And a few lines further on it is stated:

"In order to exercise a decisive influence on the results of the elections, bribery is necessary. For Teheran 400,000 tomans, and for the rest of Iran at least 600,000 tomans are necessary... It should also be noted that nationally oriented Iranian circles expect the intervention of Germany."

"I beg you to inform me whether it is possible to obtain one million tomans from the Foreign Office. This money can be sent by the people whom we are sending there by airplane. "Heil Hitler. Yours devotedly, Kaltenbrunner, SS Obersgruppenfuhrer."

This document will help you to form an idea of the range of questions which interested the Reich Foreign Minister. Such a peculiar activity of the Foreign Office was not in the nature of a chance episode.

In the course of time, the collaboration of the German Foreign Office and of the Reich Fuehrer SS waxed in strength and developed more and more. As a result, a very curious document appeared, which might be considered as an agreement between Himmler and Ribbentrop on the organization of espionage work.

I submit this document as Exhibit Number USSR-120 (Document USSR-120), and request the Tribunal to accept it as documentary evidence. This document is on Page 53 and 55 of the document book before you. The text of this agreement will be read into the record with a few remarks. The text of the agreement reads:

"By the order dated 12 February 1944, the Fuehrer has entrusted the Reich Fuehrer SS with the creation of a unified German Secret Intelligence Service. The Secret Intelligence Service has as its purpose, so far as foreign countries are concerned, to get information in the political, military, economic, and technical spheres for the Reich. In addition, the

Annex 245


274

"1. The Secret Intelligence Service of the Reich Fuehrer SS represents an important instrument for obtaining information in the sphere of foreign politics, and this instrument is placed at the disposal of the Foreign Minister. The first condition for this is close, comrade, and loyal co-operation between the Foreign Office and the main office of the Reich Security Service. The collection of information on foreign politics by the diplomatic service is not affected by this.

2. The Foreign Office places at the disposal of the main office of the Reich Security Service the information on the situation in the field of foreign politics necessary for the conduct of the Intelligence Service and the directive regarding German foreign policy. It hands over to the main office of the Reich Security Service its intelligence and other tasks in the sphere of foreign policy, which are to be performed by the organs of the Secret Intelligence Service.

3. Intelligence material in the field of foreign politics, obtained by the Secret Intelligence Service, is placed...

THE PRESIDENT: Wouldn't it be a sufficient summary of this document with which you are dealing to say that it is a document signed by Himmler and Ribbentrop and that it shows that there was a unification of the German Secret Intelligence Service. The details of that unification are not really a matter very much concerns this Tribunal, and therefore, as we are directed by the Charter to be as expeditious as possible, it is not necessary to read all the details of this unification.

GEN. ZORYA: I summarize this document and would add that this agreement, signed by Himmler and Ribbentrop, created such a state of affairs that it became extremely difficult to differentiate prevailing conditions in fascist Germany or to distinguish where Himmler's Gestapo service ended and the Foreign Office activities of the Defendant Ribbentrop began.

I shall now, with the permission of the Tribunal, proceed to the presentation of the next document. The document which I have just read-I am referring to the Himmler-Ribbentrop agreement concerning the conduct of intelligence work abroad also justifies the assumption that under the name of German diplomatic representation in such countries which maintained normal diplomatic relations with Germany, a whole intelligence network of the Gestapo was actively functioning.

If this summary, in the opinion of the Tribunal, corresponds to the contents of the document, I shall proceed to the following section of the report, "The Satellites of Germany."

When Plan Barbarossa was read into the record in Court, there was one part of the entire case which, in my opinion, received comparatively little attention. I refer to Part II of Plan Barbarossa, Document Number 446-PS. This part bears the name of "Presumed Allies and Their Tasks." I would like, here and now, to draw the attention of the Tribunal to the questions touched on in this part. In the first place, I consider it essential to remind you of the contents of this part by repeating it. Document Number 446-PS, Plan Barbarossa, is on Page 14 of the bundle of documents submitted to the Tribunal. I consider it essential to read out Part II of this case:

"1. On the flanks of our operation, we can count upon the active participation of Romania and Finland in the war against Soviet Russia.

"The Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces will, at the appropriate time, settle and lay down in what way the armed forces of the two countries will be subordinated to the German command on their entry into the war.

"2. Romania's task will be to tie up, in co-operation with the group of the armed forces advancing there, the enemy forces facing her, and, for the rest, to maintain the auxiliary services in the rear area.

"3. Finland will have to cover the advance of the German northern landing group (units of Group XXI) due to arrive from Norway, and then operate together with it. In addition, it will be up to Finland to eliminate Hango.

"4. It is possible to count upon the Swedish railways and coal available for the movements of the German northern group not later than the beginning of the operation.

In the speech of the Chief Prosecutor from the U.S.S.R., General Rudenko, attention was drawn to the opening sentence of this section:

"On the flanks of our operation, we can count upon the active participation of Romania and Finland in the war against Soviet Russia."

This justified the Chief Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R. in pointing out in his speech that on 18 December 1940, the date of the Barbarossa document, Romania and Finland were already following in the wake of the predatory policy of the Hitlerite conspirators.

275

"The most honorable Herr Reich Minister: We have made direct contact with Iran and have received information on the possibilities of exercising German influence on the course of the imminent Iranian parliamentary elections."

And a few lines further on it is stated:

"In order to exercise a decisive influence on the results of the elections, bribery is necessary. For Teheran 400,000 tomans, and for the rest of Iran at least 600,000 tomans are necessary... It should also be noted that nationally oriented Iranian circles expect the intervention of Germany."

"I beg you to inform me whether it is possible to obtain one million tomans from the Foreign Office. This money can be sent by the people whom we are sending there by airplane. "Heil Hitler. Yours devotedly, Kaltenbrunner, SS Obersgruppenfuhrer."

This document will help you to form an idea of the range of questions which interested the Reich Foreign Minister. Such a peculiar activity of the Foreign Office was not in the nature of a chance episode.

In the course of time, the collaboration of the German Foreign Office and of the Reich Fuehrer SS waxed in strength and developed more and more. As a result, a very curious document appeared, which might be considered as an agreement between Himmler and Ribbentrop on the organization of espionage work.

I submit this document as Exhibit Number USSR-120 (Document USSR-120), and request the Tribunal to accept it as documentary evidence. This document is on Page 53 and 55 of the document book before you. The text of this agreement will be read into the record with a few remarks. The text of the agreement reads:

"By the order dated 12 February 1944, the Fuehrer has entrusted the Reich Fuehrer SS with the creation of a unified German Secret Intelligence Service. The Secret Intelligence Service has as its purpose, so far as foreign countries are concerned, to get information in the political, military, economic, and technical spheres for the Reich. In addition, the
Annex 245

"a) A request has been sent to Bulgaria not to reduce to any large extent the units stationed for security reasons on the Turkish frontier.

"b) The Romanians have begun, at the instigation of the Commander-in-Chief of the German troops in Romania, a partial, camouflaged mobilization in order to be able to close their frontiers against a presumed attack by the Russians.

c) Hungarian territory will be used for the deployment of Army Group South only insofar as it would be expedient for introducing German units to link up the Hungarian and Romanian forces. Until the middle of June, however, no representations on this subject will be made to Hungary.

d) five German divisions have been deployed in the eastern part of Slovakia; the next ones will be unloaded in the area of Prosov.

e) Preliminary negotiations with the Finnish general staff take place as from 25 May."

Mr. President, in order to correlate the following documents with the testimony given by Paulus, I shall merely refer to the fact that this witness testified to the previous preparations for military aggression in that fortress which was Romania, thereby proving that corresponding measures for the reorganization of the Romanian Army, founded in the image and pattern of the German Army, were taken in September 1940 when a special military mission was sent to Romania. The chief of this mission was Cavalry General Hansen. His Chief of Staff was Major General Hauffe, his chief quartermaster Major Merk. Major General Von Rotkirch commanded the 13th Panzer Division.

The task of this military mission was the reorganization of the Romanian Army and its preparation for the subsequent attack on the Soviet Union in the spirit of Plan Barbarossa. The preliminary trend of this task, as Paulus has testified, was given to Hansen and his Chief of Staff by Paulus and they got the last directives from the Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch.

General Hansen received directives from two sources: from the OKW where his military mission was concerned, and from the OKH in all questions dealing with the Army. Directives of a military and political nature were received only from the OKW.

The military mission acted as liaison between the German and the Romanian general staffs.

The form assumed by the agreement and, even more, the publication of the true aims of high ranking fascist leaders in the country, did not always suit the satellites.

I now present, as Exhibit Number USSR-233 (Document Number USSR-233), the minutes of a conversation between Ion Antonescu and the Defendant Ribbentrop which took place on 12 February 1942. This document was taken from the personal archives of Marshal Antonescu which were captured by the advance units of the Red Army. This document, Your Honors, figures on Pages 59-62 of your document book.

In connection with Ribbentrop's speech in Budapest on the subject of Transylvania, Antonescu makes the following annotation in the course of this speech-last paragraph, Page 2 of the Russian text of the document, Page 60 of the document book:

"Without hesitation, I stressed the point that as early as 6 September, when I took over the government of the country, supported only by Monsieur Mihai Antonescu, I declared, without asking the opinion of my people, that we must follow a policy of adherence to the Axis powers. I said that this was the only example in the history of nations when two persons dare to make an open declaration and to call upon their people to follow a policy which no doubt could only appear odious...."

When making this cynical entry, Ion Antonescu could hardly have expected it to receive such wide publicity.

Mr. President, I intend to read into the record a long document which will take considerable time.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 12 February 1946 at 1000 hours.]
Annex 246

The Independent, *To see what Ukraine’s future may be, just look at Lviv's shameful past*  
(9 March 2014)
To see what Ukraine's future may be, just look at Lviv’s shameful past

A seemingly cosmopolitan city is a nationalist stronghold and monument to ethnic cleansing, as its barbaric wartime treatment of Jews illustrated

*Patrick Cockburn*  •  Sunday 09 March 2014 01:00  •  Comments

A woman is attacked during the 1941 pogrom
I used to visit Lviv, the beautiful, cosmopolitan-looking city in western Ukraine with its attractive mix of Italian, Austrian and Slavic architecture. It is in a much fought-over part of Europe and battles swirled around it in both world wars, but its ancient churches and cobbled streets somehow escaped destruction.

Appearances are deceptive because, though the buildings in Lviv have survived, the same cannot be said for most of its inhabitants. In 1939, the majority of the people in Lviv were Poles and Jews, with Ukrainians making up less than one fifth of the population. But the Jews were murdered and the Poles forced by Stalin to resettled in eastern parts of Germany ceded to Poland. Only the Ukrainians remained.
I thought about Lviv again last week when I saw a sentence in a newspaper referring to it as "a bastion of Ukrainian nationalism".

I wondered just how much the writer knew about Ukrainian nationalists in Lviv and the strong evidence that, in 1941, they had played a leading role in one of the horror stories of the Second World War.

This was the Lviv pogrom of 1 July 1941, when thousands of Jews were dragged from their homes, beaten and executed by either German troops or their Ukrainian helpers. Ukrainian politicians and historians have denied complicity, but surviving Jewish victims, other witnesses and contemporary photographs prove that Ukrainian militiamen and mobs of supporters carried out the pogrom, though the Germans oversaw it and committed many of the murders.

Of course, it does not follow that the present generation of Ukrainian nationalists are ideological descendants of pro-Nazi Ukrainians. But the Lviv pogrom and Ukraine's grim history of sectarian and ethnic slaughter does explain why many in Ukraine fear an ultra-nationalist resurgence. A rabbi in Kiev, Moshe Reuven Azman, last month called on Jews to leave the city and possibly even the country. "I don't want to tempt fate," he told the Israeli daily Maariv, "but there are constant warnings concerning intentions to attack Jewish institutions."

Ukraine crisis: A timeline of the conflict
What really happened in Lviv in July 1941 has been meticulously researched – drawing on a wealth of eyewitness information – by Professor John-Paul Himka, a Canadian-Ukrainian historian at the University of Alberta. In a study entitled The Lviv Pogrom of 1941: The Germans, Ukrainian Nationalists and the Carnival Crowd he concludes that the murderous assault on the Jewish community in Lviv – swelled by Jews fleeing the advance of fascism and anti-Semitism in other parts of central Europe – was primarily carried out by the militia of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) acting under German auspices. It happened quickly after the German occupation because the OUN wanted to show “the Germans that it shared their anti-Jewish perspectives and that it was worthy to be entrusted with the formation of a Ukrainian state”.

Lviv lies dangerously close to the ethnic, religious and military fault lines of Europe. And, as with other cosmopolitan cities, past and present, such as Beirut, Smyrna, Alexandria and Damascus, it was an excitingly diverse but potentially risky place to live. At different times it has been ruled by Poland, Austria (under the Habsburgs), the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany and, finally, an independent Ukraine. It had been known at different times, depending on which country it belonged to, as Lwow, Lemberg, Lvov and Lviv.

Between 1918 and 1939, it was part of Poland until invaded by the Soviet Union under the Nazi-Soviet Pact. At this time, it had a population of 312,231, of whom 157,490 were Poles, 99,595 were Jews, and 49,747 were Ukrainians. The Jews were well represented among the professions providing most of the doctors, lawyers and businessmen as well as dominating such trades as tailoring and barber shops. In the territory around Lviv, Ukrainians made up at least two-thirds of the population.
Annex 246

The German army captured Lviv on 30 June 1941, the Soviet NKVD secret police massacred several thousand political prisoners in the jails when they realised that the Germans could not be stopped. The next day, the pogrom started with Jews being compelled to dig up the rotting bodies of the dead prisoners. Others were ritually humiliated by being forced to clean the streets with tooth brushes or remove horse manure by putting it in their hats. "Judging by the photographs, gentiles in Lviv found the cleaners amusing," writes Professor Himka. "To some extent, the pogrom was a carnival." Women were stripped naked and beaten and hundreds of Jews were forced to crawl for miles to the prisons.

Kurt Lewin, a survivor, left a detailed account of what happened to him in one prison and he described "savage beatings by both Germans and Ukrainians", said Simka. "One Ukrainian particularly carved himself into Lewin's memory. Elegantly dressed in a beautifully embroidered shirt, he beat the Jews with an ironclad cane. Strips of skin flew with every blow, sometimes an ear or an eye." When his cane broke the man chose a heavier piece of wood with which to beat a man to death.
Edward Spicer, 22 at the time, recalled being caught by a group of Ukrainians near his home and taken to a nearby railway station: "First they were beating us all the way, then they pushed us down the staircase, until we were piled up one on top of another five-six high." Later, the Jews were made to lie on the ground and anybody who moved was killed with a rifle butt. Many were later taken away in trucks by the Germans to be shot. Professor Himka says the Ukrainians co-operating with the Germans and spearheading the pogrom were members of a militia formed the previous day who often had no uniform and were identifiable only by blue and yellow armbands, worn on the left arm. The Jews were later forced into a ghetto and by the time the Red Army recaptured Lviv in 1944 only 200 to 300 of those Jews were still alive.

The OUN militia did not confine itself to killing Jews. Later in the war, it murdered tens of thousands of Poles in western Ukraine. I was in Lviv in 2001 when Poland's National Remembrance Institute was investigating the massacre of 35,000 Polish villagers in 1943.
I visited the Polish Consulate where an official named Wicent Debicki did not directly answer my question about the investigation, but he gave a bit of personal biography. "I was born in Lviv," he said. "I remember as a small boy having to hide from Ukrainian nationalist groups with my father, in 1944, because we were Poles."

A Ukrainian woman translating Mr Debicki’s Polish interjected to ask in surprise: "But surely you were frightened of the Germans and Soviets as well?" After a long pause, he replied diplomatically that there was good reason to fear both.

Lviv presents itself as a beautiful city reflecting a culturally diverse past. In reality, it is a monument to ethnic cleansing and the appalling willingness of long-time neighbours to murder each other, as I saw earlier this year in Homs and Damascus – something those who want to heat up the conflict over Ukraine and Crimea's future should keep in mind.
Annex 247

RT, “Divide and Rule”: What Were the Real Relations between the UPA and Nazi Germany? (14 October 2022)

(translation)
“Divide and Rule”: What Were the Real Relations between the UPA and Nazi Germany?

By Svyatoslav Knyazev, Maxim Lobanov

The Ukrainian Insurgent Army* was established 80 years ago by decision of the leadership of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists. According to historians, a narrative of the activities of this military formation is being widely used these days in the national myth-making in Ukraine, in particular, in an attempt to picture the UPA as a participant in the fight against Nazi Germany. However, experts emphasize that in reality the UPA was a collaborationist organisation that worked closely with Hitler's secret services and was guilty of numerous crimes against humanity.

On 14 October 1942, the leadership of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) decided to establish the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)*, an armed formation that operated in the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR and adjacent areas of the neighbouring states during the Great Patriotic War. Despite the attempts of modern Ukrainian politicians to picture UPA militants as fighters for the national independence of Ukraine, historians point out that in real life the organisation consisted of collaborators and put Hitler's secret services’ plans in practice.
From OUN to UPA

The Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists was founded in Vienna in 1929 on the basis of the Ukrainian Military Organisation (UVO) and a number of other right-wing associations. The head of the UVO, Yevhen Konovalets, became the leader the OUN. The organisation adhered to the ideology of integral nationalism, which historians believe to be quite close to fascism.

Initially, OUN members were focused on their fight against Poland, which at that time included the Western Ukrainian regions of Galicia and Volhynia. Members of the organisation resorted to political assassinations, arson and terrorist attacks against the local population loyal to the Polish authorities.

As Andrei Koshkin, a full member of the Academy of Military Sciences of the Russian Federation, told RT, OUN leaders were in close cooperation with the German secret services from the earliest years of the OUN’s existence, and these ties became even tighter after the Nazis came to power in Germany.

“Berlin saw the OUN as a potential instrument of aggression against East European states,” the expert noted.

The unity of the OUN was broken soon after the Soviet intelligence liquidated Yevhen Konovalets in Rotterdam in 1938. After his death, a large gathering of Ukrainian nationalists in Rome elected Andriy Melnyk, Konovalets’ relative and a former officer of the Austrian and Petlyura armies, as the head of the OUN. However, a group of more radical members of the organisation refused to pledge allegiance to Melnyk and used the OUN to form their own structure, headed by Stepan Bandera, a militant from Galicia.

Historians refer to the OUN faction led by Melnyk as OUN(m), and to the one headed by Bandera as OUN(b) or OUN (r) (revolutionary). The leaders of both factions were recruited by Hitler’s intelligence. It should be noted that Nazi authorities were more sympathetic to Melnyk, while Bandera was seen as a careerist and a bandit. Nevertheless, Hitler’s secret services cooperated with both of them and even tried to reconcile them.
The Nazis first used OUN militants during the war with Poland in 1939. Before the attack on the Soviet Union, the Roland and Nachtigall battalions were formed from Ukrainian nationalists on the basis of the Brandenburg-800 special forces subordinate to the Abwehr.

From the very first days of the Great Patriotic War, the Nachtigall battalion took part in the mass killings of Jews and anti-fascist Soviet citizens. However, after the Ukrainian nationalists declared the creation of an “independent power” in Lvov under the protectorate of Germany and Bandera transferred a large amount of German government money to a Swiss bank, the OUN(b) leader was arrested, and the special forces were reformed to become police battalions.

According to historians, both OUN factions became the main sources of personnel for the punitive units of the Nazi auxiliary police and collaborationist “local self-governments” in the occupied territories of the Ukrainian SSR.
One of Bandera’s closest associates, Roman Shukhevych, left Nachtigall to serve in the rank of captain in the auxiliary police and participated in punitive expeditions in Belarus. Historians say that the details of how he resigned from Nazi service and returned to being an active member of the OUN are vague: according to one version, he refused to renew his contract with the Germans along with several other nationalists, while another version is that the Nazis deliberately took them out of Belarus to wage anti-partisan warfare in Ukraine.

As Denis Akhremenko, Chairman of the Interregional Public Organisation for Social and Humanitarian Scientific Research (MOOSGNI) named “Historical Consciousness”, told RT in an interview, a militant structure of Ukrainian nationalists under the command of Taras Borovets, who considered himself an “ally of the Wehrmacht” but was sceptical of the OUN, had been operated in Western Ukraine since 1941. Borovets called his units the Polissian Sich as well as the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (it was disbanded in 1943), which later caused terminological confusion.
In 1942, Banderites decided that they needed their own armed wing, which they also called the UPA, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. According to experts, the exact date of the establishment of this force is unknown. However, OUN members after the war notionally recorded the date in their documents as 14 October 1942.

“Double Standard Situation”

Very little is known today about the setting up of the UPA and its first actions. Some historians believe that Hitler’s secret services were behind the creation of the OUN(b) military wing from the very beginning.

“The Germans created the UPA in pursuance of their own goals. They needed a structure that would deal with the partisans and stamp out local resistance. The Wehrmacht no longer had enough personnel, so they were unable to keep large garrisons in remote hinterland areas. Using the UPA, they could fully apply the “divide and rule” principle to the population of the Ukrainian SSR. That is why the Germans let auxiliary policemen join the UPA, gave them weapons and stayed out of their way while they were turning into a kind of army,” Andrei Gorbunov, head of the research and guidance department of the Victory Museum, told RT.

According to Andrei Koshkin, despite any statements being made by Kiev these days that the UPA allegedly fought against the Nazis, there is no evidence in the German archives of any significant clashes between the “insurgents” and the Wehrmacht, which indirectly reinforces the theory that the UPA cooperated with Hitler’s secret services from the early days of existence of the OUN military wing.
"It would be a lightweight approach to say that the UPA really fought for the national independence of Ukraine from the beginning of its existence," Dmitry Surzhik, associate professor of the State Academic University for the Humanities, pointed out in his conversation with RT.

In 1943, Roman Shukhevych was appointed the chief of the main military staff of the UPA, and then its chief commander. Under him, cooperation between the UPA and German secret services was almost undisguised. Since August 1943 to September 1944 alone, the UPA received 700 guns and mortars, about 10,000 machine guns, 26,000 submachine guns, 72,000 rifles, 22,000 handguns, 100,000 grenades, and over 12,000,000 cartridges from the German Army Group South. In turn, the UPA suppressed any anti-Nazi manifestations behind the lines of German troops and tried to counter the Soviet partisans.

In 1943-1944, UPA militants turned to ethnic cleansing known as the Volhynian slaughter. The Ukrainian nationalists committed mass killings of the peaceful Polish population in Volhynia and Galicia, including women and children. According to historians, the killings were accompanied by sophisticated tortures, robbery and rape. Historians estimate the total number of victims of the Volhynian slaughter at about 50,000 to 60,000 people.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Білорусь</th>
<th>Belarus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Польща</td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Київ</td>
<td>Kiev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>УПА-Захід</td>
<td>UPA-West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>УПА-Північ</td>
<td>UPA-North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>УПА-Південь</td>
<td>UPA-South</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Territorial structure of the UPA / © Public domain
“While Ukraine was liberated by the Red Army, the UPA militants did not lay down their arms but went underground,” says Denis Akhrenenko.

According to historians, the UPA then turned to terrorist attacks against Soviet governmental structures as well as peaceful civilians of the Ukrainian SSR. Until the end of the Great Patriotic War, UPA leaders cooperated with Hitler’s secret services, receiving weapons and military equipment from them for as long as they could. During the war, the number of UPA militants varied between 15,000 and 60,000.

“After the defeat of the Nazis, the UPA established close ties with British intelligence and received their support,” Dmitry Surzhik notes.

Since the liberation of Western Ukraine from the Nazis and until the complete elimination of the UPA, it carried out more than 14,000 armed attacks, killing more than 30,000 Soviet citizens including more than 15,000 farmers and peasants, almost 2,000 intellectuals, 860 children, elderly people and women.

Soviet secret services completed the liquidation of the OUN-UPA underground bandits in the 1950s. According to a rough estimate by historians, Banderites were involved in the killings of about 850,000 Jews, 220,000 Poles, 400,000 Soviet prisoners of war and 500,000 Ukrainian civilians during the war.
“Assessing the role of the UPA in the present time, we see paradoxical double standards; the authorities of most Western countries consider OUN-UPA militants to be Nazi criminals and collaborators while supporting the Kiev regime that glorifies them. It is against any logic,” Andrey Koshkin sums up.

* The Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists – the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (OUN-UPA) is a Ukrainian organisation declared extremist and banned in Russia by the Judgment of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of 17 November 2014.
Annex 248

Resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland on paying tribute to the victims of the genocide committed by Ukrainian nationalists against citizens of the Second Republic of Poland in the years 1943 to 1945, 22 July 2016

(translation)
RESOLUTION
OF THE SEJM OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND
of 22 July 2016
on paying tribute to the victims of the genocide committed by Ukrainian nationalists
against the citizens of the Second Republic of Poland in the years 1943 to 1945

The lands of the former eastern provinces of the Republic of Poland were particularly hard-hit during the Second World War. The two greatest totalitarianisms of the 20th century, the Third German Reich and the communist Soviet Union, clashed in these areas. The actions of the German and Soviet occupiers created favourable conditions for hatred on national and religious grounds, and attempts by representatives of the Polish Underground State to reach an agreement with Ukrainian organisations were unsuccessful.

July 2016 marks the 73rd anniversary of the culmination of the crime committed against the civilian population of the Eastern Borderlands of the Second Polish Republic by units of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), and SS Division "Galicia" and by other Ukrainian formations collaborating with the Germans. As a result of the genocide committed in 1943 to 1945, more than one hundred thousand citizens of the Second Polish Republic, mainly peasants, were murdered. Their exact number remains unknown to this day, and many of them have still not been given a dignified burial and commemoration. In addition to Poles, the murdered included Jews, Armenians, Czechs, and members of other national minorities, as well as Ukrainians who sided with the victims. While recalling the crimes of the Ukrainian nationalists, one can neither pass over in silence nor relativise the Polish reprisals against Ukrainian villages, which also resulted in the deaths of civilians. All these tragic events should be recalled for today's generations.

The victims of the crimes committed in the 1940s by Ukrainian nationalists have still not been properly commemorated, and the mass murders have not been called genocide in accordance with historical truth.

The Sejm of the Republic of Poland pays tribute to the memory of all citizens of the Second Republic of Poland who were brutally murdered by Ukrainian nationalists.

The Sejm of the Republic of Poland expresses its highest appreciation to the soldiers of the Home Army, the Borderland Self-Defence, and the Peasant Battalions, who heroically defended civilians under a threat of attacks, and addresses a request to the President of the Republic of Poland to honour these individuals with state decorations.
Therefore, the Sejm of the Republic of Poland decrees that 11 July, the anniversary of the culmination of the crime, shall be the National Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Genocide committed by Ukrainian nationalists against citizens of the Second Republic of Poland.

The Sejm of the Republic of Poland calls for identifying and designating the places of the crimes, providing a dignified burial of all found victims, paying due honour and respect to those who were innocently tortured and murdered, and making complete lists of victims. The Sejm of the Republic of Poland calls for the continuation of the work for the purposes of reconciliation and dialogue, which was started by political and spiritual leaders, and for supporting cooperation among historians, including the expansion of access to state archives, and strengthening cooperation between the authorities of the Republic of Poland and Ukraine on the most important issues for the future of both nations.

The Sejm of the Republic of Poland expresses its respect and gratitude to those Ukrainians who, risking their own lives, rescued Poles, and urges the President of the Republic of Poland to honour these individuals with state decorations. The Sejm of the Republic of Poland also reminds of the attitude shown by a significant part of the Ukrainian population who refused to participate in attacks on Poles.

The Sejm of the Republic of Poland would like to thank the Kresovians and their descendants and people of good will who have been demanding the truth for decades, following the motto "It is not revenge but remembrance that the victims cry out for".

The Sejm of the Republic of Poland expresses its solidarity with Ukraine fighting against external aggression to preserve its territorial integrity. The Sejm of the Republic of Poland expresses its conviction that the best way to reconciliation and mutual forgiveness is complete truth about history only. As St John Paul II said in Lvov in 2001, "May we all, by purifying our historical memory, be prepared to place that which unites us above that which divides us, so that together we can build a future based on mutual respect, fraternal cooperation and genuine solidarity."

SPEAKER OF THE PARLIAMENT

/ - / Marek Kuchciński
Annex 249

Interfax.ua, *Anti-Terrorist Measures to be Taken Against Separatists – Turchynov* (7 April 2014)
Anti-terrorist measures to be taken against separatists - Turchynov

Verkhovna Rada Chairman and acting President Oleksandr Turchynov has said that anti-terrorist measures will be taken against separatists who seized administrative buildings in Luhansk, Donetsk and Kharkiv regions using arms.

"An anti-crisis headquarters was set up tonight, and anti-terrorist measures will be taken against those who took up arms," he said in a televised address in Kyiv on Monday.
Annex 250

Ukraine crisis: Turchynov announces anti-terror operation

Acting Ukrainian President Oleksandr Turchynov said he would not allow a repetition of what happened in Crimea which was annexed by Russia last month.
Annex 251

The Economist, *Ukraine’s top soldier runs a different kind of army from Russia’s*
(15 December 2022)
Ukraine’s top soldier runs a different kind of army from Russia’s

Valery Zaluzhny wants to encourage initiative and devolve authority

The office of Valery Zaluzhny, the head of Ukraine’s armed forces, has few personal touches bar a framed photograph on his desk, of a soldier in uniform. “When I am at ease, when things are going well, this picture is lying face down, I don’t need to look at it. When I have doubts about something I put it up straight,” he explains.

The picture is currently upright. It shows the late General Hennady Vorobyov, who commanded Ukraine’s ground forces from 2009 to 2014. He rejuvenated the top ranks, instilled a culture of respect for subordinates and refused to deploy troops to suppress public protests in 2013-14. “I look at the photograph trying to figure out what Hennady Vorobyov would do,” General Zaluzhny says.

The Economist today

Handpicked stories, in your inbox

A daily newsletter with the best of our journalism
Annex 252

RT, Poroshenko Signs Laws Praising Ukraine Nationalists as ‘Freedom Fighters’
(16 May 2015)
Poroshenko signs laws praising Ukraine nationalists as ‘freedom fighters’

RT

Ukrainian nationalists accused of having links to Nazi Germany have been legalized, praised as freedom fighters and granted social benefits in legislation signed by president Poroshenko as part of so-called ‘de-communisation’ package of laws.

Such paramilitary groups as Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), as well as other underground groups that operated in Soviet Union from 1917 till 1991, have been declared “freedom fighters.”

“The law provides for state recognition of the struggle for Ukrainian independence in the twentieth century and defines the legal status of participants in the struggle for Ukrainian independence in the twentieth century,” an explanatory note to the document reads.

READ MORE: Ukraine bans Communism & Nazism, celebrates UPA nationalists as ‘freedom fighters’

The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted a law on April 9 when some 271 MPs officially recognizes Ukrainian nationalists who actively collaborated with Nazis in the 20th century as “freedom fighters.” Members of several official paramilitary groups, including OUN and UPA, notorious for their bloody campaign in the 1940s are now granted social benefits by the new law.

According to the bill, actions by such organizations are now rendered lawful, as their goals and methods “did not contradict” the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or other international acts. Historians estimate the OUN – UPA are responsible for at least one million deaths, including a large number of Poles, Russians and Jews.

The quest to present Ukrainian nationalists as heroes, who were not just fighting against the Soviet government but also bravely resisted the Nazi Germany invasion, has been in the making for over a decade. Initially proposed in 2005 by then President Victor Yushchenko, the initiative struggled to gain much public support. Protests against recognition of Nazi collaborators were held across the country at that time.

READ MORE: Putin blasts ‘cynical attempts to rewrite history’ at Russia-China WWII conference

In 2010, Yushchenko did grant Stepan Bandera, the leader of OUN the posthumous title of Hero of Ukraine. A year later, the award was annulled after being widely condemned by European Parliament, Russian, Polish and Jewish organizations.

The ‘de-communization’ package of laws signed by Poroshenko on Friday also included a
legislation banning communist-era symbolic and propaganda, condemning Soviet government on par with German Nazi regime. He also signed laws that will see the release of Soviet-era KGB archives to public, and scrap the term Great Patriotic War from official use replacing it with World War II.
Annex 253

RELEASE: Rep. Khanna Leads Bipartisan Members In Condemning Anti-Semitism in Europe

Washington, DC – Congressman Ro Khanna (CA-17) and Congressman David N. Cicilline (RI-01) are leading more than 50 House Republicans and Democrats in pushing for the U.S. Department of State to exert diplomatic pressure on Ukraine and Poland for recent in incidents of state-sponsored Holocaust denial and anti-Semitism.

“We urge you to join us and human rights organizations in standing against anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and all forms of intolerance by calling for the Polish and Ukrainian governments to unequivocally reject Holocaust distortion and the honoring of Nazi collaborators and fully prosecute anti-Semitic crimes,” the Members wrote in a letter to Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan. “We also ask that you detail what steps are being taken by the United States (U.S.) government to monitor instances of Holocaust distortion and ensure that the U.S. is not supporting or funding groups and individuals that promote or justify anti-Semitism. We believe these steps must include a firm request that these offensive laws be repealed.”

“Our government should be concerned with the resurgence of anti-Semitism in Ukraine and Poland,” said Rep. Khanna. “The State Department must use all available diplomatic channels to work with the Ukrainian and Polish government to combat the rise of this hateful ideology which has historically threatened peace and security in the region.”

The full text of the letter is embedded below and a PDF copy is available here.

April 23, 2018

The Honorable John Sullivan
Deputy Secretary of State
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street NW
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Deputy Secretary Sullivan:

We write to express our dismay about recent reports of state-sponsored Holocaust distortion and denial taking place in Europe, particularly in Poland and Ukraine. These developments are unacceptable, especially given today’s global surge of anti-Semitism.

We urge you to join us and human rights organizations in standing against anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and all forms of intolerance by calling for the Polish and Ukrainian governments to
unequivocally reject Holocaust distortion and the honoring of Nazi collaborators and fully prosecute anti-Semitic crimes. We also ask that you detail what steps are being taken by the United States (U.S.) government to monitor instances of Holocaust distortion and ensure that the U.S. is not supporting or funding groups and individuals that promote or justify anti-Semitism. We believe these steps must include a firm request that these offensive laws be repealed.

While the legal questions and historical contexts of Ukraine and Poland differ, developments in both countries are cause for concern. Earlier this year, Warsaw passed a law making it a criminal offense to state that Poland participated in the Holocaust. The law, which was rightfully criticized by the U.S. State Department, the Israeli government, and others, was accompanied by a surge of anti-Semitic remarks. The Israeli Embassy in Warsaw reported being flooded by anti-Semitic vitriol, while members of the Polish Jewish community expressed concern at rising tensions in the wake of the law. Despite Polish President Andrzej Duda’s assurances that the law would not be used to stifle free speech, a lawsuit has already been filed against an Argentinian newspaper using this law; Jan Dziedziczak, the Deputy Director of the Polish Foreign Ministry, has demanded that Israel change an exhibit in Yad Vashem in Jerusalem; and an Israeli mayor was forced to cancel a commemoration ceremony after he refused local authorities’ demands to remove references to Polish complicity in the Holocaust from his speech.

Ukraine’s 2015 memory laws went even further by glorifying Nazi collaborators and making it a criminal offense to deny their “heroism.” However, unlike the Polish law, this move by the government in Kyiv has received little to no public response from the United States. The groups and individuals extolled by Ukraine include Nazi collaborators Stepan Bandera, Roman Shukhevych, and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), as well as the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). These paramilitaries and individuals in some cases collaborated with the Nazis and bear responsibility for the murder of thousands of Jews, 70,000-100,000 Poles, and other ethnic minorities between 1941 and 1945.

It’s particularly troubling that much of the Nazi glorification in Ukraine is government-supported. Examples include the 2017 pro-UPA campaign conducted by the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory; the naming of streets after Bandera and Shukhevych by the Kyiv city council; and L’viv’s 2017 “ShukhevychFest” which took place on the anniversary of the 1941 L’viv Pogroms in which 4000 Jews were killed.

State-sponsored Holocaust revisionism in Ukraine is accompanied by other forms of anti-Semitism. As Israel’s Department of Diaspora Affairs pointed out in its annual report on anti-Semitism, the whitewashing of these Ukrainian “heroes” has coincided with the increasing incidence of anti-Semitism across Ukraine. This includes desecration of Holocaust memorials and Jewish places of worship, such as the desecration of a holy tomb in Uman with a swastika-carved pig’s head; a January 2017 march in honor of Bandera, during which participants chanted “Jews Out!”; as well as last summer’s firebombing of a L’viv synagogue during “ShukhevychFest.”

Last November, Radio Free Europe reported on the presence of torches and Nazi salutes at a
20,000-person march in honor of the 75th anniversary of the UPA. These torchlight marches are closely linked to organizations such as the neo-Nazi Azov Battalion, an armed group that was prohibited from receiving U.S. weapons and training by the recently signed Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018. Rather than disband Azov, the government incorporated it into the Ukrainian National Guard overseen by the Ministry of the Interior. The group is widely known to be closely connected to Interior Minister Arsen Avakov.

The deeply troubling actions by Poland and Ukraine have been repeatedly condemned by the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, the Simon Wiesenthal Center, the National Coalition Supporting Eurasian Jewry, the World Jewish Congress, Yad Vashem, and the Israeli government.

As members of the U.S. Congress, we have steadfastly supported Poland’s and Ukraine’s quest to build democratic nations. However, we are deeply concerned that the rise of anti-Semitism and denial of the past will stymie these countries’ democratic development and prevent Poland and Ukraine from becoming a free and open societies for all their citizens, Jewish and non-Jewish alike. The developments in these two countries, while particularly egregious, must also be taken in context of a rise in glorification of Holocaust-era officials throughout Europe, including Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and the Baltic States. This is a troubling trend that must elicit a strong response from our government.

Therefore, we respectfully request that you respond to our serious concerns with a detailed description of what actions the State Department is taking to work with the Polish and Ukrainian governments, and other governments in the region, to combat the rise of anti-Semitism and Holocaust-denial and distortion.

Additionally, at this moment that anti-Semitism and Holocaust denial is increasing around the world, we ask that you immediately appoint someone for the position of Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat anti-Semitism. The longer this position, which has worldwide reach, sits unfilled, the more it sends the message that the U.S. will tolerate anti-Semitism and Holocaust denial. Moreover, we recognize the important work that is carried out by the Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues, and ask that you ensure that his office has the resources necessary to meet the growing challenges in this arena.

The United States must assume a leadership position by firmly standing against anti-Semitism and ensuring that our Eastern European allies continue to develop democracies that are fair and just to all.

We thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,

###

**About the Office**

Congressman Khanna represents the 17th District of California, which covers communities in
Annex 254

The Times of Israel, *Ukrainian marchers in Kiev chant ‘Jews out’* (3 January 2017)
By JTA

Ukrainian nationalist marchers in Kiev chanted “Jews out” in German at a New Year’s Day march celebrating the birthday of a Nazi collaborator whose troops killed thousands of Jews.

Thousands attended the event in the center of the Ukrainian capital celebrating Stepan Bandera, a leader of Ukraine’s nationalist movement in the 1930s and ’40s. They held up his portrait while an unidentified person shouted the anti-Semitic slogan on a loudspeaker, prompting many participants to repeat it, a video published by the Federal News Agency showed.

Bandera’s movement included an insurgent army which fought alongside Nazi soldiers during part of World War II. Supporters of Bandera claim they sided with the Nazis against the Soviet army, believing that Adolf Hitler would grant Ukraine independence. Bandera was assassinated in 1959 by Russia’s KGB in West Germany.

Oleksandr Feldman, a Ukrainian Jewish lawmaker and president of the Ukrainian Jewish Committee, called on authorities to investigate the march and prosecute those responsible for the hateful slogans.

Ukrainian WWII figure Stepan Bandera, the leader of the Ukrainian nationalist and independence
movement who in the 1940s encouraged members to ‘destroy’ Jews. (Wikimedia)

“I still can’t get over hearing it at the rally in honor of Stepan Bandera’s birthday,” Feldman wrote in an emotional post on Facebook Tuesday. “I admit, I’m choking up with tears. I love Ukraine, love the Ukrainians.”

Get The Times of Israel’s Daily Edition by email and never miss our top stories

By signing up, you agree to the terms

Adding that the chants came from a “gang of a few idiots who don’t represent anyone,” he nonetheless wrote: “I can’t ignore it when I, a man who worked so much for my country and city, created the hundreds and thousands of jobs, am being screamed at by some bastards to leave my homeland.”

Feldman also accused the Svoboda party, a far-right movement whose leaders and followers often have engaged in anti-Semitic hate speech, of being responsible for what he termed “a provocation” during the march.

Bandera is being celebrated across Ukraine as a national hero. In July he had a street named after him, also in Kiev, despite protests from the Jewish community.

Several other Ukrainian nationalists with ties to anti-Semitic acts and policies before and during the Holocaust have been the subject of veneration in Ukraine in recent years, especially after the ousting in 2014 of President Viktor Yanukovych in a bloody revolution over his alleged corruption and ties to Russia.

Is our work important to you?

Do you rely on The Times of Israel for accurate and insightful news on Israel and the Jewish world? If so, please join The Times of Israel Community. For as little as $6/month, you will:

Support our independent journalism;
Enjoy an ad-free experience on the ToI site, apps and emails; and
Gain access to exclusive content shared only with the ToI Community, including weekly letters from founding editor David Horovitz.

Join the Times of Israel Community Join our Community Already a member? Sign in to stop seeing this
Annex 255

Haaretz, *Ukraine Designates National Holiday to Commemorate Nazi Collaborator*  
(27 December 2018)
Ukraine designates national holiday to commemorate Nazi collaborator - Europe

JTA, Cnaan Liphshiz

Ukraine designated the birthday of a Nazi collaborator as a national holiday and banned a book on the anti-Semitic actions of another national leader.

The Ukrainian parliament last week declared January 1 as a national day of commemoration for Stepan Bandera, who briefly joined forces with the Nazi occupation of Ukraine. A nationalist, Bandera hoped the Germans would allow his country sovereignty from the Soviet Union, though the Nazis later arrested him.

To really understand Israel and the Jewish world - subscribe to Haaretz

Some of his supporters at the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, which he headed, committed countless war crimes against Jews.

Breaking news and the best of Haaretz straight to your inbox

Email *

Please enter a valid email address

The region of Lviv, Bandera’s native city, this month declared 2019 “Stepan Bandera Year,” sparking protests by Israel. Tarik Youssef Cyril Amar, the former academic director of Lviv’s Center for Urban History of East Central Europe, this week returned an award conferred on him by the city in protest.

Meet the Lonely Ukrainian Jew Fighting His Country’s New Fondness for Nazis

Germany Allocates $1.1m to Create Museum at Former Nazi Extermination Camp

Ukrainian City Commemorates the 75th Anniversary of Holocaust

>>Ukraine's Invented a 'Jewish-Ukrainian Nationalist' to Whitewash Its Nazi-era Past | Opinion

Separately, Ukraine’s State Committee on Television and Radio Broadcasting banned “Book of Thieves” by Swedish historian Anders Rydell, which includes critical analysis of the actions of Symon Petliura, an early-20th century nationalist whose troops murdered countless Jews in pogroms beginning in 1919.

The December 10 decree banning the book accused Rydell of “inciting ethnic, racial and religious hatred,” the Regnum news agency reported Wednesday.
A Russia-born Jew killed Petliura in Paris in 1929 as revenge for the pogroms.

“The whole book ban is very symbolic in itself,” said Ukrainian Jewish Committee Director Eduard Dolinsky. Both communist and Nazi authorities systematically banned books.
Annex 256

Kyiv Post, 2019 Declared Year of Stepan Bandera in Lviv Region (13 December 2018)
2019 declared year of Stepan Bandera in Lviv region

The Lviv Regional Council has decided to declare the year of 2019 to be the year of the leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) Stepan Bandera. The decision was made on the occasion of the 110th birthday anniversary of Stepan Bandera that is to be marked in 2019, the press service of the Lviv Regional Council said.

A plan of measures to celebrate the year of Stepan Bandera is to be developed by the Lviv Regional Council and the Lviv Region State Administration.
Also, members of the Lviv Regional Council decided to declare the year of 2019 to be the year of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists on the occasion of the 90th anniversary of the OUN.
Annex 257

Gazeta.ru, “Glorification of Nazism”: Kiev March Criticised by Germany (2 January 2019)

(translation)
March in Honour of Bandera in Kiev Criticised by Bundestag

By Rafael Fakhrutdinov

The torchlight procession in honour of the extremist Stepan Bandera that took place in Kiev the day before was criticised by the Bundestag and called “glorification of Nazism”. Czech President Milos Zeman called upon the Czech leaders to protest against the “glorification of war criminals” in Ukraine. Earlier, the President of Ukraine Pyotr Poroshenko placed the OUN-UPA* extremists who fought on the side of the Third Reich troops on the same footing as the Ukrainian veterans of the Second World War who fought on the side of the USSR.

Petr Bystron, a German MP from the Alternative for Germany party, criticised harshly the torchlight procession in honour of nationalist Stepan Bandera (who headed the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists – the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (declared extremist and banned in the Russian Federation)) that took place in Kiev the day before.

“I think that this is a big problem for the Ukrainian government – the glorification of Nazi henchmen. The heinous crimes of the Nazis during the Second World War are to be condemned and should not be forgotten. Anyone who praises and celebrates such acts tramples on the memory of millions of victims of Nazism,” the German politician is quoted as saying by the FAN.

On the first day of 2019, nationalists held a torchlight procession in Kiev to celebrate Stepan

* OUN-UPA: Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists - Ukrainian Insurgent Army.
Bandera’s 110th birthday anniversary. The festivities began near the Opera House in downtown Kiev. Representatives of various Ukrainian nationalist movements marched in formation in camouflage and uniform hats.

The marchers carried posters and banners with images of Bandera, fired up torches, shouted “Glory to Ukraine!” and gave away greeting cards with congratulations on the New Year and Bandera’s birthday.

The nationalists marched to the Maidan Square where speeches were made. Ukrainian MP Andrey Ilyenko called the 2019 “a decisive year for the future of Ukraine”.

“... if we are not active and don’t convey our ideas to the public, the situation is going to be critical. Only we, the union of Ukrainians, will be able to resist the revanchist anti-Ukrainian forces. Ukraine will be saved by nationalists, not by clowns or oligarchs,” said the MP.

A day before that, Czech President Milos Zeman called upon the Czech leadership to protest against the “glorification of war criminals” in Ukraine, as his press secretary wrote in a Twitter post.

“The President publicly called upon the Czech Republic to officially protest against the glorification of war criminals in Ukraine,” the post reads.

On the same day, the President of Ukraine Pyotr Poroshenko placed the OUN-UPA extremists who fought on the side of the Third Reich troops on the same footing as the Ukrainian veterans of the Second World War who fought on the side of the USSR.

The Ukrainian leader has endorsed the amendments to the Law on the Status of War Veterans and Their Social Welfare Guarantees that are aimed at enhancing social welfare measures for nationalist organisation members.

The categories of persons whose social welfare has been enhanced by the Presidential Decree include members of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (the organisation is banned in Russia), armed units of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, and a number of other nationalist organisations.

After the law takes effect, such persons will have the governmental social welfare guarantees as combatants.

In this regard, Sergei Tsekov, a member of the Federation Council Committee on International Affairs, said that the head of the Ukrainian state made all his decisions in line with the current political climate.

A senator from Crimea thinks that Poroshenko is doing everything he can to earn some extra political points. Since his anti-rating is off the charts, he is forced to rely on radical Ukrainian nationalists.

“What will this decision lead to? In fact, it downplays the results of the Great Patriotic War,” the Russian senator speculates.

Earlier this month, Ukrainian MPs from the Pyotr Poroshenko Bloc and the People’s Front
factions of the Verkhovnaya Rada came up with a bill to re-award the title of Hero to Stepan Bandera. Moreover, the Ukrainian parliament proposed to officially celebrate Bandera’s birthday, the NSN reports.

The Russian Foreign Ministry noted that the introduction of a “Bandera Day” would not be surprising against the background of the “bacchanalia” seen in Ukraine around memorial dates and holidays.

“The lack of a proper response to all this from the Western handlers of Kiev, international organisations and human rights structures that care so much about “democratic values” is regretful,” the commentary said.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs added that the worshipping of such “vile historical characters” testifies to the contemptuous attitude towards the Ukrainian people and Bandera’s “numerous victims”.

Last autumn, Warsaw expressed its outrage at the statement of the Ukrainian Ambassador to Poland, Andrey Deshchytia, that Poles would be allowed to carry out search and exhumation activities on the Ukrainian territory only if Warsaw began to restore the monuments to nationalists that had been destroyed.

The ideology of Ukrainian nationalism is widely supported in Ukraine. In August, Poroshenko opened a military parade in Kiev on the Independence Day of his country with the words from the March of Ukrainian Nationalists.
Annex 258

Times of Israel, *Hundreds of Ukrainian Nationalists March in Honor of Nazi Collaborator*  
(1 January 2022)
KYIV, Ukraine — Hundreds of Ukrainian nationalists held a torchlight march in the capital of Kyiv to mark the birthday of Stepan Bandera, the leader of a rebel militia that fought alongside Nazi soldiers in World War II.

The Sunday march came amid persistently high concerns over Russia’s massing of troops near the Ukrainian border, which many believe could be a prelude to an invasion. A large sector of eastern Ukraine has been under the control of Russia-backed separatist rebels since 2014.

“Today, when there is a war with the occupier at the front, and the struggle against the 'fifth column' continues in the rear, we remember and honor the memory of Stepan Bandera,” said Andriy Tarasenko, leader of the nationalist party Right Sector.

During World War II, Bandera led the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, whose men killed thousands of Jews and Poles, including women and children, while fighting alongside Nazi Germany against the Red Army and communists.

Bandera’s supporters claim that they sided with the Nazis against the Soviet army in the belief that Adolf Hitler would grant independence to Ukraine.

Expressions of admiration for Bandera and other collaborators have increased in scope and status following the 2014 revolution in Ukraine, which toppled the regime of Viktor Yanukovych amid claims that he is a Russian stooge, and triggered an armed conflict with Russia.
The veneration of Nazi collaborators, including killers of Jews, is a growing phenomenon in Eastern Europe, where many consider such individuals as heroes because they resisted Soviet Communism.

The veneration of Nazi collaborators, including killers of Jews, is a growing phenomenon in Eastern Europe, where many consider such individuals as heroes because they resisted Soviet Communism.

Bandera and the crimes of his followers are a dark page in Ukrainian history. People who called themselves Bandera actively participated in the mass executions of people on ethnic, religious and ideological grounds. This is a proven fact, moreover, the "UPA Chronicles" published in Canada contain c...
Annex 259

Ternopol City Council, From now on, the Ternopol City Stadium will bear the name of UPA Commander-in-Chief Roman Shukhevych (5 March 2021)

(translation)
Ternopol City Council, From now on, the Ternopol City Stadium will bear the name of UPA Commander-in-Chief Roman Shukhevych (5 March 2021), available at: https://ternopilcity.gov.ua/news/46912.html

From now on, the Ternopol City Stadium will bear the name of UPA Commander-in-Chief Roman Shukhevych

On 5 March, a session of the Ternopol City Council decided that the city stadium be named "Roman Shukhevych Ternopol City Stadium".

"On this special day, we honour the memory of Roman Shukhevych, the Hero of Ukraine, Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. It is very symbolic that we are making an important decision to name the central stadium 'Roman Shukhevych Ternopol City Stadium' today" Mayor Sergey Nadal said. - "The UPA Commander-in-Chief was not only an exemplary commander, but also a good athlete and leader in many sports. And right now, the sports and patriotic competitions "XI Shukhevych Cup" are taking place in Ternopol."

With due regard for the courage and unyielding determination of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army Roman Shukhevych in the national liberation struggle and his self-sacrifice in the name of the Ukrainian people, the members of the City Council unanimously supported the proposal of the Mayor to name the stadium "Roman Shukhevych Ternopol City Stadium".
Annex 260

Gazeta.ru, Kiev Residents Vote to Rename Tulskaya Square in Honour of “UPA Heroes”
(21 June 2022)

(translation)
Kiev Residents Vote to Rename Tulskaya Square in Honour of “UPA Heroes”*

By Maxim Yermolov

A voting in the “Digital Kiev” application for renaming toponyms “associated with Russia” has resulted in that fact that Tulskaya Street and Tulskaya Square can be named in honour of the “Heroes of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA; recognised as an extremist organisation and banned in Russia), Strana.ua reports.

In addition, the majority of the voters supported the renaming of Leo Tolstoy Street to Ukrainian Heroes Street and Marshal Malinovsky Street to Heroes of the Azov Regiment Street and voted to rename Bakunin Street in honour of Ulas Samchuk, a Ukrainian writer and journalist who collaborated with Nazi Germany.

Groznenska Street and Kislovodskaya Street in Kiev were decided to be renamed to Ichkerskaya Street and Mirgorodskaya Street, respectively. In addition, Kiev residents proposed to perpetuate the memory of Andriy Melnyk, the leader of a branch of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) (banned in Russia) that was considered more loyal to the Nazis, instead of Soviet Major General Vasily Tupikov.

Earlier, in the context of the special military operation, the Ukrainian authorities decided to change the traditional names of some food stuffs.

* the organization is banned in Russia
Annex 261


(translation)
Translation


**Turgenev Street Renamed in Honour of UPA Fighters in Lvov**

The Lvov City Council decided to rename Ivan Turgenev Street in honour of the Heroes of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), *Interfax* reports. 69 out of the 90 deputies supported the idea. According to *IA REGNUM*, no one voted against, with the remaining 16 parliamentarians in the hall simply refraining from the vote.

The parliamentary resolution notes that the street was renamed in respect for the memory of the “UPA soldiers – participants in the heroic struggle for the liberation of Ukraine from Nazism and the Communist terror”.

The Lvov Communists opposed that decision. Aleksander Kalinyuk, First Secretary of the local branch of the Communist Party of Ukraine, has repeatedly stated that if the street is renamed, he will appeal to the court and arrange for protests.

The Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the combat wing of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), fought against both German and Red Army troops during World War II. After the end of the war, UPA members continued to fight against the Soviet authorities.
Annex 262

RT, *Poland Wants Ukraine to Admit Genocide* (16 August 2022)
Poland wants Ukraine to admit genocide

A deputy culture minister says the 1943 Volhyn massacres fit the definition of genocide and Kiev will have to recognize that.

The mass murder of Poles by Ukrainian nationalists during the Second World War meets the definition of genocide and the government in Kiev will have to recognize this sooner or later, Poland’s Deputy Minister of Culture and National Heritage Jaroslaw Sellin said on Tuesday.

“They have to acknowledge it because it’s a fact. It’s simply a fact. A political decision was made and implemented for ethnic cleansing, the extermination of the entire national minority that has lived there for centuries,” Sellin told the Polish Press Agency (PAP) during a TV interview.

“This is genocide, it fits all the parameters of the definition of genocide, so there is no discussion here. This is a historical fact. Sooner or later, the Ukrainians will have to recognize it,” he added.

Polish historians say between 100,000-130,000 ethnic Poles were massacred by Stepan Bandera’s Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). In 2016, the parliament in Warsaw adopted a resolution establishing July 11 as a day of commemorating the genocide, referring to the date on which the UPA attacked 150 Polish towns in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia. The parliament in Kiev responded by denouncing the resolution as counterproductive.

Poland has put together a proposal for a joint working group and sent the list of its members to the Ministry of Culture in Kiev, Sellin told PAP. The working group would start the search for mass graves, organize exhumations and proper burials, and put up monuments to commemorate the dead.

“We are waiting for a personnel proposal from the Ukrainian side,” he said.

Part of the problem, Sellin said, was the Ukrainian government policy of glorifying the UPA as Ukrainian nationalists who fought against the Soviet Union – while ignoring the other things they did, such as the genocide of Poles. As a result, he said, there is a “real ignorance” of the Volhyn massacres in Ukraine.
Poland’s task is to build a common historical truth, the deputy minister said, adding that the Ukrainians will “sooner or later come to the point where part of the traditions of this military formation and the nationalist political movements behind it are unacceptable, worthy of condemnation.”

Bandera and the UPA are national heroes in present-day Ukraine, officially established as such in 2010 by the US-backed government of President Viktor Yushchenko.
Annex 263

People’s World, Ukraine’s Ally Poland Demands It Stop Glorifying Nazi Collaborators
(18 August 2022)
Ukraine’s ally Poland demands it stop glorifying Nazi collaborators
August 18, 2022 | 10:57 AM CDT | BY MORNING STAR

Ukrainian fascists carry torches and a portrait of Stepan Bandera during a rally in Kiev, Jan. 1, 2022. The rally was organized to mark the birthday of Bandera, founder of an armed group that fought against the USSR and aided Hitler during his invasion of Soviet Ukraine in 1941. Poland is demanding that the Ukrainian government stop glorifying Bandera and recognize the genocide of Poles and others that he helped commit during WWII. | Efrem Lukatsky / AP

Ukraine must acknowledge the genocide of Poles by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in World War II, a Polish official says.

Warsaw has proposed a joint commission to exhume mass graves and give victims a proper burial but received no response from Kiev, Deputy Culture Minister Jaroslaw Sellin told
Ukrainian authorities have rebuffed protests from Poland and Israel about their glorification of Nazi collaborator Stepan Bandera and his organization the UPA, which massacred over 130,000 Jews and Poles in an ethnic cleansing program during the Second World War.

Bandera, who fought with the Nazis against the Soviet Union, has been given Ukrainian national hero status as an anti-Soviet militant since the “Maidan” coup of 2014, with his birthday named a public holiday in his honor.

The public rehabilitation of Nazi collaborators provided Russian President Vladimir Putin with one of the claims he used to try to justify his invasion of Ukraine in February.

Sellin said the UPA’s massacres met the definition of genocide. “This is a historical fact. Sooner or later, Ukraine will have to acknowledge it,” he said.

“The traditions of this military formation and the nationalist political movements behind it are unacceptable, worthy of condemnation.

“They have to acknowledge it because it’s a fact. It’s simply a fact. A political decision was made and implemented for ethnic cleansing, the extermination of the entire national minority
that has lived there for centuries,” a Polish diplomat added.

Poland designated July 11 a national day in memory of the genocide in 2016, earning a rebuke from Ukraine, which has also dismissed Israeli objections to rallies celebrating Bandera as “counterproductive.”

Morning Star

TAGS: history Nazis Poland Russia Ukraine war

CONTRIBUTOR

Morning Star

Morning Star is the socialist daily newspaper published in Great Britain. Morning Star es el diario socialista publicado en Gran Bretaña.

RELATED ARTICLES

Dr. Martin Luther King on the legacy of W.E.B. Du Bois
Annex 264


(translation)

Memorial Plaque Unveiled on the Facade of Yury Lipa District Central Library in Yavorov

On 19 August 2020, on the 76th anniversary of the death of Yury Lipa, a memorial plaque was unveiled on the facade of the District Central Library named after Yuri Lipa in the urban-type settlement of Yavorov on the occasion of the 120th anniversary of his birth.

During the event, the libraries of the Yavorov District were solemnly presented with a book titled “Folk Art Treasury of Yavorov District” as written by V. Yaryomin.

Ivan Sobko, Deputy Head of the Lvov Regional State Administration, Vitaly Denega, First Deputy Chair of the Yavoriv District State Administration, Vladimir Dzyunka, Deputy Chair of the Yavorov District State Administration, Vladimir Sichak, Chair of the Yavorov District Council, and representatives of various public organisations took part in the event.

“Today’s opening of the memorial plaque named after Yury Lipa makes it possible once again to pay tribute and thank this public figure and spiritual guide of the Ukrainian people for his heroism. We must remember such heroes who served for the benefit of the Ukrainian people with their lives and work”, says Ivan Sobko.

It is worth noting that the opening of the plaque was to be held on the 5th of May 2020 but was postponed due to the quarantine.
Reference information: In the house where the Yavorov District Central Library named after Yury Lipa is now located, Dr. Yury Lipa delivered his lectures in 1943 and 1944.
Annex 265

EurAsia Daily, *OUN-UPA “Euthanasiologist” Doctor Honoured in Lvov Region* (22 August 2020)

(translation)
The plaque in honour of Yury Lipa in the Yavorov district library was for some reason placed next to the WC door. The photo is from Eduard Dolinsky’s Facebook page.

On the 23rd of August, Ukraine celebrates the Day of the National Flag, followed by the Independence Day on the 24th of August. In the district centre of Yavorov, Lvov Region, these special occasion days for the Ukrainian state are celebrated in dedication to Yury Lipa, a doctor and a Nazi criminal who was in charge of the OUN-UPA medical courses (the organisation is banned in Russia). Commemorative plaques in honour of Yury Lipa have been placed on the facade and inside the Yavorov district library (which is named after this Ukrainian Nazi as well); cultural heritage evenings are held in the district by young nationalist scouts from the Plast Association.

Alongside his medical practice, Yury Lipa was an active political publicist and is viewed as one of the most prominent thinkers of Ukrainian nationalism. Here are a few examples of his political philosophy:

"Only Ukrainian uniqueness gives ample opportunities for an expansion of the Ukrainian race. The uniqueness of Ukrainians asserts the power of their subconscious racial predecessors; the Goths and Hellenes. Interbreeding with Muscovites is a phenomenon that has been unknown to the Ukrainian race. Historically, the poorest Ukrainian woman would be ashamed to marry even the richest Muscovite. The poorest of Ukrainian peasants would never hire themselves out
to work in Muscovite villages. Taras Shevchenko's “Cherry Orchard by the House” is now our anti-Muscovite driving lever, because the thriftable and devoid of any tradition Urals-Finnish spirit of hatred towards the Ukrainian family is influencing upon Ukraine to push it away from Moscow” (The Cause of Ukraine, 1938):

"Jewish handlers treat the peoples of the Soviets as a rural kike does his horse: he whips it endlessly until the horse finally gets a kind of scuffed rhythm (...). 300 eggs from every Ukrainian woman and 1,500 ejaculations from every Ukrainian man are the same treasure for the state as energy reserves or deposits of iron, coal and oil” (The Ukrainian Race, 1938):

"First of all, Ukraine needs to be cleansed from the six million Muscovites who are its parasites, comprise almost 10 percent of its population and, as a rule, live in cities. They are parasites who are used to rule over Ukrainians (...) A free Ukraine will come not after Kiev is liberated from the Muscovites, but after Moscow is destructed. The destruction of Russia as the centre of the supranational division of lands between the Volga, Pechora and the White Sea is the basis of a strong Ukraine” (Geopolitical Landmarks of the new Ukraine, 1941).

Lipa also wrote poetry: “Ranks are advancing, rattling and bathing in blood, tempered in fire. Fire and blood, life, will or death are burning in their chests... Do you hear the cry — Sieg Heil! Heil! Sieg Heil!”

“To preserve the purity of the Ukrainian race, Lipa thought it necessary to set up sex courts and tribunals like the ones in Nazi Germany. They say that Adolf Hitler himself read the works of Yury Lipa and invited him to Berlin, offering him the post of the head the government of Ukraine. But Lipa refused the Nazi, returned home in triumph and joined the UPA," recalls the chairman of the Ukrainian Jewish Committee, Eduard Dolinsky. For his racist doctrinarianism worthy of Nazi murderer doctors, the Ukrainian Jewish Committee dubbed the certified doctor Yury Lipa an "euthanasiologist".

Yury Lipa was not born in Yavorov; he was born in Odessa in 1900. The Yavorov district administration honours his memory so much because on 19 August 1944 Lipa was shot by NKVD units in the village of Shutova near Yavorov. Beside Yavorov, streets in Odessa, Kropyvnytskyi, Lvov and Stryi, the Lvov war veteran and political prisoners’ hospital, and a Ukrainian school in Toronto, Canada, are named after the “euthanasiologist”.
Annex 266

Wikipedia, *Yury Lipa Street*

(translation)
Yury Lipa Street

Material from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.

This name is used for several geographical features and the page contains links to articles about each of them. If you got here via an internal link, please go back and correct it so that it points directly to the right article.

The person after whom these features are named is Yury Ivanovich Lipa

Yury Lipa Street is a street name in many Ukrainian cities and towns. The list below contains only some of them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Yury Lipa Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Kiev region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Kirovograd region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Lvov region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Sumy region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Ivan and Yury Lipa Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Former streets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Notes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yuri Lipa Street

Kiev region [edit][edit code].

- Yury Lipa Street is a street in the city of Kiev.

Kirovograd region [edit][edit code].

- Yury Lipa Street is a street in the city of Kropyvnytskyi.

Lvov region [edit][edit code].

- Yury Lipa Street is a street in the village Buniv village.
- Yury Lipa Street is a street in the city of Vynnyky.
- Yury Lipa Street is a street in the village of Volia-Dobrostanska.
- Yury Lipa Street is a street in the town of Ivano-Frankovo.
- Yury Lipa Street is a street in the town of Krakovets.
- Yury Lipa Street is a street in the village of Kulynichi.
• Yuri Lipa Street is a street in the city of Lvov.
• Yuri Lipa Street is a street in the village Moloshkovychi.
• Yuri Lipa Street is a street in the city of Novoyavorivsk.
• Yuri Lipa Street is a street in the town of Olesko.
• Yuri Lipa Street is a street in the village of Prylbychi village.
• Yuri Lipa Street is a street in the village of Starychi.
• Yuri Lipa Street is a street in the city of Stryi.
• Yuri Lipa Street is a street in the town of Shklo.
• Yuri Lipa Street is a street in the village of Shutova.
• Yuri Lipa Street is a street in the city of Yavorov.

Sumy region [edit][edit code]

• Yuri Lipa Street is a street in the city of Konotop.
• Yuri Lipa Street is a street in the city of Sumy.

Ivan and Yury Lipa Street[edit]. [edit code].

• Ivan and Yury Lipa street is a street in the city of Odessa[1].

Former streets[edit] [edit code].

• Ivan and Yury Lipa Street is the former name of Pishenina Street in the Malynovskiy district of the city of Odessa[1].

Notes.

1 Two largest squares to be swapped in Odessa and many streets to be renamed [Archived 21 July 2018 at Wayback Machine(Rus)]

Categories: Multiple meaning terms: urbanonyms Yury Lipa Street

This page was last edited at 23:47, 6 June 2022
Annex 267

Kulturologia.ru, *How Nationalist Symon Petlyura Became a Hero of Ukraine, and Why the Man Who Killed Him Was Acquitted* (11 April 2022)

(translation)
Symon Petlyura stands among the modern Ukrainian heroes as a symbol of a desperate desire for national independence. At some point, he even eclipsed Mazepa, the independence seeker. At the same time, hardly anybody ever probes into details of the life and death of this man. Initially far from the top of the Ukrainian nationalist movement, Petlyura managed to rise to the fore during the revolution of 1917. At the end of the 1910s, he turned to raging antisemitism and led Jewish pogroms. This fact allowed the court to acquit Symon Petlyura’s assassin.

Read more: the extermination of Jews by Ukrainian nationalists.
Kiev’s Revolution Ambivalence

The Pro-German Kiev in 1918.

Like many other figures of the revolution, Symon Petlyura, a cab driver’s son, studied at a theological seminary and was expelled because of his anti-government activities. Having emigrated to the Austro-Hungarian Lvov, he gained experience in the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party, and then among the Ukrainian Social Democrats. After returning to Russia, he earned a living as a teacher and accountant, cooperating with national liberation organisations on the side.

Petlyura was wanted by the police since 1907, all the while shuttling safely between Moscow and St. Petersburg. In 1912-1914 he was in charge of publishing The Ukrainian Life newspaper. When the First World War broke out, Petlyura was drafted to the army, although he was never seen in combat. This inglorious fact did not prevent Symon from becoming the head of the Ukraine’s Front Committee after the February Revolution. In the spring of 1917, he joined the Ukrainian Central Rada (UCR) as the War Minister and initiated the establishment of the Ukrainian Army despite his lack of military and combat experience.

When the independence of Ukraine was declared on 20 November 1917, Bolshevik detachments were disarmed. The Ukrainian delegation in Brest entered into negotiations with the Germans. Two months later, a full Ukrainian autonomy from the Russian influence was declared under the German patronage. At the same time, the Bolsheviks set up their own Ukrainian government in Kharkov and started to fight against the UCR. On 26 January 1918, the Bolsheviks took over Kiev but did not stay long there and had to retreat under the onslaught of German troops. On 29 April, the Germans declared General Skoropadsky the Hetman of Ukraine, and Petlyura was appointed the head of the All-Ukrainian Union of Zemstvos. By May 1918, acting together with Vynnychenko, he initiated the creation of a National Union of representatives of all Ukrainian parties, starting a war on Skoropadsky. On 13 November 1918, a new ruling body called the Ukrainian Directory was set up, and on the following day Petlyura’s troops, as was agreed with the Germans, entered Kiev. That is how Symon became the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian People’s Republic Army.
Hetman’s Troubles and Petlyura’s Triumph

Petlyurists have the blood of tens of thousands of Jews on their hands. Photo: ic.pics.livejournal.com

The Germans soon stopped supporting the Hetman because of their internal problems, and then Skoropadsky tried to rely upon the Russian population, proclaiming a future alliance with a non-Soviet Russia on 14 November. On the same day, the Directory leaders put Petlyura in charge of an armed uprising. They held negotiations with the Germans who still remained in Bila Tserkva and confirmed their neutrality. The Hetman's guard – the last opponent of the Directory – surrendered without any resistance. Petlyura moved on to Kiev. Vigilante guard officers and some units of the Hetman’s army that supported Skoropadsky tried to resist the Sich riflemen.

Biding his time, Petlyura set up a camp in Fastiv patiently waiting for the Hetman's army to turn to his side. In ten days, the number of his troops multiplied by dozens of times. The Hetman’s power by that time was limited to the borders of Kiev, and most of his troops defected to the Directory as expected. The last people Skoropadsky relied on were Russian officers. The Germans did not interfere in the conflict, getting ready to evacuate and selling weapons to Petlyura. The situation became finally clear when the German garrison signed a neutrality agreement with the Directory in December.

On 13 December 1918, Petlyura moved out to take Kiev. These events are described in detail by Mikhail Bulgakov in his “White Guard”. The next morning, the Directory took over the city. This was the heyday for Symon Petlyura. However, it did not last long.
Triumph and Collapse

According to historians, at the best of his times Petlyura had a dozen Cossack divisions and several regiments of Sich riflemen, all of whom were then called Petlyurists. When not in combat, the units busied themselves with pogroms. The same can be said, of course, about the White and Red units. However, according to the researcher Nahum Gergel, a larger portion of the Civil War time pogroms were perpetrated by Petlyura’s “army”. His estimates are based on eyewitness accounts and newspaper reports.

The publicist Dmitry Gubin identifies the Proskurov pogrom as the first act of extermination of an ethnic minority for the sake of building Ukraine. Archival documents cited by the researcher describe the massacre of Jews, regardless of their age or gender, by the Petlyurites. The Orthodox priest Kachurovsky who tried to shelter Jewish children, was hacked to death by the perpetrators. According to a report by the Red Cross special commission, at least 50 thousand Jews were killed in Kiev in those days. However, modern Ukrainian statisticians have questioned these facts writing off the murders to non-regular units who were not controlled by Petlyura. Nevertheless, Petlyura’s response to a demand from Jewish organisations to use power to stop the pogroms is recorded in history: “Don’t make mischief between me and my army”.

In June 1920, Kiev was taken over by the Red Army, and Petlyura, wearing a false moustache to avoid recognition, fled via Poland to Budapest, Vienna and Geneva, finally finding himself in Paris. Later on, he would often change his appearance and live under fake names, but all these efforts would not save him from revenge. His assassin, Mr. Schwarzbard, stated as an excuse that Symon Petlyura had encouraged pogroms and therefore was primarily responsible for the crimes. Mr. Schwarzbard was acquitted and declared a national hero in Israel. In contrast, his victim Petlyura was raised to the pantheon of national heroes in Ukraine.

As far as the kingdoms of Moscow and Russia are concerned, they often did not get along with the Turks throughout their history. History knows many examples of what the Russian Empire did to tame the Ottomans; the Russian-Turkish wars.
Annex 268

Lenta.ru, Comintern Street in Kiev Renamed to Petlyura Street (19 June 2009)

(translation)

**Comintern Street in Kiev Renamed to Petlyura Street**

The Kiev City Council renamed Comintern Street to Symon Petlyura Street, *RIA Novosti* reported on the 18th of June.

The renaming was timed to the 130th anniversary of the birth of Ataman Symon Petlyura, the head of the Directorate of the Ukrainian People’s Republic. During the Civil War, he participated in battles against the Red Army and then emigrated. Petlyura was killed in Paris in 1926 in retaliation for arranging for Jewish pogroms in Ukraine. Nowadays, Petlyura is considered a national hero in Ukraine.

It was reported earlier that, in addition to Petlyura Street, streets named after Colonel Yevhen Konovalets of the Ukrainian People’s Republic’s Army and Commander-in-Chief Roman Shukhevych of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army may appear in Kiev.

This initiative was opposed by Mikhail Kalnitsky, a member of the Naming Commission and a Kiev scholar. “Let’s call the streets after recognised heroes – writers, artists or scientists but not politicians”, he said.
Annex 269

UKRINFORM, *Nationalists Succeed in Protecting Petlyura Street in Poltava Region*  
(28 February 2017)  

(translation)
Nationalists Succeed in Protecting Petlyura Street in Poltava Region

The Shyshaky District Court of the Poltava Region granted a claim filed by Vladimir Chmyr, Chair of the OUN Secretariat, to invalidate the decision made by the Shyshaky Village Council to rename Simon Petlyura Street to Shyshaky Street.

The announcement was made today by Bohdan Chervak, OUN Chair, on his Facebook page.

“The Shyshaky District Court of the Poltava Region has just granted a claim filed by Vladimir Chmyr, Chair of the OUN Secretariat, to invalidate the decision made by the Shyshaky Village Council to rename Simon Petlyura Street to Shyshaky Street”, Mr. Chervak wrote. “Therefore, there will be a street named after Simon Petlyura! in Shyshaky”, he noted.

However, according to the OUN Chair, the questions remain how the deputies could have made such illegal decision and in which other towns and villages similar decisions have been made.

Earlier, in the village of Shyshaky near Poltava, the local deputies decided to rename Simon Petlyura Street to Shyshaky Street. The Shyshaky District Unit of the OUN then lodged with the court a lawsuit seeking to cancel their decision.
Annex 270

The Ukrainian News, Expert Council of Ukraine’s State Committee on Television and Radio Broadcasting Bans Swedish Historian’s World-Famous Book That Mentions Jewish Pogroms of Petlyura Times (26 December 2018)

(translation)

**Translation**

Expert Council of Ukraine’s State Committee on Television and Radio Broadcasting Bans Swedish Historian’s World-Famous Book That Mentions Jewish Pogroms of Petlyura Times

By Yakov Stashinsky

The National Council of Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine


The book has been banned in Ukraine “for inciting interethnic, racial and religious enmity”, as stated in the minutes of the Committee’s meeting held on 10 December, provided by the State TV & Radio Committee at the request of *The Ukrainian News*. 
According to the text of the minutes, the Expert Council on Publishing Products chaired by Bogdan Chervak reviewed 25 books published in the Russian Federation in 2018 at its meeting on the 10th of December. It should be noted that, apart from Russian books, the list contains translated publications.
Among others, the Council members unanimously voted to ban Rydel’s book as an “incitement to hatred”.

Annex 270

Even Nicholas Roerich who, as it turned out, “pushes propaganda of the aggressor country” from the distant past, is now in the category of banned books. Truth be told, two members of the Council voted against banning his book “The Paths of Blessing”.

Earlier, Eduard Dolinsky, the director of the Ukrainian Jewish Committee, voiced his outrage at the banning of Rydel’s book in Ukraine on his Facebook page https://www.facebook.com/eduard.dolinsky/posts/2238081892890533.

“What are these “Sharikovs” against? The author re-iterates the allegations spread by Russian propaganda about the figures of the Ukrainian People's Republic.” They refer to Symon Petlyura, infamous for the Jewish pogroms, who is mentioned in the book. This turned out to be enough to ban a book by a world-famous author. I don’t know who and what Chervak is
guided by, but this whole book banning thing is quite symbolic in itself,” he wrote.

Eduard Dolinsky
about 4 years ago

In Ukraine, it is the head of the OUN Bogdan Chervak who is in charge of issuing permits for the import of books. His work title is the first deputy head of the State Committee on Television and Radio Broadcasting. Chervak was appointed a book inquisitor because he graduated from a pedagogical institute in Drohobych and worked as a teacher of the Ukrainian language and literature. This turned out to be enough for the Nazi collaborator apologist to fly into a rage and begin the symbolic burning of books, prohibiting their import into Ukraine. Even the absolutely beautiful and harmless Poetry of the Silver Age is among his victims... See more

“The Book Thieves” is a 2017 bestseller written by the Swedish historian Andres Rydel. Its full title is “The Book Thieves: The Nazi Looting of Europe’s Libraries and the Race to Return a Literary Inheritance”. The book has been translated into 27 languages including Russian (at the end of 2018).

The book was an Amazon bestseller for over ten weeks (in the category of history books), shortlisted for the Kirkus Magazine best non-fiction book award in the USA in 2017, and received the Bengt Janson Memorial Foundation Award in Sweden in 2018.
Annex 271

Time, Exclusive: Leader of Far-Right Ukrainian Militant Group Talks Revolution With TIME
(4 February 2014)
Exclusive: Leader of Far-Right Ukrainian Militant Group Talks Revolution With TIME

By Simon Shuster

Take the smell of an army barracks, add a bit of char and gasoline, and you’d have a rough idea of the air on the fifth floor of the House of Trade Unions, the headquarters of the revolution in Ukraine. When protesters first occupied the building in December, their leaders divvied up its floors among the political parties and activists involved in the revolt. Since then, the only floor off-limits to journalists has been the fifth, which houses the militant arm of the revolution, Pravy Sektor (Right Sector), the coalition of right-wing radicals that grew out of the uprising. They had good reason to avoid publicity. After their violent clashes with police last month, their members could face years in prison if the ruling government survives the revolt.

But on Sunday night, their leader Dmitro Yarosh agreed to give his first interview to a foreign media outlet. It was not so much an act of vanity as a political coming-out. He has clearly grown tired of being the movement’s anonymous enforcer. In recent days, as a negotiated end to the crisis has started coming into view, the need for a military wing of the revolution has diminished. And so has the trust in its upper ranks. The mainstream opposition leaders, like the former world boxing champion Vitali Klitschko, have faced growing pressure to distance themselves from Pravy Sektor, which the U.S. State Department has condemned for “inflaming conditions on the streets.” Increasingly marginalized, the group has grown much more assertive and, in some ways, has started going rogue.

In his interview with TIME, Yarosh, whose militant brand of nationalism rejects all foreign influence over Ukrainian affairs, revealed for the first time that Pravy Sektor has amassed a lethal arsenal of weapons. He declined to say exactly how many guns they have. “It is enough,” he says, “to defend all of Ukraine from the internal occupiers” — by which he means the ruling government — and to carry on the revolution if negotiations with that government break down.

But so far, those negotiations have been making significant strides toward resolving the crisis. On Tuesday, the parliament began debating a sweeping reform of the constitution, while allies of President Viktor Yanukovych suggested for the first time that he is ready to consider early elections. Both moves would mark a major breakthrough. But Yarosh, watching from the sidelines, has begun to doubt whether the negotiators have the interests of his men at heart. “This whole peaceful song and dance, the standing around, the negotiations, none of it has brought real change.” Dozens of his men, he says, remain behind bars after their street battles against police two weeks ago.
With that in mind, Yarosh and another militant faction began a parallel set of negotiations over the weekend. On Monday, they claimed to be in direct talks with Ukraine's police forces to secure the release of jailed protesters, including members of Pravy Sektor. Mainstream opposition leaders said they had not authorized any such talks. At the same time, Yarosh has demanded a seat at the negotiating table with the President. Once again, he was flatly denied. His ideology, it seems, is just too toxic to let him in the room.

But neither can Klitschko and his fellow politicians easily sever their ties with Pravy Sektor. The group serves some of the uprising’s most essential functions. Its fighters control the barricades around the protest camp in the center of Ukraine’s capital, and when riot police have tried to tear it down, they have been on the front lines beating them back with clubs, rocks, Molotov cocktails and even a few catapults, in the mold of siege engines of the Middle Ages. Around the country, its fighters have helped seize government headquarters in more than a dozen cities. “Pravy Sektor has proved its loyalty to the ideals of freedom,” Yarosh says. “Now we needed to present this movement as a source of leadership.”

In any kind of fair election, that would be nearly impossible. Pravy Sektor’s ideology borders on fascism, and it enjoys support only from Ukraine’s most hard-line nationalists, a group too small to secure them a place in parliament. But taking part in the democratic process is not part of Yarosh’s strategy. “We are not politicians,” he says in his office, a pack of Lucky Strikes and a walkie-talkie on the table in front of him, while a sentry in a black ski mask and bulletproof vest stands by the door. “We are soldiers of the national revolution.” His entire adult life has been spent waiting for such a revolution to “steer the country in a new direction, one that would make it truly strong, not dependent on either the West or the East.”

(MORE: How Russia Is Fighting to Regain Control Over Ukraine)

As Unrest Grows In Ukraine, Questions Over Who’s Really Steering Opposition

Through all his years in the nationalist movement, Yarosh, a 42-year-old father of three, says he has never had any form of occupation apart from his activism. The son of two factory workers, he was born and raised in a provincial town in eastern Ukraine, and became involved in the nationalist underground in the late 1980s, just as the Soviet Union was disintegrating. Nearly all of the satellite states of the USSR, from the Baltics to Central Asia, were then pushing to break away from Moscow's control, and in 1988, Yarosh joined one of the more radical groups fighting for an independent Ukraine.

The following autumn, months after the Soviet Union pulled its troops out of Afghanistan, Yarosh was drafted into the Red Army, a common form of punishment for political activists at the time. He was stationed briefly in Belarus before being transferred to Siberia, where he served as a guard at strategic missile sites. The Soviet doctrines of unity between Russia and Ukraine did little to soften his views. "If anything, the army made me more convinced that my path is correct," he says.
When Ukraine declared independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Yarosh went on hunger strike to demand a transfer to the newly established Ukrainian army. His commanding officers ignored him.

In 1994, a few years after he was discharged and returned to Ukraine, he joined a right-wing organization called Trizub (Trident), and slowly climbed its ranks before assuming leadership in 2005. Along with several other far-right groups, Trizub formed the core of Pravy Sektor when the current uprising broke out in Ukraine two months ago. Its main adversary has always been Russia, although it also has little patience for Western influence on Ukraine. “For all the years of Ukraine’s independence, Russia has pursued a systematic, targeted policy of subjugation toward Ukraine,” Yarosh says. “So of course we will prepare for a conflict with them,” he adds, especially after Russia’s recent invasion of another one of its former satellites, Georgia. “If they stick their faces here like they did in Georgia in 2008, they’ll get it in the teeth.”

So far, his jabs at the leaders of the opposition in Ukraine have not been quite as pointed. He has accused them of vanity and ineffectiveness, but he has also observed the truce they called a week and a half ago to allow their negotiations to proceed. “Not a single Molotov cocktail has gone flying since then,” he says proudly. “A truce is a truce. They want to negotiate, let them negotiate.” But as Yarosh realizes, he and his men have staked a great deal on the outcome of these talks.

If the ruling government holds on to power, Pravy Sektor could be forced to take the blame for the violence that left dozens of police officers in the hospital two weeks ago. “All those criminal charges are already waiting in the prosecutor’s office,” he says. On the other hand, if the opposition forms a new government, they are not likely to carve out a place for Yarosh and his men in the halls of power. So it is no surprise that he has begun to show some political initiative.

For the past two decades, he has been waiting and preparing for the start of the “national revolution,” and now that he finds himself at the head of its armed division, he does not seem ready to let it pass peacefully away, at least not on anyone else’s terms. “People have gotten in touch with us from around the country, saying, ‘Guys, don’t let us down. Take us to victory, to independence, if the other leaders are incapable of that,’” Yarosh says. “So if the time has come for an active struggle, I am ready to carry it to the end. I am not afraid of that responsibility. I see no reason to hide my face.”

Contact us at letters@time.com.
Annex 272

Jewish.ru, Anti-Semitism Goes Uphill (9 April 2013)

(translation)
Last Sunday, the results of an annual study of the antisemitic manifestations worldwide in 2012 were presented at the Tel Aviv University.

The study report named “Antisemitic Manifestations Worldwide 2012. Overview of Main Trends” has been prepared by the Kantor Centre for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry in conjunction with the Kantor Data Foundation for the Study of Contemporary Anti-Semitism and Racism at Tel Aviv University and the European Jewish Congress (EJC).

“The number of antisemitic manifestations worldwide, including those associated with violence, increased by 30 percent last year compared to 2011”, the report says. “There was an escalation after two years of decline”.

In total, 686 acts of violence and vandalism motivated by antisemitism were recorded worldwide last year, including 273 attacks on people of various ages and acts of desecration of 190 synagogues, cemeteries and monuments. More than 200 cases of encroachment on properties belonging to Jews or Jewish organisations were also recorded.

Most of the anti-Semitic incidents (510) occurred in countries where the largest Jewish communities outside Israel reside. Most of these acts took place in France (200 cases), the US (99), the UK (84), Canada (74) and Australia (53).

Vyatcheslav Kantor, President of the European Jewish Congress and the head of the Kantor Centre for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry, spoke at a press conference dedicated to the publication of the report. “The number of antisemitic manifestations accompanied by acts of violence especially increased in France where a massacre took place at the in Ozar Hatorah School in Toulouse. Quite a few cases of antisemitism also occurred in Hungary, the Great Britain, Germany, and Australia. The violence in France showed that violence against Jews is rooted in the worldview of extremist elements”, Mr. Kantor said.

According to him, the attack on the Jewish school in Toulouse did not serve as a sobering shock for those extremists throughout Europe, but, on the contrary, encouraged them to continue their
“struggle”. In his opinion, this process shows that “antisemitism generates antisemitism, and authorities must henceforth act quickly and decisively to prevent such incidents”.

The President of the EJC recommended that security forces in European countries pay special attention to “extremist enclaves” in a number of Muslim communities in Europe, which, according to him, serve as the main hotbeds of radical Islamism.

Among the main factors contributing to the growth of antisemitism in the past year, the report notes: 1) imitation of the actions taken by the Toulouse terrorist Mohammed Merah; 2) intensification and growth of the popularity of far-right political parties and organisations; and 3) protest against the Israeli operation “Pillar of Defence” in the Gaza Strip.

The strengthening of right-wing extremist parties took place in Greece (Golden Dawn), Hungary (Jobbik) and Ukraine (Svoboda).

Raving representatives of right-wing parties make calls against local Jewish communities in national parliaments.

The Svoboda (Freedom) party, formerly named the Social-National Party of Ukraine (reminiscent of Hitler’s NSDAP), won 8% of the votes in the last elections to the Verkhovnaya Rada. Its leader, Oleg Tyahnybok, has repeatedly stated that “Ukraine is ruled by the Russian-Jewish mafia”.

“However, the most alarming situation with antisemitism and xenophobia has developed in Hungary where attacks on representatives of ethnic minorities take place almost every week. Polls show that the popularity of extreme nationalists in Hungary is growing. Jobbik recently became the most popular party among students”, Mr. Kantor said. He stressed that a member of the Hungarian parliament from Jobbik called Jews a “threat to the national security” and called on the authorities to put all Jews on a special account. Mr. Kantor called on the Hungarian government and the EU leadership to pay special attention to such phenomena and wage an uncompromising struggle against them. According to a sociological study recently conducted by the Kantor Centre for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry in 10 European countries, about 30 percent of the population of these countries share antisemitic prejudice to one degree or another, with Spain being the champion of such sentiments.

Street violence against Jews also grew in the past year, particularly in Western Europe, but also in North America and Australia, Mr. Kantor said. In most cases, the victims were religious Jews easily identifiable because of their clothing.

In a number of cases, Jewish community leaders advised their members for safety reasons “not to appear on the street in a traditional Jewish costume with a kippah on their heads, not to speak Hebrew, etc.”.

In conclusion, Mr. Kantor stressed that the economic difficulties experienced by Europe cause the popularity of neo-Nazis to grow, which resembles what happened with their predecessors in the 1930s in relation. “However, a situation could occur where the economy will be restored but moral values will be lost”, he noted.
European Jews are launching a campaign against antisemitism and xenophobia, Mr. Kantor said. The EJC insists that the European Parliament should hold hearings on the situation in Hungary.
Annex 273


(translation)
Hollywood star Mila Kunis, who was born in Chernovtsy, Ukraine, recently found herself at the centre of an anti-Semitic scandal in Ukraine. Igor Miroshnichenko, a Verkhovnaya Rada member from the nationalist Svoboda (Freedom) party, called on his Facebook page not to consider Ms. Kunis Ukrainian on the grounds that “she is a zhyd by her origin”. Mr. Miroshnichenko accused the actress of being proud of her Jewish origin, but never speaking positively about Ukraine. His statement and especially his use of the word “zhyd” (Jew), which sounds in modern Ukrainian no less offensive than in Russian, caused indignation of Jews in Ukraine and all over the world.

Eleonora Groysman, President of the Ukrainian Independent Council of Jewish Women, an all-Ukrainian public organisation, and Editor-in-Chief of Kiev Yevreiński, urged the Ukrainian Justice Ministry to confirm that the use of the word “zhyd” is unacceptable and offensive to Jews.

In response, the Ministry said the country’s laws do not prohibit the word “zhyd” and its derivatives from being used.

The Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles sent an indignant letter to Ukrainian Prime Minister Nikolay Azarov, tmz.com reports. “On behalf of the 400,000 members of the Simon Wiesenthal Center, one of the world’s largest human rights organisations, we want to express our indignation at the insults which the Jewish community of Ukraine is subjected to by the Svoboda party”, the letter says. “In particular, we urge you to protest against the outrageous antisemitic antics against the Ukrainian-born actress Mila Kunis by Verkhovnaya Rada member Igor Miroshnichenko who called the actress a “zhyd”. As you know, this word was used by the Nazis and their henchmen who killed Jews in Babyn Yar”.

“Mila Kunis’ parents like thousands other Jewish families were forced to leave Ukraine primarily because of anti-Semitism”, the letter says. “Today Ms. Kunis is a well-known and respected American actress whom Ukraine should apologise to. It is regrettable that intolerance
and antisemitism remain so strong in this country even after the Holocaust tragedy and the collapse of the USSR. We call on you, as Prime Minister, to condemn Mr. Miroshnichenko’s statement and thereby say “no” to xenophobic sentiments that threaten democracy”.

Representatives of the Ukrainian nationalist party themselves are convinced there is nothing wrong with the word “zhyd”. Yuriy Miroshnichenko and Iryna Farion, Verkhovnaya Rada members from the Svoboda party, said that the word “zhyd” is quite acceptable since it is used in classical literary works by Ukrainian authors.

However, the ruling Party of Regions did not support the anti-Semites. On the 21st of December, Vadym Kolesnichenko, Verkhovnaya Rada member from that party, submitted to the Rada a draft resolution “On the Prohibition of Hate Speech and Expressions Degrading Human Dignity”. The bill is intended to prohibit offensive words like “zhyd”, “khokhol” and “moskal” from being used, Ukrainskaya Pravda writes.

Mila Kunis has repeatedly said in her interviews that her family left the USSR in 1991 precisely because of antisemitism. “Jewish life was very difficult in the Soviet Union. The older generation of my family survived the Holocaust, and many of my relatives died”, she told about her life in Ukraine. “Because of the discrimination, many Soviet Jews hid their ethnicity, but my parents did not hide their Jewishness and instilled in me a sense of pride in their roots. It is not necessary to tell the whole world about it – that is enough to know for yourself. We celebrate Yom Kippur and Hanukkah, although we may not follow the canons in every aspect. When I went to a Soviet school, antisemitism was very common. It was obvious that you were not welcome in this country. So we went to America”.

Annex 273
Annex 274

Wolfram Nordsieck, *Parties and Elections in Europe. Supreme Council of Ukraine Elections*
Parties and Elections in Europe

Wolfram Nordsieck


President: Petro Poroshenko (BPP) • Prime Minister: Volodymyr Groysman (BPP) • Governing parties: BPP, NF

Legislative elections: Supreme Council of Ukraine, 5-year term, 450 seats, 5% threshold, parallel voting system (225 PR + 225 FPTP):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Narodnyj Front (NF) ☺ People's Front</td>
<td>Conservatism</td>
<td>22,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloc Petra Porošenka &quot;Solidarnist&quot; (BPP) ☺ Bloc Petro Poroshenko &quot;Solidarity&quot;</td>
<td>Liberal conservatism</td>
<td>21,8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ob'jednannja Samopomič (OS) ☺ Union Self Reliance</td>
<td>Conservatism</td>
<td>11,0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opozycijnyn Blok (OB) ☺ Opposition Bloc</td>
<td>Regionalism Centrism Euroscepticism</td>
<td>9,4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radikalna Partija Olega Ljaška (RP) ☺ Radical Party Oleh Lyashko</td>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>7,4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vseukrajinske Ob'jednannja &quot;Batkivšchina&quot; (BA) ☺ All-Ukrainian Union &quot;Fatherland&quot;</td>
<td>Conservatism</td>
<td>5,6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vseukrajinske Ob'jednannja &quot;Svoboda&quot; (SVOBODA) ☺ All-Ukrainian Union &quot;Freedom&quot;</td>
<td>Nationalism Far-right politics</td>
<td>4,7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komunistyčna Partija Ukrajiny (KPU) ☺ Communist Party of Ukraine</td>
<td>Communism Marxism-Leninism</td>
<td>3,9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Political Ideology</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Silna Ukrajina (SU)</strong></td>
<td>Centrism</td>
<td>3,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vseukrajiinske Ahrarne Ob'jednannja &quot;Zastup&quot; (ZASTUP)</strong></td>
<td>Agrarianism</td>
<td>2,7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pravyj Sektor (PS)</strong></td>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>1,8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partija Rehioniv (PR)</strong></td>
<td>Regionalism</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UDAR Vitalija Klíčka (UDAR)</strong></td>
<td>Liberalism</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Independents: 97 Seats
Others: 6,5% 5,8% 6 Seats
Unfilled: 27 Seats
Total: 450 Seats
Turnout: 52,4% 58,0%


Archive: [Elections](1990-2012).
Annex 275

Central Election Commission, Extraordinary Parliamentary Election 2014, Data as of 29 October 2014
### Autonomous Republic of Crimea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District No.</th>
<th>Winning candidate, nomination</th>
<th>Percentage of votes cast for candidate</th>
<th>Number of votes cast for candidate</th>
<th>% of processed PEC protocols</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Dombrovskiy Oleksandr Heorhiiovych, PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td>51.37</td>
<td>51 043</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Poroshenko Oleksi Petrovych, PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td>64.04</td>
<td>62 359</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>98.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Yurchyn Petro Vasylivych, self nominated</td>
<td>44.86</td>
<td>40 551</td>
<td>97.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Melnychuk Ivan Ivanovych, PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td>42.37</td>
<td>39 384</td>
<td>93.95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Sporysh Ivan Dmitrovych, PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td>33.82</td>
<td>25 676</td>
<td>93.95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Stadniichuk Roman Vasylivych, self nominated</td>
<td>21.89</td>
<td>14 506</td>
<td>93.90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Kucher Mykola Ivanovych, self nominated</td>
<td>47.38</td>
<td>42 977</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Demchak Ruslan Yevheniiovych, PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td>51.68</td>
<td>43 955</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Volyn region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District No.</th>
<th>Winning candidate, nomination</th>
<th>Percentage of votes cast for candidate</th>
<th>Number of votes cast for candidate</th>
<th>% of processed PEC protocols</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Huz Ihor Volodymyrovych, Political party &quot;NARODNYY FRONT&quot;</td>
<td>30.69</td>
<td>27 243</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>97.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Martyniak Serhii Vasylivych, self nominated</td>
<td>34.94</td>
<td>33 161</td>
<td>93.63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Ivakhiv Stepan Petrovych, self nominated</td>
<td>62.66</td>
<td>58 662</td>
<td>98.79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Lapin Ihor Oleksandrovych, PARTY &quot;NARODNYY FRONT&quot;</td>
<td>24.24</td>
<td>24 245</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Yeremetiev Ihor Myronovych, self nominated</td>
<td>40.43</td>
<td>41 510</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Dnipropetrovsk region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District No.</th>
<th>Winning candidate, nomination</th>
<th>Percentage of votes cast for candidate</th>
<th>Number of votes cast for candidate</th>
<th>% of processed PEC protocols</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Bezbakh Yakiv Yakovych, self nominated</td>
<td>30.90</td>
<td>20 399</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>99.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Kuriachyi Maksym Pavlovych, PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td>27.99</td>
<td>15 437</td>
<td>87.65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Denysenko Andri Serhiiovych, PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td>34.54</td>
<td>21 764</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Filatov Borys Albertovych, self nominated</td>
<td>56.66</td>
<td>36 166</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Kulichenko Ivan Ivanovych, PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td>33.50</td>
<td>18 864</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Kuprii Vitalii Mykolaiovych, PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td>29.71</td>
<td>16 688</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Dubinin Oleksandr Ivanovych, PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td>26.08</td>
<td>17 887</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Pavlov Kostiantyn Yuromovych, self nominated</td>
<td>33.36</td>
<td>28 469</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Halchenko Andri Volodymyrovych, self nominated</td>
<td>24.75</td>
<td>19 936</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Usz Kostiantyn Hilbovyvch, PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td>28.43</td>
<td>19 649</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Krzhyn Oleh Yuromovych, self nominated</td>
<td>24.16</td>
<td>17 206</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Shyptyk Andrii Fedorovych, self nominated</td>
<td>33.00</td>
<td>25 981</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Martoovs’kii Artur Volodymyrovych, self nominated</td>
<td>50.40</td>
<td>40 264</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Shpenov Dmytro Yuromovych, self nominated</td>
<td>38.21</td>
<td>26 102</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Nestereenko Vadym Hryhorovych, self nominated</td>
<td>31.35</td>
<td>21 334</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Yanush Dmytro Anatoliiovych, Political party &quot;PRAVYY SEKTOR&quot;</td>
<td>28.76</td>
<td>20 719</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Didych Valentyn Volodymyrovych, PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td>27.59</td>
<td>16 764</td>
<td>99.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Donetsk region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District No.</th>
<th>Winning candidate, nomination</th>
<th>Percentage of votes cast for candidate</th>
<th>Number of votes cast for candidate</th>
<th>% of processed PEC protocols</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Zviahitskyi Yuliy Leonidovych, self nominated</td>
<td>72.73</td>
<td>1 454</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>89.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Kliuev Serhii Petrovych, self nominated</td>
<td>47.47</td>
<td>22 669</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Solod Yuri Vasylivych, Political party &quot;Opozytsiynyy blok&quot;</td>
<td>34.12</td>
<td>13 126</td>
<td>93.80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Yefimov Maksym Viktorovych, self nominated</td>
<td>34.12</td>
<td>17 003</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Omelianovych Denys Serhiiovych, self nominated</td>
<td>23.18</td>
<td>4 045</td>
<td>53.90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>№</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Hillier Yevhenii Borysovyi</td>
<td>Self nominated</td>
<td>Zhytomyr region</td>
<td>39.54</td>
<td>27,674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Shkiriya Ihor Mykolaiovych</td>
<td>Self nominated</td>
<td>Zhytomyr region</td>
<td>42.76</td>
<td>4,481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Nedava Oleh Anatoliiovych</td>
<td>Self nominated</td>
<td>Zhytomyr region</td>
<td>63.63</td>
<td>2,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Matviienkov Serhi Anatoliiovych</td>
<td>Self nominated</td>
<td>Zhytomyr region</td>
<td>64.16</td>
<td>30,474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Taruta Serhi Oleksiyovych</td>
<td>Self nominated</td>
<td>Zhytomyr region</td>
<td>59.76</td>
<td>27,108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Sazhko Serhi Mykolaiovych</td>
<td>Self nominated</td>
<td>Zhytomyr region</td>
<td>30.77</td>
<td>6,148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Lubinet Dmytro Valeriyovych</td>
<td>PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td>Zhytomyr region</td>
<td>48.18</td>
<td>17,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Zhytomyr region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>96.23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>Shkiria Ihor Mykolaiovych</td>
<td>Self nominated</td>
<td>Zakarpats’ka region</td>
<td>42.76</td>
<td>4,481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>Nedava Oleh Anatoliiovych</td>
<td>Self nominated</td>
<td>Zakarpats’ka region</td>
<td>63.63</td>
<td>2,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Matviienkov Serhi Anatoliiovych</td>
<td>Self nominated</td>
<td>Zakarpats’ka region</td>
<td>64.16</td>
<td>30,474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>Rozenblat Boryslav Solomovych</td>
<td>PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td>Zakarpats’ka region</td>
<td>20.81</td>
<td>19,349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>Reveha Oleksandr Vasylovych</td>
<td>Self nominated</td>
<td>Zakarpats’ka region</td>
<td>29.42</td>
<td>26,765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>Areshonkov Volodymyr Yuriiovych</td>
<td>PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td>Zakarpats’ka region</td>
<td>41.03</td>
<td>32,805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>Lytvyn Volodymyr Mykhaliovych</td>
<td>Self nominated</td>
<td>Zakarpats’ka region</td>
<td>41.38</td>
<td>36,536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>Dubshyk Pavlo Volodymyrivych</td>
<td>Political party &quot;NARODNYY FRONT&quot;</td>
<td>Zakarpats’ka region</td>
<td>18.71</td>
<td>13,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>Razvadovskyi Viktor Yosypovych</td>
<td>Self nominated</td>
<td>Zakarpats’ka region</td>
<td>37.19</td>
<td>34,188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>Zakarpats’ka region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>Rozenblat Boryslav Solomovych</td>
<td>PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td>Zaporizhzhia region</td>
<td>21.58</td>
<td>19,469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>Berentsev Viktor Oleksiiovych</td>
<td>Self nominated</td>
<td>Zaporizhzhia region</td>
<td>61.91</td>
<td>39,364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>Vovk Oleksandr Vasylovych</td>
<td>Self nominated</td>
<td>Zaporizhzhia region</td>
<td>38.75</td>
<td>34,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>Baloha Pavlo Ivanovych</td>
<td>Self nominated</td>
<td>Zaporizhzhia region</td>
<td>44.62</td>
<td>24,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>Potovka Vasyl Vasylovych</td>
<td>Self nominated</td>
<td>Zaporizhzhia region</td>
<td>68.04</td>
<td>36,711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>Baloha Oleh Anatoliiovych</td>
<td>Self nominated</td>
<td>Zaporizhzhia region</td>
<td>44.86</td>
<td>22,777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>Sabashuk Petro Pavlovyi</td>
<td>PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td>Ivano-Frankivsk region</td>
<td>27.76</td>
<td>17,143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>Artiushenko Ihor Andriiovych</td>
<td>PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td>Ivano-Frankivsk region</td>
<td>29.91</td>
<td>23,080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>Frolow Mykola Oleksandrivyovych</td>
<td>PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td>Ivano-Frankivsk region</td>
<td>21.75</td>
<td>17,148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>Bohuslaiev Viacheslav Oleksandrivyovych</td>
<td>Self nominated</td>
<td>Ivano-Frankivsk region</td>
<td>53.74</td>
<td>36,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>Kononov Oleksandr Serhiiovych</td>
<td>Self nominated</td>
<td>Ivano-Frankivsk region</td>
<td>48.51</td>
<td>35,332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>Hryhorchuk Oleksandr Serhiiovych</td>
<td>Self nominated</td>
<td>Ivano-Frankivsk region</td>
<td>21.94</td>
<td>17,345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>Serhiiovych Yosypovych</td>
<td>Self nominated</td>
<td>Ivano-Frankivsk region</td>
<td>44.62</td>
<td>24,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>Mykhailo Oleksandr Andriiovych</td>
<td>Party &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td>Ivano-Frankivsk region</td>
<td>68.04</td>
<td>36,711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>Baloha Viktor Ivanovych</td>
<td>Self nominated</td>
<td>Ivano-Frankivsk region</td>
<td>44.86</td>
<td>22,777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>Shevchenko Oleksandr Leonidovych</td>
<td>PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td>Kyiv region</td>
<td>40.90</td>
<td>37,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>Dovbenko Mykola Oleksandrivyovych</td>
<td>PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td>Kyiv region</td>
<td>18.26</td>
<td>19,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>Nasalov Maxim Mykolaiovych</td>
<td>PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td>Kyiv region</td>
<td>52.05</td>
<td>51,569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>Sytnik Viktor Oleksandriovych</td>
<td>Self nominated</td>
<td>Kyiv region</td>
<td>22.30</td>
<td>20,635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>Derevianko Yuri Bohdanovych</td>
<td>Self nominated</td>
<td>Kyiv region</td>
<td>69.66</td>
<td>62,171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>Tymoshchenko Yuri Volodymyrovych</td>
<td>Political party &quot;NARODNYY FRONT&quot;</td>
<td>Kyiv region</td>
<td>29.30</td>
<td>26,922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>Solovei Yuri Ihorovych</td>
<td>PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td>Kyiv region</td>
<td>23.07</td>
<td>18,862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>Hryhorchuk Oleksandr Serhiiovych</td>
<td>Self nominated</td>
<td>Kyiv region</td>
<td>98.84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>Marchenko Oleksandr Oleksandrivyovych</td>
<td>Self nominated</td>
<td>Kirovohrad region</td>
<td>23.67</td>
<td>20,714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>Solvar Ruslan Mykolaiovych</td>
<td>PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td>Kirovohrad region</td>
<td>50.95</td>
<td>36,604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>Hudzenko Vitali Ivanovych</td>
<td>PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td>Kirovohrad region</td>
<td>27.05</td>
<td>23,242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td>Kryvohrad region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>96.29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>Oryshchenko Oleksandr Romanovych</td>
<td>Self nominated</td>
<td></td>
<td>35.98</td>
<td>28,796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96</td>
<td>Romaniuk Viktor Mykolaiovych</td>
<td>Self nominated</td>
<td></td>
<td>32.00</td>
<td>25,989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97</td>
<td>Hryhorchuk Oleksandr Serhiiovych</td>
<td>Self nominated</td>
<td></td>
<td>19.43</td>
<td>17,382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>Nazalov Maxim Mykolaiovych</td>
<td>PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>26.95</td>
<td>21,131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>Marchenko Oleksandr Oleksandrivyovych</td>
<td>Self nominated</td>
<td></td>
<td>34.03</td>
<td>31,408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>Mishchenko Serhi Mykhailiovych</td>
<td>Self nominated</td>
<td></td>
<td>40.41</td>
<td>38,262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>Poplavskyi Mykola Oleksandrivyovych</td>
<td>Self nominated</td>
<td></td>
<td>31.44</td>
<td>26,503</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Стр. 2 из 5

25.02.2023, 23:54
Annex 275

Dovhyi Oles Stanislavovych, self nominated

Kuzmenko Anatolii Ivanovych, PARTY "BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA"

Luhansk region

Bakulin Yevhen Mykolaiovych, Political party "OpAZYTVYNNYI blok"

Dunaiev Serhiy Volodymyrovych, self nominated

Ioffe Yulii Yakovych, self nominated

Kurylo Vitalii Semenovych, self nominated

Harbuz Yuriy Hryhoriiovych, self nominated

Kuzmenko Anatolii Ivanovych, PARTY "BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA"

Luhansk region

Bakulin Yevhen Mykolaiovych, Self nominated

Dunaiev Serhiy Volodymyrovych, self nominated

Ioffe Yulii Yakovych, self nominated

Kurylo Vitalii Semenovych, self nominated

Harbuz Yuriy Hryhoriiovych, self nominated

Kuzmenko Anatolii Ivanovych, PARTY "BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA"

Lviv region

Bakulin Yevhen Mykolaiovych, Self nominated

Dunaiev Serhiy Volodymyrovych, self nominated

Ioffe Yulii Yakovych, self nominated

Kurylo Vitalii Semenovych, self nominated

Harbuz Yuriy Hryhoriiovych, self nominated

Kuzmenko Anatolii Ivanovych, PARTY "BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA"

Lviv region

Bakulin Yevhen Mykolaiovych, Self nominated

Dunaiev Serhiy Volodymyrovych, self nominated

Ioffe Yulii Yakovych, self nominated

Kurylo Vitalii Semenovych, self nominated

Harbuz Yuriy Hryhoriiovych, self nominated

Kuzmenko Anatolii Ivanovych, PARTY "BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA"

Lviv region

Bakulin Yevhen Mykolaiovych, Self nominated

Dunaiev Serhiy Volodymyrovych, self nominated

Ioffe Yulii Yakovych, self nominated

Kurylo Vitalii Semenovych, self nominated

Harbuz Yuriy Hryhoriiovych, self nominated

Kuzmenko Anatolii Ivanovych, PARTY "BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA"

Mykolaiiv region

Kozyr Boris Yuriiiovych, PARTY "BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA"

Iliuk Artem Oleksiiovych, self nominated

Zholobetskyi Oleksandr Oleksandrovych, PARTY "BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA"

Vadaturskyi Andrii Oleksiiovych, PARTY "BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA"

Livik Oleksandr Petrovych, PARTY "BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA"

Kornatskyi Arkadii Oleksiiovych, PARTY "BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA"

Odesa region

Matviichuk Eduard Leonidovych, self nominated

Chetkai Hennadii Leonidovych, PARTY "BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA"

Kivalov Serhiy Vasylivy, PARTY "BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA"

Klimov Leonid Mykhailiiovych, self nominated

Fursin Ivan Hennadiiovych, self nominated

Presman Oleksandr Semenovych, self nominated

Huliaiev Vasyl Oleksandrovych, self nominated

Barvinenko Vitalii Dmytrovy, self nominated

Kisse Anton Ivanovych, self nominated

Urbanskyi Oleksandr Ihorovych, Partiia "Sylna Ukraina"

Poltava region

Kaplin Serhiy Mykolaiovych, PARTY "BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA"

Bublyk Yuriy Vasylivy, SVOBODA party

Shapovalov Yuriy Anatoliiovych, self nominated

Kuliniich Oleh Ivanovych, self nominated

Izhchechkin Kostiantyn Yevhenovych, PARTY "BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA"

Reka Andrii Oleksiiovych, Political party "NARODNYY FRONT"

Zhevaho Kostiantyn Valentynovych, self nominated

Kutovyi Taras Viktorovych, PARTY "BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA"

Rivne region

Osukhovskyi Oleh Ivanovych, SVOBODA party

Voznuk Yuriy Volodymyrovych, Political party "NARODNYY FRONT"

Dekhiarchuk Oleksandr Volodymyrovych, PARTY "BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA"
<p>|
| --- | --- | --- |
| 155 | Yanitskiy Vasyl Petrovych , PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot; | 28.76 | 27 510 | 97.64 |
| 156 | Yevtushok Serhi Mykolaiowych , All-Ukrainian Union &quot;Batkivschyna&quot; | 27.63 | 24 950 | 100.00 |
| 157 | Medunyiatsa Oleh Viacheslavovych , Political party &quot;NARODNYY FRONT&quot; | 31.02 | 28 276 | 100.00 |
| 158 | Suhaoniak Oleksandr Leonidovych , PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot; | 28.08 | 24 746 | 100.00 |
| 159 | Derkach Andrii Leonidovych , self nominated | 61.84 | 47 503 | 100.00 |
| 160 | Molotok Ihor Fedorovych , self nominated | 46.15 | 29 957 | 100.00 |
| 161 | Lavryk Mykola Ivanovych , PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot; | 21.50 | 18 079 | 100.00 |
| 162 | Bulkaniev Vladyslav Viktorovych , All-Ukrainian Union &quot;Batkivshchyna&quot; | 27.63 | 24 950 | 100.00 |
| 163 | Pastukh Taras Tymofiiovych , self nominated | 35.45 | 37 583 | 100.00 |
| 164 | Holovko Mykhailo Yosyfovych , SVOBODA party | 35.58 | 39 000 | 100.00 |
| 165 | Pastukh Taras Tymofiiovych , self nominated | 35.45 | 37 583 | 100.00 |
| 166 | Holovko Mykhailo Yosyfovych , SVOBODA party | 35.58 | 39 000 | 100.00 |
| 167 | Pastukh Taras Tymofiiovych , self nominated | 35.45 | 37 583 | 100.00 |
| 168 | Holovko Mykhailo Yosyfovych , SVOBODA party | 35.58 | 39 000 | 100.00 |
| 169 | Pastukh Taras Tymofiiovych , self nominated | 35.45 | 37 583 | 100.00 |
| 170 | Holovko Mykhailo Yosyfovych , SVOBODA party | 35.58 | 39 000 | 100.00 |
| 171 | Pastukh Taras Tymofiiovych , self nominated | 35.45 | 37 583 | 100.00 |
| 172 | Holovko Mykhailo Yosyfovych , SVOBODA party | 35.58 | 39 000 | 100.00 |
| 173 | Pastukh Taras Tymofiiovych , self nominated | 35.45 | 37 583 | 100.00 |
| 174 | Holovko Mykhailo Yosyfovych , SVOBODA party | 35.58 | 39 000 | 100.00 |
| 175 | Pastukh Taras Tymofiiovych , self nominated | 35.45 | 37 583 | 100.00 |
| 176 | Holovko Mykhailo Yosyfovych , SVOBODA party | 35.58 | 39 000 | 100.00 |
| 177 | Pastukh Taras Tymofiiovych , self nominated | 35.45 | 37 583 | 100.00 |
| 178 | Holovko Mykhailo Yosyfovych , SVOBODA party | 35.58 | 39 000 | 100.00 |
| 179 | Pastukh Taras Tymofiiovych , self nominated | 35.45 | 37 583 | 100.00 |
| 180 | Holovko Mykhailo Yosyfovych , SVOBODA party | 35.58 | 39 000 | 100.00 |
| 181 | Pastukh Taras Tymofiiovych , self nominated | 35.45 | 37 583 | 100.00 |
| 182 | Holovko Mykhailo Yosyfovych , SVOBODA party | 35.58 | 39 000 | 100.00 |
| 183 | Pastukh Taras Tymofiiovych , self nominated | 35.45 | 37 583 | 100.00 |
| 184 | Holovko Mykhailo Yosyfovych , SVOBODA party | 35.58 | 39 000 | 100.00 |
| 185 | Pastukh Taras Tymofiiovych , self nominated | 35.45 | 37 583 | 100.00 |
| 186 | Holovko Mykhailo Yosyfovych , SVOBODA party | 35.58 | 39 000 | 100.00 |
| 187 | Pastukh Taras Tymofiiovych , self nominated | 35.45 | 37 583 | 100.00 |
| 188 | Holovko Mykhailo Yosyfovych , SVOBODA party | 35.58 | 39 000 | 100.00 |
| 189 | Pastukh Taras Tymofiiovych , self nominated | 35.45 | 37 583 | 100.00 |
| 190 | Holovko Mykhailo Yosyfovych , SVOBODA party | 35.58 | 39 000 | 100.00 |
| 191 | Pastukh Taras Tymofiiovych , self nominated | 35.45 | 37 583 | 100.00 |
| 192 | Holovko Mykhailo Yosyfovych , SVOBODA party | 35.58 | 39 000 | 100.00 |
| 193 | Pastukh Taras Tymofiiovych , self nominated | 35.45 | 37 583 | 100.00 |
| 194 | Holovko Mykhailo Yosyfovych , SVOBODA party | 35.58 | 39 000 | 100.00 |
| 195 | Pastukh Taras Tymofiiovych , self nominated | 35.45 | 37 583 | 100.00 |
| 196 | Holovko Mykhailo Yosyfovych , SVOBODA party | 35.58 | 39 000 | 100.00 |
| 197 | Pastukh Taras Tymofiiovych , self nominated | 35.45 | 37 583 | 100.00 |
| 198 | Holovko Mykhailo Yosyfovych , SVOBODA party | 35.58 | 39 000 | 100.00 |
| 199 | Pastukh Taras Tymofiiovych , self nominated | 35.45 | 37 583 | 100.00 |
| 200 | Holovko Mykhailo Yosyfovych , SVOBODA party | 35.58 | 39 000 | 100.00 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>№</th>
<th>Громадянин/Громадянка</th>
<th>Партия</th>
<th>% голоси</th>
<th>Кількість голосів</th>
<th>% обов'язкових</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>201</td>
<td>Fedoruk Mykola Trokhymovych</td>
<td>Political party &quot;NARODNYY FRONT&quot;</td>
<td>34.49</td>
<td>28 800</td>
<td>99.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>202</td>
<td>Rybak Ivan Petrovych</td>
<td>PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td>21.17</td>
<td>17 344</td>
<td>97.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>203</td>
<td>Timosh Hryhori Ivanovych</td>
<td>PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td>28.74</td>
<td>20 219</td>
<td>97.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>204</td>
<td>Burbak Maxym Yuriiovych</td>
<td>Political party &quot;NARODNYY FRONT&quot;</td>
<td>24.34</td>
<td>18 898</td>
<td>92.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205</td>
<td>Kulich Valerii Petrovych</td>
<td>PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td>28.19</td>
<td>20 469</td>
<td>93.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>206</td>
<td>Atroshenko Vladyslav Anatoliiovych</td>
<td>PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td>51.34</td>
<td>38 684</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>207</td>
<td>Yevlakhov Anatoli Serhiiovych</td>
<td>PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td>37.71</td>
<td>29 464</td>
<td>99.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>208</td>
<td>Davydenko Valerii Mykolayovych</td>
<td>POLITICAL PARTY &quot;SVEUKRAYINSKE AHARARNE OB&quot;YEDNANNYA &quot;ZASTUP&quot;</td>
<td>38.86</td>
<td>33 073</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>209</td>
<td>Kodola Oleksandr Mykhaliovych</td>
<td>Political party &quot;NARODNYY FRONT&quot;</td>
<td>26.88</td>
<td>19 037</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210</td>
<td>Dmytrenko Oleh Mykolairovych</td>
<td>PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td>27.58</td>
<td>21 934</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>211</td>
<td>Rybachynskyi Yevhen Yuriiovych</td>
<td>PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td>34.39</td>
<td>31 188</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>212</td>
<td>Stashuk Vitalii Fylymonovych</td>
<td>Political party &quot;NARODNYY FRONT&quot;</td>
<td>36.75</td>
<td>36 102</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>213</td>
<td>Bereza Boryslav Yukhymovych</td>
<td>self nominated</td>
<td>29.44</td>
<td>26 909</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>214</td>
<td>Chumak Viktor Vasyllovych</td>
<td>PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td>51.52</td>
<td>44 349</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>215</td>
<td>Illienko Andrii Yuriiovych</td>
<td>SVOBODA party</td>
<td>39.55</td>
<td>33 966</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>216</td>
<td>Suprunenko Oleksandr Ivanovych</td>
<td>self nominated</td>
<td>24.60</td>
<td>19 699</td>
<td>98.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>217</td>
<td>Biletskyi Andrii Yevheniiovych</td>
<td>self nominated</td>
<td>33.75</td>
<td>31 445</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>218</td>
<td>Ariev Volodymyr Ihorovych</td>
<td>PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td>63.46</td>
<td>51 213</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>219</td>
<td>Tretiakov Oleksandr Yuriiovych</td>
<td>PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td>44.91</td>
<td>39 986</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220</td>
<td>Konstantinovskii Vacheslav Leonidovych</td>
<td>Political party &quot;NARODNYY FRONT&quot;</td>
<td>32.47</td>
<td>25 340</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>221</td>
<td>Yemets Leonid Oleksandrovych</td>
<td>Political party &quot;NARODNYY FRONT&quot;</td>
<td>37.70</td>
<td>33 669</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>222</td>
<td>Andriievskyi Dmytro Yosypovych</td>
<td>PARTY &quot;BLOK PETRA POROSHENKA&quot;</td>
<td>57.29</td>
<td>48 011</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>223</td>
<td>Levchenko Yuri Volodymyrovych (1984)</td>
<td>SVOBODA party</td>
<td>37.30</td>
<td>33 402</td>
<td>99.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sevastopol**

0.00

© Information Analysis System "Vybori narodnykh deputativ Ukrajiny"
Annex 276

European Parliament Resolution on the Situation in Ukraine No. 2012/2889 (RSP),
13 December 2012
The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions and reports, in particular those of 1 December 2011 containing the European Parliament’s recommendations to the Council, the Commission and the EEAS on the negotiations on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement(1) and of 24 May 2012 on the situation in Ukraine and the case of Yulia Tymoshenko(2),

– having regard to the interim reports and preliminary conclusions of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission to Ukraine, in particular the Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, issued on 29 October 2012 jointly with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the European Parliament and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly,

– having regard to the joint statement on the parliamentary elections in Ukraine issued by High Representative Catherine Ashton and Commissioner Štefan Füle on 12 November 2012,

– having regard to the Council conclusions on Ukraine of 10 December 2012,

– having regard to the statement made by former Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski and former European Parliament President Pat Cox on 3 October 2012, stating that the elections will be ‘decisive’ for the future of Ukraine and that the ‘momentum in EU-Ukraine relations has stalled’,

– having regard to the report of Parliament’s ad hoc election observation delegation to the parliamentary elections in Ukraine, presented at the Committee of Foreign Affairs meeting of 6 November 2012,

– having regard to the EU-Ukraine Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation, adopted on 22 November 2010,

– having regard to the ENP Progress Report on Ukraine, published on 15 May 2012,

– having regard to Rule 110(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the 2011 EU-Ukraine summit in Kyiv recognised Ukraine as a European country with a European identity, which shares a common history and common values with the countries of the European Union;

B. whereas OSCE/ODIHR and international election observers found evidence that the Ukrainian elections were characterised by an unbalanced media environment, mismanagement regarding the composition of the electoral commissions, lack of transparency in party financing, abuse of administrative resources, and a tilted playing field, also reflected in the absence of leading opposition candidates imprisoned for political reasons, which constituted a step backwards compared with previous general elections;

C. whereas, while the OSCE has issued a generally positive assessment of the voting process on election day, international observers pointed to a lack of transparency in the way the final results were collated, and assessed negatively both the vote-tabulation process in 77 out of the 161 district election commissions observed and the fact that delays in vote tabulation
continued on 10 November in 12 single-mandate districts;

D. whereas, according to OSCE/ODIHR reports, the conduct of the post-electoral process was marred by irregularities, delays in the vote count and a lack of transparency in the electoral commissions;

E. whereas, in a joint statement, Vice-President / High Representative Catherine Ashton and Commissioner Štefan Füle expressed concern about the conduct of the post-electoral process, which was marred by irregularities;

F. whereas the general elections of 28 October 2012 were considered a key test for Ukraine in signalling the irreversibility of the country’s engagement towards the development of a fully-fledged democratic system, the consolidation of the rule of law and the continuation of political reforms;

G. whereas, for the first time, the Venice Commission and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) issued recommendations stating very clearly that Ukraine should have a proportional system with open lists;

H. whereas the European Parliament’s special envoy, Aleksander Kwasniewski, warned against attempts to isolate Ukraine, which could lead to the creation of favourable conditions for undemocratic regimes;

I. whereas the EU-Ukraine summit of December 2011, which was intended to lead to the signing of the association agreement, fell short of its objective due to the EU’s uneasiness concerning the political situation in Ukraine, in particular the arrest and trial of opposition leaders Yulia Tymoshenko and Yuri Lutsenko;

J. whereas the Verkhovna Rada is examining Bill 8711, a liberticidal piece of legislation that will limit freedom of expression and assembly for those who support the human rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people; whereas the United Nations Human Rights Committee recently ruled that this breaches Articles 19 and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

1. Expresses regret at the fact that, according to the OSCE, PACE, NATO Parliamentary Assembly and European Parliament observers, the electoral campaign, electoral process and post-electoral process failed to meet major international standards and constitute a step backwards compared with the national elections in 2010;

2. Notes, in particular, that certain aspects of the pre-election period (the arrest of opposition political leaders, the lack of a level playing field, caused primarily by the misuse of administrative resources, cases of harassment and intimidation of candidates and electoral staff, a lack of transparency in campaign and party financing, and a lack of balanced media coverage) and the irregularities and delays in the vote count and tabulation process constituted a step backwards compared with recent national elections;

3. Stresses that the fact that two leaders of the opposition, Yulia Tymoshenko and Yuri Lutsenko, and others were held in jail during the elections adversely affected the electoral process;

4. Stresses that effective cooperation between Ukraine and the European Union can only be realised on the basis of a clear willingness on the part of the Ukrainian authorities to carry out and implement the necessary reforms, in particular that of the legal and judicial system, with the aim of fully adhering to the principles of democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, minority rights and the rule of law; calls for active and effective support to be given to this reform process by the institutions of the European Union, the Council of Europe and its Venice Commission;

5. Is concerned about the misuse of administrative resources and the system of campaign financing, which fell short of international standards as set by the Council of Europe’s Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO); calls on the new government to continue strengthening the provisions of the law on party financing in order to provide for more transparency of funding and spending, the full disclosure of sources and amounts of campaign expenditure and the sanctions for violation of campaign funding provisions in particular;

6. Calls on the Government of Ukraine to address the electoral irregularities, including the inconclusive results in some election districts, in dialogue with all political parties; expects, furthermore, the Ukrainian parliament to address in due course the shortcomings of the electoral law; expects the Verkhovna Rada to be able to build on the existing proposals that were prepared by the outgoing parliament with the full support of the European Union and the Venice Commission;

7. Expresses its concern about the problems relating to the counting and tabulation of votes in a number of single-mandate constituencies; welcomes the decision of the Central Election Commission not to declare a result for these constituencies and the fact that the Ukrainian authorities started to take measures to hold new elections in these constituencies as rapidly possible;

8. Is concerned about the rising nationalistic sentiment in Ukraine, expressed in support for the Svoboda Party, which, as a result, is one of the two new parties to enter the Verkhovna Rada; recalls that racist, anti-Semitic and xenophobic views go against the EU’s fundamental values and principles and therefore appeals to pro-democratic parties in the Verkhovna Rada not to associate with, endorse or form coalitions with this party;

9. Expresses continued support for the European aspirations of the Ukrainian people; regrets that the recent parliamentary elections did not constitute meaningful progress in advancing Ukraine’s credentials in this regard; stresses that the EU remains committed to working with Ukraine, including civil society (NGOs, religious organisations, etc.), in order to improve democratic institutions, strengthen the rule of law, ensure media freedom and advance essential economic reforms;

10. Confirms the EU’s commitment to further advancing relations with Ukraine through the signing of the association agreement as soon as the Ukrainian authorities determine action and tangible progress, as called for above, possibly by the time of the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius in November 2013; notes that progress in political
association and economic integration is dependent on Ukraine’s tangible commitment to democratic principles, the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and media freedom;

11. Notes the adoption and signing of the law on referendums in Ukraine; expects the Ukrainian authorities to consider the recommendations of the Venice Commission, once available, in order to prevent possible abuse of this legislation;

12. Makes a strong appeal to the Ukrainian authorities to find, together with the European Parliament’s envoys, Aleksander Kwasniewski and Pat Cox, a reasonable and just solution to the Tymoshenko case; urges the Ukrainian Government to respect and implement the final decisions of the European Court of Human Rights on the ongoing case of Yulia Tymoshenko and Yuri Lutsenko;

13. Calls on Ukraine to end the selective application of justice in Ukraine at all levels of government and to make it possible for opposition parties to participate in political life on the basis of a level playing field; calls on the authorities, in this context, to free and rehabilitate politically persecuted opponents, including Yulia Tymoshenko, Yuri Lutsenko and others;

14. Welcomes the signing of the amended visa facilitation agreement between the European Union and Ukraine, which introduces clear improvements in the delivery of visas for Ukrainian citizens, compared with the agreement currently in force; calls on the Council to advance EU-Ukraine dialogue on visa liberalisation ahead of the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius in November 2013;

15. Strongly appeals to VP/HR Catherine Ashton and Commissioner Štefan Füle to step up the EU’s engagement with Ukraine and to remain committed to work towards using the full potential of the relations between the EU and Ukraine for the benefit of the citizens of Ukraine and the EU, inter alia by ensuring steady progress in the visa liberalisation dialogue;

16. Welcomes the conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council meeting of 10 December 2012;

17. Calls on the Verkhovna Rada to reject Bill 8711, which limits freedom of expression in relation to sexual orientation and gender identity and which was adopted at first reading in October; points out that this law is in clear breach of the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, both ratified by the parliament of Ukraine;

18. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Council, the Commission, the Member States, the President, Government and Parliament of Ukraine and the Parliamentary Assemblies of the Council of Europe and the OSCE.

(1) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2011)0545.
Annex 277

Newsweek, Yarosh: Russians, Rise Up Against Putin! (19 March 2014)
Yarosh: Russians, Rise Up Against Putin!

By Anna Nemtsova / March 19, 2014 5:28 PM EDT

Newsweek spoke with Dmitry Yarosh, 42, a leader of the Right Sector, a once obscure right-wing group that is now at the center of a geopolitical standoff between Russia and the United States.

NEWSWEEK: Is it true that you have been training Right Sector forces for more than 20 years?

YAROSH: I was training paramilitary troops for almost 25 years. Although we just came out of the revolution, my guys are continuing military training all across Ukraine, ready to cleanse the country of the occupiers.

How many are you?

I cannot give you the exact number, as our structure and divisions are constantly growing all over Ukraine, but more than 10,000 people for sure. We have certain preconditions for our recruits: patriotism and other criteria for proper behavior.

Are you aware that a Moscow court is trying you for calling for terrorist actions against Russia?

That is Putin's idea. He is a political corpse.

Do you have many war veterans in your ranks? Are your forces a part of Ukraine’s army?

As soon as Russia declared war, we recruited retired officers, generals of the interior ministry and security agencies. We are coordinating our actions with the council of the National Security and Defense, as well as with the army's general headquarters. We are currently negotiating to put our forces on a proper legal footing.

What is Right Sector's response to a vote to secede Crimea from the Ukraine?

Right Sector, together with all other Ukrainian citizens, is ready to defend Ukraine's territorial integrity by all possible means. In case the Kremlin decides to attack us, they will
have a major partisan war on Ukraine territory.

**Do you think Ukraine has enough forces to defend itself?**

I am realistic about the pitiful conditions of our military forces, including Right Sector. Our army is many hundreds of times weaker than Russia's, so it's important for Ukraine to do everything to resolve the crisis through negotiations.

**Why do you call your organization paramilitary? Are you armed just with Kalashnikovs or do you also have more serious weapons?**

As in any army, we have specialists trained to shoot S-300 missiles. In case of a partisan war, there will be shooting from every house.

**Do you realize that the majority of Russians, including cultural and intellectual leaders, support Putin's actions in Crimea because they see you as a leader of a fascist, radical movement? Are you ready to become the reason for the end of years of Russian-Ukrainian friendship?**

Unfortunately, Russia is largely brainwashed. Ukrainian nationalists have nothing to do with fascism. The powerful Russian propaganda machine knows what it's doing. The beliefs of Right Sector are against chauvinism. We base our views on nationalist ideas. The proof is that 40 percent of our members speak Russian; Jews and other nationals feel comfortable in our forces.

**What then makes your movement "right"?**

Ukraine deserves to have its own national state. That is what makes our movement right.

**Was your book *Nation and Revolution*—in which you define your movement's enemies as the Russian Federation and the Russian Orthodox Church—a prediction of "the liberating war" of the Ukrainian nation?**

The book is a collection of my articles that was criticized when it came out. But now we see that it predicted many events that have since happened. I would advise Russian citizens to start their struggle against Putin's fascist regime. That would be the best guarantee of friendship between Russian and the Ukrainian people. So long as Putin is in power, Russian imperialism will always be putting improper pressure upon Ukraine.

**Why do you refer to the Russian president, who enjoys high popularity ratings, as a fascist?**
Putin built up his power by fascistic methods. He ignored the constitutional rights of Russian citizens. In Russia, police beat up those taking part in mass protests in Moscow and St. Petersburg. That smells of fascist methods to me. They arrest protesters carrying antiwar signs. That is fascism.

**It is broadly believed in Ukraine that the revolution would not have happened without Right Sector. What kind of revolution was it?**

We had a nationalist revolution to create a state where Ukrainian people would be the master of their own destiny in their own land. Until now, we have had an occupying regime. We'll do everything to give our people full freedom, justice and a share of the nation's wealth.

**Your men are all over the center of Kiev. Why do you and your men wear black uniforms?**

This is not an official uniform. We bought uniforms sold to security guards. [And] I have taken professional advice about strengthening our security [because] we have been given information that some Russian forces are interested in kidnapping, arresting or liquidating me.

**Who is shooting on the Maidan every night?**

That is not my people. My men never use their weapons unless there is a specific need.

**You are running for president. What special qualifications do you have to be a politician? Do you think you have a chance to win the presidential election?**

I graduated from university, specializing in Ukrainian language and literature. I never intended to be a politician. But since January 19 of this year, I have been responsible for all the events. We have seen two miracles happen already: Politicians have not betrayed the revolutionary spirit of the Maidan; and we won the revolution. I expect one more miracle to take place at the presidential election.

**Did your movement support Chechen insurgencies in Russia?**

We supported the first Chechen war against Russian empire. We sent a delegation to Chechnya. We helped treat the Chechen wounded here. And we publish Chechen books.

**Did you really call for Islamic insurgencies to support Ukraine in the war against Russia? Did any of your men meet with the Chechen insurgency leader Doku Umarov?**
I didn't say that. I am not sure [who met Umarov]. When we were helping Chechnya, Doku Umarov was just an ordinary field commander. We are not supporters of the Islamist war against defenseless women and children.

**Ukraine's former president, Viktor Yanukovych, has said the new leadership in Kiev is going to raise Bandera flag that is considered fascist in Russia. Is that true?**

We stood under red and black flags throughout the revolution. Red Ukrainian blood spilled on the black Ukrainian earth—that flag is the symbol of the national revolution. I am convinced that this flag will bring us freedom.

**Who finances you? Do you think the West is going to support Ukraine?**

As a matter of principle, I do not take money from oligarchs, as we do not want to be dependent. We received some U.S. dollars from the Ukrainian diaspora. Otherwise the entire country supports the Right Sector.

I am sure that if Russians bombed Kiev—and we believe there is fifty-fifty chance that will happen—NATO will not come to fight for Ukraine. Europe has betrayed Ukraine many times. We are not counting on its help. We can count only on our own forces and our ingenuity.
Annex 278

Reuters, *Commentary Ukraine’s neo-Nazi problem* (20 March 2018)
Commentary: Ukraine’s neo-Nazi problem

Josh Cohen

As Ukraine’s struggle against Russia and its proxies continues, Kiev must also contend with a growing problem behind the front lines: far-right vigilantes who are willing to use intimidation and even violence to advance their agendas, and who often do so with the tacit approval of law enforcement agencies.

A January 28 demonstration, in Kiev, by 600 members of the so-called “National Militia,” a newly-formed ultranationalist group that vows “to use force to establish order,” illustrates this threat. While the group’s Kiev launch was peaceful, National Militia members in balaclavas stormed a city council meeting in the central Ukrainian town of Cherkasy the following day, skirmishing with deputies and forcing them to pass a new budget.

Many of the National Militia’s members come from the Azov movement, one of the 30-odd privately-funded “volunteer battalions” that, in the early days of the war, helped the regular army to defend Ukrainian territory against Russia’s separatist proxies. Although Azov uses Nazi-era symbolism and recruits neo-Nazis into its ranks, a recent article in Foreign Affairs downplayed any risks the group might pose, pointing out that, like other volunteer militias, Azov has been “reined in” through its integration into Ukraine’s armed forces. While it’s true that private militias no longer rule the battlefront, it’s the home front that Kiev needs to worry about now.

When Russian President Vladimir Putin’s seizure of Crimea four years ago first exposed the decrepit condition of Ukraine’s armed forces, right-wing militias such as Azov and Right Sector stepped into the breach, fending off the Russian-backed separatists while Ukraine’s regular military regrouped. Though, as a result, many Ukrainians continue to regard the militias with gratitude and admiration, the more extreme among these groups promote an intolerant and illiberal ideology that will endanger Ukraine in the long term. Since the Crimean crisis, the militias have been formally integrated into Ukraine’s armed forces, but some have resisted full integration: Azov, for example, runs its own children’s training camp, and the careers section instructs recruits who wish to transfer to Azov from a regular military unit.

According to Freedom House’s Ukraine project director Matthew Schaaf, “numerous organized radical right-wing groups exist in Ukraine, and while the volunteer battalions may have been officially integrated into state structures, some of them have since spun off political and non-profit structures to implement their vision.” Schaaf noted that “an increase in patriotic discourse supporting Ukraine in its conflict with Russia has coincided with an apparent increase in both public hate speech, sometimes by public officials and magnified by the media, as well as violence towards vulnerable groups such as the LGBT community,” an observation that is supported by a
In recent months, Ukraine has experienced a wave of unchecked vigilantism. Institute Respublica, a local pro-democracy NGO, reported that activists are frequently harassed by vigilantes when holding legal meetings or rallies related to politically-controversial positions, such as the promotion of LGBT rights or opposition to the war. Azov and other militias have attacked anti-fascist demonstrations, city council meetings, media outlets, art exhibitions, foreign students and Roma. Progressive activists describe a new climate of fear that they say has been intensifying ever since last year’s near-fatal stabbing of anti-war activist Stas Serhiyenko, which is believed to have been perpetrated by an extremist group named C14 (the name refers to a 14-word slogan popular among white supremacists). Brutal attacks this month on International Women’s Day marches in several Ukrainian cities prompted an unusually forceful statement from Amnesty International, which warned that “the Ukrainian state is rapidly losing its monopoly on violence.”

Ukraine is not the only country that must contend with a resurgent far right. But Kiev’s recent efforts to incorporate independent armed groups into its regular armed forces, as well as a continuing national sense of indebtedness to the militias for their defense of the homeland, make addressing the ultranationalist threat considerably more complicated than it is elsewhere. According to Schaaf and the Institute Respublica, Ukrainian extremists are rarely punished for acts of violence. In some cases — such as C14’s January attack on a remembrance gathering for two murdered journalists — police actually detain peaceful demonstrators instead.

To be clear, the Kremlin’s claims that Ukraine is a hornets’ nest of fascists are false: far-right parties performed poorly in Ukraine’s last parliamentary elections, and Ukrainians reacted with alarm to the National Militia’s demonstration in Kiev. But connections between law enforcement agencies and extremists give Ukraine’s Western allies ample reason for concern. C14 and Kiev’s city government recently signed an agreement allowing C14 to establish a “municipal guard” to patrol the streets; three such militia-run guard forces are already registered in Kiev, and at least 21 operate in other cities.

In an ideal world, President Petro Poroshenko would purge the police and the interior ministry of far-right sympathizers, including Interior Minister Arsen Avakov, who has close ties to Azov leader Andriy Biletsky, as well as Sergei Korotkykh, an Azov veteran who is now a high-ranking police official. But Poroshenko would risk major repercussions if he did so; Avakov is his chief political rival, and the ministry he runs controls the police, the National Guard and several former militias.

As one Ukrainian analyst noted in December, control of these forces make Avakov extremely powerful and Poroshenko’s presidency might not be strong enough to withstand the kind of direct confrontation with Avakov that an attempt to oust him or to strike at his power base could well produce. Poroshenko has endured frequent verbal threats, including calls for revolution, from ultranationalist groups, so he may believe that he needs Avakov to keep them in check.
Avakov’s Peoples’ Party status as the main partner in Ukraine’s parliamentary coalition increases Avakov’s leverage over Poroshenko’s Bloc. An attempt to fire Avakov could imperil Poroshenko’s slim legislative majority, and lead to early parliamentary elections. Given Poroshenko’s current unpopularity, this is a scenario he will likely try to avoid.

Despite his weak position, Poroshenko still has some options for reducing the threat from the far right. Though Avakov controls the Ukraine’s police and National Guard, Poroshenko still commands Ukraine’s security and intelligence services, the SBU, and could instruct the agency to cut its ties with C14 and other extremist groups. Poroshenko should also express public support for marginalized groups like the Roma and LGBT communities, and affirm his commitment to protecting their rights.

Western diplomats and human rights organizations must urge Ukraine’s government to uphold the rule of law and to stop allowing the far right to act with impunity. International donors can help by funding more initiatives like the United States Agency for International Development’s projects supporting training for Ukrainian lawyers and human rights defenders, and improving equitable access to the judicial system for marginalized communities.

There’s no easy way to eradicate the virulent far-right extremism that has been poisoning Ukrainian politics and public life, but without vigorous and immediate efforts to counteract it, it may soon endanger the state itself.

**About the Author**

Josh Cohen is a former USAID project officer involved in managing economic reform projects in the former Soviet Union.

The views expressed in this article are not those of Reuters News.
Annex 279

The Telegraph, *Ukraine crisis: the neo-Nazi brigade fighting pro-Russian separatists*  
(11 August 2014)
Ukraine crisis: the neo-Nazi brigade fighting pro-Russian separatists

By Tom Parfitt 11 August 2014 • 9:00am

The fighters of the Azov battalion lined up in single file to say farewell to their fallen comrade. His pallid corpse lay under the sun in an open casket trimmed with blue velvet.

Some of the men placed carnations by the body, others roses. Many struck their chests with a closed fist before touching their dead friend’s arm. One fighter had an SS tattoo on his neck.

Sergiy Grek, 22, lost a leg and died from massive blood loss after a radio-controlled anti-tank mine exploded near to him.

As Ukraine’s armed forces tighten the noose around pro-Russian separatists in the east of the country, the western-backed government in Kiev is throwing militia groups — some openly neo-Nazi — into the front of the battle.

The Azov battalion has the most chilling reputation of all. Last week, it came to the fore as it mounted a bold attack on the rebel redoubt of Donetsk, striking deep into the suburbs of a city

Andriy Biletsky, 35, (in black T-shirt), commander of Ukraine's Azov battalion Credit: Tom Parfitt

In Marinka, on the western outskirts, the battalion was sent forward ahead of tanks and armoured vehicles of the Ukrainian army’s 51st Mechanised Brigade. A ferocious close-quarters fight ensued as they got caught in an ambush laid by well-trained separatists, who shot from 30 yards away. The Azov irregulars replied with a squall of fire, fending off the attack and seizing a rebel checkpoint.

Mr Grek, also known as “Balagan”, died in the battle and 14 others were wounded. Speaking after
the ceremony Andriy Biletsky, the battalion’s commander, told the Telegraph the operation had been a “100% success”. “The battalion is a family and every death is painful to us but these were minimal losses,” he said. “Most important of all, we established a bridgehead for the attack on Donetsk. And when that comes we will be leading the way.”

The military achievement is hard to dispute. By securing Marinka the battalion “widened the front and tightened the circle”, around the rebels’ capital, as another fighter put it. While Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, prevaricates about sending an invasion force into Ukraine, the rebels he backs are losing ground fast.

But Kiev’s use of volunteer paramilitaries to stamp out the Russian-backed Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics”, proclaimed in eastern Ukraine in March, should send a shiver down Europe’s spine. Recently formed battalions such as Donbas, Dnipro and Azov, with several thousand men under their command, are officially under the control of the interior ministry but their financing is murky, their training inadequate and their ideology often alarming.

The Azov men use the neo-Nazi Wolfsangel (Wolf’s Hook) symbol on their banner and members of the battalion are openly white supremacists, or anti-Semites.

“Personally, I’m a Nazi,” said “Phantom”, a 23-year-old former lawyer at the ceremony wearing camouflage and holding a Kalashnikov. “I don’t hate any other nationalities but I believe each nation should have its own country.” He added: “We have one idea: to liberate our land from terrorists.”

The Telegraph was invited to see some 300 Azov fighters pay respects to Mr Grek, their first comrade to die since the battalion was formed in May. An honour guard fired volleys into the air at the battalion’s headquarters on the edge of Urzuf, a small beach resort on Ukraine’s Azov Sea coast. Two more militiamen died on Sunday fighting north of Donetsk. Petro Poroshenko, Ukraine’s president, called one of them a hero.
Each new recruit receives only a couple of weeks of training before joining the battalion. The interior ministry and private donors provide weapons.

The HQ is a seaside dacha compound dotted with pines that once belonged to the ousted president of Ukraine, Vladimir Yanukovich, when he was governor of this region. Families in swimsuits with towels and inflatable rings walk past gate-guards toting automatic rifles.

Parked inside among wooden gazebos overlooking the sea are the tools of Azov’s trade – two armoured personnel carriers, a converted truck with retractable steel shutters to cover its windows, and several Nissan pick-ups fitted with machine-gun mounts.

A converted truck with steel shutters used by the Azov battalion and known to the fighters as ‘the Lump of Iron’ (Tom Parfitt)

Mr Biletsky, a muscular man in a black T-shirt and camouflage trousers, said the battalion was a light infantry unit, ideal for the urban warfare needed to take cities like Donetsk.

The 35-year old commander began creating the battalion after he was released from pre-trial detention in February in the wake of pro-western protests in Kiev. He had denied a charge of attempted murder, claiming it was politically motivated.

A former history student and amateur boxer, Mr Biletsky is also head of an extremist Ukrainian group called the Social National Assembly. “The historic mission of our nation in this critical moment is to lead the White Races of the world in a final crusade for their survival,” he wrote in a recent commentary. “A crusade against the Semite-led Untermenschen.”

The battalion itself is founded on right wing views, the commander said in Urzuf, and no Nazi convictions could exclude a recruit. “The most important thing is being a good fighter and a good brother so that we can trust each other,” he said.

Interestingly, many of the men in the battalion are Russians from eastern Ukraine who wear masks because they fear their relatives in rebel-controlled areas could be persecuted if their identities are revealed.
Phantom said he was such a Russian but that he was opposed to Moscow supporting “terrorists” in his homeland: “I volunteered and all I demanded was a gun and the possibility to defend my country.”

Asked about his Nazi sympathies, he said: “After the First World World War, Germany was a total mess and Hitler rebuilt it: he built houses and roads, put in telephone lines, and created jobs. I respect that.” Homosexuality is a mental illness and the scale of the Holocaust “is a big question”, he added.

Fighters of the Azov battalion say farewell to their first comrade to die in the war against Russia-backed rebels (Tom Parfitt)

Stepan, 23, another fighter, said that if leaders of the pro-Russian separatists were captured they should be executed after a military tribunal.

Such notions seem a far cry from the spirit of the “Maidan” protests that peaked in Kiev in February with the ousting of Mr Yanukovich, who had refused to sign a trade agreement with the European Union. Young liberals led the way but the uprising, which ended with the president fleeing to Russia, provoked a huge patriotic awakening that sucked in hardline groups.

Azov’s extremist profile and slick English-language pages on social media have even attracted foreign fighters. Mr Biletsky says he has men from Ireland, Italy, Greece and Scandinavia. At the base in Urzuf, Mikael Skillt, 37, a former sniper with the Swedish Army and National Guard, leads and trains a reconnaissance unit.

“When I saw the Maidan protests I recognised bravery and suffering,” he told the Telegraph. “A warrior soul was awakened. But you can only do so much, going against the enemy with sticks and stones. I had some experience and I though maybe I could help.”

Mr Skillt says he called himself a National Socialist as a young man and more recently he was active in the extreme right wing Party of the Swedes. “Now I’m fighting for the freedom of Ukraine against Putin’s imperialist front,” he said.
His unit is improving fast under his tutelage. “What they lack in experience, they make up in balls,” he said. Once he is done with Azov – where he claimed he receives a nominal GBP100 a month – Mr Skillt plans to go to Syria to fight for President Bashar al-Assad as a hired gun earning “very good money”.

Such characters under Kiev’s control play straight into the hands of Russian and separatist propaganda that portrays Ukraine’s government as a “fascist junta” manipulated by the West.

“These battalions are made up of mercenaries, not volunteers,” said Sergei Kavtaradze, a representative of the rebel authorities in Donetsk. “They are real fascists who kill and rape civilians.” Mr Kavtaradze could not cite evidence of his claim and the battalion says it has not harmed a single civilian.

Ukraine’s government is unrepentant about using the neo-Nazis. “The most important thing is their spirit and their desire to make Ukraine free and independent,” said Anton Gerashchenko, an adviser to Arsen Avakov, the interior minister. “A person who takes a weapon in his hands and goes to defend his motherland is a hero. And his political views are his own affair.”

Mark Galeotti, an expert on Russian and Ukrainian security affairs at New York University, fears battalions like Azov are becoming “magnets to attract violent fringe elements from across Ukraine and beyond”. “The danger is that this is part of the building up of a toxic legacy for when the war ends,” he said.

Extremist paramilitary groups who have built up “their own little Freikorps” and who are fundamentally opposed to finding consensus may demand a part in public life as victors in the conflict, Mr Galeotti added. “And what do you do when the war is over and you get veterans from Azov swaggering down your high street, and in your own lives?”
Annex 280


(translation)
Why Western Human Rights Activists Paid Attention to Ukrainian Nationalists’ Outages

Four well-known western human rights organisations urged Ukrainian Prosecutor General Yury Lutsenko and Ukrainian Interior Minister Arsen Avakov to condemn the crimes committed by Ukrainian nationalists and punish the perpetrators. Their letter has been published on Human Rights Watch’s website. Radical groups have committed at least 20 crimes since the beginning of 2018, but all of them have gone unnoticed by the authorities, activists say. RT found out why the West finally paid attention to the outrages of Ukrainian radicals.

Four human rights organisations – Human Rights Watch (HRW), Freedom House, Amnesty International, and Front Line Defenders – have written an open letter to Ukrainian Prosecutor
General Yury Lutsenko and Ukrainian Interior Minister Arsen Avakov, urging them to rein in Ukrainian radicals and punish them for their crimes.

Their letter says that since the beginning of 2018, various radical groups, including those banned in Russia, such as S14, Right Sector*, Tradition and Order, Carpathian Sich and others, have committed at least two dozen attacks on civilians in Kiev, Vinnitsa, Uzhhorod, Lvov, Chernovtsy, Ivano-Frankovsk and other cities and towns in Ukraine. However, law enforcement agencies either fail to conduct or delay investigations those crimes.

“Even where the attackers publicly stated their responsibility on social networks, the investigative authorities took no measures against them”, the letter points out.

Human Rights Watch, Freedom House, Amnesty International, and Front Line Defenders ask the official Kiev to investigate the crimes committed by radical groups and punish those liable.

Radical Factor

This is the first document prepared by Western human rights activists, which expresses concerns about the actions taken by radicals in Ukraine and condemns those actions, political scientist Alexander Asafov said in an interview with RT. Human Rights Watch and other human rights organisations finally paid attention to the fact that journalists, members of LGBT communities, and Roma, whose camp in Kiev was attacked by S14, a right-wing radical group that, by the way, received a state grant for its operations, are under attack in Ukraine, he stressed.

According to RT’s source in the People’s Front party, Western partners of Ukraine fear that “the situation in the country may get out of control”.

“The police have long lost their monopoly on violence” as radical attacks on all unwanted citizens go unpunished, and any attempts to rein in nationalists are accompanied by accusations of “playing into the hands of the Kremlin”, the source said.

In their appeal to Mrs. Avakov and Lutsenko, the human rights activists, among other things, expressed concerns about the fact that the Ukrainian authorities involve radicals in “performing police functions”, including patrolling the streets.

RT’s source in the Popular Front party confirmed that the Kiev authorities often engage radicals in solving “delicate problems” the Ukrainian police cannot be used for. As an example, he cited the blocking of Russian consulates in Ukraine during the presidential elections in Russia in March of this year, an attack on the head of Rossootrudnichestvo and on the Russian Centre for Science and Culture in Kiev, threats to Igor Guzhva, Editor-in-Chief of the opposition medium Strana.ua, who was forced to emigrate to Vienna, attacks on branches of Russian banks and the Inter TV channel, and blocking of the building occupied by the 21K TV channel.

The representative of People’s Front also recalled the creation of a parallel power structure in Ukraine – the so-called people’s militias, which are reportedly controlled by Arsen Avakov.

“As far as I know, representatives of the EU and the United States regularly discuss security issues in Ukraine with President Pyotr Poroshenko. But there is no reaction, so it seems that the
authorities benefit from what is happening”, said RT’s source in the Samopomich (Self-Reliance) party.

The interlocutor of RT recalled that the US State Department published a report on human rights in Ukraine in 2017. It stated that the number of murders, kidnappings and illegal arrests is growing in the country. It also described total corruption among authorities, attacks on journalists which remain uninvestigated, and the deplorable condition of the national judicial system.

**Crimes without Punishment**

The experts also paid attention to the fact that the human rights activists for the first time pointed out the impunity of Ukrainian radicals. In many instances during the post-Maidan period, those nationalists who committed offenses have managed to avoid liability.

For example, in late October 2017, the Svyatoshino District Court of Kiev released Nikolay Kokhanovsky, the commander of the volunteer battalion of the extremist group “Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists” who had wounded a man with two shots in his back.

Another telling example was the release in last June of those Right Sector’s fighters who set off a shootout in Mukachevo in July 2015, resulting in four people killed and 14 wounded.

In late March 2016, nationalists Andrey Medvedko and Denis Polishchuk were released; they were accused of killing Oles Buzina, a famous Ukrainian writer and journalist, in the spring of 2015. The court is still unable to hear their case.

During the years of the “Maidan” power, Ukrainian radicals felt their complete impunity, experts say. And nationalists themselves are already openly talking about that.

“We are fighting for the rights of Ukrainian citizens, and there is nothing to punish us for”, a source in S14 told RT.

“The police are not coping with their duties, so we are forced to act. Law enforcers understand this and informally support us”, he added.

Yevhen Karas, a leader of S14, openly stated in an interview with the Ukrainian edition of Liga.net that law enforcement officers work in close connection with nationalists. When asked by the journalist whether the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) was providing them with information, he answered in the affirmative.

“Yes. Relatively speaking, if there is a separatist rally – then they pass [the relevant information]. Moreover, they inform not only us but also Azov, Right Sector and so on”, he explained.

**“There Is no Place for Criticism Here”**

According to some experts, the appeal by the human rights activists to the official Kiev will not change the situation.
“None of this will affect human rights or the attitude towards Kiev in the West. The Ukrainian government will always be able to say: “It’s not us, it’s some citizens showing their position in this way, we will definitely punish them”. In fact, this is happening with either tacit approval or quiet help from the government. Right-wing radical groups have long turned into illegal armed formations perfectly integrated into the political life of Ukraine; major politicians, such as Arsen Avakov, use their services”, Mr. Asafov said.

At the same time, the Ukrainian authorities seem to remain aloof from what is happening, experts say.

After all, it is not the official Kiev who attacks human rights activists, dissidents and representatives of the LGBT community, Rostislav Ishchenko, President of the Centre for System Analysis and Forecasting, explained in an interview with RT.

“The attacks are carried out by right-wing radicals whom the official Ukrainian authorities cannot control. Moreover, the official Kiev relies on them as a means of intimidation. These people are very strong, and they are themselves a political force that can rein in anyone”, he said.

However, according to Mr. Ishchenko, the West’s attitude towards Ukraine has changed recently.

“Since 2015, they have stopped providing significant financial assistance to Ukraine. The country receives just crumbs from the Western community to implement certain targeted programs, and people in the West are well aware of whom they are dealing with”, he emphasised.

According to analysts, the calls by the human rights activists will not be heeded by Kiev, nor will be any serious response to them.

RT’s source in the Samopomich party believes the heads of law enforcement agencies will ignore the appeal of human rights organisations.

“Elections are approaching, and the authorities will tighten the screws, continuing to put pressure on those journalists and human rights activists who will criticize the actions taken by the country’s top officials. They need to increase their ratings, so there is no place for criticism here”, he said.

* Right Sector is a Ukrainian association of radical nationalist organisations found to be extremist and banned in Russia (by the Judgment of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation dated 17 November 2014).

** Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists – Ukrainian Insurgent Army (OUN-UPA) is a Ukrainian organisation found to be extremist and banned in Russia (by the Judgment of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation dated 17 November 2014).
Annex 281

Azov.org, About Azov

(translation)
ABOUT AZOV

Subordination:

The Azov Battalion was created on 5 May 2014 in the city of Berdyansk as a battalion of the Special Operations Police Patrol Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs pursuant to a decision of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine.

On 17 September 2014, by order of the Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, the Azov Battalion was reorganised and expanded to become a part of the Azov Special Operations Police Regiment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

On 11 November, the Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine signed an order to transfer the Azov Regiment to the National Guard of Ukraine and bring it up to strength as a combat unit of the National Guard. Today, it is a separate special operations detachment "Azov" of military unit 3057 of the National Guard of Ukraine.

Conduct of hostilities:

As part of the forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, the Azov detachment took part in military operations in the territory where the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) and the Joint Forces Operation (JFO) were conducted and also throughout Ukraine:

After its creation, the Azov Police Battalion conducted training in Zaporozhskaya region near the city of Berdyansk and patrolled the area around the city of Mariupol.

On 07 May 2014, terrorists fired with automatic weapons at a bus of the Azov police battalion near the village of Mangush. The driver was wounded. One of the attackers was killed, two others were taken prisoner, including Igor Khakimzyanov, the 'minister of defence' of the terrorist organisation of the so-called "Donetsk People's Republic".

On 09 May 2014, servicemen of the Azov Police Battalion took part in the liberation of the building of the city police department which had been seized by terrorists in the city of Mariupol.

On 12 June 2014, servicemen of the Azov Police Battalion detained Aleksandr Fomenko, one of the leaders of terrorists of the so-called "Donetsk People's Republic" in the city of Mariupol.
On 13 June 2014, servicemen of the Azov Police Battalion, supported by units of the National Guard and the Armed Forces of Ukraine, liberated Mariupol from terrorists of the so-called "Donetsk People's Republic". Terrorists lost 3 killed and 17 wounded and 38 terrorists were detained.

On 30 June 2014, servicemen of the Azov Battalion detained a commander of pro-Russian Berdyansk cossacks Igor Guskov, who is an associate of one of the leaders of terrorists in Donbas, Russian citizen Igor Girkin.

Since the beginning of July 2014, servicemen of the Azov Battalion have been conducting operations to block the weapons supply channels used by terrorists in Donetsk region. As of 6 July, the Azov Sea coast in Donetsk region is fully controlled by the battalion's forces, and checkpoints have been set up.

On 12 July 2014, servicemen of the battalion detained Vasyl Chernenko, one of the leaders of terrorists from the city of Druzhkovka. The detainee was handed over to the SBU for investigative actions. He is accused of creating terrorist groups and carrying out attacks on Ukrainian military.

On 15 July 2014, servicemen of the Azov Battalion detained one of the leaders of terrorists of the so-called "DPR" Oleksey Pabushkov, or the "Greek", who is an associate of Andrey Borisov nicknamed "Chechen", the leader of the combat unit of the "DPR"'s terrorists in Mariupol. The detainee was handed over to the SBU for investigative actions.

On 25 July 2014, servicemen of the Azov Battalion detained a terrorist from "DPR" nicknamed "Flag", who held the position of a gunsmith in a local terrorist cell. The detainee was handed over to the SBU for investigative actions.

On 04 August 2014, the Azov Police Battalion, in coordination with the Armed Forces of Ukraine, liberated the town of Maryinka from terrorists and Russian mercenaries.

On 10 August 2014, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, in coordination with the Azov Police Battalion, launched an operation to liberate the city of Ilovaisk and eliminate the terrorists' fortified area.

On 18 August 2014, the Azov Police Battalion, in conjunction with units of the Donbas Battalion and a separate company of the Dnepr Battalion, fought heavy battles on the outskirts of Ilovaisk.

On 05 September 2014, the Azov Police Battalion, in conjunction with units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, was defending Mariupol and repelled several attacks by illegal armed groups.

On 12 October 2014, servicemen of the Azov Police Regiment and soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine put out of action a terrorist tank that was shelling the positions of the Ukrainian military and an armoured vehicle "Tiger" of the Russian occupation forces.
In November 2014, the leadership of the Azov Police Regiment, jointly with the SBU and the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, detained a Russian citizen who, on the instructions of the Russian special services, was to join the unit and share information on the activities of Azov and the operations in which it would participate, as well as to prepare a murderous attack on its leadership, for which purpose he had components for making remotely operated explosives.

On 12 December 2014, the special operations detachment "Azov" of the National Guard of Ukraine fought with the terrorist groups of the so-called "DPR" and Russian troops for the towns of Pavlopol, Granitnoye and Kominternovo.

On 10 February 2015, the separate special operations detachment "Azov" of the NGU conducted an offensive operation and liberated 5 populated places east of the city of Mariupol from occupation: Shyrokino, Berdyansk, Lebedinskoye, Kominternovo, Pavlopol.

April and May 2016 - strengthening the enforcement of public order in Odessa.

In August 2016, at the instance of the Commander of the National Guard of Ukraine, a part of the special operations detachment "Azov" was assigned to guard checkpoints in Zaporozhskaya.

From autumn 2016 to the present, the special operations detachment "Azov" of the NGU has been carrying out ant-airborne defence tasks along the Azov Sea coast.

March-July 2017 – a unit of the special operations detachment "Azov" of the NGU, in conjunction with the SBU, served at entry-exit checkpoints near Donetsk and took preventive measures to prevent terrorism and other offences.

From 09 September 2017 to 05 May 2018, sniper groups of the special operations detachment "Azov" of the NGU were carrying out special and general military reconnaissance and counter-sabotage missions in the ATO (Anti-Terrorist Operation) and, later, the JFO (Joint Forces Operation) areas. During the period of the mission, illegal armed groups suffered the following losses: 8 killed and 8 wounded; 9 coaxial grenade launchers, 1 firing position, and 1 blindage were destroyed; and 2 firing positions were partially destroyed.

On 20 January 2018, while carrying out a counter-battery task, the special operations detachment "Azov" of the NGU destroyed 1 Nona-B artillery piece of illegal armed groups.

From January to September 2019, the battalion tactical group (BTG) "Azov", as part of the 30th Separate Mechanised Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, was performing a combat mission on the line of contact in the area of the Svetlodarsk Bulge. During the period of the mission, illegal armed groups suffered the following losses: 30 killed, 42 wounded, and 1 captured; 1 "Zoo 1" radar destroyed, 2 "Eleron" UAVs shot down; 8 infantry combat vehicles, 1 MT-LB multi-purpose light-armoured towing vehicle, 10 cars and trucks, 8 exclusion zones, 9 blindages, and 11 barracks destroyed. The BTG forces advanced the front line by 1 km in various areas.
Since its inception, Azov unit has been involved in rapid response teams and patrols throughout the Joint Forces Operation (JFO) area to counter sabotage and prevent terrorism.

**Losses of the Azov detachment in 2014 to 2019**

**Awards for the period 2014 to 2019:**

More than 150 Azov servicemen were awarded state decorations, including the title "Hero of Ukraine", to whom the Order of the Golden Star was awarded (posthumously); the Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky, III class; the Order of Danyl Galytskyi, III class; the Order "For Courage", III, II and I classes; and the medals "For Military Service to Ukraine" and "To the Defender of the Fatherland". More than 1,700 servicemen of the Azov detachment were awarded departmental decorations of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, and the National Guard of Ukraine and badges of the JFO Commander.
Annex 282

SPIEGEL, *Ukraine: German mercenaries join far-right volunteer battalion* (11 November 2017)

(translation)
SPIEGEL, Ukraine: German mercenaries join far-right volunteer battalion

Ukraine: German mercenaries join far-right volunteer battalion

Jan K. from eastern Germany, for example: he is posing with his thumb outstretched in his Facebook photo, he is wearing a T-shirt in camouflage colors, a protective vest, on it an emblem with the lettering "Azov". According to SPIEGEL, this right-wing extremist volunteer battalion (https://www.spiegel.de/thema/deutschland_rechtsextremismus/), which is fighting pro-Russian separatists in the Ukraine conflict (https://www.spiegel.de/thema/ukraine_konflikt/), is increasingly receiving support from Europe, especially from Germany. While around 850 mercenaries were still fighting in the militia troops in 2014, today there are already more than 2,500, according to security authorities. (This message comes from the SPIEGEL. You can find the new SPIEGEL here https://magazin.spiegel.de/SP/2017/46/index.html.)

The reason is a recruitment offensive for a "reconquest of Europe", with which the regiment is also recruiting young recruits among German neo-Nazis. In July, for example, German-language leaflets were distributed among the visitors at the Rechtsrock festival in Themar, Thuringia, inviting them to "join the ranks of the best" to "save Europe from extinction".

Azov was founded in the spring of 2014 by nationalist politicians and is subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine. The commander of the regiment, the right-wing extremist politician Andrey Biletsky, received the rank of lieutenant colonel from the Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in 2014.

The advertising campaign of the Ukrainian fighters has apparently succeeded: as with Jan K., photos of German neo-Nazis who proudly present their affiliation to Azov are increasingly appearing on social networks.
Annex 283

Gazeta.ua, Biletskiy: "Azov" will become a party" (28 May 2016)

(translation)
Biletskiy: “Azov” will become a party

Gazeta.ua, Saturday, 28 May 2016, 14:57

Photo: unian.ua

The “Azov” Civil Corps was created for political activities. In the future, it will be reorganised as a party.

Andrey Biletskiy, people’s deputy and first commander of the “Azov” Regiment, said this in an interview with “Ostrov”.

“Of course, yes,” he said when asked about the creation of a party.

Biletskiy noted that the “Azov” Civil Corps network has long existed for political and social struggle. It will be used to form a party. At the same time, he is confident that “Azov” will not need a lot of money for political activities.

“We need many times less money than classical parties. Our people are heavily motivated by the principle of volunteerism and ideology. And this replaces a lot of money for us. Where a conventional party needs to spend 100 thousand dollars, 5 thousand will be enough for me,” Biletskiy said.

Biletskiy: "Azov" will become a party"

Gazeta.ua

Saturday, 28 May 2016 14:57

Biletskiy: "Azov" will become a party"

Photo: unian.ua

The "Azov" Civil Corps was created for political activities. In the future, it will be reorganised as a party.

Andrey Biletskiy, people’s deputy and first commander of the "Azov" Regiment, said this in an interview with "Ostrov".

"Of course, yes," - he said when asked about the creation of a party.

Biletskiy noted that the "Azov" Civil Corps network has long existed for political and social struggle. It will be used to form a party. At the same time, he is confident that "Azov" will not need a lot of money for political activities.

"We need many times less money than classical parties. Our people are heavily motivated by the principle of volunteerism and ideology. And this replaces a lot of money for us. Where a conventional party needs to spend 100 thousand dollars, 5 thousand will be enough for me," Biletskiy said.
Annex 284

Newsweek, *Ukrainian Nationalist Volunteers Committing 'ISIS-Style' War Crimes* (10 September 2014)
WORLD

Ukrainian Nationalist Volunteers Committing 'ISIS-Style' War Crimes

Groups of right-wing Ukrainian nationalists are committing war crimes in the rebel-held territories of Eastern Ukraine, according to a report from Amnesty International, as evidence emerged in local media of the volunteer militias beheading their victims.

Armed volunteers who refer to themselves as the Aidar battalion "have been involved in widespread abuses, including abductions, unlawful detention, ill-treatment, theft, extortion, and possible executions", Amnesty said.

The organisation has also published a report detailing similar alleged atrocities committed by pro-Russian militants, highlighting the brutality of the conflict which has claimed over 3,000 lives.

Amnesty's statement came before images of what appeared to be the severed heads of two civilians' started circulating on social media today, identified by Russian news channel NTV as the heads of rebel hostages.

Shortly after, Kiev-based news network Pravilnoe TV reported that it had spoken with one of the mothers of the victims who confirmed her son was a rebel, captured during fighting in Donetsk.

She said she had received her son's head in a wooden box in the post, blaming nationalist volunteers for her son's death. Newsweek has not been able to verify the report independently.
There are over 30 pro-nationalist, volunteer battalions similar to Aidar, such as Ukraina, DND Metinvest and Kiev 1, all funded by private investors.

The Aidar battalion is publicly backed by Ukrainian oligarch Ihor Kolomoyskyi, who also allegedly funds the Azov, Donbas, Dnepr 1, Dnepr 2 volunteer battalions, operating under orders from Kiev. Last spring Kolomoyskyi offered a bounty of $10,000 of his own money for each captured Russian "saboteur".

Amnesty's report, however, indicates Kiev's loose regulation on volunteer groups and its "members... act with virtually no oversight or control".

Amnesty has asked for Kiev to clarify the legal status and affiliation of its volunteer battalions and fully integrate them into "clear chains of command", making all of its servicemen aware of international law and implementing "effective investigations" into abuses of human rights.

Meanwhile Norwegian channel TV2 presented footage yesterday of the Azov battalion flying flags with the symbols of Ukraine's neo-Nazi party - Patriot of...
This is the first instance of government-backed volunteers displaying far-right tendencies. However, numerous powerful paramilitary groups are reportedly involved in the Ukrainian conflict such as Patriot of Ukraine, Right Sector and White Hammer.

Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko announced today that the majority of Russian troops had left the country, raising hopes of peace negotiations between Kiev and pro-Russian separatists.

Correction: This article originally mistakenly stated Ihor Kolomoyskyi offered a bounty for each killed 'saboteur', when it was in fact for each captured 'saboteur'. This has been corrected and Newsweek apologises for the error.
Annex 285

Amnesty International Briefing, Ukraine: Abuses and war crimes by the Aidar Volunteer Battalion in the north Luhansk region, 8 September 2014
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL BRIEFING

8 September 2014

AI Index: EUR 50/040/2014

Ukraine: Abuses and war crimes by the Aidar Volunteer Battalion in the north Luhansk region

It’s not Europe. It’s a bit different… There is a war here. The law has changed, procedures have been simplified… If I choose to, I can have you arrested right now, put a bag over your head and lock you up in a cellar for 30 days on suspicion of aiding separatists.

--Aidar battalion commander to Amnesty International researcher

Members of the Aidar territorial defence battalion, operating in the north Luhansk region, have been involved in widespread abuses, including abductions, unlawful detention, ill-treatment, theft, extortion, and possible executions.

The Aidar battalion is one of over thirty so-called volunteer battalions to have emerged in the wake of the conflict, which have been loosely integrated into Ukrainian security structures as they seek to retake separatist held areas.

In the course of a two-week research mission to the region, an Amnesty International researcher interviewed dozens of victims and witnesses of the abuses, as well as local officials, army commanders and police officers in the area and representatives of the Aidar battalion.
Our findings indicate that, while formally operating under the command of the Ukrainian security forces combined headquarters in the region members of the Aidar battalion act with virtually no oversight or control, and local police are either unwilling or unable to address the abuses.

Some of the abuses committed by members of the Aidar battalion amount to war crimes, for which both the perpetrators and, possibly, the commanders would bear responsibility under national and international law.

Part of the region where the Aidar battalion currently operates – such as the conurbation of Severodonetsk, Lysychansk and Rubizhne and the town of Shchastya - was under the control of the separatist forces of the so-called Lugansk People’s Republic (LNR) from mid-May to late July. During this time, separatist forces are reported to have committed a wide range of abuses against civilians, including abduction, theft and murder. Amnesty International has documented such abuses by separatist armed groups in other regions.

The Aidar battalion played a significant role in the Ukrainian advances in July, most prominently in the recapture of the town of Shchastya, 24 kilometers north of Luhansk city. It has lost many of its combatants in the fighting. Up to several dozen were killed in an ambush south of Shchastya after the announcement of the ceasefire on 6 September, 2014.

While hailed by many nationally as a committed fighting force, the Aidar battalion has acquired locally a reputation for brutal reprisals, robbery, beatings and extortion.

Amnesty International is calling on the Ukrainian authorities to bring Aidar and other volunteer battalions under effective lines of command and control, promptly investigate all allegations of abuses, and hold those responsible to account.

The Ukrainian authorities cannot afford to replicate in the areas they retake, the lawlessness and abuses that have prevailed in separatist-held areas. The failure to eliminate abuses and possible war crimes by volunteer battalions risks significantly aggravating tensions in the east of the country and undermining the proclaimed intentions of the new Ukrainian authorities to strengthen and uphold the rule of law more broadly.
Abuses by the Aidar battalion

Amnesty International documented dozens of cases of abuses allegedly committed by members of the Aidar battalion in Novoaidar district, Starobilsk, Severodonetsk, Lysychansk, and Shchastya between late June and late August.

Typically, the fighters abducted local men, often businessmen or farmers, whom they accused of collaborating with the separatists and held in makeshift detention facilities before either releasing them or handing them over to the Security Service (SBU).

In nearly all cases documented by Amnesty International the victims were subjected to beatings at the moment of capture and/or during interrogations, and either had to pay ransom for their release, or had possessions, including money, cars, telephones, and other valuables seized by the battalion members. Many of the witnesses and victims approached by Amnesty International were reluctant to share details of the incidents, fearing retaliation from Aidar battalion members. The names of victims and witnesses in illustrative cases detailed below have been changed.

- On 25-27 August, Aidar battalion members abducted 4 miners from Novodruzhesk, a small town north of Lysychansk. One of the men, “Andriy” (not his real name), undergoing chemotherapy for lung cancer, told Amnesty International that he was outside his home at 3pm on 27 August when a group of Aidar battalion fighters arrived in a minibus. Two men with automatic weapons, in camouflage uniforms approached him and ordered him to lie on the ground. He said:

  They broke my jaw... When I lay down as they shouted 'lie on the ground!', one of them kicked me... They wound tape over my eyes and tied my wrists, also with tape.

  They put me in a minibus with my neighbour ...They drove for about 20 minutes, then brought me into some kind of a room. I could not see where or what it was as my eyes were covered with tape the whole time... They held me there for a day. They gave water, one biscuit, led me to the toilet when needed.
There were about 12-15 other detainees there. We were forbidden to talk... I was interrogated twice: ‘where were you? What did you do?’, but not beaten any more. But I heard others being beaten in the next rooms.”

Andriy said the captors drove him to a stadium in Severodonetsk and released him, still blindfolded. His wife said she went to the local police who eventually managed to return to the family some of the possessions taken from him by his abductors, 2 passports and a telephone, but not his car documents, driving licence, keys, wallet and bank cards. They did not open a criminal case into the incident. On 28 August there was an attempt to debit money from his bank card. Amnesty International saw the text message sent automatically to Andriy’s phone, informing him of the attempt.

Family members of two of the other detained men, seeking information on 28 August at Severodonetsk police station about their whereabouts, told Amnesty International that police and soldiers in Lysychansk told them about a secret detention facility in Severodonetsk, but Severodonetsk police denied its existence - as indeed they have to Amnesty International. An acquaintance just released from the same place had recognised one of the two men there, and recounted that detainees were forced to recite the Ukrainian national anthem and beaten if they failed.

- On 25 August, at around 4 p.m., members of the Aidar battalion abducted Yevhen a 31-year-old local businessman, near the TV tower outside of Starobilsk.

Yevhen told Amnesty International that three men in masks, who arrived in a black VAZ car, approached him when he stopped for a bathroom break at a disused petrol station, searched his car, took UAH 30,000 (roughly 1700 Euros) they found in it, and accused him of being a separatist. He said:

“They pulled a mask over my head, and drove me for about 20 minutes. They brought me to a place that seemed to be a garage, and started interrogating me, demanding I confess to being a separatist.

“They interrogated me three times. Each time, they beat me: with rifle barrels, in the kidneys with the blunt end of an axe, and other
things. They threatened to take me out to a field and execute me.

“After a day had passed they came in again and said I had been detained by the Aidar battalion, but was now in the hands of ‘Alpha’ [a unit belonging to the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU)], but I could see they were the same people.”

Yevhen said that eventually the captors asked him how much money he was willing to pay for his release, and, when he said that they had already taken all he had, decided to let him go. He filed a case with the police, but was not able to recover his confiscated possessions – the money, his car, two mobile phones, and golden jewellery.

- On 23 August in the afternoon, members of Aidar battalion raided the house of Olena in the village of Olexandrivka near Severodonetsk.

82-year-old Olena told Amnesty International that she was at home with her daughter, her son-in-law, and her grandson. The family heard gunfire and saw a number of vehicles approaching the house on their security camera. Olena said:

“I just opened the gate, and they rushed at me. From fright I let go and it swung shut. They began firing. One jumped up on a car. I made a run for it, into the garage. They were firing. Bursts of automatic fire. A racket. Rat tat tat tat.

In the garage they had already got me... I crawled my way to the door, cried out and fell at the threshold. My daughter came out shouting: “What’s going on? What are you doing? Call an ambulance, quickly.”... Blood was spilling. My daughter staunched it.”

Olena told Amnesty International that the armed men searched the house, and wanted to detain her grandson, accusing him of being a separatist. She managed to convince them not to take him away, but they took some money that they found in the house, and her grandson’s four-wheel drive car.

Olena was quickly sent in a taxi to Severodonetsk hospital and, as doctors informed Amnesty International, underwent 7 hours of surgery. Her significant abdominal injuries were from shrapnel rather than bullets –
there were ragged entry and exit wounds. Her colon was severed. She had two smashed ribs removed.

**Response of the authorities**

Amnesty International raised its concerns regarding abuses committed by members of the Aidar battalion directly with its commander for Severodonetsk and Rubizhne. He confirmed that the battalion used a “simplified” procedure for detentions and indicated that the battalion indeed had its own facility in the Severodonetsk area for holding detainees. He acknowledged that there could be instances of beating during arrest, confirmed that detainees were blindfolded throughout the detention, that his troops had held Andriy, and that he personally supervised the handover of his bag of documents to the police.

He did not acknowledge any acts of theft by the battalion and saw no need to introduce any measures to address them. He acknowledged that his troops took the car of Olena’s grandson as it was temporarily needed, and stated that an order had been given for its return. However, Olena’s family later informed Amnesty International that police in Troitsk (in the far north of Luhansk region) detained the car and a man driving it, after it had apparently been illicitly sold.

Police and military authorities in Severodonetsk informed Amnesty International that there are 38 criminal cases opened into actions allegedly committed by the members of the Aidar battalion, mostly involving incidents of robbery. Reports on this spate of crimes were submitted up the line to the Ministries of Defence and Interior, without tangible result thus far. Local police told Amnesty International that they were well aware of the widespread criminal actions by the Aidar members but were unable to do anything beyond the registration of criminal cases.

A high ranking military official in the area informed Amnesty International that after receiving his reports the Ministry of Defence sent two commissions in early August to inspect the Aidar battalion. Their recommendations for its re-organisation and the regularisation of procedures, have yet to be acted upon.

**Recommendations**

Amnesty International urges the Ukrainian authorities to:
- Clarify the legal status of the Aidar battalion and other volunteer units;
- Integrate the volunteer battalions into clear chains of command, control and accountability.
- Conduct prompt, thorough, impartial and effective investigations into all allegations of abuses committed by members of volunteer battalions, including, specifically, abuses committed by the Aidar battalion in the north Luhansk region;
- Effectively protect victims and witnesses of abuses under investigation against reprisals;
- Ensure that all those involved in military and law-enforcement operations, including members of volunteer battalions, are made fully aware of the provisions of national and international law applicable to their actions and their potential personal and command responsibility for their breach.

END/
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The government generally respected citizens’ right to demonstrate peacefully. Numerous public gatherings and protests took place during the year. The Helmand Peace March Initiative—the “peace tent” protest that launched in the provincial capital of Lashkar Gah on March 26 following a deadly car bombing–inspired antiwar demonstrations in at least 16 other provinces, which were largely peaceful.
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for the right to freedom of association, and the government generally respected it. The 2009 law on political parties obliges political parties to register with the Ministry of Justice and to pursue objectives consistent with Islam. In 2012 the Council of Ministers approved a regulation requiring political parties to open offices in at least 20 provinces within one year of registration. In 2017 President Ghani signed a decree prohibiting employees and officials of security and judicial institutions, specifically the Supreme Court, Attorney General’s Office, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, and National Directorate of Security, from political party membership while government employees. Noncompliant employees could be fired.

Albania

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provide for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

Algeria

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

Although the constitution provides for freedom of peaceful assembly and association, the government severely restricted the exercise of these rights.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY
The constitution provides for the right of peaceful assembly, but the government continued to curtail this right. A ban on demonstrations in Algiers remained in effect. Authorities utilized the ban to prohibit assembly within the city limits. Nationwide, the government required citizens and organizations to obtain permits from the national government-appointed local governor before holding public meetings or demonstrations. The government restricted licenses to political parties, NGOs, and other groups to hold indoor rallies or delayed permission until the eve of the event, thereby impeding publicity and outreach efforts by organizers.

Hotels in Algiers and other major cities continued their practice of refusing to sign rental contracts for meeting spaces with political parties, NGOs, and civil associations without a copy of written authorization from the Ministry of Interior for the proposed gathering. NGOs reported instances of not receiving the written authorization in time to hold planned meetings. NGOs reported that the government threatened hotel and restaurant owners with penalties if they rented rooms to NGOs without official authorization. In most cases, the NGOs continued to hold their meetings and police came to the hotels to end the gatherings.

In July, Algerian League for the Defense of Human Rights (LADDH) and 15 representatives from other NGOs gathered at a hotel in Oran to discuss migration. Security services prevented the meeting from taking place “in the absence of an official authorization.” The attendees moved their meetings elsewhere and were followed by police who ordered them to disperse.

Throughout the year police dispersed unauthorized gatherings or prevented marching groups of protesters from demonstrating. Police typically dispersed protesters shortly after a protest began and arrested and detained organizers for a few hours. Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and other NGOs criticized the government’s use of the law to restrict peaceful assembly.

In September a group of military veterans organized a protest in Algiers, prompting a crackdown by authorities. Press reported 107 protestors were injured along with 51 police and gendarmes.

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

The constitution provides for the right of association, but the government restricted this right.
The law’s extensive requirements and uneven enforcement served as major impediments to the development of civil society. The law grants the government wide-ranging oversight of and influence in the day-to-day activities of civil society organizations. It requires national-level civil organizations to apply to the Ministry of Interior for permission to operate. Once registered, organizations must inform the government of their activities, funding sources, and personnel, including notification of personnel changes. The law imposes an additional requirement that associations obtain government preapproval before accepting foreign funds. If organizations fail to provide required information to the government or attempt to operate with or accept foreign funds without authorization, they are subject to fines between DZD 2,000 and DZD 5,000 ($17 and $43) and up to six months’ imprisonment.

According to the law, associations that apply for accreditation are entitled to receive a response within two months for national organizations, 45 days for interregional-level associations, 40 days for province-level associations, and 30 days for communal organizations. While the Ministry of Interior oversees the accreditation process for most associations, the president of a local assembly approves applications for communal associations.

The Ministry of Interior may deny a license to or dissolve any group regarded as a threat to the government’s authority or to public order, and on several occasions failed to grant, in an expeditious fashion, official recognition to NGOs, associations, religious groups, and political parties. According to the ministry, organizations receive a receipt after submitting their application for accreditation, and after the time periods listed above, this slip is legally sufficient for them to begin operating, to open a bank account, and to rent office or event space. The law does not explicitly include this provision. If the application is approved, the ministry issues a final accreditation document.

Many organizations reported that they never received a deposit slip and that even with the receipt; it was difficult to conduct necessary administrative tasks without formal accreditation. Other organizations reported they never received any written response to their application request even after calling the ministry and trying to register at local police stations. The ministry maintained that organizations that were refused accreditation or that did not receive a response within the specified time period could appeal to the State Council, the administrative court responsible for cases involving the government.

The ministry did not renew the accreditations of the NGOs SOS Disparus (SOS Disappeared), Djazairouna, the LADDH, the National Association for the Fight Against Corruption, and the
Youth Action Movement, all of which submitted their renewal applications in prior years.

The government issued licenses and subsidies to domestic associations, especially youth, medical, and neighborhood associations. According to the Ministry of Interior, there were 108,940 local and 1,293 national associations registered as of 2016. Unlicensed NGOs remained active, but rarely received government assistance, and citizens at times hesitated to associate with these organizations.

Andorra

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provide for the freedoms of assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

Angola

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

A. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, INCLUDING FOR THE PRESS

The constitution and law provide for freedom of expression, including for the press, but while the government loosened restrictions on these rights during the year, state media continued to be the country’s primary source for news and reflected a progovernment view.

Freedom of Expression: Individuals reported practicing self-censorship but generally were able to criticize government policies without fear of direct reprisal. Social media was widely used in the larger cities and provided an open forum for discussion.

Press and Media Freedom: Private radio and print media criticized the government openly and harshly, but access to private media sources was limited outside of the capital. Journalists
routinely complained of lack of transparency and communication from government press offices and other government officials.

The president appoints the leadership of all major state-owned media outlets and state control of these outlets often led to one-sided reporting. State news outlets, including Angolan Public Television (TPA), Radio Nacional, and the Jornal de Angola newspaper, favored the ruling party but increased their coverage of opposition political parties’ perspectives and social problems reflecting poor governance during the year. On January 18, the TPA inaugurated live broadcasts of plenary sessions of the National Assembly. Also in January, the TPA began permitting opposition politicians to comment live on stories featured on the nightly news. Opposition parties, however, received far less overall coverage on state media than did the ruling party.

Violence and Harassment: Journalists reported fewer incidents of violence or harassment during the year. On October 19, the board of directors of TV Zimbo dismissed journalist Jorge Eurico allegedly for reporting on an attempted bribery scandal involving senior government officials. Media outlets Club-K and a foreign news organization reported that General Leopoldino Fragoso de Nascimento “Dino,” a major shareholder in TV Zimbo, ordered Eurico’s dismissal. On October 24, Eurico published an opinion editorial denouncing his dismissal from TV Zimbo.

Censorship or Content Restrictions: In January 2017 the National Assembly passed a package of five regulatory media laws, one of which established the Regulatory Entity for Social Communication (ERCA), a body mandated to license and delicense journalists and determine what constitutes appropriate media content. At year’s end ERCA remained largely inactive. Journalists reported practicing self-censorship.

The minister of social communication, the spokesperson of the presidency, and the national director of information maintained significant decision-making authority over media. It was commonly understood these individuals actively vetted news stories in the state-controlled print, television, and radio media and exercised considerable authority over some privately owned outlets. State-controlled media rarely published or broadcast stories critical of the ruling party, government officials, or government policies. Coverage critical of the previous government of Jose Eduardo dos Santos and of senior-level officials who had been dismissed on allegations of corruption increased significantly during the year.
On September 3, the minister of social communication announced that cable provider DStv would start broadcasting two Portuguese-owned television channels, SIC Noticias and SIC Internacional, which Angolan telecommunications operator ZAP, owned by Isabel dos Santos, the daughter of former president Jose Eduardo do Santos, stopped broadcasting in March 2017. *Expresso* newspaper correspondent in Luanda Gustavo Costa and the president of the Media Institute for Southern Africa-Angola, Alexandre Solombe, stated that ZAP’s decision to cease broadcasting the two channels was in response to their critical reporting on corruption and poverty in the country.

**Libel/Slander Laws:** Defamation is a crime for which conviction is punishable by imprisonment or a fine, and unlike in most cases in which defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty, defendants in defamation cases have the burden of proving their innocence by providing evidence of the validity of the allegedly damaging material.

Several journalists in print media, radio, and political blogs faced libel and defamation lawsuits. Journalists complained the government used libel laws to limit their ability to report on corruption and nepotistic practices, while the government assessed that some journalists abused their positions and published inaccurate stories regarding government officials without verifying the facts or providing the accused the right of reply. On July 6, the Provincial Tribunal of Luanda acquitted journalists Rafael Marques and Mariano Bras on charges of defamation and slander for alleging corrupt practices by former attorney general Joao Maria de Sousa. Judge Josina Ferreira Falcao ruled that Marques’ reporting, which Bras had republished, fulfilled the duty of journalism to inform the public and expose suspected wrongdoings.

**INTERNET FREEDOM**

The law mandates ERCA to determine what constitutes appropriate media content, including online content. The government did not, however, restrict or disrupt access to the internet or censor online content, and there were no credible reports the government monitored private online communications without appropriate legal oversight. According to the International Telecommunication Union, in 2017 approximately 14 percent of residents had access to the internet.

**ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND CULTURAL EVENTS**

There were no government restrictions on academic freedom or cultural events.
B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution and law provide for the right of peaceful assembly, and the government increasingly respected this right.

The law requires written notification to the local administrator and police three days before public assemblies are to be held. The law does not require government permission to hold public assemblies, but permits authorities to restrict or stop assemblies in public spaces within 109 yards of public, military, detention, diplomatic or consular buildings for security reasons. The law also requires public assemblies to start after 7 p.m. on weekdays and 1 p.m. on Saturdays. The government at times prohibited events based on perceived or claimed security considerations. Police and administrators did not interfere with progovernment gatherings. Nonpartisan groups intending to criticize the government or government leaders, however, often encountered the presence of police who prevented them from holding the event. Usually authorities claimed the timing or venue requested was problematic or that the proper authorities had not received notification.

On May 26, in Luanda, police intervened to prevent a group of 20 activists from commemorating the 41st anniversary of a 1977 protest against the MPLA that resulted in the arrest and killings of thousands of individuals. Protesters stated police prevented their access to the protest site and attacked them with dogs and sticks. One protester was badly injured. Opposition parties, UNITA and the Broad Convergence for the Salvation of Angola-Electoral Coalition (CASA-CE), as well as Amnesty International, criticized the police intervention.

Members of LTPM held several protests during the year. On November 17, security forces allegedly fired shots in the direction of LTPM protesters in Cafunfo, Lund Norte province, to disperse them. LTPM and several media sources reported that security forces shot one protester in the leg and detained dozens.

The government at times arbitrarily restricted the activities of associations it considered subversive by refusing to grant permits for organized activities. Authorities generally permitted opposition parties to organize and hold meetings.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
The constitution and law provide for the right of association, but the government did not always respect this right (see also section 7.a.). Extensive delays in the NGO registration process continued to be a problem; however, NGOs that had not yet received registration were allowed to operate.

In July 2017 the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional a 2015 presidential decree regulating the operation of NGOs. Civil society had criticized the decree as potentially restrictive and intrusive for including requirements that NGOs obtain approval from the government before the implementation of any project, provide frequent financial reports to the government on NGO activities, and allow local authorities to supervise NGO projects within their municipalities. The government stated this regulation was part of its strategy to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The court ruled that only the National Assembly had jurisdiction to legislate such requirements according to the clearly defined separation of powers in the constitution.

**Antigua and Barbuda**

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

**B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION**

The constitution provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

**Argentina**

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

**B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION**

The constitution provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights. Local NGOs, including CELS, expressed concerns that security-related protocols the Ministry of Security implemented informally beginning in 2016 imposed restrictions on the right to peaceful protest and assembly.
Amnesty International reported that authorities violently suppressed a public protest in La Plata, Buenos Aires Province on August 21. Violent confrontations with police occurred after some protesters attempted to break into a provincial government building. Police used tear gas and rubber bullets to halt the demonstration. Five protesters were arrested and dozens were injured, including one protester who was hit by a police patrol car.

The government filed charges against approximately 20 civilians for the violence that occurred during December 2017 demonstrations against pension reform, which injured 160, including 88 police officers. On May 23, the Ministry of Security offered a monetary award for information leading to the arrest of one of the fugitive protesters. On August 31, a federal court ordered one protester to pretrial detention. Additional defendants were at liberty while awaiting trial. The cases were ongoing at year’s end. Local and international NGOs, including CELS and Amnesty International, stated that law enforcement had violently suppressed the protests and called for official investigation into actions by security forces.

Armenia

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provide for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association. In some instances, the government restricted those freedoms.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution and the law provide for freedom of peaceful assembly and after the spring “velvet revolution,” the new government generally respected these rights.

A local NGO, the Armenian Helsinki Committee (AHC), examined the right to freedom of peaceful assembly, especially focusing on the protest period of April-May. The April rallies were unprecedented in terms of the number of participants as compared to rallies held in earlier years, with estimates of 100,000-150,000 protesters at some points. From April 13 to April 15, NGOs reported no instances of police interference with assemblies and marches, but the situation changed after April 16, when in response to Nikol Pashinyan’s call for a
“decentralized struggle,” numerous citizens organized and held rallies and marches in various parts of Yerevan as well as in the regions.

AHC found many instances of disproportionate use of force, violence, and abuse of official powers by the police at assemblies from April 16 to April 23. For example, on April 16 and on April 22, members of an unknown police unit threw 11 flash grenades into the crowds without proper warning. As a result, 40 citizens and six police officers sought medical assistance. Reporters from 168?am and Factor.am news websites also sustained injuries.

According to the police report, from April 16 to April 26, 1,283 persons were forcibly brought to police departments, including 1,144 in Yerevan, 918 of whom were also subjected to administrative detention. The majority of the demonstrators were held in administrative detention for no more than three hours, in accordance with the law, although some detainees reported being held longer. Some were brought to police departments but were not allowed to make a phone call. Lawyers who cooperated in a hotline organized by human rights defenders reported in many cases officers prevented them from meeting with their clients. In some cases, obstacles for lawyers to enter police departments were removed after intervention from the ombudsman's office.

There were incidents of violence by masked assailants. On April 22, for example, more than 50 individuals on Erebuni Street attacked protesters with electroshock weapons, truncheons, and stones and verbally abused them. Many of the attackers wore masks that covered their faces. More than 20 police officers were present when the incident occurred, but did not interfere to stop the assaults. A reporter, a cameraman from Shant TV, and a cameraman from Factor TV were hurt during the incident.

The SIS opened investigations into more than 50 criminal cases of police abuse of power accompanied by violence during the assemblies held from April 13 to May 8. Later, those cases were merged into a single criminal case and an investigative group was established. More than 60 episodes of violence were under investigation within the framework of that criminal case, with reporters, lawyers, and numerous citizens recognized as aggrieved parties.

In November the UN special rapporteur on peaceful assembly and association noted, “Armenia has come a long way with recent reforms and the adoption of new laws that regulate the exercise of the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association; however authorities need to ensure the consistent enforcement of the current regulations.”
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provide this right, and the government generally respected it. Under the Law on Public Organizations, in force since February 2017, some NGOs have legal standing to act on behalf of their beneficiaries limited to environmental issues in court. The limitations contradict a 2010 Constitutional Court decision that allowed all NGOs to have legal standing in court.

On October 29, the Ministry of Justice proposed draft amendments to the Law on Public Organizations that generated intense public debate. For example, on November 16, the Transparency International Anticorruption Center (TIAC) released a statement expressing concerns the draft amendments would introduce problematic changes to the reporting requirements for civil society organizations. The draft proposed to toughen the reporting for civil society organizations by extending reporting requirements to all organizations regardless of their sources of funding. In addition, the amendments would require personal information of the donors as well as members, governing bodies, staff and volunteers who have received funding. According to TIAC, the draft would put an unreasonable and disproportionate burden on public organizations.

Australia

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

Although the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association are not codified in law, the government generally respected these rights.

Austria

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION
The constitution and law provide for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

Azerbaijan

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, but the government restricted these rights.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The government severely restricted freedom of peaceful assembly. Authorities at times responded to peaceful protests and assemblies by using force and detaining protesters. The law permits administrative detention for up to three months for misdemeanors and up to one month for resisting police. Punishment for those who failed to follow a court order (including failure to pay a fine) may include fines of 500 to 1,000 manat ($290 to $580) and punishment of up to one month of administrative detention.

While the constitution stipulates that groups may peacefully assemble after notifying the relevant government body in advance, the government continued to interpret this provision as a requirement for prior permission. Local authorities required all rallies to be preapproved and held at designated locations. Most political parties and NGOs criticized the requirements as unacceptable and characterized them unconstitutional. Authorities throughout the country routinely ignored applications for public rallies, effectively denying the freedom to assemble.

Activists stated that police routinely arrested individuals who peacefully sought to exercise their fundamental freedoms on false charges of resisting police that consistently resulted in periods of administrative detention up to 30 days. A total of 18 individuals were detained and sentenced to 15 to 30 days of administrative detention for their participation in government authorized opposition rallies on March 10, March 31, and April 14. Activists also stated that, as of April 15, more than 100 Popular Front party members were summoned or harassed by police and warned about participating in opposition demonstrations. In another high-profile
example, Azer Gasimli and four other activists of the opposition Republican Alternative Party were arrested, charged with resisting police, and sentenced to administrative detention for their role in organizing an unauthorized march in the center of Baku on May 28 to celebrate the centennial anniversary of the founding of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic. Police summoned dozens of other participants and warned them not to take part in similar future events.

The government also prevented opposition groups from gathering to visit culturally important sites, a practice authorities previously permitted. For example, on November 17, police detained approximately 50 opposition activists, including PFP Chairman Ali Kerimli and NCDF Chairman Jamil Hasanli, for attempting to hold a procession through Martyr's Alley to commemorate National Revival Day. Most activists were released the same day, but Kerimli and approximately eight others were held incommunicado until November 19, when Kerimli and five others were released with fines and three PFP activists were sentenced to 20 days of administrative detention.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for freedom of association, but the law places some restrictions on this right, and amendments enacted during 2014 severely constrained NGO activities. Citing these amended laws, authorities conducted numerous criminal investigations into the activities of independent organizations, froze bank accounts, and harassed local staff, including incarcerating and placing travel bans on some NGO leaders. Consequently, a number of NGOs were unable to operate.

A number of legal provisions allow the government to regulate the activities of political parties, religious groups, businesses, and NGOs, including requiring NGOs to register with the Ministry of Justice if they seek “legal personality” status. Although the law requires the government to act on NGO registration applications within 30 days of receipt (or within an additional 30 days, if further investigation is required), vague, onerous, and nontransparent registration procedures continued to result in long delays that limited citizens’ right to associate. Other laws restrict freedom of association, for example, by requiring deputy heads of NGO branches to be citizens if the branch head is a foreigner.

Laws affecting grants and donations imposed a de facto prohibition on NGOs receiving cash donations and made it nearly impossible for them to receive anonymous donations or to solicit contributions from the public.
In 2014 the president approved a number of amendments to the administrative code and the laws on NGOs, grants, and registration of legal entities that imposed additional restrictions on NGO activities and closed several loopholes for the operations of unregistered, independent, and foreign organizations. The legislation also introduced some restrictions on donors. For example, foreign donors were required to obtain preapproval before signing grant agreements with recipients. The laws make unregistered and foreign NGOs vulnerable to involuntary dissolution, intimidated and dissuaded potential activists and donors from joining and supporting civil society organizations, and restricted their ability to provide grants to unregistered local groups or individual heads of such organizations.

In January 2017 the Cabinet of Ministers issued new regulations for establishing a “single window” mechanism to streamline the grant registration process. According to the new procedures, obtaining grant registration processes for multiple agencies were merged. The new procedures were not fully implemented, however, further reducing the number of operating NGOs.

In 2016 the Ministry of Justice adopted rules on monitoring NGO activities. The rules authorize the ministry to conduct inspections of NGOs, with few provisions protecting their rights, and provide the potential of harsh fines if they do not cooperate.

The far-reaching investigation opened by the Prosecutor General's Office in 2014 into the activities of numerous domestic and international NGOs and local leadership remained open during the year. As a result a number of NGOs were unable to operate, the bank accounts of several NGOs remained frozen, and some NGO leaders were still prohibited from leaving the country.

The government continued to implement rules pursuant to a law that requires foreign NGOs wishing to operate in the country to sign an agreement and register with the Ministry of Justice. Foreign NGOs wishing to register a branch in the country are required to demonstrate they support “the Azerbaijani people’s national and cultural values” and commit not to be involved in religious and political propaganda. The decree does not specify any time limit for the registration procedure and effectively allows for unlimited discretion of the government to decide whether to register a foreign NGO. As of year’s end, no foreign NGOs had been able to register under these rules.

NGO representatives stated the Ministry of Justice did not act on submitted applications, particularly those from individuals or organizations working on issues related to democratic development. Some experts estimated up to 1,000 NGOs remained unregistered.
Bahrain

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution provides for the right of free assembly, but a number of laws restrict the exercise of this right. The Ministry of Interior maintained a prohibition on public demonstrations, stating that the purpose was to maintain public order in view of sectarian attacks in the region and that the ban was expected to be temporary in nature. Prior to the ban, the government limited and controlled political gatherings, and activists reported the government denied permits for organized demonstrations by refusing to accept application paperwork. For the fourth year, there were no authorized demonstrations, although the ministry generally did not intervene in peaceful, unauthorized demonstrations, including spontaneous labor demonstrations. For the third year, the government declined to issue permits for a “May Day” rally in support of workers’ rights by thousands of members of the more than 45 trade unions affiliated with the General Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions (GFBTU). According to the government, there were no applications submitted to hold a demonstration or protest during the year.

The law outlines the locations and times during which it prohibits functions, including areas close to hospitals, airports, commercial locations, security-related facilities, and downtown Manama. The General Directorate of the Police may prevent a public meeting if it violates security or public order, or for any other serious reason. The law states that mourners may not turn funeral processions into political rallies and that security officials may be present at any public gathering.

The law states every public gathering shall have a committee consisting of a head and at least two members. The committee is responsible for supervising and preventing any illegal acts during the function. According to the law, the Ministry of Interior is not obligated to justify why it approves or denies requests to allow protests. The penal code penalizes any gathering “of five or more individuals” that is held for the “purpose of committing crimes or inciting others to commit crimes.” Lawyers asserted authorities should not prevent demonstrations in advance based on assumptions crimes would be committed. Authorities prohibited the use of
vehicles in any demonstration, protest, or gathering unless organizers obtained special written permission from the head of public security.

Organizers of an unauthorized gathering faced prison sentences of three to six months. The minimum sentence for participating in an illegal gathering is one month, and the maximum is two years’ imprisonment. Authorities gave longer sentences for cases where demonstrators used violence in an illegal gathering. The maximum fine is 200 dinars ($530). The law regulates election campaigning and prohibits political activities at worship centers, universities, schools, government buildings, and public institutions. The government did not allow individuals to use mosques, *maatams* (Shia religious community centers), or other religious sites for political gatherings.

The government did not prevent small opposition demonstrations that occurred in traditional Shia villages that often protested government policies or were intended to show solidarity with prisoners. Police reportedly broke up some of these protests with tear gas, however. While groups participating in these protests often posted photographs on social media of these events, participants were careful to hide their faces for fear of retribution.

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

The constitution provides for freedom of association, but the government limited this right. The government required all groups to register: civil society groups and labor unions with the Ministry of Labor and Social Development and political societies with the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs. The government decided whether a group was social or political in nature, based on its proposed bylaws. The law prohibits any activity by an unlicensed society, as well as any political activity by a licensed civil society group. A number of unlicensed societies were active in the country (see section 3).

A civil society group applying for registration must submit its bylaws signed by all founding members, together with minutes of the founding committee’s meetings containing the names, professions, places of residence, and signatures of all founding members. The law grants the Ministry of Labor and Social Development the right to reject the registration of any civil society group if it finds the society’s services unnecessary, already provided by another society, contrary to state security, or aimed at reviving a previously dissolved society. Associations whose applications authorities rejected or ignored may appeal to the High Civil Court, which may annul the ministry’s decision or refuse the appeal.
NGOs and civil society activists asserted the ministry routinely exploited its oversight role to stymie the activities of NGOs and other civil society organizations. Local NGOs asserted officials actively sought to undermine some groups’ activities and imposed burdensome bureaucratic procedures on NGO board members and volunteers. The Ministries of Justice and Interior must vet funding from international sources, and authorities sometimes did not authorize it.

Bangladesh

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The government limited or restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The law provided for the right to peaceful assembly, but the government limited this right. The law gives the government broad discretion to ban assemblies of more than four persons. A Dhaka Metropolitan Police (DMP) order requires advance permission for gatherings such as protests and demonstrations in Dhaka.

According to human rights NGOs, authorities continued to use approval provisions to disallow gatherings by opposition groups. Occasionally, police or ruling party activists used force to disperse demonstrations.

Throughout the year the BNP was hindered by the government from hosting assemblies and rallies. The BNP was denied applications “for security reasons” to hold rallies in Dhaka on March 11, 19, and 29 at the Suhrawardy Udyan, one of the few large places designated for political rallies, but it was ultimately permitted to host its rally at a different location.

In a separate instance, the BNP claimed it received verbal permission to conduct a rally on its founding anniversary on September 1 in Dhaka and to conduct a human chain in front of the National Press Club on September 10. Law enforcement officials, however, apprehended hundreds of participants in the two BNP events. The BNP reported law enforcement detained
304 leaders and activists in the first three days of September and approximately 200 leaders and activists during the party’s human chain later in the month. The assistant inspector general of police headquarters denied reports of raids to detain opposition activists.

The incumbent Awami League (AL) and its allies were allowed to hold rallies at Suhrawardy Udyan and other venues of their choice throughout the year.

On September 15, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina said she would instruct the DMP commissioner to allow political parties to hold rallies at Suhrawardy Udyan. According to Prothom Alo, on September 29, the DMP gave permission to the BNP to hold rallies at Suhrawardy Udyan, under 22 conditions, including that they provide their own security and install closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras at the venue. The DMP also “banned all activities that can hamper public safety; carrying sticks; speech hurting religious sentiments, and arriving at the venue in processions.”

During the year police used force to disperse peaceful demonstrations. According to the Daily Star, on March 14, police dispersed a group of approximately 1,000 protesters marching towards the secretariat building in Dhaka, using batons and tear gas and injuring 15 protesters. The protesters were scheduled to arrive at a prescheduled sit-in at the secretariat. After the violent dispersal occurred, a DMP spokesperson defended the government’s actions on the grounds the protesters were obstructing traffic.

Beyond formal government hindrance and police obstruction of peaceful demonstrations, there were reports the government deployed ruling party student activists to areas where peaceful assemblies took place. On August 4, alleged Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL) activists attacked a group of students in Dhanmondi with batons, rocks, and pistols in an effort to quell road safety protests. The action resulted in a reported 150 injuries. Multiple news outlets reported police did not try to prevent or restrain the attackers. Police detained dozens of students and supporters publicly supporting the road safety protestors.

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

The law provides for the right of citizens to form associations, subject to “reasonable restrictions” in the interest of morality or public order, and the government generally respected this right. The government’s NGO Affairs Bureau sometimes withheld its approval for foreign funding to NGOs working in areas the bureau deemed sensitive, such as human
rights, labor rights, indigenous rights, or humanitarian assistance to Rohingya refugees (see sections 2.d., 5., and 7.a.).

The 2016 Foreign Donations (Voluntary Activities) Regulation Act places restrictions on the receipt of foreign funds by NGOs or government officials and provides for punishment of NGOs making any “derogatory” comments regarding the constitution or constitutional institutions (see section 5). The government announced in October 2017 a number of NGOs were no longer allowed to operate in Cox’s Bazar, including Muslim Aid Bangladesh, Islamic Relief, and Allama Fazlullah Foundation. The three organizations remain barred from operating in Cox’s Bazar during the year, according to media reports.

Barbados

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

Belarus

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for freedom of peaceful assembly; however, the government severely restricted this right. Authorities employed a variety of means to discourage demonstrations, disperse them, minimize their effect, and punish the participants. The law provides for freedom of association, but the government restricted it and selectively enforced laws and registration regulations to restrict the operation of independent associations that might criticize the government.
FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

Only registered political parties, trade unions, and NGOs could request permission to hold a demonstration of more than 1,000 persons. Authorities usually denied requests by independent and opposition groups as well as those of self-organized citizens’ groups in various communities around the country. A general atmosphere of repression and the threat of imprisonment or large fines exercised a chilling effect on potential protest organizers.

The law criminalizes the announcement of an intention to hold demonstrations via the internet or social media before official approval, participation in the activities of unregistered NGOs, training of persons to demonstrate, financing of public demonstrations, or solicitation of foreign assistance “to the detriment” of the country. Violations are punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment. Persons with unexpunged criminal records for crimes related to violating peace and order, statehood and governance, public security, safety, and public morals did not have the right to act as mass event organizers. Such organizers must apply at least 15 days in advance for permission to conduct a public demonstration, rally, or meeting, and government officials are required to respond no later than five days prior to the scheduled event. Authorities, however, generally granted permits for opposition demonstrations only if held at designated venues far from city centers. The amended law allowed organizers to notify authorities of a mass event planned at a designated location no later than 10 days before the date of the event. Authorities should inform organizers of denial no later than five days before the event. By law denials can be issued for one of two reasons: the event conflicted with one organized by a different individual or group or the notification did not comply with regulations.

Authorities used intimidation and threats to discourage persons from participating in demonstrations, openly videotaped participants, and imposed heavy fines or jail sentences on participants in unauthorized demonstrations. In addition authorities required organizers to conclude contracts with police, fire department, health, and sanitary authorities for their services after a mass event. Authorities waived some of these requirements for the March 25 celebration of the 100th anniversary of the Belarusian People’s Republic (BPR). All media representatives had to be clearly identified and carry an official media ID or foreign media accreditation. They have to provide their personal ID and press documents to law enforcement upon request.

On March 27, President Lukashenka told Interior Minister Ihar Shunevich that the Ministry should be ready to “immediately suppress” any unauthorized events which “impede people’s
lives” because “chaos stems from them [unauthorized protests].” Shunevich responded that “not a single event, which is not sanctioned by authorities, will take place, and even if it starts it will be immediately stopped in an effective manner and in compliance with the law.”

During the year local authorities countrywide rejected dozens of applications for permission to stage various demonstrations.

While Minsk city authorities cooperated with opposition groups to stage a rally and concert on the 100 anniversary of the Belarusian People's Republic in front of the Opera House on March 25, they denied two other applications to hold marches the same day. Organizers of the concert had sought to walk from a nearby park to the concert location before the concert. A second application was filed by opposition activist Mikalai Statkevich and his supporters to march from the central Yakub Kolas square via the main avenue to the concert location. When Statkevich decided to go ahead with his plan without permission, police arrested him as he was leaving his home. Police also arrested approximately 60 individuals gathered at Yakub Kolas square.

In addition, authorities in Mahilyou and Homiel denied local activists’ permission to hold rallies in city centers on March 25. They alleged that the venues were not designated for mass events or had been already booked for other events.

Across the country in at least 11 different localities, approximately 57 individuals were briefly detained, apparently in order to prevent their participation in March 25 events in Minsk.

On July 3, celebrated as the Belarusian Independence Day, police dispersed an unauthorized protest and detained approximately 30 individuals, including Mikalai Statkevich, in front of a WWII monument to Soviet soldiers in central Minsk. Statkevich called upon his associates to hold a rally to mark the “liberation [of Minsk from the Nazis on July 3, 1944] and solidarity.” Statkevich was arrested as he was leaving his house on his way to the site on July 3. Police detained approximately 30 activists at the site, including five observers from the human rights group Vyasna, transported them to a local precinct, and released the majority later in the day. Statkevich and at least three other activists remained in detention overnight and stood trial on July 4. A Minsk district court sentenced Statkevich to a fine of 980 rubles ($490) for making calls to participate in an unauthorized protest on July 3.

From June through October, authorities fined, detained, or arrested more than 20 protesters at the site of the Stalinist-era execution site Kurapaty. The protesters opposed the building and operation of a restaurant in close vicinity to the site. While police repeatedly fined the
majority of activists for purportedly violating traffic regulations and participating in unauthorized demonstrations, a number of protesters, including Belarusian Christian Democracy (BCD) party cochair Paval Sevyarynets, European Belarus campaign activist Maksim Vinyarski, and filmmaker Alyaksei Tourovich were sentenced to up to 10 days of administrative detention.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

All NGOs, political parties, and trade unions must receive Ministry of Justice approval to become registered. A government commission reviews and approves all registration applications; it based its decisions largely on political and ideological compatibility with official views and practices.

Actual registration procedures required applicants to provide the number and names of founders, along with a physical address in a nonresidential building for an office, an extraordinary burden in view of the tight financial straits of most NGOs and individual property owners’ fears of renting space to independent groups. Individuals listed as members were vulnerable to reprisal. The government’s refusal to rent office space to unregistered organizations and the expense of renting private space reportedly forced most organizations to use residential addresses, which authorities could then use as a reason to deny registration or to deregister them. The law criminalizes activities conducted on behalf of unregistered groups and subjects group members to penalties ranging from large fines to two years’ imprisonment (also see section 7.a.).

The law on public associations prohibits NGOs from keeping funds for local activities at foreign financial institutions. The law also prohibits NGOs from facilitating provision of any support or benefits from foreign states to civil servants based on their political or religious views or ethnicity, a provision widely believed to be aimed at the Polish minority.

Only registered NGOs may legally accept foreign grants and technical aid and only for a limited set of approved activities. NGOs must receive approval from the Department for Humanitarian Affairs of the Presidential Administration and the Ministry of the Economy for technical aid before they may accept such funds or register the grants.

The government continued to deny registration to some NGOs and political parties on a variety of pretexts, including “technical” problems with applications. Authorities frequently harassed and intimidated founding members of organizations in an effort to force them to
abandon their membership and thus deprive their groups of the number of petitioners necessary for registration. Many groups had been denied registration on multiple occasions.

On March 21, Minsk city authorities registered an educational NGO called “Out Loud.” This was the group’s ninth registration application under its previous name, “Make Out,” which the government requested it change before granting registration. The NGO focused on advancing the human rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) persons and countering discrimination and violence against them.

On April 6, the BCD reported that the Ministry of Justice denied its seventh registration application. The ministry said the BCD had failed to include phone numbers of some of its members and had incorrectly listed the birth dates of two party founders in its application documents. The party submitted the application on January 22, and the ministry decided to suspend the registration process and seek additional documents on February 23. The Supreme Court upheld the ministry’s denial on May 25.

Belgium

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provide for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

Belize

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The law provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights. A state of public emergency was declared on September 4
for 30 days in two areas of Belize City as a result of gang violence, which limited assembly in the areas.

Benin

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provide for the freedoms of assembly and association. Advance notification is required for demonstrations and other public gatherings. The government generally respected these rights. There were no instances of denial on political grounds.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution and law provide for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the government generally respected this right.

The government requires advance notification for use of public places for demonstrations. Authorities sometimes cited “public order” to prevent demonstrations by opposition groups, civil society organizations, and labor unions.

On May 22, the Constitutional Court ruled that the prefect of Littoral Modeste Toboula Department violated the constitution and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights related to freedom of assembly and public liberties. The court ruled he did so by issuing a decree on March 13 that restricted antigovernment demonstrations by requiring prior registration and approval by the Ministry of Interior. The court stated that requiring registration with the Ministry of Interior violated the enjoyment of fundamental liberties.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provide for freedom of association, and the government generally respected this right. There were, however, instances where the government violated freedom of association.
In March 2017 the Constitutional Court overturned a Council of Ministers decree banning the activities of university student groups as a violation of the right to freedom of association. The decree claimed that student groups were engaged in military training and intended to disrupt public security and peace. The court ruled that the government’s public order concerns did not justify the suspension of citizens’ constitutional rights.

Bhutan

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The government restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

While the constitution provides for the right to assemble peacefully, the government restricted this right. The law permits the government to control the public’s right to assembly “to avoid breaches of the peace” by requiring licenses, prohibiting assembly in designated areas, and declaring curfew. The penal code prohibits “promotion of civil unrest” as an act that is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony among different nationalities, racial groups, castes, or religious groups.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for freedom of association, and the government permitted the registration of some political parties and organizations that were deemed “not harmful to the peace and unity of the country.” Many of the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the country maintained formal or informal connections to members of the royal family. In its Freedom in the World 2018 report, Freedom House stated the government did not permit the operation of NGOs working on the status of Nepali-speaking refugees but that other local and international NGOs worked with increasing freedom from official scrutiny. Under the law, all NGOs must register with the government. To register an NGO, an individual must be a citizen, disclose his or her family income and assets, provide his or her educational qualifications, and disclose any criminal records.
Bolivia

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

Although the constitution provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, civil society groups, especially, but not limited to, those critical of the government, faced harassment from government officials.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

While the law requires a permit for most demonstrations, the government rarely enforced the provisions, and most protesters demonstrated without obtaining permits. Most demonstrations were peaceful, but occasionally demonstrators carried weapons, including clubs, machetes, firearms, firecrackers, and dynamite. Security forces at times dispersed protest groups carrying weapons or threatening government and private facilities.

There were several demonstrations during the year defending the “21F” movement, which opposed Morales’ candidacy for president and rejected the constitutional change that ended presidential term limits. On May 29, during the South American Games in Cochabamba, a group of 21F supporters began shouting “Bolivia said no” and wore T-shirts with “21F” printed on the front. Police asked the protesters to cover their 21F shirts. After the incident the police subcommander, General Agustin Moreno, warned he would not allow 21F demonstrations during patriotic celebrations on the country’s national day in Potosi on August 6. In Potosi on August 6, police did not permit access to public space for those critical of the government. In September police in Santa Cruz and Cochabamba did not allow 21F supporters access to the main plaza and other public spaces.

On July 21, a small group of persons arrived at the Plaza Murillo in La Paz with 21F T-shirts. Within minutes a police contingent pushed the protesters out of the plaza and ended the protest.
Annex 286

According to the NGO UNIR Bolivia Foundation, on average there were approximately three different types of protests per day throughout the country between January and March. These demonstrations, radical protest actions, and confrontations with police resulted in one person dead and more than 100 injured.

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

The constitution provides for freedom of association, but the government did not consistently respect this right. NGOs continued to be targets of government officials, including the president, vice president, and government ministers, if they operated in a manner perceived as adversarial to the government. Some NGOs alleged government registration mechanisms were purposefully stringent in order to deter an active civil society.

**Bosnia and Herzegovina**

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

**B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION**

**FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY**

The law provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the government generally respected this right. In December, however, the RS Ministry of Interior banned a group of citizens from holding peaceful protests in Banja Luka. Prior to the ban, the “Justice for David” movement had been seeking justice in the case of 21 year-old David Dragicevic, whose murder has yet to be solved. Dragicevic's family has mobilized thousands of citizens in support of their search for the truth and their efforts to demand justice for all. The RS government justified its decision to ban all public gatherings of the group, including protests, with claims the movement failed to fully respect the law during previous rallies. The RS police interrupted a December 25 gathering, in the process arresting 20 supporters of Justice for David, including two members of the Party for Democratic Progress (PDP) – President Borislav Borenovic and delegate in the RS National Assembly Drasko Stanivukovic. Some journalists and protestors have alleged that during the arrests police used excessive force on protesters, and have produced photographs that appear to support their claims. There are 10 laws governing this right in different parts of the country, all of which were generally assessed to be overly
restrictive. Examples include the prohibition of public assembly in front of numerous public institutions in the RS, while some cantonal laws in the Federation (e.g., in Central Bosnia Canton) prescribe criminal liability for failing to fulfill administrative procedures for holding a peaceful assembly. Human rights NGOs reported that authorities manipulated and controlled the process of granting the right to assembly to civil society groups in both entities on several occasions in 2017.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The law provides for freedom of association, and the government generally respected this right. Under the law, NGOs can register at the state, entity, and cantonal levels in a generally streamlined and simple administrative process. Cooperation between the government and civil society organizations at the state and entity levels, however, remained weak, while government support for civil society organizations remained nontransparent, particularly regarding the allocation of funds.

Botswana

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

A. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, INCLUDING FOR THE PRESS

Freedom of Expression: The constitution and law provide for freedom of speech and press; however, the law restricts the speech of some government officials and fines persons found guilty of insulting public officials or national symbols. The law states, “Any person in a public place or at a public gathering (who) uses abusive, obscene, or insulting language in relation to the president, any other member of the National Assembly, or any public officer” is guilty of an offense and may be fined up to 400 pula ($38). The penal code also states that any person who insults the country’s coat of arms, flag, presidential standard, or national anthem is guilty of an offense and may be fined up to 500 pula ($47).

Press and Media Freedom: In a break from his predecessor, President Masisi initiated a productive relationship with media shortly after assuming the presidency on April 1. He held two press conferences in his first 100 days and repeatedly assured journalists of his respect for their role in a healthy democracy. He also began the process of establishing a first-ever
presidential press office to welcome and promote engagement with media. The government dominated domestic broadcasting.

The government owned and operated the Botswana Press Agency, which dominated the print media through its free, nationally distributed newspaper, Daily News, and two state-operated FM radio stations. State-owned media generally featured reporting favorable to the government and, according to some observers, were susceptible to political interference. Opposition political parties claimed state media coverage heavily favored the ruling party. The government ombudsman stated in a 2017 report that public broadcaster Botswana Television “unduly favored” the ruling party in its political coverage.

Independent media were active and generally expressed a wide variety of views, which frequently included strong criticism of the government; however, media members complained they were sometimes subject to government pressure to portray the government and country in a positive light. Private media organizations had more difficulty than government-owned media obtaining access to government-held information.

**Censorship or Content Restrictions:** Some members of civil society organizations alleged the government occasionally censored stories in government-run media it deemed undesirable. Government journalists sometimes practiced self-censorship.

**Libel/Slander Laws:** In 2014 police arrested Sunday Standard editor Outsa Mokone and charged him with sedition for publishing articles about an automobile accident allegedly involving President Khama. Observers noted the use of the penal code's sedition clause for a newspaper article was unprecedented and that the Sunday Standard had published several articles exposing corruption allegations within the DISS. In 2016 lawyers for Mokone sought to have the charges dropped based on the penal code's infringement of the defendant's constitutional right to freedom of expression. That same year the High Court ruled the penal code's sedition clause was constitutional and charges of sedition against Mokone could proceed. In September the government dropped all charges against Mokone. The Court of Appeal did not rule on the constitutionality of the sedition clause.

**Internet Freedom**

The government did not restrict or disrupt access to the internet or censor online content, and there were no credible reports the government monitored private online
communications without appropriate legal authority. According to the International Telecommunication Union, in 2017 approximately 41 percent of individuals used the internet.

**Academic Freedom and Cultural Events**

There were no government restrictions on academic freedom or cultural events.

**Brazil**

**Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:**

**B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION**

The law provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

**FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY**

The government generally respected the right of freedom of peaceful assembly, but police occasionally intervened in citizen protests that turned violent.

**Brunei**

**Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:**

**B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION**

The government limited/restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.

**FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY**

The government’s emergency powers restrict the right to assemble. Public gatherings of 10 or more persons require a government permit, and police may disband an unofficial assembly of
five or more persons deemed likely to cause a disturbance of the peace. Permits require the approval of the minister of home affairs. The government routinely issued permits for annual events, but occasionally used the restrictions to disrupt political gatherings. Organizers of events on sensitive topics tended to hold meetings in private rather than apply for permits, or practiced self-censorship at public events. In March the RBPF raided a live music event organized by a local grassroots arts initiative and detained the 176 persons in attendance. A number of those detained were charged with possession of narcotics. The raid was publicized live on national television and followed a clamp down on drugs and alcohol by authorities. The LGBTI community reported that the government would not issue permits for community events or events on LGBTI topics.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The law does not provide for freedom of association. The law requires formal groups, including religious, social, business, labor, and cultural organizations, to register with the Registrar of Societies and provide regular reports on membership and finances. Applicants were subject to background checks, and proposed organizations were subject to naming requirements, including a prohibition on names or symbols linked to triad societies (Chinese organized crime networks). The government reported it accepted the majority of applications to form associations, but some new organizations reported delaying their registration applications after receiving advice that the process would be difficult. The government may suspend the activities of a registered organization if it deems such an act to be in the public interest.

Organizations seeking to raise funds or donations from the general public are required to obtain permission from the Ministry of Home Affairs, and each individual fundraising activity requires a separate permit. Approved organizations dealt with matters such as pollution, wildlife preservation, arts, entrepreneurship, and women in business.

Bulgaria

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION
The constitution and law provide for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

Authorities continued to deny registration of the Macedonian activist group OMO Ilinden despite a January judgment and 10 prior decisions of the European Court of Human Rights that the denials violated the group’s freedom of association.

Burkina Faso

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution and law provide for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the government generally respected this right.

In October 2017 national police arrested Pascal Zaida, a civil society leader and open government critic, for holding a demonstration to protest against the administration without a permit. National police issued a statement that they had denied his three prior requests to protest because the protest presented “a risk of disturbing public order.” Authorities released Zaida in November 2017 after 37 days in pretrial detention.

Political parties and labor unions may hold meetings and rallies without government permission, although advance notification and approval are required for public demonstrations that may affect traffic or threaten public order. If a demonstration or rally results in violence, injury, or significant property damage, penalties for the organizers include six months to five years’ imprisonment and fines of between 100,000 and two million CFA francs ($180 and $3,600). These penalties may be doubled for conviction of organizing an unauthorized rally or demonstration. Demonstrators may appeal denials or imposed modifications of a proposed march route or schedule before the courts.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, but the government restricted these rights.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution provides the right to peaceful assembly, although this right was not always respected in practice. Restrictions remained in place in 11 Rangoon townships on all applications for processions or assemblies. Some civil society groups asserted these restrictions were selectively applied and used to prevent demonstrations against the government or military. Farmers and social activists continued to hold protests over land rights and older cases of land confiscation throughout the country, and human rights groups continued to report cases in which the government arrested groups of farmers and those supporting them for demanding the return of confiscated land. Many reported cases involved land seized by the military under the former military regime and given to private companies or persons with ties to the military.

Local government officials in Yangon Region, Kayah State, and elsewhere required civil society organizations to apply for advance permission before holding meetings and other functions in hotels and other public venues. Officials forced venues to cancel civil society events where such permission was not obtained. Officials in Mandalay Division and Kayah State required civil society organizations to request advance permission from the local government to meet with diplomats.

At least 42 persons were arrested in May for their participation in peaceful antiwar protests in Rangoon, Mandalay, and other cities. Three people who were arrested for their participation in a related poetry reading were sentenced on September 19, two with fines of 20,000 kyats ($13) and one opting to serve 15 days in prison instead of paying the fine.

Following a peaceful protest on July 3 against the erection of a statue of the Burmese independence hero General Aung San, in Loikaw, Kayah State, 16 demonstrators were
arrested; 11 of those 16 faced charges under Sections 505(b) for distributing pamphlets related to the protest. The trial continued as of October.

Common charges used to convict peaceful protesters included criminal trespass, violation of the Peaceful Assembly and Processions Act, and violation of Section 505(b) of the penal code, which criminalizes actions the government deemed likely to cause “an offense against the State or against the public tranquility.”

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

Although the constitution and laws allow citizens to form associations and organizations, the government sometimes restricted this right.

In June the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee ordered local branches of the organization commonly known as Ma Ba Tha to remove signs using that name, following a 2017 ban on the use of the name after which the organization formally rebranded itself the Buddha Dhamma Parahita Foundation. Some of its members, including Wirathu, were sanctioned in 2017 for inflaming tensions towards the Muslim community using ultranationalist rhetoric. Some local branches of the organization continued to use the name on their signs in spite of the ban, and as of October no action had been taken against them.

The law on registering organizations stipulates voluntary registration for local NGOs and removes punishments for noncompliance for both local and international NGOs. Some NGOs that tried to register under this law found the process extremely onerous.

Activists reported civil society groups, community-based organizations, and informal networks operated openly and continued to discuss openly human rights and other political problems. They reported, however, that state surveillance of such operations and discussions was common and that government restrictions on meetings and other activity increased during the year.

**Burundi**

**Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:**
B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution and law provide for freedom of peaceful assembly, but the government severely restricted this right (see section 1.d.). The law requires political parties and large groups to notify the government with details prior to a public meeting and at least four days prior to a proposed demonstration, and allows the government to prohibit meetings or demonstrations for reasons of “public order.” When notified, authorities in most cases denied permission for opposition members to meet or demonstrate and dispersed meetings already underway. By contrast, supporters of the CNDD-FDD and government officials were regularly able to meet and organize demonstrations on short notice; these demonstrations were frequently large and included participation by senior officials.

Freedom of assembly was significantly restricted in the wake of the failed coup attempt in 2015, and these restrictions largely remained in place, with some notable exceptions. Members of the wing of the nonrecognized FNL-Rwasas and the Amizero Y’Abarundi coalition of independents stated that government officials harassed or arrested supporters for holding unauthorized meetings. Other political parties generally reported being unable to hold party meetings or conduct political activities outside Bujumbura, except during the official campaign period before the May referendum. Some opposition party members cited greater leeway, however, to conduct political meetings, such as party conferences than in the preceding three years. In September the FRODEBU-Sahwanya party conducted a congress in Bujumbura followed by a series of meetings in regions around the country; however, the party continued to be unable to conduct public events outside of Bujumbura.

During the official May 1-14 campaign period before the referendum, the Amizero Y’Abarundi coalition of independents led by Rwasa and some other opposition parties conducted large rallies throughout the country to publicize their opposition to, and advocate for votes against, the proposed constitutional changes. The events were widely publicized in media sources, through social media, and online, and there were no apparent constraints on Rwasa’s public discourse, which was critical of the government. There were some reports that individuals attending rallies subsequently faced arrest or harassment by government officials, security services, and members of the Imbonerakure.

Outside of the official campaign period, opposition actors continued to be restricted from conducting most political activities, and members of the Imbonerakure and security services...
arrested, harassed, and in some cases committed violence against individuals they alleged opposed passage of the referendum. Although government officials stated that restrictions on political speech outside of the campaign period were consistent with the Burundian Electoral Code, no such limitations were applied to government officials and members of the CNDD-FDD party, who between December and May conducted numerous events and media appearances, during which they promoted the referendum and the proposed constitutional changes.

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

The constitution provides for freedom of association within the confines of the law, but the government severely restricted this right.

In January 2017 the government enacted a law constricting the liberties of international NGOs. The law includes requirements that international NGOs deposit a portion of their budgets at the Bank of the Republic of Burundi and that they maintain ethnic and gender balances in the recruitment of local personnel. The law contains several clauses that give the government considerable control over NGO selection and programming. In November 2017 an international NGO was instructed to suspend its agricultural programs due to a disagreement with the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock on program design; in September the NGO was reinstated following lengthy negotiations with the government. In December 2017 another international NGO was expelled for allegedly distributing rotten seeds.

On September 27, the government’s National Security Council announced a three-month suspension of international NGOs as of October 1. On October 2, the minister of the interior clarified that the government was suspending their operations until the NGOs provided documents demonstrating compliance with the country’s NGO and banking laws. The minister required NGOs to submit a copy of their cooperative agreement with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a memorandum of understanding with the appropriate technical ministry, a certification of compliance with banking regulations, and a plan to comply with the law’s ethnic and gender balances within three years. He stated that the ministry would review the files of each NGO as soon as it received their submissions, but that NGOs failing to provide documents within three months would be closed. Many organizations viewed the suspension as a politically motivated restriction on civil space. The suspension had an immediate and significant impact on NGO operations, including on the provision of basic services. Some international NGOs were allowed to continue medical and education programs during the suspension. As of mid-November the government had lifted the suspension on 38 NGOs,
while the majority were either awaiting response to their compliance documents or still in the process of completing them.

In January 2017 the government also enacted laws governing domestic CSOs. The law requires CSOs to register with the Ministry of the Interior (or with provincial governments if they operate in a single province), a complex process that includes approval for an organization’s activities from the Ministry of the Interior and other ministries depending on their areas of expertise. There is no recourse when authorities deny registration. Registration must be renewed every two years. The law provides for the suspension or permanent closure of organizations for “disturbing public order or harming state security.”

In 2016 the government permanently banned five CSOs that it claimed were part of the political opposition. In 2016 the government announced its intention to ban Ligue Iteka, the country’s oldest human rights organization, for “sow(ing) hate and division among the population following a social media campaign created by the International Federation of Human Rights and Ligue Iteka in which a mock movie trailer accused the president of planning genocide.” The ban took effect in January 2017; Ligue Iteka continued to operate from Uganda and report on conditions in Burundi. At year’s end there were no further reported closings of domestic CSOs.

Cabo Verde

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provide for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

Cambodia

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
The constitution provides for freedom of expression, including the press; however, in 2017-18 the government carried out a sustained campaign to eliminate independent news media in the country, and most individuals and institutions reported on the need for self-censorship.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

Although the constitution provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, the government did not always respect this right.

The Law on Associations and Nongovernmental Organizations (LANGO) requires all groups to register and requires advance notification for meetings, training, protests, marches, or demonstrations, although authorities inconsistently enforced this requirement. One provision requires five days' notice for most peaceful demonstrations, while another requires 12 hours' notice for impromptu gatherings on private property or protests at designated venues and limits such gatherings to 200 persons. By law provincial or municipal governments may issue demonstration permits at their discretion. Lower-level government officials, particularly in Phnom Penh, generally denied requests unless the national government specifically authorized the gatherings. All levels of government routinely denied permits to groups critical of the ruling party.

There were credible reports the government prevented associations and NGOs from organizing human rights-related events and meetings, because those NGOs failed to receive permission from local authorities; however, the law does not require preapproval any such events. Authorities cited the need for stability and public security–terms left undefined in the law and therefore subject to wide interpretation–as reasons for denying permits. Government authorities occasionally cited the LANGO simply to break up meetings and trainings deemed hostile to the government.

Despite these restrictions the press reported numerous public protests, most related to land or labor disputes. In some cases police forcibly dispersed peaceful groups assembled without a permit, sometimes causing minor injuries to demonstrators. In other cases police used force against demonstrators after they interfered with traffic, made threats or carried out acts of violence, or refused orders to disperse.
According to a joint report released in August by the CCHR, ADHOC, the American Center for International Labor Solidarity, and the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, from April 2017 to March, there were 48 incidents of NGOs prevented by authorities from holding meetings, training, or gatherings due to LANGO provisions. The report also recorded 539 restrictions of fundamental freedoms by the government and third-party entities linked to the government between April 2017 and March, a 52 percent increase from the previous year. Although the vast majority of restrictions occurred in Phnom Penh, restrictions were documented in every province except Prey Veng and Kep. The government sometimes took legal action against peaceful protesters. On February 14, authorities arrested four union leaders and charged them with organizing an illegal strike at the Cosmo Textile Factory in Kandal Province. In October 2017 authorities arrested five persons who planned to distribute leaflets during the Water Festival to call for demonstrations to demand the government release political prisoners. On the same day, the Phnom Penh municipal court summoned Leng Seng Hong, president of the Cambodian Democratic Student Intellectual Federation, to appear in court on charges of incitement to commit felony for appealing to the public to protest if the CNRP was dissolved.

Senior government and military officials, including Prime Minister Hun Sen, Phnom Penh Governor Khoung Srng, CPP spokesperson Sok Eysan, Council of Ministers spokesperson Phay Siphan, and armed forces Commander in Chief Pol Sarouen, warned the public not to gather or demonstrate in the capital during the trial of opposition leader Kem Sokha following his arrest in September 2017.

In April the NEC threatened to prosecute anyone who urged voters to boycott the elections. In June it sent a message to mobile phone subscribers forbidding “criticizing, attacking, or comparing their party policies to other parties.” Government officials threatened that persons who boycotted the election but inked their fingers to indicate they had voted would receive punishment.

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

The constitution provides for freedom of association, but the government did not always respect this right, particularly with regard to workers’ rights (see section 7.a.). The law requires all associations and NGOs to be politically neutral, which not only restricts the right to association but also restricts those organizations’ rights to free expression.
In June 2017 Prime Minister Hun Sen ordered the Ministry of Interior to dissolve the Situation Room, a consortium of 40 of the country’s prominent human rights NGOs, after it issued findings on the conduct of the June 4 communal elections. The Situation Room was charged with violating the LANGO for failing to register as an NGO (although each of the 40 constituent NGOS were registered individually) and for violating the LANGO provisions on political neutrality. After COMFREL, the lead NGO in the Situation Room, announced it would unofficially observe election-day atmospherics without entering polling stations, it received a warning from the Ministry of Interior that any COMFREL volunteers found observing the election would be subject to legal penalties.

In September 2017 the government dissolved environmental NGO Mother Nature without explanation, simply issuing a letter stating the Interior Ministry’s power to do so: “The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior (Sar Kheng) decides to cancel the Mother Nature organization...from the list of the nongovernmental organizations of the Ministry of Interior.”

In August 2017 authorities forced the National Democratic Institute to cease operations in the country, after authorities found it did not properly register with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (despite a valid memorandum of understanding with the NEC).

In September 2017 the Ministry of Interior also suspended the operations of land rights NGO Equitable Cambodia due to what the ministry alleged were violations of the organization’s own bylaws and failures to update the ministry with the most recent staff roster. The ministry finally permitted the NGO to reopen in February.

Vaguely worded provisions in several laws prohibit any activity that may “jeopardize peace, stability, and public order“ or harm “national security, national unity, traditions, and the culture of Cambodian society.” Civil society organizations expressed concern these provisions created a substantial risk of arbitrary restriction of the right of association. According to critics, the laws on associations and trade unions (see section 7.a.) establish heavily bureaucratic, multistep registration processes that lack both transparency and administrative safeguards, rendering registration processes vulnerable to politicization. These laws also impose burdensome reporting obligations on activities and finances, including the disclosure of all successful funding proposals, financial or grant agreements, and bank accounts.

The local NGO consortium Cooperation Committee for Cambodia reported in July that NGOs generally lacked guidance from the government on how to comply with the requirements.
Cameroon

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The government limited and restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

Although the law provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, the government often restricted this right. The law requires organizers of public meetings, demonstrations, and processions to notify officials in advance but does not require prior government approval of public assemblies, nor does it authorize the government to suppress public assemblies that it has not approved in advance. Nevertheless, officials routinely asserted the law implicitly authorizes the government to grant or deny permission for public assemblies. The government often refused to grant permits for gatherings and used force to suppress assemblies for which it had not issued permits. Authorities typically cited “security concerns” as the basis for deciding to block assemblies. The government also prevented civil society organizations and political parties from holding press conferences. Police and gendarmes forcibly disrupted meetings and demonstrations of citizens, trade unions, and political activists throughout the year, arrested participants in unapproved protests, and blocked political leaders from attending protests.

On March 9, in Yaounde, police arrested approximately 20 women who participated in a rally, holding up a banner that read, “Stand Up for Cameroon.” According to the organizers of the rally, including Edith Kabang Walla, the president of the Cameroon People’s Party (CPP), the event was aimed to call attention to the deteriorating sociopolitical situation in the country. Police released the women after keeping them for a few hours at the judicial police’s regional headquarters.

Authorities also banned some political rallies. In April the divisional officer of Fokoue in Menoua Division, West Region, banned a meeting meant to encourage voter registration by the CRM opposition party. The CRM claimed they notified the divisional officer that they were organizing an event on April 11. This event would have been 10th in a series organized in
conjunction with Elections Cameroon, the organization that oversees and administers elections, to encourage more persons to register to vote. The divisional officer initially told CRM leaders the meeting might not be authorized because April 11 was a market day. On April 9, he reportedly changed his mind and instead referred CRM’s leaders to the mayor, whom he said had control over the market place. Organizers said they had contacted the mayor, who said she had planned to conduct a tax collection exercise in the market that day and turned down the request. Further, in June the mayor of Bagangte banned a rally by the CRM at the local ceremonial ground and reportedly justified his decision by saying that the ceremonial ground was meant only for exceptional events and official ceremonies. CRM officials said the ruling CPDM held a meeting at the venue a few days earlier. Authorities also banned rallies by the CRM in Baham and Bandjoun in the West Region.

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

The constitution and law provide for freedom of association, but the law also limits this right. On the recommendation of the senior divisional officer, the Ministry of Territorial Administration may suspend the activities of an association for three months on the grounds that the association is disrupting public order. The minister may also dissolve an association if it is deemed a threat to state security. National associations may acquire legal status by declaring themselves in writing to the ministry, but the ministry must explicitly register foreign associations and religious groups. The law imposes heavy fines for individuals who form and operate any such association without ministry approval. The law prohibits organizations that advocate a goal contrary to the constitution, laws, and morality, as well as those that aim to challenge the security, territorial integrity, national unity, national integration, or republican form of the state.

Conditions for recognition of political parties, NGOs, or associations were complicated, involved long delays, and were unevenly enforced. This resulted in associations operating in legal uncertainty, their activities tolerated but not formally approved.

Unlike in 2017 the government did not ban any organizations during the year. On July 18, however, Minister of Territorial Administration Paul Atanga Nji unilaterally designated three political figures as spokespersons for three opposition political parties, disregarding these parties’ own hierarchies and internal elections. The minister stated the three parties, the Cameroon People’s Party (CPP), the
Annex 286

Union of the Peoples of Cameroon (UPC), and the African Movement for a New Independence and Democracy (Manidem), were suffering from persistent internal crises. He urged administrative command officers nationwide to authorize only events organized by the appointees. On July 20, all three appointed leaders joined 17 other nominally “opposition” leaders to rally with their parties behind President Biya for the October 7 presidential election.

Canada

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The law provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

Central African Republic

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, including the right to participate in political protests. The government, however, denied most requests to protest that were submitted by civil society groups, citing insecurity in Bangui.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

A law prohibiting nonpolitical organizations from uniting for political purposes remained in place. In May the government briefly detained opposition leader Joseph Bendounga following a march in Bangui. The attorney general reiterated that the detention was justified because the march was not authorized.
Chad

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The government limited freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

Although the constitution provides for freedom of peaceful assembly in limited circumstances, the government did not respect this right. The government regularly interfered with opposition protests and civil society gatherings. The law requires organizers to notify the Ministry of Public Security and Immigration five days in advance of demonstrations, although groups that provided advance notice did not always receive permission to assemble. The law also requires opposition political parties to meet complicated registration requirements for party gatherings. Following the 2015 Boko Haram attacks, the ministry often denied permission for large gatherings, including social events such as weddings and funerals.

The Ministry of Administration, Public Security, and Local Governance banned the peaceful march planned by lawyers and notaries for June 16, and it did not happen. The march was intended to demand the government turn former governor of Logone Oriental and his accomplices over to the justice system. Former governor Adam Nouky Charfaddine and some military personnel were accused of the assassination attempt on a lawyer, as well as kidnapping and illegally detaining three individuals released by courts.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provide for freedom of association, and the government generally respected this right. While an ordinance requires the Ministry of Public Security and Immigration to provide prior authorization before an association, including a labor union, may be formed, there were no reports the ordinance was enforced. The ordinance also allows for
the immediate administrative dissolution of an association and permits authorities to monitor association funds.

Chile

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The law provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected those rights.

China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau) – China

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The government restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

While the constitution provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, the government severely restricted this right. The law stipulates such activities may not challenge “party leadership” or infringe upon the “interests of the state.” Protests against the political system or national leaders were prohibited. Authorities denied permits and quickly suppressed demonstrations involving expression of dissenting political views.

Citizens throughout the country continued to gather publicly to protest evictions, forced relocations, and inadequate compensation, often resulting in conflict with authorities or formal charges. Media reported thousands of protests took place during the year across the country. Although peaceful protests are legal, public security officials rarely granted permits
to demonstrate. Despite restrictions, many demonstrations occurred, but authorities quickly broke up those motivated by broad political or social grievances, sometimes with excessive force.

On March 20-30, more than one thousand residents from Longyan’s Changting County in Fujian province protested outside the local government office against the government’s plan to construct a garbage incinerator one kilometer (0.6 mile) from the town’s residential areas. On March 30, local authorities called in riot police to restore order. Later that day government officials announced they were canceling the planned incinerator project.

Concerts, sports events, exercise classes, or other meetings of more than 200 persons require approval from public security authorities. Large numbers of public gatherings in Beijing and elsewhere were canceled at the last minute or denied government permits, ostensibly to ensure public safety.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for freedom of association, but the government restricted this right. CCP policy and government regulations require all professional, social, and economic organizations officially register with and receive approval from the government. These regulations prevented the formation of autonomous political, human rights, religious, spiritual, labor, and other organizations that the government believed might challenge its authority in any area. The government maintained tight controls over civil society organizations and in some cases detained or harassed NGO workers.

The regulatory system for NGOs was highly restrictive, but specific requirements varied depending on whether an organization was foreign or domestic. Domestic NGOs were governed by the Charity Law and a host of related regulations. Domestic NGOs could register in one of three categories: a social group, a social organization, or a foundation. All domestic NGOs are required to register under the Ministry of Civil Affairs and find an officially sanctioned sponsor to serve as their “professional supervisory unit.” Finding a sponsor was often challenging, since the sponsor could be held civilly or criminally responsible for the NGO’s activities. All organizations are also required to report their sources of funding, including foreign funding. Domestic NGOs continued to adjust to this new regulatory framework.
In 2016 the CCP Central Committee issued a directive mandating the establishment of CCP cells within all domestic NGOs by 2020. According to authorities, these CCP organizations operating inside domestic NGOs would “strengthen guidance” of NGOs in areas such as “decision making for important projects, important professional activities, major expenditures and funds, acceptance of large donations, and activities involving foreigners.” The directive also mandates authorities conduct annual “spot checks” to ensure compliance on “ideological political work, party building, financial and personnel management, study sessions, foreign exchange, acceptance of foreign donations and assistance, and conducting activities according to their charter.”

In January 2017 the Law on the Management of Foreign NGOs’ Activities in Mainland China (Foreign NGO Management Law) came into effect. The law requires foreign NGOs to register with the Ministry of Public Security and to find a state-sanctioned sponsor for their operations. NGOs that fail to comply face possible civil or criminal penalties. The law provides no appeal process for NGOs denied registration, and it stipulates NGOs found to have violated certain provisions could be banned from operating in the country. The law also states domestic groups cooperating with unregistered foreign NGOs will be punished and possibly banned.

Some international NGOs reported it was more difficult to work with local partners, including universities, government agencies, and other domestic NGOs, as the law codified the CCP’s perception that foreign NGOs were a “national security” threat. Finding an official sponsor was difficult for most foreign NGOs, as sponsors could be held responsible for the NGOs’ conduct and had to undertake burdensome reporting requirements. After the Ministry of Public Security published a list of sponsors, NGOs reported most government agencies still had no unit responsible for sponsoring foreign NGOs. Professional Supervisory Units reported they had little understanding of how to implement the law and what authorities would expect of them. The vague definition of an NGO, as well as of what activities constituted “political” and therefore illegal activities, left many business organizations and alumni associations uncertain whether they fell within the purview of the law. The lack of clear communication from the government, coupled with harassment by security authorities, caused some foreign NGOs to suspend or cease operations in the country. As of December 31, approximately 439 of the officially estimated 7,000 previously operational foreign NGOs had registered under the Foreign NGO Management Law, with most focusing on trade and commerce activities.

According to the Ministry of Civil Affairs, by the end of 2017, there were more than 800,000 registered social organizations, public institutions, and foundations. Many experts believed
the actual number of domestic NGOs to be much higher. Domestic NGOs reported foreign funding continued to drop, as many domestic NGOs sought to avoid such funding due to fear of being labeled as “subversive” in the face of growing restrictions imposed by new laws. NGOs existed under a variety of formal and informal guises, including national mass organizations created and funded by the CCP that are organizationally prohibited from exercising any independence, known as government-operated NGOs or GONGOs.

For donations to a domestic organization from a foreign NGO, the Foreign NGO Management Law requires foreign NGOs to maintain a representative office in the country to send funds or to use the bank account of a domestic NGO when conducting temporary activities. By law foreign NGOs are prohibited from using any other method to send and receive funds, and such funding must be reported to the Ministry of Public Security. Foreign NGOs are prohibited from fundraising and “for-profit activities” under the law.

Although all registered organizations came under some degree of government control, some NGOs, primarily service-oriented GONGOs, were able to operate with less day-to-day scrutiny. Authorities supported the growth of some NGOs that focused on social problems, such as poverty alleviation and disaster relief. Law and regulations explicitly prohibit organizations from conducting political or religious activities, and organizations that refused to comply faced criminal penalties.

Authorities continued to restrict and evict local NGOs that received foreign funding and international NGOs that provided assistance to Tibetan communities in the TAR and other Tibetan areas. Almost all were forced to curtail their activities altogether due to travel restrictions, official intimidation of staff members, and the failure of local partners to renew project agreements.

China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau) – Hong Kong

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION
The law provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, but government actions, including prosecutions of activists, increased the perceived risks associated with participating in political protest.

**FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY**

The law provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the government generally respected this right. Police routinely issued the required “letter of no objection” for public meetings and demonstrations—including those critical of the SAR and central governments—and most protests occurred without serious incident.

On June 4, tens of thousands of persons peacefully gathered without incident in Victoria Park to commemorate the 28th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square crackdown. The annual vigil and a smaller annual event in Macau were reportedly the only sanctioned events in China to commemorate the Tiananmen Square anniversary. Figures varied for participation in the annual July 1 prodemocracy demonstration, held on the anniversary of the 1997 transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong to China. Police estimated 14,500 protesters; an independent polling organization estimated 27,000, and organizers claimed 60,000. Police did not interfere with the legally permitted rally.

Several government prosecutions of protesters and attempts to seek harsher penalties against protesters raised the perceived cost of protesting government policies, which could have a chilling effect on political protest in the SAR. For example, in 2016 authorities found prodemocracy activists Joshua Wong and Alex Chow guilty of participating in an illegal assembly. The charge arose after they led a group of persons over a fence into a closed SAR government complex where protests had traditionally been held at the start of the 2014 Occupy protests. In connection with the same event, prodemocracy activist Nathan Law was found guilty of inciting others to participate in an illegal assembly. Wong and Law were originally sentenced to perform 80 and 120 hours of community service, respectively, while Chow was given a suspended sentence of three weeks’ imprisonment. The government filed a timely appeal of the sentences, and Wong and Law completed their community service sentences while the appeal was pending.

On August 17, the Court of Appeal overturned the lower court’s sentences and ordered Wong, Law, and Chow to serve six, eight, and seven months in prison, respectively. The Court of Appeal argued the lower court’s sentences were inadequate and stiffer sentences were required to deter such acts in the future, which the court characterized as violent. Wong and
Law were imprisoned from August through October, when they were released on bail, pending the outcome of their appeal. Chow was imprisoned in August and released on bail in November, also pending the outcome of his appeal. On August 20, tens of thousands of persons protested the prison sentences, which would bar the three from running in local elections for five years, according to SAR law. Some commentators claimed the SAR government sought stiffer penalties against the trio in order to stifle dissent and prevent the three defendants from running for office. Two UN special rapporteurs and prominent international lawyers expressed public concern the prison sentences were inconsistent with freedoms of expression and assembly. The SAR government denied any political motivation for seeking stiffer penalties against the trio and argued the cases were handled in accordance with the law. Wong, Law, and Chow appealed their sentences.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

SAR law provides for freedom of association, and the government generally respected it. Nonetheless, officials did not approve prodemocracy political party Demosisto’s application to register as a legal entity, even though the application had been pending for more than one year. The mainland Foreign NGO Management Law, which came into effect on January 1 and also applies to NGOs based in the SAR, imposes onerous restrictions on NGOs’ ability to operate in the mainland.

China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau) – Macau

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The law provides for freedom of peaceful assembly and association, and the government often respected these rights, despite some efforts to discourage participation in peaceful demonstrations.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY
The law requires prior notification, but not approval, of demonstrations involving public roads, public places, or places open to the public. Police may redirect demonstration marching routes, but organizers have the right to challenge such decisions in court.

Activists alleged authorities were making a concerted effort to use both intimidation and criminal proceedings against participants in peaceful demonstrations to discourage their involvement. For example, the Legislative Assembly, in a secret ballot, voted to suspend Sulu Sou from the Legislative Assembly after prosecutors charged him with “aggravated disobedience” to police authorities during a peaceful protest against the Chief Executive. Activists reported police routinely attempted to intimidate demonstrators by ostentatiously taking videos of them and advising bystanders not to participate in protests.

In June approximately 200 persons participated in a vigil at Senado Square to mark the 28th anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown.

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

The law provides for freedom of association, and the government generally respected this right. No authorization is required to form an association, and the only restrictions on forming an organization are that it not promote racial discrimination, violence, crime, or disruption of public order, or be military or paramilitary in nature.

**China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau) – Tibet**

**Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:**

**B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION**

Even in areas officially designated as “autonomous,” Tibetans generally lacked the right to organize and play a meaningful role in the protection of their cultural heritage and unique natural environment. Tibetans often faced government intimidation and arrest if they protested official policies or practices.
In February the TAR Public Security Office announced it would consider as criminals those who promote “economic, people’s livelihood, environmental, traditional, and cultural development in Tibetan areas” on behalf of the “Dalai clique” and “foreign hostile forces,” and would label these “spokespersons” as criminals.

In July local contacts reported that many monasteries and rural villages in the TAR and Tibetan areas in Sichuan and Qinghai provinces received official warnings not to organize certain gatherings, including the celebration of the Dalai Lama’s birthday. In one instance, Radio Free Asia reported authorities from Malho (Chinese: Huangnan) TAP of Qinghai province deployed large numbers of armed police to Tibetan villages and towns to discourage such celebrations. According to these contacts, many Tibetan students at various nationality universities were instructed not to organize gatherings and parties in March (Tibet Uprising Day) or July (the Dalai Lama’s birthday).

Colombia

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The law provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The law provides for the freedom of peaceful assembly, and the government generally respected this right. Some NGOs alleged that riot police (Esmad) used excessive force to break up demonstrations. For example, on December 14, media reported eight students were injured as a result of confrontations between student protesters and the Esmad in Popayan. An unknown number of police officers were also injured.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The law provides for the freedom of association, and the government generally respected this right. Freedom of association was limited by threats and acts of violence committed by illegal
armed groups against NGOs, indigenous groups, and labor unions.

Although the government does not prohibit membership in most political organizations, membership in organizations that engaged in rebellion against the government, espoused violence, or carried out acts of violence, such as FARC dissidents, the ELN, and other illegal armed groups, was against the law.

Comoros

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provide for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, but the government did not always respect these rights.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

On June 21, a peaceful march by the Mouvement du 17 Fevrier in Fomboni, Moheli, was dispersed by the police due to lack of Interior Ministry authorization, despite the claim by organizers that they had authorization from the mayor of Fomboni. The next day, opposition leaders Moustoifa Said Cheikh, Ahmed Wadaane, and Ibrahim Razida, were arrested for their role in the march and charged with mobbing, disturbing public order, and holding an unauthorized protest. On July 2, they were found guilty and sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment and a fine of 150,000 Comorian francs ($358), but they were released after 20 days.

Costa Rica

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION
The constitution provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

Cote d’Ivoire

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The law provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, but the government sometimes restricted the freedom of peaceful assembly.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The law provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, but the government did not always respect this right. The law requires groups that wish to hold demonstrations or rallies in stadiums or other enclosed spaces to submit a written notice to the Ministry of Interior three days before the proposed event. Numerous opposition political groups reported denials of their requests to hold political meetings and alleged inconsistent standards for granting public assembly permissions. In some instances public officials stated they could not provide for the safety of opposition groups attempting to organize both public and private meetings.

In May, 21 students protesting poor living conditions were arrested following a clash with police in Abidjan and released after several days. In September stone-throwing students affiliated with a student union clashed with police on the campus of Houphouet-Boigny University in Abidjan as they protested education fees. The students disrupted traffic throughout the city, and police forces fought back using tear gas and sound grenades.

Croatia

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION
The constitution and law provide for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

Cuba

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The government restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

Although the constitution grants a limited right of assembly, the right is subject to the requirement that it may not be “exercised against the existence and objectives of the socialist state.” The law requires citizens to request authorization for organized meetings of three or more persons, and failure to do so could carry a penalty of up to three months in prison and a fine. The government tolerated some gatherings, and many religious groups reported the ability to gather without registering or facing sanctions.

Independent activists faced greater obstacles, and state security forces often suppressed attempts to assemble, even for gatherings in private dwellings and in small numbers. The government did not grant permission to independent demonstrators or approve public meetings by human rights groups or others critical of any government activity.

The government also continued to organize “acts of repudiation” in the form of mobs organized to assault and disperse those who assembled peacefully. Participants arrived in government-owned buses or were recruited by government officials from nearby workplaces or schools. Participants arrived and departed in shifts, chanted progovernment slogans, sang progovernment songs, and verbally taunted those assembled peacefully. The targets of this harassment at times suffered physical assault or property damage. Government security officials at the scene, often present in overwhelming numbers, did not arrest those who physically attacked the victims or respond to victims’ complaints and instead frequently orchestrated the activities or took direct part in physical assaults.
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The government routinely denied citizens freedom of association and did not recognize independent associations. The constitution proscribes any political organization not officially recognized. A number of independent organizations, including opposition political parties and professional associations, operated as NGOs without legal recognition.

Recognized churches (including the Roman Catholic humanitarian organization Caritas), the Freemason movement, and a number of fraternal and professional organizations were the only organizations legally permitted to function outside the formal structure of the state or the CP. Religious groups are under the supervision of the CP's Office of Religious Affairs, which has the authority to deny permits for religious activities and exerted pressure on church leaders to refrain from including political topics in their sermons.

Groups must register through the Ministry of Justice to receive official recognition. Authorities continued to ignore applications for legal recognition from new groups, including several new religious groups as well as women's rights and gay rights organizations, thereby subjecting members to potential charges of illegal association.

The government continued to afford preferential treatment to those who took an active part in CP activities and mass demonstrations in support of the government, especially when awarding valued public benefits, such as admissions to higher education, fellowships, and job opportunities.

Cyprus

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The law and constitution provide for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.
Cyprus – the Area Administered by Turkish Cypriots

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The “law” provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, but the “government” sometimes limited both.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

A teachers union reported police obstructed unions and civil society organizations from demonstrating and opening banners in front of the Turkish “embassy” during demonstrations and protests.

A labor union reported police interfered in demonstrations and used force against peaceful demonstrators. The labor union also reported police used force and pepper gas to disperse demonstrators during the Animal Producer Association’s demonstration in September.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

While the “law” provides for the freedom of association, and while the “government” usually respected this right, some organizations faced lengthy registration processes.

Czech Republic

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provide for the freedom of peaceful assembly and association and the government generally respected these rights.
FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The government may legally restrict or prohibit gatherings, including marches, demonstrations, and concerts, if they promote hatred or intolerance, advocate suppressing individual rights, or jeopardize the safety of the participants.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The law requires organizations, associations, foundations, and political parties to register with the Ministry of Interior. The courts may dissolve or ban, and the Ministry of Interior may refuse to register, groups that incite hatred based on race, religion, class, nationality, or other affiliation or that use prohibited symbols.

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

While the constitution provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, the government did not respect this provision and continued to prohibit public meetings not previously authorized and not under government control.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for freedom of association, but the government failed to respect this provision. There were no known organizations other than those created by the government. Professional associations existed primarily to facilitate government monitoring and control over organization members.

Democratic Republic of the Congo
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, but the government frequently restricted this right and prevented those critical of the government from exercising their right to peaceful assembly. The law requires organizers of public events to notify local authorities in advance of the event. The government maintained that public events required advance permission and regularly declined to authorize public meetings or protests organized by opposition parties or civil society groups critical of the government. The government did, however, authorize protests and assemblies organized by progovernment groups and political parties. During the year the SSF beat, detained, or arrested persons participating in protests, marches, and meetings. The SSF also used tear gas, rubber bullets, and at times live ammunition, resulting in numerous civilian deaths and injuries.

According to MONUSCO there were 633 violations of democratic space from January through August. These included restrictions on freedom of assembly, the right to liberty and security of person, and of the right to freedom of opinion and expression.

On March 19, a joint report of the UNJHRO and the OHCHR for 2017 stated that the SSF used illegal, systematic, and disproportionate force against protesters, resulting in 47 civilian deaths and several hundred wounded during protests. The report stressed the illegality of government prohibitions on public demonstrations and accused the FARDC's 11th Rapid Reaction Brigade and the Republican Guard of grave violations of human rights for indiscriminately using live rounds specifically against civilians in August 2017 after members of the RMG Bundu dia Kongo separatist group attacked police and civilians in Kinshasa. The report also cited instances of threats and intimidation against protestors by government officials and outlined specific attacks and restrictions against UNJHRO personnel. The report confirmed at least nine deaths during December 2017 demonstrations, at least 98 wounded, and 185 arbitrarily arrested. For the January 21 demonstrations, the report cited at least seven persons killed, 67 wounded, and at least 121 persons arbitrarily arrested, including four children. The report also stressed that security force members were rarely, if ever, held accountable for disproportionate use of force during protests. It stated the United Nations was aware of only a few instances in which security force members were held accountable,
including the case of one police officer who was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment in Bukavu for conviction related to his actions during a protest in July 2017.

In March government and civil society representatives released a report of investigations into abuses related to protests during December 2017, on January 21, and on February 25, alleging 14 deaths, 65 injuries, and 40 persons arrested, detained, and in some cases tortured.

In Kinshasa opposition parties were regularly allowed to hold political rallies. On April 24, the opposition UDPS party held a rally in the capital. On September 29, opposition parties held a rally in Kinshasa, but reports and photographs showed that the government sought to deter attendance by halting public transportation, raising fuel prices, and dumping garbage near the site of the rally.

The government, which must simply be informed of nonviolent demonstrations and is not vested with authorizing their occurrence, consistently prohibited nonviolent demonstrations elsewhere in the country, notably in Lubumbashi, Kananga, and Goma. On October 13, government officials and the SSF blocked opposition leaders from organizing a political rally in Lubumbashi to highlight concerns regarding the electoral process. The SSF prevented opposition leaders from accessing a residence of the rally leader and fired live ammunition into the air while opposition members attempted to reach the planned rally point. From November 21 to election day on December 30, the JHRO recorded 16 election-related deaths. This included three deaths in Lubumbashi on December 11, one death in Tanganyika on December 12, one death in Mbuji-Mayi on December 13, one death in Kisangani on December 14, one death in Tshikapa on December 18, one death in Lubumbashi on December 19, six deaths in Tanganyika on December 27, one death in Beni on December 28, and one death in South Kivu province on election day on December 30.

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

The constitution provides for freedom of association, and the government generally respected this right. Civil society organizations and NGOs are required to register with the government and may receive funds only through donations; they may not generate any revenue, even if it is not at a profit. The registration process is burdensome and very slow. Some groups, particularly within the LGBTI community, reported the government had denied their registration requests.
During an interactive dialogue with civil society in Kinshasa in March 2016, the minister of justice and human rights stated that only 63 of more than 21,000 NGOs in the country were formally registered. Many NGOs reported that, even when carefully following the registration process, it often took years to receive legal certification. Many interpreted registration difficulties as intentional government obstacles for impeding NGO activity.

**Denmark**

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

**B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION**

The constitution provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government respected these rights.

**Djibouti**

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

**B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION**

The government restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.

**FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY**

Although the constitution provides for freedom of assembly, the government restricted this right. The Ministry of Interior requires permits for peaceful assemblies. The ministry allowed opposition groups to host events and rallies. Security authorities occasionally restricted this right.

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**
The constitution and law allow for freedom of association provided community groups register and obtain a permit from the Ministry of Interior. Nevertheless, the ministry ignored the petitions of some groups (see section 5). The government harassed and intimidated opposition parties, human rights groups, and labor unions.

Dominica

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

Following the February 2017 opposition political party's public meeting and subsequent riot, the government denied the opposition a number of permits to hold public meetings, citing public safety. There were no reports that the government denied permits during the year.

Dominican Republic

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The law provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

Ecuador

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The law provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The law provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the government generally respected this right. Public rallies require prior government permits, which authorities usually granted.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The law provides for freedom of association. In October 2017 President Moreno issued Decree 193 to replace executive Decrees 16 and 739 that regulated freedom of association. NGOs claimed former president Correa used the latter two decrees—which required all social organizations, including NGOs, to reregister in a new online registration system within one year of the decree or face dissolution—to stymie opposition and limit foreign influence. Following implementation of the new decree, the government allowed the reincorporation of two organizations Correa had dissolved.

Decree 193 simplifies the application process to obtain and maintain legal status for NGOs and social groups by relaxing and eliminating some bureaucratic hurdles. The decree closes loopholes exploited by the former government to infiltrate and fracture NGOs, including the elimination of a clause forcing groups to provide membership to any person, even against the will of the other members. International NGOs faced fewer restrictions on working in the country under the new decree. It ends the policy requiring government entities to collect information through the country's diplomatic missions abroad on the “legality, solvency, and seriousness” of foreign NGOs before they are allowed to work in the country. Civil society representatives said the new decree was a step in the right direction but lamented that it leaves in place some Correa-era policies, including the right of the government to dissolve organizations for poorly defined reasons.

Egypt

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The government restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution provides for freedom of assembly “according to notification regulated by law.” Authorities implemented an amended 2013 demonstrations law that includes an expansive list of prohibited activities, giving a judge the authority to prohibit or curtail planned demonstrations after submitting an official memorandum. Domestic and international human rights organizations asserted the law did not meet international standards regarding freedom of assembly. In 2017 the government imposed an exclusion zone of 2,600 feet (790 meters) around vital governmental institutions in which protests are prohibited.

There were protests throughout the year, mostly small, and some occurred without government interference. In most cases the government rigorously enforced the law restricting demonstrations, in some cases using force, including in cases of small groups of protesters demonstrating peacefully.

The number of persons arrested under the protest law was not publicly available, although research center Daftar Ahwal reported at least 37,000 cases of individuals stopped, arrested, or charged under the protest law between November 2013 and September 2016. Authorities charged 15,491 individuals under the protest law, resulting in 6,382 convictions and 5,083 acquittals.

On May 12, police arrested 22 persons protesting increased metro fares but released 12 of them the same day. The remaining 10 faced charges of disrupting public transport. Authorities released them on May 16. On May 14, State Security ordered 20 more persons detained for playing a role in the protests. They faced charges of disturbing the peace and obstructing public facilities. Among those arrested was lawyer and labor activist Haytham Mohamedeen, who was released on October 30, although charges remain pending.

Thousands of persons whom authorities arrested during 2013 and 2014 due to their participation in demonstrations (some of which were peaceful) remained imprisoned; however, authorities released others who had completed their sentences. Authorities held such individuals under charges of attending an unauthorized protest, incitement to violence, or “blocking roads.” This included prominent activist Alaa Abdel Fattah, who was convicted in 2015 of breaking the demonstrations law related to his participation in a protest in front of
the Shura Council in 2013. In 2017 the Court of Cassation reduced the prison sentence of prominent activist Abdel Fattah from five years’ “rigorous” imprisonment to five years’ imprisonment followed by five years of probation. No further appeals are possible. In 2015 the Cairo Criminal Court sentenced Abdel Fattah to five years in prison on charges of breaking the demonstrations law related to his participation in a protest in front of the Shura Council in 2013.

Human rights groups claimed authorities inflated or used these charges solely to target individuals suspected of being members of groups in opposition to the government or those who sought to exercise the rights to free assembly or association.

Since their release from prison in January 2017 after completing three-year sentences for violating the protest law, activists Ahmed Maher and Mohamed Adel remained on probation with terms requiring them to reside in the local police station from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. each day. On June 19, when Adel reported for his nightly stay, he was detained after a local storeowner filed a legal complaint accusing Adel of inciting antistate sentiments in 14 posts on Facebook. In July he was sentenced to a 15-day detention order.

According to press reports, student groups focused on entertainment while political activities virtually disappeared in light of pressure from authorities and the threat of arrest. Authorities allowed students to protest the move of the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, but authorities tightly controlled and managed such protests. Universities held student union elections in December 2017 for the first time in two years.

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

The constitution provides for freedom of association. The law governing associations, however, significantly restricts this right.

In 2017 the government enacted a new NGO law, which remained unimplemented by year’s end. Local and international NGOs stated the law if implemented could make it impossible for them to operate independently. In November, President Sisi stated he recognized the law’s shortcomings and directed the Ministry of Social Solidarity to chair a committee to draft amendments in consultation with civil society and submit the amendments to parliament. The 2017 law includes the creation of a new administrative body that includes members of security services and can regulate all NGOs that receive foreign funding and reject registration applications by not responding for 60 days; rules targeting all aspects of NGO work; and
prison sentences among the penalties for violations. Throughout the year the Ministry of Social Solidarity continued to apply the previous NGO law on international and domestic organizations receiving international funding, denying government approval of programs that domestic and international organizations sought to implement, or granting governmental approval after lengthy delays (which in some cases amounted to effective denials). Rights groups reported several incidents of security services ordering cancellation of planned training programs or other events. On June 2, the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled an article of the previous NGO law, which gives the Minister of Social Solidarity the right to dissolve NGOs, was unconstitutional.

The penal code criminalizes the request for or acceptance of foreign funds, materiel, weapons, ammunition, or “other things” from states or NGOs “with the intent to harm the national interest.” Those convicted may be sentenced to life in prison (or the death penalty in the case of public officials) for crimes committed during times of war or with “terrorist purpose.”

In a series of raids on November 1, security forces arrested Hoda Abdel Moneim, a former member of the NCHR and at least 30 others, including staff members of the human rights NGO ECRF and unaffiliated lawyers and activists. ECRF subsequently announced it was suspending its operations citing the arrest of Abdel Moneim as well the March arrest of ECRF leader Ezzat Ghoneim (see section 2.b.).

Ibrahim Metwally Hegazy, founder of the Association of the Families of the Disappeared, remained in detention. Authorities arrested him in September 2017, at the Cairo International Airport and initially held him incommunicado. Hegazy was traveling to Geneva to participate in the UN Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances. The charges against him included “communicating with a foreign body to harm the Egyptian national interest.” In September 2017 Hegazy told his lawyers authorities tortured him during the first three days they held him.

On April 5, the Court of Cassation overturned the conviction of 16 mostly foreign NGO workers sentenced in 2013 for operating unlicensed organizations and receiving foreign funding without government permission. They were to be retried along with 27 other NGO workers convicted in their absence in the same case. On December 20, a court acquitted 41 defendants; the status of the remaining two was unclear as of the end of the year.

The MB, the MB-affiliated Freedom and Justice Party, and its NGO remained illegal, and the MB was a legally designated terrorist organization.
Authorities continued investigations of local NGOs that received foreign funding under a case originally brought in 2011. On June 20, authorities released Nazra for Feminist Studies founder Mozn Hassan on bail; her charges included receiving foreign funding to harm national security in connection with her NGO. On May 27, authorities questioned Magda Adly and Suzanne Fayyad, founders of the el-Nadeem Center for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence, on charges of establishing an entity in violation of the civil society law and publishing information that was harmful to the state.

On May 21, authorities released Hossam Eddin Ali, executive director of the Egyptian Democratic Institute, on bail. He faced charges of harming national security and receiving foreign funds.

In February 2017 authorities closed the offices of el-Nadeem Center for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence (also registered under the name el-Nadeem for Psychological Rehabilitation), which documents torture and other forms of abuse and provides counseling for torture and rape victims. In early 2016 the center received administrative closure orders from three governmental bodies, and in late 2016 authorities froze its assets. The organization asserted the closure was politically motivated, targeting el-Nadeem because of its work on torture, deaths in detention, and impunity for these crimes. A court case brought by Nadeem challenging the closure order continued; the most recent hearing was December 5, wherein the court postponed a decision until December 26. The organization continued to operate in a limited capacity.

El Salvador

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

Equatorial Guinea
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The government restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, although the constitution and law provide for these freedoms.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution and law provide for the right of peaceful assembly, but regulatory provisions effectively undermined this right, and the government routinely restricted freedom of assembly. The government formally abolished permit requirements for political party meetings within party buildings but requires prior permission for public events, such as meetings in other venues or marches, and frequently denied these permit requests. The government frequently dispersed peaceful, preapproved public gatherings if a participant asked a question that could be construed as criticism of the government or the PDGE.

In contrast, authorities pressured citizens to attend progovernment demonstrations and rallies. For example, various citizen groups, government employees, and others were required to participate in the annual Independence Day parade.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provide for freedom of association, but the government severely restricted this right. All political parties, labor unions, and other associations must register with the government, but the registration process was costly, burdensome, opaque, and slow. During the year the government continued to reduce funding for civil society organizations and distributed remaining funds among a few mostly progovernment organizations close to the president's inner circle. Grant funding decisions were arbitrary and nontransparent.

Politically motivated crackdowns on civil society organizations remained a problem, including the temporary detention of civil society activists without charge.

The law prohibits the formation of political parties along ethnic lines. Only one labor organization was believed to be registered by the end of the year, but the registry was inaccessible due to a change in leadership at the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (see section 7.a.).
Despite laws that authorities stated were designed to facilitate the registration of political parties, the government prevented the registration of opposition parties. Although elected officials from the CI opposition party were released from prison on October 22 after a presidential pardon, they were not immediately allowed to return to their positions in local and national offices because the party had been deregistered early in the year.

During the 2017 legislative and municipal electoral campaign season, public gatherings were closely monitored and tightly controlled. Political parties required government authorization to hold rallies. Authorities prohibited political parties from campaigning in the same location at the same time as the official PDGE party. The PDGE received preferential treatment. On election day security forces prevented voters from forming large groups (see section 3).

A 1999 law on NGOs limits to approximately 53,000 CFA francs ($90) per year the amount of funding civil society organizations can receive from foreign sources. The government has also pressured civil society organizations, especially those focused on human rights, through both overt and covert means (see sections 1.d. and 5 for additional information).

**Eritrea**

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

**B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION**

The government restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.

**FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY**

The law and unimplemented constitution provide for freedom of assembly, but the government restricted this right. For some public gatherings, the government intermittently required those assembling to obtain permits. Authorities subjected gatherings of large groups of persons without prior approval to investigation and interference, with the exception of events that occurred in the context of meetings of government-affiliated organizations, were social in nature, or were events such as weddings, funerals, and religious observances of the four officially registered religious groups. During the October 2017 and March protests, the government did not provide any official data in connection with the arrests and detentions, or
the number of persons injured or requiring treatment because of the excessive use of force by the security apparatus.

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

The unimplemented constitution provides citizens the right to form organizations for political, social, economic, and cultural ends. It specifies that their conduct must be open and transparent and that they must be guided by principles of national unity and democracy. The government did not respect freedom of association. It did not allow any political parties other than the PFDJ. It also prohibited the formation of civil society organizations except those with official sponsorship. The government generally did not allow local organizations to receive funding and other resources from or to associate with foreign and international organizations.

**Estonia**

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

**B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION**

The constitution provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the government generally respected these freedoms.

The annual remembrance ceremony commemorating the Battle of Sinimae mentioned in previous years’ reports again occurred.

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

While the constitution provides for freedom of association, the law specifies that only citizens may join political parties. There were no restrictions on the ability of noncitizens to join other civil groups.

**Eswatini**
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution and law provide for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

In June, August, and September, REPS officials used nonlethal measures to control and disperse crowds when protesters deviated from agreed routes or provoked the police by throwing stones or trying to enter government facilities without authorization. Some protesters experienced non-life-threatening injuries during these incidents.

Ethiopia

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The government limited freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution and law provide for freedom of assembly; SOE regulations, however, prohibited demonstrations and town hall meetings that did not have approval from the Command Posts, in some cases federal and in other cases more local bodies. After the lifting of the SOE, security forces’ response to protests showed signs of increasing restraint. In July and August Federal Police and Addis Ababa police provided security to at least three large peaceful demonstrations staged without prior notification to the authorities in Addis Ababa.

Prior to the SOE, organizers of public meetings of more than two persons or demonstrations had to notify the government 48 hours in advance and obtain a permit. Authorities could not refuse to grant a permit but could require changing the location or time for reasons of public
safety or freedom of movement. If authorities require an event be moved to another place or
time, by law authorities must notify organizers in writing within 12 hours of their request.

The EPRDF used its own conference centers in Addis Ababa, the regional capitals, and
government facilities for meetings and events. Following the imposition of the SOE, the
prohibition on unauthorized demonstrations or town hall meetings severely limited the
organization of meetings, training sessions, and other gatherings, especially for civil society
and opposition political parties, who repeatedly reported being intimidated by authorities
concerning organizing under SOE regulations.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

Although the law provides for freedom of association and the right to engage in unrestricted
peaceful political activity, the government severely limited this right (see sections 3 and 5).

The SOE and the accompanying regulations restricted the ability of labor organizations to
operate (see section 5). Regulations prohibited exchanging information or having contact with
a foreign government or NGOs in a manner that undermines national sovereignty and
security, and this reduced communication between local and international organizations.

The Charities and Societies Proclamation (CSP), also called the Civil Society Organizations
(CSO) law, bans anonymous donations to NGOs and political parties. All potential donors were
therefore aware their names would be on the public record. A 2013 report by the UN special
rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association stated, “The
enforcement of these provisions has a devastating impact on individuals’ ability to form and
operate associations effectively.” For example, international NGOs seeking to operate in the
country had to submit an application via the country’s embassies abroad, which the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs then submitted to the government’s Charities and Societies Agency for
approval. Prime Minister Abiy prioritized the reform of the CSP, along with the ATP and media
law, as a mechanism to foster change in a process managed by the attorney general.

Federated States of Micronesia

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

Fiji

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association; however, the government may restrict these freedoms in some cases.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution provides for freedom of peaceful assembly but allows the government to limit this right in the interests of national security, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, and the orderly conduct of elections. The constitution also allows the government to limit freedom of assembly to protect the rights of others and imposes restrictions on a public official's right to freedom of assembly.

The POA allows the government to refuse permit applications for any meeting or demonstration deemed to prejudice peace, public safety, and good order or to sabotage or attempt to undermine the economy. It also allows authorities to use whatever force necessary to prohibit or disperse public and private meetings after “due warning” to preserve public order.

Although event organizers said authorities were sometimes very slow to issue permits, they granted permits for public rallies in support of UN Human Rights Day and the 16 Days of Activism against Domestic Violence Campaign but denied a permit for a public service union to protest.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
The constitution provides for freedom of association but limits this right in the interests of national security, public order, and morality and also for the orderly conduct of elections. It allows the government to regulate trade unions and collective bargaining processes, strikes and lockouts, and essential industries in the interests of the economy and population (see section 7.a.). The government generally did not restrict membership in NGOs, professional associations, and other private organizations.

Finland

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provide for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

France

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provide for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, subject to certain security conditions, and the government generally respected these rights.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

In February Amnesty International released a report claiming “prefects (representatives of the French state at local level; the most senior central government officials) continued to resort to emergency measures to restrict the right to freedom of peaceful assembly. In particular they adopted dozens of measures restricting the freedom of movement of individuals to prevent them from attending public assemblies. Authorities imposed these measures on vague
grounds and against individuals with no apparent connection to any terrorism-related offense.”

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provide for the freedom of association, and the government generally respected this right.

Gabon

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The government limited freedom of peaceful assembly.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution and law provide for freedom of assembly; however, the government did not consistently respect this right. In August 2017 parliament enacted a law that placed restrictions on freedom of assembly. On August 28, authorities prohibited union leaders from holding a march to protest austerity measures. Authorities detained several individuals who attempted to march but released them after a few hours without charge. There were reports the government failed to approve permits for public meetings. Some civil society activists stated they did not submit requests to hold public meetings because they expected the government would deny them.

Georgia

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION
The constitution and law provide for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association; government respect for those rights was uneven.

**FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY**

The constitution and law generally provide for freedom of assembly. Human rights organizations expressed concern, however, about provisions in the law, including the requirement that political parties and other organizations give five days’ notice to local authorities to assemble in a public area, thereby precluding spontaneous demonstrations. NGOs reported that police sometimes restricted freedom of assembly. For example, on December 17, 14 NGOs accused the authorities of restricting opposition access to the site of a planned Inauguration Day demonstration on December 16. The government responded that it had provided an area for demonstrations, but that protestors had refused to use it. As of mid-December, two supporters of Georgian Dream and one opposition activist were in detention after inauguration day incidents. Two Georgian Dream activists were arrested after allegedly assaulting an opposition activist in Velistsikhe, and opposition leader Davit Kirkitadze was arrested after he reportedly assaulted a police officer who was blocking the highway with a bus. Kirkitadze and his supporters claimed his arrest was politically motivated. NGOs also stated police abused the administrative offences code to detain participants of peaceful assemblies based on articles 166 (petty hooliganism), 173 (non-compliance with a lawful order of a law enforcement officer), and 150 (defacing the appearance of a self-governing unit).

There were several protests in May, including those against raids on popular nightclubs and in support of the International Day Against Homophobia, Transphobia, and Biphobia (IDAHOT). In May LGBTI organizations were unable to hold a sanctioned IDAHOT rally due to safety concerns following large rallies attended in part by far right groups that threatened violence against LGBTI supporters. Several LGBTI activists still met in front of the State Chancellery under heavy police presence. The PDO reported violence against LGBTI individuals, whether in the family or in public spaces, was a serious problem, and that the government has been unable to respond to this challenge.

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

There were reports that some government representatives and supporters of the ruling party pressured political opposition figures and supporters and state employees (see Section 3).
Germany

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

While the constitution provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, the government restricted these freedoms in some instances.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

While the constitution provides for the freedom of peaceful assembly, the government restricted this freedom in some instances. Groups seeking to hold open-air public rallies and marches must obtain permits, and state and local officials may deny permits when public safety concerns arise or when the applicant is from a prohibited organization, mainly right-wing extremist groups. In rare instances during the year, authorities denied such applications to assemble publicly. Authorities allowed several nonprohibited, right-wing extremist, or neo-Nazi groups to hold public rallies or marches when they did so in accordance with the law.

It is illegal to block officially registered demonstrations. Many anti-Nazi activists refused to accept such restrictions and attempted to block neo-Nazi demonstrations or to hold counterdemonstrations, resulting in clashes between police and anti-Nazi demonstrators. In October the immunity of the Green party Bundestag member Canan Bayran was lifted, and the Berlin police opened an investigation to determine whether she had blocked a demonstration. In February she reportedly blocked an antiabortion rally. The investigation continued at year’s end.

Police detained known or suspected activists when they believed such individuals intended to participate in illegal or unauthorized demonstrations. The length of detention varied from state to state.

Foreign politicians may not hold rallies in Germany if they are election candidates in their country within three months of the proposed rally. In the months preceding the Turkish presidential election in June, local authorities canceled a number of rallies that featured Turkish cabinet ministers or politicians.
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

While the constitution provides for the freedom of association, the government restricted this freedom in some instances. The law permits authorities to prohibit organizations whose activities the Constitutional Court or federal or state governments determine to be opposed to the constitutional democratic order or otherwise illegal. While only the Federal Constitutional Court may prohibit political parties on these grounds, both federal and state governments may prohibit or restrict other organizations, including groups that authorities classify as extremist or criminal in nature. Organizations have the right to appeal such prohibitions or restrictions.

The federal and state OPCs monitored several hundred organizations. Monitoring consisted of collecting information from public sources, written materials, and firsthand accounts but also included intrusive methods, such as the use of undercover agents who were subject to legal oversight. The FOPC and state OPCs published lists of monitored organizations, including left- and right-wing political parties. Although the law stipulates that surveillance must not interfere with an organization’s activities, representatives of some monitored groups, such as Scientologists, complained that the publication of the organizations’ names contributed to prejudice against them.

The FOPC monitored approximately 16,500 so called Reichsbuerger (“citizens of the empire”) and Selbstverwalter (self-administrators), a significant increase from the 10,000 monitored in 2016. These individuals denied the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany and rejected its legal system. The FOPC considered the groups to represent a potential threat due to their affinity for weapons and their contempt for national authorities. In 2017 members of Reichsbuerger and Selbstverwalter groups committed 911 politically motivated crimes; of these, authorities categorized 783 crimes as extremist and 130 as violent.

Ghana

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provide for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.
Greece

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provide for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

Although the constitution and law provide for freedom of association, the government continued to place legal restrictions on the names of associations of nationals who self-identified as ethnic Macedonian or associations that included the term “Turkish” as indicative of a collective ethnic identity (see section 6). Such associations, despite the lack of legal recognition, continued to operate.

On July 12, the Thrace appeals court rejected a request from the unofficial “Turkish Union of Xanthi” to reinstate its legal status. The association submitted this petition following a European Court of Human Rights ruling that the Greek court’s decision violated the right of association as protected by the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and a 2017 law allowing the reexamination of such previously rejected requests.

Grenada

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The law provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights, with a few exceptions.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The law provides for freedom of association, and the government generally respected this right.

On September 12, the congressional spokesperson reported that more than 2,100 police were present at Congress during a commemoration of the country’s independence, led by President Morales. A protest scheduled to converge at Congress on the same day was not able to approach the perimeters of Congress. The heavy police presence ostensibly serving as presidential security and crowd control received widespread criticism and media as a form of intimidation against the protesters. Civil society groups expressed concern over the presence of Kaibiles, military special forces who were implicated in war crimes during the country’s internal armed conflict from 1960-96.

On September 14, when President Morales and his cabinet attended a ceremony at the cathedral on the central plaza, NGOs and journalists accused the government of using excessive security measures to intimidate citizens and restrict their right to assemble. Observers stated security measures included the deployment of antiriot military police; the registration of all pedestrians entering the plaza, including children; and excessive security checks. On September 14, a Public Ministry prosecutor stated publicly he would investigate for possible violations of freedom of movement.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The law provides for freedom of association, and the government generally respected this right. There were reports, however, of significant barriers to organizing in the labor sector (see section 7.a.).
Guinea

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, but the government did not always respect these rights.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, but the government restricted this right. The law bans any meeting that has an ethnic or racial character or any gathering “whose nature threatens national unity.” The government requires a 72-working-hour advance notification for public gatherings. The law permits local authorities to prohibit a demonstration or meeting if they believe it poses a threat to public order. Authorities may also hold event organizers criminally liable if violence or destruction of property occurs.

The government did not respect the right of freedom peaceful assembly. In August the government announced a blanket ban on political protests.

In February security forces arrested 15 peacefully demonstrating civil society activists who were demanding dialogue between the government and the union of teachers. The demonstrators were subsequently released. Police use of excessive force to disperse demonstrators—often protesting poor public services—resulted in deaths and injuries (see section 1.a.).

Part of the 2013 and 2015 political accords promised an investigation into the political violence that resulted in the deaths of more than 50 persons in 2012 and 2013, punishment of perpetrators, and indemnification of victims. The government had taken no action on these promises by year’s end.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
The constitution provides for freedom of association, and authorities generally respected this provision. Requirements to obtain official recognition for public, social, cultural, religious, or political associations were not cumbersome, although bureaucratic delays sometimes impeded registration.

**Guinea-Bissau**

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

**B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION**

The constitution and law provide for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government failed to respect these rights.

In January the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cabo Verde’s (PAIGC) congress was suspended by a judicial order, allegedly for not respecting the internal procedures of the party. Police prohibited PAIGC members from entering their headquarters, injuring 11 persons. The congress eventually took place a few days later, but observers believed that political interference in the justice sector was behind the suspension.

During the year several protests by a civil society group, the Movement of Nonconforming Citizens (MCCI), were prohibited by authorities, who claimed the movement did not have a legal structure or because the protest would occur near public places. In May the MCCI filed a complaint against the government for violation of freedom of peaceful protest to the Economic Community of West African States Community Court of Justice. The case continued at year’s end.

**Guyana**

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

**B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION**
The law provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

Haiti

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution provides for freedom of assembly, and the government generally respected this right. There were several instances when police used force to impose order during demonstrations. Citizens must apply for a permit to hold legal demonstrations. Although impromptu political demonstrations in some instances provoked aggressive law enforcement responses, police generally responded to these protests in a professional and effective manner.

Following the July 6-7 protests against the government’s decision to increase fuel prices, Port-au-Prince prosecutor Dameus ordered the arrest of 64 individuals accused of looting. These individuals included three who were living on property owned by opposition senator Antonio Cheramy. Some members of the opposition called the arrests politically motivated and illegal because a prosecutor can arrest only individuals caught in the process committing a crime. Dameus denied the allegations of “political persecution” and stated the persons arrested were caught carrying numerous items that had been looted from various stores. The detainees were subsequently released.

Honduras

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The law provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the government generally respected this right. The law requires a judge to issue an eviction order for individuals occupying public and private property if security forces had not evicted the individuals within a specified period of the occupation. Some local and international civil society organizations, including students, agricultural workers groups, political parties, and indigenous rights groups, alleged that members of the security forces used excessive force to break up demonstrations. The IACHR reported that the government at times used a policy of arbitrary detentions or arrests to inhibit protest.

Law enforcement evictions of protesters, land rights activists, and others were generally conducted peacefully, although injuries to both protesters and law enforcement officers were occasionally reported. The NGO Peace Brigades International reported several instances of threats and intimidation by security forces, including a heavy military presence in disputed areas. Conversely, media sources reported in October that two soldiers were ambushed and killed near Tocoa, Colon, as they sought peacefully to remove protesters from blocking a road. No suspects were arrested, and it is unclear if the shooters were related to the protesters or linked with illicit groups.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The law provides for freedom of association, and the government generally respected this right. The law prohibits illicit association, defined as gatherings by persons bearing arms, explosive devices, or dangerous objects with the purpose of committing a crime, and prescribes prison terms of two to four years and a fine of 30,000 to 60,000 lempiras ($1,250 to $2,500) for anyone who convokes or directs an illicit meeting or demonstration. There were no reports of such cases during the year, although authorities charged some protesters with sedition. Public-sector unions expressed concern over some officials refusing to honor bargaining agreements and firing union leaders. The law prohibits police from unionizing (see section 7.a.).

Hungary
Annex 286

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

**B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION**

The constitution and law provide for the freedom of peaceful assembly, and the government generally respected this right. By law demonstrations do not require a police permit, but event organizers must inform police of a planned assembly in a public place at least three days in advance. The law authorizes police to prohibit any gathering if it seriously endangers the peaceful operation of representative bodies or courts or if it is not possible to provide for alternate routes for traffic. Police may not disband a spontaneous, unauthorized assembly that remains peaceful and is aimed at expressing opinion on an event that was unforeseeable, but organizers must inform police immediately after organizing has begun. Police are required to disband an assembly if it commits a crime or incites the commission of a crime, results in the violation of the rights of others, involves armed participants, or is held despite a preliminary official ban. A police decision to prohibit or disband a public demonstration is open for judicial review. The police may disband public events in the geographic area affected by a terrorist act that has occurred or one that is threatened.

On June 20, parliament adopted a constitutional amendment that includes a provision to strengthen the protection of privacy by stipulating that freedom of expression and the exercise of the right of assembly shall not harm others’ private and family life and their homes. Critics asserted this would be used to ban unwanted protests in public spaces near politicians’ homes and could be used to ban protests in many other public spaces that have apartments nearby.

On July 20, parliament also amended the law on assembly to give more power to the government to regulate public demonstrations, including the ability to hold organizers liable for damages caused by their events and to ban protests in advance. According to the amended law, authorities may ban or dissolve gatherings that unnecessarily and disproportionately harm others’ human dignity, the dignity of the Hungarian nation, or other national, ethnic, or religious communities. The new rules also permit police to prevent demonstrations that hinder diplomats from performing their duties, threaten public order, or disturb others’ rights to free movement. Although the police’s decision is not subject to appeal, the organizers may contest it in court within three days. The police can fine demonstration organizers if they fail to restore a demonstration site to its original state or clean it up. The new legislation also criminalizes the nonviolent disturbance or impediment of a demonstration.
On July 20, parliament amended the criminal code to make harassment of “official persons” (including members of parliament, judges, and prosecutors) when they are not performing public duties a crime punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment.

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

The constitution and law provide for freedom of association, and the government generally respected it, with some exceptions.

During the year the government passed legislation that introduced new criminal and financial penalties for migration-related work of NGOs and their staff (see section 5).

On July 23, the Budapest local municipality ordered the Aurora Civil and Cultural Center—which provides office space for several NGOs—to close, claiming Aurora’s lease was invalid because it predates the center’s registration; Aurora claimed that it had not violated any rules and that the issue with the date was an administrative mistake. This was the second attempt to shut down the center within one year.

The Fidesz-dominated city assembly of Pecs passed a resolution in December 2017 calling on local residents, businesses, and organizations not to rent or provide any space within the city to the NGO With the Strength of Humanity because it received an approximately $490,000 grant from the Open Society Foundations (OSF) to support community building in the region. The NGO sued the city mayor for libel but lost the case in a July ruling. The NGO said it would appeal the decision. In March a local municipality-owned company rejected an attempt by the same NGO to rent premises for an event. The Equal Treatment Authority fined the company in June.

A 2011 law on religion deregistered more than 300 religious groups and organizations that had previously held incorporated church status; most were required to reapply for registration. The government had not approved any applications for incorporated church status since it amended the same law in 2012, but many applications were approved allowing for status as a lesser religious organization. On December 20, parliament passed an amendment to the law that creates four different statuses for religious organizations. Observers noted that while the amendment provides a simpler procedure for religious entities to gain an intermediate level religious status, it only restores some of the rights they had before 2011.
Iceland

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provide for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

India

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The law provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The law provides for freedom of assembly. Authorities often required permits and notification before parades or demonstrations, and local governments generally respected the right to protest peacefully. The state of Jammu and Kashmir was an exception, where the state government sometimes denied permits to separatist political parties for public gatherings, and security forces reportedly occasionally detained and assaulted members of political groups engaged in peaceful protest (see section 1.g.). During periods of civil unrest in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, authorities used the law to ban public assemblies and impose curfews.

Security forces, including local police, often disrupted demonstrations and reportedly used excessive force when attempting to disperse protesters. On May 22, Tamil Nadu police opened fire on protesters who were demanding the closure of the Sterlite copper smelting plant at Thoothukudi, Tamil Nadu, killing 15 individuals. The Tamil Nadu government claimed
the police only fired on individuals who used logs and petrol bombs to set fire to vehicles during the protests.

There were sometimes restrictions on the organization of international conferences. Authorities required NGOs to secure approval from the central government before organizing international conferences. Authorities routinely granted permission, although in some cases the approval process was lengthy. Some human rights groups claimed this practice provided the government tacit control over the work of NGOs and constituted a restriction on freedoms of assembly and association.

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

The law provides for freedom of association. While the government generally respected this right, the government’s increased monitoring and regulation of NGOs that received foreign funding caused concern. In certain cases the government required “prior approval” for some NGOs to receive foreign funds, suspended foreign banking licenses, or froze accounts of NGOs that allegedly received foreign funding without the proper clearances or that mixed foreign and domestic funding, and in other instances canceled or declined to renew Foreign Contributions (Regulation) Act (FCRA) registrations. On April 3, Minister of State for Home Affairs Kiran Rijiju informed the lower house of parliament that the government had canceled the registration of more than 14,000 NGOs in the last four years, although some of the cancellations reportedly pertained to defunct organizations. Some human rights organizations claimed these actions were sometimes used to target specific NGOs.

Some NGOs reported an increase in random FCRA compliance inspections by Ministry of Home Affairs officials who they said were purportedly under pressure to demonstrate strict enforcement of the law. FCRA licenses were also reportedly canceled periodically based on nonpublic investigations by the Intelligence Bureau. On June 1, the Ministry of Home Affairs launched an online tool to facilitate real-time monitoring of foreign funds deposited into NGO bank accounts. On June 5, it announced NGOs found in violation of FCRA provisions would be assessed a civil fine instead of having their licenses canceled or suspended. The rules, however, were not applicable retroactively. Some NGOs reported the new rules would severely affect smaller organizations that would be unable to pay the steep penalties—amounting to 10 percent of their total funds—and that did not have the compliance expertise, leaving only large entities able to maintain their FCRA licenses.
Some NGOs alleged they were targeted as a reprisal for their work on “politically sensitive” issues like human rights or environmental activism. The Center for Promotion of Social Concerns (CPSC) and its partner program unit People’s Watch continued court proceedings against the nonrenewal of their FCRA license. A September 12 report by the UN secretary general cited the use of FCRA regulations to “restrict the work of NGOs cooperating with the United Nations, for example by a refusal to renew or grant licenses, including for the CPSC.”

On October 25, the Enforcement Directorate (ED), a government agency that investigates financial crimes, raided the premises of Amnesty International India’s Bengaluru office and froze its bank accounts on suspicion that it had violated foreign funding guidelines. Aakar Patel, Amnesty International India’s executive director stated, “The Enforcement Directorate's raid on our office today shows how the authorities are now treating human rights organizations like criminal enterprises, using heavy-handed methods that are commonly found in repressive states. Our staff have been harassed and intimidated.” The searches came days after the ED searched the premises of environmental nonprofit Greenpeace India in Bengaluru on October 12, also for allegedly violating foreign funding rules. Greenpeace India refuted the allegations stating, “This seems to be part of a larger design to muzzle democratic dissent in the country.”

In February the Public Health Foundation of India (PHFI), a public-health advocacy group, was placed in the “prior permission” category, requiring the organization to seek permission from the Ministry of Home Affairs each time it wanted to receive and use funds from foreign sources. The Ministry of Home Affairs indicated the center and state governments would review PHFI’s use of foreign funds quarterly and that the investigation into PHFI’s alleged FCRA violations would continue.

**Indonesia**

**Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:**

**B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION**

The law provides for freedom of assembly, and the government generally respected this right. The law requires demonstrators to provide police with a written notification three days before any planned demonstration and for police to issue a receipt for the written notification. This receipt acts as a de facto license for the demonstration. Police in Papua routinely refused to
issue receipts of notification to would-be demonstrators because the demonstrations would likely include calls for independence, an act that is prohibited under the same law. Papua provincial police issued a decree in 2016 prohibiting rallies by seven organizations labeled as proindependence groups, including the National Committee of West Papua, the United Liberation Movement for West Papua, and the Free Papua Movement. There were fewer large-scale Papua-related demonstrations during the year than in previous years.

On April 5, police from Papua’s provincial capital Jayapura raided a University of Cenderawasih dormitory that police alleged was a venue for a separatist declaration, rounding up at least 44 students for their involvement in the event. Police later released all of them except for three who they held on unrelated charges.

**FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY**

The constitution and laws provide for freedom of association, which the government generally respected.

By law to receive official registration status, foreign NGOs must have an MOU with a government ministry. Some organizations reported difficulties obtaining these MOUs and claimed the government was withholding them to block their registration status, although cumbersome bureaucracy within the Ministry of Law and Human Rights was also to blame.

Some LGBTI advocacy groups reported encountering difficulties when attempting to register their organizations.

**Iran**

**Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:**

**B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION**

The government severely restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.

**FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY**
The constitution permits assemblies and marches of unarmed persons “provided they do not violate the principles of Islam.” In order to prevent activities it considered antiregime, the government restricted this right and closely monitored gatherings such as public entertainment and lectures, student and women’s meetings and protests, meetings and worship services of minority religious groups, labor protests, online gatherings and networking, funeral processions, and Friday prayer gatherings.

According to activists, the government arbitrarily applied rules governing permits to assemble, with proregime groups rarely experiencing difficulty, while groups viewed as critical of the regime experienced harassment regardless of whether authorities issued a permit.

The government cracked down on small protests that began in the city of Mashhad in December 2017 and continued into 2018. These protests subsequently spread across the country and included broader economic and political grievances with the nation’s leadership. International media and human rights organizations widely covered the government’s crackdown on protests. According to media reports, at least 20 protesters were killed as of January, and thousands more were arrested throughout the year. Official government sources cited 4,970 arrested, 90 percent of whom were younger than 25 years old. Over the year, as protests arose across the country among various groups and by individuals expressing diverse grievances and demands, actions by security forces resulted in hundreds of additional arrests and further alleged deaths.

CHRI reported that authorities denied detainees access to attorneys and threatened them with charges that carried the death penalty if they sought counsel. There were multiple reports of detainees beaten while in custody. Several human rights organizations, including CHRI, reported that detainees were given pills of unknown substance, including methadone, to portray them as drug addicts. According to CHRI, at least two detainees died under suspicious circumstances while in detention, while the death of a third detainee was labeled a “suicide” (see section 1.a.).

In February security forces violently cracked down on a group of Gonabadi Sufi dervishes in Tehran who were protesting to demand the release of a 70-year-old fellow Sufi, Nematollah Riahi, who protesters believed was unjustly detained because of his religious affiliation. According to CHRI and reports from Sufi news sites, at least 300 hundred Gonabadi Sufis were arrested and imprisoned in the Great Tehran Penitentiary and Qarchak Prison, with numerous deaths reported at the hands of security forces. Reports indicated that the government’s crackdown continued in various cities throughout the country and that Sufis
were subjected to torture and forced confessions in detention centers prior to their transfer to prisons.

According to an August HRW report, revolutionary courts sentenced at least 208 Gonabadi Sufi dervishes, from the hundreds detained, in unfair trials to prison terms ranging from four months to 26 years, flogging, internal exile, travel bans, and a ban on membership in social and political groups. Authorities did not allow the defendants to choose their legal representation and repeatedly insulted and questioned their faith during trials that lasted as little as 15 minutes. More than 40 dervishes received sentences in absentia.

In August Great Tehran Penitentiary authorities conducted a “brutal” attack, according to CHRI, on Gonabadi Sufis prisoners who were peacefully protesting the harsh treatment of female Gonabadi Sufi prisoners at Qarchak Prison. According to the report, several detainees were badly injured and suffered broken bones, while female prisoners in Qarchak Prison were reportedly subjected to torture and beatings by prison officials.

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

The constitution provides for the establishment of political parties, professional and political associations, and Islamic and recognized religious minority organizations, as long as such groups do not violate the principles of freedom, sovereignty, national unity, or Islamic criteria, or question Islam as the basis of the country’s system of government. The government limited the freedom of association through threats, intimidation, the imposition of arbitrary requirements on organizations, and the arrests of group leaders and members.

The government barred teachers from commemorating International Labor Day and Teachers’ Day. Several prominent teachers and union activists either remained in prison or were awaiting new sentences, including Mahmoud Beheshti Langroudi and Esmail Abdi (see section 7.a.).

**Iraq**

**Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:**

**B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION**
The government sometimes limited freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.

**FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY**

The constitution provides for freedom of assembly and peaceful demonstration “regulated by law.” Regulations require protest organizers to request permission seven days in advance of a demonstration and submit detailed information regarding the applicants, the reason for the protest, and participants. The regulations prohibit all “slogans, signs, printed materials, or drawings” involving “sectarianism, racism, or segregation” of citizens. The regulations also prohibit anything that would violate the constitution or law; encourage violence, hatred, or killing; or prove insulting to Islam, “honor, morals, religion, holy groups, or Iraqi entities in general.” Provincial councils traditionally maintained authority to issue permits. Authorities generally issued permits in accordance with the regulations.

The government largely respected the right of its citizens to freedom of peaceful assembly. In July and August in Baghdad, demonstrators staged peaceful protests to demand better services, jobs, and an end to government corruption.

In some cases the government used force against protesters. During protests in Basrah Governorate and other areas of southern Iraq over corruption and poor public services related to water and electricity between July and September, at least 15 persons died in clashes with government forces, according to media reports. Local human rights organizations reported that government forces in some cases prevented the injured from receiving treatment at hospitals and detained members of civil society investigating the government’s response to the protests.

On March 28, KRG forces arrested more than 80 protesters demonstrating against poor public services and government salaries in the IKR.

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

The constitution provides for the right to form and join associations and political parties, with some exceptions. The government generally respected this right, except for the legal prohibitions against groups expressing support for the Baath Party or Zionist principles. The penal code stipulates that any person convicted of promoting Zionist principles, association with Zionist organizations, assisting such organizations through material or moral support, or
working in any way to realize Zionist objectives, be subject to punishment by death. There were no known cases of individuals charged with violating this law during the year.

The government reported it took approximately one month to process NGO registration applications. NGOs must register and periodically reregister in Baghdad. The NGO Directorate in the Council of Ministers Secretariat reported approximately 3,500 registered NGOs as of September. International organizations such as the ICRC and the International Commission on Missing Persons continued to operate in a legal gray area, given a gap in government registration regulations.

The IKR requires separate registration in Erbil. The first half of the year witnessed continuing fallout from the September 2017 KRG independence referendum in that the KRG and central government did not mutually recognize NGO registration. As a result, many NGOs that were registered only in Baghdad could not operate in the IKR for the first half of the year, while NGOs registered only in Erbil could not operate outside the IKR and KRG-controlled disputed territories until the issue was resolved.

Ireland

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

Israel, Golan Heights, West Bank, and Gaza

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION
The law provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

**FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY**

The law provides for this right, and the government generally respected it.

There were reports that police used excessive force in response to protests by certain groups, including ultra-Orthodox men and boys, Arab citizens and residents, and persons with disabilities. For example, on April 4 in Jerusalem, two police officers reportedly hit on the head an ultra-Orthodox man with a mental disability after he briefly stopped in the road and waved his hands while walking with a group of ultra-Orthodox protesters toward a demonstration, according to PCATI. Multiple NGOs reported that on some occasions, police used excessive force to break up permitted demonstrations after protesters waved a Palestinian flag.

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

The law provides for this right, and the government generally respected it.

The law prohibits registration of an association or a party if its goals include denial of the existence of the State of Israel or the democratic character of the state. A political party will not be registered if its goals include incitement to racism or support of an armed struggle, enemy state, or terror organization against Israel.

The 2016 NGO law, which came into effect after NGOs filed their 2017 annual statements in the first half of the year, requires NGOs receiving more than one-half of their funding from foreign governments to state this fact in all of their official publications, applications to attend Knesset meetings, websites, public campaigns, and any communication with the public. The law allows a fine of 29,200 shekels ($8,000) for NGOs that violated these rules. As of December 15, the government had not taken legal action against any NGO for failing to comply with the law.

In March 2017 the Knesset passed a law mandating additional scrutiny on requests for National Service volunteers from NGOs that received more than one-half of their funding from foreign governments.
Israel and Palestinian NGOs, particularly those focused on human rights problems and critical of the government, asserted the government sought to intimidate them and prevent them from receiving foreign government funding (see section 5).

Israel, Golan Heights, West Bank, and Gaza – West Bank and Gaza

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

Authorities in the West Bank and Gaza limited and restricted Palestinian residents’ freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

PA law permits public meetings, processions, and assemblies within legal limits. It requires permits for rallies, demonstrations, and large cultural events. Both the PA and Hamas security forces selectively restricted or dispersed peaceful protests and demonstrations in the West Bank and Gaza during the year.

According to a Hamas decree, any public assembly or celebration in Gaza requires prior permission. Hamas used arbitrary arrest to prevent some events from taking place, particularly political events affiliated with Fatah. Hamas also attempted to impede criticism of Hamas policies by imposing arbitrary demands for the approval of meetings on political or social topics.

A 1967 Israeli military order stipulates that a “political” gathering of 10 or more persons requires a permit from the regional commander of military forces—which Israeli commanders rarely granted. The penalty for a breach of the order is up to 10 years’ imprisonment or a heavy fine. Israeli military law prohibits insulting a soldier, participating in an unpermitted rally, and “incitement” (encouraging others to engage in civil disobedience). In 2016 an Israeli military court indicted Palestinian human rights activist Issa Amro on 18 charges dating to 2010. Human rights organizations such as Amnesty International stated Amro’s actions during these incidents were consistent with nonviolent civil disobedience. Amro’s trial, which began
in 2016, continued through the end of the year. In November the seventh hearing on the case was held in Israeli Military Court. Ha’aretz reported the IDF detained him at least 20 times at various checkpoints from May-July.

The IDF Central Command declared areas of the West Bank to be “closed military zones,” in which it prohibited Palestinian public assembly. It maintained the same designation on Fridays for areas adjacent to the security barrier in the Palestinian villages of Bil’in and Ni’lin during hours when Palestinian, Israeli, and international activists regularly demonstrated there. There were frequent skirmishes between protesters and ISF personnel. The ISF stationed on the West Bank side of the barrier during weekly protests in those villages responded to rock throwing with nonlethal force.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

PA law allows freedom of association. PA authorities sometimes imposed limitations in the West Bank, including on labor organizations (see section 7.a.). NGOs said a regulation subjecting “nonprofit companies” to PA approval prior to receiving grants impeded their independence and threatened the ability of both local and international nonprofits to operate freely in the West Bank.

In Gaza, Hamas attempted to prevent various organizations from operating. These included some it accused of being Fatah-affiliated, as well as private businesses and NGOs that Hamas deemed to be in violation of its interpretation of Islamic social norms. The Hamas de facto Ministry of Interior claimed supervisory authority over all NGOs, and its representatives regularly harassed NGO employees and requested information on staff, salaries, and activities.

Italy

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for the freedoms of assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.
Jamaica

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

Japan

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The law provides for freedom of assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

Jordan

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The government limited freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution provides for freedom of assembly, but the government limited this right. Security forces provided security at demonstrations granted permits by government or local authorities.
The law requires a 48-hour notification to the governor for any meeting or event hosted by any local or international group. While not required by law, several local and international NGOs reported that hotels, allegedly at the request of security officials, required them to present letters of approval from the governor prior to holding training, private meetings, or public conferences. There were 42 reported cases of governor denials without explanation this year. Without letters of approval from the government, hotels cancelled the events. In some cases, NGOs relocated the events to private offices. In one case the Amman governor’s office informed a human rights organization it would not be allowed to proceed with hosting antitorture training at a hotel. The organization claimed that it was eventually permitted to host the training after threatening legal action against the governor.

Protests regarding economic policies, corruption, and government ineffectiveness occurred across several governorates throughout the spring and summer. A few hundred local tribal activists organized daily sit-ins lasting up to 70 days in the main town squares of Salt and Karak from February to May. Protestors generally spoke favorably about the government response.

In late May, labor unions joined the protest movement, leading to larger demonstrations across the country. According to government officials, protests were generally peaceful with 42 injuries to security personnel and 60 arrests for vandalism or assault. The Justice Center for Legal Aid, a civil society organization, operated a detention hotline during the protests where citizens could report violations of the government’s pledge not to detain protestors for more than six hours. They reported one incident when a governor allegedly detained a group of 10 protestors for a prolonged period.

The government tabled the proposed tax reform law in response to the protests, leading to the resignation of then Prime Minister Hani Al-Mulki and his government. Police subsequently allegedly dispersed peaceful anticorruption protests under the new government headed by Prime Minister Razzaz.

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

The constitution provides for the right of association, but the government limited this freedom. The law authorizes the Ministry of Social Development and Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Supply to approve or reject applications to register organizations and to prohibit organizations from receiving foreign funding for any reason. It prohibits the use of associations for the benefit of any political organization. The law also gives the ministry
significant control over the internal management of associations, including the ability to
dissolve associations, approve boards of directors, send government representatives to any
board meeting, prevent associations from merging their operations, and appoint an auditor
to examine an association's finances for any reason. The law requires associations to inform
the Ministry of Social Development of board meetings, submit all board decisions for
approval, disclose members' names, and obtain security clearances for board members from
the Interior Ministry. The law includes penalties, including fines up to 10,000 JD ($14,000), for
violations of the regulations.

In 2015, the Ministry of Social Development introduced an application form for the approval
process for associations that receive foreign funding. Associations criticized the procedure,
which incorporated additional ministries into the decision process and removed the deadline
for review of funding requests. NGOs stated the registration process and foreign funding
procedures were neither clear, transparent, nor consistently applied. Groups attempting to
register experienced months of delays, and those for whom authorities denied their
applications complained that they received inadequate explanations.

During the year, the Ministry of Social Development introduced an automated system for
associations to apply for foreign funding and track their applications. As of August 30, the
ministry received 5,735 applications for foreign funding and approved 190 of them. NGO's
reported that unexplained, months-long delays in the decision process continued.

The law authorizes the Ministry of Social Development to intervene in NGO activities. Warned
NGOs are given a two-month probationary period to address violations.

In June Amman's first instance court sentenced the chief executive officer of the Center for
Defending Freedom of Journalists (CDFJ) to one year in prison for inaccuracies in the CDFJ's
budget and operating under an incorrect legal status. The court also fined CDFJ 200 JD ($282)
for irregularities in its budget and organizational documents. In October, a Court of Appeal
acquitted the CDFJ's chief executive officer of these charges. The Ministry of Industry, Trade,
and Supply alleged in 2017 that CDFJ violated foreign funding restrictions and ordered it to
halt receipt of any foreign funding.

Citizens widely suspected that the government infiltrated civil society organizations, political
parties, and human rights organizations and their internal meetings.
Kazakhstan

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The law provides for limited freedom of assembly, but there were significant restrictions on this right. The law defines unsanctioned gatherings, public meetings, demonstrations, marches, picketing, and strikes that upset social and political stability as national security threats.

The law includes penalties for organizing or participating in illegal gatherings and for providing organizational support in the form of property, means of communication, equipment, and transportation, if the enumerated actions cause significant damage to the rights and legal interests of citizens, entities, or legally protected interests of the society or the government.

By law organizations must apply to local authorities at least 10 days in advance for a permit to hold a demonstration or public meeting. Opposition figures and human rights monitors complained that complicated and vague procedures and the 10-day notification period made it difficult for groups to organize public meetings and demonstrations and noted local authorities turned down many applications for demonstrations or only allowed them to take place outside the city center.

Activists in Almaty applied to hold a public gathering on August 4 to demand police reform following the death of Olympic medalist Denis Ten. The mayor’s office refused the request, stating that the only place designated for public events in Almaty had already been reserved for another event. The Astana mayor’s office similarly declined a demonstration request. The Almaty activists subsequently submitted 31 petitions requesting a gathering to be held any day in the next month; the mayor’s office denied them all.

On May 10, several dozen individuals staged a protest initiated by fugitive banker and leader of the banned opposition group Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DCK) Mukhtar Ablyazov to demand the release of political prisoners and an end to torture. The protest had not received government approval. Police dispersed the protestors and detained several, among them
random passers-by and minors, according to activists. Some of those detained were punished by court fines or short administrative detentions. The government did not release any official data on the number of detained or punished protestors.

On June 23, the DCK called another unapproved rally. Police preemptively arrested a number of individuals thought to be involved in the protests. Human rights advocacy organizations reported that those detained included passersby, senior citizens, pregnant women, and children. In several cities reporters who came to cover the event were briefly detained. All detainees were taken to police stations and held there for several hours without food or water. Human rights observers criticized police for unjustified detention and numerous procedural violations in holding the detainees in custody. There were no official reports on the number of those detained. Human rights advocates stated that more than a hundred individuals were detained in Almaty, 30 in Astana, and at least a dozen in Shymkent. In some cities protestors dispersed without police involvement.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The law provides for limited freedom of association, but there were significant restrictions on this right. Any public organization set up by citizens, including religious groups, must be registered with the Ministry of Justice, as well as with the local departments of justice in every region in which the organization conducts activities. The law requires public or religious associations to define their specific activities, and any association that acts outside the scope of its charter may be warned, fined, suspended, or ultimately banned. Participation in unregistered public organizations may result in administrative or criminal penalties, such as fines, imprisonment, the closure of an organization, or suspension of its activities.

NGOs reported some difficulty in registering public associations. According to government information, these difficulties were due to discrepancies in the submitted documents.

Membership organizations other than religious groups, which are covered under separate legislation, must have at least 10 members to register at the local level and must have branches in more than one-half the country’s regions for national registration. The government considered political parties and labor unions to be membership organizations but required political parties to have 40,000 signatures for registration. If authorities challenge the application by alleging irregular signatures, the registration process may continue only if the total number of eligible signatures exceeds the minimum number required. The law prohibits parties established on an ethnic, gender, or religious basis. The law also prohibits
members of the armed forces, employees of law enforcement and other national security organizations, and judges from participating in trade unions or political parties.

According to Maina Kiai, the UN special rapporteur who visited Kazakhstan in 2015, the law regulating the establishment of political parties is problematic as it imposes onerous obligations prior to registration, including high initial membership requirements that prevent small parties from forming and extensive documentation that requires time and significant expense to collect. He also expressed concern regarding the broad discretion granted to officials in charge of registering proposed parties, noting that the process lacked transparency and the law allows for perpetual extensions of time for the government to review a party’s application.

Under the 2015 NGO financing law, all “nongovernment organizations, subsidiaries, and representative offices of foreign and international noncommercial organizations” are required to provide information on “their activities, including information regarding the founders, assets, sources of their funds and what they are spent on....” An “authorized body” may initiate a “verification” of the information submitted based on information received in mass media reports, complaints from individuals and entities, or other subjective sources. Untimely or inaccurate information contained in the report, discovered during verification, is an administrative offense and may carry fines up to 53,025 tenge ($159) or suspension for three months if the violation is not rectified or is repeated within one year. In extreme cases criminal penalties are possible, which may lead to a large fine, suspension, or closure of the organization.

The law prohibits illegal interference by members of public associations in the activities of the government, with a fine of up to 636,300 tenge ($1,910) or imprisonment for up to 75 days. If committed by the leader of the organization, the fine may be up to 1.06 million tenge ($3,180) or imprisonment for no more than 90 days. The law does not clearly define “illegal interference.”

By law a public association, along with its leaders and members, may face fines for performing activities outside its charter. The law is not clear regarding the delineation between actions an NGO member may take in his or her private capacity versus as part of an organization.

The law establishes broad reporting requirements concerning the receipt and expenditure of foreign funds or assets; it also requires labeling all publications produced with support from foreign funds. The law also sets out administrative and criminal penalties for noncompliance
with these requirements and potential restrictions on the conduct of meetings, protests, and similar activities organized with foreign funds.

Kenya

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

Although the constitution and law provide for freedom of assembly, the government sometimes restricted this right. Police routinely denied requests for meetings filed by human rights activists, and authorities dispersed persons attending meetings that had not been prohibited beforehand. Organizers must notify local police in advance of public meetings, which may proceed unless police notify organizers otherwise. By law authorities may prohibit gatherings only if there is another previously scheduled meeting at the same time and venue or if there is a perceived specific security threat.

Police used excessive force at times to disperse demonstrators. The local press reported on multiple occasions that police used tear gas to disperse demonstrators or crowds of various types, including looters at the demolition of a shopping mall in September. On August 6, police tear-gassed Kenyatta National Hospital staff staging a peaceful protest over nonpayment of their health service allowances. IPOA's investigation of resulting complaints continued as of year's end.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provide for freedom of association, and the government generally respected this right, but there were reports that authorities arbitrarily denied this right in some cases. A statement by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights dated July 11 noted reprisals faced by numerous human rights defenders and communities that raised human rights concerns. Reprisals reportedly took the form of intimidation, termination of employment, beatings, and arrests and threats of malicious prosecution. There were reports of restrictions on workers' freedom of association, including in the agribusiness and
public sectors. Trade unionists reported workers dismissed for joining trade unions or for demanding respect for their labor rights.

The Societies Act requires that every public association be either registered or exempted from registration by the Registrar of Societies. The NGO Coordination Act requires that NGOs dedicated to advocacy, public benefit, or the promotion of charity or research register with the NGO Coordination Board. In February the High Court ordered the NGO Coordination Board to pay the Kenya Human Rights Commission KSH two million ($20,000) compensation for illegally freezing its accounts and attempting to deregister it in 2017. The NGO Coordination Board had also attempted to deregister the Africa Centre for Open Governance, but a court overturned that decision in December 2017.

The NGO Coordination Act of 1990 requires organizations employing foreign staff to seek authorization from the NGO Coordination Board before applying for a work permit.

In 2016 the Ministry of Devolution and Planning announced its intention to implement immediately the 2013 Public Benefits Organization (PBO) Act, an important step in providing a transparent legal framework for NGO activities. Despite two court rulings ordering the government to operationalize the PBO Act. In September the interior cabinet secretary pledged to operationalize the PBO Act by the end of the year but the government failed to do so.

Kiribati

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for the freedoms of assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

Kosovo

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
Annex 286

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provide for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government, EULEX, and KFOR generally respected these rights.

Kuwait

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution provides for freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, but the government restricted the right of noncitizens to demonstrate.

Officials sometimes also restricted the location of planned protests to designated public spaces, citing public safety and traffic concerns. In September a group of activists peacefully assembled and protested the censorship of books in front of the Ministry of Information. Activists reported that they had applied in advance, notifying the authorities of their planned protest, but had not received a response. The initial rally dispersed peacefully when members of police requested activists to move to a different venue. A second protest was organized and the authorities gave permission for the rally away from the Ministry of Information. In the past courts have tried and sentenced participants in unlicensed demonstrations to prison terms and deported noncitizens for participating in rallies.

The Bidoon are stateless Arabs who are recognized by the authorities but not granted citizenship. Bidoon activists have reported that if they try to assemble peacefully or organize campaigns to gain equal rights, authorities regularly harass them. Some Bidoon activists indicated they were detained for questioning by authorities each time they planned campaigns or protests.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
The constitution provides for freedom of association, but the government placed restrictions on this right. The law prohibits officially registered groups from engaging in political activities.

The government used its power to register associations as a means of political influence. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor can reject an NGO's application if it deems the NGO does not provide a public service. Most charity closings resulted from improper reporting of fundraising activities, which included not getting permission from the ministry or failing to submit annual financial reports. Dozens of unlicensed civic groups, clubs, and unofficial NGOs had no legal status, and many of those chose not to register due to bureaucratic inconvenience or inability to meet the minimum 50-member threshold. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor continued to reject some new license requests, contending established NGOs already provided services similar to those the petitioners proposed. Members of licensed NGOs must obtain permission from the ministry to attend international conferences as official representatives of their organization.

Kyrgyz Republic

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The law provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

**FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY**

The constitution provides for this right, and the government generally respected it. Organizers and participants are responsible for notifying authorities of planned assemblies, but the constitution prohibits authorities from banning or restricting peaceful assemblies, even in the absence of prior notification. Local authorities, however, have the right to demand an end to a public action and, in the event of noncompliance, are empowered to take measures to end assemblies.

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**
The law provides for freedom of association, and the government generally respected it. NGOs, labor unions, political parties, and cultural associations must register with the Ministry of Justice. NGOs are required to have at least three members and all other organizations at least 10 members. The Ministry of Justice did not refuse to register any domestic NGOs. The law prohibits foreign-funded political parties and NGOs, including their representative offices and branches, from pursuing political goals.

The government continued to maintain bans on 21 “religiously oriented” groups it considered to be extremist, including al-Qaida, the Taliban, the Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkistan, the Kurdish People’s Congress, the Organization for the Liberation of Eastern Turkistan, Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Union of Islamic Jihad, the Islamic Party of Turkistan, the Unification (Mun San Men) Church, Takfir Jihadist, Jaysh al-Mahdi, Jund al-Khilafah, Ansarullah At-Takfir Val Hidjra, Akromiya, ISIS, Djabhat An Nusra, Katibat al-Imam al-Buhari, Jannat Oshiqlari, Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, and Yakyn Incar. Authorities also continued the ban on all materials or activities connected to A. A. Tihomirov, also known as Said Buryatsky.

As in recent years, numerous human rights activists reported continued arrests and prosecution of persons accused of possessing and distributing Hizb ut-Tahrir literature (see section 1.d.). Most arrests of alleged Hizb ut-Tahrir members occurred in the southern part of the country and involved ethnic Uzbeks. The government charged the majority of those arrested with possession of illegal religious material. In some cases NGOs alleged police planted Hizb ut-Tahrir literature as evidence against those arrested.

Laos

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The law places restrictions on the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government continued to restrict these rights.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY
The law prohibits participation in demonstrations, protest marches, or other acts that cause turmoil or social instability. Participation in such activities is punishable by a maximum five years’ imprisonment; however, this was not strictly enforced. For example, in October 2017 a crowd of almost 2,000 persons gathered to protest outside the office of a financial company that had allegedly defrauded investors; police intervened by detaining the company’s executives but did not detain any protesters.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The government used laws that restrict citizens’ right to organize and join associations. For example, political groups other than mass organizations approved by the LPRP are prohibited. Moreover, the government occasionally influenced board membership of civil society organizations and forced some organizations to change their names to remove words it deemed sensitive, such as “rights.”

The registration process was generally burdensome, and authorities restricted NGOs’ ability to disseminate information and conduct activities without interference. By law the government regulates the registration of nonprofit civil society organizations, including economic, social welfare, professional, technical, and creative associations at the district, provincial, or national level, depending on their scope of work and membership. The government did not approve registration of any new nonprofit at the national level during the year, and there was no change in the number of registered associations since 2015: 147 national-level associations were fully registered, 22 had temporary registration, and 32 others had pending applications. Taxation of civil society organizations varied from organization to organization. Taxation requirements for international and local nonprofit organizations that receive foreign funding could be cumbersome and lacked uniformity, relying heavily on prenegotiated memorandums of understanding.

Some NGOs said the August 2017 decree covering NGOs further lengthened the registration process and government officials were either uncertain or unaware of the decree, leading to further delays. The decree also states that NGOs must seek approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to receive funding greater than $60,000. It also mandates the government to provide “advice and assistance” to NGOs to ensure their operations are in line with party policy, the law, and government regulations.

Some ministries appeared more open to engagement with civil society organizations, illustrated by an increase in invitations to attend meetings at ministries. The government also
invited NGOs to the National Assembly’s intersession and plenary. Despite some positive steps, civil society organizations still faced many challenges for effective civil engagement and participation.

Latvia

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution and the law provide for freedom of peaceful assembly. The government generally respected this right, but there are some restrictions. Organizers of demonstrations typically must notify authorities 10 days in advance, although this requirement can be reduced to 24 hours if the longer advance notice is “reasonably impossible” to meet. Officials may deny or modify permits to prevent public disorder.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The constitution and the law provide for freedom of association, and the government generally respected this right. The law prohibits the registration of communist, Nazi, or other organizations that contravene the constitution or advocate the violent overthrow of the government.

Lebanon

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these freedoms.
FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution provides for the freedom of peaceful assembly with some conditions established by law. Organizers are required to obtain a permit from the Interior Ministry three days prior to any demonstration.

Security forces occasionally intervened to disperse demonstrations, usually when clashes broke out between opposing protesters.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for freedom of association with some conditions established by law, and the government generally respected the law.

No prior authorization is required to form an association, but organizers must notify the Ministry of Interior for it to obtain legal recognition, and the ministry must verify that the organization respects public order, public morals, and state security. The ministry sometimes imposed additional, inconsistent restrictions and requirements and withheld approval. In some cases the ministry sent notification of formation papers to the security forces to initiate inquiries about an organization's founding members. Organizations must invite ministry representatives to any general assembly where members vote on bylaws, amendments, or positions on the board of directors. The ministry must then validate the vote or election. Failure to do so may result in the dissolution of the organization by a decree issued by the Council of Ministers.

The cabinet must license all political parties (see section 3).

In areas under Hizballah's sway, independent NGOs faced harassment and intimidation, including social, political, and financial pressures. Hizballah reportedly paid youth who worked in “unacceptable” NGOs to leave the groups.

Lesotho

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION
The constitution and law provide for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, but the law requires organizers to obtain permits seven days in advance for public meetings and processions. The government generally respected these rights when timely applications for permits were submitted.

Liberia

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for the freedoms of assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights. The Ministry of Justice required permits for public gatherings and obtaining a permit was relatively easy.

Libya

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The Constitutional Declaration provides for a general right to peaceful assembly, and the GNA generally respected this right. The law on guidelines for peaceful demonstrations, however, fails to include relevant assurances and severely restricts the exercise of the right of assembly. The law mandates protesters must inform the government of any planned protest at least 48 hours in advance and provides that the government may notify the organizers that a protest is banned as little as 12 hours before the event.

Throughout the year the Libyan Movement for the Voice of the People, led by Mohammed al-Boa, held several protests in Tripoli opposing the role militia groups played in the capital (see
section 1.g.). Police authorities generally cooperated with the group's requests, coordinating with the group to issue permits and provide security at protest sites.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The Constitutional Declaration includes freedom of association for political and civil society groups. The government lacked capacity, however, to protect freedom of association, and targeted attacks on journalists, activists, and religious figures severely undermined freedom of association. Civil society organizations also complained about a lack of a legal framework for organizing and implementing their activities. The FMD (see FMDs section 2.a.) and the Ministry of Culture Civil Society Commission took steps to regulate the activity of civil society organizations. Other organizations, including the NCHRL and the AOHRL, were able to register and to interact freely with GNA officials.

Liechtenstein

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provide for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

Lithuania

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The government generally respected the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, with the exception of some organizations associated with the Soviet period.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY
The constitution and law provide for freedom of assembly and the government generally respected this right.

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

Although the law provides for this freedom and the government generally respected it, the government continued to ban the Communist Party and other organizations associated with the Soviet period.

**Luxembourg**

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

**B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION**

The constitution and law provide for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

**Madagascar**

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

**B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION**

**FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY**

The constitution and law provide for freedom of peaceful assembly, but authorities often restricted this right. The government required all public demonstrations to have official authorization from the municipalities and police prefectures, but these rarely gave authorization to opposition parties. Security forces regularly impeded opposition gatherings throughout the country and used excessive force to disperse demonstrators.
Several times during the year, security forces used tear gas to disperse demonstrations by university students, supporters of political opponents, and other groups. Students generally retaliated by throwing stones at security forces or set up roadblocks, which often resulted in injuries and arrests.

During the year, the government systematically hindered political opponents’ ability to meet with their supporters in public places. On January 6 and 22, for example, the joint security unit Emmo-Reg prevented former president Marc Ravalomanana from meeting with supporters by blocking supporters’ entry and destroying audio equipment in private venues.

Government political restrictions on public political demonstrations peaked in April when a group of parliamentarians demonstrated against the proposed electoral code. On April 21, in Antananarivo, elements from the Emmo-Reg blocked the entry to City Hall where opposition parliamentarians had planned to meet voters and report on the adoption of the electoral laws that they judged controversial and in violation of democratic principles. Security forces threw tear gas and fired blanks to prevent access to the compound. Later the same day, security forces that reportedly left the area because they were out of supplies allegedly shot at demonstrators who tried to pursue them. Casualty reports after the confrontations differed, with estimates of between two and five dead and 17 injured.

After April 21, security forces issued a statement that they would no longer intervene in demonstrations unless lives or property were endangered. Opposition members were allowed to demonstrate unhindered, which eventually led to the establishment of a consensus government, and the freedom of all parties to hold political rallies and events without interference for the remainder of the year.

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

The constitution and law provide for the right of association, but the government did not always respect this right.

**Malawi**

**Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:**
B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, but the government did not always respect these rights.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution and law provide for freedom of assembly, but the government did not always respect this right.

Government officials used their positions to thwart protests or gatherings by opposition figures through the selective use of permits. In September, after a coalition of NGOs critical of the government announced its intent to hold a protest, the ruling party sought and quickly obtained a permit for a competing event, forcing the activists to reschedule.

In September 2017, during a march against gender-based violence, male police officers arrested protester Beatrice Mateyo and charged her with “insulting the modesty of a woman” for carrying a placard deemed offensive. Released on bail, she had yet to be tried by year’s end.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provide for the freedom of association, and the government generally respected this right. The government required registration of all NGOs and political parties. NGOs must register with three different government entities and pay significant yearly registration fees.

During the year the government tried to increase its control over civil society. Two draft laws include provisions that would give government-controlled bodies the ability to deregister NGOs. The government, however, had yet to introduce these drafts into parliament.

Malaysia

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association but allows restrictions deemed necessary or expedient in the interest of security, public order, or (in the case of association) morality. Abiding by the government’s restrictions did not protect some protesters from harassment or arrest.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution provides all citizens “the right to assemble peaceably and without arms;” however, several laws restricted this right. Although the law does not require groups to obtain a permit for assemblies, police frequently placed time, location, and other restrictions on the right to assemble. Authorities banned street protests, and police sometimes confronted civil society and opposition demonstrations with mass arrests.

Protests deemed acceptable by the government usually proceeded without interference.

In December police approved a demonstration opposing the ratification of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination but rescinded a previously approved application to hold a Human Rights Day event on the same day citing security risks.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for the right of association; however, the government placed significant restrictions on this right, and certain statutes limit it. By law only registered organizations of seven or more persons may legally function. The government often resisted registering organizations deemed particularly unfriendly to the government or imposed strict preconditions. The government may revoke registrations for violations of the law governing societies.

The government bans membership in unregistered political parties and organizations.

The law prohibits students who hold political positions from conducting political party activities on campus. Students are also prohibited from “expressing support or sympathy” for an unlawful society or organization. In December the lower house of parliament passed amendments to legislation on university students’ participation in political-party activities on campus. The Senate, however, did not approve the legislation during the year. Earlier in the
year the government lifted the ban on opposition politicians visiting schools in their constituencies, but required them to first obtain approval from state authorities.

Many human rights and civil society organizations had difficulty obtaining government recognition as NGOs. As a result, many NGOs registered as companies, which created legal and bureaucratic obstacles to raising money to support their activities. Authorities frequently cited a lack of registration as grounds for action against organizations. Some NGOs also reported the government monitored their activities in order to intimidate them.

Maldives

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The government restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution provides for “freedom of peaceful assembly without prior permission of the State,” but the government did not respect this right. A 2013 law on peaceful assembly restricts protests outside designated areas, and a 2016 amendment to the law further restricts the designated areas for lawful protests in the capital city. Protesters must obtain prior written permission from the MPS to hold protests outside of designated areas and from the Ministry of Home Affairs to hold protests within the designated area, which local civil society organizations condemned as unconstitutional. Opposition political parties expressed concern the amendment effectively banned protests in the city. Police reported they had dispersed 72 gatherings for violation of the Freedom of Peaceful Assembly Act as of July 31. In a March 12 statement, the HRCM said MPS had used disproportionate force in dispersing multiple opposition protests since February 1, causing injuries to protesters and journalists, and violating regulations on use of less-than-lethal weapons in their use of pepper spray. Opposition parties also reported that the police and Ministry of Housing routinely ignored requests to grant permission to hold opposition protests, while allowing and facilitating progovernment gatherings to proceed.
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for freedom of association, but the government imposed limits on this freedom. The government allowed only clubs and other private associations that did not contravene Islamic or civil law to register.

NGOs reported that a 2015 associations regulation threatened their freedom of operation. The regulation requires human rights and other NGOs to seek government approval before applying for domestic assistance above MVR 25,000 ($1,630) or for any foreign assistance. The regulation also requires organizations to submit a membership registry to the government and grants the registrar of associations sweeping powers to dissolve organizations and enter organizations to obtain documents without a search warrant. The registrar dissolved the Maldives NGO Federation, a registered network of 62 NGOs, after it released a statement calling for the enforcement of the February 1 Supreme Court order to release nine detained opposition figures.

The Political Parties Act restricts registration of political parties and eligibility of state funds to those parties with 10,000 or more members. A 2016 amendment to the act requires all political parties to submit fingerprints with each membership application, legalizing a 2011 Elections Commission requirement. Forms without fingerprints would be considered invalid, and those persons would not be counted as members of a political party. The TM and the MDN raised concerns the law and subsequent amendments restricted the constitutional right to form and participate in political parties.

Mali

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution and law provide for freedom of assembly, but the government did not always respect this. Security forces used tear gas to break up a June 2 march led by leading opposition politicians and activists. The governor of Bamako used State of Emergency powers,
in effect since 2015, to deny the organizers’ formal request to hold the march. March organizers held the march despite this denial. More than 30 protesters, including presidential candidates, were injured during the violence. A reported 16 protesters were admitted to Hospital Gabriel Toure, with unconfirmed reports of two critically injured, of whom one died from his wounds on June 3. The government claimed three security force members also suffered injuries. The government denied that live ammunition was used and defended the actions of the security forces. The political opposition condemned the violence and called for another march on June 8, which the government permitted without restrictions. The June 8 March occurred peacefully.

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

The constitution provides for freedom of association, although the law prohibits associations deemed immoral. The government generally respected freedom of association except for members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) community.

**Malta**

**Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:**

**B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION**

The constitution and law provide for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

**Marshall Islands**

**Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:**

**B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION**

The constitution provides for the freedoms of assembly and association, and the government respected these rights.
Mauritania

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution provides for freedom of peaceful assembly. Registered political parties are not required to seek permission to hold meetings or demonstrations. The law requires NGO organizers to apply to the local administrative chief for permission to hold large meetings or assemblies. Authorities usually granted permission but on some occasions denied it in circumstances that suggested the application of political criteria.

On several occasions officials with the IRA and other organizations reported security force members arrested their activists for failing to obtain the local prefect’s permission before holding a rally.

On August 29, the news website Sahara Media reported that police dispersed an opposition rally in Nouakchott in advance of the September elections. Police objected to the rally on the grounds of a complaint filed by Al-Najah Company, which owned the old airport (site of the rally). According to opposition leaders, they had previously received approval from the government to hold the rally.

After parliament opened on October 8, the IRA organized several largely peaceful protests against the continued detention of their leader and newly elected parliamentarian Biram Dah Abeid. Police response to some protests was violent.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The law provides for freedom of association, and the government generally, but not in every instance, respected this right.

All local NGOs must register with the Ministry of Interior and Decentralization. Generally, if the ministry fails to respond within 45 days to a request to establish an NGO, the NGO may proceed with its work, although it was not considered officially registered.
Since 2014 Amnesty International documented 43 cases in which NGOs working in the human rights domain had not received a response from the government on their registration requests, meaning the NGOs were not authorized to operate in the country.

The government encouraged locally registered NGOs to join the government-sponsored Civil Society Platform. Approximately 6,000 local NGOs did so.

Mauritius

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provide for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

Mexico

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The law provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights. There were some reports of security forces using excessive force against demonstrators. Twelve states have laws that restrict public demonstrations.

Moldova

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION
The government placed some limits on freedoms of peaceful expression and association

**FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY**

The law provides for freedom of assembly, and the government generally respected this right, with several exceptions during the year.

On August 26, opposition extra-parliamentary parties and their supporters held a large-scale rally to protest the courts’ invalidation of the local elections in Chisinau, the government’s failure to investigate the bank fraud, and mounting pressure levied against opposition parties. The protest organizers asserted that authorities “took illegal and disproportionate measures to hinder the arrival of protesters in Chisinau, particularly from the rural areas.” Opposition leaders also alleged that law enforcement agencies intimidated local activists before the protest and that regional representatives from the ruling party threatened to withdraw the licenses of local transportation companies if they transported people to Chisinau on the day of the protest. Media outlets reported several incidents of police or transportation regulators stopping drivers to fine them for “unusual illegalities.” In an appeal sent to diplomatic missions and international human rights watchdogs, a number of NGOs claimed that authorities infringed upon the right to free movement and the right to peaceful assembly.

Authorities in Transnistria continued to restrict freedom of assembly and were reluctant to issue permits for public protests organized by the opposition. Transnistrian authorities refused to authorize a protest planned for June 5 by the region’s only allowed opposition group, the Communist Party. Oleg Horjan, the leader of the Communist Party and organizer of the planned protest, instead decided to hold an informal public gathering of his party’s constituents. Transnistrian law enforcement bodies reportedly arrested approximately 40 participants present at the gathering, including Horjan’s son. On June 11, Oleg Horjan was arrested after the plenary of the region’s legislature lifted his legislative immunity. The case was ongoing in court.

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

The constitution provides for freedom of association and states that citizens are free to form parties and other social and political organizations, and the government generally respected this right. The law prohibits organizations “engaged in fighting against political pluralism, the principles of the rule of law, or the sovereignty and independence or territorial integrity” of the country.
During the year government officials and members of the parliamentary majority continued to denigrate the role of civil society in the country, characterizing NGOs critical of government actions as “political actors” who require increased regulation.

In June the UN’s special rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Michel Forst, expressed concern that human rights defenders and journalists were victims of stigmatization campaigns. According to Forst there were allegations of intimidation and threats towards human rights defenders by public authorities, particularly after defenders expressed criticism of government decisions.

In Transnistria, authorities severely restricted freedom of association. Separatist authorities granted the legal right of association only to persons they recognized as citizens of Transnistria. All nongovernmental activities had to be coordinated with local authorities; groups that did not comply faced harassment, including visits from security officials. Authorities strictly prohibited organizations favoring reintegration with the rest of Moldova.

The human rights NGO Promo-Lex, which suspended its activities in the Transnistrian region in 2015 following notification of a criminal case opened against it, did not renew attempts to enter the region.

Monaco

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provide for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

Mongolia

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION
The law provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

Montenegro

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution and law provide for the freedom of peaceful assembly. The government usually respected this right, but on several occasions, the Ministry of Interior denied permits to workers and LGBTI groups wishing to assemble to express their grievances. Public gatherings within 164 feet of government buildings are prohibited.

Police asserted that they prohibited gatherings that would disturb public peace and order and interfere with traffic. In some cases, authorities offered protesters alternate locations for demonstrations. In a few cases, when protesters assembled without authorization or failed to obey police orders to disperse, police detained them for questioning and charged them with misdemeanors.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provide for the freedom of association, and the government generally respected this right.

c. Freedom of Religion

Morocco

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION
The government limited freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.

**FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY**

The law provides for the right of peaceful assembly. The government generally allowed authorized and unauthorized peaceful demonstrations to occur. Under the law groups of more than three persons require authorization from the Ministry of Interior to protest publicly. Security forces intervened on occasion to disband both authorized and unauthorized protests when officials deemed the demonstration a threat to public security.

Some NGOs complained that authorities did not apply the approval process consistently and used administrative delays and other methods to suppress or discourage unwanted peaceful assembly. According to Human Rights Watch's *World Report 2018*, police allowed many protests demanding political reform and protesting government actions, but often forcibly dispersed peaceful protests or prevented demonstrations from occurring. According to the government, there was an average of 20,000 demonstrations per year. While the majority of protests proceeded peacefully, on several occasions violence erupted between protestors and police. According to the CNDH, during some unauthorized demonstrations in Tan-Tan, the security forces intervened in a "disproportionate manner."

Security forces were generally present both in and out of uniform at protests, particularly if the protest was expected to address a sensitive issue. In general, officers were under orders to observe and not intervene, unless the demonstration becomes unruly, threatening to bystanders, or overflows into public highways. In those cases, under standard operating procedures, officers are required to give the crowd three warnings that force will be used if they do not disperse. Security forces then attempt to force protestors to leave the area, using riot shields to push standing protestors into a designated area or carrying seated protestors to the designated area. If such lower-level tactics fail, security forces may escalate to the use of batons, water cannons, or tear gas to clear the area and restore order. Security force tactics did not differ significantly, whether the protest was authorized or unauthorized, although the decision on whether to intervene sometimes depended on whether the protest was authorized. According to the government, if officers intervene in a protest, a police judiciary officer not involved in the intervention and under the supervision of the attorney general must produce a statement documenting the circumstances of the case, the number of victims, and the material damage due to the operation. The police judiciary officer must address the statement to the Attorney General's Office with a copy to the governor of the
territorial jurisdiction where the incident transpired. The government organized ongoing training on human rights-based methods to manage crowds throughout the year.

In December 2017, two brothers were found dead inside a coal pit in the northeast province of Jerada where they mined illegally. According to media reports, their deaths sparked protests over social disparities, economic grievances, and unemployment. According to the government, from December 2017 to August, approximately 300 protests involving nearly 55,000 persons total took place, injuring 29 civilians and 247 members of the security forces in violence that erupted during interventions.

On March 14, online media sources released a video showing four police vehicles driving close to protesters and severely injuring a minor during an unauthorized protest in Jerada. The government reported that security forces accidentally hit the minor while attempting to disperse the crowds. As of December authorities arrested 94 people in connection with the Jerada protests. According to press reports, several protest leaders and three minors were among the detained. According to the government, 51 were sentenced to prison, 31 of whom were sentenced to prison terms of one to five years. Some detainees were sentenced for destruction of public goods, incitement to commit crimes, and or involvement in unauthorized protests. More than 40 cases continued at year's end.

On June 26, the Casablanca Court of Appeal convicted and issued sentences to protest leader Nasser Zefzafi and 52 other members of the Hirak protest movement. Four detainees, including Zefzafi, were sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment on charges including threatening national security. Other sentences varied from 15 years’ imprisonment to suspended sentences and fines. The detainees appealed the convictions; no updates were available at year's end. According to the Ministry of Justice, authorities implicated 578 persons in crimes related to the Hirak protests, of whom 306 were sentenced, 204 pardoned, 39 acquitted of all charges, and 29 were awaiting trial as of November.

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

The constitution and the law provide for freedom of association, although the government sometimes restricted this freedom. The government prohibited or failed to recognize some political opposition groups by deeming them unqualified for NGO status. While the government does not restrict the source of funding for NGOs operating in the country, NGOs that receive funding from foreign sources are required to report the amount and its origins to the government within 30 days from the date of receipt. The government denied official
recognition to NGOs that it considered advocates against Islam as the state religion or questions the legitimacy of the monarchy or the country's territorial integrity. Authorities obstructed the registration of a number of associations perceived to be critical of the authorities by refusing to accept their registration applications or to deliver receipts confirming the filing of applications (see section 5).

The Ministry of Interior required NGOs to register before being recognized as legal entities, but there was no comprehensive national registry publicly available. A prospective organization must submit its objectives, bylaws, address, and photocopies of members' identification cards to the ministry. The ministry issues a receipt to the organization that signifies formal approval. Organizations without receipts are not formally registered, although the government tolerated activities of several organizations without these receipts. Unregistered organizations could not access government funds or legally accept contributions.

The National Federation of Amazigh Associations, an organization supporting the inclusion of the Amazigh (Berber) population in public life, reported that, as of October, the nine Amazigh organizations denied registration in 2017 continued to be denied registration during the year, including the federation itself (see section 6, National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities).

According to the CNDH, the Tan-Tan branch of the CNDH received one complaint from an organization denied registration during the year. The branch contacted government authorities, and following mediation the government registered the organization.

Authorities continued to monitor Justice and Charity Organization activities.

Mozambique

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provide for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association; however, the government did not always respect these rights.
FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

By law protest organizers do not require government “authorization” to protest peacefully; however, they must notify local authorities of their intent in writing at least four business days beforehand. Unlike in prior years, there were no reports the government disapproved organizers’ requests to hold protest demonstrations by alleging errors in notification documents.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The Ministry of Justice, Constitutional, and Religious Affairs did not act on the request for registration of The Mozambican Association for the Defense of Sexual Minorities (LAMBDA)—the country’s only lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) advocacy NGO—by year’s end. Although the registration process usually takes less than two months, LAMBDA’s request has been pending since 2008 despite resubmissions of its application. Civil society leaders and some diplomatic missions continued to urge the ministry to act on LAMBDA’s application and to treat all registration applications fairly. In October 2017 the Constitutional Court ruled LAMBDA and other groups could not be precluded from registration based on “morality” but did not direct the government to grant official recognition to LAMBDA. LAMBDA continued to pursue a previously filed case with the Administrative Tribunal—the highest jurisdiction for administrative matters—specifically seeking to compel the government to respond to its registration request.

Namibia

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provide for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

Nauru
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

Nepal

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The law provides for the freedoms of assembly and association; however, the government sometimes restricted freedom of assembly.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

Freedom of assembly generally was respected for citizens and legal residents, but there were some restrictions. The government continued its attempts to stop Tibetans from celebrating culturally important events, such as Tibetan New Year (Losar), World Peace Day (the anniversary of the Dalai Lama’s award of the Nobel Peace Prize), and the Dalai Lama’s birthday. The law authorizes chief district officers to impose curfews when there is a possibility that demonstrations or riots could disturb the peace.

In early July the government restricted demonstrations at the Maitighar Mandala, a historical public space. Opposition leaders, media, and civil society members said the government’s decision violated citizens’ right to peaceful assembly. The Supreme Court issued an interim order to the government not to implement the decision.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The law provides for freedom of association, and the government generally respected this right. NGOs, however, stated the existing legal framework does not adequately recognize the independence of civil society and opens the door to the exercise of excessive discretion by the
government. They added that the registration process for civil society organizations (CSOs) is restrictive and cumbersome, the government has wide discretion to deny registration, and requirements vary among various registration authorities, with some entities requiring documents not mentioned in existing laws on an ad hoc basis. Additionally, the Association Registration Act empowers the government to give directions to associations and to terminate associations if they refuse to follow directions. To receive foreign or government resources, CSOs must seek separate and additional approval from the Social Welfare Council (SWC), the government entity responsible for overseeing CSOs. The SWC requires that CSOs allocate at least 80 percent of their budgets for hardware or tangible development outputs, which places undue restrictions on CSOs that focus on advocacy issues.

Netherlands

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The law provides for the freedoms of assembly and association, and the governments generally respected these rights.

New Zealand

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The law provides for freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

Nicaragua

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The government restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The government did not respect the legal right to public assembly, demonstration, and mobilization. Antigovernment marches and protests were allowed at times, but in several instances, the NNP and parapolice shot live ammunition at protesters. Police failed to protect peaceful protesters from attacks; they also committed attacks and provided logistical support to other attackers. Human rights organizations reported police stopped traffic for and otherwise protected progovernment demonstrations. On July 12-13, when student protesters sought refuge inside a Catholic church in Managua, NNP and parapolice shot live ammunition at the church.

Through various press releases and arrests, the NNP claimed protesters were responsible for destruction of public and private buildings, setting of fires, homicides, and looting. While the majority of protesters were peaceful, some turned violent as they responded to NNP and parapolice provocations and use of force by throwing stones and employing homemade mortars and weapons to defend their positions. Protesters sometimes tore down “Trees of Life,” giant, illuminated, tree-like sculptures Vice President Murillo had ordered installed along major thoroughfares. The OHCHR August 29 report noted “abuses committed by individuals who took part in the protests, including the killing and injuring of police officers and members of the Sandinista party and the destruction of public infrastructure.”

On September 28, the NNP issued a press release stating: “The NNP reiterates that the people and organizations that call for these illegal movements from which criminal and destructive activity has been promoted will be found responsible and face justice for any alteration and/or threat to the tranquility, work, life, and rights of people, families, and communities.” Civil society took the statement as effectively outlawing peaceful protests.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The law provides for freedom of association, including the right to organize or affiliate with political parties; nevertheless, the Supreme Electoral Council and National Assembly used their accreditation powers for political purposes. National Assembly accreditation is mandatory for NGOs to receive funding, have bank accounts, or employ workers licitly. In late
November and early December, the FSLN wielded its supermajority in the National Assembly to strip legal status from nine civil society organizations that work on transparency, democracy, environmental issues, and human rights.

Niger

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The government at times restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

Although the constitution and law provide for freedom of assembly, police sometimes forcibly dispersed demonstrators. The government retained authority to prohibit gatherings under tense social conditions or if organizers did not provide 48-hour advance notice.

There were several instances of police restrictions and government bans on protests. On April 18, students blocked the road to the main campus of Niamey's Abdou Mounouni University to demand reinstatement of the five senior student leaders who had been expelled on March 17. Police intervened with tear gas, and according to the union, 32 protesters were injured and six hospitalized, including one in critical condition (numbers of injured were not reliably reported in the press, and independent verification of the extent and seriousness of the injuries was not available). An official government announcement noted damage to six vehicles and university offices. On April 23, the government declared that university campuses nationwide would remain closed until CASO, accused of general and long-term violence and misconduct, was disbanded. Negotiations led to reopening the university on May 15 without the disbanding of CASO.

The government regularly banned planned civil society-organized gatherings from April to August. Municipal authorities often denied official permission for opposition demonstrations and rallies without responding to organizers' requests within the 48-hour timeline required by regulations. There was an instance in Maradi where the government did not implement a court order that supported the organizers' right to protest.
On March 23, the government banned a civil society protest of new tax laws planned for March 25. Organizers encouraged their supporters to demonstrate despite the ban, arguing the constitution gave them a right to protest. On the morning of March 25, before the protest had begun, police arrested two civil society leaders at their offices: Moussa Tchangari and Ali Idrissa. Later in the day, activist Nouhou Arzika was arrested at his lawyer’s office, and television commentator Lirwana Abdourahamane was arrested at Labari Television after making a call for individuals to stand up for their rights. Authorities shuttered the television station for five days. Police arrested another 19 demonstrators the same day, charging them with organizing or participating in an illegal demonstration, damaging property, acts of violence and assault, and assault and battery.

The group of 23 went to trial in July after four months of pretrial detention. On July 24, a Niamey judge convicted the four civil society leaders of inciting a banned protest and gave them three-month suspended jail sentences. The judge acquitted 11 of the defendants and found another eight guilty of participating in a banned protest, sentencing them to one year in prison, with six months suspended.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provide for freedom of association, and the government generally respected this freedom; however, government representatives accused human rights-related civil society organizations of being “putschist” or intending to overthrow the government. Police on several occasions, without a legal warrant, blocked access to offices of the NGO Alternative Citizen Spaces in Niamey and Zinder. The law does not permit political parties based on ethnicity, religion, or region.

Nigeria

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY
Although the constitution and law provide for freedom of assembly, the government occasionally banned and targeted gatherings when it concluded their political, ethnic, or religious nature might lead to unrest. Open-air religious services held away from places of worship remained prohibited in many states, due to fear they might heighten interreligious tensions. From October 27-30, members of the IMN carried out a series of religious processions across northern Nigeria, while also protesting the continued detention of their leader, Sheikh Ibrahim El-Zakzaky. Police and military officials set up roadblocks and used other means to confront protestors in and around the capital city of Abuja. In the ensuring altercations, security forces shot and killed a number of IMN members. According to HRW, on October 28, soldiers shot into a procession in Zuba, a bus terminal northwest of Abuja, killing six persons. The army acknowledged in a statement that three persons were killed at Zuba, but said the soldiers were responding to an attack. According to international press reports and various human rights groups, on October 29, soldiers at a military checkpoint shot at an IMN procession at Karu, northeast of Abuja, as the group sought to continue their march into the capital. The *New York Times* and multiple rights groups reported that video evidence showed, and witness statements confirmed, that soldiers shot indiscriminately into the crowd of protestors, including in some cases while protestors attempted to flee. In a statement, the army said protestors attacked the soldiers. In total, the government said six IMN members were killed; AI said 45 were killed; and the IMN said 49 of its members were killed. According to a *New York Times* report, the soldiers involved were primarily from the Seventh Battalion of the Guards Brigade.

In areas that experienced societal violence, police and other security services permitted public meetings and demonstrations on a case-by-case basis.

Security services used excessive force to disperse demonstrators during the year (see section 1.a.).

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

The constitution and law provide for the right to associate freely with other persons in political parties, trade unions, or other special interest organizations. While the government generally respected this right, on occasion authorities abrogated it for some groups. The government of Kaduna State continued its proscription of the IMN, alleging the group constituted a danger to public order and peace.
The Same Sex Marriage Prohibition Act (SSMPA), a law prohibiting marriages and civil unions among persons of the same sex, criminalizes the free association of any persons through so-called gay organizations. Citizens suspected of same-sex activities are frequently harassed, intimidated, and arrested. In August six men were arrested in Abia State on suspicion of engaging in same-sex activity. Later in the month, 57 men attending a party in Lagos were also arrested and detained by police on similar allegations. In both cases, the men were subsequently charged for lesser offences rather than under the SSMPA, but rights groups reported that the SSMPA had a significant chilling effect on free association.

North Macedonia

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The law provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association and the government generally respected these rights.

Norway

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provide for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

Oman

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION
The government restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly and association. Human rights organizations expressed concern that overly broad provisions in the 2018 penal code could further restrict the work of human rights activists and limit freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.

**FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY**

The law provides for limited freedom of assembly, but the government restricted this right. Under the 2018 penal code, gatherings of more than 10 persons in a public place are unlawful if they “endangered the public security or order” or “influenced the function of authorities.” A 2014 report from the UN special rapporteur on the right to freedom of peaceful assembly expressed concern with government attempts to limit assembly and association rights and stated individuals seeking reform were “afraid to speak their minds, afraid to speak on the telephone, afraid to meet.”

Private sector employees in the energy and industrial manufacturing sectors threatened strikes in isolated cases; however, company leadership used incentives like promises of job security and other material benefits to persuade organizers to call off strikes (see section 7.a.).

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

The law provides for freedom of association for undefined “legitimate objectives and in a proper manner.” Examples of such associations include registered labor unions and social groups for foreign nationalities, such as the Indian Social Group.

The government limited freedom of association in practice by prohibiting associations whose activities it deemed “inimical to the social order” or otherwise inappropriate. A 2014 royal decree stipulates citizens joining groups deemed harmful to national interests could be subject to revocation of citizenship.

Associations must register with their corresponding ministries, which approve all associations’ bylaws and determine whether a group serves the interest of the country. The time required to register an association ranged from two months to two years. Approval time varied based on the level of preparedness of the applying organization, the subject matter of the organization, its leadership, and the organization's mission. The law limits formal registration of nationality-based associations to one association for each nationality and restricts activities of such associations. The government sometimes denied permission for associations to form.
Under the 2018 penal code, associations are forbidden from conducting any kind of fundraising without government approval, including for charitable causes. Individuals convicted of accepting unlawful funding for an association may receive up to one year in jail and a fine of 2,000 rials ($5,200). Foreign diplomatic missions are required to request meetings with nongovernmental associations through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by diplomatic note. Associations may not meet with foreign diplomatic missions and foreign organizations without prior approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The government enforced this law, and all foreign-funded educational and public diplomacy programs required prior government review.

Pakistan

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution and laws provide for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, but these freedoms were subject to restrictions.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

By law district authorities may prevent gatherings of more than four persons without police authorization. The law permits the government to ban all rallies and processions, except funeral processions, for security reasons.

Authorities generally prohibited Ahmadis, a religious minority, from holding conferences or gatherings. Ahmadis cited the closure by Sialkot authorities of an Ahmadiyya mosque on May 14 and mob attacks on two other mosques in Sialkot and Faisalabad as evidence of the ongoing severe conditions for the community.

During the year the Pashtun Tahafuz (Protection) Movement, or PTM, mobilized its predominantly ethnic Pashtun supporters to participate in sit-ins and demonstrations to demand justice and to protest abuses by government security forces. Thousands of individuals participated in peaceful protests across the country’s main population centers, including Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, and Islamabad. Observers noted that authorities
Annex 286

attempted to discourage protestors through arrests, intimidation, and harassment, but did not engage in any systematic acts of violence against PTM supporters.

Protests, strikes, and demonstrations, both peaceful and violent, took place throughout the country. The government generally prevented political and civil society groups of any affiliation from holding demonstrations in Islamabad's red zone—a restricted area that includes a diplomatic enclave and federal government buildings—citing security restrictions that limit all public rallies and gatherings in the area.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for freedom of association subject to certain restrictions imposed by law. The government maintained a series of policies that steadily eroded the freedom of international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) to carry out their work and access the communities they serve. INGOs, UN organizations, and international missions must request government permission in the form of no-objection certificates before they can conduct most in-country travel, carry out certain project activities, or initiate new projects.

The government adopted a new online registration regime for INGOs in 2015, and in September introduced a more restrictive operating agreement that INGOs must follow. The registration process entails extensive document requirements, multiple levels of review, and constant investigations by security and other government offices. The government denied registration applications of dozens of INGOs in 2017 and 2018. After a lengthy appeals process, in October the Ministry of Interior issued final rejection notices to 18 INGOs, denying their registrations and ordering them to close operations within 60 days. The rejection notices did not specify the reasons for rejection.

The years of uncertainty about registration status negatively impacted even those INGOs that have not received final rejection notices. They faced additional barriers to fundraising, opening bank accounts, and obtaining tax-exempt status from the Federal Board of Revenue. No-objection certificates were hard to obtain in certain provinces without an approved registration, thus hindering implementation and monitoring of activities, even for INGOs that had initiated the new registration process. INGOs also faced an uptick in visa denials for international staff. The government asked country directors and international staff, during visa applications and separate surveys, whether they were Indian or Israeli nationals. The lack of transparency and unpredictability of the registration process caused some INGOs to withdraw their registration applications and terminate operations in the country.
The government at both the federal and provincial levels similarly restricted the access of foreign-funded local NGOs through a separate registration regime, no-objection certificates, and other requirements. Authorities required NGOs to obtain no-objection certificates before accepting foreign funding, booking facilities or using university spaces for events, or working on sensitive human rights issues. Even when local NGOs receiving foreign funding were appropriately registered, the government often denied their requests for no-objection certificates. Furthermore, domestic NGOs with all required certificates faced government monitoring and harassment.

**Palau**

**Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:**

**B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION**

The constitution provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

**Panama**

**Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:**

**B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION**

The law provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights. The government provided permits for organized groups to conduct peaceful marches. Police at times used force to disperse demonstrators, especially when highways or streets were blocked. The law provides for six to 24 months’ imprisonment for anyone who, through use of violence, impedes the transit of vehicles on public roads or causes damage to public or private property.

**Papua New Guinea**
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association and the government generally respected these rights.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

Public demonstrations require police approval and 14 days’ advance notice. If public demonstrations occurred without official approval, police normally requested crowds to disperse. If that failed, and if violence or public disturbances ensued, police used tear gas and fired shots in the air to disperse crowds.

In April police shot and killed four demonstrators in Madang who were participating in a protest march. As of November no officers had been charged in the killings and police said a lack of cooperation from those at the scene hampered their investigation.

Paraguay

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The law provides for the freedoms of assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

Peru

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION
The constitution provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The law does not require a permit for public demonstrations, but organizers must report the type of demonstration planned and coordinate its intended location to the appropriate regional representative. The government continued to suspend freedom of assembly in the VRAEM emergency zone, where armed elements of the Shining Path and drug traffickers operated, as well as in regions suffering from crime and public health crises.

The government may restrict or prohibit demonstrations in specific times and places to assure public safety or health. Police used tear gas and occasional force to disperse protesters in various demonstrations. Although most demonstrations were peaceful, protests in some areas turned violent, resulting in two deaths and multiple injuries in February (see section 6, Other Societal Violence and Discrimination).

Philippines

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution provides for the right to peaceful assembly, and police generally exhibited professionalism and restraint in dealing with demonstrators. Presidential spokesman Harry Roque stated in January that authorities would “observe maximum tolerance” and “respect the protesters’ right to peaceful assembly.” There was no reported progress in the PNP’s investigation of the forcible dispersal of farmers and protesters in Kidapawan City in 2016 that left two protesters dead and many others injured. A CHR investigation found that the PNP
used unnecessary force to disperse the protest. No disciplinary action was taken, and no charges were filed as of August.

Poland

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights. The 2015 antiterrorism law permits restrictions on public assemblies in situations of elevated terrorist threats. During the year there were no cases of the prohibition of a public assembly due to an elevated terrorist threat.

In September the human rights defender published a report recommending the repeal of the 2017 amendments to the law on public assemblies that established special protections for “cyclical” or recurring assemblies. The defender asserted the amendments significantly limit the right of assembly by creating a hierarchy of assemblies entitled to greater and less protection. He also noted that, during 2016-2018, public institutions frequently violated the right to freedom of assembly by penalizing assembly participants.

On September 12, the Warsaw prosecutor’s office discontinued its investigation into an attack on counterdemonstrators during the November 2017 Independence March. Prosecutors asserted the attackers’ intention was to show dissatisfaction and not to physically harm the 14 counterdemonstrators they confronted. The prosecutors also explained that “the position of injuries indicate that violence was targeted at the less sensitive body parts,” concluding that the attackers’ intention was not to “endanger the victims.” On September 27, the Warsaw local court fined nine of the counterdemonstrators 200 zlotys ($50) each for blocking a legal demonstration.

On October 13, police used tear gas, water cannons, and clubs to disperse roughly 200 counterdemonstrators trying to disrupt the Lublin Equality Parade. According to witnesses, the counterdemonstrators threw tomatoes, rocks, bottles, and firecrackers at marchers and police. No marchers were injured, but eight police were treated for injuries, and 21 counterdemonstrators were detained.
Portugal

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provide for the freedoms of assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

Qatar

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution provides for freedom of assembly, but this right is restricted by law, including the General Assembly and Demonstration Law and the Associations and Private Institutions Law. Noncitizens are exempt from the constitutional protections on freedom of assembly. Organizers of public meetings must meet a number of restrictions and conditions and obtain approval from the Ministry of Interior to acquire a permit.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for the right to form groups, defined by the law as professional associations and private institutions, but the government significantly limited this right. Noncitizens are exempt from the constitutional protections on freedom of association. There were no reports of attempts to organize politically. There were no organized political parties, and authorities prohibited politically oriented associations. The government prohibits professional associations and private institutions from engaging in political matters or affiliating internationally. Civil society organizations must obtain approval from the Ministry of Administrative Development, Labor, and Social Affairs, which may deny their establishment if it deems them a threat to the public interest.
Informal organizations, such as community support groups and activity clubs, operated without registration, but they may not engage in activities deemed political.

Republic of the Congo

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The government restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution and law provide for freedom of peaceful assembly; however, the government often did not respect this right.

The government required all groups that wished to hold public assemblies to seek authorization from the Ministry of Interior and Decentralization and appropriate local officials. Both the ministry and local officials sometimes withheld authorization for meetings they claimed might threaten public order. They also created unnecessary obstacles to gaining authorization and called police to disperse meetings they claimed had not received proper authorization.

Local NGOs and political groups reported restrictions on freedom of assembly throughout the year. For example, in May security forces arrested 23 activists from the political youth activist movement Ras-le-Bol (“enough is enough”), including coordinator Frank Nzila, for “association with criminals and participation in an unauthorized demonstration” following their demonstration in Pointe-Noire on May 7 calling on the government to release political prisoners. In July the government released Ras-le-Bol’s members from custody. Ras-le-Bol’s members also reported numerous direct threats from police to stop their activities, and police harassment targeting their families and friends to ascertain their whereabouts.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
The constitution and law provide for freedom of association, and the government sometimes respected this right. Political, social, or economic groups or associations were required to register with the Ministry of Interior and Decentralization. Authorities sometimes subjected registration to political influence. According to a local NGO, groups that spoke openly against the government encountered overt or veiled threats and found the registration process more time consuming.

Romania

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provide for the freedom of association, but the government occasionally restricted freedom of peaceful assembly.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the government partially respected it. The law provides that unarmed citizens may assemble peacefully but also stipulates that meetings must not interfere with other economic or social activities and may not take place near such locations as hospitals, airports, or military installations. In most cases organizers of public assemblies must request permits in writing three days in advance from the mayor’s office of the locality where the gathering is to occur.

On October 15, the Supreme Court ruled that public gatherings, including protests, must be declared in advance when they are to be held in markets, public spaces, or in the vicinity of institutions “of public or private interest.” The decision was mandatory. Activists opposed these restrictions, stating that by announcing the protests, those who take to the streets will be forced to take responsibility not only for themselves, but also for larger groups or for instigators to violence who may be brought there to compromise peaceful anticorruption protests. Civic organizations also warned that in Bucharest, authorities granted public spaces for longer periods to NGOs with no activity only as a pretext to refuse permits to protest to legitimate organizations.
On August 10, a major protest at Victoria Square in Bucharest attracted approximately 100,000 protesters. According to the Ministry of Interior, several hundred persons allegedly attempted to get close to the cabinet office building and threw objects at gendarmes. Media and civic groups reported that the number of violent protesters was much lower, amounting to several dozens of persons. Gendarmes used tear gas and water cannon in an indiscriminate manner, harming peaceful protesters, some of whom were children or elderly. Many bystanders were also injured. NGOs, observers, and journalists noted that gendarmes launched tear gas canisters in adjacent areas of the square against persons who did not pose a threat. Because of the large crowd, protesters did not have the opportunity to disperse when gendarmes began using tear gas grenades. Gendarmes also used violence against protesters who left the protest and were on adjacent streets. Numerous broadcast television reports showed members of the gendarmerie punching, kicking, and hitting peaceful protesters with their batons. Several protesters suffered injuries caused by shrapnel from exploding tear-gas canisters.

According to the Interior Ministry, 452 individuals needed medical care during the protest, of which 33 were gendarmes; 70 persons were taken to the hospital, including 14 gendarmes. Hundreds of protesters reported side effects from irritant agents after the protest. Four Israeli tourists and a driver who happened to be in the area were dragged out of a taxi and beaten by gendarmes. Numerous reports showed that several gendarmes had the identification numbers on their helmets covered with duct tape. Dozens of civic and human rights NGOs condemned the intervention of the gendarmerie, which they viewed as a highly disproportionate response to the actions of most protesters.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for freedom of association, and the government generally respected this right. The law prohibits fascist, racist, or xenophobic ideologies, organizations, and symbols.

In August the government adopted an ordinance that authorizes the Ministry of Public Finances to check whether NGOs use the funds redirected by citizens from their income tax according to the organizations’ primary goals. The ADHR-HC asserted that this measure would allow the government to harass NGOs.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The government restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The law provides for freedom of assembly, but local authorities restricted this right. The law requires organizers of public meetings, demonstrations, or marches by more than one person to notify the government, although authorities maintained that protest organizers must receive government permission, not just provide notification. Failure to obtain official permission to hold a protest resulted in the demonstration being viewed as unlawful by law enforcement officials, who routinely dispersed such protests. While numerous public demonstrations took place, on many occasions local officials selectively denied groups permission to assemble or offered alternate venues that were inconveniently or remotely located.

Although they do not require official approval, authorities restricted single-person pickets, and required that there be at least 164 feet separating protesters from each other. In 2017 the Constitutional Court decreed that police officers may stop a single-person picket to protect the health and safety of the picketer.

The law requires that “motor rallies” and “tent city” gatherings in public places receive official permission. It requires gatherings that would interfere with pedestrian or vehicle traffic to receive official agreement 10 days prior to the event; those that do not affect traffic require three days’ notice. The law prohibits “mass rioting,” which includes teaching and learning about the organization of and participation in “mass riots.” The law allows authorities to prohibit nighttime demonstrations and meetings and levy fines for violating protest regulations and rules on holding public events.

The law provides heavy penalties for engaging in unsanctioned protests and other violations of public assembly laws—up to 300,000 rubles ($4,500) for individuals, 600,000 rubles ($9,000) for organizers, and one million rubles ($17,140) for groups or companies. Protesters with multiple violations within six months may be fined up to one million rubles ($15,000) or imprisoned for up to five years.
On May 10, President Putin signed a decree limiting freedom of assembly in cities hosting the 2018 International Federation of Football Associations (FIFA) World Cup in conjunction with enhanced security, although protests in cities that did not host the tournament were allowed to take place.

Arrests for organizing or taking part in unsanctioned protests were common. For instance, on August 25, police arrested opposition leader Navalny for allegedly organizing an unsanctioned “voters’ strike” rally on January 28. His arrest came shortly before planned rallies in opposition to pension reform scheduled nationwide on September 9. Immediately following his release on September 24, police from a different precinct rearrested Navalny for 20 more days for allegedly organizing the unsanctioned September 9 demonstration, which purportedly caused “bodily harm to a government official.”

There was a reported increase in authorities charging individuals with “inciting mass riots” based upon their social media activities. For example, following the May 5 antigovernment protests, 28 organizers and activists with opposition leader Navalny’s Anticorruption Foundation were detained and charged with inciting mass riots based on their tweets or retweets. While some were fined and released, others were sentenced to 30-day prison terms.

Activists were at times subject to threats and physical violence in connection with organizing or taking part in public events or protests. On May 5, police stood by as unknown persons in Cossack uniforms beat participants in peaceful opposition rallies in Moscow and other cities. More than 1,300 persons were arrested during these protests, 572 in Moscow alone.

Police often broke up demonstrations that were not officially sanctioned, at times using disproportionate force. For example, on September 9, police throughout the country detained 1,195 persons who were demonstrating against pension reform. Media reports of the Moscow protest described unprovoked and disproportionate police beatings of protesters with rubber batons.

Authorities regularly arrested single-person picketers. For example, on June 14 authorities arrested UK-based activist Peter Tatchell in Moscow for staging a single-person picket against restrictions on LGBTI persons in the country, citing a breach of antiprotest rules put in place for the World Cup. Tatchell was released the same day and departed the country before appearing in court.
Authorities continued to deprive LGBTI persons and their supporters of free assembly rights. Despite a Supreme Court ruling that LGBTI persons should be allowed to engage in public activities, the law prohibiting “propaganda” of homosexuality to minors (see section 6, Acts of Violence, Discrimination, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity) provides grounds to deny LGBTI activists and supporters the right of assembly and was often used to interrupt public demonstrations by LGBTI activists. On November 27, the ECHR ruled that the country’s blanket refusal to grant permission to hold public assemblies related to LGBTI issues could not be justified by public safety concerns and constituted a violation of the right to freedom of assembly.

On April 8, police detained approximately 30 gay rights activists who took part in an unsanctioned rally in St. Petersburg. City authorities had turned down their request to hold a parade, so each participant demonstrated alone, in a bid to avoid the protest being called a gathering, which did not prevent their arrest.

Moscow authorities refused to allow an LGBTI pride parade for the 13th consecutive year, notwithstanding a 2010 ECHR ruling that the denial violated the rights to freedom of assembly and freedom from discrimination.

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

The constitution provides for freedom of association. During the year, however, the government instituted new measures and expanded existing restrictive laws to stigmatize, harass, fine, close, and otherwise raise barriers to membership in organizations that were critical of the government.

Public organizations must register their bylaws and the names of their leaders with the Ministry of Justice. The finances of registered organizations are subject to investigation by tax authorities, and foreign grants must be registered.

The government continued to use a law, which requires NGOs that receive foreign funding and engage in “political activity” to register as “foreign agents,” to harass, to stigmatize, and in some cases to halt their operation, although fewer organizations were registered than in previous years. As of October the Ministry of Justice had added five NGOs to the “foreign agents” registry during the year, and its registry of organizations designated as “foreign agents” included 73 NGOs.
For the purposes of implementing the foreign agents law, the government considered “political activities” to include organizing public events, rallies, demonstrations, marches, and pickets; organizing and conducting public debates, discussions or presentations; participating in election activities aimed at influencing the result, including election observation and forming commissions; public calls to influence local and state government bodies, including calling for changes to legislation; disseminating opinions and decisions of state bodies by technology; and attempting to shape public political views, including public opinion polls or other sociological research.

To be delisted, an NGO must submit an application to the Ministry of Justice proving that it did not receive any foreign funding or engage in any political activity within the previous 12 months. If the NGO received any foreign funding, it must have returned the money within three months. The ministry would then initiate an unscheduled inspection of the NGO to determine whether it qualified for removal from the list.

The law on “foreign agents” requires that NGOs identify themselves as “foreign agents” in all their public materials. Authorities fined NGOs for failing to disclose their “foreign agent” status on websites or printed materials. For example, on August 13, a court in the Mari-El Republic fined the human rights group Man and Law 300,000 rubles ($4,500) for failing to mark its Facebook page as belonging to a “foreign agent.” According to the NGO, the page had previously been marked but the marking disappeared when Facebook had updated its user interface.

The government placed additional restrictions on NGOs designated as “foreign agents.” On October 11, President Putin signed a law prohibiting “foreign agent” NGOs and foreign NGOs from receiving an accreditation from the Ministry of Justice that would allow them to submit anticorruption analysis of legislation. NGOs designated “foreign agents” were already prohibited from participating in election observation.

Organizations the government listed as “foreign agents” reported experiencing the social effects of stigmatization, such as being targeted by vandals and online criticism, in addition to losing partners and funding sources and being subjected to smear campaigns in the state-controlled press.

The law requires the Ministry of Justice to maintain a list of “undesirable foreign organizations.” The list expanded during the year as the Ministry of Justice added the European Platform for Democratic Elections, the International Elections Study Center, the German Marshall Fund, and Pacific Environment. As of October the total number of
“undesirable foreign organizations” was 15. According to the law, a foreign organization may be found “undesirable” if that group is deemed “dangerous to the foundations of the constitutional order of the Russian Federation, its national security, and defense.” Authorities have not clarified what specific threats the “undesirable” NGOs posed to the country. Any foreign organization deemed “undesirable” must cease its activities, any money or assets found by authorities may be seized, and any citizens found to be continuing to work with the organization in contravention of the law may face up to seven years in prison.

NGOs engaged in political activities or activities that purportedly “pose a threat to the country” or that receive support from U.S. citizens or organizations are subject to suspension under the “Dima Yakovlev” law, which also prohibits NGOs from having members with dual Russian-U.S. citizenship.

Authorities continued to misuse the country’s expansive definition of extremism as a tool to stifle freedom of association. In 2017 the Supreme Court criminalized the activity of members of Jehovah’s Witnesses. The decision prohibited all activity of Jehovah’s Witnesses’ legal entities throughout the country, effectively banning their worship. The parent organization of the Jehovah’s Witnesses in the country and 395 regional branches were formally placed on the Justice Ministry’s list of “extremist” groups, a procedural move following the Supreme Court’s decision. As of October more than 50 Jehovah’s Witnesses were facing criminal charges for taking part in the activities of a banned extremist organization (see the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/).

There were reports civil society activists were beaten or attacked in retaliation for their professional activities and that in most cases law enforcement officials did not adequately investigate the incidents. As of September the legal NGO Agora had identified more than 80 such attacks during the year. For example, there were multiple reports of physical attacks on the Memorial and its activists in the North Caucasus during the year, which human rights organizations believed to be a coordinated campaign of pressure aimed at silencing Memorial and halting its human rights work. On January 17, two masked men set fire to the Memorial office in Nazran, Ingushetia. On January 23, unknown perpetrators set fire to one of Memorial’s cars in Makhachkala, Dagestan. On March 29, Sirazhutdin Datsiyev, the head of Memorial’s office in the Republic of Dagestan, was hospitalized with a head injury after an attack by unknown assailants.
Annex 286

In multiple cases authorities arbitrarily arrested and prosecuted civil society activists in political retaliation for their work (see section 1.e.).

There were reports authorities targeted NGOs and activists representing the LGBTI community for retaliation (see section 6, Acts of Violence, Discrimination, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity).

Rwanda

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution, law, or both provide for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, but the government limited these rights.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution and law provide for freedom of peaceful assembly, but the government did not always respect this right. The updated penal code states it is illegal to demonstrate in a public place without prior authorization. Violation of this provision is punishable by a prison sentence of eight days to six months or a fine of 500,000 to one million Rwandan francs ($575 to $1,150) or both. For illegal demonstrations deemed to have threatened security, public order, or health, the penalties are increased. Even with prior written authorization, public meetings were subject to disruption or arbitrary closure.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

While the constitution provides for freedom of association, the government limited the right. The law requires private organizations to register. Although the government generally granted licenses, it impeded the formation of political parties, restricted political party activities, and delayed or denied registration to local and international NGOs seeking to work on human rights, media freedom, or political advocacy (see section 3). In addition the government imposed burdensome NGO registration and renewal requirements, especially on international NGOs, as well as time-consuming requirements for annual financial and activity
reports (see section 5). On September 10, the government enacted legislation imposing additional registration requirements on faith-based organizations (FBOs). The law requires FBOs to obtain legal status from the government before beginning operations. It also calls for legal representatives of FBOs and preachers with supervisory responsibilities to hold academic degrees.

Saint Kitts and Nevis

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for freedom of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights. Opposition parties and media, however, reported incidents in which the exercise of these rights was restricted. For example, in February the government banned the opposition St. Kitts and Nevis Labour Party from using public facilities.

Saint Lucia

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION
The law provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights. Various civil society organizations, however, reported citizens were hesitant to participate in antigovernment protests due to fear of retaliation.

Samoa

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for the freedoms of assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

San Marino

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The law provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

Sao Tome and Principe

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provide for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY
The law provides for this right, and the government generally respected it. On October 11, presumably to maintain order, police restricted freedom of peaceful assembly, forbidding public gatherings until after the announcement of election results on October 19. The restriction was prompted by a protest on October 8, when a crowd of several hundred overturned an official’s car and burned it. Several groups objected to the restriction but respected the ban.

Saudi Arabia

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The law does not provide for freedom of assembly and association, which the government severely limited.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The law requires a government permit for an organized public assembly of any type. The government categorically forbids participation in political protests or unauthorized public assemblies, and security forces reportedly arrested demonstrators and detained them for brief periods. Security forces at times allowed a small number of unauthorized demonstrations throughout the country.

On March 27, security forces arrested 32 citizens and referred them to the public prosecutor for illegally gathering in front of Taif governorate headquarters to protest the removal of unlicensed housing structures built on government land, according to the Ministry of Interior.

CPVPV and other security officers also restricted mixed gender gatherings of unrelated men and women in public and private spaces (see section 1.f.).

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The law provided for limited freedom of association, however, the government strictly limited this right. In 2016 a law came into effect known as the Law on Associations and Foundations
Annex 286

(Civil Society Organizations Law), which for the first time provided a comprehensive legal framework to govern the establishment, operation, and supervision of associations and foundations. The government, however, prohibited the establishment of political parties or any group it considered as opposing or challenging the regime. All associations must be licensed by the Ministry of Labor and Social Development and comply with its regulations. Some groups that advocated changing elements of the social or political order reported their licensing requests went unanswered for years, despite repeated inquiries. The ministry reportedly used arbitrary means, such as requiring unreasonable types and quantities of information, to delay and effectively deny licenses to associations.

On January 25, the SCC sentenced Mohammad al-Otaiby and Abdullah al-Attawi, founding members of the Union for Human Rights (known in Arabic as “al-Ittihad”) to 14 and seven years in prison, respectively, for “participating in setting up an organization and announcing it before getting an authorization,” “spreading chaos, inciting public opinion and publishing statements harmful to the kingdom and its institutions,” and “publishing information about their interrogations despite signing pledges to refrain from doing so,” according to media and NGO reporting.

In 2013 and 2014, the few local NGOs that had operated without a license ceased operating after authorities ordered them disbanded. While ACPRA maintained a presence on social media networks such as Twitter, the government severely curtailed its operations and closed down its website. On February 28, the SCC sentenced lawyer and ACPRA member Issa al-Nukheifi to six years in prison (three years under the anti-cybercrimes law and three years under ta’zir, or “discretionary” sentencing), followed by a six-year ban on social media and travel outside of the country, based on charges of “infringing on the public order and religious values,” “communicating with members of ACPRA,” “opposing Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen,” and related charges. Al-Nukheifi was detained in 2016 and charged in August 2017 under provisions of both the 2014 Counterterrorism Law and the 2008 Anti-Cybercrimes Law.

Government-chartered associations limited membership only to citizens.

Senegal

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION
The government sometimes restricted freedom of peaceful assembly but generally respected freedom of association.

**FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY**

The constitution and law provide for the freedom of assembly, but the government sometimes restricted this right. Some groups complained of undue delays in response to authorization requests for public demonstrations. Other groups were denied such authorization.

In April the government denied a permit to opposition activists to protest the National Assembly’s vote on a law changing the eligibility requirements for presidential candidates and used force to disperse opposition supporters trying to hold the protest despite the ban. The government also detained several opposition leaders for several hours before releasing them without pressing charges.

**Serbia**

**Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:**

**B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION**

The law provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, but the government limited these rights in some cases.

**FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY**

The constitution provides for the freedom of assembly, and the government generally respected the right. The law obliges protesters to apply to the police for a permit, providing the exact date, time, and estimated number of demonstrators. Police generally issued a permit if a protest was not likely to disturb the public or public transportation; otherwise, police consulted with city authorities before issuing a permit. Higher-level government authorities decided whether to issue permits for gatherings assessed as posing high security risks.
EC staff noted in the Serbia 2018 Report working document that the country lacked secondary legislation to implement fully the law on freedom of assembly. Commission staff also noted numerous reports of excessive use of force by law enforcement and a lack of prosecution of violent counterprotestors.

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

The constitution provides for the freedom of association, and the government generally respected this right.

All companies continued to pay mandatory annual membership to the Serbian Chamber of Commerce. In March 2017 the Association for Protection of Constitutionality and Legality filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court, asserting that mandatory membership was against the constitution. The Constitutional Court has not issued a ruling on this case.

**Seychelles**

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

**B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION**

**FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY**

The constitution and law provide for freedom of assembly, and the government generally respected this right. There were several public demonstrations and marches during the year.

The Public Assembly Act published in 2015 requires organizers of gatherings of 10 or more persons to inform the police commissioner five working days prior to the date proposed for the planned gathering. For example, a public protest against the building of a military facility on Assomption Island to coincide with National Day celebrations on June 29 was called off due to lack of the required notification time. Several other protests against the proposed facility, however, were allowed to continue. The police commissioner may impose conditions or deny the right to assemble on security, morality, and public safety grounds. Authorities did not restrict the holding of lawful public opposition gatherings.
Sierra Leone

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provide for the freedoms of assembly and association, and the government generally respected the right of freedom of association.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

Upon assuming office on April 4, President Maada Bio introduced an Executive Order lifting the ban on public assembly, including Sunday trading, imposed by his predecessor.

As of August, nine persons who were arrested and detained in 2015 for demonstrating in front of a foreign embassy still awaited a trial date. They remained on bail and were directed to report monthly to the SLP Criminal and Investigations Division.

Singapore

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

Although the constitution provides citizens the right to peaceful assembly, parliament imposed restrictions in the interest of security, public order, or morality. Public assemblies, including political meetings and rallies, require police permission. By law a public assembly may include events staged by a single person. Citizens do not need permits for indoor speaking events, unless they touch on “sensitive topics” such as race or religion, or for qualifying events held at Speakers’ Corner. Per 2017 amendments to the Public Order Act, the Commissioner of Police may decline to authorize any public assembly or procession that could be directed towards a political end and be organized by, or involve the participation of,
a foreign entity or citizen. The amendment followed a 2016 LGBTI “Freedom to Love” rally, after which the Ministry of Home Affairs issued a press statement stating “foreign entities should not interfere in our domestic issues, especially political issues or controversial social issues with political overtones.”

Police may also order a person to “move on” from a certain area and not return to the designated spot for 24 hours.

In April police denied a request by activist Terry Xu to stage a one-person, silent sit-in protest without signage for one hour. Police stated the late-night protest, which would have been held in the central business district during the weekend, carried “a risk of causing public disorder, as well as damage to property.”

In October artist Seelan Palay was convicted of breaching the Public Order Act for taking part in a public procession without a permit in October 2017. He was fined 2,500 SGD ($1,820) but served two weeks in jail in lieu of the fine. Seelan had obtained a permit to stage a performance art piece as a protest in Hong Lim Park, but he later continued his solo protest by walking from the park to parliament buildings, holding a mirror. Prosecutors alleged Seelan did not specify in his permit request that he intended to move from the park to outside parliament.

Some civil society groups and members of parliament expressed concern that the Public Order and Safety (Special Powers) Act (see section 2.a.) conflates peaceful protests and terrorist violence. The law’s illustrations of “large-scale public disorder” include a peaceful sit-down demonstration that attracts a large group of sympathizers and which after a week starts to impede the flow of traffic and interfere with local business activities.

The government closely monitored political gatherings regardless of the number of persons present.

Spontaneous public gatherings or demonstrations were virtually unknown.

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

Most associations, societies, clubs, religious groups, and other organizations with more than 10 members are required to register with the government under the Societies Act. The government could deny registration to groups it believed were formed for unlawful purposes or for purposes prejudicial to public peace, welfare, or public order. The majority of
applications in recent years were approved. The government has absolute discretion in applying criteria to register or dissolve societies.

The government prohibits organized political activities except by groups registered as political parties or political associations. These may not receive foreign donations but may receive funds from citizens and locally controlled entities. The ruling PAP was able to use nonpolitical organizations, such as residential committees and neighborhood groups, for political purposes far more extensively than could opposition parties. Due to laws regulating the formation of publicly active organizations, there were few nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) apart from nonpolitical organizations, such as religious or environmental groups.

In April the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority (ACRA) declined to register OSEA Pte. Ltd., a local branch of a UK-based company that provides training and other support to journalists, as well as editorial services to a website called New Naratif. New Naratif's director PJ Thum and editor-in-chief Kirsten Han organize “democracy workshops” and are considered critical of the government. New Naratif also has subscribers not based in the country. ACRA explained that registration of OSEA would be contrary to national interests, as OSEA's purposes were “clearly political in nature” and its parent company had received a 75,000 SGD ($54,700) grant from a foreign charitable foundation. In September Minister of Finance Heng Swee Keat rejected an appeal against ACRA’s decision.

Slovakia

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provide for freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

Slovenia

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provide for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

Solomon Islands

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including: B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights. Demonstrators must obtain permits, which the government generally granted.

Somalia

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including: B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The federal provisional constitution provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, but the government limited this right. A general lack of security effectively limited this right as well. The federal Ministry of Internal Security continued to require its approval for all public gatherings, citing security concerns, such as the risk of attack by al-Shabaab suicide bombers.

In May Somaliland authorities in the Sool region arrested 57 demonstrators for staging a protest in support of Somali unity, including some in support of Puntland. All the demonstrators were later released.

Al-Shabaab did not allow any gatherings without its prior consent.
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The provisional federal constitution provides for freedom of association, but government officials harassed NGO workers. There were also reports that regional authorities restricted freedom of association. Al-Shabaab did not allow most international NGOs to operate.

Persons in the southern and central regions outside of al-Shabaab-controlled areas could freely join civil society organizations focusing on a wide range of problems. Citizens generally respected civil society organizations for their ability to deliver social services in the absence of functioning government ministries.

Regional administrations took steps to control or gain benefit from humanitarian organizations, including by imposing duplicative registration requirements at different levels of government; attempting to control humanitarian organization contracting, procurement, and staffing; and using opaque and vague taxation.

South Africa

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution and law provide for freedom of assembly, and the government generally respected this right. According to SAPS, from April 2017 through March there were 11,058 peaceful protests and an additional 3,583 demonstrations that turned violent. Protest action was most common in Gauteng, North West, Western Cape, and KwaZulu-Natal Provinces.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for the right of association, and the government generally respected this right.
Annex 286

South Sudan

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The government generally respected freedom of peaceful assembly but restricted freedom of association.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The transitional constitution provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the government generally respected this right, but many citizens did not gather due to fear of targeted violence. Security officials lacked nonviolent crowd control capabilities and at times fired live ammunition into the air to disperse crowds.

In February security officials disrupted and dispersed a meeting of the South Sudan Civil Society Forum, which had met to discuss the peace process.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The transitional constitution provides for freedom of association, but the government did not respect this right for those suspected of associating with or having sympathies for opposition figures (see section 1.g.). Some civil society leaders interpreted the 2012 Political Parties Act as an attempt to suppress opposition to the SPLM (see section 3).

A law passed in 2016 strictly regulating the activity and operations of civil society was widely enforced throughout the year. The law focused particularly on NGOs working in the governance, anticorruption, and human rights fields, and it imposed a range of legal barriers including limitations on the types of activities in which organizations can engage, onerous registration requirements, and heavy fines for noncompliance. Human rights groups and civil society representatives reported NSS officials continued surveillance and threats against civil society organizations.

Spain
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The law provides for the freedom of peaceful assembly, and the government generally respected this right. The law provides for fines of up to 600 euros ($690) for failing to notify authorities about peaceful demonstrations in public areas, up to 30,000 euros ($34,500) for protests resulting in “serious disturbances of public safety” near parliament and regional government buildings, and up to 600,000 euros ($690,000) for unauthorized protests near key infrastructure. By law any protestors who refuse to disperse upon police request may be fined.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provide for the freedom of association, and the government generally respected it.

Sri Lanka

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The law provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, but the government restricted these rights in a limited number of cases.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The law provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the government generally respected this right. The constitution stipulates that the freedom of assembly may be restricted in the interest of religious harmony, national security, public order, or the protection of public health or morality. It also may be restricted in the interest of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others, or in the interest of meeting the just requirements of the general welfare of a democratic society. Under Police Ordinance Article 77(1), protesters must seek permission from the local police before holding a protest.
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The law provides for freedom of association but limits the right, for example, by criminalizing association with or membership in banned organizations. Christian groups and churches reported some authorities classified worship activities as “unauthorized gatherings” and pressured them to end these activities. According to the groups, authorities sometimes justified their actions stating the groups were not registered with the government, although no law or regulation specifically requires such registration.

Sudan

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The law provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, but the government restricted these rights.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

Although the Interim National Constitution and law provide for freedom of peaceful assembly, the government severely restricted this right. The criminal code makes gatherings of more than five persons without a permit illegal. Organizers must notify the government 36 hours prior to assemblies and rallies.

On March 9, a Public Order Court convicted 12 youths of gross indecency, committing an indecent or immoral act, and alcohol and drug consumption. The individuals were arrested at Burri Beach in Khartoum and accused of belonging to a sunworshipping cult, after they had brought mattresses to sleep on the beach with the intention, reportedly, of waking early to watch the sunrise and then slaughter a sheep.

The government continued to deny permission to Islamic orders associated with opposition political parties, particularly the Ansar (Umma Party) and the Khatmiya (Democratic Unionist Party), to hold large gatherings in public spaces, but parties regularly held opposition rallies on private property. Government security agents occasionally attended opposition meetings,
disrupted opposition rallies, or summoned participants to security headquarters for questioning after meetings. Opposition political parties claim they were almost never granted official permits to hold meetings, rallies, or peaceful demonstrations. Security forces used tear gas and other heavy-handed tactics against largely peaceful protests at universities or involving university students. NISS and police forces regularly arrested Darfuri students at various universities for publicly addressing civilians).

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

The Interim National Constitution and law provide for freedom of association, but the government severely restricted this right. The law prohibits political parties linked to armed opposition groups. The government closed civil society organizations or refused to register them on several occasions.

Government and security forces continued arbitrarily to enforce legal provisionsthat strictly regulate an organization's ability to receive foreign financing and register public activities. The government maintained its policy of “Sudanization” of international NGOs. Many organizations reported they faced administrative difficulties if they refused to have progovernment groups implement their programs at the state level.

**Suriname**

**Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:**

**B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION**

The law provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

**FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY**

In contrast with 2017, there were no violations of the freedom to peaceful assembly during the year.
Sweden

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

Switzerland

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

Syria

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The government limited freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution provides for the freedom of peaceful assembly, but the law grants the government broad powers to restrict this freedom.

The Ministry of Interior requires permission for demonstrations or any public gathering of more than three persons. As a rule, the ministry authorized only demonstrations by the
government, affiliated groups, or the Baath Party, orchestrating them on numerous occasions.

According to allegations by Kurdish activists and press reporting, the PYD and the YPG sometimes suppressed freedom of assembly in areas under their control. During the year, however, hundreds of Christians and Assyrians peacefully protested against PYD policy to close private religious schools that teach the Syrian regime’s curriculum. Kurdish security forces fired weapons into the air but reportedly did not otherwise engage the protesters. Similar protests in Hasaka against forcible recruitment also appear to have occurred without serious incident.

During the year multiple media outlets reported that HTS loosened restrictions on civil society activity, including protests, due to popular pressure for engagement to oppose an expected assault by government and progovernment forces on the Idlib Governorate. This approach was manifested in September, when substantial numbers protested against President Assad and the government in opposition- and HTS-held areas of Idlib and Hama.

The COI reported that residents who previously resided in ISIS-controlled Raqqa noted severe restrictions on assembly while under ISIS rule, but ISIS territories contracted considerably during the year.

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

The constitution provides for the freedom of association, but the law grants the government latitude to restrict this freedom. The government required prior registration and approval for private associations and restricted the activities of associations and their members. The executive boards of professional associations were not independent of the government.

The government often denied requests for registration or failed to act on them, reportedly on political grounds. None of the local human rights organizations operated with a license but many functioned under organizations that had requisite government registration. The government continued to block the multiyear effort by journalists to register a countrywide media association. Despite government efforts, journalists in exile founded the Syrian Journalist Association as an independent democratic professional association in 2012 to empower the role of freedom of the press and expression in Syria.
The government selectively enforced the 2011 decree allowing the establishment of independent political parties, permitting only progovernment groups to form official parties (see section 3). According to local human rights groups, opposition activists declined to organize parties, fearing the government would use party lists to target opposition members.

Under laws that criminalize membership and activity in illegal organizations as determined by the government, security forces detained hundreds of persons linked to local human rights groups and prodemocracy student groups. The thousands of death notices released by the government during the year shed light on this practice. For example, the *Atlantic* described the fates of many of the young protest organizers, civil society leaders, and local coordination committee members forcibly disappeared by the government in 2011. These included Yahya and Ma’an Shurbaji; both had been missing since 2011 and were now listed as having died in government detention in 2013. The government also searched these individuals’ personal and social media contacts for further potential targets.

HTS restricted the activities of organizations it deemed incompatible with its interpretation of Islam. For example, in its March report, the COI describes how in 2015 the HTS predecessor Jabhat al-Nusra group burned a women’s organization in Idlib, stole the organizer’s car, and detained the organizer for a short period. In 2017 the March COI report noted that HTS prevented NGOs in Idlib from conducting meetings with mixed participants so a number of NGOs began holding meetings via remote presence.

According to previous media reports and reports from former residents of ISIS-controlled areas, ISIS did not permit the existence of associations that opposed the structures or policies of the “caliphate.”

**Taiwan**

**Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:**

**B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION**

The constitution provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.
In March the High Court upheld the 2017 dismissal of charges against 22 protesters who led the occupation of the Legislative Yuan during the 2014 Sunflower Student Movement. The lower court judge said the protesters’ actions met the criteria for civil disobedience.

**Tajikistan**

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

**B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION**

The government limited freedoms of peaceful assembly and association through requirements to obtain permission from local governments and through frequent inspections by various government agencies.

**FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY**

The constitution provides the right to freedom of peaceful assembly, but the government required that individuals obtain permission from the government to stage public demonstrations. Individuals considering the staging of peaceful protests reportedly chose not to do so for fear of government reprisal.

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

The constitution protects freedom of association, but the government restricted this right. As in the previous year, civil society organizations reported a noticeable increase in the number and intensity of registration and tax inspections by authorities. The government continued to enforce the ban on activities held under the banner of the IRPT. As a result of a 2016 constitutional referendum, nonsecular political parties became illegal.

**Tanzania**

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The government restricted freedom of peaceful assembly and association, including through bans decreed by authorities but not supported by law. The government requires organizers of rallies to obtain police permission. Police may deny permission on public safety or security grounds or if the permit seeker belongs to an unregistered organization or political party. The government and police continued to limit the issuance of permits for public demonstrations and assemblies to political parties, NGOs, and religious organizations. The only political meetings allowed in principle are by MPs in their constituencies; outside participants, including party leaders, are not permitted to participate. Restrictions are also applied to nonpolitical gatherings deemed critical of the government.

In August police arrested members of an opposition coalition for holding a public rally in Turwa Buyungi ward in advance of by-elections. During a June speech at the State House, the president declared the opposition should confine its political opinions to appropriate platforms, such as parliament, until the next elections in 2020.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for freedom of association, and the government generally respected this right. Thousands of NGOs and societies operated in the country. Political parties were required to register and meet membership and other requirements. Freedom of association for workers was limited (see section 7.a.).

The registration process for associations outside Zanzibar was slow. The law makes a distinction between NGOs and societies and applies different registration procedures to the two. It defines a society as any club, company, partnership, or association of 10 or more persons, regardless of its purpose, and notes specific categories of organizations not considered societies, such as political parties. The law defines NGOs to include organizations whose purpose is to promote economic, environmental, social, or cultural development; protect the environment; or lobby or advocate on issues of public interest. Societies and organizations may not operate until authorities approve their applications. In August the government began a verification exercise that required all NGOs to reregister. Registration of new NGOs was suspended until December 1.

Religious organizations are registered as societies and wait the longest—an average of four years—for registration. From July 2017 to March, the Registrar of Societies received 252
registration applications, 74 of which came from religious institutions. The registrar registered 136 organizations and rejected five applications; 111 applications remained unprocessed. The government rarely registered societies within the legally required 14-day period.

NGOs in Zanzibar apply for registration with the Zanzibar Business and Property Registration Agency. While registration generally took several weeks, some NGOs waited months if the registrar determined additional research was needed.

Thailand

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The government restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The 2017 constitution grants the freedom to assemble peacefully, subject to restrictions enacted to “protect public interest, peace and order, or good morals, or to protect the rights and liberties of others.” Nonetheless, NCPO orders, invoked under authority of Article 44 of the interim constitution and extended under the constitution, continued to prohibit political gatherings of five or more persons and penalize persons supporting any political gatherings.

According to a human rights advocacy group, the NCPO has moved away from disrupting public events, opting instead to charge event leaders and participants for violating NCPO orders and laws prohibiting gatherings and political activities. In September, the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand announced police had ordered the club to cancel a scheduled panel discussion entitled “Will Myanmar’s Generals Ever Face Justice for International Crimes.” The club issued a statement noting this was the sixth event canceled by police order at the club since the 2014 coup.

In May police arrested 15 leaders and activists from the “We Want Elections” group for organizing a demonstration to commemorate the fourth anniversary of the 2014 coup. The
group members were charged with sedition and violating the NCPO’s ban on political gatherings of five or more persons.

Surat Thani, Phuket, and Phang Nga Provinces have regulations that prohibit migrant workers—specifically persons from Cambodia, Burma, and Laos—from gathering in groups, while Samut Sakhon Province prohibits migrant gatherings of more than five persons. Authorities did not enforce these provisions strictly, particularly for gatherings on private property. Employers and NGOs may request permission from authorities for migrant workers to hold cultural gatherings.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The 2017 constitution grants individuals the right to free association subject to restrictions by law enacted to “protect public interest, peace and order, or good morals.”

The law prohibits the registration of a political party with the same name or logo as a legally dissolved party.

The Bahamas

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

The Gambia

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION
The law provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

**Timor-Leste**

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

**B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION**

The constitution provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

**FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY**

The constitution provides for “freedom to assemble peacefully and without weapons, without a need for prior authorization.” The law establishes guidelines on obtaining permits to hold demonstrations, requires police be notified five days in advance of any demonstration or strike, and establishes setback requirements at some buildings. The power to grant or deny permits is vested only in the PNTL.

**Togo**

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

**B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION**

The constitution and law provide for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government did not consistently respected these rights.

**FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY**

The constitution and law provide for the freedom of peaceful assembly, and the government generally respected this right. Organizers of demonstrations must obtain permission from the
Ministry of Territorial Affairs, which may prescribe the route marchers may take. In September 2017 the government implemented a ban on public demonstrations in the cities of Sokode, Bafilo, and Mango, citing a risk of violence. The ban continued during the year.

For example, citing a law prohibiting the disruption of political campaigns, during the two weeks prior to the December 20 parliamentary elections, the government banned all gatherings and demonstrations of political parties promoting a boycott of the elections.

**Tonga**

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

**B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION**

The constitution provides for the freedoms of assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

**Trinidad and Tobago**

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

**B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION**

The law provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

**Tunisia**

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

**B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION**
The law provides for the rights of freedom of peaceful assembly and association, but the government did not always respect the right of association. The state of emergency law grants the government the right to limit the right of assembly, although the government rarely applied this law during the year. On July 27, parliament adopted a law mandating the establishment of a more comprehensive business registration system, with the aim to combat terrorism finance and money laundering that also included requirements for nonprofit associations to submit financial data to a newly created registry. This National Center for the Registry of Institutions would be responsible for collecting and maintaining the financial and administrative data of all “economic actors,” including nonprofit associations. Several prominent civil society organizations (CSOs) issued a public statement contending that this registry would duplicate existing requirements, place an undue burden on CSOs, and potentially threaten freedom of association. The government contends that the law does not prevent either the registration or the operations of CSOs.

**FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY**

The law provides for the freedom of peaceful assembly, and the government generally respected these rights.

In January the government authorized civil society groups throughout the country to organize peaceful protests against the new budget law as well as price increases and subsidy cuts. Media reported that authorities detained some of the organizers of the social movement #Fech_Nestanew (What Are We Waiting For) on charges including graffiti, destruction of property, and “inciting riots” through the distribution of flyers calling for more protests. All were subsequently released without charge, according to human rights groups. With this notable exception, human rights groups reported that the police respected the protesters’ rights to peaceful assembly.

In several cities, these peaceful social movements gave way to instances of opportunistic crime, including episodes of vandalism and looting masquerading as protests that led to small-scale clashes with security forces. On January 13, the Ministry of Interior stated that authorities arrested more than 930 individuals for criminal charges that the ministry reported were unrelated to the legitimate and authorized protest movements; many of these individuals were subsequently released. The ministry also reported that more than 50 police officers were injured during the protests and one civilian died of asphyxiation as a result of an asthma attack prompted by the tear gas used by police to clear protesters.
Subsequent social movements, including several large protests in downtown Tunis during the summer, took place without major incidents or reports of interference by security forces. In several smaller protests throughout southern Tunisia to demand greater economic development, security forces responded proportionately to violent incidents using riot control techniques and tear gas to disperse crowds that had blocked access to border posts.

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

The law provides for the right of freedom of association, but the government did not always respect it. A 2011 law on associations eliminated penalties in the previous law, as well as the prohibition on belonging to, or serving in, an unrecognized or dissolved association. The law eased the registration procedure, making it more difficult for government entities to hinder or delay registration. According to the 2011 law, only the judiciary has the authority to suspend or dissolve an association. Several independent monitoring organizations asserted, however, that the government delayed registration of associations through unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles, at times for political reasons, a practice counter to the law.

**Turkey**

**Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:**

**B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION**

The government restricted the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.

**FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY**

Although the constitution provides for freedom of assembly, the law provides several grounds for the government to limit that right. The law stipulates penalties for protesters convicted of carrying items that might be construed as weapons, prohibits the use of symbols linked to illegal organizations (including chanting slogans), and criminalizes covering one’s face during a protest. The law permits police to use tinted water in water cannons, potentially to tag protesters for later identification and prosecution. The law also allows police to take persons into “protective custody” without a prosecutor’s authorization if there is reasonable suspicion that they are a threat to themselves or to public order. The state of emergency and
subsequent antiterror law gave governorates enhanced authority to ban protests and public gatherings, a ban widely enacted during the year.

The government regarded many demonstrations as security threats to the state, deploying large numbers of riot police to control crowds, sometimes using excessive force. At times the government used its authority to detain persons before protests were held on the premise that they might cause civil disruption.

Throughout the year at the hearings of detained former HDP co-chair Demirtas, the Ankara governorate or court security personnel banned gatherings, marches, and sit-in protests outside the court. Domestic and international observers were also banned from observing the trial hearings.

The government also selectively restricted meetings to designated sites or dates, particularly limiting access to Istanbul's Taksim Square and Ankara's Kızılay Square, and set up roadblocks to prevent protesters from gathering there. Although police removed barriers around the human rights monument in Ankara's Kızılay Square in July, a mobile police presence remained. The government banned many demonstrations outright if they touched on sensitive subjects.

On August 25, Istanbul police began preventing the vigil of the Saturday Mothers—a group who since the 1990s had gathered to commemorate the disappearances of relatives following their detention by Turkish security forces in the 1980s and 1990s and call for accountability. Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu said the group was exploiting the concept of motherhood to mask support for terrorism.

In January police prevented HDP lawmaker Ziya Pir, Democratic Regions Party (DBP) co-chair Mehmet Arslan, Democratic Society Congress (DTK) co-chair Leyla Bırıl, and other party members from holding a press conference opposing Operation Olive Branch in front of the HDP Diyarbakır provincial headquarters.

Security forces at times responded with excessive force to protests, resulting in injuries, detentions, and arrests. The government generally supported security forces' actions. The HRA and HRFT jointly reported that, in the first 11 months of the year, police intervened in 785 demonstrations, detaining 3,697 people and arresting 118 individuals. Year-end figures for those injured in clashes with authorities during demonstrations were not available. Human rights NGOs asserted that the government's failure to delineate clearly in the law the circumstances that justify the use of force contributed to disproportionate use of force during
protests. On June 27, for example, police in Ankara broke a facial bone of a protester in Ankara while detaining her.

On May 1 (Labor Day), authorities restricted rallies in parts of Istanbul and other cities if they were not government sanctioned. In Istanbul, 50 persons participating in the celebrations were detained while authorities closed Taksim Square, the traditional venue for the celebrations. Police roughly arrested protesters who sought to defy the ban on demonstrations by marching towards the square.

On April 25, Istanbul police briefly detained three human rights activists for using the word “genocide” in their statements and on their banners in an April 24 Armenian Remembrance Day commemoration organized by the HRA in Istanbul’s Sultanahmet Square. Police reportedly told the organizers that the term “genocide” was not permitted, and they did not allow the ceremony to be held.

Pro-Kurdish demonstrations of many kinds faced violent police responses throughout the year. For example, police tear gassed and sprayed pressurized water at supporters of the pro-Kurdish HDP celebrating the party’s elections performance in June after the demonstrators began throwing stones at police vehicles.

Local authorities issued indefinite bans on LGBTI events in several parts of the country, including for film festivals and other public activities in Ankara and parts of Istanbul. Adana’s governor banned a planned LGBTI pride march in June, and Ankara’s governor extended a ban on LGBTI events through the end of October 2019.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

While the law provides for freedom of association, the government continued to restrict this right during the year. Under the state of emergency and using provisions of the antiterror law, the government shut down associations and foundations for alleged threats to national security. The government did not release data on the number of NGOs it closed during the year. According to the HRJP, the government closed nearly 1,500 nongovernmental associations or foundations for alleged threats to national security. Other NGOs reported different statistics, based on different data collection methods. Observers widely reported that the appeals process for institutions seeking redress was opaque and ineffective (see section 1.e.).
By law, persons organizing an association do not need to notify authorities beforehand, but an association must provide notification before interacting with international organizations or receiving financial support from abroad and must provide detailed documents on such activities. Representatives of associations stated this requirement placed an undue burden on their operations. Human rights and civil society organizations, groups promoting LGBTI rights, and women’s groups in particular complained that the government used regular and detailed audits to create administrative burdens and to intimidate them through the threat of large fines. Bar association representatives reported that police sometimes attended civil society organizational meetings and recorded them, interpreting it as a means of intimidation.

In January authorities detained at least 25 members of the conservative Furkan Foundation and closed all of its branches in Adana in connection with the group’s criticism of Operation Olive Branch. In July 2017 authorities detained eight leading human rights activists, including Amnesty International’s Turkey director, and two foreign trainers during a workshop on digital security and stress management that President Erdogan claimed was a “continuation” of the 2016 failed coup attempt. Most were charged with supporting a terrorist organization. All were released from pretrial detention in October 2017, but those arrested still faced charges and prison time at year’s end.

Turkmenistan

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution and law provide for freedom of assembly, but the government restricted this right. During the year authorities neither granted the required permits for public meetings and demonstrations nor allowed unregistered organizations to hold demonstrations. According to Forum 18, in some instances police raided homes where members of religious groups were meeting and detained participants.

Unregistered religious groups were not allowed to meet, according to the country’s religion law adopted in 2016.
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

Although the constitution and law provide for freedom of association, the government restricted this right. The law requires all NGOs to register with the Ministry of Justice and all foreign assistance to be coordinated through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Unregistered NGO activity is punishable by a fine, short-term detention, and confiscation of property. The law requires all religious groups to register with the Ministry of Justice and sets out a schedule of fines for religious activity conducted by unregistered groups.

Of the estimated 120 registered NGOs, international organizations recognized only a few as independent. NGOs reported the government presented a number of administrative obstacles to NGOs that attempted to register. Authorities reportedly rejected some applications repeatedly on technical grounds. Some organizations awaiting registration found alternate ways to carry out activities, such as registering as businesses or subsidiaries of other registered groups, but others temporarily suspended or limited their activities. Although the law states there is a process for registering foreign assistance, NGOs had difficulty registering bilateral foreign assistance in practice due to the 2013 decree requiring such registration.

Sources noted a number of barriers to the formation and functioning of civil society. These included regulations that permitted the Ministry of Justice to send representatives to association events and meetings and requirements that associations notify the government about their planned activities.

In February 2017 the official government newspaper *Neytral'nyy Turkmenistan* published the changes and new amendments to the Law on Public Associations. Specifically, the law does not exempt religious organizations, nonprofit associations, and political parties; founders of public associations have to be Turkmen citizens; the law denies public associations the right to represent and protect the rights of other citizens, including the right to participate in elections; and public associations can be sponsored only by legal entities, including foreign nonprofit organizations.

Tuvalu

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION
Although the law provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, the government allowed island chiefs to place restrictions on it.

**FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY**

The law provides for freedom of peaceful assembly; however, the government allows island chiefs to place restrictions on assembly for public worship (see section 2.c.).

**Uganda**

**Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:**

**B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION**

The government restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.

**FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY**

While the constitution provides for freedom of assembly, the government did not respect this right. The government continued to use the Public Order Management Act to limit the right to assemble and disrupted opposition and civil society-led public meetings and rallies. The act also placed a significant bureaucratic burden on those wishing to organize or host gatherings and afforded the UPF wide discretion to prevent an event by refusing to approve it, or, more commonly, by not responding to the permission request, which then created a legal justification for disrupting almost any gathering.

According to local media, the UPF on July 11 fired teargas and live bullets to disperse a crowd of youth who were marching in Kampala to protest the government’s imposition of a 1-percent tax on all mobile money transactions. The police arrested three protesters and the state charged them in court on July 16 with holding an unlawful assembly. The court released the three on bail on July 23 and the trial continued at year’s end. On July 18, the UPF questioned MP Kyagulanyi, who had led the protest, and released him on police bond.

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**
While the constitution and law provide for freedom of association, the government did not respect this right. The government restricted the operations of local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), especially those that work on civil and political rights (see section 5). Government regulations enacted in 2017 require NGOs to disclose sources of funding and personal information about their employees and impose onerous registration and reporting requirements. Government regulations enable the NGO Bureau and its local level structures to deny registration to any organization focused on issues deemed to be “undesirable” or “prejudicial” to the “dignity of the people of Uganda.” The regulations also provide the NGO Bureau broad powers to inspect NGO offices and records and to suspend their activities without due process. The regulations increased registration fees for local NGOs from 20,000 shillings ($5.33) to 100,000 ($26.67), and annual permit renewal fees from 20,000 shillings ($5.33) to 60,000 shillings ($16), respectively. They also introduced new fees, including for the NGO Bureau to review permit applications (60,000 shillings, or $16) and for NGOs to file annual reports (50,000 shillings, or $13.33). On July 24, local media reported that the minister for internal affairs had instructed the bureau “to tighten accountability oversight” over NGOs to ensure they used their funds for the approved purpose. The bureau in turn vowed “to crack the whip” on NGOs deemed noncompliant. Local media reported that the minister had voiced suspicion that NGOs used foreign funds to support dissent.

The government also restricted the operations of opposition political parties (see section 3).

Ukraine

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution provides for the freedom of peaceful assembly, and the government generally respected this right. There are no laws, however, regulating the process of organizing and conducting events to provide for the right, and authorities have wide
discretion under a Soviet-era directive to grant or refuse permission for assemblies on grounds of protecting public order and safety. Organizers are required to inform authorities in advance of plans for protests or demonstrations.

During the year citizens generally exercised the right to assemble peacefully without restriction in areas of the country under government control. There were reports, however, that police at times used excessive force when dispersing protests. For example, on March 3, police destroyed a protest tent camp that had been set up near the parliament in October 2017. Police allegedly beat protesters and used tear gas against journalists. Nineteen persons sustained injuries (10 had head injuries and nine other types of physical injuries), including journalists from Radio Liberty, Hromadske TV, and the Insider news outlet. The journalists reported deliberate attacks by police despite the fact that they had clearly identified themselves as members of the press. According to the chief of the Kyiv police, investigators and police were lawfully investigating criminal acts in connection with protester attempts to seize the International Center for Culture and Arts in Kyiv in December 2017 and clashes at the parliament on February 27. Police initiated two criminal investigations on possible use of excessive force by officers and interference by police in the work of journalists who were attempting to record the event. The investigation continued as of December.

While the main 2018 Pride March in Kyiv was protected by thousands of police, police at times did not adequately protect smaller demonstrations, especially those organized by persons belonging to minority groups or opposition political movements. Events organized by women’s rights activists or the LGBTI community were regularly disrupted by members of nationalist hate groups. On March 8, members of right-wing groups attacked participants in public events in Uzhhorod, Lviv, and Kyiv aimed at raising awareness of women’s rights and gender-based and domestic violence. Police launched investigations of the incidents. Police briefly detained attackers but no charges were filed.

In Russia-controlled territory, the HRMMU noted an absence of demonstrations because “people are concerned that they may be ‘arrested’ if they organize protests or assemblies against the policies” of Russia-led forces. The HRMMU also noted the only demonstrations permitted in these areas were ones in support of local “authorities,” often apparently organized by Russia-led forces, with forced public participation.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
The constitution and law provide for freedom of association, and the government generally respected this right.

Human rights groups and international organizations continued to criticize sharply a law signed by the president in March 2017 that introduced vague and burdensome asset-reporting requirements for civil society organizations and journalists working on anticorruption matters. The law was widely seen as an intimidation and a revenge measure against the country’s anticorruption watchdogs, which had successfully pushed for increased financial transparency for government officials. Heads and members of the boards of anticorruption NGOs had to submit their asset declarations by April 1. Observers continued to express concern that these asset declarations have the potential to endanger the staff of NGOs working on human rights and anticorruption, particularly if they work on issues related to Russian-occupied Crimea or areas of the Donbas controlled by Russia-led forces.

Human rights organizations reported a growing number of unsolved attacks on members of civil society organizations, which they believed created a climate of impunity. A September 26 joint statement by several dozen Ukrainian civic organizations stated that there had been more than 50 such attacks in the previous 12 months and accused the government of failing to investigate these crimes properly.

There were reports of incidents in which observers alleged that the government targeted activists for prosecution in retaliation for their professional activity. For example, several major human rights groups expressed concern about the government’s prosecution of Vitaliy Shabunin, head of the anticorruption NGO AntAC, which they alleged was selective and politically motivated. On January 15, authorities charged Shabunin with allegedly inflicting bodily harm on a journalist, a charge that carries a heavier penalty than the crime of inflicting intentional moderate bodily harm with which he had previously been charged in 2017. Both charges stemmed from an incident in June 2017 in which Shabunin allegedly punched Vsevolod Filimonenko, a supposed journalist who had reportedly harassed one of Shabunin’s colleagues. Human rights groups noted that video footage of the events suggested that Filimonenko may have been sent by the country’s security services to provoke a conflict with Shabunin and that the resources and vigor the government applied to prosecuting Shabunin far exceeded their usual approach to prosecuting attacks on journalists, including attacks where the resultant injuries were much more grave.

According to the HRMMU, in the territories controlled by Russia-led forces, domestic and international civil society organizations, including human rights defenders, could not operate
freely. Residents informed the HRMMU they were being prosecuted (or feared being prosecuted) by the “ministry of state security” for their pro-Ukrainian views or previous affiliation with Ukrainian NGOs. If human rights groups attempted to work in those areas, they faced significant harassment and intimidation. The HRMMU also noted an increase in civil society organizations run by Russia-led forces, which appeared to require certain persons, such as public-sector employees, to join.

Ukraine (Crimea)

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

See the Country Reports on Human Rights for Russia for a description of the relevant Russian laws and procedures that the Russian government applied and enforced in occupied Crimea.

Individuals opposing the occupation reported widespread harassment and intimidation by occupation authorities to suppress their ability to assemble peacefully. For example, the press reported on October 11 that authorities in Armyansk had issued a warning to a local resident, Yekaterina Pivovar, not to violate laws governing public protests. Pivovar had allegedly been planning to organize a group of local mothers to assemble outside city hall to demand a meeting with local officials. The mothers were concerned about the impact of toxic sulfur dioxide gas being released since late August from a nearby titanium plant on the health of their children.

A 2017 regulation limits the places in Crimea where public events may be held to 366 listed locations. The HRMMU noted that the “regulation” restricted freedom of assembly to a shrinking number of “specially designated spaces,” an unnecessary move that appeared “designed to dissuade the exercise of the right of freedom of assembly.”

Authorities fined individuals for conducting single-person pickets, the only type of protest that is supposed to be permitted without official permission under the legal system that Russia has imposed on occupied Crimea. According to the HRMMU, between December 2017 and
March, occupation “courts” fined 80 Muslim men, who had conducted single-person pickets in October 2017 to protest the arrests of other Muslim men, mostly Crimean Tatars, for alleged membership in terrorist or extremist organizations.

There were reports of occupation authorities using coercive methods to provide for participation at rallies in support of the “government.” Students, teachers and civil servants were forced to attend a commemoration event on the day of deportation of the Crimean Tatars organized by Crimean-occupation authorities in Simferopol on May 18.

There were reports that occupation authorities charged and fined individuals for allegedly violating public assembly rules in retaliation for gathering to witness security force raids on homes.

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

See the *Country Reports on Human Rights* for Russia for a description of the relevant Russian laws and procedures that the Russian government applied and enforced in occupied Crimea.

Occupation authorities broadly restricted freedom of association for individuals that opposed the occupation. For example, there were numerous reports of authorities taking steps to harass, intimidate, arrest, and imprison members of the human rights group Crimean Solidarity, an unregistered movement of friends and family of victims of repression by occupation authorities. Two of the group’s leaders, Emir-Usain Kuku and Server Mustafayev, remained in pretrial detention as of November on charges of allegedly belonging to the Islamic organization Hizb ut-Tahrir. Human rights monitors believed the cases against both men to be politically motivated and without basis. On January 27, law enforcement officers in Sudak disrupted a Crimean Solidarity civic group meeting attended by 150 persons. Law enforcement officers allegedly searched for drugs and weapons and questioned and photographed participants at the gathering. On October 27, in Simferopol, officials from the “prosecutor general's office” accompanied by a contingent of armed men in masks and uniformed police raided another Crimean Solidarity meeting. The officials issued formal warnings to three members of the group, whom authorities claimed were poised to violate “counterterrorism and counterextremism” legislation by purportedly planning to hold a series of single-person pickets. On October 28, occupation authorities blocked the group’s website.

The Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people remained banned for purported “extremism” despite an order by the International Court of Justice requiring that Russian authorities “refrain from
maintaining or imposing limitations on the ability of the Crimean Tatar community to conserve its representative institutions, including the Mejlis.” On October 29, occupation authorities announced plans to “nationalize” the Mejlis building in Simferopol, which they had seized in 2014, by transferring it to a Muslim organization that supported the occupation. Following the 2016 ban on the Crimean Tatar Mejlis as an “extremist organization,” occupation authorities banned gatherings by Mejlis members and prosecuted individuals for discussing the Mejlis on social media (see section 6).

United Arab Emirates

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for the freedoms of assembly and association, but the government did not always respect these rights.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The law provides limited freedom of assembly and the government imposed restrictions.

The law requires a government-issued permit for organized public gatherings. Authorities dispersed impromptu protests such as labor strikes and at times arrested participants. While there was no uniform standard for the number of persons who could gather without a permit, civil society representatives in the past have reported authorities could ask groups of four or more to disperse if they did not have a permit. The government did not interfere routinely with informal, nonpolitical gatherings held without a government permit in public places unless there were complaints. The government generally permitted political gatherings that supported its policies. Hotels, citing government regulations, sometimes denied permission for groups such as unregistered religious organizations to rent space for meetings or religious services.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The law provides limited freedom of association. The government imposed some restrictions.
Annex 286

Political organizations, political parties, and trade unions are illegal. All associations and NGOs are required to register with the Ministry of Community Development (formerly Social Affairs), and many that did received government subsidies. Domestic NGOs registered with the ministry were mostly citizens’ associations for economic, religious, social, cultural, athletic, and other purposes. Registration rules require that all voting organizational members, as well as boards of directors, must be local citizens. This requirement excluded almost 90 percent of the population from fully participating in such organizations. In Dubai volunteer organizations were required to register with the Community Development Authority (CDA) and were required to obtain approval from the CDA before conducting fundraising activities.

Associations must follow the government’s censorship guidelines and receive prior government approval before publishing any material. In Abu Dhabi exhibitions, conferences, and meetings require a permit from the Tourism and Culture Authority. To obtain a permit, the event organizer must submit identification documents for speakers along with speaker topics. The government denied permits if it did not approve of the topic or speaker. If the event or speaker continued without an approved permit, the government imposed fines.

United Kingdom

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

A. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, INCLUDING FOR THE PRESS

The law provides for freedom of expression, including for the press, and the government routinely respected these rights. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a functioning democratic political system combined to promote freedom of expression, including for the press.

Freedom of Expression: The law prohibits expressions of hatred toward persons because of their color, race, nationality (including citizenship), ethnic or national origin, religion, or sexual orientation as well as any communication that is threatening or abusive and is intended to harass, alarm, or distress a person. The penalties for such expressions include fines, imprisonment, or both.

Press and Media Freedom: The law’s restrictions on expressions of hatred apply to the print and broadcast media. In Bermuda the law prohibits publishing written words that are
threatening, abusive, or insulting, but only on racial grounds; on other grounds, including sexual orientation, the law prohibits only discriminatory “notices, signs, symbols, emblems, or other representations.”

Uruguay

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The law provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights. SERPAJ reported some increased efforts by the government to delegitimize social movements. According to SERPAJ, the government’s “antipicketing decree” had direct consequences on the forms of popular mobilization by limiting protesters’ ability to block streets and highways. The government responded that the decree did not affect the right to strike as defined in the constitution. SERPAJ also claimed that the “essential services” decree was being used to stifle protests and union activity. In August the umbrella union organization PIT-CNT organized a general strike against the government’s alleged overuse of the essential services decree.

Uzbekistan

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution and law provide for freedom of assembly, but the government often restricted this right. Authorities have the right to suspend or prohibit rallies, meetings, and demonstrations for security reasons. The government often did not grant the permits required for demonstrations. Authorities subjected citizens to large fines, threats, arbitrary detention, and abuse for violating procedures for organizing meetings, rallies, and
demonstrations or for facilitating unsanctioned events by providing space, other facilities, or materials. Organizers of “mass events” with the potential for more than 100 participants must sign agreements with the Ministry of Interior for the provision of security prior to advertising or holding such an event. This regulation was broadly applied, even to private corporate functions.

On August 3, the City Court in Chust, near Namangan, sentenced Pastor Alisher and his assistant Abror, to 10 days of administrative arrest. Judge Bokhodir Kazakov found them and six other individuals guilty of “illegal religious activity“ that was allegedly just a tea party at the pastor’s home. The six other individuals were penalized under the same charges for 999,445 sums ($120) each, with payment due immediately. Their cell phones were also confiscated.

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

While the law provides for freedom of association, the government continued to restrict this right. While the government released new laws and guidance it stated were intended to encourage the growth of civil society, the government still sought to control NGO activity, internationally funded NGOs, and unregulated Islamic and minority religious groups. The operating environment for independent civil society, in particular human right defenders, remained restrictive. Activists reported continuing government control and harassment.

On April 21 in Chimbay City, Karakalpakstan, local police raided a birthday party attended by a group of Christians. The participants were escorted to the local police station and charged with holding an “illegal religious meeting,” and released the next morning. On July 13, group members were summoned to the local court by telephone, not by written notification. The judge found all of them, except the minors, guilty of engaging in illegal religious activity. The women were ordered to pay penalties of $150-$200 (1,230,000 sum to 1,640,000 sum) each and the owner of the house to pay $1,000 (8,220,000 sum). The 11 men involved were sentenced to 5 to 7 days of administrative arrest. Eight of the convicted Christians were 18-19 years of age, and their parents did not receive any formal notification after their children were sentenced. As a result of international pressure, on July 17, the Supreme Court of Karakalpakstan vacated the verdicts of the Chimbay court and ordered restitution of personal belongs to the defendants.

The Ministry of Justice, which oversees the registration of NGOs, requires NGOs to obtain the ministry’s approval to hold large meetings with nonmembers, including foreigners; to seek the
Annex 286

On April 12, the President signed the new Law on Public Control to establish a legal framework for public oversight of the activities of government bodies and government officials. In accordance with the law, citizens, citizens' self-government bodies, noncommercial organizations, and mass media have the right to exercise oversight regarding activities of government bodies and officials.

There are legal restrictions on the types of groups that may be formed, and the law requires that organizations with an operating budget and funds be registered formally with the government. The law allows for a six-month grace period for new organizations to operate while awaiting registration from the Ministry of Justice, during which time the government officially classifies them as “initiative groups.” Several NGOs continued to function as initiative groups for periods longer than six months.

The government issued a number of regulations that affected NGO activity. In May the president issued a decree entitled “Measures to Fundamentally Enhance the Role of Civil Society Institutions in the Process of Democratic Renewal of the Country.” In a separate action, in June the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) issued an order on the procedure for NGOs to inform the government of their planned activities. According to a summary posted on Norma.uz, starting from June 1, NGOs are no longer required to obtain approval from the MoJ in order to conduct events, but they still need to notify the MoJ of plans to conduct public programs. The minimum period for informing the ministry of planned activities is 10 days before the start of an event without the participation of foreign citizens, and 20 days before the start of event with the participation of foreign citizens. The MoJ only provides NGOs with written notice in cases of refusal to conduct the event. On June 27, another order established a new form of annual reporting on the NGO activities for submission to the government. In August the Ministry of Justice adopted the Regulation on Monitoring and Studying Activities of Nongovernmental Noncommercial Organizations, which establishes a separate procedure on monitoring and studying NGOs' activities.

International NGOs praised the development of these procedures, stating that they offered new procedural rules and limitations for the actions of MoJ inspectors; one NGO stated, however, a concern that the latter regulation still provided the authority for the MoJ to audit and harass NGOs. The administrative liability code imposes large fines for violations of procedures governing NGO activity as well as for “involving others” in “illegal NGOs”; the law
does not specify whether the term refers to NGOs suspended or closed by the government or merely NGOs not officially registered. The administrative code also imposes penalties against international NGOs for engaging in political activities, activities inconsistent with their charters, or activities the government did not approve in advance.

In May the president signed a decree abolishing the so-called banking commission, established in 2004 to regulate or oversee NGO receipt of foreign grants. Beginning on September 1, registered NGOs are allowed to receive grants from domestic and foreign donors. Receiving organizations must notify the Ministry of Justice of their grants and present a plan of activities to the ministry that details how the NGO would allocate the funds. If the ministry approves, no other government approvals are required. The ministry requires yearly financial reports from NGOs.

Parliament’s Public Fund for the Support of Nongovernmental, Noncommercial Organizations, and Other Civil Society Institutions continued to conduct grant competitions to implement primarily socioeconomic projects. Some civil society organizations criticized the fund for primarily supporting government-organized NGOs. The law criminalizes membership in organizations the government broadly deemed “extremist.”

Vanuatu

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for the freedoms of assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.

Venezuela

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION
FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The constitution provides for this right, but the government generally repressed or suspended it. The law regulates the right to assembly. Human rights groups continued to criticize the law as enabling the government to charge protesters with serious crimes for participating in peaceful demonstrations. Ambiguous language in the law also allowed the government to criminalize organizations that were critical of the government. Protests and marches require government authorization in advance and are forbidden within designated “security zones.”

Citizens organized sporadic and often spontaneous small-scale protests throughout the year to demand basic services such as water and electricity. The government generally refrained from using the widespread, violent, and in some cases fatal responses they used to quash the 2017 protests, but NGOs reported cases of arbitrary detention and heavy-handed police tactics to quell protests.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for freedom of association and freedom from political discrimination, but the government did not respect these rights. Although professional and academic associations generally operated without interference, a number of associations complained that the TSJ and the National Electoral Council (CNE), which is responsible for convoking all elections and establishing electoral dates and procedures, repeatedly interfered with their attempts to hold internal elections.

A 2016 presidential decree called on the Foreign Ministry to suspend international funding to NGOs when “it is presumed” that the funding is used with “political purposes or for destabilization.” There were no reports the government implemented the decree during the year.

Vietnam

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION
FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The government restricted freedom of peaceful assembly. Law and regulations require persons wishing to gather in a group to apply for a permit, which local authorities issued or denied without explanation. Only those arranging publicized gatherings to discuss sensitive matters appeared to require permits, however, and persons routinely gathered in informal groups without government interference. The government generally did not permit any demonstrations perceived to be political. The law permits security forces to detain individuals gathering or protesting outside of courthouses during trials.

The Ministry of Public Security and local police routinely prevented activists from peacefully assembling. There were numerous reports of police dispersing gatherings of environmental activists, anti-China activists, land rights advocates, human rights defenders, bloggers and independent journalists, women's rights, and former political prisoners.

Social media and multiple activists reported that on June 17, authorities took some 180 people, including those who were involved in protesting the draft SAEZ and cybersecurity laws and those observing the demonstrations, to Tao Dao stadium in Ho Chi Minh City. Some activists including Phan Tieu May said they were not protesting but were taken by authorities from their homes or cafes to the stadium. Authorities searched, and beat those detained. Many of those involved said they sustained injuries to the head, and some lost consciousness. One individual required long-term hospitalization for his injuries.

On August 15, Ho Chi Minh City police and plainclothes individuals beat musician Nguyen Tin and other activists at Casanova Cafe in District 3 in Ho Chi Minh City after Nguyen Tin held an unregistered concert. They tied him to a chair and beat him over the head with his guitar, according to other activists.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The constitution affords individuals the right of association, but the government restricted freedom of association severely. The country's legal and regulatory framework establishes mechanisms for restricting freedom of NGOs to act and organize, including by restricting freedom of association. The government generally prohibited the establishment of private, independent organizations, insisting that persons work within established, party-controlled mass organizations, usually under the aegis of the VFF. The government used complex and
politically registered systems for NGOs and religious organizations to suppress unwelcome political and religious participation.

Laws and regulations governing NGOs restrict their ability to engage in policy advocacy or conduct research outside of state-sanctioned topics and prohibit organizations focused on social science and technology from operating in fields such as economic policy, public policy, political issues, and a range of other areas considered sensitive. Authorities also do not permit them to engage in the public distribution of policy advocacy positions.

The Law on Belief and Religions, which came into effect January 1, still requires religious groups to register with authorities and to inform officials of activities. Authorities had the right to approve or refuse religious activities. Some unregistered religious groups reported an increase in government interference.

Some registered organizations, civil society organizations including governance and environment-focused NGOs, reported increased scrutiny of their activities.

Western Sahara

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

Moroccan law applies. As in internationally recognized Morocco, the Moroccan government limited freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

Moroccan law provides for the right of peaceful assembly. The government generally permitted authorized and unauthorized peaceful demonstrations to occur. According to Moroccan law, groups of more than three persons require authorization from the Ministry of Interior to protest publicly. As in internationally recognized Morocco, some NGOs complained that the government used administrative delays and other methods to suppress or discourage unwanted peaceful assembly. Security forces intervened on occasion to disband both authorized and unauthorized protests when officials deemed the demonstration a
threat to public security. The October 3 UN secretary-general’s report on Western Sahara cited claims by some local NGOs that Moroccan security forces had forcibly dispersed demonstrations related to the right to self-determination, the disposal of natural wealth and resources, and the rights of detainees.

Several proindependence organizations and some human rights NGOs stated that in recent years the submission of applications for permits to hold demonstrations declined because police rarely granted them. In most cases the organizers proceeded with planned demonstrations in the absence of authorization, and there was no discernable difference in security forces’ reaction to authorized or unauthorized protests. Violent confrontations between security forces and protesters were less common than in previous years, according to several local NGOs, although violent dispersals did occur on occasion. Security force practices were similar to those in internationally recognized Morocco; however, in Western Sahara there was often a higher ratio of members of security forces to protesters.

The CNDH’s three regional commissions monitored 52 demonstrations from April 2017 to March and concluded that the security forces’ use of violence to disperse demonstrations decreased during the year.

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

Moroccan law and practice apply. Generally, the government denied official recognition to NGOs that it considered advocates against Islam’s status as the state religion, the legitimacy of the monarchy, or Morocco’s territorial integrity. Authorities noted that 418 organizations were registered in Laayoune and 288 in Dakhla, the two largest cities in Western Sahara. The Laayoune branch of the CNDH reported that it received complaints from three organizations that were denied registration during the year. The branches contacted government authorities and following mediation, one of the organizations in Laayoune was in the process of being registered. According to the CNDH, of the 10 organizations denied registration in 2017, five were registered, one was in the process of being registered, two were referred to judiciary, and two did not receive a response as of September.

The government tolerated activities of several unregistered organizations.

**Yemen**
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The law provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, but these rights were not respected in the majority of the country, i.e., areas which the government did not control.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The law provides for freedom of peaceful assembly. The Houthis and their affiliates responded to demonstrations and protests in various parts of the country with excessive force.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

While the law provides for freedom of association, there were reports Houthis harassed and shut down NGOs. The law regulates associations and foundations and outlines the establishment and activities of NGOs. Authorities required annual registration. The law exempts registered NGOs from taxes and tariffs and requires the government to provide a reason for denying an NGO registration, such as deeming an NGO's activities “detrimental” to the state. It forbids NGO involvement in political or religious activities. It permits foreign funding of NGOs. The law requires government observation of NGO internal elections. There were no known attempts by NGOs to register during the year.

Zambia

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for freedom of peaceful assembly; however, the government restricted this right, and police and progovernment groups disrupted meetings, rallies, and other activities of opposition political parties and civil society organizations. In dealing with demonstrators, police adopted heavy-handed practices such as surrounding the venue to
prevent meetings from taking place, forcefully breaking up demonstrations, and arresting demonstrators.

The Public Order Act requires political parties and other groups to notify police in advance of any rallies but does not require formal approval or permit. In 1995 the Supreme Court declared provisions in the act that previously gave police the power to regulate assemblies, public meetings, or processions unconstitutional. The police, however, have continued to disregard this landmark ruling and continued to stop opposition and civil society groups from holding public gatherings. For example, on October 19, police in Ndola arrested a small group of civil society and church officials during a meeting and charged them with unlawful assembly. The meeting, which took place at the Ndola Central Baptist Church, was organized by the Center for Trade Policy and Development as a public discussion about the government’s 2019 national budget. Police justified the arrests on the premise the meeting had become “political” and the group had not notified them of the gathering.

Opposition political parties complained of selective application of the Public Order Act, noting police allowed ruling party gatherings without notification. Police also prevented opposition and civil society groups planning to protest government actions from gathering on the grounds that police received notifications too late, had insufficient staff to provide security, or the gathering would coincide with government events in the same province. For example, in the lead up to the July 26 Lusaka mayoral elections, police in the district of Kanyama blocked opposition UPND leader Hakainde Hichilema from holding a campaign rally in the area after the group had registered the event with the Electoral Commission, ostensibly because President Lungu would be visiting the area. Although police claimed inadequate staff to provide security for gatherings, police responded in force to disrupt opposition gatherings and often allowed ruling party supporters to disrupt them.

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION**

The constitution provides for freedom of association. While the government generally respected the right to freedom of association, it placed some limits on this right through various mechanisms. For example, although it generally went unenforced, the NGO Act requires all organizations to apply for registration to the registrar of societies. The registration process is stringent, long, and gives the registrar considerable discretion. The law also places restrictions on funding from foreign sources. For this reason donors, including some UN agencies, required all organizations to register under the NGO Act before receiving funding. According to the Southern African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes,
uncertainties surrounding the implementation of the NGO Act and NGO policy affected the operations of civil society organizations.

Despite these restrictions the government liberally allowed civil society organizations to hold meetings in which they criticized it. For example, on March 6, the Oasis Forum, an association of civil society organizations, hosted a public discussion in Lusaka on a topic critical of the government.

Zimbabwe

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

The constitution provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, but the government restricted these rights.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY

The government restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly, association, or both. The Public Order and Security Act (POSA) requires organizers to notify police of their intention to hold a public gathering—defined as 15 or more individuals—seven days in advance. Failure to do so may result in criminal prosecution as well as civil liability. The law also allows police to prohibit a gathering based on security concerns but requires police to file an affidavit in a magistrate’s court stating the reasons behind the denial. The government enacted POSA after a demonstration resulted in security forces killing six opposition protestors on August 1. A seventh individual died from injuries related to the protests.

Although many groups did not seek permits, other groups informed police of their planned events, and police either denied permission or gave no response. The MDC Alliance accused police of using the cholera epidemic in Harare as an excuse to ban large public assemblies to prevent an MDC Alliance rally on September 15. Media reported that from September 16-22 police forcibly removed vendors who refused to comply with orders related to the cholera outbreak to vacate their stalls in the Harare CBD. On October 11, police arrested Peter Mutasa, president of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), and 35 trade unionists
in Harare and other major city centers as they awaited a court decision to overturn the ban on their planned demonstration against the government’s 2 percent tax on electronic transfers. Police had previously denied ZCTU’s request for a permit, and a Harare magistrate dismissed ZCTU’s challenge to the police ban on October 12.

Authorities often denied requests by civil society, trade unions, religious groups, or political parties other than ZANU-PF to hold public events if the agenda conflicted with government policy positions. There were several reports of political rallies interrupted by opposing political parties.

On February 26, police used tear gas and water cannons to disperse dozens of National University of Science and Technology students protesting continued strikes by lecturers. Police dogs injured eight students, while police arrested 61 students. A local NGO reported 15 students sought medical treatment after this incident.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The constitution and law provide for freedom of association, but the government restricted this right. Although the government did not restrict the formation of political parties or unions, ZANU-PF supporters, sometimes with government support or acquiescence, intimidated and harassed members of organizations perceived to be associated with other political parties. For example, a local NGO reported that on July 25, a local councilor in Mbire threatened to have community members beaten and their homes burnt down if they voted for opposition political parties. Local NGOs provided multiple reports similar to this one.
Annex 287

UK Government Official Site, *Protests and marches: letting the police know*
Protests and marches: letting the police know

By law you must tell the police in writing 6 days before a public march if you’re the organiser.

Tell the police the:

- date and time of the march
- route
- the names and addresses of the organisers

The police have the power to:

- limit or change the route of your march
- set any other condition of your march

If you arrange a march at short notice, you must still tell the police as soon as you can.

The police can also:

- change the location
- limit how long a rally lasts
- limit the amount of people who attend
- stop a sit-down protest if it blocks road traffic or public walkways

If there’s no march involved

Related content

Police powers of arrest: your rights
(police-powers-of-arrest-your-rights)

Petition Parliament and the government
(petition-government)
If there’s no march organised as part of your protest, you do not have to tell the police.

Explore the topic

Penalties, sentences and police (/browse/justice/penalties-sentences-police)
Annex 288

Right to Assembly, *The right of peaceful assembly in France*
The right of peaceful assembly in France

The International Human Rights Framework on the Right of Peaceful Assembly

France is a State Party to the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 21 governs the right of peaceful assembly, providing that:

The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

France is also a State Party to the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, which allows individuals to petition the Human Rights Committee if they believe the State has violated their human rights as protected under the Covenant.

At regional level, France is a State Party to the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. Article 11 governs freedom of assembly and association:

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.

The Domestic Legal Framework on the Right of Peaceful Assembly

Constitutional Provisions

There is no explicit protection of the right of peaceful assembly in the French Constitution. The 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, however, protects the right of resistance to oppression and to freedom of expression.

National Legislation

Under French law, a notification of an assembly must be made to the local town hall or city police station in the case of Paris, at least 48 hours in advance. The organisers are required to give their names, addresses, the aim of the assembly, the date, the place, et and the route of any
demonstration. The measures are set out in the Decree-Law of 23 October 1935 governing measures to strengthen the maintenance of public order.

In the wake of terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015, a state of emergency was imposed, which included a temporary ban on demonstrations. When the government sought to extend the initial three-month state of emergency, thousands of protestors took to the streets in Paris in March 2016 in protest.

Part of a new law on the maintenance of public order during demonstrations (No. 2019-780 DC), adopted on 13 March 2019, was deemed unconstitutional by the French Supreme Court in a judgment in April 2019. The provision would have inserted an Article L. 211-4-1 in the Internal Security Code allowing the authorities, in certain circumstances, to prohibit participation in a demonstration on the public highway. The broad preventive nature of the prohibition would, the Court concluded, have been disproportionate.

On 9 July 2020, the Constitutional Court held that Parliament had not duly authorised the Executive (namely, the Prime Minister) to replace a notification regime by an authorisation regime on the sole ground of the COVID-19 pandemic. The decision was therefore struck down.

The Legal Framework on Use of Force During Assemblies

The Use of Force

International Legal Rules

Under international law, the duty on the State and its law enforcement agencies is to facilitate the enjoyment of the right of peaceful assembly. According to the 1990 United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials:

In the dispersal of assemblies that are unlawful but non-violent, law enforcement officials shall avoid the use of force or, where that is not practicable, shall restrict such force to the minimum extent necessary.

All force used by police and other law enforcement agencies must be necessary for a legitimate law enforcement purpose and proportionate to that purpose.

National Legislation

According to the 2013 Internal Security Code, force must be used only when necessary and in a manner that is proportionate to the seriousness of the threat.

The Use of Firearms

International Legal Rules
According to the 1990 United Nations Basic Principles, in the dispersal of violent assemblies, a law enforcement official may only use a firearm against a specific individual where this is necessary to confront an imminent threat of death or serious injury or a grave and proximate threat to life.

**National Legislation**

The provisions of the 2013 Internal Security Code were amended in 2017. Article L. 435-1 of the Code now allows police officers and gendarmes may use their firearms "in case of absolute necessity and in a strictly proportionate manner" including when, after two warnings have been given, "they can not otherwise defend the places they occupy or the persons entrusted to them" or they cannot otherwise effect the arrest "of persons who seek to evade custody or investigation and who are likely to perpetrate in their flight, attacks on lives or physical integrity". This is more permissive than international law allows.

**State Compliance with its Legal Obligations**

**Views and Concluding Observations of United Nations Treaty Bodies**

In its 2015 Concluding Observations on France, the Human Rights Committee did not address the right of peaceful assembly.

**Regional Jurisprudence**

*Les Authentiks and Supras Auteuil 91 v. France (2016)*

This case concerned the dissolution of two Paris-Saint-Germain supporters’ associations, following fights in which some of their members were involved in in 2010, leading to the death of one supporter. The European Court of Human Rights found that there had been no violation of the right of freedom of assembly and association.

*Barraco v. France (2009)*

The applicant was a lorry driver. In 2002, 17 motorists, including the applicant, took part in a traffic-slowing operation on a motorway, which involved driving along a predetermined route in a convoy, at slow speed, occupying several lanes, to slow down the traffic on the motorway. When three drivers at the front of the convoy, one of whom was the applicant, stopped their vehicles, completely blocking the road for other users, the police arrested them. The drivers concerned were summoned to appear in court for having obstructed the public highway by placing or attempting to place on it an object that obstructed vehicular traffic, or using or attempting to use any means to obstruct it – in the instant case by stopping their vehicles several times. The court acquitted the accused, but the public prosecutor appealed and the Court of Appeal set aside that judgment, found them guilty as charged and sentenced them each to a suspended term of three months’
imprisonment together with a €1,500 fine. The Court of Cassation dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant.

The applicant’s conviction was held to have amounted to interference by the public authorities with his right to freedom of peaceful assembly, which included the freedom to demonstrate. The interference had been “prescribed by law” and had pursued the legitimate aims of preventing disorder and protecting the rights and freedoms of others. As to whether it had been necessary in a democratic society, it was to be noted that no formal prior notice of the demonstration had been given as required by the relevant domestic law. However, the authorities had been aware of it and had also had the opportunity to take measures for the protection of safety and public order, for example by organising police protection and a police escort. So even if the demonstration had not been tacitly tolerated, at least it had not been prohibited. Moreover, the applicant had not been convicted of taking part in the demonstration as such, but for his particular conduct during the demonstration, namely, blocking a motorway and thereby causing more of an obstruction than would normally be caused by exercising one’s right to freedom of peaceful assembly. It was indeed clear from the case file that while the demonstration was in progress, from 6 am to 11 am, the traffic had been held up, but also that several total stoppages had been caused by drivers at the head of the convoy, including the applicant, stopping their vehicles. This complete blockage of the traffic had clearly gone beyond the mere inconvenience caused by any demonstration on the public highway. The police, whose task had been to protect safety and public order, had arrested the three demonstrators only in order to unblock the traffic, after the drivers had been warned several times not to stop their vehicles on the motorway and informed of the penalties they could incur. In that context and for several hours, the applicant had been able to exercise his right to freedom of peaceful assembly and the authorities had displayed the tolerance that should be shown towards such gatherings. The applicant’s conviction and sentence had therefore not been disproportionate to the aims pursued.

**Views of Civil Society**

In March 2021, CIVICUS reported that French authorities have cracked down on civil society organisations (CSOs) accused of opposing the ‘Republican order’ and being ‘radical Islamists’. CSOs have also been under attack from extreme right and mainstream political forces, who have expressed stigmatising views towards Muslims and Muslim organisations. Following this, the French government led several initiatives which threatened civic space and the rule of law in France, which includes the draft Anti-Separatism law and the draft bill on Global Security. Objectors to the draft law on Global Security have maintained ongoing protests. The most controversial protest occurred in Paris, where organisers noted that police officers blocked access to the protest, refused to reveal their identification numbers and assaun.

According to Freedom House’s **2019 report on France**:

**Freedom of assembly is normally respected. However, rights organizations expressed concern that**
an anti-terrorism law passed in 2017 limits the right to demonstrate.

In November 2018, the yellow vest protests against anticipated fuel tax increases broke out across the country. The protests grew into a mass movement that reflected deep-seated discontent with French political elites among working- and middle-class people. Some of the protests devolved into riots, with demonstrators blocking roads and damaging property, including the interior of the Arc de Triomphe. However, security forces responded to the demonstrations in a manner that Amnesty International described as “extremely heavy-handed,” injuring hundreds with tear gas, rubber bullets, and sting-ball grenades. Ten people died during the protests, which continued through the end of the year, often from car accidents at roadblocks.

Downloads
Annex 289

Zpravy, Law on rallies flawed, Prague officials plan amends (29 April 2008)
Law on rallies flawed, Prague officials plan amends

Michal Pavec

Prague - Prague authorities are working on a bill on public assemblies, since they see the current legal framework as providing those who organize demonstrations with too much power.

Also, the authorities plan to relocate Prague’s "Hyde Park" - a place where people may assembly without informing authorities. from Palackého náměstí to the Letná Plain or nearby Hvězda Park in Prague 6.

According to the authorities, Palacké náměstí cannot sufficiently serve as a place for assemblies, as it is somewhat limited and more massive assemblies can create problems.

"Bigger crowds of people do not fit the space marked for assemblies and that often causes traffic complications on the road since it is an intersection of a number of busy tram lines here," explained Deputy Mayor Rudolf Blažek.

Three days too few
The municipal authorities argue there is a growing number of assemblies announced by groups, in general considered extremist.

The Prague municipality has recently banned two May Day marches announced by Neo-Nazi groups.

The officials complain that the current legal framework doesn't provide them with enough time to examine an announced assembly.

The municipal authority has to decide in no more than three days since the moment it learns about the planned event.

"In the case of suspicion, the strict deadline doesn't give the authorities enough time to obtain adequate information that could serve as the grounds to ban the assembly and to examine the information properly to be able to reason their decision to ban the assembly," said Blažek.

**Troubles with weekends**

In addition, the current law doesn't set the three days to be weekdays. Thus, with announcing an assembly electronically on Friday night, the authorities are left with only one day (Monday) to analyse the issue.

This year in January, for example, Mayor of Pilsen Pavel Rödl breached the law by banning a Neo-Nazi march a few weeks after it was announced.

Experts of the Prague authorities are presently analyzing the law on assemblies. They are to produce their findings in mid-June.

Pokud jste v článku zaznamenali chybu nebo překlep, dejte nám, prosím, vědět prostřednictvím [kontaktního formuláře]. Děkujeme!
Annex 290

AA, German court upholds ban on pro-Palestine protest in Berlin (30 April 2022)
German court upholds ban on pro-Palestine protest in Berlin

Police barred rally over fears of repeat of alleged anti-Semitic incidents at demonstrations held last week

Oliver Towfigh Nia | 30.04.2022

A Berlin court has upheld a ban on a planned pro-Palestine demonstration in the German capital.

Due to alleged anti-Semitic incidents on the sidelines of an anti-Israel protest last week, the Berlin administrative court endorsed the ban imposed by police earlier this week, a court official told the German Press Agency (dpa) on Saturday.

It was unclear whether the organizers will challenge the decision in a higher court.

Palestinian groups planned to hold a protest in Berlin’s Kreuzberg district against recent Israeli aggression in the occupied West Bank and the flashpoint Al-Aqsa Mosque complex in East Jerusalem.

Police barred the protest in an announcement on Thursday, saying there could be a repeat of what they alleged were anti-Semitic incidents at similar demonstrations held last Friday and Saturday.

“Based on experiences from the recent past” there is “the immediate danger” of anti-Semitic slogans, glorification of violence and acts of violence, police officials were quoted as saying.

Several people were arrested after last week’s protests as officials accused participants of throwing stones and firecrackers at police officers.

The police also alleged that there were anti-Semitic and inflammatory slogans at the rallies.

“We saw crimes, anti-Semitic exclamations and slogans of the worst kind during the demonstrations last weekend. That is completely unacceptable,” Berlin’s Interior Senator Iris Spranger said earlier this week.
Palestinian civic leaders in Berlin have repeatedly made clear they do not condone anti-Semitic slurs at demonstrations, saying their only objective is to highlight the ongoing repression by Israel in the occupied Palestinian territories.

Germany is a staunch ally of Israel and has largely remained silent over the oppression and discrimination Palestinians face from Israeli authorities in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem.

Anadolu Agency website contains only a portion of the news stories offered to subscribers in the AA News Broadcasting System (HAS), and in summarized form. Please contact us for subscription options.

**Related topics**

- Ban
- Berlin
- Demonstration
- Germany
- pro-Palestinian

---

**World**

- Zelenskyy says modern combat aircraft needed to defend against Russian strikes
- Russian Defense Ministry accuses US of preparing provocations with chemicals in Ukraine
- Belgian field hospital medics moved by bravery of Turkish quake survivors
- US to crack down on child labor amid rise in violations
- Azerbaijani military personnel return from medical duties in quake-hit Türkiye

---

**Related news**

- Germany calls on Russia to return to New START nuclear treaty
German archbishop vows further investigation into abuse in Catholic church

Strike grounds hundreds of flights in northwestern Germany

Majority of Germans against tank, jet deliveries to Ukraine: Survey

Thousands rally in Berlin for peace talks with Russia

India calls for dialogue to end Russia-Ukraine war
German court upholds ban on pro-Palestine protest in Berlin

Annex 291

France 24, *Pro-Palestinian rally in Paris banned amid rising Israel-Gaza tensions*  
(13 May 2021)
Pro-Palestinian rally in Paris banned amid rising Israel-Gaza tensions

The Paris police prefecture on Thursday issued an order banning a Palestinian solidarity demonstration planned for Saturday in the French capital as weekend pro-Palestinian rallies were being planned across the world following Israel’s latest deadly offensive on the Gaza Strip.

Earlier on Thursday, French Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin had asked the police to ban a pro-Palestinian protest in Paris this weekend over the conflict with Israel, fearing a repeat of clashes during a similar situation in 2014.

Activists had called the protest in the Barbès district of northern Paris to demonstrate against Israel’s use of force in the Gaza Strip in response to the rocket fire by militant group Hamas at the Jewish state.

"I have asked the Paris police chief to ban the protests on Saturday linked to the recent tensions in the Middle East," Darmanin wrote on Twitter.

"Serious disturbances to public order were seen in 2014," he added, urging police chiefs elsewhere in France to remain vigilant over demonstrations.

Several peaceful Palestinian solidarity demonstrations took place in France in the summer of July 2014 to denounce an Israeli offensive on the Gaza Strip.

On July 19, 2014 though, several thousand protesters defied a ban on a demonstration at Barbès and the rally rapidly degenerated into violent clashes that lasted for hours.

**Arrest of Palestinian rights advocacy group condemned**

On Wednesday, Paris police detained the head of French Palestinian rights advocacy group Association France Palestine Solidarité (AFPS) near the foreign ministry building for several hours before he was released.

Bertrand Heilbronn was arrested after he met with a French foreign ministry advisor as part of a delegation including members of parliament and representatives of trade unions and organisations, said the AFPS in a statement.

📅 A la sortie d’un rendez-vous au Ministère des affaires étrangères, Bertrand Heilbronn, président de @AFPSOfficiel a été arrêté par la police pour avoir organisé le rassemblement pacifique qui accompagnait la délégation reçue (avec 3 parlementaires dont je fais partie)
pic.twitter.com/PmUb2c1fWw
— Elsa Faucillon (@ElsaFaucillon) May 12, 2021

A demonstration outside the foreign ministry was scheduled for 4pm local time, but the decision to ban it was only announced at 1pm while many participants were already on their way to the site, said AFPS.

The detention of the veteran 71-year-old activist sparked outrage from several activists and political figures on the left, including Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the leader of La France insoumise (France Unbowed).

Last year, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) overturned a conviction by France’s highest court, the Court of Cassation, which criminalised peaceful protests by the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement.

BDS seeks an Israeli withdrawal from occupied Palestinian territory.

The ECHR found that the freedom of expression of 11 BDS supporters was violated by the October 2015 ruling in Paris.

*(FRANCE 24 with AFP)*
Annex 292

11 pct of assemblies banned in Seoul last year due to pandemic: activists | Yonhap News Agency

황장진

SEOUL, Aug. 12 (Yonhap) -- Human rights activists on Thursday accused the government of violating citizens' right of assembly by restricting rallies excessively and often arbitrarily during the coronavirus pandemic.

Authorities have banned protests and rallies with certain numbers of people under social distancing guidelines to prevent the spread of COVID-19 since early last year.

A task force of civic groups formed to monitor public power said 11.06 percent of assemblies were banned in Seoul last year, citing data from the National Police Agency.

The rate compares to 0.002 percent and 0.003 percent in 2018 and 2019, respectively.

Of a total of 34,944 rallies reported to authorities in 2020, 3,865 were disallowed, the team said.

They criticized the government for applying much stricter social distancing rules to protest rallies than other gatherings.

This July 3, 2021, file photo shows members of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions holding...
a protest rally in Seoul. (Yonhap)

They also claimed protest bans were not adjusted in accordance with changes in the number of infections. For example, COVID-19 cases in Seoul began to surge in August 2020, but the number of prohibited assemblies began to increase in February 2020.

They took issue with the infectious disease control act that gives heads of local governments the power to restrict freedom of assembly and demonstration during an epidemic.

"There are no clear standards regarding how much and how long assemblies can be banned, so an indefinite prohibition is made possible," a member of the group said.

"The judiciary and legislature should correct the arbitrary exercise of administrative powers but they do not play such a role."

(END)
Annex 293


(excerpts)
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

REPORT 2014
PART I

SOCIAL AND LEGAL MONITORING OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN RUSSIA
The main problems with work of commissioners for human rights consist primarily of ensuring their independence and protection from possible pressure from regional authorities, and balance between their organizational and financial resources and their objectives set forth in legislation. The difference between concepts of creating a state institution for protection of human rights hinders the creation of a unified system of measures aimed at preventing violations and restoring violated rights of the citizens of the Russian Federation, prevents positive public opinion on the state abiding by its constitutional obligations. Irregular and incoherent measures, lack of systematic interaction between commissioners have negative effect on efficiency of correcting violations of human rights.

The High Commissioner paid great attention to development and introduction of a draft law “On Changes in Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Aimed at further Development of Commissioners' Activities” that would provide for creation a unified independent system of state protection of citizens' rights and 1) set out special procedures for nomination and amotion for regional commissioners; 2) define categories of entities with the right of nominating candidates for the post of regional commissioner, including human rights watchdogs; 3) ensured the right of immediate access for commissioners on the matters of their competence to heads and high regional, local and other officials with relevant state or public authority as provided for in federal law, as well as prison administrations.

Moreover, the amendments in the legal framework are aimed at improving organizational and financial resources of regional commissioners for human rights, including their own offices financed from regional budgets. This, on the whole, ensures efficient work within the system of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian Federation and regional commissioners for human rights.

The aforementioned meeting with the President of the Russian Federation on December 5, 2014 resulted in a series of instructions, including ones for commissioners for human rights in federal districts, on ways of developing human resources policies and ensuring independence of commissioners for human rights in Russia’s regions.

The High Commissioner hopes that most issues concerning organization of work of regional commissioners for human rights and their independence from executive authorities could be discussed in the near future at the meetings of federal districts coordination councils.

**Appeals Activities**

In 2014 the High Commissioner received 59,100 appeals from citizens and governmental and non-governmental organizations. The number of appeals increased by 43.6% compared to the previous year.

In 2014 the office of the High Commissioner received in person over 4,000 people (citizens of the Russian Federation, foreign citizens and stateless persons).

Over 8,500 appeals and complaints were received via call centre phones, about 7,600 of them were received by means of an e-form which was set up on the official web site of the High Commissioner in 2014.

Most complaints — 98.5% — came from the territory of the Russian Federation, the rest from abroad.

---

87. The draft law provides that the candidate for the post of regional commissioner before it is considered in legislative (representative) regional government body is to be approved by the High Commissioner for Human Rights of the Russian Federation, and decisions on amotion are made after consultations with the High Commissioner for Human Rights of the Russian Federation.

The current e-form was first set up along with the renewal of the official website of the High Commissioner in 2014. Before that, e-applications could be submitted via the previous form (available at www.old.ombudsmanrf.org), and e-mail.

Fig. 18. Comparative statistics of the number and means of submission of appeals to the High Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian Federation in 2011–2014.

- **Appeals via electronic means**
- **Complaints and appeals from citizens**
- **Total number of written appeals from citizens, state agencies and NGOs.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Appeals via electronic means</th>
<th>Complaints and appeals from citizens</th>
<th>Total number of written appeals from citizens, state agencies and NGOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>7,592</td>
<td>32,382</td>
<td>39,977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>3,081</td>
<td>22,997</td>
<td>26,078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>3,665</td>
<td>24,930</td>
<td>28,595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2,529</td>
<td>26,197</td>
<td>28,726</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

89. The current e-form was first set up along with the renewal of the official website of the High Commissioner in 2014. Before that, e-applications could be submitted via the previous form (available at www.old.ombudsmanrf.org), and e-mail.
Number of appeals received from federal districts.

Distribution of received appeals in groups of rights and freedoms.

Fig. 19.

Fig. 20.
Main topics of appeals related to economic rights in 2014.

![Fig. 21.](image1)

- Termination of employment contract: 27.6%
- Individual and collective employment disputes: 13.4%
- Issues of recognition of housing rights: 12.8%
- Land disputes: 18.4%
- Civil transactions: 15.3%
- Other: 12.5%

Main topics of appeals related to social rights and freedoms.

![Fig. 22.](image2)

- Provision of housing: 36.4%
- Issues of eviction: 22.4%
- Utility payments: 9.1%
- Healthcare and health insurance: 6.8%
- Admission and payment of pensions: 6.7%
- Social protection of certain groups of people: 5.2%
- Social protection of servicemen and members of their families: 6.8%
- Other: 9.1%
Most appeals to the High Commissioner related to on the following complaints:

- protection of human rights in penal proceedings (complaints regarding sentences, rules and court decisions, violation of right to legal defense, violations during interrogations and investigations) — 32.1%;
- protection of housing rights (provision of housing, eviction, transfer form substandard housing, recognition of housing ownership, rent, utility payments and other) — 18.3%;
- protection of prisoners’ rights (in particular, complaints on conditions of detention) — 11.2%;
- social protection and healthcare — 6.9%;
- protection of labour rights (terminations of employment agreements, collective or individual employment disputes) — 4.6%.

The appeals addressed to the Commissioner covered almost all domains of human life (apart from the aforementioned there were issues of education and culture, land use, marriage and family, administrative responsibility, business and a lot more).

The increase in the number of appeals on the aforementioned and other problems in 2014 compared to the previous year was almost gradual. Still, the number of appeals on certain issues increased twofold or more (for example, on the issue of Russian citizenship — by 2.7 times).

**Restoration of Human Rights: Some Examples**

On the whole, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, on its own and in cooperation with relevant authorities, took measures to restore violated rights in 25,303 cases.

61 lawsuits were filed in courts of general jurisdiction. Three appeals were sent to the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, 20 petitions were submitted to cassation and supervisory bodies. Staff members of the Office of the High Commissioner took part in 60 hearings on cases and materials related to some events which had sparked a public outcry.
PART II

CURRENT PROBLEMS OF PROTECTION AND RESTORATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS BASED ON CONSIDERED COMPLAINTS AND APPEALS RECEIVED BY THE HIGH COMMISSIONER IN 2014
"Approve Impossible to Prohibit"

The practice of approving applications for public actions sometimes grows into full-scale procedures of requesting and granting "leaves", which eventually leads to impossibility of conducting events.

According to the Federal Law No.54-FZ of June 19, 2004 “On Assemblies, Meetings, Demonstrations, Marches and Picketing”, governmental or municipal authorities may refuse to approve a public event. It happens if another event is applied for at the same time at the same place. Besides, there is an established practice of refusing the approval if the declared goals differ from evaluations of the officials on the nature of the event.

Mr. P., a resident of St. Petersburg, was refused a 20-person picketing by the administration of the Central district of the city91. The applicant suggested three alternative locations in the city center, yet none of them were accepted by the officials. At the same time the Smolninskiy District Court of St. Petersburg ruled that none of the reasons presented by the Administration were legitimate to refuse the approval of the event. However, despite the apparent triumph of justice, the public event could no longer be held: up to the court decision the refusal was still effective and after its ruling in favor of the complainants the event itself became irrelevant.

A resident of Moscow, Mr. N., filed an application to the Prefecture of the Central Administrative District of Moscow for picketing at Nikolskaya Street92. He was refused an approval of his planned event with reference to inability to ensure security of the participants in the picketing and other people as well. The High Commissioner in her petition to the Moscow City Court Presidium in defense of Mr. N.'s position notes that the prefecture's position cannot be deemed legitimate, since according to a decree of the Government of Moscow Nikolskaya Street is a major pedestrian area, therefore people can walk the whole width of the street, which is 10–15 meters. Thus, the presence of 2 to 5 declared participants in it could hardly threaten anyone's security. The Moscow City Court did not agree with the High Commissioner's arguments. In this view, an appeal on the court decision is being prepared for the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.

The procedure of approving implies not just unilateral decision on the part of a government authority on approval or refusal of holding public actions, but a joint search for a compromise. In each individual case of refusal to approve a public event viable arguments should be presented to justify its prohibition due to necessity to protect public interests. That is the exact position that is reflected in the rulings of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation93.

Governmental authorities are also charged with informing the organizers of a justified suggestion on conducting the event at a different time and place, if it is not possible due to objective circumstances94. Replies to the High Commissioner’s inquiries revealed that the number of refusals varies from 8.5% (Yekaterinburg) to 23% (Samara). Still the organizers of non-approved events are not always presented with alternatives to time and place of these actions.

One should note minimal practice of administrative action against officials whose actions may constitute elements of offence in terms of infringement of citizens’ rights to freedom of public assembly.

According to statistics of the Judicial Department of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation for the first half of 2014, only 11 cases under Article 5.38 of the Code of Administrative Offence of the Russian Federation were filed in courts (violation of laws on assemblies, meetings, demonstrations, marches and picketing). 10 of them were considered, 4 were dismissed due to jurisdiction problems and incompletions in the records, four officials were relieved from liability. Only two people were fined 20,000 rubles in total.

91. Collective complaint No.KL-1503 of November 12, 2013
It is suggested that each case of unlawful restriction by government officials of the constitutional rights of the people to freedom of assembly and freedom of speech and should be investigated with regard to Article 5.38 of the Code of Administrative Offenses of the Russian Federation.

Implementation of legal norms which regulate public events that differ from their declared goals leads to imbalance of relations between citizens and the authorities.

The aim of a public event is to draw attention of the general public and the authorities to a certain issue and inform representatives of the government on the organizers’ viewpoint.

The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, when considered the term “approval”, noted that its constitutional legal sense implies the right of a public authority to present the organizer of a public event with alternative time and place for a manifestation, providing legitimate motivations for such limitations with a full list of legal grounds concerning safety for life and health as well as normal lives of the citizens.

A possible solution to preventing further limitations of freedom of assembly is uploading maps of population centers to official websites of regional and local authorities in the regions of the Russian Federation with highlighted areas that are acceptable (unacceptable) for public events in accordance with the law. Such open information could promote public events in strict accordance with the law.

Monitoring of law enforcement bodies’ activities on ensuring public order in Moscow shows that, on the whole, actions of police officers are lawful, correct and justified. In the recent year the police have become a lot less harsh towards protesters. Police officers on duty wear special badges with their register number for their identification.

In 2014, Moscow police drew up 323 incident reports under Part 2 of Article 20.2 of the Code of Administrative Offenses of the Russian Federation (conduction of a public event without notification). That is 83 less than in 2013, which may be considered a positive trend. Yet the number of incident reports under Part 5 of Article 20.2 of this Code (violation of the order of a public event by its participant) in 2014 was a lot higher in 2014–716 compared to 249 in 2013.

Some police stations do not have proper conditions to keep in custody and make prompt records in relation to a large number of detainees. Long-term detention cases are observed. At the same time, the High Commissioner notes that objective information should be received and distributed, and it is unacceptable to deliberately distribute false information about and doubtful assessment of police officers’ actions, which seem to deliberately set a contradiction between the general public and law enforcement authorities.

Today we witness productive cooperation between the staffers of commissioners and the representatives of law enforcement bodies. Such cooperation makes it possible to analyze current events objectively, as well as direct information to eliminate problems and resolve certain issues on site. In the end this practice appeared to be of great interest to the policemen themselves, since it not only maintains discipline in the police, but also makes it possible to restore the real picture in case it is distorted due to misinformation.

The High Commissioner believes that the system of interaction of the office of the High Commissioner with police officers in Moscow requires further development, especially in the aspect of prompt exchange of information with officials responsible for upholding public order during mass protest events. Therefore, creation of a three-party work group with participation of the General Administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia in Moscow, the Office of the High Commissioner, and staffers of the Commissioner...