

**BHY**

CR 2006/29 (traduction)

CR 2006/29 (translation)

Mardi 28 mars 2006 à 10 heures

Tuesday 28 March 2006 at 10 a.m.

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Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de président : Veuillez vous asseoir. L'audience est ouverte. Le président Higgins ne pourra être des nôtres ce matin en raison d'un rendez-vous important. Elle m'a chargé de présider cette audience. Le juge Parra-Aranguren vient de m'informer qu'il ne serait pas non plus en mesure d'assister à l'audience.

La Cour entendra maintenant la déposition du prochain témoin produit par la Serbie-et-Monténégro, M. Dragoljub Mićunović. Le témoin peut être introduit dans la salle d'audiences.

[Le témoin entre et prend place à la barre.]

Monsieur Mićunović, je vous invite à faire la déclaration solennelle prévue pour les témoins, dont l'énoncé figure à l'alinéa a) de l'article 64 du Règlement de la Cour.

M. MIĆUNOVIĆ [*interprétation du serbe*] : Je déclare solennellement, en tout honneur et en toute conscience, que je dirai la vérité, toute la vérité et rien que la vérité.

Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de président : Monsieur Stojanović, je vous invite maintenant à commencer l'interrogatoire du témoin. Je demanderai au témoin de s'interrompre régulièrement pour permettre l'interprétation consécutive du serbe.

M. STOJANOVIĆ [*interprétation du serbe*] : Je vous remercie. J'invite maintenant Monsieur Mićunović à donner lecture de sa déposition à la Cour.

Mr. MIĆUNOVIĆ [*interpretation from Serbian*] : Mr. Vice-President, Members of the Court, let me say what a great honour it is to testify before this honourable Court. I was born in 1930 in Toplica in southern Serbia. In 1960 I was appointed professor in the faculty of philosophy in Belgrade. I was expelled from the University in 1975, with a group of eight other professors, for my commitment to democratic values and freedom of thought and expression and for criticizing the government, which was suppressing human rights in the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. In the 1980s I was a member of the Yugoslav Forum for Human Rights and I defended political opponents of the régime, as well as the terrorized Muslim peasantry in the village of Mosevci, because repression by the régime was very strong at the time. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the establishment of a pluralistic system in Yugoslavia, a group of intellectuals and I created the Democratic Party, which was active throughout Yugoslavia. I was elected Deputy at the first

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pluralistic elections, and from then on I have been a Deputy in the Serbian Assembly, the Yugoslav Assembly or the Assembly of Serbia and Montenegro. After the defeat of Milosevic in the 2000 elections I was elected President of the Assembly of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and I held that office until 2004. Mr. Vice-President, I can testify, as regards events that are of importance in the present proceedings, in my capacity as a politician who was in opposition throughout the régime of Slobodan Milosevic. Under the Constitution that was then in force, and under the current Constitution of Serbia, consent to the declaration of war and for war has to be given by the Assembly. No mention of this was made to the Assembly. The response to the call for mobilization by the Yugoslav People's Army during the conflicts in Croatia was very poor, the poorest in the history of Serbia. According to information to which I had access, this response was about 30 per cent. Several hundred young men emigrated from Serbia at the beginning of the 1990s expressly to avoid the call-up. The Democratic Party, which I had led since its creation, sought to ensure that Yugoslavia was kept safe and that conflicts that would have led to the dismantling of the State were avoided. In the Serbian Assembly, in canvassing public opinion and as part of our international activities the party strove to prevent conflicts from breaking out. As a party committed to peace and civilian values, with organizations in all the republics of the former Yugoslavia, we severely criticized the policy of the Government of the Republic of Serbia because it was not doing enough and was not acting with sufficient vigour in preventing conflicts. As part of these activities in the National Assembly we called for the resignation of the President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, and a civil initiative was launched seeking his removal from office, in the course of which some 700,000 citizens' signatures were collected. Following the failure of the agreement by the Presidents of the six republics of the former Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia regarding the constitutional rearrangement of the country, the first conflicts broke out between armed groups in Croatia. These flared up later into a real war, involving territorial defence forces, the police, the Yugoslav People's Army and volunteers organized as paramilitary units. We in the Democratic Party had understood that we had to react quickly in order to prevent the conflict from spreading to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina; we knew that this was the most dangerous of the possible scenarios because of the extensive ethnic and religious intermingling there. Our idea was to attempt to exercise pressure for a peaceful solution to the

constitutional differences, by way of parliamentarians who were closer to the citizens than the Presidents of the republics were. We thought — and later this proved to be correct — that the Presidents of the republics — all of them the same, Milosevic, Tudjman and Izetbegovic — were completely incapable of solving the problems and preventing conflicts from breaking out. With a view to putting this idea into practice, I wrote a letter to all the leaders of parliamentary groups in all six parliaments in which I suggested a joint meeting to seek a common solution. Almost all of them, 36 out of 38 to be precise, accepted this invitation. This encouraged us, and in accordance with the principal idea of preventing the war from spreading, I proposed that the conference be held in Banja Ilidza, not far from Sarajevo. Our idea in choosing this site for the meeting was to send a clear message that all those attending the meeting were agreed that the war should not spread to Bosnia and Herzegovina. To give the conference greater status, we also invited international observers from Liberal International and Deputies from the Netherlands, Greece and elsewhere, most of whom responded positively to our invitation. A large number of journalists from the country and abroad also attended the conference. The conference, entitled “The possibility of a peaceful solution to the Yugoslav crisis”, was inaugurated on 21 August 1991 in Ilidza, near Sarajevo, and lasted for two days. The atmosphere at the conference was one of tolerance, and on the first day we launched an appeal for peace aimed at public opinion and all competent institutions. At the end of the conference a letter was drafted calling for the immediate cessation of hostilities and suggesting the urgent implementation of preventive measures to check the spread of conflicts. In accordance with the decision of the conference I handed this letter personally to Mr. Stipe Mesic, the President of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, to Mr. Ante Markovic, the President of the Government of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, to Mr. Slobodan Gligorijevic, the President of the Assembly of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, and to General Veljko Kadijevic, the Minister of Defence of the Federal Government.

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Having regard to the situation prevailing in the country, it was decided at the conference that it should reconvene in Sarajevo in 15 days with the same participants. The purpose of this second meeting was to allow each parliamentary party in Yugoslavia to put forward its plan for solving the

Yugoslav State crisis, and so that we could immediately adopt those points on which we were in agreement, leaving contentious matters to subsequent discussions.

At this second meeting, held on 6 and 7 September 1991 in Sarajevo in the premises of the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, most of the parties came with a programme for a way out of the crisis. The final document from this conference was also harmonized with the initial efforts of the international community to re-establish peace in the territory of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia.

Unfortunately, Mr. Vice-President, these sustained efforts by the parliamentarians to prevent war breaking out failed, and soon what we most feared happened: war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Even after conflicts had begun on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Democratic Party continued to make great efforts domestically and internationally in pursuit of a peaceful solution to the Yugoslav crisis. Of course, the situation was different now. The Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia had just disintegrated, while the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had just come into being. This State was not at war with Croatia or with Bosnia and Herzegovina, but was to suffer sanctions because of its support for the Serb people beyond its frontiers.

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I also cite the activities of the Democratic Party in accordance with this policy concerning the examination and acceptance of the Vance-Owen peace plan during 1993, which was just one of the attempts to put an end to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Pursuant to our efforts in the Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, it was decided that the Vance-Owen plan was an acceptable solution for ending the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In accordance with this decision and with our consistent policy of peace, our support for the Vance-Owen plan was always placed at the forefront in the direct discussions. Unfortunately, despite the decision by the Assembly of the Republic of Serbia and despite the pressure to accept the plan exerted at the time by public opinion within Serbia on Republika Srpska, it was rejected in the latter's Assembly and in the referendum held later in Republika Srpska, with the result that this peace initiative was aborted.

It is also important to mention that, in addition to the Democratic Party, most of the other opposition parties had a peace-oriented programme. One particular area of activity involved civil initiatives and action by non-governmental organizations, which, despite the war and the blockade,

reached as far as Sarajevo, Tuzla and other towns under the control of Bosnian Muslim forces, so as to express solidarity with the citizens who were living under the armed blockade. A number of humanitarian organizations in Serbia continued their activities throughout the period of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, seeking to ease the difficult situation of populations who were experiencing serious shortages.

Following the victory of the Serbian democratic opposition in the 2000 elections, and in my capacity as president of the Assembly of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, I joined one of the first delegations from our parliament in a visit to the parliament in Sarajevo and a meeting with the most senior officials of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The borders were being opened, economic exchanges were growing steadily, and cultural exchanges too.

Mr. Vice-President, the war caused serious traumas which it will take a very long time to heal. The most senior government leaders in Serbia have repeatedly expressed their deep regret for all the victims of the war, and they have condemned all the crimes and demanded that the perpetrators of those crimes, whatever side they come from, should be put on trial. I believe that there are good and bad elements in every people and that progress is possible if individuals are categorized in terms of their good character and not merely by national or religious affiliation. Good people condemn all crimes and join together in building friendship and ensuring a better future. Thank you for your attention.

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The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Thank you. Mr. Stojanović.

Mr. STOJANOVIĆ [*interpretation from Serbian*]: Thank you, Mr. Vice-President. I have only three questions to put to Mr. Mićunović. The first will refer to the last part of his statement. During your visit to Sarajevo, you met the most senior government officials of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Would you care to tell us what subjects you discussed?

Mr. MIĆUNOVIĆ [*interpretation from Serbian*]: Mr. Vice-President, that visit was in a sense a “trial” visit. The Milošević Government had just fallen and the visit was meant to represent a chance for restoring relations. Even if some people felt that it was too soon to go there and that it might be an unpleasant experience for me, I must say that my visit passed off very well. I was given a friendly welcome, I had conversations with the presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

with the Prime Minister and with the President of the parliament. And I held a press conference at the end. So everything passed off very well. We discussed restoring trade, cultural and political ties between the two States as quickly as possible. We concluded that companies from Bosnia and Herzegovina which had been doing business in Serbia and, conversely, Serbian companies which had been in business in Bosnia and Herzegovina should re-establish their previous relations as quickly as possible. We also discussed the possibility of dual nationality to enable the nationals of both States to cross the border easily and exercise their rights in both countries. We also discussed the need to establish a truth and reconciliation commission along the lines of those set up in certain other countries, particularly South Africa, where there had been a conflict and reconciliation was also required. In short, we reached agreement on the need for active mutual communication and the peaceful settlement of any disputes that might arise.

16 Mr. STOJANOVIĆ [*interpretation from Serbian*]: You mentioned the Vance-Owen plan and a common assembly in which members of the parliaments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia participated together with representatives of the parliament of Republika Srpska and the parliament of the Republic of Krajina-Srpska. Could you tell us, Mr. Mićunović, what transpired during that period? Why was that assembly convened and what issues were discussed?

Mr. MIĆUNOVIĆ [*interpretation from Serbian*]: Serbia had been hit hard by sanctions. Public opinion and the entire political class felt that everything should be done to stop the war and exert pressure on Republika Srpska for the latter to accept the plan, so that we could restore normal relations with the international community.

I myself spoke at that session of the Serbian Yugoslav parliament, and it was necessary to exert pressure for the plan to be accepted. All the leading figures agreed on that plan, with a few exceptions, such as the representative of the Radical Party, which was in opposition at the time, and we resorted to a mediator, the Prime Minister of Greece, Mr. Mitsotakis. The session was continued in Athens, where Radovan Karadžić initialled the plan.

At the conference, I emphasized my opposition to the referendum, saying that it was still fanning the flames, if I may use that term, and opening up the possibility of conflict. Those present at that meeting of the Pale Assembly, at which the agreement was to be ratified, that is, those who

attended, were: President Jocić, of the Republic of Yugoslavia ; President Milošević, of Serbia; and then Mr. Mitsotakis and other guests. But the pressure that was exerted did not bear fruit, and the assembly of Republika Srpska rejected the plan.

Mr. STOJANOVIĆ [*interpretation from Serbian*]: I should like to ask a third question. This is the last question. The Democratic Party proposed a number of initiatives to prevent, and subsequently to stop, the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Because of the little time available to us, I would ask you to mention only the most important initiatives which were used, first, to prevent the outbreak of war, and subsequently, to stop the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de président : Je suis désolé de vous interrompre, mais je crains que le temps réservé à l'interrogatoire ne touche à sa fin, et je vous prierais donc de bien vouloir être bref.

17 Mr. MIĆUNOVIĆ [*interpretation from Serbian*]: As regards the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, I objected to such recognition, because I thought that it was premature, and I conveyed my thoughts to the United States Ambassador and to Mr. Boutros-Ghali, the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Thus, my first objection concerned the date of recognition, which was 6 April. This was the date when, in 1941, Hitler had ordered the bombing of Yugoslavia and had destroyed the country, and the second objection was a more important one. The status of the army in Bosnia and Herzegovina had not been resolved. To use the cynical expression of Carl Schmitt: power belongs to him who declares a state of emergency. And in my view, it was not known who had that power, that capacity, in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I proposed that there should first be reforms of the army in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to ascertain who would be given command responsibility, so as to prevent conflict between the army and the civilian authorities. The arguments were not persuasive, the arguments to the effect that this army should be treated exclusively as a foreign army in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Because that army had been stationed there since 1918.

I therefore made my objection known to the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Eagleburger, during the visit and meeting that I had with Mr. Boutros-Ghali, and this is something that I subsequently published, which was subsequently published, in the newspaper, the



*Baltimore Sun*, where I accordingly stated that the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina — which was premature — had fanned the flames of war.

Mr. STOJANOVIĆ [*interpretation from Serbian*]: I am satisfied with the reply. Thank you. I shall conclude with these remarks. Thank you, Mr. Vice-President.

Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de président : Je vous remercie. Je donne maintenant la parole à Mme Korner, pour son contre-interrogatoire.

Mme KORNER : Monsieur Mićunović, vous venez de dire que vous vous étiez opposé à la reconnaissance de la Bosnie le 6 avril, car c'est un 6 avril qu'avaient commencé les bombardements allemands, en 1941. Une petite question historique, en passant : N'est-ce pas aussi un 6 avril — le 6 avril 1945 — que Sarajevo a été libérée de l'occupation allemande ? Contentez-vous de répondre par «oui» ou par «non».

M. MIĆUNOVIĆ [*interprétation du serbe*] : C'était le jour de la division, du démantèlement d'un Etat. Il est vrai que c'est aussi un 6 avril, le 6 avril 1945, que les troupes de partisans ont libéré Sarajevo, mais j'associe quant à moi cette date au démantèlement de notre Etat, parce que c'est le 6 avril 1941 qu'il a été bombardé.

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Mme KORNER : Comme je l'ai dit, il s'agissait là d'un point historique, en passant. Monsieur Mićunović, j'ai très peu de questions à vous poser. Vous nous avez dit que vous aviez fondé le parti démocratique, en 1989 — si je ne m'abuse. Est-ce exact ?

M. MIĆUNOVIĆ [*interprétation du serbe*] : C'est exact.

Mme KORNER : L'avez-vous fondé avec M. Stojanović, l'agent de la Serbie-et-Monténégro ?

M. MIĆUNOVIĆ [*interprétation du serbe*] : En effet, c'était bien l'un des cofondateurs.

Mme KORNER : Et y en avait-il un troisième ?

M. MIĆUNOVIĆ [*interprétation du serbe*] : Nous étions treize.

Mme KORNER : Très bien. Vous nous avez dit avoir continué à siéger comme député tout au long de la guerre, mais toujours dans l'opposition.

M. MIĆUNOVIĆ [*interprétation du serbe*] : C'est exact.

Mme KORNER : Et vous êtes-vous opposé à toutes les guerres menées par le gouvernement ?

M. MIĆUNOVIĆ [*interprétation du serbe*] : A toutes, oui.

Mme KORNER : Et puis-je déduire du fait que vous vous trouviez dans l'opposition que vous n'étiez pas au courant des opérations conjointes menées par les trois armées ?

M. MIĆUNOVIĆ [*interprétation du serbe*] : La Serbie est un petit pays, la Yougoslavie de même, et les informations y circulent très rapidement. Et même si, dans ma position, je ne pouvais prendre aucune décision officielle, je n'en avais pas moins autour de moi, en ma qualité d'homme politique, des comités, des militants, et puis il y avait aussi la population en général ... autant de sources dans lesquelles je pouvais puiser, et j'étais informé.

Mme KORNER : Puis-je vous donner un exemple ? Etiez-vous au courant d'une opération menée dans la région de Bihać, appelée «opération PAUK» ?

M. MIĆUNOVIĆ [*interprétation du serbe*] : Non.

Mme KORNER : Une simple question : Saviez-vous, par exemple — ou plutôt, ignoriez-vous que les soldes des membres de l'armée de la Republika Srpska étaient payés par l'intermédiaire des 30<sup>e</sup> et 40<sup>e</sup> centres du personnel ?

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M. MIĆUNOVIĆ [*interprétation du serbe*] : Oui, je l'ignorais. Je n'étais pas dans le secret des opérations financières de l'état-major.

Mme KORNER : Je vous remercie. Et enfin, une dernière question : vous avez indiqué avoir exigé la démission de Milošević. Tout d'abord, pouvez-vous nous préciser combien de fois vous l'avez fait ?

M. MIĆUNOVIĆ [*interprétation du serbe*] : Nous l'avons demandée très souvent, et de différentes façons. Tout d'abord, nous l'avons demandée dans le cadre de l'Assemblée, puis nous avons fait signer des pétitions et organisé des manifestations et des formes de protestations publiques.

Mme KORNER : Et vous l'avez fait régulièrement, entre 1990 et 2000 ?

M. MIĆUNOVIĆ [*interprétation du serbe*] : Oui, bien sûr, et nous avons aussi fait valoir nos revendications avec force lors de la tenue d'élections. En 1996, par exemple, lorsque Milošević a tenté de truquer les élections locales, la population de Belgrade a défilé dans les rues

pendant trois mois, jusqu'à ce qu'une commission de l'OSCE vienne sur place et constate que nous étions dans le vrai. Et à cette période, l'ensemble des grandes villes — la capitale Belgrade, tout d'abord, puis Niš, Novi Sad, Pirot, et une trentaine d'autres — sont de fait passées à l'opposition, de sorte que, dès 1996, c'est nous qui détenions le pouvoir local.

Mme KORNER : Avez-vous notamment exigé la démission de Milošević après que la Cour devant laquelle nous nous trouvons aujourd'hui eut, en avril 1993, ordonné à la République fédérale de Yougoslavie de cesser de prêter appui aux Serbes de Bosnie ?

M. MIĆUNOVIĆ [*interprétation du serbe*] : En avril 1993, après sa tentative avortée à Pale, et l'embarras éprouvé, Milošević était mortifié, et l'opinion publique l'était aussi, et, à la suite de cela, il a imposé à la Republika Srpska un embargo dans tous les domaines, excepté celui de l'aide humanitaire. Exiger sa démission était inutile à ce moment-là— au moment où, justement, il était en train de faire pression sur la Republika Srpska pour l'amener à accepter le plan Vance-Owen.

Mme KORNER : Mais ces pressions ont fait long feu... Saviez-vous que la République fédérale de Yougoslavie continuait à approvisionner les Serbes de Bosnie, et en particulier l'armée ?

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M. MIĆUNOVIĆ [*interprétation du serbe*] : Eh bien, je me doute que c'était le cas, puisque les guerres continuaient, et que l'ensemble des belligérants recevaient des armes. Il est loisible de supposer qu'ils étaient tous approvisionnés, par des voies officielles ou non, et que cette pratique s'est poursuivie un certain temps après 1994.

Mme KORNER : Si vous aviez été dûment informé que des armes continuaient d'être livrées, en dépit de ce qu'affirmait Milošević — à savoir qu'il avait imposé un embargo sur l'aide —, auriez-vous redemandé sa démission ?

M. MIĆUNOVIĆ [*interprétation du serbe*] : Bien sûr que oui, mais Milošević s'est bien sûr gardé de nous le faire savoir— et il démentait bel et bien l'existence de tels liens. Et il faut bien évidemment aussi tenir compte du fait qu'un embargo était alors en vigueur, et qu'embargo signifie nécessairement contrebande. Et contrebande il y avait— contrebande de tous types de marchandises : d'essence, d'armes et de cigarettes. C'était là le lot commun.

Mme KORNER : Je vous remercie, Monsieur Mićunović. Je n'ai pas d'autre question.

Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de président : Je vous remercie. Monsieur Stojanović, souhaitez-vous procéder à un nouvel interrogatoire ?

M. STOJANOVIĆ [*interprétation du serbe*] : Non, cela n'est pas nécessaire. Je vous remercie.

Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de président : La Cour va maintenant se retirer pour quinze minutes. Les Parties et le témoin sont néanmoins priés de demeurer à proximité de la grande salle de justice.

Si la Cour souhaite poser des questions au témoin, elle le fera lorsqu'elle regagnera la salle d'audiences. Dans le cas contraire, elle n'en retournera pas moins dans la salle d'audiences, car un juge a exprimé le souhait de poser aux Parties — et non au témoin — une question, comme l'y autorise le paragraphe 3 de l'article 61 du Règlement de la Cour. Je rappelle que la fin de l'audition des témoins, des experts et des témoins experts marque aussi la fin du premier tour de plaidoiries.

L'audience est à présent levée.

*L'audience est suspendue de 11 h 10 à 11 h 35.*

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Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de président : Veuillez vous asseoir. Ainsi que l'a fait savoir le Greffe, aucun juge ne souhaite poser de question au témoin. Je voudrais donc remercier M. Mićunović d'avoir bien voulu comparaître devant nous. Et voilà qui clôt l'audition des témoins, experts et témoins-experts.

Le juge Tomka souhaite néanmoins soumettre une question à la Bosnie-Herzégovine. Vous avez la parole.

Le juge TOMKA : Je vous remercie, Monsieur le président en exercice.

Le 28 février 2006, le conseil de la Bosnie-Herzégovine a indiqué que «[l]a Yougoslavie [était] demeurée Membre des Nations Unies». Dans une lettre datée du 9 août 2005 adressée au Secrétaire général adjoint de l'Organisation des Nations Unies à la gestion par le représentant permanent de l'ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine et les chargés d'affaires par intérim de la Bosnie-Herzégovine, de la Croatie, de la Serbie-et-Monténégro et de la Slovénie, ces cinq Etats

— au nombre desquels figurait donc le demandeur — ont indiqué que «[l]a République fédérale de Yougoslavie, qui a vu le jour le 27 avril 1992, n'est devenue un Etat Membre de l'Organisation des Nations Unies que le 1<sup>er</sup> novembre 2000; c'est l'Etat actuellement connu sous le nom de «Serbie-et-Monténégro»». Je serais heureux d'entendre toute explication, ou tout commentaire, que la Bosnie-Herzégovine pourrait souhaiter apporter sur cette dernière déclaration. Je vous remercie, Monsieur le président en exercice.

Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de président : Je vous remercie. Le texte de cette question sera communiqué dans les meilleurs délais à la Bosnie-Herzégovine ainsi qu'à la Serbie-et-Monténégro, pour son information. La Bosnie-Herzégovine est priée de bien vouloir y répondre lors du second tour de procédure orale.

Je confirme que la Cour se réunira de nouveau le mardi 18 avril 2006, à 10 heures, pour entendre les Parties en leur second tour de plaidoirie.

L'audience est maintenant levée.

*L'audience est levée à 11 h 40.*

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