CASE CONCERNING
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION
OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

(UKRAINE v. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)

VOLUME X OF THE ANNEXES
TO THE MEMORIAL
SUBMITTED BY UKRAINE

12 JUNE 2018
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Annex 336  OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine Based on Information Received as of 28 August 2015 (28 August 2015)

Annex 337  OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 27 September 2015

Annex 338  OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30 (9 August 2016)

Annex 339  OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30 (12 August 2016)

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Annex 345  OSCE, Spot Report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine: Casualties, Damage to Civilian Infrastructure Registered in Donetsk Region Following Fighting (3 February 2017)

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Annex 347  OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information Received as of 19:30 (5 February 2017)
Annex 348  OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information Received as of 19:30 (6 February 2017)

Annex 349  OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information Received as of 19:30 (19 February 2017)

Annex 350  OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information Received as of 19:30 (26 February 2017)

Annex 351  OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information Received as of 19:30 (5 March 2017)

Annex 352  OSCE, Thematic Report: Restriction of SMM’s Freedom of Movement and Other Impediments to Fulfilment of Its Mandate (January to June 2017)

Annex 353  OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information Received as of 19:30 (24 July 2017)


Annex 315

President: Mr. Yelchenko ........................................... (Ukraine)

Members:
- Bolivia (Plurinational State of) ....................... Mr. Llorentty Soliz
- China .................................................. Mr. Liu Jieyi
- Egypt ................................................... Mr. Moustafa
- Ethiopia ............................................... Ms. Guadey
- France ................................................ Mr. Delattre
- Italy .................................................... Mr. Lambertini
- Japan ................................................... Mr. Bessho
- Kazakhstan ............................................ Mr. Umarov
- Russian Federation ................................... Mr. Churkin
- Senegal ................................................ Mr. Seck
- Sweden ............................................... Mr. Thöresson
- United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland .. Mr. Rycroft
- United States of America ............................ Mrs. Haley
- Uruguay ............................................... Mr. Bermúdez

Agenda

Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)
The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)

The President: In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs; Ambassador Ertuğrul Apakan, Chief Monitor of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine; and Mr. Stephen O’Brien, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator.

On behalf of the Council, I welcome Ambassador Apakan, who is joining today’s meeting via video teleconference from Kyiv.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

Two days ago, the Security Council discussed the deterioration of the situation in eastern Ukraine and succeeded in adopting a press statement (SC/12700) on the subject. It became the first document of the Council on the situation in and around Ukraine in almost two years.

Unfortunately, despite the Council’s call for an immediate return to a ceasefire regime, the situation in Avdiivka and other areas of eastern Ukraine remains tense, with strong signs of a possible further escalation. Therefore, today’s discussion is meant to contribute to the settlement of the conflict. If we find common ground, I suggest we consider the possibility of adopting a draft presidential statement. If the Council agrees with such a proposal, in the coming days we may embark upon drafting it to reflect the main elements of this briefing.

I now give the floor to Mr. Feltman.

Mr. Feltman: The conflict in Ukraine will soon enter its fourth year. Since the Department of Political Affairs last briefed the Security Council on the situation in eastern Ukraine, on 28 April 2016 (see S/PV.7683), fighting has continued unabated, with only short periods of respite. Almost 10,000 people have been killed — Ukrainian armed forces, civilians and members of armed groups — and more than 23,000 have been injured since the beginning of the conflict, according to the human rights Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine; over 2,000 of those killed were civilians.

Since 7 January, and in particular over the past few days, we have seen a dangerous intensification of the conflict. On 1 February, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission reported over 10,000 explosions in the Donetsk region over 24 hours, the highest number of violations yet recorded by the Mission. While the most serious clashes in the past few days predominantly hit the Avdiivka, Yasynuvata and Donetsk airport areas, heavy fighting has also been reported near Mariupol, Popasna and the Svitlodarsk/Debaltseve areas, both in Government- and non-Government-controlled territories. The entire length of the contact line has seen a serious escalation of hostilities, and there is still a risk of further deterioration of the situation.

The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission has also registered frequent use of heavy weapons proscribed by the Minsk agreements, such as multiple launch rocket systems, including in the areas designated for disengagement, as per the 21 September 2016 framework decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to the disengagement of forces and hardware. There are reports of civilian casualties, including at least four deaths since the escalation on 28 January, and heavy losses among combatants on both sides. The human rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine also recorded damage to civilian houses and a school in populated areas of Avdiivka, which raises serious concerns about possible violations of international humanitarian law by all sides.

There are now reports of clashes that are directly endangering civilian crossing points, residential areas and critical civilian infrastructure, such as water purification plants and delivery systems, power lines and heating supply lines. Ensuring the urgent disengagement of forces at all checkpoints across the contact line would greatly improve the security of the population in the conflict-affected areas, where more than 20,000 people cross the contact line daily. Hundreds of thousands of civilians on both sides of the contact line are still at risk of losing all access to
heating, water and electricity, bringing the spectre of further displacement closer. That is particularly worrying given the frigid winter temperatures in the region at present.

There are also real threats of serious environmental disasters should any of the major chemical-waste storage locations in the area be shelled. As of yesterday, thousands of inhabitants in Avdiivka, including children, were reportedly at risk of being evacuated. The combatants must stop the shelling in cities such as Avdiivka, on both sides of the contact line, and enable basic services to be restored. The Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Mr. Stephen O’Brien, will shortly provide further updates on the humanitarian situation on the ground.

We welcome the prompt statement (SC/12700) issued by the Security Council on 31 January on the deterioration of the situation in the Donetsk region. The Secretary-General has expressed deep concern about the high level of military readiness and the recently intensified fighting, which is having an increasingly serious impact on the civilian population in the conflict areas. He has called on all parties to halt all hostilities immediately, fully observe the ceasefire, allow immediate and unhindered humanitarian access to the affected population, facilitate full and safe access for the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission so that it can report on the situation on the ground, and renew serious efforts to reach a peaceful settlement of the conflict. He particularly underlines how imperative it is that all sides take every possible measure to protect civilians and refrain from any action that could be seen as provocative or might escalate tensions.

In just a few days, the intensity of the hostilities around the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata-Donetsk airport areas has risen to levels that the Special Monitoring Mission has never before recorded in the area. The escalation demonstrates how precarious the situation continues to be and how suddenly and abruptly the security situation can deteriorate. The statement agreed on at yesterday’s meeting in Minsk between the Trilateral Contact Group and representatives from various areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions lays down the urgent measures the sides should take, not only in the area under discussion but along the entire contact line, in order to prevent further ceasefire violations that could in turn spiral out of control. That is a positive development, but the test will be in the implementation of the measures. The pattern of successive ceasefire agreements broken by fresh violence has left civilians caught in the crossfire and trapped in suffering. With every new day of fighting, the conflict becomes more entrenched and more difficult to resolve. There is no military solution to this conflict.

Despite the commendable efforts of the Trilateral Contact Group and the Normandy four, the recent intensification of the conflict coincides with a period of relative stagnation in the diplomatic processes designed to find a peaceful solution and ensure the full implementation of the Minsk agreements. The international community must remain constructively and actively engaged, however, if we are to prevent this crisis from becoming a catastrophe. In that regard, there is a pressing need to revitalize the negotiation process without delay.

The United Nations continues to strongly support the efforts being made in the Normandy four and Trilateral Contact Group frameworks and of the OSCE chairship in Ukraine. We commend the work of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission, which is carrying out essential work under extremely difficult circumstances in the conflict areas. The United Nations calls on both sides to lift all restrictions on the Special Monitoring Mission’s freedom of movement and to immediately end all use of force or threats against the Mission’s monitors. We welcomed the January visits of Mr. Sebastian Kurz, OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Austria, to Ukraine and the Russian Federation, and hope that his engagement, along with other ongoing efforts, will bear fruit. The United Nations stands ready to support those efforts. I look forward to hearing today from Ambassador Apakan, Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, about his assessment of the latest developments the ground.

It has been almost two years since 12 February 2015, when the package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements was signed in Minsk, and in turn endorsed by the Security Council’s adoption, on 17 February, of resolution 2202 (2015). That remains the foundation based on which we, the international community, have committed to seeking lasting peace in eastern Ukraine. I urge the Council to continue those efforts with renewed vigour.

In accordance with the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, the United Nations remains committed to supporting a peaceful resolution
of the conflict in a manner that fully upholds the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Ukraine. The United Nations priority continues to be on supporting the peace efforts in Ukraine led by the OSCE and ensuring the full implementation of the Minsk agreements. The parties themselves, however, have the main responsibility to work constructively to that end.

The President: I thank Mr. Feltman for his briefing.

I now give the floor to Mr. Apakan.

Mr. Apakan: I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council on the security situation in eastern Ukraine. I am reporting to the Council today on the significant escalation of violence that has taken place in the past few days. The Special Monitoring Mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has seen a sharp intensification in fighting in the Avdiivka-Yasnyuvata-Donetsk airport area. That latest upsurge comes after months of sustained ceasefire violations, particularly in five hotspots in eastern Ukraine, including in the Svitlodarsk and Debaltseve areas, Horlivka, in areas east of Mariupol, around Shyrokyne, and in Popasna, Pervomaiske and Troitske, in the Luhansk region. Sporadic fighting has continued, with several spikes in violence recorded from November through January.

Today the fighting in that triangular area is in its fifth day. The tension levels witnessed have increased during that period and the ceasefire violations are becoming more frequent and severe. Since 29 January, the intensity of the fighting in and around Avdiivka has been greater than in any similar period in recent months. On 31 January, the Special Monitoring Mission recorded thousands of explosions in Donetsk caused by incoming and outgoing mortar and artillery fire, including from multiple-launch rocket systems. On 1 February, there were almost 10,000 explosions in the Donetsk region. Today the situation continues to be tense and volatile. This is the highest number of explosions that the Mission has ever recorded. Most were in the Avdiivka and Yasnyuvata areas. The Special Monitoring Mission has also registered a steep increase in the use of all types of weapons regulated by the Minsk agreements, and the use of Grad multiple-launch rocket systems, mortars and artillery is particularly worrying. The use of tanks has also been observed.

The sides’ indiscriminate use of proscribed weapons has resulted in civilian casualties and considerable damage to civilian homes and essential infrastructure. The conditions for civilians who have remained in Avdiivka have reached emergency levels. The town lost electricity when power lines in the area were damaged. In the meantime, civilians, including the most vulnerable, have been left without heat in sub-zero winter temperatures. The Avdiivka coke factory, which was providing the area with its main source of heating, has lost its power and water supplies. Repair crews have difficulty conducting repairs owing to the security situation. Efforts to ensure access in order to repair power lines and restore electricity to the coke factory and the Donetsk filtration station are ongoing. The Donetsk filtration station supplies water to the population on both sides of the contact line, and its protection is of the utmost importance. Further damage to Donetsk and other water filtration stations in the region could leave large parts of the Donetsk region without water.

All of those factors demonstrate a blatant disregard for the obligations undertaken by the signatories of the Minsk agreements. Instead of the disengagement of forces and hardware, we see the engagement of forces and a full range of hardware in areas where they are prohibited by the Minsk agreements. The Special Monitoring Mission’s safe access and ability to conduct effective monitoring and verification continues to be restricted. The Mission needs full, safe and unhindered access.

At the moment, our teams and monitors are facilitating local ceasefires in the area, in coordination with the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination—the joint military centre for Russian and Ukrainian officers. That window of opportunity, along with the ceasefires, as unstable as they may be, helped to allow repair crews to access the damaged sites. Those efforts are still under way. Local ceasefires show that, if they are willing to, the sides can stop fighting.

Allow me to reiterate that the developments in the Avdiivka/Yasnyuvata and Donetsk airport areas are of great concern. In that context, I welcome yesterday’s joint statement by the Trilateral Contact Group appealing for strict adherence to a full and comprehensive cessation of fire, withdrawal into storage sites of all weapons regulated by the Minsk agreements, safe and secure access for members of the Special Monitoring Mission in accordance with the Mission’s mandate, and, finally,
the facilitation of efforts aimed at restoring water, electricity and heating supplies, including by way of the repair of infrastructure. I would like once again to say to the Security Council that a ceasefire is a basic requirement. We call for the immediate cessation of fighting.

The withdrawal of heavy weapons is another imperative. I should also mention that work is ongoing in the disengagement areas. In that context, I must say that the verification of heavy weapons is an important step that we are trying to achieve through monitoring, verification and reporting. It is also imperative that the Special Monitoring Mission be given immediate safe and unhindered access to the affected areas in order to verify that sides are complying with their obligations on the ceasefire and the withdrawal of weapons. I would also reiterate that the sides should try to prioritize the protection of civilians and the repair of infrastructure, which is also an immediate need.

We will also continue to monitor the humanitarian situation, which remains a matter of deep concern. Violence on such a scale, involving the loss of life, is unacceptable, and the protection of civilians must be paramount. Access to shelter, water, heat and medical care is limited in many areas. In that respect, the Special Monitoring Mission works closely with the United Nations and its specialized agencies. The Mission will continue to implement its mandate with impartiality and in close cooperation with all sides, in the context of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. We continue to support the implementation of the Minsk agreements, and thereby contribute to efforts towards peace.

The President: I thank Mr. Apakan for his briefing.

I now give the floor to Mr. O'Brien.

Mr. O'Brien: I thank Under-Secretary-General Jeffrey Feltman and His Excellency Mr. Apakan for their briefings. I am also grateful for this opportunity to join them in briefing the Security Council on the humanitarian situation in Ukraine.

Over three years into the conflict in eastern Ukraine, in what has become yet another protracted humanitarian crisis, we are now faced with a significant deterioration in the situation following the sudden and recent escalation in violence. That escalation on both sides of the contact line in Donetsk oblast near Avdiivka and Donetsk city has claimed the lives of four civilians, all women, since 18 January, according to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. According to the United Nations team on the ground, it is resulting in widespread fear, panic and a real struggle to survive by civilians. We call on all parties to immediately cease all hostilities in order to prevent a further loss of life and further unacceptable human suffering.

The current escalation in violence is causing severe damage to critical infrastructure — water, electricity and heating. Combined with low winter temperatures, the result is a deteriorating humanitarian situation. Today temperatures are -10°C but, -20°C is not unheard of at this time of the year. Adequate shelter, heating and access to water are therefore essential to people's survival. Shelling has damaged electricity and water systems, with a knock-on effect on the heating supply; once damaged, it could take days, or weeks, for systems to restart. For civilians living on both sides of the frontline, that means they are not only traumatized, living a precarious and dangerous existence, but damage to critical services is making survival an issue. We are also concerned about the reported presence of heavy weapons in urban areas, which further heightens the risk to civilians' lives.

For example, critical water and electricity systems in Avdiivka, a front-line town in Government-controlled areas, were damaged by the recent violence on 29 and 30 January. The United Nations and other humanitarian partners joined a Government-led assessment team to the town on 1 February, and are working to ensure that critical needs are met in support of the Government. That is not without risk. For example, two technical teams sent to repair infrastructure were promised a ceasefire for a few hours on 1 February in order to carry out their work, but were subjected to small-arms fire in non-government controlled areas and, as a result, were forced to abandon their work. A similar incident took place earlier today. The arrival of powerful generators on 31 January in Avdiivka provided some temporary respite to 17,000 people, including 2,500 children, but that is not sufficient. Unless repairs are made, the power that keeps the heating system functioning in Avdiivka cannot be fully restored. The result could be displacement on a large scale.

Avdiivka is not alone. Approximately 1 million people in non-government controlled areas in Donetsk city were without water or heating for 24 hours following the shelling. A repair team has managed to
fix some power lines, thereby managing to preserve the city’s heating systems and avoid a major catastrophe. Elsewhere, the 500,000 inhabitants of Mariupol are now reliant on a backup reservoir after the water main on which the city depends developed a massive leak. It will take several days — once hostilities are over — to ensure the area is demined and heavy machinery can access the area to carry out repairs. Unfortunately, shelling could be heard again last night in Donetsk and in other areas along the contact line.

I welcome yesterday’s statement of the Trilateral Contact Group in Minsk, which called for not only strict adherence to a full and comprehensive cessation of fire but also the facilitation of humanitarian efforts aimed at the restoration of water, electricity and heating supplies, including through the repair of infrastructure. I also acknowledge the efforts of the Government of Ukraine and the de facto authorities to provide critical heating and water for those most at risk, but I highlight that that is not enough. On 31 January, the Government of Ukraine appealed to international organizations to prepare to support civilian evacuees from Avdiivka should it be necessary. The United Nations and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) stand ready to lend their support.

If hostilities continue, we may also face a serious environmental crisis. Damage to the phenol plant near the village of Novgorodskoe means that waste chemicals, including deadly sulfuric acid and formaldehyde, are now at critical levels. Leakage into the surrounding land and the Seversky Donets River would have disastrous humanitarian consequences in a highly industrialized part of Europe. Similarly, there is a real risk at present that damage to water facilities could have further deadly consequences for the population living in the surrounding areas, with the potential leak of chlorine gas, which is routinely stored at such facilities.

This latest escalation in violence is exacerbating the ongoing needs of an estimated 3.8 million civilians who continue to bear the brunt of this protracted conflict and who require various degrees of humanitarian assistance. There are 700,000 more people in need this year as compared to those identified in the 2016 humanitarian response plan. More than 60 per cent of those in need — approximately 2.3 million people — reside in non-Government controlled areas. Furthermore, over 70 per cent of people in need are the elderly, women and children. Those demographic groups are particularly vulnerable and must be accessed immediately with lifesaving assistance and protection interventions. When I visited Luhansk and Donetsk just over a year ago, I met an octogenarian woman living in one room in the bomb-bout ruins of her house, whose son had been killed in the cracked remains of what was once her front door when he just happened to be visiting to check on her safety and a bomb came down on him — an innocent non-combatant nipping back in the lunch hour from his market store. While tending to her rambling rose bush growing up the charred remains of her house, she told me of her unconscionable grief, of the cold she endures and that she would only light a camp fire during the night, as she was afraid that any smoke during the day would allow others to target her location. It was truly heartbreaking. That is the reality for so many civilians caught in this conflict, trapped by the fighting with minimal shelter, critical services cut-off and in desperate need of assistance and building repair materials to prevent death or injury by either the violence or the elements.

While some humanitarian response efforts continue, since July 2015 the de facto authorities in Donetsk and Luhansk have imposed undue bureaucratic restrictions that are severely affecting humanitarian access. That is in contradiction to their commitments under article 7 of the Minsk full package of measures, as well as their responsibilities under international humanitarian law. Few partners are officially allowed to operate in those areas and, on 25 November 2016, the international NGO People in Need — the last international NGO to have access — was summarily ejected from Donetsk non-Government controlled areas, depriving 140,000 people of immediate lifesaving assistance. The United Nations repeats its appeal to all parties to guarantee secure and unimpeded access for United Nations and humanitarian partners to all people in need, wherever they may be.

Finally, Government-imposed bureaucratic impediments, particularly in relation to the ban on commercial trade and the importation of food and medicines across the contact line, remain a serious constraint to alleviating the humanitarian crisis. In addition, the suspension of social payments by the Government has severely affected hundreds of thousands of displaced people.

I am alarmed about the turn that this conflict has taken and about the increasing toll it has on the civilian population. As the humanitarian situation in Ukraine deteriorates, increasing numbers of people are at risk
and in need — their resilience eroded and their hope fading. The inability to reach a political solution to this crisis is resulting in further civilian casualties, damage to critical infrastructure and more human suffering. This suffering will continue until this conflict comes to an end once and for all.

**The President:** I thank Mr. O’Brian for his briefing.

I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Ukraine.

I thank the briefers for the updated information they provided on the attack on the town of Avdiivka, in the Donetsk region of Ukraine, by the Russian occupying forces and their proxies, which led to a humanitarian emergency in the area.

Ukraine continues to be fully committed to implementing the Minsk agreements in their entirety. The President of Ukraine has stressed on many occasions that there is no military solution in the Donbas. The Ukrainian Government is sharply focused on peaceful and diplomatic means in that regard. Ukrainian forces continue to respect the ceasefire. They have strict orders to open fire only in response to the attacks and assault actions of Russia-backed militants.

On the contrary, Russia, as the party to the conflict in Donbas, and its proxies have blatantly violated the Minsk agreements from the very beginning. They have continued their attacks and occupied several Ukrainian towns and localities. As of now, Russian proxies occupy about 1,700 square kilometres, going far beyond the contact line agreed in Minsk on 19 September 2014.

Before the crisis in Avdiivka, there was the battle for Debaltseve two years ago, which was captured by Russian forces immediately after the Minsk summit on 12 February 2015, contrary to decisions taken by the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France.

In the early hours of Sunday, 29 January, the Russian army and its proxies began massive artillery attacks on Avdiivka and its suburbs from residential areas in Donetsk and Yasinuvata, which are under the control of the Russia-led terrorists, and sent assault units to storm positions of the Ukrainian armed forces. The Russian forces used Grad multiple-rocket launch systems, tanks, 152-millimetre and 122-millimetre artillery, and 120-millimetre and 82-millimetre mortars. All those weapons are forbidden under the Minsk agreements. On 29 January alone, the Ukrainian positions were shelled nearly 400 times.

The shelling intensified on 30 and 31 January, when civilian infrastructure sites were also targeted. As a result, the Donetsk water filtration plant and the Avdiivka coke plant, which provides heat for Avdiivka, are now without electricity. The city is left without water, electricity or heat. The current temperature in Avdiivka is -18°C. Without central heat, civilians will not survive. Sixteen thousand people ended up without water, electricity or heat, including 2,000 children. Just imagine: 2,000 children without heat at -18°C. Ukrainian emergency services prepared to evacuate people from Avdiivka.

Numerous attempts by the Ukrainian services to repair damaged infrastructure were consistently blocked until 1 February by the Russia-led terrorists, who continued shelling, and by the Russian part of the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC), which were unreasonably delayed in providing security guarantees necessary to reach the destroyed objects.

According to information that we just received 15 minutes before the start of this briefing, the separatist forces resumed the shelling of residential areas of Avdiivka using high-calibre artillery systems. Several residential buildings were hit and there are several fires around the town. One of the shells exploded close to a temporary heating station that had been set up by the Ukrainian authorities to provide Avdiivka residents with warmth in these freezing temperatures.

Destroying critical infrastructure and thus creating a humanitarian disaster is a terrorist tactic aimed primarily at civilians. This tactic obliterates the Russian propaganda myth of so-called peaceful miners who fight the authorities with their own shotguns. Locals would never do this to their neighbours, but those who have come to Ukrainian soil as aggressors to destroy Ukrainian statehood do not hesitate to damage factories, houses and powerlines. This tactic is not new for the Russian forces.

The aforementioned actions by Russia may qualify as a war crime. Ukraine will add evidence related to the recent escalation and indiscriminate attacks on civilian infrastructure to our claim against Russia on terrorism to the International Court of Justice. This is a first but very important step in bringing Russia to justice for its mounting violations of the United Nations Charter and international law.

The Ukrainian Government announced the emergency situation in Avdiivka. We have managed
to sustain the functioning of the heating system at a minimum level and to avoid the rapid degradation of the situation into a real humanitarian disaster. Eleven warming centres have been set up, scores of field kitchens have been deployed, and kindergartens and hospitals are functioning in emergency mode. Additional police units have been deployed to protect civil order and to help provide a timely response to the emergency.

The events of recent days have become a test for monitoring and coordination mechanisms in Donbas. Since the outbreak of hostilities, Ukraine has repeatedly, literally hundreds of times, requested Russian representatives at the JCCC to use their influence to stop the hostilities. Of the 230 requests made during the period from 29 January to 1 February to stop the hostilities in the area around Avdiivka, all but two were ignored. On 31 January, Ukraine called for an urgent video-teleconference meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) to defuse tensions. Once again, the Russian side and their proxies in Donbas did not show up, claiming that this was not the right time. Seriously? Not the right time?

Despite calls from all corners for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of heavy weaponry, the militants continue shelling day and night. On 1 February, despite the appeal of the Trilateral Contact Group for an immediate and comprehensive ceasefire in the region of Avdiivka, Russian militants did not stop shooting, and even shot at the repair team that was trying to fix the damaged power line. They shelled residential buildings and last night shelled one of the roads designated for the evacuation of civilians. This is nothing less than a war crime.

I have a picture here that I would ask the Council to look at. This is an apartment building in Avdiivka; at least 1,500 people lived there. It was shelled by terrorists, and the inhabitants rushed out into the freezing cold; it was -20°C outside. This is beyond evil. The perpetrators, those who pulled the trigger and those who gave the orders, should face justice, and they will.

It has to be mentioned that when the content of the aforementioned appeal was being discussed in the Trilateral Contact Group, the Russian side was against the formulations regarding repair work on the energy and power-supply infrastructure. This is additional clear evidence of the Kremlin’s intention to create a humanitarian catastrophe in Avdiivka, as was done, by the way, by the Russian army in Aleppo not so long ago.

Two Ukrainian soldiers have died and 14 have been wounded over the past 24 hours. Altogether, 20 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed and 134 wounded by Russian hybrid forces and Russia-backed militants since the beginning of the year. We call on the Russian Federation to abide by the ceasefire and to ensure the necessary secure conditions for the repair work.

The attacks on and near Avdiivka in recent days as well as the continuing Russian aggression underscore two important trends. First, Russia and its proxies in Donbas continue to block and undermine the peaceful process by pursuing their political objectives through the indiscriminate use of force. There can be no illusion about the Russian role in the implementation of the Minsk agreements. Every bit of progress made in the TCG or on the contact line is flagrantly destroyed by another assault by Russia-led terrorists.

Secondly, the existing mechanisms created to avoid further destabilization and to move forward with the implementation of the Minsk agreements are not efficient enough to fulfill their mandate. Despite the urgency of the situation, the TCG met only three days after the outbreak of hostilities, and the JCCC appears to be an ineffective tool in a crisis situation — all of this due to Russian non-cooperation. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Special Monitoring Mission observers still face serious restrictions on their freedom of movement on the territories temporarily controlled by Russia-backed militants. They lack 24/7 monitoring capabilities and the relevant technical means.

The events around Avdiivka have created an obstacle to Russia’s aspiration to resolve the conflict in Donbas by military means. Yes, the Ukrainian army proved its strength and ability to repeal a Russian offensive. However, Ukraine is paying a dramatically high price, losing its best sons and daughters to this war.

We care about our people. The death of every single soldier or civilian is yet another scar on the soul of Ukraine. I ask the Council to look at this picture; it shows a 26-year-old officer, Andriy Kyzlo, who was killed on 29 February near Avdiivka. Look at his eyes, Mr. Ambassador; it is your weapons and your compatriots who killed him.

*(spoke in Russian)*

You killed him.
(spoke in English)

Our people get down on their knees to treat their fallen defenders. Russian invaders are buried in unmarked graves. We are seeking peace and are doing our utmost and taking every step to bring peace back to Ukraine. Therefore, we do not advocate a military solution and believe that the available political means should be used. The armed confrontation could be easily ended. The Russian Federation should stop arming militants and sending its mercenaries and military personnel to Ukraine.

Does anyone seriously think that rockets and artillery shells grow on trees in Donbas? We are talking about tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of rounds of artillery ammunition. Since November, we and international observers have noted an increased supply of ammunition and armour to militants from the Russian Federation. Now we are seeing the consequences.

What is clear is that an international security presence on the ground needs to be enhanced so as to prevent such provocations in future and thus contribute to the implementation of the Minsk agreements and, ultimately, to a peaceful resolution. We once again urge the Russian Federation to exercise its responsibility to implement the Minsk commitments, specifically their security and humanitarian provisions. We urge Russia to halt its support for terrorists and to stop building hybrid terrorist armies in eastern Ukraine as well as its military buildup along Ukraine’s eastern borders.

Moreover, we call on the Russian Federation not to expand the framework of the escalation. Yesterday Russian military forces shelled and damaged an Antonov An-26 Ukrainian aircraft while it was conducting a flight over the Odessa gas-deposit region in the Black Sea, in Ukraine’s exclusive maritime zone. This time only a lucky coincidence saved the crew from the Russian shelling. God only knows what will happen next time.

There is a rather simple remedy that would stop this Russian aggression against my country and prevent further civilian suffering. What the international community needs to do is to step up the pressure on the aggressor and urge the Russian Federation to get out of Ukraine.

I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council.

I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements.

Mr. Churkin (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We are grateful for today’s briefings, which painted a disturbing picture of the ongoing events and suffering of the people of eastern Ukraine.

What has basically been happening is quite obvious. Kyiv is attempting to use clashes it has itself provoked as a pretext for a complete refusal to implement the Minsk agreements, signed on 12 February 2015 and endorsed in resolution 2202 (2015). However hard the Ukrainian side tries to portray things differently, including by convening this meeting of the Council and making statements that turn the facts upside down, there is a massive amount of information, including open admissions by Ukrainian officials right up to the level of the country’s President, that is too overwhelming to permit denial of the destructive policies of Kyiv and its armed forces.

On 3 January, Ukraine’s Defence Minister Poltorak confirmed that the Ukrainian armed forces had seized new positions in the grey zone, with the demagogic claim that that did not violate the Minsk agreements because the occupied territories thereby belonged to Ukraine. On 17 January, Interior Minister Avakov, speaking to Ukrainian border guards, urged them to prepare to seize the State borders in 2017. On 22 January, President Poroshenko declared publicly that Ukraine would not be doing anything about political reform until it regained full control of its border with Russia, in an approach that completely perverts the content of the Minsk package of measures and deliberately renders them unrealizable, practically speaking. Lastly, yesterday Deputy Defence Minister Pavlovsky completed the picture by bragging to the press that his heroic lads were moving forward where they could, metre by metre, step by step.

That overtly militaristic rhetoric has had very real consequences, as is clearly apparent from the latest reports of the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Observers have confirmed that the escalation was provoked by Ukrainian security forces. On the night of 27 and 28 January, the Mission’s camera at the Oktyabrskaya mine recorded intense crossfire between the Ukrainian armed forces and militias, which was preceded by firing from the north-west to the south-east, that is, from the security forces’ positions. At the same time, another Special Monitoring Mission camera
captured an intense artillery exchange in Avdiivka that began with five shots fired from north to south, which also meant from Ukrainian forces’ positions. The next night, 28 and 29 January, a Mission camera in Avdiivka recorded 15 shots fired from a north-westerly direction towards the south-east, also from the Kyiv security forces’ side, bombarding the militias’ positions. That was followed by hours of fighting in the Avdiivka industrial zone. The picture on the southern flank was the same. According to the Mission camera in Shyrokyne, intense crossfire on the night of 28 January was preceded by 20 shots fired from west to east, that is, again from the Ukrainian forces’ positions towards the rebels’ territory, after which another battle ensued.

According to Mission data for 26 to 29 January, indiscriminate shelling of residential areas under rebel control, coming from areas where Ukrainian security forces were deployed, injured civilians in Brianka and destroyed more than a dozen houses in Brianka, Donetsky, Olenivka, Zaichenko, Kalynove, Novooleksandrivka and Pervomaiske. The Mission continued to observe Ukrainian forces’ military equipment in the security zone. Between 26 and 29 January observers discovered four tanks in Avdiivka and three howitzers in Mykolaitse, as well as the disappearance from the security forces’ storage of 76 tanks, 10 mortars and 18 field guns. Only about 6 per cent of the stored military hardware was actually there.

Thus began a new spiral of tensions that since then has only been ratcheted up further. According to yesterday’s Special Monitoring Mission report, the number of violations has risen daily, reaching 10,300 shell explosions in a span of 24 hours. At the same time, the statistics on restrictions to the Mission’s access speak for themselves — in seven of nine cases it was the Ukrainian forces that put obstacles in its way. The numbers testify to the fact that, rather than attempting to normalize the situation in the Donbas region and arrive at reasonable compromises within the Normandy format and the framework of the Trilateral Contact Group, the Ukrainian authorities are desperately trying to achieve a military solution to the conflict.

Another attention-grabbing feature is the fact that any serious deterioration of the situation in the Donbas region, amazingly, coincides with foreign visits on the part of Ukraine’s leadership. Evidently that is how Kyiv hopes to keep its self-created crisis on the international agenda while at the same time roping in newly elected Heads of Government with its reckless, confrontational policies. But, of course, the Ukrainian leadership needs money, which it hopes to extract from the European Union, various European countries, the United States and the international financial institutions by setting itself up as a victim of aggression.

Kyiv seems not to worry very much about the humanitarian cost of such a policy. It is actively using heavy types of armaments around village residential areas, schools and hospitals, including heavy artillery and multiple-launch rocket systems, which according to the Minsk package of measures of 12 February 2015 should have been withdrawn from the contact line long ago. Civilians are among those killed and wounded. Thanks to Ukrainian security forces’ attacks, the Donetsk filtration station and the Avdiivka coke plant have been damaged and mineworkers’ lives threatened.

In order to prevent a humanitarian disaster and get the situation back on a political track, the international community must be firm and consistent. In that regard, the Security Council sent an important message on 31 January (SC/12700) when it united in calling for an immediate ceasefire and strict respect for the Minsk package. Yesterday the Trilateral Contact Group made an announcement in the same spirit when it called for full compliance with the ceasefire regime and the withdrawal of the heavy weaponry that comes under the Minsk agreements. We expect to see effective action from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission aimed at de-escalating the situation as soon as possible. The Normandy format participants, and those who can exert the most influence on Kyiv, have a particular responsibility in that regard. We hope that the forces of common sense in Ukraine itself, as well as those who are interested in resolving such situations by political means, will not allow the situation in south-eastern Ukraine to turn into a worst-case scenario, but will instead focus their attention and efforts on ensuring that the Minsk agreements are fulfilled.

Today President Poroshenko said that he had personally ordered the Ukrainian delegation to convene today’s Council meeting. When he called to order today’s meeting, the Permanent Representative of Ukraine proposed drafting a Security Council document building on the statement we issued on 31 January. Sadly, the unbridled, odious statement we heard today from Ukraine shows that the Ukrainian delegation here in New York is continuing on the path of war, which is deeply regrettable.
Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): France firmly condemns the resumption of fighting in eastern Ukraine in the past few days, specifically in Avdiivka. We are dealing with the worst upsurge in violence and the highest rate of violations of the ceasefire that we have seen in months. They have been accompanied by a spike in the number of victims, including among civilians, as well as a serious deterioration in the humanitarian situation, which we are following closely. We are forced to conclude that neither the security or the humanitarian situation has improved since the consultations we had on the subject two days ago, despite the fact that the Council called unanimously for the immediate restoration of the ceasefire (SC/12700). In that regard, France calls on all the parties to exercise restraint, and supports the appeal of the Trilateral Contact Group for the immediate restoration of the ceasefire in accordance with terms of the Minsk agreements, in particular with respect to the prohibition against the use and withdrawal of heavy weapons. The disengagement of forces on both sides of the line of contact must also be implemented without delay. We expect each of the parties to refrain from any provocation that might further aggravate the situation. We also call on Russia to use its influence with the separatists.

The work of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission in support of the ceasefire and de-escalation is essential. We call on all the parties on the ground to ensure the access and security of OSCE observers in Avdiivka, as well as in all areas of the conflict, as established in the mandate of the Mission.

The humanitarian situation is of particular concern to us, as the civilian population is facing extreme weather conditions and a disruption to the supply of water and electricity in several areas, including Avdiivka. We urge the parties to act as quickly as possible to improve the living conditions of the civilian population on the ground. Immediate compliance with windows of calm is essential to enable the repair of critical infrastructure in areas affected by fighting and for the relief of populations. We believe that to be crucial. The current crisis also calls to mind the crucial importance of the ongoing presence of humanitarian agencies throughout Ukrainian territory, including in areas beyond the control of the Government.

Faced with the new resurgence in violence, France recalls that the solution to the crisis in Ukraine cannot be a military one; rather, it must be political. That is why the implementation of the Minsk agreements remains more than ever the only way forward for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. France and Germany remain fully engaged in their diplomatic efforts within the framework of the Normandy format. Although we are aware of the scale of the work that remains to be done and the challenges to be overcome, we are convinced that working in that format, the only one to bring Ukraine and Russia together around the same table at the political level, is necessary and must be continued. In particular, work in the Normandy format has made it possible in recent months to lessen the intensity of the fighting and reduce the number of human casualties on the ground, as well as to implement confidence-building measures in the security and humanitarian spheres, with respect to the re-establishment of the ceasefire, the implementation of areas of disengagement or even the carrying out of exchanges of prisoners.

Despite continued fighting, the number of civilian casualties remains six times lower since the signing of the package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements, according to estimates by United Nations agencies. Our efforts are currently focused on developing a common road map that would enable concomitant progress with respect to the security and political aspects of the Minsk agreements. We can make progress only by moving forward on those two tracks. It is the shared belief of France and Germany that this is now the only way forward and that the European sanctions implemented at the beginning of the crisis are linked to the full implementation of the Minsk agreements.

For France, a resolution to the crisis in eastern Ukraine is more than ever a major priority. Alongside Germany, we will continue tirelessly in our efforts to mediate within the framework of the Normandy format, for there is currently no viable alternative and because every result on the ground counts. Our goal remains the restoration of Ukrainian control over all of its internationally recognized borders, which, we recall, can take place only via the re-establishment of its authority over Crimea.

In this challenging environment, everyone must now shoulder their responsibilities and fulfil their commitments. In our view, that is the main message the Council should send, and it is the spirit with which we are prepared to consider any draft presidential statement that may be adopted by the Council.
Mr. Rycroft (United Kingdom): Let me take this opportunity to welcome you, Sir, in your role as President of the Security Council for the month of February. I commend you for the start that you have made, and I support your proposal for a draft presidential statement on this important issue.

As our briefers made clear, Sir, we begin your presidency — sadly — in troubling times for eastern Ukraine. The worrying upsurge in fighting in that part of your country should concern us all. It is claiming yet more lives, both civilian and military. It is aggravating the suffering of those living there, forcing more to flee their homes. There is no end in sight. In cities such as Avdiivka, people talk of an endless salvo of artillery and rockets. They talk of failing electricity and falling temperatures, of burying loved ones in the snow. And those events have not come out of the blue. They are not new. The Council knows all too well the root causes of this violence and instability. This is what happens when Russia disregards the sovereign right of Ukraine to choose its own destiny. This is what happens when Russia undermines the territorial integrity of Ukraine by illegally annexing Crimea. This is what happens when Russian military personnel stand side-by-side with separatists whom they have equipped, armed and trained. And, this is a reality that the Security Council cannot, must not, accept. We need urgent action to bring an end to this upsurge in violence before it spirals out of control.

I want to pay tribute to the efforts of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination to bring about a truce to allow crucial repairs. Those efforts will help to restore vital utilities and to allow for the evacuation of civilians. I urge all parties to support those efforts and to facilitate access to the area for humanitarian actors.

But such actions are just a band-aid on a bullet wound. For any fragile short-term truce to become a comprehensive and sustained cease-fire, all parties must show restraint. That means in particular ending the extensive use of high-caliber indiscriminate weapons, such as Grad rocket systems. The use of those weapons, from and against civilian areas, is not only in disregard of the Minsk agreement; it is also an abhorrent rejection of the norms of conflict. They must be withdrawn from the line of contact, as stipulated in the Minsk agreements.

We also need to tackle the underlying causes of the fighting. It is clear that any solution to the Ukraine crisis must be political, not military, as we all recognized in resolution 2202 (2015). The Minsk agreements are the only meaningful path to long-term peace in Ukraine. Let us therefore urge all sides to recommit to meeting their full obligations under the Minsk agreements. We support the continued efforts of France and Germany within the Normandy format towards securing full implementation, and we are extremely grateful for the enormous investment that they have made in the process to date.

Let me conclude with this final thought. We frequently hear from the Russian Government — as we did today — that all the problems in eastern Ukraine are the consequences of actions by the Ukrainian Government. That is simply not the case; it is an inversion of reality. The responsibility for the inception and continuation of the conflict in eastern Ukraine lies squarely with Russia and the separatists it supports. As the British Prime Minister made clear in Washington, D.C., last week, the United Kingdom will continue to stand by Ukraine in full support of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Most recently, the international community — through the General Assembly resolution on the situation in Crimea in December — sent the same clear message to Russia. And earlier this week, the entire Security Council, including Russia, expressed the very same thing in an agreed statement (SC/12700): that we support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.

But Russian words are not the same as Russian deeds. We need to see Russia comply with its Minsk commitments. We need to see Russia stop equipping and arming the separatists and, instead, use its influence to make sure the separatists meet their Minsk obligations. And we need to see Russia withdrawing its force from all of Ukraine. That includes Crimea, the illegal annexation of which we do not, and will not, recognize. Sanctions against Russia cannot be lifted until that happens. It is for the people for Ukraine to decide their country’s future. Ukraine must be allowed to make its own sovereign decisions.

Mrs. Haley (United States of America): I thank Under-Secretary-General Feltman, Under-Secretary-General O’Brien and Ambassador Apakan for their useful and comprehensive briefings today.
This is my first appearance in the Chamber as the Permanent Representative of the United States. It is an immense honour for me to sit behind the United States placard and to follow in the footsteps of so many giants of American diplomacy. It is humbling to be part of a body whose responsibility is nothing less than maintaining international peace and security. I look forward to working closely with all Council members. The United States is determined to push for action. There is no time to waste.

I consider it unfortunate that the occasion of my first appearance here is one in which I must condemn the aggressive actions of Russia. It is unfortunate because it is a replay of far too many instances over many years in which United States representatives have needed to do that. It should not have to be that way. We do want to better our relations with Russia. However, the dire situation in eastern Ukraine is one that demands clear and strong condemnation of Russian actions. The sudden increase in fighting in eastern Ukraine has trapped thousands of civilians and destroyed vital infrastructure. And the crisis is spreading, endangering many thousands more. The escalation of violence must stop.

The United States stands with the people of Ukraine, who have suffered for nearly three years under Russian occupation and military intervention. Until Russia and the separatists it supports respect Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, the crisis will continue.

Eastern Ukraine, of course, is not the only part of the country suffering because of Russia's aggressive actions. The United States continues to condemn and call for an immediate end to the Russian occupation of Crimea. Crimea is a part of Ukraine. Our Crimea-related sanctions will remain in place until Russia returns control of the peninsula to Ukraine.

The basic principle of the United Nations is that States should live side by side in peace. There is a clear path to restoring peace in eastern Ukraine — the full and immediate implementation of the Minsk agreements, which the United States continues to support. For the people in eastern Ukraine, the stakes are high. With each passing day, more people are at risk of freezing to death or dying from a mortar blast.

The United States calls on Russia and the combined Russian-backed separatist forces to fulfil their commitments in the Minsk agreements and fully restore and respect the ceasefire. The Minsk agreements require the disengagement of forces and the withdrawal of heavy weapons from both sides of the contact line. That is the formula for a sustainable ceasefire. Pulling back forces and taking heavy weapons out of the area will save lives. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission must also be granted full, unfettered access. The presence of OSCE monitors can help calm tensions.

Cooperation on this issue is possible. Earlier this week, both Russia and Ukraine supported this Council's unanimous call (SC/12700) to return to a ceasefire. It was the first time in years that the Council was able to come together on Ukraine. The parties on the ground should heed that signal and hold their fire. The United States expects that those who can influence the groups that are fighting — in particular Russia — will do everything possible to support an end to the escalation of violence.

Mr. Liu Jieyi (China) (spoke in Chinese): I thank Under-Secretary-General Feltman; Ambassador Apakan, Chief Monitor of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine; and Under-Secretary-General O'Brien for their briefings.

China has been following the situation in eastern Ukraine closely, and is concerned about the recurring hostilities that have resulted in civilian casualties. We have taken note of the fact that the Normandy format and the Trilateral Contact Group in Minsk held consultations on the implementation of the Minsk agreements and promoting a peaceful resolution to the Ukrainian issue. We call on the parties to the conflict to strictly abide by the ceasefire regime and remain committed to a political solution. There must be a fundamental and long-term solution to this conflict that will both accommodate the legitimate rights and aspirations of all regions and ethnic groups and address the reasonable concerns of all the parties concerned, in order to strike a balance among the interests of all sides.

China is of the view that all parties should fully implement resolution 2202 (2015), enforce the cessation of hostilities and violence and implement the Minsk agreements. They must remain committed to seeking a comprehensive, lasting and balanced solution to the Ukrainian issue through dialogue and consultation, so as to help achieve peace, stability and development in Ukraine, harmonious relations among all ethnic groups and peaceful coexistence between Ukraine and
countries of the region. The international community should continue to support every diplomatic effort for a political solution. Council discussions on the issue should contribute to the easing of tensions on the ground and a proper solution to the Ukrainian question.

Mr. Thöresson (Sweden): Let me start by thanking Under-Secretary-General Feltman, Ambassador Apakan and Under-Secretary-General O’Brien for their very useful briefings.

As today’s briefings have reminded us, the conflict in Donbas has now been ongoing for almost three years. Each day that it continues to simmer without a solution results in more deaths and injuries, as well as fear and uncertainty for civilians. The humanitarian fallout of the current deterioration in the region is particularly alarming. Access to basic needs, including water, electricity and heating, has been interrupted. Sixteen thousand people are acutely affected, with reports of 2,000 children in need of assistance in Avdiivka.

We call on all parties to ensure that civilians are protected in line with international humanitarian law. Humanitarian actors must have access to the entirety of the Ukrainian territory, including the zones outside the control of the Ukrainian Government. The recent escalation in violence is a clear breach of the first point of the Minsk agreements, which call for an immediate and full ceasefire. A cessation of hostilities is essential for security, which, in turn, is a basic prerequisite for finding a sustainable political solution to the conflict. In that regard, we fully support the efforts of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the difficult work of its Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. Safe, full and unhindered access for its monitors must be guaranteed.

As a small country committed to a rules-based international order, Sweden relies upon strict adherence to the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and respect for international law. Violation of those core principles and commitments poses a threat to the European security order, and are therefore a fundamental concern for all of us.

Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity must be fully respected, as underlined by all of us in the Security Council press statement of 31 January (SC/12700). Let us not lose sight of who is the aggressor and who is the victim in this conflict. We highlight Russia’s particular responsibility in that regard, and stress that Russia can bring its influence to bear to end the violence, should it wish to do so. In that connection, we should not forget Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and Sebastopol, in clear violation of international law, including the rules and principles of the United Nations Charter.

In line with consistent appeals from the European Union, Sweden calls for an immediate and lasting ceasefire. We reiterate our call for the full implementation of the Minsk agreements. Sanctions against Russia must remain in place until the Minsk agreements are fully implemented. We commend and support the efforts of France and Germany in the Normandy format. Finally, we call for the rules and principles of international law, including international humanitarian law, to be fully respected.

Mr. Lambertini (Italy): At the outset, I would like to thank Under-Secretaries-General Feltman and O’Brien and Ambassador Apakan for their detailed briefings. What we heard from them has reinforced our deep concerns about the escalation of tensions in Donbas over the past few days. That is why we urge all the parties involved to immediately end the intense fighting that erupted around Avdiivka, which involved the use of heavy weapons proscribed by the Minsk agreements and inflicted suffering on the civilian population. We urge them to agree on concrete and immediate steps to reverse the deterioration of the security situation. That includes a return to the ceasefire without delay, to which they have repeatedly committed, as well as to proceed with disengagement in the areas specifically identified in September and to withdraw heavy weaponry in line with the provisions of the Minsk agreements.

Secondly, we are seriously concerned about the dire humanitarian situation in the area. In the current harsh winter conditions, with freezing temperatures, thousands of lives are at risk on both sides of the contact line because of the destruction of the local power and water filtration plants. Every action required to restore full access to water, electricity and heating should be put in place without delay to prevent further suffering. We therefore call upon all the parties to allow the urgent repair of critical infrastructure and to grant safe, full, unrestricted access to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission and to humanitarian organizations. The protection of the civilian population must remain the highest priority for all sides. In that regard, my country promptly responded to the humanitarian call
with a contribution of €1 million to the World Food Programme and UNICEF programmes on food security and mine-risk education in conflict-affected areas.

Thirdly, the blatant violation of the ceasefire we are witnessing is not acceptable. The latest developments represent a serious violation of the Minsk agreements. We firmly believe that their implementation is the only path to a political solution to the crisis. In that regard, Italy reiterates its full support of the role played by the Normandy group and the OSCE in facilitating dialogue. We deem it to be necessary to relaunch negotiations without delay and expect a constructive commitment with tangible results to be made with the Trilateral Contact Group. I would like to take this opportunity to recall Italy’s well-known position in support of the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

Let me conclude by emphasizing that dialogue and political will must prevail over a military solution. All parties are encouraged to fully honour their commitments in order to achieve an inclusive and sustainable solution to the crisis in Ukraine.

Mr. Bessho (Japan): I thank the briefers for providing us with a vivid update on the situation on the ground. Japan is deeply concerned about the situation in eastern Ukraine and its severe impact on the local civilian population. We are disappointed that, as we have just heard, the ceasefire is not being observed on the ground, even as we speak.

Japan strongly calls for an immediate return to the ceasefire regime, as expressed in the Security Council press statement (SC/12700) issued on 31 January. Japan takes note of the statement of the Trilateral Contact Group today calling for an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of heavy weaponry from the contact line and the provision of unhindered humanitarian access to the affected population. The full and prompt implementation of those measures is critical in order to alleviate the suffering of the population and to prevent a further escalation of the situation. Japan calls for all the parties to act swiftly and in good faith.

Japan strongly believes that the situation in Ukraine can be solved only by diplomatic means and in full respect for international law, especially the legal obligation to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. The full implementation of the Minsk agreements is the only way forward.

Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): Kazakhstan is gravely concerned about the dangerously deteriorating situation in eastern Ukraine and its severe impact on the local civilian population, which results in death and injuries and many humanitarian problems. We extend our sincere and deep condolences following the civilian casualties, which we consider to be unacceptable. We express our appreciation to Under-Secretaries-General Feltman and O’Brien and to Ambassador Apakan for their updates, as well as their efforts to resolve the crisis.

My delegation would like to refer to some key points. We are very much interested in the stability of Ukraine, taking into account all that has transpired and the current situation on the ground. We express sincere concerns about the fate of young people, women and all vulnerable groups in the crisis zone, as well as the effect on future generations. Last March, my President, who contributed to the launch of the Normandy format, mentioned at the Nuclear Security Summit that was held in Washington, D.C., that bringing an end to the conflict in eastern Ukraine should be of utmost common priority. Conflicts should be resolved through negotiations.

Kazakhstan is firmly convinced that there is no alternative to resolving the crisis in Ukraine other than through peaceful means based on the observance by all participants of their obligations, in accordance with the norms and values of international law and key principles of the Charter of the United Nations. We therefore call for strict compliance with resolution 2202 (2015), on the Minsk agreements.

Kazakhstan fully endorses the activities of the Trilateral Contact Group and its working groups on implementing confidence-building measures in the four areas they cover. We welcome the results of the Contact Group meeting held in Minsk on 1 February. We also believe that any further escalation of tensions should be prevented in order to avoid a worsening of the situation. Any aggravation of the current circumstances could have unpredictable consequences both regionally and globally. We call upon the parties to withdraw their heavy weapons from the contact line. We stand ready to assist the population, support international mediation efforts and facilitate the negotiation process among all the parties and their leaders, with a view to resolving this situation as soon as possible.

Kazakhstan continues to provide both bilateral and multilateral aid. All parties must follow their obligations
to provide free access to humanitarian assistance in the conflict zone. We believe that the full-fledged normalization of the country's situation can be achieved only with the economic recovery of Ukraine, which should be our primary and requisite consideration. We therefore call for economic confidence-building measures to be established. Kazakhstan intends to work in a balanced and unbiased manner, on an equal basis, with all Security Council members to promote compromise and consensus in order to help achieve an early solution to the crisis, keeping in mind the paramount importance of maintaining and strengthening peace and security. We call upon all parties to demonstrate wisdom, responsibility and political will to ensure an immediate return to a ceasefire regime.

Mr. Seck (Senegal) (spoke in French): As this is the first time that I take the floor, Sir, since your country's assumption of the presidency of the Security Council, I would like to warmly congratulate you and to wish you every success. Rest assured of the full support of the Senegalese delegation. I would also like to commend the skill, efficiency and the transparent manner in which the Swedish delegation guided the work of the Council last month.

I should like to thank you, Mr. President, for convening today's briefing with Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador Apakan and Under-Secretary-General Stephen O'Brien, whose updates are key to our discussions.

Two years after the signing of the Minsk agreement and the adoption of resolution 2202 (2015) by the Security Council, by which the former was endorsed, the situation in eastern Ukraine is still tense and has suddenly worsened now that armed clashes have resumed. The resurgence in hostilities has resulted in a heavy death toll, left many wounded and exacerbated the region's dire humanitarian situation. As others have mentioned, the fighting has disrupted electricity, water and heating for thousands, at this time of year when temperatures drop to as low as -20°C during the night. This alarming picture leads me to urge the protagonists to think about the civilians and immediately cease hostilities, respect the ceasefire and withdraw heavy weapons.

I would like to commend the reiterated call by the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine, which met yesterday in an emergency meeting, for an immediate cessation of hostilities. The withdrawal of heavy weapons from the front lines and access for the observers of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and for humanitarian assistance to affected areas are all crucial.

In conclusion, I want to call for an intensification of diplomatic efforts, in particular through the Normandy format, by which France and Germany seek to support Russia and Ukraine in fully implementing the Minsk agreements for the good of the civilian population.

Ms. Guadey (Ethiopia): I wish to thank Under-Secretary-General Jeffrey Feltman and Under-Secretary-General Stephen O'Brien, as well as the Chief Monitor of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Special Monitoring Mission, Ambassador Apakan, for their briefings on the most recent developments in eastern Ukraine.

The deteriorating security situation in the region and the use of weapons prohibited by the Minsk agreements is a matter of concern. We also note the consequences of the most recent violence in terms of civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure. The humanitarian situation requires an urgent response.

We believe there is a need to do everything possible to de-escalate the situation. In that regard, we fully support the call made by the Security Council two days ago (SC/12700) for an immediate return to a ceasefire regime. No doubt, a resolution of the situation in the eastern region of Ukraine can be achieved only through a peaceful settlement. That is why it is absolutely imperative that the parties remain fully committed to the implementation of the Minsk agreements and strictly adhere to resolution 2202 (2015), which endorsed the package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements.

Mr. Llorentty Solís (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): The Plurinational State of Bolivia takes note of what we have heard in the briefings by Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs; Ambassador Ertuğrul Apakan, Chief Monitor of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine; and Mr. Stephen O'Brien, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator.

We express our concern about the resurgence of tension in Donbas. We deplore in particular the
non-compliance with the ban on the use of heavy artillery, given the urgent need to maintain the ceasefire. In that regard, we approve of the Council’s press statement SC/12700, of 31 January, which condemns the use of weapons banned by the Minsk agreements and calls for full compliance with resolution 2202 (2015). Bolivia calls upon the parties to respect the provisions of the Minsk agreements, as endorsed by resolution 2202 (2015), which is essential to strengthen the efforts the parties must make in the search for a peaceful and political solution to the crisis.

We are particularly concerned about the impact of the crisis on the civilian population. We therefore urge the parties to strictly adhere to their obligations in terms of protecting civilians, including the need to guarantee access to humanitarian assistance and basic medical services. With the support of the international community, full compliance with the Minsk agreements and the joint efforts of the Security Council it should be possible in the short term to avoid a military escalation and to reach a peaceful solution to this crisis with a view to preventive diplomacy, which the Secretary-General has called for. Every possible effort must be made to achieve lasting peace, which in the long term will be beneficial not only for the parties but also for the region and the entire world. We also call for the parties to not step up the rhetoric, for we do not think it will contribute to a political solution to this very difficult situation.

Mr. Bermúdez (Uruguay) (spoke in Spanish): Uruguay is grateful for the detailed briefings by Under-Secretary-General Jeffrey Feltman and Under-Secretary-General Stephen O’Brien, as well as by Ambassador Ertuğrul Apakan.

Uruguay continues to follow with great concern the recent developments in Avdiivka and the recent violations of the ceasefire. Uruguay thinks it is crucial to step up efforts and dialogue to ensure the effective implementation of the Minsk agreements, as they constitute the right way to achieve a political and peaceful solution to this conflict. Along those lines, Uruguay calls on the parties to ensure the effective protection of human rights of the residents of all regions, in particular of the territories of Donetsk and Luhansk.

At the same time, it is also crucial for the parties to the conflict to respect international humanitarian law in all circumstances. This is critical to addressing the situation of internally displaced persons and people requiring humanitarian assistance, in particular in terms of protection and given the current weather conditions, the continuous supply of water, food, energy and heat, emergency shelter and other critical services in temperatures that drop to -20°C.

Uruguay recognizes the important work being carried out by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine and believes that it is vital for the Mission to be allowed access to all conflict areas in order to end to fulfil its mandate. We urge a resumption of the spirit with which the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2202 (2015). The parties must comply with their obligations in that regard.

In conclusion, Uruguay hopes that the challenges in implementing the Minsk agreements can be overcome and that the disputes can be settled exclusively through peaceful means, dialogue between the parties and with full respect for international law and democratic values.

Mr. Moustafa (Egypt) (spoke in Arabic): I would like to join those who have spoken before me in thanking you, Mr. President, as well as Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Mr. Ertuğrul Apakan and Mr. Stephen O’Brien for their briefings to the Security Council on the worsening of the situation in the Donbas region.

Egypt expresses its serious concern about the continuation of hostilities in eastern Ukraine, and especially with regard to the supplies of electricity, water and heat, which have been cut off and which affect a great number of civilians in very difficult weather conditions in Ukraine. Egypt calls upon all the parties to respect an immediate cessation of hostilities and to fully implement the ceasefire and prevent any provocation that could create further stress.

Furthermore, we must guarantee full access for humanitarian assistance to the entire region affected by the conflict with a view to improving the living conditions of the citizens, above all in the light of the worsening of the humanitarian situation in the region. In that context, Egypt welcomes the agreement expressed by the Council on press statement SC/12700, which was issued on 31 January.

Egypt believes that we should seek a peaceful solution to the conflict in keeping with international commitments. We support the Minsk agreements and believe that they are the appropriate framework for dealing with this crisis, which must be resolved
in the context of the region, through mediation efforts among the stakeholders and with respect and appreciation for both parties to the conflict and the entire international community. That is essential if we are to reach the ultimate goal of a political solution to the crisis in Ukraine and to achieve peace and stability in the country and a lasting settlement of the conflict in the region.

Egypt also urges full compliance with resolution 2202 (2015) and calls on all the parties involved to implement the Minsk agreements’ package of measures and procedures, particularly observance of the ceasefire, the withdrawal of heavy weapons, the institution of essential constitutional reforms and the holding of elections in the Donbas region. Those should be accompanied by a settlement of the military crisis brought on by the conflict in coordination with all the parties, without exception.

Egypt reaffirms its confidence in the various formats for peaceful negotiations between the two parties. We urge those parties to redouble their efforts to reach a peaceful settlement of the crisis that can fulfill the people’s aspirations within a framework of international legitimacy, to show restraint and to avoid any military escalation. We reiterate our firm support for all efforts designed to achieve a political solution to the crisis, including those in the Normandy format.

The President: The representative of the Russian Federation has asked for the floor to make a further statement.

Mr. Churkin (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Our meeting is drawing to a close, and I am now perhaps within my rights, as doyen of the Security Council, to welcome our new United States colleague, Ambassador Nikki Haley. From time to time we may have differences on particular issues, but her efforts will greatly influence the Council’s ability to effectively carry out its collective functions as the body with the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. I would therefore like to wish her every success.

In her statement, Ambassador Haley touched on the issue of Crimea. In that connection, I would like to remind her that it was the United States Constitution that proclaimed those marvellous, historic words “We the people”. The people of Crimea clearly expressed their will in a referendum in which 93 per cent of the population voted for reunification with Russia, from which Crimea had been unjustly and unlawfully severed. And, by the way, that expression of the people’s will has subsequently been confirmed in a number of public opinion surveys conducted by Western organizations.

Still on the issue of Crimea, however, it is the representative of the United Kingdom, as aggressive as ever, who for some reason persists in saying that the crisis in Ukraine began with Crimea. I am compelled yet again to recall that the whole thing began with a coup that owed a great deal to external support. Here is my advice to the representative of the United Kingdom about his position. Give back the Malvinas; give back Gibraltar; give back the part of Cyprus that was annexed; give back the Chagos archipelago in the Indian Ocean, which has been turned into a huge military base. Perhaps then his conscience will be a little clearer and he will be able to speak to other topics.

While we sometimes have to deal in controversy, I believe nonetheless that our job as diplomats in the Security Council is to adopt resolutions and see to it that they are strictly implemented. Ten days from now we will observe the second anniversary of the adoption of the Minsk package of measures and the corresponding agreements, while 17 February is the second anniversary of the Council’s adoption of resolution 2202 (2015), giving the Minsk agreements international legal status. From time to time, we hear that Russia is not fulfilling the Minsk agreements; but the President of Ukraine says that the military provisions of the Minsk agreements must be complied with before the political ones are dealt with. It is not hard to figure out who is right and who is wrong here. All we have to do is look at a Security Council document — the same resolution 2202 (2015), to which the package of measures is attached as annex I. It contains some very simple propositions that we can all understand.

Regarding the relationship between military and political measures, paragraph 9 of the annex provides for:

"Reinstatement of full control over the State border by the Government of Ukraine throughout the conflict area, starting on day 1 after the local elections and ending after the comprehensive political settlement ... provided that paragraph 11 has been implemented in consultation with and upon agreement by representatives of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in the framework of the Trilateral Contact Group."
That means that certain military steps should start only after various political measures have been implemented. Now, what are those conditions in paragraph 11 that have to be implemented? Paragraph 11 provides for 

“Carrying out constitutional reform in Ukraine with a new constitution ... providing for decentralization as a key element ... as well as adopting permanent legislation on the special status of certain areas in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in line with measures as set out in the footnote”.

And the footnote clearly sets out the eight measures that must be taken in order to ensure special status for south-eastern Ukraine. They are extremely precise. The President of France, who made a very active and substantive contribution, and the Chancellor and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, who made a number of proposals that were then agreed to by everyone, did not spend 17 hours drafting them in vain.

There can simply be no arguing here. And, logically, who could suggest or expect that Donetsk and Luhansk should close off their borders and allow themselves to be walled in? And then what? Throw themselves on the mercy of the Kyiv authorities? Can the citizens of Donetsk and Luhansk trust the Kyiv authorities? At one point — I believe it was 1 July 2014 — President Poroshenko appeared on Ukrainian television and said that the citizens of Donetsk and Luhansk were so beloved in Kyiv that there would be no heavy-artillery shelling of residential areas during their anti-terrorism operations. He said that his valiant warriors had other ways of recovering those territories and that they would not be shelling residential areas with heavy weapons.

Since then, Mr. Apakan can confirm that not a single day has passed when residential areas have not been shelled targets, while high-rise buildings are fired on one day and then fired on again the next. Take the photograph that Ambassador Yelchenko showed us today. If it is a picture of a ruined building in Avdiivka, of course it is terrible. But he could have brought similar photos of other areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as many as you like. Why did he not do that?

Yes, of course, Ukrainian soldiers have died in the fighting, and there is nothing good about that. But most of those who have died on the Donetsk and Luhansk side have been civilians, including women and children. Why not talk about them? Of course we could draft some document, but if we are serious people representing serious Governments, especially the Governments that have been directly involved in the process, by the way, let me point out to dear Ambassador Haley that we know how they respect the American authorities in Kyiv, which means that in this regard the American authorities can have some very serious influence on the developing situation. All that is needed is to call for the implementation of the relatively simple provisions in the Minsk package in order to restore Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. And yet Kyiv's actions are in fact bringing about the destruction of its territorial integrity. Ambassador Yelchenko says that the local people cannot do this, cannot wreak such destruction, and so forth. But can the local Ukrainians on the Ukrainian side wreak such destruction on Donetsk and Luhansk? It seems that they can. Do they not consider these Ukrainian citizens their brethren? While that would be very sad, we know that that is exactly what some hotheads in Kyiv think and believe.

I would like to appeal to the common-sense section of the Ukrainian political spectrum. But I repeat that, needless to say, without major influence from those on the external factor side, the Normandy format and others, none of this will succeed. Because they will simply deceive their own people with unsubstantiated claims that own population that Kyiv has somehow complied with the Minsk agreements. They say that they are recapturing their country, metre by metre. How many people will have to die as they progress metre by metre from Avdiivka to the Ukrainian border? How many Ukrainian soldiers and civilians will have to die? And this at a time when a political alternative exists, agreed to at the highest level, and including President Poroshenko's participation two years ago. While it is therefore regrettable that what we heard today from the Ukrainian delegation was totally irresponsible, I hope that our frank discussion will still enable those who really want to resolve the Ukrainian crisis to look at things more objectively and push Kyiv into taking the steps that are essential to establishing peace in Ukraine. It would certainly be a tragedy if the situation we have faced in the past two or three years should drag on any longer.

The President: I shall now make a further statement in my capacity as the representative of Ukraine.

Today is indeed Groundhog Day. The first statement made by the Russian delegation repeats word for word what was said in the consultations two days ago. As
far as the second statement is concerned, I do not even wish to comment on that cocktail of demagogy.

I wish to stress that such frivolous interpretations of the reports of the Special Monitoring Mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are more than ridiculous. There is no reference to Ukrainian forces in OSCE reports; that is a known fact. I would rather trust the assessment of Ambassador Apakan, who is with us today.

The Russian Ambassador asserted that the coal factory in Avdiivka was shelled by Ukrainian forces. I have to clarify once again that this factory is located on territory controlled by the Ukrainian Government, so the shells that rained down on the factory were propelled by Russian guns. This was reported by all three briefers.

Russia blames President Poroshenko and other high Ukrainian officials for stirring up the violence around Avdiivka. However, it is not Poroshenko who is supplying the terrorists with ammunition and armour. Indeed, one of them, captured during the recent attack on Avdiivka, already confessed, just yesterday, that the Russian officers commanding his unit had given orders to capture the town before the end of last week; this is all documented.

The reality is very simple. It is Russian weapons that are killing Ukrainians. It is Russian soldiers and mercenaries who have come to Ukraine to earn money for murder. Recalling my remarks about the resumption of shelling in Avdiivka about an hour ago, I would like to inform my colleagues that, as a result, at least two civilians were killed and another injured. The shelling continues to batter residential areas even as we speak, including the school building used for the distribution of humanitarian supplies.

Thus, we do not exclude any escalation or provocation in and around Donetsk, in further attempts to discredit the Ukrainian armed forces and the Ukrainian leadership. We have information about the evacuation of civilians in Donetsk that we believe to be a preparation for a possible provocation similar to what happened in August 2008, when Russia prepared to attack Georgia.

As I stated at the beginning of the meeting, we expected a serious, professional dialogue that would put an end to the violence and help to avert a humanitarian disaster and save lives. Denying reality is not the way to achieve this. It seems that Russia is living in a parallel reality created by current Russian propaganda, a parallel reality that becomes even more twisted when Ambassador Churkin starts to talk about Crimea.

I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council.

The meeting rose at 4.55 p.m.
Annex 316

OSCE, Thematic Report: Internal Displacement in Ukraine (12 August 2014)
Thematic report

Internal displacement in Ukraine

12 August 2014

*) Re-distribution is due to change or distribution status, text remains unchanged
Summary

This report presents views on displacement and future expectations of around 400 internally displaced persons, interviewed by the Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (SMM) in thirteen Ukrainian regions between 18 June and 19 July 2014.

The number of IDPs in Ukraine has increased dramatically since the beginning of June. UNHCR estimates that in early August the number of registered IDPs was over 117,000 persons. There is a high discrepancy in numbers due to lack of centralised registration. Many IDPs also refrain from registering for various reasons. IDPs are predominantly women and children.

Assistance to IDPs comes predominantly from Ukrainian regions’ authorities and civil society actors. The central government of Ukraine has stepped up its co-ordination efforts since late June. International assistance to IDPs remains modest. While current efforts provide reasonable housing as well as food and non-food assistance to IDPs, the agencies providing the assistance are running out of assets. The approaching school year and cooler seasons introduce additional challenges for IDPs.

Direct experience of violence and perception of imminent threat was the main reason why people decided to leave their home regions. Protecting children from traumatizing events and worsening living conditions was also decisive. Only the most important items were brought along.

Internally displaced persons from Crimea are not expecting to be able to return home in the near future. Most IDPs from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions expressed their intention to return home as soon as the security situation allows, reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure and houses is started and public services start functioning.

Interviewed IDPs raised their concern over emerging critical voices towards displaced persons in some host regions. They also stressed the need for reconciliation in their home communities to enable the communities divided by the conflict to cohabit peacefully.
Details

Internal displacement in Ukraine

This report aims to provide an overview of the current situation of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Ukraine. The first part of the report briefly describes the current IDP situation, the normative framework in place to guarantee the rights of IDPs, and ongoing efforts to assist internally displaced persons. The second part of the report gives voice to IDPs themselves – based on interviews with IDPs from Ukraine’s eastern regions and Crimea, it outlines the IDPs’ own perceptions of their current situation and future plans.

The SMMU teams interviewed, either individually or through focus group discussions (FGDs), some 400 internally displaced persons in a month (18 June to 19 July 2014). More than half of participants were adult women, around 25% adult men, and the rest were children of various ages, accompanied by their parents. The interviews were conducted in the current places of residence of IDPs (sanatoriums, dormitories or private houses), or, in a few cases, at cafes or office premises of local NGOs that provided sufficient privacy for the discussion. All interviews were conducted in full confidentiality by the SMM monitors. Thirty participants were ethnically Crimean Tatars, six Metskhetan Turks and ten Roma. The vast majority of interviewees came from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The SMMU also wishes to thank the office of United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR), Ukrainian regional authorities and several civil society groups that helped to facilitate the interviews.

IDP situation in Ukraine

The SMM does not systematically gather numbers of internally displaced populations. The lack of a centralised registration system causes discrepancies in IDP numbers. UNHCR and Ukrainian state authorities gather statistics on registered IDPs, but both acknowledge that there are significant discrepancies and a great deal of fluctuation in numbers. On 5 August the Ukrainian governmental Interagency Co-ordination Headquarters stated that the number of IDPs from eastern Ukrainian regions was 83,494 persons. In comparison, on 4 August UNHCR estimated that the number of IDPs from eastern Ukraine was 102,624 persons. Additionally, 15,286 persons, or 13% of the total number of IDPs in Ukraine, had been displaced from Crimea. It is clear, however, that there has been a dramatic increase of IDPs from the eastern regions since early June – on 6 June 2014 UNHCR recorded that the number of IDPs from the eastern regions was just 2,649 persons.

Governmental and non-governmental agencies working with IDP issues assess that, in reality, the number of IDPs is two to three times higher, as the above numbers only include persons who have registered with regional authorities for assistance. Many displaced persons interviewed by the SMMU were not registered. Some perceive their displacement as temporary, hoping to return home by the end of summer – they rely on help from relatives and friends, and spend their own

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1 SMMU monitors conducting the interviews received training from the UNHCR office in Ukraine. The training material was based on the OSCE-UNHCR Protection Checklist: Addressing Displacement and Protection of Displaced Populations and Affected Communities along the Conflict Cycle: a collaborative approach. (Available online [http://www.osce.org/cpc/111464](http://www.osce.org/cpc/111464)).
savings to cover the costs of their stay. Some are reluctant to register, fearing consequences, such as confiscation of property by separatist groups at home or conscription of men to the Ukrainian security operation in the east. Persons fleeing Donbas due to abductions and intimidation may also refrain from registration in order to avoid revealing their whereabouts to the perpetrators. Some would like to register, but cannot do so because they lack the necessary documentation such as identity cards and health records due to disrupted services in the home region.

IDPs in Ukraine come predominantly from urban or semi-urban backgrounds. The vast majority of IDPs are women and children\(^2\). Commonly, men stay at home to take care of family property. As breadwinners some men have stayed in the conflict area for work reasons. Men who would like to leave the conflict area may be prevented from doing so by armed groups. Another group of people who have often stayed in the home community are the elderly, who have either been unwilling, or in some cases unable to travel.

**Legal framework**

Ukraine lacks a legal framework on internal displacement. The first piece of legislation in this field, “Law on guaranteeing rights and freedoms of citizens and the legal regime on the temporary occupied territory of Ukraine” was adopted by Ukraine’s Parliament in mid-April. This law determines the rights of displaced persons from Crimea. Conflict in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and the consequently growing number of IDPs has necessitated a new law to cover IDPs from both eastern regions and Crimea. However, an IDP law passed by the Parliament on 19 June 2014 has become a subject of controversy. The main criticism concerned the process of registration, and the lack of stipulations on how to provide financial aid and compensation on lost property to IDPs. Following heavy criticism from civil society, the president of Ukraine vetoed the law on 16 July 2014. In response, the Human Rights Committee of the Parliament recommended that the Parliament would override the presidential veto. However, the presidential administration and the Ministry of Justice, with assistance from civil society groups and UNHCR are currently preparing a new draft law.

Furthermore, the Ministry of Justice has, since the beginning of July, been drafting a by-law on IDP registration. Establishing a nation-wide centralised registry of IDPs would alleviate many problems related to registration, some of which have been discussed above. Currently there are two types of registration: first, IDPs need to register with the Department of Social Protection in the host region to access social payments and services; and second, IDPs may need to register their temporary change of residence with the State Migration Services if they plan to purchase property or open a business. The by-law on registration depends on the passing of the law on IDPs.

**Assistance to IDPs**

\(^2\) This holds true for internal displacement globally. Some 70% of all IDPs in the world are women and children, see: NRC and IDMC Briefing Paper of 7 March 2014. [http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/images/2014/201403-global-girl-disrupted-brief-en.jpg](http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/images/2014/201403-global-girl-disrupted-brief-en.jpg)
Assistance to IDPs in Ukraine has so far been provided by regional government authorities, civil society organizations and private donors. The central government has faced growing criticism due to limited funding allocations to IDPs. Many IDPs interviewed by the SMM also raised criticism towards what they perceived to be lack of interest by the central government in their difficult situation. Since late June the central government has taken a more active co-ordinating role by establishing governmental interagency co-ordination centres, both at the national and regional levels.

Regional and district governments establish in which sanatoriums or resorts there are available places, and assist them to find private housing. Some regional authorities, for example Ivano-Frankivsk, Khmelnytskyi and Kherson, provide cash assistance to newly arrived IDPs. Social service costs of IDPs are also covered from the social budgets of host regions, which will be increasingly difficult if IDP numbers continue to grow in the future and their displacement becomes protracted. Civil society organizations such as NGOs and churches also provide accommodation assistance, and they carry the main responsibility to provide humanitarian assistance like food and non-food items. Civil society organizations also assist IDPs to access government services. NGOs and churches are also helping people to leave their home regions by arranging transportation. The source of funding for civil society assistance is private donations. UN agencies and international organisations have so far provided some assistance to IDPs, such as hygiene kits and other non-food items, as well as medical and psychological services. Unsupportive legislation on humanitarian aid and insufficient data on IDPs hamper international aid efforts.

Views of IDPs on displacement

The following section of this report presents views presented by IDPs to SMM monitors during focus group discussions and individual interviews in thirteen Ukrainian regions. The subtitles reflect the topics that were discussed during the interviews. Some explanatory and contextualising information has been included from SMM interviews with Ukrainian government representatives, NGOs and international aid agencies.

Departure from home

The vast majority of persons who participated in the discussions had left their home regions in late May or in June 2014. IDPs from Crimea had left home earlier, in March or April. Elderly IDPs of Crimean Tatar origin stated that they left Crimea because taking Crimea under the effective control of Russia’s government had revived memories of deportation during Soviet times. They also had more tangible fears that pushed them to leave: curtailed freedom of assembly, information about enforced disappearances, persecution of Tatars and political activists, and their personal experiences of armed men conducting searches in mosques and private houses had made life in Crimea perilous.

The vast majority of interviewees came from the most affected conflict areas in the eastern part of Ukraine (Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Horlivka, and Luhansk and Donetsk cities). Direct experience or the witnessing of acts of violence, such as killings, abductions, threats and
intimidation, as well as the perception by people that these acts of violence could affect also them personally, made them leave. The activity of armed gangs targeting the local population and, in general, a lack of rule of law were amongst key reasons. In June shelling and shootings became more frequent in the northern part of Donetsk. Many interviewed IDPs recalled particular incidents that had triggered them to leave. One woman said that she left on the day she found a corpse at her doorstep. Another person said that they fled their hometown Kramatorsk after witnessing the bombing of a five-story building that caused the death of one man and two teenage girls.

Fear for children’s lives and their exposure to traumatising events and repeated nights spent in makeshift shelters due to fighting were major reasons for families to decide that at least part of the family had to leave for safety. Parents told the SMM that younger children particularly suffered from sleeping problems, and had become afraid of loud noises. Some children had become withdrawn and stopped talking. Others started playing war games and showed aggression. Many interviewed parents said, however, that time in a safe environment in other regions had made most symptoms disappear. Some reported that their children were still afraid of aircrafts and sharp noises that resemble shooting.

Another push factor for people to leave their homes was worsening living conditions. Water and electricity supply had become irregular, and in towns like Sloviansk stopped altogether, which made everyday life difficult. Banks and shops were closing down, and food prices had grown higher. Social payments were not paid any longer as civil services were not functioning. Work places were closed, or in some cases, destroyed.

Interviewees said that they had selected their destination based on having relatives or friends in a certain region. While people had often discussed the possibility of leaving beforehand, their accounts of departure revealed the degree of panic and hastedness. They took only the most important documents, some clothes and necessary medicines. Some said that they did not want to draw attention by carrying large luggage. They feared that armed groups might hinder them from leaving, or confiscate their unoccupied apartment.

Train travel was considered safer than road travel, as there were numerous checkpoints of both armed groups and Ukrainian armed forces along the main roads. Travel by train had mostly been uninterrupted for those who left in June or earlier. Challenges to train travel were the difficulties purchasing tickets for overcrowded trains at the railway stations. Some said that their friends or relatives elsewhere in the country had purchased online tickets for them. In July the Ukrainian Ministry of Transportation arranged extra train capacity from the eastern regions, but intensified fighting made it difficult to enter the train stations. According to information received from IDPs, leaving by train has also become more difficult as armed groups have started to sweep train stations and train carriages in search of adult men leaving the territories under their control. In some instances, adult men were pushed to join the armed groups. Reportedly adult men have also been used as forced labour to dig trenches or build barricades. On 28 July the trains ceased going to Luhansk due to fighting in the area and damage to railway infrastructure.

3 UNICEF’s Rapid Psychosocial Assessment of Children in Donetsk Oblast confirms high levels of fear and anxiety amongst children in the conflict areas of Donetsk region. The assessment was conducted in May 2014. 
A number of volunteer organisations, such as a Protestant church in Sloviansk, arranged buses to evacuate people from conflict zone. Those travelling by road either in buses or private cars said that they had been stopped several times at the checkpoints where their documents, luggage and vehicles were screened. The screening of men was reportedly more meticulous than of women both at Ukrainian government and militant checkpoints. None of the interviewees stated that any person was detained or hindered. Nobody described any extortion at checkpoints.

With few exceptions, travelling had taken place without major incidents. At least two interviewees said that their car tires had been shot at, and others reported having items stolen. One family said that Chechen fighters had held them at a checkpoint for three hours and threatened to kill their families back home if they revealed the position of militant forces to Ukrainian military.

Not everyone willing to escape from the conflict area was able to leave. Several focus group discussions brought up the fact that only those who had sufficient financial means could do so, while others who could not afford the travel costs or temporary stay in other regions had no other option than to stay at home. Some had family members who were disabled or whose health condition did not allow travel. In such cases either the whole family, or some family members, stayed at home to take care of them.

The loss of control over Crimea by the Ukrainian government, and the armed conflict in Donbas, has led to disruptions in the social fabric in these places. Family members have become physically separated from each other due to the situation, as has been described above. Separation and fear for the lives of family members who stayed in the conflict area caused anxiety amongst many interviewees. Most said that they were still able to keep in touch with family members and friends at home via mobile phones or Skype. IDPs from the eastern regions also explained to the SMM that some of their family members or relatives had fled to Russia, because they had friends or relatives living there. Others chose Russia because their opinion about the conflict made them distrust the Ukrainian government, and were reluctant to move to other parts of the country.

**Housing in the place of displacement**

The government of Ukraine seems to have insufficiently responded to the housing needs of internally displaced persons. Only in late June was a web portal launched, through which persons wanting to leave conflict areas could browse through available accommodation facilities in potential host regions (www.migrants.gov.ua). The website is maintained by the Interagency Co-ordination HQ in Kyiv. A few recently arrived IDPs interviewed by the SMMU said that they had used the website to find accommodation, but most had arrived before the service was available.

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4 On 16 July a State Emergency Services representative said that, nationally, almost five thousand premises had been identified that could accommodate up to 55,000 IDPs. Some civil society interlocutors told the SMM that not all premises listed on the website are in habitable condition, and some premises cannot be found at all. The Ministry for Regional Development has responded to criticism by tasking regional authorities to verify that the offered premises are in sufficient condition, have sanitation facilities and access to water and electricity. They are also mapping premises that are suitable for winter.
available. The most common methods to find housing were social networks (either web-based or personal), NGOs or through regional departments of social protection. Ordinary Ukrainians’ willingness to help displaced families might be illustrated in the account of two women who had fled Luhansk with their children: during the train journey they had engaged in a conversation with travellers from western Ukraine who had offered them accommodation free of charge until the end of summer. Finding housing has been more problematic for Roma IDPs; interviewees from this group perceived that they did not receive necessary assistance from local state officials.

Housing conditions and costs vary greatly, depending on where arriving persons end up. Those currently in private accommodation were staying with relatives or friends, in flats or houses that had been offered to IDPs by local residents, and some in flats that they had rented themselves. Around two thirds of those interviewed who were staying in private accommodation did not pay rent, as many of them were staying in houses together with their relatives. Those who did pay rent were sometimes given a reduced rent price, but some others said that they had to pay high rental costs. Some of those staying with relatives said that they felt like an extra burden to the households, especially if they had no means to help cover housing costs.

Collective accommodation is provided to IDPs, either by regional administration or by private owners. These include sanatoriums, summer camp facilities, holiday resorts and hotels, student dormitories, monasteries or other types of communal buildings. Collective accommodation is by and large free of charge, at least for an initial stay. Amongst around thirty interviews (both groups and individuals) with people staying in collective accommodation, only three had to pay for it. Accommodation costs were covered either by regional or district authorities, by churches or private donors (businessmen, owners of hotels, NGOs). However, for example in the Kyiv region, some IDPs had been told that soon they would be expected to pay for utility costs, though no exact information about this had been made available. This illustrates a more common expectation that private agencies that have until now offered free accommodation to IDPs, are about to reach the limits of their available assets for the purpose.

So far, the Government’s financial support for covering accommodation costs of IDPs has been limited to the Cabinet of Ministers Resolution no. 213 ‘On Guaranteeing Temporary Accommodation for Families Displaced from the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and from the city of Sevastopol.’ The resolution allocates UAH 25 million (EUR 1.42 million) from state budget reserve funds to compensate the costs of accommodation of displaced families of civilians and military servicemen from Crimea until 1 July 2014. The compensation will be paid to the accounts of institutions providing accommodation. This Resolution thus aims to compensate owners of sanatoriums and recreation institutions for past costs of accommodating IDPs rather than respond to any future needs of accommodation. The Resolution procedure also suggests that IDPs from Crimea staying in private accommodation will not receive compensation. Currently, there is no legal mechanism enabling the state to finance the accommodation of IDPs from the eastern regions.

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5 Kyiv regional administration representatives informed the SMM on 23 July that electricity and gas companies were putting pressure on the regional administration and the owners of IDP accommodation facilities to pay accumulated debts or face supply cuts. The regional administration hopes that the central government will find a solution.

6 The text is available under [http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/213-2014-%D0%BF](http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/213-2014-%D0%BF)
Generally, the interviewed IDPs were content with the quality of accommodation. Particularly, those staying in private housing were satisfied, though few worried about the costs of living in the long run. The level of sanatorium facilities varies widely: some have spacious, newly renovated rooms with private bathrooms while others are run-down establishments that have not been used for years. Some overcrowding was observed, and some complained about the lack of privacy. In some sanatoriums and dormitories there was only a limited number of sanitation facilities, that were often shared by men and women. Some facilities lack insulation and heating systems. If displacement continues after September, the lack of heating will be a major problem for many IDPs. An additional problem for those currently staying in student dormitories is that they will need to find another housing solution by the start of the study year in early September.

**Socio-economic situation**

None of the participants in the assessment reported serious problems with nutrition. Those staying in private housing buy and cook their own food, though some had received food aid from churches or NGOs. Collective housing often lacks kitchens for private use; instead, communal meals are prepared by volunteers several times a day. Less than a third of interviewees staying in collective accommodation, mostly in hotels or student dormitories, said they covered their own food costs. Donated food was sometimes lacking in fresh food items. Mothers with babies, in particular, mentioned that baby food had not been donated, meaning additional financial pressure.

Access to medical services varies. State health services for IDPs work well in some regions while in other places accessing health services is problematic. The majority of interviewees said that they had not needed medical services, and thus did not know whether they would be easily accessible. Hoping to return home soon, they had not made an effort to find out how the system worked. A few sanatoriums provide medical care, and some local doctors and nurses offer medical services to IDPs as voluntary work. But IDPs often need financial support to purchase the medicine, or to access specialised care. Those with chronic diseases and prescribed medicine had difficulties in renewing the prescriptions. Civil society actors are covering the gaps by covering medical costs and assisting IDPs to get access to hospital care.

Only few IDPs are employed in their place of displacement. For example, in Ivano-Frankivsk only two of 27 interviewed had found work, while the rest said they lived on savings, social benefits and support from families and local communities. Many were not in a position to take up regular employment due to their personal situation. These included women who are pregnant or have small children, pensioners and disabled persons. Location of displacement also affected work opportunities: IDPs staying in the city of Dnipropetrovsk had better chances finding work than those staying in the countryside. Some IDPs committed to do voluntary work helping other IDPs. In Kherson region some IDPs have found seasonal employment as daily workers in agriculture or selling food and souvenirs at the beach. The jobs that IDPs have been able to find are often not in the field of their previous work experience, and they receive far lower salaries than at home. An exception in interviews were IT experts that reportedly found work easily in

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7 According to the UN’s Weekly Situation Report on Emergency Shelter and NFI, period 23-30 July 2014, some 60 % of the buildings used as collective accommodation for IDPs are not suitable for winter accommodation.
the western Lviv region. Many Ukrainian regions also currently have high unemployment rates, and there is tough competition for jobs even for local residents.

IDPs had varying experiences in accessing social payments such as child benefits and pensions in the host region. While in principle there should be no obstacles to receiving social payments in other regions, in practice some displaced families had experienced bureaucratic problems related to documentation causing delays in payments, sometimes of months. Many interviewees expressed their frustration about laborious processes and lack of information from the state authorities on their status and rights. They also criticised the central state authorities for not preparing the necessary legal framework on displacement and for not allocating any budget funds to assist IDPs. At the same time, the IDPs were grateful for the hospitality and aid efforts of civil society groups and local residents to assist displaced persons in their difficult situation. In the absence of the Government’s instructions some regions, e.g. Ivano-Frankivsk, Khmelnytskyi and Kherson, have decided to provide one-time cash assistance (UAH 200-1,000; EUR 11.38-57) to IDPs at the time of arrival.

**Return home, and other durable solutions**

The possibility of returning home appears different for displaced persons from Crimea and the eastern regions. The interviewed IDPs from Crimea are not expecting a fast solution to the Crimean question, and they are not willing to return to Crimea if it stays under the control of the Russian Federation. The given reasons for not returning included information regarding price increases and growing unemployment in Crimea, continuing political pressure, and fear of religious and ethnic discrimination, particularly among Crimean Tatars. Not expecting to return home soon, IDPs from Crimea aspired to integrate in the host region by finding sustainable sources of livelihood, affordable private housing, and educational opportunities for children. Crimean Tatar interlocutors were concerned that resettling Crimean Tatars in different regions in Ukraine would lead this minority group to lose its cohesion and unity.

Unlike IDPs from Crimea almost all displaced persons from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions stated that they wanted to return home. Families with children were hoping to return before the beginning of school year (1 September), though not all expected this to be feasible. A crucial pre-condition for returning home was the cessation of hostilities and an improved security situation. Other factors affecting return were the reconstruction of destroyed public infrastructure, private houses, and functioning public services. Many also raised a concern that the economic recovery of Donbas area would take years, and there might not be job opportunities for returnees. Concern that the above conditions would not be met was amongst the main reasons for those not planning to return. Some had relatives in the big cities of Ukraine or Russia and considered there were good opportunities to settle permanently in these places.

A number of interviewed IDPs raised their concerns over perceived emerging critical attitudes towards IDPs in the host communities. While in general people in the host regions were hospitable and generous, some negative voices, particularly towards male IDPs from the eastern regions, had started to be heard in July. At the same time the interviewees also raised their concerns over social tensions that may be awaiting them at home. Divided political views that preceded and contributed to the current conflict may have strengthened during the displacement
as part of communities fled to other parts of Ukraine and others to Russia or Crimea. Sometimes differing views have even affected family cohesion. Reconciliation processes are needed to enable the returnee communities to cohabit peacefully together and build back home towns and villages. Some members of minority groups such as Roma and Protestants were particularly concerned whether they would be able to return back home as the armed groups and their supporters had openly targeted them during the conflict. In general, the interviewees said that post-conflict rehabilitation and reconciliation processes will be essential for sustainable conflict resolution in eastern Ukraine.
Annex 317

OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time) (9 September 2014)
Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time), 9 September 2014

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM continued to observe the situation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in light of the Minsk agreement on non-use of weapons. IDPs continue to leave the east of the country.

The situation in Kharkiv remained calm.

The SMM visited Luhansk city and assessed that the situation had improved slightly. People and cars appeared to move more freely, and limited commercial activities were noted. However, the SMM observed citizens still waiting in long queues to receive water, food and medicine. Mains water and electricity are still unavailable in the city.

The SMM met in Svatovo (150 km to the northwest of Luhansk) with the deputy head of the Luhansk Regional State Administration in charge of finance and economy, who stated that more funds are urgently needed from the central government, because the current regional budget is only about 7 billion UAH (around 400 million EUR), as opposed to a normal level of about 20 billion UAH (around 1.2 billion EUR). The interlocutor stated that currently the Ukrainian Government controls thirteen territories where financial institutions are working normally. However, he stated that in areas currently controlled by the “Luhansk People’s Republic”, people have not received wages and pensions for more than three months.

The SMM in Donetsk on 8 September, between 20:21 and 21:14 hrs recorded the sound of eight to ten instances of outgoing shelling which appeared to have originated both from the west and the north of the city centre. At 01:35hrs the SMM heard sounds consistent with the detonation of heavy mortar rounds which appeared to have originated from the airport area. The shelling continued for nearly two minutes with short intervals.

On 9 September in Kievski district, to the north of Donetsk city centre, local residents told the SMM that the area had been shelled since Friday night, and persistently in the following days, by an unspecified number of howitzer artillery pieces and “Grad” missiles. According to local inhabitants, five men have died as a result of the impacts and many others were injured. The SMM could not independently verify this information.

On 9 September, at 11:50hrs, the SMM visited the northern outskirts of Donetsk city and entered a nine storey apartment building, located less than one km away from the airport, from where it observed the airport area and its surroundings. At 12:34 hrs, mortar shelling was heard, but the SMM could not ascertain its origin. The SMM saw two impacts caused by shelling, and resultant smoke, one in the airport area and the second one 200-250m from the building where the SMM stood. The SMM could not ascertain from where the
shelling had originated. The SMM in total observed up to 15 instances of shelling at the airport area, which according to the SMM’s assessment were also very close to the airport. The SMM could not ascertain their origin.

The SMM visited the village of Spartak (17 km to the north of Donetsk) where it observed the aftermath of what appeared to be a mortar attack that directly hit a small family house, located in the village’s centre. The house was badly damaged. The SMM was told by “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”) representatives, present at the scene, that the shelling had taken place on the night of 8 to 9 September. The SMM could not independently verify this information.

In Mariupol city the SMM observed that the bus and train stations were working normally. The SMM spoke to a bus driver, who stated that to reach Donetsk city it is no longer necessary to make a long detour, as was the case last week, but it is now possible to travel directly via the highway.

The SMM met with the governor of Donetsk Region in Mariupol, Mr Serhiy Taruta, who said that on Thursday and Friday last week the rebels made two attempts to take over the city in order to try to gain a stronger negotiating position. He said that Russian regular forces are the driving force in the south-eastern region, and that, on 9 September, Russian military hardware was moved across the border to Bezimenne (33 km to the east of Mariupol), where he said they are concentrating their forces. According to the governor, control of the strategic cities of Mariupol and Debaltsevo, and of Donetsk and Luhansk airports, is the main aim of the “DPR” forces, as this would give them stronger leverage for negotiations.

Two residents of the village Shyrokyne (15 km to the east of Mariupol city), in separate conversations with SMM by phone, said that on 8 September irregular armed groups, affiliated to “DPR”, had entered the village.

The SMM was informed by representatives of the IDP Co-ordination Centre in Dnipropetrovsk city that during recent days they had seen an increase in the number of IDPs registering officially. The interlocutors stated that those IDPs who have been in the city for some time without registering are now doing so, in order to enrol their children in school or receive other types of assistance. According to the Centre’s estimate, only 10 to 15 per cent of the recently-registered IDPs are new, whilst the majority of them have been in the city for some time.

The situation in Kherson remained calm.

In Odessa the SMM visited the Emergency Services Coordination Centre for IDPs, located at the city’s railway station. The representative of the Department of Social Protection, in charge of registration procedures, stated that IDPs are continuously arriving, mainly from the Luhansk region but more recently from Mariupol, too. According to the interlocutor, a significant movement of IDPs from Mariupol started approximately two weeks ago.

In Chernivtsi the SMM met the director of economic development and the head of international co-operation and investments of the Chernivtsi region, both newly appointed to their positions. Regarding mobilization, the interlocutors stated that for businessmen,
credits are frozen during their period of service, as they neither have to pay back the loan nor have to pay interest, and that employers have to give employees a job guarantee for one year.

The SMM in Ivano-Frankivsk met with the head of “Right Sector” in Pricarpathia. He stated that the organization is creating battalions in every region. Concerning the ceasefire, the interlocutor stated that “Right Sector” supports the president’s decision; however, should the shelling continue, their position may change. The interlocutor described Ukraine as a buffer for Europe, and said that Europe should understand how dangerous it would be if this buffer is lost.

In Lviv and Kyiv the situation remained calm.
Annex 318

OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, Based on Information Received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time) (10 November 2014)
Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time), 10 November 2014

KYIV 11 November 2014

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, focusing on the implementation of the Minsk Protocol and Memorandum. In Kharkiv the SMM followed up on reports of an explosion at a pub in the city centre.

In Kharkiv the SMM followed up on an incident at the “Stena Rock Club” in the city centre where on 9 November an explosion occurred at 22.25 hrs. Whilst visiting the scene the SMM spoke to representatives of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), who stated that a device disguised in a small box was used. The device had been placed in the back of the bar by the owner of the premises, who thought that a customer had left it accidentally. Representatives of the Ukrainian Interior Ministry told the SMM that the incident had been classified as a “terrorist act” and that an investigation was ongoing. The SMM observed explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) officers at the scene collecting evidence. The explosion resulted in a number of injured people, though the official figure had not been announced by the close of this reporting period.

The SMM met the “acting mayor” of Luhansk City who stated that currently approximately 400 multi-storey buildings and 2,000 private houses need to be repaired in the city. The interlocutor informed the SMM that at present only social enterprises are entitled to free construction materials for repairs, which is part of the humanitarian aid delivered by the Russian Federation. The interlocutor added that the next convoy with construction material from the Russian Federation is scheduled to arrive next week.

On 9 November the SMM visited the village of Nyzhnya Vil'khova (33 km north-east of Luhansk), controlled by Ukrainian forces, and talked to local residents about the situation in the Stanytsia Luhanska area. A female shop employee stated that prior to the conflict the village shop had been supplied from Luhansk. Due to the presence of checkpoints on the way to Luhansk city, the shop owner now mostly purchased goods from the Kharkiv region and the additional transport cost had to be included into the selling price. However, the interlocutor added that residents themselves continued to travel to Luhansk for their personal shopping as everyday goods were less expensive in the so-called “Lugansk People's Republic” (“LPR”)-controlled territory. One female pensioner complained that broadcasts of her favourite Ukrainian radio station were no longer available. Instead, they could now only receive broadcasts from the Russian Federation and the “LPR”. Another local inhabitant told the SMM that, after a 3-month disruption, the tap water supply had been restored, which was a result of the restoration of the electricity grid in Stanytsia Luhanska.

The SMM visited the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) HQ in Debaltseve, (55 km north-east of Donetsk) where four Ukrainian and four Russian Federation officers
were working with members of the so-called “Donetsk People's Republic” (“DPR”) and “LPR”. The SMM discussed with them how to improve implementation of the provisions of the Minsk Memorandum.

When entering the “DPR”-controlled village of Kumachovo (77 km south-east of the city of Donetsk), the SMM observed that armed personnel were no longer present at the improvised checkpoints. In addition, the “Cossacks' Union Unit”, affiliated to the “DPR”, and which was previously deployed in Kumachovo, was also no longer present there. No other illegally armed group has replaced the “Cossacks' Union Unit”, the SMM observed. The SMM met with the “DPR”-appointed “mayor” of the village. When asked about the absence of armed groups in the village, the “mayor” declared that they had left 2 weeks ago, before the so-called “DPR elections” held on 2 November. Since then, only the “DPR police” patrolled the area once in a while.

The SMM met with a representative of the local administration and the head of the social protection department of Slovianka (123 km east of Dnipropetrovsk), who said that the transit points for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Slovianka and Novopidhorodne (139 km south-east of Dnipropetrovsk) had been closed. Their functions were taken over by the IDP transit point in Krasnoarmiisk, located in the Donetsk Region.

In Kherson and Odesa the situation remained calm.

The head of the Chernivtsi Regional Association of Polish Culture informed the SMM that the organization supports soldiers in the “Anti-Terrorism Operation” (“ATO”) zone by collecting money for clothes, shoes, and military uniforms. The interlocutor said the association is planning to focus on the IDP situation and plans to provide support to them.

In Ivano-Frankivsk and Lviv the situation remained calm.

In Kyiv the SMM visited the Ministry of Internal Affairs hospital where wounded and sick soldiers from the “ATO” are treated. At the time of reporting, there were 13 “ATO” patients with injuries as well as patients that had become sick during the military operation. The director of the hospital stated that cases of serious injuries are transferred to the Central Military hospital. According to the interlocutor, wounded “ATO” personnel are initially treated at the field hospitals in the “ATO” zone, and they are then taken to hospitals in Dnipropetrovsk or Kharkiv, before being transferred to Kyiv.
Annex 319

OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) based on information received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time) (30 November 2014)
Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) based on information received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time) 30 November 2014

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM continued to focus its observation on the implementation of the Minsk Protocol and Memorandum, including by monitoring activities of the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC). In Makilka, the SMM observed the offloading of three trucks of the Russian convoy coming from the Russian Federation.

On 28 November the SMM visited Pervomaisk (76km West of Luhansk), controlled by irregular armed groups. The SMM was escorted by the Cossack commander of Pervomaisk. The SMM assessed that 90% of civilian houses and apartment blocks had been seriously damaged by shelling. The SMM saw two churches, one food storage facility and two hospitals which had been hit by shelling. Upon arrival of the SMM to the residential part of the city centre, old people came out of basements and approached the SMM. They said that they had been in the basements since July 2014 and were drinking water of low quality. Interlocutors said their main food was potatoes. They said that shelling continued with people still being killed on a daily basis. The SMM saw four to five fresh roadside graves with a cross on one of them. The SMM observed the results of alleged recent shelling, and although it could not ascertain the date of the shelling, it assessed that the mentioned shelling took place within the last 48 hours.

In Shchastya, Ukrainian-controlled (23km North of Luhansk), the SMM heard outgoing and incoming mortar/artillery and small arms fire to the East and South-east of Shchastya.

On 28 November the SMM visited the “Brianka Correctional Center” in territory controlled by the “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”) (50km South-West of Luhansk). The institution, however, remains under the control of the Ukrainian Government. The commander of the Centre informed the SMM that his institution struggles with the effects of Presidential Decree No. 875 which removes support from all institutions in areas not controlled by the Government. Comment: The Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 595 prescribes compulsory relocation of all state-funded institutions to the areas controlled by the government by 1 December. Twenty unarmed prison officers and twenty administration staff run the facility with 170 prisoners. The commander said that “LPR” in Brianka had maintained the supply of electricity, gas and coal for heating, as well as access to medical facilities in Brianka.

On 29 November, in Luhansk, the SMM was present at a meeting of the head of the Ukrainian contingent to the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), Lt Gen Askarov; the head of the Russian Representation in south-east Ukraine, Lt Gen Lentsov; and members of the “LPR”. Participants continued to dispute aspects of the disengagement phase of the Generals’ plan of 13 November. (See SMM Daily Report of 14 November).
Nonetheless, all agreed in principle to a total ceasefire along the entire line of contact between Ukrainian Armed Forces and those under control of the “LPR”, to be effective from 5 December. Members of the “LPR” insisted that they were in control of all Cossack units and that these units, too, would adhere to this proposal. They also agreed that the withdrawal of heavy weapons would start on 6 December.

Whilst travelling to the city of Snizhne, “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”)-controlled territory (80km East of Donetsk city), the SMM saw a large number of military-painted trucks on the move to and from the Donetsk direction. The SMM observed the movement of eight different convoys from 10:48hrs until 14:55hrs, including several military trucks. One of the mentioned eight convoys with 16 covered military trucks was escorted by two unmarked vehicles with a red and blue roof. Each vehicle displayed a bumper sticker of “Novorossiya”. One covered military truck was towing a damaged armoured vehicle, type BTR and one pulling a multi-purpose armoured vehicle type MTLB with a multi-launch rocket system (MLRS) attached.

In Snizhne the SMM met with the “acting mayor” and “deputy mayor”. According to the interlocutors humanitarian aid is currently being carried out by the local city administration. Around 2,500 people identified locally as the most needy, have obtained food and non-food items thus far.

At around 15:35hrs, while in Makiivka, “DPR”-controlled territory (10km North-East of Donetsk), the SMM observed the presence of what appeared to be the Russian Federation convoy (see Spot Report of the OSCE Observer Mission at the Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk 30 November). The SMM spoke to the mayor of Makiivka who said that 57 trucks, with an unknown tonnage, had arrived on 30 November. He said that the humanitarian aid was destined for vulnerable social groups like the elderly, schools and medical facilities. The mayor invited the SMM into one of the warehouses where offloading of aid was taking place. The SMM observed three trucks with the insignia “Humanitarian Aid from the Russian Federation” from which canned meat, fish and plywood were being offloaded. The mayor said these supplies would be further delivered in accordance with a priority list, which will be compiled by an ad hoc commission for the distribution of social aid. This commission is scheduled to convene in Donetsk on 1 December 2014.

In Kuibyshev district, “DPR”-controlled territory, (15km West of Donetsk) the SMM was approached by local residents. According to them, shortage of food and access to income were the most pressing issues. At 11:15hrs the SMM heard several outgoing 82mm mortar rounds at around 300m to the East of its location. The direction of the mortar fire was unknown. The SMM left the area and returned to the base.

In Hranitne (57km South of Donetsk) which is divided by the Kalmius River, with its eastern part under “DPR” control, and its western part under the control of the Ukrainian Government, the SMM met with the head of the village council on the territory controlled by the Ukrainian authorities. He said the village had not had electricity for the last four weeks and pensioners had not received pensions for the past four months. Since early November some public services, e.g., transportation and postal service were halted. He said that, on 29 November, an attack with three mortar shells on a residential area in the western part of
the village killed a woman and injured two others. The second mortar destroyed a house and the third was undetonated protruding from one of the roads. The SMM spoke to the local commander of the Ukrainian army who confirmed that the above-mentioned mortar attack had come from an eastern direction, and also confirmed the reported fatality and injuries.

In Kramatorsk, controlled by Ukrainian forces (80km North of Donetsk) the SMM observed, on 29 November, a weekly public meeting at Shevchenko Square. The rally gathered approximately 80 people, more than half of whom were men. Some participants complained about the low quality of services, such as insufficient heating and shortcuts in electricity supply. The SMM observed a minor police presence. No security incidents were observed and after 1.5hrs the participants dispersed peacefully.

On 29 November the SMM visited the headquarters of the JCCC in Debaltseve (55km North-East of Donetsk), where officers of the General staffs of Ukraine and Russia were present, as well as members of the “LPR” and “DPR”. The SMM did not witness any shelling during its visit. A Ukrainian officer told the SMM that the Ukrainian and Russian logbooks each registered the same total number of complaints (61) during the previous 24 hours. On 30 November, when the SMM again visited, the Ukrainian officer said that the logbooks again each showed the same total number of complaints (75).

The SMM visited Strelkove (238km South-East of Kherson) on the Arabat Spit and met with representatives of the Ukrainian army, who said that they had observed military activities on the Crimean side, such as shot light flares and the presence of snipers. The interlocutors said that every 2-3 days, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles can be seen flying over the area. The SMM could not independently verify any of this information.

The SMM observed two different gatherings on 30 November in Kharkiv. Both gatherings were organised in order to commemorate the Euro-Maidan events from November 2013. About 150 people, mostly young, both genders equally represented, including 20 masked individuals gathered at Constitution Square, which was guarded by 70 police officers. At about 15:00hrs the crowd started a “patriotic march” through Sumi road, accompanied by 100 police officers. At the Shevchenko monument on the Sumi road, flowers were laid to pay tribute to the Euro-Maidan victims, as well as to the Ukrainian soldiers killed in Donbas. A six metre long Ukrainian flag was also carried. When the march reached Liberty Square, the SMM observed approximately 500 participants of all ages and both genders equally represented. Participants of the march where standing at Liberty Square for approximately 30 minutes. An unidentified number of the participants later joined the other gathering (see below) and marched towards the Russian General Consulate, while the others dispersed peacefully.

Another gathering took place at around 16:00hrs, when the SMM observed a group of around 300 mostly young males, including 30 masked individuals assembled in front of Kharkiv regional administration building. The group marched towards the Russian General Consulate. About 100 police officers in full riot gear were in front of the building. The SMM saw about three demonstrators throwing firecrackers into the Consulate premises. At that
time, the number of police officers reached 200. Demonstrators, escorted by the police, left the area at around 16:45hrs and walked down Pushkin road to the metro station from where they dispersed.

On 29 November the SMM monitored a peaceful gathering in Kyiv on Maidan. About 500 people (both genders equally represented, mainly over 50 years of age) gathered on Maidan to commemorate the events of November 2013. The SMM saw people gathering around 20:00hrs, lighting candles. Approximately 50 regular police officers were present. The crowd dispersed peacefully after 1.5hrs.

The situation in Dnipropetrovsk, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk and Lviv was calm.
Annex 320

OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine Based on Information Received as of 18:00 (Kyiv Time) (13 January 2015)
The SMM continued to monitor the implementation of the provisions of the Minsk Protocol and Memorandum and the work of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC). A Grad rocket exploded near a civilian bus at a Ukrainian Army Checkpoint near Volnovakha, killing 12 civilians and injuring 17.

The SMM met the head of the newly established co-ordination centre at the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) premises in government-controlled Starobilsk (90km north of Luhansk). The SMM was informed that the co-ordination centre would be responsible for the implementation of order 144 “T” issued by the “Anti-Terrorism Operation” (“ATO”) operational headquarters on 29 December 2014. He explained that order 144 “T”, which will enter into force on 21 January, aims to improve the control of people and vehicles traveling to and from areas that are not under the control of the government. The order will require all those wishing to travel between government-controlled areas and territories controlled by the “Lugansk People's Republic” (“LPR”) and the “Donetsk People's Republic” (“DPR”) to obtain a permit, which will be necessary for both individuals and vehicles, including public transport.

At approximately 14:35hrs the regional traffic police confirmed to the SMM that a Grad rocket struck close to a civilian bus when it stopped at a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint approximately 2km north of Volnovakha (35 km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM arrived at the location of the incident at 17:45hrs and witnessed the removal of two of the dead from the bus. The bus had shrapnel damage consistent with a nearby rocket impact, estimated by the SMM to be 12-15 meters from the side of the bus. The SMM visited the Volnovakha hospital where the staff confirmed that ten persons on the bus were killed instantly, while two died later in the hospital. Another 17 passengers were injured. Following a proposal from the SMM, the Ukrainian Major-General and Head of the Ukrainian side to the JCCC and the Russian Federation Major-General, representative of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to the JCCC and the “DPR” leadership have agreed to conduct a joint investigation led by the JCCC. In parallel, the SMM will continue its observations and establish its own findings regarding the incident.

The SMM in Donetsk city heard shelling from around Donetsk airport throughout 13 January, intensifying during the day.

When contacted by the SMM, the Ukrainian Major-General and the Russian Federation Major-General of the JCCC said to the SMM that during the 24-hour period from 08:00hrs on 12 January to 08:00hrs on 13 January, 131 ceasefire violations were recorded: 54 reported by the Ukrainian Armed Forces; and 77 by the “DPR”/“LPR”. Of these incidents 56 were recorded at the Donetsk airport, in government-controlled Pisky (11km north-west
of Donetsk) and government-controlled Opytne (10km north-north-west of Donetsk). The Ukrainian Major-General reported that one Ukrainian soldier had been killed and eight wounded during this time period.

The SMM visited JCCC Sectors A and S duty rooms in Luhansk city. The Ukrainian and Russian Federation JCCC representatives said to the SMM that there were several incidents recorded in the previous 48 hours including the shelling of Slayanooserbsk (35km north-west of Luhansks) which reportedly resulted in 87 private houses and 6 administrative buildings sustaining damages.

The SMM visited Chermalyk and Orlivske (72 and 79km south of Donetsk), located in between government-controlled and “DPR”-controlled territories. In Chermalyk the SMM heard shelling which it estimated to have occurred in an area 5-15km north of Chermalyk but could not ascertain whether it was outgoing or incoming. In Chermalyk, Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel and several villagers said to the SMM that shelling had taken place in the area on a daily basis for the past week.

The head of the Chermalyk village council said to the SMM that since 4 January the village had no access to drinking water due a damaged pipe located in an area that has been under constant shelling. Similarly, in Orlivske the SMM spoke to several villagers who said that they had no access to drinking water for the past 5 months due to the lack of supply as a result of local authorities having stopped water delivery. As such, they had resorted to collecting rainwater or melting snow. The residents also said that for the past month the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint had not allowed private vehicles to pass, thus limiting their freedom of movement and access to medical care. Children are reportedly unable to attend school as the road goes through a potentially hazardous and dangerous area.

At a “DPR” checkpoint located in Oktyabr (85 south of Donetsk) the SMM attempted to discuss with the “DPR” members manning the checkpoint the possibility of the Ukrainian Armed Forces gaining temporary access to Kominternove (88km south of Donetsk) in order to neutralize unexploded ordnance (UXO) in the kindergarten yard which have been a risk for the children of the village (See SMM Daily Report 29 December). The checkpoint “commander” displayed a strong hostility towards the SMM and ordered his staff to search the SMM vehicle stating to the patrol members that they would be shot if a camera was found in the vehicle. When allowed to regain their vehicle, the SMM noticed two kneeling riflemen aiming their weapons at the patrol members. The SMM departed without further incidents.

The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) confirmed to the SMM that unknown persons had used a rocket-propelled grenade in an attempt to hit a gas tank located within the compound of the Kharkiv regional gas company on the night of 11-12 January, causing no injuries and minimal damage to the guards’ building. The SMM was not allowed access to the scene and the company’s head of security was not allowed to share any details.

On 12 January, in Dnepropetrovsk, the SMM observed a public meeting organised by the city administration and aimed at discussing a programme to assist volunteer groups, soldiers and internally displaced persons (IDPs). The 4-year programme of 4 million UAH (approximately EUR 217,000) is earmarked for research, publications, roundtables and Volunteer Day celebrations. Some 80 representatives of various volunteer groups were present and expressed concerns over the implementation modalities and in particular the
risks of embezzlement. The meeting participants voted to call for the city council to scrap the program in its current form.

In Odesa, the SMM monitored a press conference on the situation of disabled IDPs hosted at sanatorium "Esperanza" in Serhiivka (82km south-west of Odessa). The IDP representatives, the director of the sanatorium and the NGO President of the European Association for the Rights of Disabled People described their situation in terms of lack of food, transportation and medical care. The IDPs from the sanatorium have commenced a five-day hunger strike to draw the Ukrainian Government’s attention to their living conditions.

In Lviv the SMM observed a press conference by the Western Military Media Centre of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, attended by seven, mostly female journalists where the new rules on access to the “ATO” zone were explained. The journalists were informed that they would only be allowed to enter with press cards issued by the SBU.

The situation in Kherson, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk and Kyiv was calm.
Annex 321

OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) Based on Information Received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time) (13 January 2015)
Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time), 13 January 2015

KYIV 14 January 2015

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM continued to monitor the implementation of the provisions of the Minsk Protocol and Memorandum and the work of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC). A Grad rocket exploded near a civilian bus at a Ukrainian Army Checkpoint near Volnovakha, killing 12 civilians and injuring 17.

The SMM met the head of the newly established co-ordination centre at the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) premises in government-controlled Starobilsk (90km north of Luhansk). The SMM was informed that the co-ordination centre would be responsible for the implementation of order 144 “T” issued by the “Anti-Terrorism Operation” (“ATO”) operational headquarters on 29 December 2014. He explained that order 144 “T”, which will enter into force on 21 January, aims to improve the control of people and vehicles traveling to and from areas that are not under the control of the government. The order will require all those wishing to travel between government-controlled areas and territories controlled by the “Lugansk People's Republic” (“LPR”) and the “Donetsk People's Republic” (“DPR”) to obtain a permit, which will be necessary for both individuals and vehicles, including public transport.

At approximately 14:35hrs the regional traffic police confirmed to the SMM that a Grad rocket struck close to a civilian bus when it stopped at a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint approximately 2km north of Volnovakha (35 km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM arrived at the location of the incident at 17:45hrs and witnessed the removal of two of the dead from the bus. The bus had shrapnel damage consistent with a nearby rocket impact, estimated by the SMM to be 12-15 meters from the side of the bus. The SMM visited the Volnovakha hospital where the staff confirmed that ten persons on the bus were killed instantly, while two died later in the hospital. Another 17 passengers were injured. Following a proposal from the SMM, the Ukrainian Major-General and Head of the Ukrainian side to the JCCC and the Russian Federation Major-General, representative of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to the JCCC and the “DPR” leadership have agreed to conduct a joint investigation led by the JCCC. In parallel, the SMM will continue its observations and establish its own findings regarding the incident.

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The situation in Kherson, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk and Kyiv was calm.
Annex 322

OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) Based on Information Received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time) (14 January 2015)
Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time), 14 January 2015

KYIV 15 January 2015

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM continued to monitor the implementation of the provisions of the Minsk Protocol and Memorandum and the work of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC). The Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) gathered imagery and video data of shell impact craters at Volnovakha where a bus was hit on 13 January.

The SMM Deputy Chief Monitor met in Donetsk with the Ukrainian Major-General and Head of the Ukrainian side, and the Russian Federation Major-General, Representative of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and the “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”). The agenda included discussing an SMM initiative for conducting a JCCC-led investigation of the shelling which occurred on 13 January in government-controlled Volnovakha (35km south-west of Donetsk), resulting in 12 killed and 17 injured passengers in a bus. All sides agreed upon drafting a joint protocol that will mandate the JCCC to conduct a special investigation concerning this incident. The agreement included a security guarantee and free access to the incident site for the Russian Federation representatives at the JCCC and “DPR” members. The investigation is planned to take place on 15 January. The SMM will monitor the JCCC-led investigation, continue its observations and establish its own findings regarding the incident (see SMM Spot Report 14 January 2015).

The Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) conducted a flight over the Ukrainian checkpoint in Volnovakha and gathered imagery and video data of shell impact craters at the incident site where the passenger bus was hit on 13 January.

The SMM, together with JCCC representatives and “DPR” members attempted to conduct a joint patrol to Donetsk airport on 14 January. In meetings with SMM, all parties had guaranteed the SMM’s security. It had been agreed by all parties that troops located at the airport will cease fire on 14 January at 14:30hrs local time, but JCCC representatives and “DPR” failed to contain the situation despite the declared “regime of silence”. Due to incoming and outgoing shelling, consistent with heavy artillery and small arms and light weapons, directly observed by SMM, the patrol was discontinued and the airport was not reached.

According to the Ukrainian and Russian Federation officers in the JCCC in “DPR”-controlled Olenivka (22km south-west of Donetsk) the number of ceasefire violations has increased dramatically within their respective areas of responsibility in recent days. Both reported that on 13 January 2015 there was incoming artillery and BM-21 Grad rocket rounds both in daytime and night time, mainly from southern, south-eastern and eastern directions, as well as outgoing artillery fire from southern and eastern directions.

https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/134916
The SMM met with the “acting head” of the city council in “DPR”-controlled Khartsyzk (29km east of Donetsk), who stated that the railway connection between Ilovaisk (31 km east of Donetsk), Makiivka (5km east of Donetsk) and Isnovataya (17km north-east of Donetsk), all “DPR”-controlled, was re-opened after reconstruction. He said that the railway to Uspenka at the border between Ukraine and the Russian Federation will also soon be operational, without giving any precise date. Damage to both railways was caused by shelling. According to the interlocutor the “Bank of DPR” and a post office recently opened offices in Ilovaisk, giving people working in “DPR structures” and elderly people an opportunity to collect allowances from “DPR”.

In government-controlled Hranitne (57km south of Donetsk) the commander of a garrison of the Ukrainian Armed Forces confirmed to the SMM the death of a three-year old girl on 11 January. He said that mortar shells struck two houses in the north-eastern part of the village and subsequently seriously injured the girl, who then died on the way to Volnovakha hospital. Between 11:40hrs and 11:45hrs, the SMM observed what it assessed as four mortars of 120 mm impacting in the outskirts of the village. The last mortar impacted approximately 400 metres from where the SMM was located. According to the SMM the mortars were assessed to originate from a south-eastern direction. Due to security reasons, the SMM had to leave the site.

In Luhansk the SMM received information separately from Ukrainian Armed Forces and “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”) about heavy shelling which occurred in government-controlled Shchastya (23km north of Luhansk). Both sides told the SMM on separate occasions that the Ukrainian Armed Forces and “LPR” exchanged tank fire, artillery, and machine gun fire. As independently reported by both sides, at least one civilian was killed and several wounded. Residents from Shchastya contacted the SMM, saying that at 16:00hrs mortar fire had started and lasted approximately 15 minutes. Reportedly the residential area was damaged. The SMM could not independently verify this information due to the security situation.

In Shchastya the SMM observed at 13:37hrs three outgoing heavy artillery shells. The SMM heard two outgoing heavy mortars, which were estimated to originate from an eastern direction. At 14:35hrs, on the road leading up to a Ukrainian checkpoint the SMM observed intensive small arms fire.

The SMM met together with the local Cossack “commander” and with the “LPR” in Rovenky (65km south of Luhansk). According to “LPR” their local structure functions in co-operation with the Cossack armed groups controlling the area. The Cossack “commander” said they assisted the “LPR” in keeping the local community functional, for example, through the distribution of humanitarian assistance and local “policing”.

The SMM met with the head of the regional police investigation department of Kherson to enquire about the pre-trial investigation related to the two explosion incidents of 27 December 2014 and 3 January 2015. According to the interlocutor the incidents are interrelated and a result of criminal acts, with no connection to extremism or terrorist activity. The suspected perpetrator has been arrested and is accused of robbery, murder, attempted murder, illegal possession and manufacturing of explosives and other charges.

The SMM continued to follow up on the bus transport to and from Crimea speaking with dispatchers at several bus stations in the region. According to SMM interlocutors, on 14 January three buses left Kherson towards Crimea, whereas no buses left from the Henichesk (207km south-east of Kherson) bus station to the peninsula.
In Kyiv the SMM observed a roundtable discussion focusing on ecological security in Donbas, organized by the previously Luhansk-based NGOs “Luhansk Coalition for Transparency of Governance” and the “Luhansk Human Rights Defense Group”, in cooperation with the Ukrainian State Environmental Agency. The speakers said that the Ukrainian Government is currently not able to confirm or even assess damage and possible destruction of 14 large chemical and industrial plants in Donbas due to a lack of access. According to the experts, the situation could jeopardize the safety of the local population in the region which had already been affected by other environmental hazards. Among other hazards, the speakers referred to the fact that the water accumulating in the coal mines, due to the stand-still caused by the conflict, was polluting the groundwater. A representative of the Ukrainian Ministry of Regional Development stated that due to financial reasons State control or inspections regarding the exploitation of nature and natural resources cannot be conducted in Ukraine as of 1 January.

The situation in Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, Chernivtsi and Ivano-Frankivsk was calm.

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Annex 323

OSCE, Spot Report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, 14 January 2015: 12 Civilians Killed and 17 Wounded When a Rocket Exploded Close to a Civilian Bus Near Volnovakha (14 January 2015)
Spot report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, 14 January 2015: 12 civilians killed and 17 wounded when a rocket exploded close to a civilian bus near Volnovakha

At approximately 14:35hrs on 13 January the regional traffic police confirmed to the SMM that a Grad rocket struck close to a civilian bus when it stopped at a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint approximately 2km north of Volnovakha (35km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM arrived at the location of the incident at 17:45hrs and witnessed the removal of two of the dead passengers from the bus. The bus had shrapnel damage consistent with a nearby rocket impact, estimated by the SMM to be 12-15 meters from the side of the bus. The SMM visited the Volnovakha hospital where the staff confirmed that ten persons on the bus were killed instantly, while two died later in the hospital. Another 17 passengers were injured.

Following a proposal from the SMM, the Ukrainian Major-General and Head of the Ukrainian side to the JCCC and the Russian Federation Major-General, representative of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and the “Donetsk People’s Republic” (DPR) leadership have agreed to conduct a joint investigation led by the JCCC. In parallel, the SMM will continue its observations and establish its own findings regarding the incident.
Annex 324

OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine Based on Information Received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time) (16 January 2015)
SMM continued to monitor the implementation of the provisions of the Minsk Protocol and Memorandum and the work of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC). The SMM observed a large number of ceasefire violations in the Donetsk region. The SMM conducted its third visit to the site of the incident causing the deaths of civilians on a bus in Volnovakha.

The SMM concluded its third fact-finding patrol to government-controlled Volnovakha (35km south-west of Donetsk), where 12 civilian passengers of a bus had been killed and 17 injured on 13 January (see SMM Spot Report 14 January and SMM Daily Report 14 January). The SMM conducted a comprehensive inspection, focusing on five craters caused by explosions that had occurred during the incident. The investigation included comprehensive crater analysis of two specific blast craters, including the crater located 10 metres from the side of the passenger bus. In the SMM’s assessment all craters examined were caused by rockets fired from a north-north-easterly direction.

At the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) headquarters in government-controlled Debaltseve (55km north-east of Donetsk), the Chiefs of Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the Russian Federation Armed Forces told the SMM that the security situation had deteriorated considerably in the previous few days, with a significant increase in ceasefire violations by all parties. In the 24 hours preceding 08:00hrs, 16 January, they said the JCCC had registered 138 violations: 64 committed by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and 74 by armed groups of the “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”) or the “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”), with the Donetsk airport and environs being the most problematic area.

The Russian Federation General at the JCCC in Donetsk suggested that the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the Russian Federation representation to the JCCC, and “LPR” and “DPR” armed groups should use artillery detection radars to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire. He invited the SMM to monitor the usage of this technology. The SMM had previously monitored such technology used by the “DPR” (what seemed to be an AISTYONOK Portable Mortar Position Reconnaissance Radar) on 14 January while on patrol in the north-western suburbs of Donetsk city.

In “DPR”-controlled Makiivka (5km east of Donetsk), a senior local “DPR” member told the SMM that some areas of the city had experienced shelling in the previous 48 hours. The SMM observed structural damage to a number of houses, and saw a number of craters, most likely caused by mortars. Residents informed the SMM that on 11 January a 44-year-old man had been killed and his 14-year-old daughter seriously injured in a shelling incident in the city, and subsequently transferred to Moscow for treatment. In a 20
minute period, the SMM heard six outgoing 82mm mortar rounds emanating from a location 300 metres from its position in the city.

Whilst in government-controlled Avdiivka (15km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard and/or saw more than 150 incoming and outgoing artillery and mortar rounds in and around the city in less than an hour.

At the JCCC office in “LPR”-controlled Velykyi Sukhodil (43km south-east of Luhansk), Ukrainian and Russian Federation military officers attached to the JCCC told the SMM that there had been 25 ceasefire violations in the sector in the previous 24 hours, 10 by the Ukrainian side and 15 by the “LPR”.

The “LPR”-appointed and Cossack-approved “municipal head” in “LPR”-controlled Stakhanov (50km west of Luhansk), told the SMM on 15 January that approximately half of the municipal employees and more than half of the town’s medical personnel had left since the start of hostilities. According to him, no major enterprises were working in the city, and the “LPR” had only made one-off payments to pensioners and public-sector workers.

At a checkpoint manned by Ukrainian volunteer battalion members near government-controlled Myrna Dolyna (75km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard sustained outgoing mortar fire emanating from a location north-east of its position.

The acting regional military commissar – speaking at a press conference in Dnepropetrovsk – said the fourth wave of mobilisation, to last 210 days, would start on 20 January. The previous day, the Dnepropetrovsk regional military prosecutor – speaking to the SMM – said 50,000 men would be mobilised throughout Ukraine.

On 14 January the SMM observed the first day of a three-day training module in Zaporizhzhia (85km south of Dnepropetrovsk), organised by the Women of Maidan Non-Governmental Organisation, in which 24 female school psychologists were offered advice on how to treat children and families psychologically affected by the conflict.

The situation remained calm in Kharkiv, Kherson, Odessa, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv and Kyiv.
Annex 325

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The situation remained calm in Kharkiv, Kherson, Odessa, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv and Kyiv.
Annex 326

OSCE, OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Status Report as of 20 January 2015 (20 January 2015)
The Chief Monitor of the OSCE SMM to Ukraine, Ambassador Ertugrul Apakan, called upon all sides to exercise maximum restraint in eastern Ukraine. The SMM also called upon all parties to immediately stop the fighting in the east, withdraw heavy weapons and armed units from Donetsk airport and from all adjacent residential areas as agreed in the Minsk documents.

The SMM continues to follow up on the incident in which civilians were killed on a bus in Volnovakha. See all the details in SMM’s Spot report (www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/134636) and further developments in SMM’s daily reports (Reports as of 13, 14, 15, 16 January).

The SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug visited Donetsk on 13-16 January. At the invitation of the SMM, security experts from 21 OSCE participating States took part in a visit to Donetsk to assess the situation on the ground and to witness how the Mission implements its operational and security procedures.

The SMM attempted to reach Donetsk airport to establish the facts on the ground on 14-15 January. Regrettably, the SMM could not venture further into the airport itself as shelling, counter-shelling and small arms fire in and around the airport was ongoing.

The SMM received 10 armoured vehicles from the UK government on 13 January.

Daily SMM reports are available in three languages (English, Ukrainian, Russian) on the OSCE website: www.osce.org/ukraine-smm

LATEST NEWS

- The Chief Monitor of the OSCE SMM to Ukraine, Ambassador Ertugrul Apakan, called upon all sides to exercise maximum restraint in eastern Ukraine. The SMM also called upon all parties to immediately stop the fighting in the east, withdraw heavy weapons and armed units from Donetsk airport and from all adjacent residential areas as agreed in the Minsk documents.

- The SMM continues to follow up on the incident in which civilians were killed on a bus in Volnovakha. See all the details in SMM’s Spot report (www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/134636) and further developments in SMM’s daily reports (Reports as of 13, 14, 15, 16 January).

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- The SMM continues to expand—the total number of International Monitors is 372, with 229 Monitors in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

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MISSION MEMBERS

| Mission Members | 
|-----------------|-----------------|
| Male            | 309             |
| Female          | 63              |

MISSION MONITORS

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* Other international staff includes Chief Monitor, Deputy Chief Monitor, advisors, analysts, spokesperson etc.

** National staff includes assistants, advisors and other administrative personnel.
Annex 327

OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time)(22 January 2015)
Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time), 22 January 2015

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM continued to monitor the implementation of the provisions of the Minsk Protocol and Memorandum and the work of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC). The SMM saw the aftermath of a shelling incident in Donetsk. The SMM witnessed many instances of heavy artillery fire and military movements.

The SMM observed the aftermath of the shelling incident – involving civilian fatalities – at Kuprina Street, 4.4km south-south-west of Donetsk city-centre (for detailed observations see SMM Spot report, 22 January).

In Donetsk, the SMM heard intermittent shelling throughout the reporting period. The SMM could not ascertain whether this was incoming or outgoing due to their distance from the shelling, or where the impacts hit. The SMM saw a Grad multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) near Makiivka (16km east of Donetsk, "DPR"-controlled). A convoy of ten unmarked T-80 tanks was seen by the SMM travelling west on highway H-21 in Zuhres (36km east of Donetsk, “DPR”-controlled). The SMM also saw a BMP-1 armoured personnel carrier travelling west on H-21 near Shaktarsk (50km east of Donetsk, “DPR”-controlled).

Representatives of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the “DPR” and “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”) were not present at the JCCC headquarters (HQ) in Debaltseve (55km north-east of Donetsk, government-controlled) as they have moved (as of 21 January) to the JCCC field office in Soledar (77km north of Donetsk) citing security concerns (see SMM Daily Report, 21 January 2015). The Ukrainian Armed Forces Major General stated that the JCCC is still functioning with liaison between offices conducted by phone. This information was later confirmed to the SMM by the Russian Federation Army Major General in Soledar. Both Ukrainian and Russian Major-Generals expect all parties to return to the JCCC HQ in Debaltseve in the near future. The Ukrainian Armed Forces Major-General told the SMM that the Ukrainian Armed Forces withdrew from Donetsk airport on the evening of 21 January. The SMM were unable to travel to the airport for security reasons so cannot verify this claim.

The Ukrainian Major-General said that the JCCC field offices in areas outside ofde-facto government control have either redeployed, such as Telmanove (69km south-south-east of Donetsk, “DPR”-controlled) to Donetsk, or may redeploy, such as Horlivka (35km north of Donetsk, “DPR”-controlled), possibly to Shakhtarsk (50km east of Donetsk, “DPR”-controlled). The Russian Federation Major-General mentioned that the JCCC in Krasnohorlivka (20km west of Donetsk, government-controlled) is in need of evacuation due to security concerns.
The JCCC incident logs indicated a total of 128 ceasefire violations for the 24 hour period from 21 January 08:00hrs to 22 January 08.00hrs. The Ukrainian Maj-General stated that tension has spread from Donetsk airport to areas further north. He named areas near Stanitsa Luhanska (140km north-east of Donetsk, government-controlled), Shchastia (132km north-east of Donetsk, government-controlled), Vesela Hora (132km north-east of Donetsk; “LPR”-controlled) and Krymske (108km north-east of Donetsk, government-controlled) as hot spots with 39 of the total 128 violations recorded over the preceding 24 hours. Fighting continued around Donetsk airport according to the interlocutor.

While at the JCCC HQ, the SMM heard 32 outgoing heavy artillery rounds of 122mm calibre at 11:57hrs. Twelve incoming artillery rounds followed at 12:12hrs. The SMM was unable to verify the origin and impact sites of the rounds. The SMM saw no damage upon leaving the JCCC.

In Dzerzhynsk (42km north of Donetsk, government-controlled) the SMM heard several heavy artillery rounds outgoing from a south-south-eastern direction and impacting in a north-north-east location at an indeterminate distance. Heavy machine gun and anti-aircraft fire was heard coming from the same direction. The SMM saw damage to a civilian house in Dzerzhynsk consistent with a medium calibre artillery shell. Furthermore, the SMM ascertained that the artillery was fired from a south-eastern direction. Heavy artillery impacts were heard by the SMM in areas to the south of the village fired from an unknown area. When leaving the location, the SMM heard seven more impacts.

The SMM talked to the director of the municipal hospital in Kostiantynivka (55km north of Donetsk, government-controlled) who stated that within the last two weeks the number of soldiers admitted has increased dramatically, with figures comparable to those in August and September 2014.

Three kilometres outside Chermalyk (72km south of Donetsk, located between government-controlled and “DPR”-controlled territories), the SMM heard artillery fired from a south-east direction, judged to be from approximately 5–8 km away. The SMM talked to the head of the village administration in Chermalyk, who claimed that there has been no water for the past 3 weeks due to a broken pump, which remains in disrepair due to continued shelling in the area. While in the village, the SMM heard twenty rounds about 5–8 km away to the east. The SMM was unable to judge whether these were incoming or outgoing.

Two kilometres outside Orlivske (79km south of Donetsk, located between government-controlled and “DPR”-controlled territories) the SMM saw fifty fresh crater impacts in open countryside. Residents the SMM spoke to said these occurred in the past two days. According to residents, Orlivske has been without fresh water for four months due to a pump that does not function. They now obtain water from streams and by melting snow.

The SMM heard the use of heavy weapons at Novoaidar (57km north-west of Luhansk, government-controlled) and Shchastya (23km north of Luhansk, government-controlled) district boundaries. The SMM heard outgoing mortars (three rounds) from the vicinity of the Shchastya power plant followed by incoming shelling. The SMM also heard outgoing Grad
rockets from around Trokhizbenka (40km west of Luhansk, government-controlled) fired in an unknown direction, followed by an exchange of heavy artillery. This was followed by incoming heavy artillery shelling from an unknown location.

The SMM monitored a “Day of Unity of Ukraine” ceremony in Kharkiv. Around 80 participants, both men and women of all ages attended. The national flag of Ukraine and flags of the Svoboda party, Falcon and Azov volunteer battalions and “Pravyi Sektor” (Right Sector) were observed. Approximately 40-50 police were present. The rally ended peacefully.

Approximately 500 people attended the “Day of Unity of Ukraine” ceremony in Odesa. Local dignitaries were present. 50 uniformed police were at the location. Around 30 members (approximately equal numbers of men and women, average age 30-40 years) of the “Batkivschyna” (fatherland) Party and the Svoboda Party carried party flags. The ceremony passed without incident.

Around 200 persons of all ages (approximately 60 per cent men) gathered peacefully for the “Day of Unity of Ukraine” anniversary in Chernivtsi. Ten police attended. During a separate event in Chernivtsi, representatives of political parties and civil society organizations gave speeches emphasizing national unity. Members of the “Svoboda” party were particularly visible, holding flags and collecting donations for the “Sich” battalion. Four police were present.

On 22 January the SMM monitored a local march in honour of the “Ukrainian Day of Unity” in Ivano-Frankivsk. About 1,500 people took part; most were men, although some women and children participated. The “Pravyi Sektor” (Right Sector), “Self Defence” non-governmental organization (from Ivano-Frankisk region) and “Auto-Maidan” group each organized separate marching columns with their own flags. 15 uniformed police were present.

The situation in Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson and Lviv was calm.

On 22 January, the SMM went to Kontraktova Square in Kyiv to monitor a civic “reconciliation gathering” organized under this label by civil society groups through social networks. Upon arrival, the SMM observed a counter-demonstration of 30 to 50 young persons (mostly men) instead of the planned reconciliation gathering. About twelve anti-riot police officers were in the vicinity. The SMM spoke to a woman who identified herself as a member of the “Union of Ukrainian Mothers”, a civic organization, present for the reconciliation gathering. She told the SMM that 30 to 50 participants had gathered on the square to collect signatures in support of a peace process when the aforementioned young people arrived and argued with those at the reconciliation gathering. The SMM spoke to counter-protestors who said they wanted to stop these activities organized by what they call “IDPs and Russian” activists. The SMM also observed some activists from both sides engaged in peaceful discussion. The SMM left shortly after.
Annex 328

OSCE, Spot Report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), 24 January 2015: Shelling Incident on Olimpiiska Street in Mariupol (24 January 2015)
Spot report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), 24 January 2015: Shelling Incident on Olimpiiska Street in Mariupol

MARIUPOL 24 January 2015

This report is provided for the media and general public.

At approximately 09:15hrs on 24 January, the SMM in government-controlled Mariupol heard at its location incoming massed Multi-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) attacks from a north-east direction, consisting of an extremely heavy barrage lasting 35 seconds. Twenty minutes later the SMM received information from the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC) in Mariupol and other sources, that shelling had occurred in the area of Olimpiiska Street, in Ordzhonikidzevskyi district, 8.5 km north-east of Mariupol city centre, approximately 400 metres from a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint.

At 10:20hrs the SMM went to Olimpiiska Street and saw seven adult civilians dead. The SMM observed in an area of 1.6 km by 1.1 km, including an open market, multiple impacts on buildings, retail shops, homes and a school. The SMM observed cars on fire and windows facing the north-eastern side of a nine-storey building shattered. The SMM was able to count 19 rocket strikes and is certain there are more. Four hospitals and the emergency service in the city informed the SMM that at least 20 people died and 75 people were injured and hospitalized. Ten of the wounded were in a critical condition, according to a hospital representative.

The SMM conducted a crater analysis and its initial assessment showed that the impacts were caused by Grad and Uragan rockets. According to the impact analysis, the Grad rockets originated from a north-easterly direction, in the area of Oktyabr (19 km north-east of Olimpiiska Street), and the Uragan rockets from an easterly direction, in the area of Zaichenko (15 km east of Olimpiiska Street), both controlled by the “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”).

At 13:02hrs and 13:21hrs the SMM heard again incoming MLRS salvos lasting for eight seconds, from an easterly direction. At a distance of 300 metres the SMM saw smoke above the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ checkpoint number 14 (8.9 km north-east of Mariupol city centre), just several hundred metres away from where the shelling had hit in Olimpiiska Street.
Annex 329

OSCE, Spot Report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Shelling Incident on Olimpiiska Street in Mariupol (24 January 2015)
Spot report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), 24 January 2015: Shelling Incident on Olimpiiska Street in Mariupol

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Statement by the Chairmanship on the Trilateral Contact Group consultations in Minsk on 31 January 2015

MINSK 1 February 2015

MINSK, 31 January 2015 - The participants in the Trilateral Contact Group came to Minsk for consultations with the representatives of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The TCG had prepared a detailed plan for the concrete implementation of the Minsk Protocol and Memorandum, which continue to be the indispensable basis for any peaceful settlement.

Unfortunately, the signatories of these documents from Donetsk and Luhansk did not participate, although they had been personally invited by the Trilateral Contract Group. Their representatives who were present were not in a position to discuss the proposal put forward by the TCG. In fact, they were not even prepared to discuss implementation of a ceasefire and withdrawal of heavy weapons. Instead, they called for revision of the Protocol and Memorandum. The meeting was adjourned.

The TCG remains open to continuing consultations at any time. In view of the seriously deteriorating situation and growing numbers of casualties, the TCG calls on all actors involved to engage responsibly in the comprehensive implementation of the Minsk documents with no further delays.

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Annex 331

KRAMATORSK  10 February 2015

This report is for media and the general public.

On 10 February at 11:51hrs, the SMM heard a powerful explosion in Kramatorsk (95km north of Donetsk). From their position at Kramatorsk Boulevard #41, the SMM assessed that the sound of the explosion came from approximately 1.5 kilometres south-east, near Kramatorsk airport (where the Ukrainian authorities have deployed an “Anti-terrorist Operation” (ATO) base). The SMM also observed a white smoke trail in the direction of the explosion. At 12:00hrs, the SMM contacted the “ATO” command, which did not have further information. The SMM did not go to the airport for security reasons.

At 12:33hrs, while at Kramatorsk Boulevard #50, the SMM heard at least four blasts in the surrounding area. For security reasons, the SMM did not check the sites of the explosion. The SMM observed a rocket landing 30 metres from their position behind a building on Kramatorsk Boulevard #50. The rocket landed on the ground in the yard behind the building (at its north-western side) without exploding. The SMM noticed that the windows of the apartment building on Kramatorsk Boulevard #55 (facing north-west) were shattered.

The SMM spotted a second set of unexploded ordnance (UXO) at Lenin Street #45, which landed behind the house on the yard side (facing north-west). The site is located 2.5km north-east of Kramatorsk Boulevard #50. The SMM did not notice damage in the surrounding area. The SMM also observed sub-ammunition bomblets (clusters) in the surroundings of Lenin Street.
The SMM observed a third UXO which landed on the yard side (north-west) on Dvortsova Street #32. The SMM did not notice damage in the surrounding area.

The SMM assessed that the three shells were 300mm ammunition fired from a BM-30 Smerch or Tornado Multiple Rocket Launch System (MRLS). Based on the live observation, the pictures and maps analysis, the SMM assessed that the shelling was coming from the south-south-east direction. The SMM has not yet conducted any crater analysis for security reasons.

At 12:45hrs, at the entrance of a Ukrainian military compound on Lenin Street, the SMM saw a member of uniformed Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel lying on the ground, not moving. At 16:00hrs an official from the Donetsk Region Administration informed the SMM that the shelling in Kramatorsk killed 7 civilians and injured 26, including 5 wounded children. The injured individuals were subsequently transferred to local hospitals in Kramatorsk. The interlocutor added that 32 Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel were injured at Kramatorsk airport. The SMM will follow-up on the shelling and further examine the sites affected by the shelling in Kramatorsk.

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Annex 332

OSCE, Statement by OSCE Chief Monitor in Ukraine on Situation in Kramatorsk (10 February 2015)
Statement by OSCE Chief Monitor in Ukraine on situation in Kramatorsk

KYIV, 10 February 2015 - Today, in the early afternoon, the city of Kramatorsk in Donetsk region was struck by several shells which landed in heavily-populated residential neighbourhoods. Deaths and injuries have been reported. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) made all efforts to observe the impact of the shelling within the constraints of the rapidly deteriorating security situation.

Once again, innocent civilians are bearing the brunt of a violent conflict characterized by increasing the death-toll and indiscriminate shelling. That Kramatorsk was a relatively peaceful city until now gives us reason for concern that the violence is expanding to new areas.

I call upon all sides to exercise maximum restraint, and for an immediate ceasefire. Dialogue, and not the use of weapons, is the only path towards a durable peace.
Annex 333

OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine Based on Information Received as of 18:00 (Kyiv Time) (11 February 2015)
Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time), 11 February 2015

The SMM continued to monitor the implementation of the provisions of the Minsk Protocol and Memorandum and the work of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC). The SMM continued observing widespread and recurrent shelling in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. In Dnepropetrovsk the OSCE Secretary General Lamberto Zannier started an official two-day visit to Ukraine.

In Donetsk, on 11 February from 10:00 to 11:30hrs, the SMM observed the aftermath of a shelling incident in the morning of 11 February at the central bus station and a metal works factory located in Leninskiy district (”Donetsk People’s Republic” (”DPR”)-controlled). At the bus station the SMM saw two burnt-out buses, one of them struck by an artillery shell. The SMM could not determine the precise type of artillery shell or the direction of fire. At the metal works factory, the SMM observed three shelling impacts around the factory. Based on its observations and crater analysis, the SMM assessed that the impacts were caused by mortar shells fired from the north-west. Staff at the Donetsk Central Hospital later confirmed to the SMM that the shelling at the two sites had caused four civilian casualties and injured three.

On 11 February the SMM followed-up on the shelling which hit Kramatorsk (government-controlled, 80km north of Donetsk) – see Spot report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM): Shelling in Kramatorsk, 10 February 2015. The SMM conducted crater and impact analysis and assessed the angle of the fall of rocket remnants at two different sites: behind an apartment building at No.42 Lenin Street (on its south-eastern side) and in front of a building at No.37 Kramatorsk Boulevard (on its south-eastern side). The SMM confirmed the rocket remnants were from 300mm ammunition. The strike was fired by one single launcher system - probably a BM-30 Smerch or Tornado Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS). The observation is consistent with the duration of the strike heard on 10 February. Based on the aforementioned analysis, the SMM assessed the shelling was coming from a south-south-easterly direction.

The SMM observed that all rockets were equipped with sub-munition dispenser canisters. The SMM examined the clusters and assessed that they were consistent with anti-tank and anti-personnel type of ammunition. The SMM subsequently contacted the head of Donetsk Regional Emergency Services. The interlocutor said that his team would remove all remnants and unexploded ordnance (UXOs) in Kramatorsk and map the locations of any sub-munitions resulting from the attack.
At their location in Kramatorsk near the city centre, the SMM heard at 08:03hrs and 12:45hrs the sound of four outgoing surface to air missiles fired from a south-eastern sector of Kramatorsk airport. The SMM could see the smoke trails left by the missiles. At 12:45hrs the SMM observed that a missile hit its target, which created a fireball and scattered debris in the sky above the airport. The SMM could not identify the targets of the missiles.

At the “DPR”-controlled Uspenka international border crossing point (74km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw approximately 100 private vehicles and three passenger busses lining up at the “DPR” checkpoint in order to cross the Ukrainian international border towards Russian Federation territory. The SMM headed to “DPR”-controlled Ulyanivske border crossing point (62km south-south-east of Donetsk) driving north to south on the T0519 road. “DPR” armed personnel stopped the SMM at a checkpoint on the T0519 road, preventing the SMM from continuing towards Ulyanivske. The “DPR” armed personnel did not provide an explanation.

In government-controlled Sloviansk (110km north of Donetsk), the SMM attended a meeting focusing on the recent increase of persons fleeing the fighting near the contact line, organised by the acting mayor of Sloviansk, social protection departments from other neighbouring cities, UNHCR and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The interlocutors expressed their frustration about the fact that no evacuation had been conducted since 8 February despite constant heavy shelling in the government-controlled Debaltseve area (55km north-east of Donetsk). They added that the Ukrainian Ministry of Emergencies had already allocated 20 buses to the local authorities in Sloviansk to support any future evacuation. They went on to say that the total number and condition of the remaining inhabitants in the areas around Debaltseve remain unclear and are currently being assessed by the local authorities and international NGOs and inter-governmental organisations. They underlined that the government-controlled districts in the Donetsk region cannot accommodate more evacuees as their administration’s resources and accommodation capacity are stretched to their limits.

In government-controlled Myrne (60km south of Donetsk) – located 10km west of the contact line – the SMM spoke to representatives of the local administration and inhabitants who reported shelling which had hit the village on 5, 9 and 10 February. The SMM observed damage to local residential houses. While in Myrne, the SMM heard between 10:15 and 10:45hrs continuous distant artillery shelling, approximately 15km south of the SMM’s position. The SMM could not estimate the origin and direction of the shelling.

In government-controlled Bila Hora (78km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard from 10:15 to 11:15hrs continuous MLRS outgoing shelling. The SMM assessed that the shelling was coming from 10km east of Bila Hora but could not determine its direction.

In the southern outskirts of government-controlled Tsarivka (45km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard at 10:57hrs sporadic shelling and distant detonations south-west of Tsarivka. In the western outskirts of government-controlled Raihorodka (23km north of Luhansk), the SMM
heard sporadic outgoing heavy artillery, explosions and fire arms bursts coming from a south-western direction. The SMM was unable to estimate the distance, origin and direction of the aforementioned shelling and shooting.

In government-controlled Borivske (96km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard between 10:01 and 10:15hrs eight outgoing MLRS salvos. The SMM assessed that the shelling occurred 10km south-east of the SMM’s position. In the western outskirts of government-controlled Kapitanove (72km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard at 14:00hrs heavy outgoing and incoming MLRS shelling six to eight kilometres south-east of its position. On both occasions, the SMM could not specify the direction of the fire.

At Izvaryne border crossing point (“Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”)-controlled, 60km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed 70 private vehicles lined up to cross towards Russian Federation territory. The SMM spoke to male and female individuals sitting in some of the vehicles. Most of the interlocutors said that they were crossing to Russia for private, professional or medical reasons and intended to return to Ukraine.

In Dnepropetrovsk the OSCE Secretary General Lamberto Zannier started an official two-day visit to Ukraine.

In Odessa the SMM followed-up on the bomb explosion which reportedly hit a hostel in central Odessa on 10 February. The SMM contacted a spokesperson from the regional headquarters of the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) who confirmed the explosion of 10 February around 23:00hrs. The interlocutor said that the explosion only caused property damage. The interlocutor added that the MIA had started a criminal investigation based on terrorist action related charges. The SMM visited the site of the explosion where Ukrainian police officers were still conducting their investigation. The SMM could observe the damage caused by the explosion inside and outside the hostel’s premises. The SMM spoke to two young men who said that they were inside the hostel during the explosion. The interlocutors confirmed that the explosion did not cause any casualties.

In Kyiv, on 10-11 February, the SMM followed-up on media reports indicating the deployment of concrete roadblocks around the city’s main access points. The SMM spotted concrete protective shooting posts at the four following positions: on the north-western flank of the city on M07 highway-1027 road junction, on the south-western flank on the M05 highway, on the southern flank on the M01 highway and on the north-eastern flank on the E 95 highway. All the aforementioned positions were staffed by Ukrainian traffic police officers.

The SMM also continued monitoring the situation in Kharkiv, Kherson, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi and Lviv.
Annex 334

Spot report by Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, 22 February 2015: explosion in Kharkiv at march commemorating February 2014 pro-Maidan events

This report is for the media and general public.

On 22 February 2015 at 13:15hrs, an explosion occurred at a pro-Maidan march commemorating the anniversary of February 2014 events in Kharkiv (during which three people died in demonstrations), outside the Palace of Sports on Marshal Zhukova Street (7km east of the city centre). The SMM, who were monitoring the commemoration, heard the blast and felt shockwaves from their position 100m away. The SMM arrived at the scene of the explosion at 13:20hrs, and saw two dead individuals covered with Ukrainian flags and casualties being attended to. The SMM noted the explosion caused no damage to nearby buildings or windows. At 14:45hrs, a police spokesperson and a representative of the prosecutor’s office gave a press conference at the scene, confirming that an explosive device killed two (one police officer, and one civilian taking part in the march) and injured eleven, six of whom were police officers.

The SMM observed that the main commemoration had concluded and that approximately 500 participants (approximately equal numbers of men and women and some children) were on Marshal Zhukova Street carrying a 250m long Ukrainian national flag to Liberty Square when the device was detonated. Police confirmed to SMM that the explosion took place at the head of the march which was led by police officers escorting participants to Liberty Square. The police also informed the SMM that the device consisted of the explosive trinitrotoluene (TNT) and shrapnel concealed in a plastic bag and was detonated remotely. According to police, the device was similar to one that exploded at the Moscovy District Courthouse in Kharkiv (see SMM Daily Report based on information as of 21 January). The incident is being investigated as an act of terrorism according to police.
Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time), 23 February 2015

KYIV 24 February 2015

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM monitored the implementation of the “Package of measures for the Implementation of the Minsk agreements”. The SMM, based on its monitoring – which was restricted by third parties and security considerations – noted that fighting continued in areas of Donetsk region including Shyrokyne and, to a lesser extent, in a number of other locations. Baseline data enabling the SMM to monitor and verify withdrawal of heavy weapons had still not been provided.

From their location on Krasnohvardeyskyi Prospect, five kilometres north-east of “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”)-controlled Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard the sound of shelling (around 30 explosions) approximately 10km to the west, in the area of Donetsk airport. The SMM assessed that it was both incoming and some outgoing shelling, but it could not determine the direction of fire.

When travelling through “DPR”-controlled Budonivskiy district (5km south-south-west of Donetsk city centre) the SMM heard small arms fire from what they concluded to be a firing range. The firing came from the direction of an abandoned industrial area on Bauman Street. The SMM visited a house on Chernovitskaja Street that the owner said had been shelled on 2 February. The SMM observed that one artillery shell had impacted through the roof and the house was gutted in the subsequent fire.

At the temporary Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC) headquarters re-located to government-controlled Soledar (77km north of Donetsk), those present, including officers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the Russian Federation Armed Forces and members of the “DPR” and “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”) gave the SMM the latest map of the region with a definite line of contact agreed upon by all. The Russian Federation Major-General, Representative of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to the JCCC, said that some heavy weapons had been withdrawn by the “LPR” in Luhansk Region. The Ukrainian Armed Forces Major-General, Head of the Ukrainian side to the JCCC said he had no evidence that any heavy weapons had been withdrawn. Until the signatories of the Minsk Package provide baseline information repeatedly requested by the SMM Chief Monitor – including inventories, withdrawal routes and concentration points – the SMM remains able to monitor movement of weapons but not to verify that weapons are withdrawn.

The JCCC incident log seen by the SMM showed the total number of complaints of ceasefire violations for the 24 hours to 08:00hrs on 23 February had decreased in comparison with the previous 24 hours. For the third day in a row most complaints were logged in villages near Donetsk airport and in Shyrokyne (23km east of Mariupol, 125km south of Donetsk).

https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/142606
At 10:45hrs, whilst stationary to the north of government-controlled Avdiivka (14km north-north-west of Donetsk) the SMM heard several outgoing mortar rounds (assessed as 82mm calibre) fired from a location several hundred meters to the south-east of its position. The SMM observed that many buildings within the city have sustained damage to their roofs and/or windows from shelling. The deputy mayor of Avdiivka told the SMM that the town had been without gas, water and electricity supply for the last two months.

The chief of police in Avdiivka showed the SMM to Maladiozhanaja Street – the location of a shelling that he said took place on the morning of 23 February. The SMM analysed a single crater on the road and determined that it was likely caused by artillery fired east-south-east from the impact site. A definitive assessment of the firing distance could not be made.

According to Avdiivka’s chief of police, incoming Grad rounds at 07:45hrs on 23 February had caused damage to an abandoned warehouse at Industrialnaya Street. At this location the SMM saw shelling damage and aluminium tubing resembling Grad remnants. The SMM was unable to determine the distance and the direction from where the rounds were fired. The SMM also saw damage to a factory administration building and to the Ministry of Emergency Services building within an industrial complex in the northern part of the town. The SMM visited a cafe in Avdiivka where media reported three local men were killed when a rocket struck on 21 February, and saw remnants of a Grad rocket at the site.

The SMM spoke with the commander at a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint in government-controlled Volnovakha (35km south-west of Donetsk) concerning recent movement restrictions the SMM has faced travelling through this checkpoint. The commander told the SMM that he will continue to refuse passage unless he is informed in advance about the time and destination of the SMM’s patrols. The commander also informed the SMM that after 23 February, the checkpoint will no longer accept applications for travel permits from civilians. According to him, people must now apply for permits in Mariupol or Velyka Novosilka (29km west of Donetsk).

In government-controlled Sopyne (99km south of Donetsk) the SMM heard incoming and outgoing artillery and mortar fire (about 20 rounds) at 10:15hrs. Whilst in government-controlled Berdianske (98km south of Donetsk) during the morning of 23 February, the SMM heard artillery, mortar and tank fire as well as heavy machine gun, small arms and anti-aircraft fire from 500 metres to one kilometre north-east from its position. In Berdianske, the SMM talked to four men and three women living in a basement to escape shelling who said they have no food or utilities. They told the SMM that the town has been without water for three weeks and without electricity for three days. Two other groups of local residents spoke of enduring the same living conditions to the SMM.

According to a member of the village council in government-controlled Trokhizbenka (40km west of Luhansk), the area has been calm since the ceasefire came into effect on 15 February. This was corroborated by Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel at a checkpoint outside the village. The SMM saw severe damage to village infrastructure, including water and gas lines. There is no gas supply or mains water due to damage caused by shelling. Residents draw water from private wells, according to the village council member. The interlocutor stated that the village has been reconnected to the electricity network.

At 10:50hrs, on the northern outskirts of Trokhizbenka, the SMM heard three shots (likely artillery) coming from the south-east direction at an estimated distance of 10-20km.

https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/142606
On 22 February, the “mayor” of “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (75km west of Luhansk) told the SMM that despite the non-functioning of the pre-conflict town council, some local administration employees still repair and maintain the town infrastructure. The “mayor” does not know when funds for the town administration may be forthcoming from the “LPR”. According to her, no enterprises are operating and no taxes are being paid in the town.

The SMM monitored a rally at the Shevchenko monument in Kharkiv in memory of those killed in the 22 February explosion (see SMM Spot Report, 22 February). The death of a 15 year old boy (injured in the explosion) in hospital on 23 February was announced to the crowd. The atmosphere at the rally, at first sombre, turned to anger, though remained peaceful. Approximately 150 to 250 (mostly men, and some women and children) and 75 police (uniformed, plainclothes, and explosive detection canine units) were present. By 13:45hrs, participants dispersed peacefully.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Dnepropetrovsk, Odessa, Kherson, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv and Kyiv.
Annex 336

OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine Based on Information Received as of 28 August 2015 (28 August 2015)
Early morning explosion hit a locality near the Ossetian-Persian front in the eastern part of the country. The situation remains tense in the area.

In government-controlled Yasne (30km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM conducted crater analysis on one impact of alleged shelling on 26 August. The SMM assessed it to have been caused by 125mm high explosive fragmentation shells of a main battle tank (MBT) fired from a southerly direction.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM monitored the implementation of the “Package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements”. Its monitoring was restricted by the parties and security considerations. Ceasefire violations were recorded in numerous locations. The SMM observed damage caused by shelling and conducted several crater analyses in Donetsk and Luhansky regions.

The overall security situation at and around “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”)-controlled Donetsk airport (9km north-west of Donetsk) remained tense. Between 08:55 and 17:30hrs, whilst at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) observation point at Donetsk railway station (“DPR”-controlled, 8km north-west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM recorded a total of 73 explosions – both incoming and outgoing - mostly consistent with mortar (88mm and 120mm) and automatic grenade launchers (AGL) at distances ranging between 1.5 and 6km north-west, north and north-north-east of its position[1].

In government-controlled Kominternove (23km north-east of Mariupol), between 12:32 and 13:10hrs, the SMM heard 12 explosions from undetermined distance southeast of its position and saw one impact at a location 3km south of its position. Whilst in Kominternove, local residents showed the SMM three craters which they said resulted from shelling on 26 August. The SMM analysed craters in a residential area. Analysis indicated that 120mm mortar rounds – two were fired from the east, another one was fired from a westerly direction – had caused the damage including blown-out windows and a pitted roof. The SMM also observed that a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint in the west of the village was closed for any residents, preventing them from crossing from the village into the west. The checkpoint commander told the SMM that following the shelling on 26 August the checkpoint had been closed for all traffic.

In “DPR”-controlled Holmivskyi (49km north-north-east of Donetsk), the SMM was told by local residents that shelling had taken place during the previous night. The SMM analysed three of six craters observed in and around a residential area and assessed that they had been caused by 122mm artillery fired from a north-easterly direction.

In government-controlled Zaitseve (50km north-north-east of Donetsk), the SMM visited a humanitarian logistic centre south of the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint located near...
the Kursiumivka junction close to the contact line. The SMM observed around 100 people - mainly representative of local authorities, media and shopkeepers – attending the opening ceremony. The centre includes 53 food shops, a pharmacy, a bank and a police station.

At a checkpoint in government-controlled Buhas (60km north of Mariupol), the SMM observed a queue of 212 civilian vehicles waiting to enter “DPR”-controlled area and 150 civilian vehicles waiting to enter government-controlled area. The SMM spoke to some passengers - four women and two men – who said that they had been waiting for over five hours, while sometimes it had taken them more than 10 hours to proceed to cross the checkpoint.

The overall situation in Luhansk remained relatively tense with the SMM observing ceasefire violations in government-controlled Troitske (69km west of Luhansk).

The SMM visited the checkpoint near the government-controlled northern side of the Stanitsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk), where a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer informed them that shelling and fire exchange had occurred during the previous night. The SMM observed and carried out analysis on three craters around the checkpoint, who assessed that they had been caused by 82mm and 120mm mortars – fired from a southerly direction. The SMM also visited four sites of a residential area in the town and observed four damaged civilian houses including a house with a completely destroyed summer kitchen, and another house with its roof entirely burnt. The SMM analysed craters and assessed that the impacts had been caused by 82mm and 120mm mortar.

At the “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”)-controlled side of the Stanitsia Luhanska bridge, an “LPR” member told the SMM that shelling had occurred during the previous night. The SMM analysed 33 craters around the “LPR” checkpoint in the non-residential area 200m east from the bridge across the contact line and assessed that most of them had been caused by 82mm mortar while others were consistent with rounds from infantry fighting vehicles (BMP1), mortar, automatic grenade launcher (AGS 17) and tank – fired from a northerly direction.

In “LPR”-controlled Kalynove (58km west of Luhansk), the SMM followed up on information received from “LPR” members about shelling during the night of 26 August. The SMM observed 29 craters in a non-residential area and conducted analysis on 28. The SMM assessed that 20 craters had been caused by 120mm mortar, six by 82mm mortar and two by 152mm artillery – mostly fired from a north-westerly direction.

In government-controlled Orlikove (56km south-west of Luhansk), local residents informed the SMM about heavy shelling that occurred the previous evening. The SMM observed temporary military installation in a residential area, saw civilian houses damaged by shrapnel fragments and met with one injured civilian. It found the remnants of ammunition from multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) on the ground in several sites in the village. The SMM could not conduct crater analysis due to the risk of unexploded ordnance.

The SMM visited an “LPR” training ground in the vicinity of Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk), where it observed 40 MBTs (T-64). Around five of them were positioned in the shooting range and engaged in live-fire exercises.
At the checkpoint in “LPR”-controlled Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk), the SMM observed a crew conducting repair works of electricity pylons. The supervisor of the repair crew told the SMM that the high-voltage electricity cables, originating from the power station in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), were damaged in several places as a result of shelling.

The SMM – through the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) – spotted in “DPR”-controlled areas five self-propelled artillery in Rozdolne (46km south-east of Donetsk, 67 north-east of Mariupol), two MBTs in Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol) and two towed artillery pieces in Zaichenko (27km north-east of Mariupol). In government-controlled areas, SMM UAVs spotted two MBTs east of Starohnativka (51km south of Donetsk, 51km north-east of Mariupol).

On 27 August, the SMM revisited eight Ukrainian Armed Forces heavy weapons holding areas whose locations corresponded with the respective withdrawal lines. At seven areas at total of 22 heavy weapons previously recorded were missing: three towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) were missing at one site, missing since 9 July; five towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) were missing at the second site, since 9 July; six MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) were missing at the third site, since 12 July; two MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) were missing at the fourth site, since 12 July; two towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) were missing at the fifth site, since 9 July; two towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) were freshly missing at the sixth site; and two towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) were missing at the seventh site, since 22 August. At the eighth area for the first time the SMM was allowed to register serial numbers of twelve pieces of heavy weapon (six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and six multipurpose light-armoured towing vehicles (MT-LB)).

The SMM also revisited two “DPR” heavy weapons holding areas whose locations corresponded with the respective withdrawal lines. In one area, all previously registered weapons were present and their serial numbers matched the SMM’s records. In the second holding area the SMM observed that two previously recorded MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) were missing.

On 27 August, in front of the regional police headquarters in Odessa, the SMM monitored 250 people (men and women equally, different age groups) protesting against Right Sector activists, who had allegedly destroyed Opposition Block tents, and calling police to protect its supporters. Around 100 police officers were present.

On 27 August, the SMM followed up on media reports of an explosion during the previous night at a Kyiv Branch of the Sberbank of Russia on Peremohy Avenue in Kyiv. The SMM observed shattered glass of the windows, a small indentation on the ground adjacent to the main entrance (30cm wide) and damaged frame of the main entrance.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk and Lviv.

*Restrictions on SMM monitoring, access and freedom of movement*

The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by the parties and security considerations, including the presence – and lack of information on the whereabouts – of mines, and damaged infrastructure. The security situation in Donbas is fluid and unpredictable and the ceasefire does not hold everywhere. Self-imposed restrictions on
movement into high-risk areas have impinged on SMM patrolling activities, particularly in areas not controlled by the government. Most areas along the Ukraine-Russian Federation international border, particularly those controlled by the “LPR”, have ordinarily been placed off limits to the SMM.

Delayed access:

- At a checkpoint in government-controlled Mykolaivka (63km north of Mariupol), the SMM was not allowed to proceed further by Ukrainian Armed Forces officer who cited that one of the SMM vehicles was not registered on their list. The SMM turned back 2km away from the checkpoint. After 20 minutes, the SMM tried to pass again and was allowed to proceed.

Conditional access:

- At two “DPR” checkpoints in the south of Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the “DPR” members insisted on checking the passports of SMM monitors.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.
Annex 337

OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 27 September 2015
Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 27 September 2015

This report is for the media and general public.

The SMM monitored the implementation of the “Package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements”. Its monitoring was restricted by the parties and security considerations*. The situation remained largely calm in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions with only sparse ceasefire violations recorded by the SMM. The SMM observed considerable queues of civilian vehicles waiting at checkpoints to cross both into government-controlled and non-government controlled areas.

The SMM recorded a small number of ceasefire violations in the Donetsk region, where the security situation was otherwise relatively calm. At the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC) observation point at “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”)-controlled Donetsk railway station (8km north-west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM recorded on 26 September three instances of ceasefire violations between 11:28 and 13:34hrs.[1] The Ukrainian Armed Forces representatives at the JCCC present at the observation point suggested the explosions were likely part of “DPR” training activities.

On 27 September the SMM heard six explosions consistent with outgoing mortar or artillery fire, as well as small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire some 1.5-2km east of its position at a filling station in government-controlled Opytne (61km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM enquired with an employee at the filling station who said there was a Ukrainian Armed Forces firing range in the area.

In government-controlled Dzerzhynsk (41km north of Donetsk), the SMM talked on 26 September to the deputy commander of the Ukrainian Armed Forces battalion deployed to the area. The interlocutor claimed that while the situation was calmer recently, his subordinates reported that “DPR” intelligence gathering and reconnaissance patrols in the area were contributing to a tense atmosphere.

On 26 September the SMM observed a convoy consisting of 15 cargo trucks marked as humanitarian convoy belonging to the Rinat Akhmetov Foundation, which was leaving “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city travelling freely through the “DPR” checkpoint in a southern direction. The SMM also observed in Donetsk city five cargo trucks escorted by a “DPR” “military police” vehicle, moving west.

In government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM talked to several interlocutors, who expressed a strong opinion about the need for Ukrainian Armed Forces to open a passage across the contact line for the residents from the nearby villages to travel on the Kurakhove-Donetsk route. Following that the SMM discussed the issue with
the civil-military co-operation officers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Marinka, who stated the Anti-Terrorist Operation Headquarters was considering the idea of opening the requested passage corridor.

The SMM spoke to shop-owners in government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk) who indicated that they had to acquire from the city administration a permit with the list of products they were bringing through government checkpoints, and that there was a limit for the amount of goods per crossing. The deputy commander at the closest relevant government checkpoint near Heorhiivka (26km south-west of Donetsk) confirmed to the SMM that local businesses indeed had to obtain a permit in order to transport goods through the checkpoint.

On 26 September the SMM observed long lines of civilian vehicles at armed checkpoints waiting to cross both into governmental-controlled and “DPR”-controlled areas. While driving on H20 highway the SMM recorded at a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk) a queue of 160 vehicles waiting to cross into government-controlled area. Approaching a government checkpoint near government-controlled Volnovakha (52km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM noted 90 vehicles waiting to cross into the governmental-controlled area, and 432 vehicles queued to move north, into the “DPR”-controlled area. At a checkpoint near government-controlled Maiorsk (44km north of Donetsk) the SMM counted 370 vehicles waiting to enter the government-controlled area, while 16 buses, 300 pedestrians, and 30 vehicles were queued to enter the “DPR”-controlled area. At the government checkpoint near Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM observed at least 79 vehicles waiting to move into the “DPR”-controlled area and 373 vehicles waiting to travel into the government-controlled area.

At the “Shakhtarski Zori” health resort in Proletarskiy district of “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city, the SMM observed on 27 September a civilian mini-van with Russian Federation Krasnodar region licence plates. The licence plate number was fixed on a factory-made frame carrying the Russian inscription “FSB of Russian Federation”. As the SMM was about to depart from the facility, a male wearing the Russian new-style camouflage uniform without any rank, insignia or patches, came out of the resort building and took a photograph or video of the leaving SMM vehicle, and made written notes.

The SMM observed an overall calm security situation in the Duhansk region with few ceasefire violations. On 26 September, from a stationary position north of government-controlled Trokhizhenka (33km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard in short intervals a couple of small-arms shots, three undetermined explosions, and sounds of two outgoing 82mm mortar rounds. All sounds were assessed as originating from the nearby Ukrainian Armed Forces military training area, and the SMM was informed in advance by Ukrainian Armed Forces that live-fire exercises would be conducted at this specific training facility.

During their interaction with the SMM both Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel and armed “Lugansk People’s Republic (“LPR”)” members made mutual allegations of small-arms ceasefire violations. “LPR” members told the SMM that they were targeted on 25 September in the area of “LPR”-controlled Pryshyb (33km north-west of Luhansk), and
Krasnyi Lyman (30km north-west of Luhansk). The Ukrainian Armed Forces interlocutors stated they came under fire at the checkpoint near government-controlled Troitske (69km west of Luhansk).

On 27 September the SMM enquired on prices and the availability of goods at two trading places in “LPR”-controlled Luhansk city. While both markets were well equipped with food and sanitary items the SMM concluded that the cost of basic products increased by an average 5% during the month of September. The SMM interlocutors at the markets claimed that the rise in prices was owed to the fact that they had to pay at the checkpoints for transporting the supplies into “LPR”-controlled areas. The SMM observed that the Russian Rouble was used as the primary currency in the market transactions, rather than the Ukrainian Hryvnia.

The SMM monitored on 26 September a local ceasefire regime, through which it facilitated power line repair works near “LPR”-controlled Obozne (18km north of Luhansk). The SMM heard two explosions occurring within an interval of three hours. A repair worker of the electrical company informed the SMM that a member of the “LPR” demining team had been injured by an anti-personnel mine in the first explosion, and transported to the hospital. The second explosion, according to the interlocutor, was a controlled detonation of unexploded ordnance (UXO) performed by the “LPR” demining team during the demining process that preceded the repairs.

The SMM re-visited on 26 September three “DPR” heavy weapons holding areas. At one of the sites the “DPR” armed member on guard did not allow access to the SMM for 50 minutes, until receiving permission from his superiors. One anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 10mm) was missing at this location.

On 27 September the SMM visited another two “DPR” heavy weapons holding areas. At one of the sites the SMM recorded that two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) were missing. At the second site the SMM observed two multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS, BM-21 Grad, 122mm) were missing, as they had been during the previous visit on 5 April (see SMM Daily Report 7 April).

The SMM visited on the same day two Ukrainian Armed Forces heavy weapons holding areas, which were found empty. The SMM had previously recorded eight self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) at one site and four self-propelled howitzers (2S1) at the second. The military commander present at the first site told the SMM that the weapons were redeployed to another specified location on the previous day. At the second site the SMM learned from several civilian interlocutors that the military removed the weapons from the site a few days prior to the visit.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted 11 tanks (type unknown) in the area of “DPR”-controlled Sontseve (56km south-east of Donetsk).

The SMM observed military movement in areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines. The SMM UAV observed on 26 September five tanks in the “DPR”-controlled area of Komsomolske (43km south-east of Donetsk). Both on 26 and 27 September the SMM UAV
spotted a concentration of at least 50 tanks and other military hardware in a training area south of “DPR”-controlled Torez (61km east of Donetsk).

On 26 September the SMM observed at least 36 tanks (type unknown) at the training area in “LPR”-controlled Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk). A day earlier the SMM spotted at the same training area one heavy multiple launch thermobaric rocket system (TOS-1 Buratino, 220mm).

In the area of government-controlled Novookhtyrka (53km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM noted a convoy consisting of three main battle tanks (T-72) transported on trailers, and one infantry fighting vehicle (IFV, BMP-2) moving east.

On 27 September the SMM noted a military convoy in the area of government-controlled Artemivsk (66km north-east of Donetsk), which contained six self-propelled howitzers (2S1), one armoured personnel carrier (APC), and one military truck transporting troops to a north-west direction. Also on 27 September the SMM observed another convoy consisting of four IFVs (BMP), and three towed howitzers (D-30) moving north away from Artemivsk on the M03 highway.

On 27 September the SMM noted a convoy of six tracked APCs (type unknown) moving east, in the area of government-controlled Plotyna (28km north-east of Luhansk). On the same day the SMM observed at the training area near “LPR”-controlled Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk) a number of heavy artillery pieces, including 12 towed howitzers (D-30, 122mm), and 13 self-propelled howitzers (2S1), an increase comparing to previous SMM observation (see SMM Daily Report 25 September).

The SMM continued to monitor the situation at the crossing points to Crimea – Kalanchak, Chaplyinka, and Chonhar (95, 90, and 162km south-east of Lherson, respectively) – which remained relatively calm and stable. Activists randomly checked vehicles and drivers’ documents at their improvised check-points, which are now installed a few kilometres away from the three Ukrainian border guards crossing points.

At the activists’ improvised checkpoint some 2km away from the Kalanchak crossing point, a protester who introduced herself as the Pravyi Sektor’s Press Officer told the SMM that the vehicle drivers and passengers did not object to car searches when approached by activists, and “showed their understanding of the blockade”. At Chonhar, another Pravyi Sektor activist told the SMM on 27 September that less than a quarter of the drivers passing the ‘blockade’ were contesting the activists’ efforts to conduct vehicle searches.

On 27 September the SMM followed up with the v dessa Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and the Odessa regional police on the explosion that occurred at the headquarters of the Odessa SBU office earlier the same day. The police confirmed that an unidentified explosive device in the equivalent of at least 5 kg of trinitrotoluene (TNT) had been placed near the back door of the SBU building and exploded at 04:45hrs. The SBU interlocutor told the SMM that nobody had been injured in the detonation, and that an investigation had been initiated under the “terrorism” article of Ukraine’s Criminal Code.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in LharkiK, OnepropetroKsk, CherniKsi, Ikano-FrankiKsk, DGiK and LyiK
*Restrictions on SMM monitoring, access and freedom of movement:

The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by the parties and security considerations, including mine threats, and damaged infrastructure. The security situation in Donbas is fluid and unpredictable and the ceasefire does not hold everywhere. Self-imposed restrictions on movement into high-risk areas have impinged on SMM patrolling activities, particularly in some areas not controlled by the government. Members of the “LPR” continue to prevent the SMM from monitoring in some areas close to the border with the Russian Federation.

Denied access:

- On 26 September the armed personnel at a “DPR” “traffic police” checkpoint stopped the SMM some 2km away from the Ternove shooting range, denying its passage without any explanation;
- On 27 September two “LPR” “border guards” stopped the SMM in “LPR”-controlled Velykyi Sukhodil (43km south-east of Luhansk), a town 1.5km away from the Ukraine-Russian Federation international border. The “LPR” members denied the SMM any further movement without a permit signed by the “LPR” leadership, demanded the SMM to leave the area, and escorted it out of town.

Delayed access:

- During the visit of a “DPR” heavy weapons holding area on 26 September, the SMM was not allowed access to the site for 50 minutes, until the “DPR” guard received a phone call from his superior;
- The “DPR” armed members at a checkpoint near Ozeryanivka (32km north-east of Donetsk) delayed the SMM for 75 minutes, after which it only allowed its movement with an escort.

Interference with the UAV:

- On 27 September, while flying over “DPR”-controlled areas north-east of government-controlled Mariupol (103km south-west of Donetsk) a SMM UAV was jammed four times.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations observed, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions on SMM access and freedom of movement” for further information.
Annex 338

OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30 (9 August 2016)
Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 9 August 2016

cose.org/ukraine-smm/258496

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared to the previous day. The Mission observed the aftermath of shelling on both sides of the contact line and analysed craters in and around Krasnohorivka, Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove), Novotoshvivske, Popasna and Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov), assessing in all cases the direction of fire. It observed the presence of multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) in violation of the respective withdrawal line on both sides of the contact line. The SMM noted long queues at an entry-exit checkpoint near the contact line in Stanytsia Luhanska and monitored one border area not controlled by the Government. The SMM continued to monitor the situation at three crossing points at the administrative boundary line between Kherson region and Crimea, observing the closure of one of the crossing points. The Mission observed public gatherings in Lviv and Kyiv.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations[1] compared to the previous reporting period, including more than 220 explosions.

On the night of 8 August, whilst in Donetsk city centre the SMM heard 21 undetermined explosions at locations 5-15km ranging from north-west to north of its position.

Whilst in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), on the night of 8 August, the SMM heard 51 explosions assessed as impacts (including eight artillery rounds and one mortar round) 5-7km east of its position. It also registered eight explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of artillery 2km north and three explosions assessed as impacts of rounds from undetermined weapons 7km north-east of its position.

Positioned at the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre) between 07:45 and 13:30 of 9 August, the SMM did not record any ceasefire violations.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 58 undetermined explosions 2-6km west-south-west, west-north-west, north-west and north of its position. Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM recorded 64 undetermined explosions, all 3-5km east of its position.

While stationed in government-controlled Karlivka (25km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions 1km west-north-west of its position.

The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Luhansk regions compared to the previous day. On the night of 8 August whilst in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 25-26 explosions (19-20 were
assessed as impacts of artillery rounds and six as outgoing artillery rounds), all 3km west of its position. The following day, while positioned in government-controlled parts of Zolote 1 (60km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard three single shots of small-arms fire 200m south-east of its position.

The SMM conducted crater analysis on both sides of the contact line. In government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk), the SMM saw eight craters: one in a field 25m away from a hospital, two in and around the gym of a college, one on an asphalt road, and four in yards of two different inhabited houses. It assessed seven of them as caused by 120mm mortar rounds fired from east-south-easterly (five of them) and easterly (two of them) directions, and one by an 82mm mortar round fired from an east-south-easterly direction. The SMM saw a tail fin from a 120mm mortar round stuck in the floor of the gym of the college and assessed that the round had penetrated its roof. The SMM observed shattered windows and shrapnel damage to the wall of a house. The Ukrainian Armed Forces representative to the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and residents told the SMM that shelling occurred between 04:00 and 05:00. No casualties were reported.

The SMM observed three inhabited houses damaged by shelling in “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol) that several residents separately said had taken place on the night of 9 August. The SMM saw shrapnel damage to the south-west facing wall and shattered windows of a house, and a resident (woman aged 48) stated that her son (aged 28) had sustained serious wounds in the chest, stomach, left shoulder as well as face, and had been admitted to a hospital in “DPR”-controlled Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol). The SMM also saw shrapnel damage to the roof and wall of another house and shrapnel damage to the north-west-facing corner of a small summerhouse. The SMM assessed the impacts as having been caused by 120mm mortar rounds fired from a south-westerly (first two impacts) and a north-westerly (third impact) directions.

In government-controlled Novotoshkivske (53km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed fresh remnants of a 120mm mortar shell, stuck in an asphalt road at a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint, 500m away from a residential area, and assessed it as having been fired from a southerly direction. At the eastern edge of government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), the SMM conducted analysis on two fresh craters on an asphalt road – 500m away from a residential area, and assessed them as having been caused by 82mm mortar rounds fired from an east-south-easterly direction. In both locations, Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel separately told the SMM that shelling had occurred on the previous night and no casualties had been reported.

In a residential area of “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov), the SMM, accompanied by the Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the JCCC, saw three fresh craters (one in the backyard of an inhabited house, the second in a field close to a factory and the third in the factory), which it assessed as caused by 152mm artillery rounds fired from a westerly direction. The SMM saw an abandoned house with a newly destroyed west-facing wall and another with windows shattered. Residents separately told the SMM that shelling had started at around 03:00 and lasted until 04:00 that morning. In the vicinity of the town, the SMM also conducted analysis on two fresh craters – one on an asphalt
road and another in the gravel side of the road, concluding that they had been caused by 152mm artillery rounds fired from a westerly direction.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal line, the SMM observed four multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS; BM21 Grad, 122mm) heading west in government-controlled Mykhailivka (37km north-west of Donetsk). An SMM unmanned aerial vehicle spotted the presence of two MLRS (BM21 Grad, 122mm) together with two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23) in “LPR”-controlled Luhansk city on 8 August, as well as the presence of the presence of one tank (T-72), one self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and an anti-tank radio-guided missile system (9K114 Shturm, 134mm) mounted on an armoured personnel carrier (APC; MT-LB, 9P149) together with one APC (BMP-2) and six infantry fighting vehicles (BTR-4) near government-controlled Syze (23km north-east of Luhansk).

Beyond the respective withdrawal line but outside assigned areas, the SMM observed 13 tanks (T-64) at the training area near “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal line the SMM saw 15 towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm), while it noted as missing six towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) as it had observed previously. The SMM also observed that two areas continued to be abandoned, as they had been since 6 April with 12 towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 155mm) missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed three infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-2) near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk). In “LPR”-controlled areas the SMM observed one armoured personnel carrier (BTR-80) near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to insist on accountability for violations related to impediments to SMM monitoring and verification. Mr. Zakharchenko again did not respond to a request to meet the SMM in order to indicate effective steps taken in response to the incident of 29 July when SMM monitors were threatened at gunpoint by aggressive armed “DPR” members near Lukove (72km south of Donetsk) (see: SMM Spot Report, 29 July 2016).*

At the JCCC headquarters in government-controlled Soledar (79km north of Donetsk), the SMM referred the JCCC to longstanding and continuing impediments to monitoring and verification of areas south of Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and between government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk) and “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk). The SMM emphasized that responsibility for remedying these violations lay with those in control of the respective areas but reminded the Russian and Ukrainian representatives of the mission’s mandate – including freedom of movement – and the JCCC’s obligation under the Addendum to the Package of Measures to facilitate rapid response to the abovementioned violations of the Addendum, which were an obstacle to normalization.
The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. Positioned on both sides of the contact line, the SMM monitored the cleaning of canals that provide water to the Shchastia power plant (government-controlled 20km north of Luhansk), and repair work to water infrastructure near “LPR”-controlled Krasnyi Lyman (30km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to observe long queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. In the morning at the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint north of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge the SMM observed approximately 500 pedestrians waiting to cross into government-controlled areas and some 250 people waiting to proceed in the opposite direction. At the “LPR” checkpoint immediately south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed a queue of around 500 people waiting to proceed to government-controlled areas.

The SMM monitored a border area not controlled by the Government. At the pedestrian border crossing point in “LPR”-controlled Verkhnoharsymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) over 55 minutes the SMM observed seven pedestrians crossing towards the Russian Federation and seven pedestrians crossing into Ukraine.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation at three crossing points at the administrative boundary line between Ukrainian mainland and Crimea in Kalanchak, Chaplyinka and Chonhar (67km, 72km and 167km south-east of Kherson, respectively). At around 11:00 on 8 August in Kalanchak, the SMM observed that the crossing point was closed in both directions with 19 cars (all with Ukrainian licence plates) waiting to exit Kherson region. The following day at the southernmost border guard position of the same crossing point, the SMM saw that the road before the crossing point on the Crimean side was blocked with a metal fence. Both on 8 (at 13:00) and 9 August (at 13:45) at Chaplyinka crossing point the SMM observed approximately 120 cars (all with Ukrainian licence plates) waiting to cross to Crimea and no traffic flow from Crimea. The border guard shift commander told the SMM that traffic from Crimea has not been allowed on the Crimean side. The SMM noted that border guard personnel were on heightened alert, carrying assault rifles and continuously searching the area with binoculars. At 13:00 of 8 August at Chonhar the SMM saw a queue of some 140 cars (all with Ukrainian licence plates) and 150 pedestrians waiting to cross to Crimea and no traffic from Crimea. Several drivers separately told the SMM that they had been waiting at the crossing point for eight hours.

The SMM monitored public gatherings in Lviv and Kyiv. On 8 August in front of the building of the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) office in Lviv, the SMM observed a gathering of approximately 50 people (mostly men aged 25-35) including ten men dressed in green military-style uniforms with the insignia of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) expressing support to fellow members of their organization, arrested by the SSU. According to an official statement of the SSU, “five members of a terrorist group, planning to simultaneously explode railway tracks in three different locations in Lviv, had been identified and arrested”. A member of the OUN told the SMM that their three members had been detained by the SBU in Lviv on the night of 7 August.
On 9 August in front of the National Bank of Ukraine in Kyiv, the SMM observed some 250 people (mixed gender, mostly elderly) demanding their savings in their accounts of a closed bank being returned. The gathering passed off peacefully overseen by 20 police officers.

In Kyiv, the SMM also monitored the situation around the Obolonskyi district court building, where a court hearing of 12 former members of the former Tornado volunteer battalion was being held. The SMM observed 70 people (men and women, different age groups) and 50 journalists gathering next to the court building which was cordoned by approximately 400 law enforcement officers. Among 70 participants, the SMM saw some holding national flags and banners expressing support to the detained, and others dressed in T-shirts or camouflage uniforms with the insignias of former volunteer battalions of Donbas, Tornado and Aidar. The SMM saw two small clashes between the police officers and supporters, when the police tried to arrest some participants and the crowd prevented it from doing so. At about 15:15 the crowd dispersed.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate*

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions to its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction to the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Besides the abovementioned general restrictions, the SMM was not subject to any specific restrictions to its freedom of movement.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.
Annex 339

OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30 (12 August 2016)
Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 12 August 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations through the evening of 12 August, including fewer explosions, in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission recorded an intense exchange of fire near Stanytsia Luhanska on the night of 12 August. The SMM confirmed civilian casualties and conducted crater analysis near Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, Donetsk city, Marinka, Lobacheve and Popasna. It continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, and saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in areas not controlled by the Government. The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles in the security zone and monitored a border area not controlled by the Government. The Mission continued to monitor the situation at three crossing points at the administrative boundary line between the mainland and Crimea. The SMM faced four freedom of movement restrictions, three of them in areas controlled by the Government.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region on 12 August compared with the previous day[1].

While in government-controlled Mariupol on the evening of 11 August, the SMM heard 37 undetermined explosions at an undetermined distance to the east, assessed as occurring in or around Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol). During and immediately following these explosions, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne recorded 39 explosions occurring north of the camera: beginning with 11 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds at unknown distances north of the camera, from west to east, continuing with 13 explosions assessed as airbursts north of “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol), two explosions assessed as impacts near government-controlled Vodiane (19km north-east of Mariupol), and another 13 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds (unknown calibre) at an unknown distance north of the camera.

While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), late in the evening on 11 August, the SMM heard seven explosions assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds 4km south-east of its position. On the night of 12 August, the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions 7-8km south-west of its position.

Positioned at the Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre) shortly before and after noon on 12 August, the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 3-6km north-west of its position and 12 undetermined explosions 2-3km west-south-west of its position. During the same time period, the SMM heard 16 undetermined explosions 3-
5km west and south-west of its position in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) and three undetermined explosions 5km south-east of its position in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk).

Later in the afternoon, positioned approximately 2km south of “DPR”-controlled Oleksandrivka (20km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard 18 undetermined explosions 2-4km north-north-west of its position. Positioned approximately 2km south of government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) in the late afternoon, the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions 2-3km north-north-east and saw and heard one airburst less than 1km north-east of its position.

On the night of 12 August, while in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard 75 undetermined explosions 6-12km west and north-west of its position.

In Luhansk region the SMM also noted a decrease in the number of recorded ceasefire violations through the reporting period for 12 August. Whilst in government-controlled Stanitsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) on the night of 11 August, the SMM heard an exchange of fire that began with one undetermined explosion 3.4-4.7km south-south-west of its position, followed by an explosion assessed as an outgoing recoilless-gun (SPG-9, 73mm) round 3.4km south-south-west of the SMM’s position, and shortly after an explosion assessed as the impact of the same recoilless-gun round 4.7km south-south-west of its position. The ensuing exchange included 27 explosions assessed as outgoing recoilless-gun (SPG-9) rounds and 27 explosions assessed as their impacts, as well as 14 explosions assessed as outgoing automatic-grenade-launcher (AGS-17) rounds, 12 explosions assessed as outgoing mortar or artillery rounds and 150 shots and burst of small-arms and machine-gun fire, all at locations 3.4-3.9km south-south-west of the SMM’s position. At the same time, 3-5km south-south-west of its position, the SMM heard five explosions assessed as impacts of artillery or mortar rounds, 22 undetermined explosions and approximately 100 single shots and bursts of small arms and machine-gun fire. During the late evening of 12 August, the SMM heard an intense engagement in Stanitsia Luhanska which included: 24 explosions assessed as outgoing 82mm mortar rounds, 79 explosions assessed as automatic-grenade-launcher rounds (AGS-17), 21 explosions assessed as rocket-propelled-grenade rounds (RPG-7), 18 explosions assessed as recoilless-gun (SPG-9) rounds, as well as over 270 bursts of small arms fire; all 3-5km south of its position.

On 12 August, the SMM heard nine undetermined explosions, all assessed as live-fire exercises at “LPR” training areas outside of the security zone in Shymshynivka and Uspenka (27 and 23km south-east of Luhansk, respectively).

In the evening of 12 August, positioned in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard 55-60 explosions assessed as caused by mortar rounds of unknown calibre 10-15km south-west of its position.

The SMM confirmed reports of civilian casualties and conducted crater analysis. In the morning of 12 August, the SMM followed up on the aforementioned ceasefire violations it has recorded around Stanitsia Luhanska bridge during the night. It observed two fresh craters just south of the last Ukrainian Armed Forces position before Stanitsia Luhanska
bridge. The SMM assessed the first crater as caused by an under-barrel grenade launcher (GP-25) fired from a southerly direction. The second crater was assessed as caused by a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-7), also fired from a southerly direction. The SMM observed impacts from small-arms fire on the south-facing surfaces of anti-tank fortifications and cement blocks at the Ukrainian Armed Forces position. Two additional pieces of a fortification had been destroyed by what the SMM assessed as a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-7) round. Halfway between the southernmost Ukrainian Armed Forces position and the northernmost “LPR” position, the SMM observed another fresh crater assessed as caused by an unknown weapon fired from a northerly direction. The SMM noted that the “LPR” position had a Russian Federation flag, a Russian Federation paratroopers and navy flag, as well as Novorossiya and Don Cossack flags. The Ukrainian Armed Forces position was flying a red and black flag.

The SMM, accompanied by a Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), visited a house in Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district at approximately 13:00 on 12 August. The SMM observed shrapnel damage to the fence, door and a wall of the house as well as broken windows. The SMM assessed that the damage had been caused by an 82mm mortar round, fired from an undetermined direction, which had destroyed a shed upon impact in the yard of a neighbouring home. In the house the SMM observed the body of an elderly man lying on the floor, covered in blood. The man had sustained an injury to his chest and to his left hand. The SMM observed as the body was taken to a morgue. The man’s wife (80 years of age) informed the SMM that the shelling had occurred at approximately 01:45 and had lasted for 15 minutes.

On 11 August, at a hospital in government-controlled Kurakhove (40km west of Donetsk), medical personnel told the SMM that two boys (8 and 13 years of age) had been treated for minor shrapnel injuries on 10 August. The deputy head of the Kurakhove police station told the SMM that both children had been injured in Marinka on the evening of 10 August.

In government-controlled Lobacheve (17km north-west of Luhansk), two separate groups of residents and a group of Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers confirmed the reports of a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC that their position had been hit during an exchange of fire the previous night. The SMM observed a fresh crater at the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint, located 15-20m from civilian houses, and assessed it as having been caused by a grenade from an under-barrel grenade launcher, but was unable to determine the direction of fire. The SMM also saw bullet holes on the south-facing surface of a defensive position at the checkpoint. The SMM found more traces from bullets assessed as fired from a southerly direction on the south-facing wall of a shop, 30-40 metres from the checkpoint. Approximately 100 metres south of the checkpoint, the SMM also observed damage on the north-east facing roof and satellite dish of two houses caused by unknown weapons fired from a north-easterly direction.

In government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), the SMM, accompanied by a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC, was shown the location of four fresh craters by a Ukrainian Armed Forces commander. The craters were located in a field approximately 100 metres south of a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint and were the result of shelling which took place during the previous night according to the commander. Three of the craters were assessed as having been caused by 82mm mortar rounds fired from a south-
easterly direction. The SMM was not able to determine the weapon type which had caused the fourth crater but assessed that it had also been fired from a south-easterly direction.

The SMM continued to monitor the **withdrawal of weapons** in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed in “LPR”-controlled areas four multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS; BM-21 *Grad*, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 54km south-west of Luhansk) and one tank near Khriashchuvate (10km south-east of Luhansk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas, the SMM observed 18 tanks (T-64) and six towed howitzers (D-30, 122mm) at a known training area near “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk). On 11 August, aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of six MLRS (BM-21 *Grad*, 122mm) and six self-propelled howitzers (2S3 *Akatsiya*, 152mm) near government-controlled Kramatorsk (83km north of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed two such sites which continued to be abandoned as they had been since 12 March and 15 July 2016, and one site which was noted as abandoned for the first time. In total 74 anti-tank guns (71 MT-12 *Rapira*, 100mm; and three D-48, 85mm) were recorded as missing from the sites. At an additional site, the SMM saw that eight MLRS (BM-27 *Uragan*, 220mm) were present and six were absent.

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. In government-controlled areas the SMM noted that 16 tanks (six T-64 and ten T-72) and six mortars (2B9 *Vasilek*, 82mm) were missing.

The SMM observed the **presence of armoured combat vehicles (ACV) in the security zone**. In “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk) the SMM observed one armoured personnel carrier (APC, BTR-80), five APCs (MTLB) mounted with anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23/2, 23mm), three infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs, BMP) and 12 military-type trucks (Ural). In “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy the SMM observed one IFV (BMP-1). Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of two armoured vehicles in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk).

In government-controlled areas the SMM noted one IFV (BMP-1) near Kriakivka (38km north-west of Luhansk) and two IFVs (BMP-2) near Stanytsia Luhanska.

The SMM observed **the presence of mine hazard signs**. The SMM, travelled along a 400 metre stretch of a road west of “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk). The SMM observed red, triangle-shaped signs at the western entrance of Petrivske and another sign approximately 400 metres down the road with the words “danger mines” in English and “stop mines” in Cyrillic written in white letters. According to a Russian Federation Armed Forces officer from the JCCC and a “DPR” member who accompanied the SMM, the area had recently been cleared of mines.
The SMM monitored a border area not controlled by the Government. The SMM noted a low level of pedestrian and vehicular traffic at two border crossing points near “LPR”-controlled Krasnodarskyi (58km south-east of Luhansk). In just over one hour at the two crossing points the SMM observed a total of 23 pedestrians crossing into Ukraine.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation at three crossing points at the administrative boundary line between the mainland and Crimea. The SMM observed that all three crossing points at Kalanchak, Chaplynka and Chonhar (67km, 72km and 167km south-east of Kherson, respectively) were open. The SMM observed a low level of traffic at all three crossing points. Near the Kalanchak crossing point, the SMM saw one Ukrainian Armed Forces armoured personnel carrier (BTR70).

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate*

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions to its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

- Armed men refused the SMM access to a compound in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk). The SMM informed the JCCC.
- Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers prevented the SMM from proceeding through a checkpoint on a road leading from government-controlled to “LPR”-controlled parts of Zolote (60km west of Luhansk). The SMM informed the JCCC.
- Near Stanytsia Luhanska Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel stopped the SMM from approaching closer to a collapsed road bridge (approximately 1.6km east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge crossing route). An officer among them cited danger from small-arms fire and demining activity in the area as the reason for the denial.
- A short time later, near the railway bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska, Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel stopped the SMM from accessing a vantage point with a view over the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.
Annex 340

OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30 (14 August 2016)
Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 14 August 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions, with a significant increase in the number of explosions recorded in both regions on 14 August compared with the previous day. The SMM confirmed casualties and conducted crater analysis near Popasna, Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, Donetsk city, Yasynuvata, Mykolaivka, Zhovte and Kruta Hora. It continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, and saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines. The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles in the security zone and monitored border areas not controlled by the Government on six occasions*. The Mission continued to monitor the situation at three crossing points at the administrative boundary line between the mainland and Crimea. The SMM faced 11 freedom-of-movement restrictions, most in areas not controlled by the Government.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, with a spike in fighting noted on 14 August compared to 13 August.[1]

Positioned at the Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre) on 13 August, the SMM heard 25 undetermined explosions 3-7km north-north-east of its position before and shortly after noon.

During the day, positioned in two locations in Yasynuvata (“DPR”-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard over 82 undetermined explosions and numerous bursts and shots of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire at a range of 0.1-12km west, west-north-west, north-west, north-north-west, south-west and west-south-west of its positions. Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard within 90 minutes around noon 20 undetermined explosions, two explosions assessed as impacts of recoiless-gun (SPG-9) rounds and numerous bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at a range of 4 to 7km east of its position.

In the evening hours of 13 August, while in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard 158 undetermined explosions at a range of 5 to 15km north and north-west of its position.

On the same evening, positioned in Horlivka (“DPR”-controlled 39km north of Donetsk) the SMM heard uncountable, overlapping explosions assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds, recoiless-gun (SPG-9) rounds, infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-1) cannon rounds and automatic-grenade-launcher rounds as well as bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2km north of its position. While in Horlivka later the same evening, the SMM heard within 20 minutes 12 explosions it assessed as outgoing 120mm mortar
rounds, 44 explosions assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds (33 outgoing and 11 impacts) as well as ten explosions assessed as outgoing automatic-grenade-launcher rounds, bursts of anti-aircraft cannon and heavy-machine gun, all at a range of 4 to 7km north and north-west of its location. While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) that same evening, the SMM heard numerous bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-5km east of its position.

The SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) after midnight, within an hour, recorded 60 undetermined explosions and three tracer shots fired from north-east to west at unknown distance north and north east of its position.

During the day on 14 August, positioned at two locations in Yasynuvata, the SMM heard 184 undetermined explosions and numerous bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire at a range of 2 to 5km west-south-west of its position. Positioned in Aivdivka, the SMM heard 16 undetermined explosions at a range of 4 to 7km south and east of its position.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations on 14 August compared to 13 August. On 13 August within 10 minutes in the morning, positioned in government-controlled Lobacheve (17km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard nine explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds and bursts and shots of small-arms fire 1km north-east of its position. Also in the morning, positioned in government-controlled Zolote-1 (60km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion followed by a short bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, 7-10km east of its position. Less than 10 minutes later, at the same location, the SMM heard another undetermined explosion.

On 14 August, within 30 minutes before noon while in the centre of government-controlled areas of Zolote (60km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 26 undetermined explosions 10km south-west of its position, in the area of government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk). Explosions were assessed as being both incoming and outgoing, though more incoming than outgoing.

Within 20 minutes before noon, positioned at the main junction in “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 23 undetermined explosions 2-3km south-west of its position. In roughly the same time period, positioned at the destroyed petrol station on the main road between Pervomaisk and “LPR”-controlled Irmino (54km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions 2-4km south-west of its position. Within five minutes shortly after noon, positioned at the abandoned coal mine located in the south-western part of Irmino, the SMM saw and heard 15 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds 1.8-2km south of its position. Although hidden in a tree line, the SMM could observe flares from two different muzzles. The artillery rounds were fired in a westerly direction.

The SMM confirmed reports of casualties and conducted crater analysis. At the hospital in government-controlled Popasna, on 13 August medical personnel told the SMM that a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier had died of his wounds sustained on 12 August at a Ukrainian Armed Forces position in Popasna.

On 12 August the SMM analysed impact sites in a residential area (see SMM Daily Report 13 August 2016) in Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district (15km south-west of the city centre),
accompanied by “DPR” members. At one location the SMM saw that the roofs of three houses had been destroyed. The SMM assessed the damages as caused by mortar rounds of at least 82mm in calibre. According to residents, the shelling had occurred after midnight on 11-12 August. At another location, the SMM saw four houses had sustained shrapnel damage and assessed it as caused by a single impact of an artillery shell of at least 122mm in calibre on a structure located among the houses, but saw no craters.

On 13 August, the SMM saw five fresh craters on the road 0.3km east of Mykolaivka (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM assessed three of the craters as caused by 82mm mortar rounds. The SMM assessed the other two craters as caused by 122mm multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS; BM-21 Grad, 122mm) rounds. The SMM could not assess the direction of fire at any of the locations due to the soil characteristics.

On 14 August, in Yasynuvata, near the railway station, the SMM analysed one fresh crater located in a field. The surrounding trees showed impacts of shrapnel and cut off branches. The south-eastern side of a nearby restaurant was damaged (broken windows and shrapnel damage on the exterior walls). The SMM saw that shrapnel had also caused damage to interior walls. The restaurant was located about 70 meters west-north-west of the fresh crater. In the vicinity of the crater several electricity cables had been cut and the SMM saw repairmen working on the cables. The SMM assessed the crater as caused by an artillery round, at least 122mm in calibre fired from a north-westerly direction.

On 13 August, in “LPR”-controlled Zhovte (16km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw 20 fresh craters near and on the asphalt road and assessed them as impacts of 82mm mortar rounds fired from a north-westerly direction. The SMM also saw five unexploded 82mm mortar rounds stuck in the asphalt near an “LPR” position. According to residents of nearby government-controlled Lobacheve (17km north-west of Luhansk), the shelling had occurred during the previous night. At the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska pedestrian bridge, the SMM saw a fresh crater and assessed it as caused by a recoilless-gun (SPG-9) round fired from a northerly direction. In “LPR”-controlled Kruta Hora (16km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw the smouldering ruins of a house and spoke to the owner (man, 81 years old) and his grandson (30 years old). The grandson told the SMM, that the roof had been hit by a shell at 21:15 on 12 August. The grandfather added that he had tried to extinguish the fire with water from buckets. On 14 August, the SMM saw a fresh crater about 50m north of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, close to the northernmost “LPR” position. The SMM assessed the crater as caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from a northerly direction. At the same location, the SMM also saw a remnant of the tail part of a grenade (RPG) lying on the soft ground 1.5m west of the asphalt road.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed on 12 August in government-controlled areas: three towed howitzers (D-30, 122mm) towed by military trucks travelling east near Maksymilianivka (30km west of Donetsk); three covered towed howitzers (D-30, 122mm) towed by three Ural trucks travelling east of the government-checkpoint on the H-
15 road near Marinka; four stationary self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) near Donske (57km south of Donetsk); one stationary surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm) on the T-316 road between government-controlled Zolote 4 (61km west of Luhansk) and “LPR”-controlled Zolote-5 (59km west of Luhansk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas, on both 13 and 14 August, the SMM observed 18 tanks (T-64) at a known training area near “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed on 13 August: 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm). The SMM noted that the following weapons were missing: 47 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), 30 mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm; noted missing for the first time), 43 self-propelled howitzers (39 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm; and four 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm); five surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm), and six towed artillery pieces (three D-48, 85mm and three D-44, 85mm).

In “DPR”-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines the SMM observed on 13 and 14 August: 15 MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm); six towed howitzers (D-30, 122mm); 12 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm); 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and two mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm). The SMM noted that one self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) was missing.

The SMM revisited a Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage site, whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines and noted that all weapons previously verified as withdrawn to that site were present.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles (ACV) in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, the SMM saw: on 12 August – three armoured personnel carriers (APC; one BRDM-2, one MT-LB fitted with a heavy machine gun, and one MT-LB fitted with an anti-aircraft gun, ZU-23) near a Ukrainian Armed Forces position in Zolote-3 (61km west of Luhansk) and an APC (Kraz Cougar) mounted with a heavy machine gun in Zolote (60km west of Luhansk); one stationary anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) with a pile of 23mm shells lying nearby in Lobacheve. On 13 August, the SMM saw one IFV (BMP-2) near the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint north of government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk). The SMM also observed empty cases of ammunition and fresh track marks nearby.

At the eastern edge of government-controlled Hirskie (63km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a stationary train with 11 wagons full of coal.

The SMM monitored border areas not controlled by the Government on six occasions, but faced restrictions on three of those.* On 13 August, at the Ulianivske pedestrian crossing point (“DPR”-controlled, 61km south-east of Donetsk) within two and a half hours, the SMM saw ten persons (three women, one child and six men) exiting Ukraine on foot. All of them told the SMM that they were living in the nearby villages. At the Uspenka border crossing point (“DPR”-controlled, 73km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw 99 civilian cars (20 had Russian Federation licence plates, the remainder had
Ukrainian plates), three buses and ten covered trucks, waiting to leave Ukraine. Travellers told the SMM that the usual waiting time is about one and a half hours. At the Novoazovsky border crossing point ("DPR"-controlled, 53km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw 17 civilian vehicles waiting to leave Ukraine. At the "LPR"-controlled Izvaryne crossing point (52km south-east of Luhansk) within two hours the SMM saw 75 civilian cars (55 had Ukrainian licence plates, 19 had Russian Federation plates and one had an “LPR” plate) and five covered trucks (with Ukrainian licence plates) queuing to exit Ukraine. It also saw 18 empty buses with Ukrainian licence plates exit Ukraine and four buses with Ukrainian plates enter within the same time period. The SMM observed no pedestrians queuing. At the adjacent parking lot, the SMM saw 55-70 vehicles (80 per cent had Ukrainian licence plates).

On 14 August, at the Marynivka border crossing point ("DPR"-controlled, 78km east of Donetsk), the SMM saw at least 55 civilian cars and one bus queuing to exit Ukraine. Two of the vehicles had “DPR” plates, one had Georgian and one had Lithuanian licence plates. Two thirds of the rest of the cars had Ukrainian and one third had Russian Federation licence plates. The bus had Ukrainian licence plates. At the Uspena border crossing point ("DPR"-controlled, 73km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw a line of at least 30 civilian cars and 28 covered trucks waiting to exit Ukraine. Two thirds of the cars had Ukrainian licence plates, one third had Russian Federation licence plates, while all the trucks had Ukrainian license plates.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation at three crossing points at the administrative boundary line between the mainland and Crimea. On both 13 and 14 August, the SMM observed that all three crossing points at Kalanchak, Chaplynka and Chonhar (67km, 72km and 167km south-east of Kherson, respectively) were open and the situation was calm. The SMM did not observe military movements at the three crossing points and in adjacent areas. On 14 August, the SMM monitored the coastal villages of Khorly, Prymorske, Oleksiivka and Oleksandrivka (82km, 89km, 91km and 88km south-east of Kherson respectively) situated across the bay from the Crimean town of Armiansk (102km south-east of Kherson) and found the situation calm and saw no signs of military activity or troop movements.

"Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate"

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions to its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

- On 13 August, at the Ulianivske pedestrian crossing point ("DPR"-controlled, 61km south-east of Donetsk) an armed “DPR” member prevented the SMM from walking along the border line, citing the presence of booby traps in the area.
On 14 August an armed “DPR” member denied the SMM access to what he referred to as “customs” area of the Marynivka border crossing point (“DPR”-controlled, 78km east of Donetsk).

On 14 August, an armed “DPR” member denied the SMM access to what he referred to as the “customs” area of the Uspenka border crossing point (“DPR”-controlled, 73km south-east of Donetsk).

On 14 August, armed “LPR” members told the SMM to leave its position at the southern edge of “LPR”-controlled Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk). The armed “LPR” members specifically requested the SMM to withdraw 400-500m closer to the next residential area. The SMM complied, but shortly after that the same armed men again approached the SMM and demanded it left the area altogether. The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was informed.

On 14 August Ukrainian Border Guards personnel denied the SMM access to its positions at the Chonhar peninsula (162km south-east of Kherson) citing security reasons including the presence of mines.

Conditional access:

On 14 August, an armed “LPR” member at the “LPR” checkpoint at Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north of Luhansk), wrote down the names and ID numbers of SMM monitors before allowing them access to the bridge.

On 14 August, a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier at the southernmost Ukrainian Armed Forces position at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge wrote down the names and ID numbers of SMM monitors before allowing them to proceed further north towards government-controlled areas.

Delay:

-On 13 August Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied the SMM passage through a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint between government-controlled Zolote-4 (61km west of Luhansk) and “LPR”-controlled Zolote-5 (59km west of Luhansk). The SMM contacted the JCCC and after waiting for one hour was allowed to proceed.

Other impediments:

-On 12 August, a military vehicle (SUV) with a clearly displayed sticker on the back of the car with the Right Sector insignia (either “DUK” or 14th battalion) endangered the SMM by driving recklessly, including veering on both sides of the road outside government-controlled Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, 55km north-west of Donetsk), in front of it.

-On 13 August, the SMM was forced to make a detour of 44km (instead of driving 4km) in order to reach the village of Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) from the east along the road E58, due to the lack of security guarantees facilitated by the JCCC and provided by the sides.

-On 13 August, the SMM was unable to pass through Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove “DPR”-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and had to take a detour of 38km (instead of driving 7km) due to the lack of security guarantees facilitated by the JCCC and provided by the sides.
[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.
Annex 341

Statement of Alexander Hug, Deputy Chief Monitor of the OSCE SMM (19 August 2016) (video)
Annex 342

OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information Received as of 19:30 (27 January 2017)
Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 27 January 2017

KYIV 28 January 2017

This report is for the general public and the media.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk region compared with the previous reporting period, but fewer explosions in Luhansk region. The Mission saw a civilian casualty in Kalynove and damage from shelling to homes in Kalynove, Brianka and Zolote. It continued monitoring the three disengagement areas in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske but access remained restricted.* The SMM monitored weapons withdrawal and observed weapons in violation and outside of storage sites. The Mission saw a new crack across a section of asphalt, which extends the full width of the bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska. It visited two border areas currently not under government control. The SMM experienced freedom of movement restrictions on both sides of the contact line, and in non-government-controlled Amvrosiivka and Debaltseve, armed men in an aggressive manner temporarily prevented it from leaving both areas.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations [1] in Donetsk region, including about 520 explosions, compared with 420 in the previous reporting period.

While in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre on the night of 26 January the SMM heard 38 undetermined explosions 3-10km north-north-east, north-west, and north-north-west.

While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) on the night of 26-27 January, the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions, 42 explosions of automatic-grenade-launcher rounds (38 assessed as impacts and five assessed as outgoing), ten outgoing explosions of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-1) cannon (73mm) fire, nine outgoing explosions of recoilless gun (SPG-9, 73mm) fire, eight explosions assessed as impacts of 82mm mortar rounds, ten explosions assessed as impacts of artillery rounds (type and calibre unknown), five bursts of anti-aircraft cannon fire (ZU-23, 23mm), and about 38 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 4-8km east-south-east and south-east.

During the evening of 26 January while in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard four undetermined explosions, 12 explosions assessed as impacts of 120mm mortar rounds, three explosions assessed as recoilless gun (SPG-9, 73mm) fire, two bursts of cannon fire (type unknown), and five bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, 3-6km north-north-east.

While in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) on the night of 26-27 January, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions, two bursts of heavy-machine-gun and about 50 shots of small-arms fire, 3-7km north-west. The following day, the SMM heard 27 undetermined explosions and eight shots of heavy-machine-gun fire 5-7km west and west-north-west.
During the evening of 26 January, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north-east of Donetsk) recorded one undetermined explosion, and in total 25 projectiles in flight from north-east to south-west and three projectiles in flight from north to south, all 3-6km east-south-east and south-east. The following evening, the same camera recorded four undetermined explosions 3-4km east-south-east. Positioned in Avdiivka on 27 January, the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions 5km east.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), over approximately 4.5 hours, the SMM heard 261 undetermined explosions, 29 outgoing explosions of unknown weapon system fire, 43 bursts and 55 shots of heavy-machine-gun and 502 bursts and 50 shots of small-arms fire, as well as nine minutes of intense heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-7km west-south-west, south-west, west, west-north-west and north-west.

The SMM camera at “DPR”-controlled Oktiabr mine (9km north-west of Donetsk) recorded 23 undetermined explosions, three illumination flares, and an exchange of fire including 266 undetermined projectiles in flight (150 east-south-east to west-north-west, 86 west-north-west to east-south-east, 22 from north-west to south-east, seven from south-east to north-west, and three from north to south), all beginning with one undetermined explosion and one undetermined projectile in flight from east-south-east to west-north-west, all 6-11km north-east of the camera’s location.

During the night 26-27 January the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded 22 undetermined explosions and 16 explosions assessed as impacts of unknown weapon systems fire at undetermined distances to the north, north-north-east and north-east of the camera’s location.

Positioned in government-controlled Sopyne (16km east of Mariupol), the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions at unknown distances to the north and north-east.

Positioned approximately 3km north-east of “DPR”-controlled Zaichenko (26km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard nine undetermined explosions, one outgoing explosion of unknown weapons system fire and two bursts of small-arms fire at unknown distances to the north-north-east, south-west and west.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard one explosion assessed as an impact of unknown weapon systems fire at an unknown distance to the east followed by four explosions assessed as impacts to the west.

In “DPR”-controlled Sakhanka (24km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions at unknown distances to the south-south-west.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations but fewer explosions compared with the previous reporting period, including about 85 explosions compared with 143. At a checkpoint south of “LPR”-controlled Smile (31km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard one explosion assessed as outgoing artillery fire (type and calibre unknown) approximately 5km north.

While in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk) on the evening 26 January the SMM heard 12 undetermined explosions 10-15km north-north-east.
On 27 January, positioned in “LPR”-controlled Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard nine undetermined explosions over 12-13km west. Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Brianka (46km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions and 12 bursts of machine-gun fire, over 13-15km south-east. While positioned in “LPR”-controlled Donetskyi (49km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two explosions about 10km south-west.

Positioned in government-controlled Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions and four bursts of small-arms fire approximately 7km south-south-west. Positioned in government-controlled Troytske (69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard four explosions assessed as 120mm mortar rounds approximately 3km south-west.

The SMM followed up on civilian casualties and reports of damage in residential areas due to shelling. At a hospital in Brianka, the SMM spoke with a 57-year-old man who had two toes amputated, which a surgeon at the hospital said was due to injuries the man had sustained during shelling the night before. The injured man told the SMM that his wife had sustained injuries to her back but had already been discharged from the hospital. The man said that the shelling had happened around 23:00 the night before and that he and his wife had been injured in their house because they could not make it to the shelter in the garden. In Brianka, the SMM observed six fresh impacts, all located between 3-15m from the nearest houses, including the house of the injured man. There was damage to four houses near impacts, including the house of the injured man (above) and the roof and top floor of an apartment building, all including shrapnel damage to outer walls and broken windows. The SMM assessed that the craters and damage were caused by 122mm artillery fired from a north-westerly direction.

In Kalynove, the SMM observed two fresh impacts – one on Gagarina Street and another impact 25m away from a house on Furmanova Street. The SMM assessed that both impacts were caused by 120mm mortar rounds fired from a westerly direction. At the house on Furmanova, the SMM also saw that a door on the storage shed was damaged by shrapnel and observed broken windows on the nearby house. The two residents living in the affected houses separately told the SMM that the shelling had occurred around 22:00 on 26 January.

A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) led the SMM to three fresh impact sites in government-controlled Zolote (60km west of Luhansk). The SMM observed damage to a house caused by shrapnel as well as broken windows. The SMM saw that a water pipe had been broken and water was pouring out of it and residents told the SMM that as a result, their access to water was interrupted. The SMM could not assess the type of weapon or direction of fire.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The SMM’s access to all three areas remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.* The SMM observed no de-mining activities or disengagement in the three areas.

On the night of 23-24 January, the SMM camera at Stanytsia Luhanska recorded an exchange of fire including: 13 explosions, all assessed as inside the disengagement area;
32 flashes (28 assessed as outside the disengagement area, five assessed as within); seven projectiles in flight from north to south (six assessed as inside the disengagement area and one as outside); ten projectiles in flight from north-east to south-west (eight assessed as inside the disengagement area and two outside); 38 projectiles fired from south to north (15 assessed as inside the disengagement area, 22 as outside and one unable to determine); and one projectile in flight from south-south-west to north-north-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area.

On the night of 25-26 January, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded 15 undetermined explosions assessed as artillery rounds approximately 8km south-south-east of the camera's location (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On 27 January, the SMM noted a calm situation while present in all three disengagement areas.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, the SMM observed 13 multiple-launch rocket system (BM-21 Grad, 120mm) near “LPR“-controlled Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside assigned sites, approximately 4km north of government-controlled Volnovakha (53km south of Donetsk), the SMM saw two tubes assessed to be either mortar or artillery tubes and a portable weapons system (unable to identify).

In non-government-controlled areas the SMM observed three tanks (T-64) near “LPR“-controlled Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) and two anti-tank guided missile systems (9K111 Fagot, 120mm) near “LPR“-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

Aerial imagery revealed on 22 January 13 tanks near government-controlled Spirne (96km north of Donetsk).

The Mission revisited a Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage site, whose location corresponded with the relevant withdrawal lines and observed that 64 tanks (41 T-72 and 23 T-64) and six mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) were missing, as previously noted.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles [2] in the security zone and military-type trucks and other hardware outside the security zone. The SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC; MTLB) near government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk). In areas not controlled by the Government the SMM observed two IFVs (BMP-1), driving near Yasynuvata.

On 27 January, an SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted 45 military-type trucks, assessed as what appeared to be modern models of Kamaz and/or Ural trucks, parked in a courtyard near “DPR“-controlled Amvrosiivka (56km south-east of Donetsk, 18km from the Ukrainian-Russian Federation border). Six passenger cars and a fuel truck were also present in the area, located approximately 500m from a railway station. When the SMM had finished the UAV flight, “DPR“ members approached the SMM and blocked
its vehicles with their cars, preventing the patrol from leaving the area for over 30 minutes.*

The SMM asked the JCCC for an update on its co-ordination of mine clearance along several roads with a view to removing long-standing restrictions to the freedom of movement of SMM monitors and other civilians. (See SMM Daily Report 19 January.) The JCCC did not report any progress on mine clearance.

The SMM continued to observe entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. At the northern end of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge the SMM observed a 0.5cm crack across the full width of the bridge just north of the the last “LPR” checkpoint, which had appeared in the last 24 hours. The SMM also observed continued deterioration of the wooden section of the broken bridge, noting that the planks and hand rails of the wooden ramps were unstable. The SMM saw and elderly man slip but catch himself before falling and two elderly women slip and fall down the ramp; neither reported injuries.

The SMM visited two border crossing areas currently not under the control of the Government. Over 60 minutes in Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol), the SMM observed five vehicles with Ukrainian licence plates, four vehicles with Russian Federation licence plates, and one vehicle with “DPR” plates queued to exit Ukraine. Six vehicles with Ukrainian licence plates, four vehicles with Russian Federation licence plates, three vehicles with “DPR” plates, one vehicle with Polish licence plates and two pedestrians entered Ukraine. Over 40 minutes in Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk), at the pedestrian border crossing point, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance.

Denial of access:

- A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and that, with the exception of the main road, the SMM's safety could not be guaranteed in the surrounding areas due to the possible presence of mines and/or UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe and informed the JCCC.
- Ukrainian Armed Forces told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the Zolote disengagement area. Due to the danger of mines the SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
- An armed “LPR” member told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the Zolote disengagement area. Due to the danger of mines the SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
- Due to the lack of security guarantees and possible threat from mines, the SMM could not travel west from “DPR”-controlled Petrivske. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- On the road between government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) and Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk), the SMM could not proceed due to the presence of anti-tank obstacles in the road. Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel at the checkpoint also told the SMM that the area is mined. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- The SMM could not cross the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said there were still mines on the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- In “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM could see seven anti-tank mines and armed men said they had no orders to let the SMM pass. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- At a checkpoint west of Pikuzy, the SMM saw seven anti-tank mines on the road and Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said they could not guarantee the safety of the SMM due to the mines on the road. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- In “DPR”-controlled Markyne (94km south of Donetsk), six armed “DPR” members spoke offensively to the SMM and denied it access to an industrial compound stating that the SMM does not have access without permission from their “commander” and that he was not present.
- Near “DPR”-controlled Uzhivka (formerly Leninske, 24km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM was prevented from proceeding further east into the village by two armed “DPR” members who told them that they were acting on orders from their “commander”. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- Near “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk), armed “LPR” members began insulting the SMM with vulgar words and demanded that the SMM leave the area. When the SMM tried to move to their vehicles, the “LPR” members began filming the SMM, even opening the door to the vehicle to film inside. The armed “LPR” members aggressively and repeatedly demanded to know the nationality of the SMM patrol members, which the SMM provided. After 18 minutes, the SMM left the area. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Delay:

- Near “DPR”-controlled Amvrosiivka (56km south-east of Donetsk), armed “DPR” members prevented the SMM from leaving the area after the SMM finished a mini-UAV flight in the area by blocking the SMM’s exit with their vehicles. After 31 minutes, they allowed the SMM to leave. The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.
[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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Annex 343

OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information Received as of 19:30 (31 January 2017)
Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 31 January 2017

KYIV 1 February 2017

This report is for the general public and the media.

The SMM noted a significant increase in ceasefire violations recorded in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions and recorded the widespread use of multiple-launch-rocket systems in Avdiivka, Yasinuvata and Horlivka. The number of explosions in Donetsk region was the highest yet recorded by the SMM. While the majority of violations were in the wider area of Avdiivka-Yasinuvata, the SMM recorded hundreds of explosions in different areas of the contact line. The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines and on the move on both sides of the contact line. The Mission monitored the humanitarian situation in Avdiivka, and followed up on reports of civilian casualties and saw damage caused by shelling in Troitske and Novooleksandrivka. The SMM continued monitoring the three disengagement areas in Stanitsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske but its access remained restricted.* The SMM was denied access to Yasinuvata. The SMM visited border areas currently not under control of the Government. In Kyiv the SMM monitored a protest against the reported arrest in Crimea of a Crimean Tatar lawyer.

The SMM noted a significant increase in ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region, including over 10,330 explosions, compared with around 2,500 in the previous reporting period.[1] The number of explosions was the highest yet recorded by the SMM. Over 9,250 of them were recorded in the area of Avdiivka and Yasinuvata.

While in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre on the night of 30-31 January the SMM heard 410 undetermined explosions 5-10km north-west and 34 undetermined explosions 5-10km south-west.

On the night of 30 January and well into the afternoon of 31 January the SMM camera at Okтябрь mine (9km north-west of Donetsk city centre) recorded almost 200 undetermined explosions 6-10km north-east, 104 undetermined explosions 4-6km north-east, 181 explosions 4-5km north-east and 45 undetermined explosions 6-8km north-east.

While in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) on the night of 30 January the SMM heard over 286 undetermined explosions 5-8km west-north-west and a five-minute period of uncountable overlapping undetermined explosions.

While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) on the night of 30 January, the SMM heard 106 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery fire and 28 explosions assessed as impacts of artillery rounds 3-5km east. On 31 January, the SMM heard 26 undetermined explosions 3-5km north-east, 66 undetermined explosions 6km north-east, five undetermined explosions 2-4km north-east, four undetermined explosions 3-4km north-east and one explosion assessed as outgoing infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; 30mm) cannon fire and bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 3-4km north-east.
On the night of 30 January, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded 23 tracer rounds, nine of which were in flight from west to east, 13 from east to west and one from south-west to north-east, and one undetermined explosion, all to the north-east.

While in government-controlled Mariupol (102km south of Donetsk) on the night of 30 January the SMM heard 44 undetermined explosions to the east. On 31 January the SMM heard 22 undetermined explosions east.

On the night of 30-31 January, while in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM saw 62 airbursts 8-20km south-west and heard over 100 undetermined explosions and heavy-machine-gun fire 4-10 km south-west, north-west and 10-15 km south-south-east. On the morning of 31 January, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 8-9km south and south-west. In the afternoon the SMM heard 190 undetermined explosions and approximately 1,800 outgoing explosions assessed as multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) (type unknown) fire and 50 undetermined explosions 20km south-west and south-south-east. Later the SMM heard 135 undetermined explosions and 2,640 explosions assessed as outgoing MLRS fire 20km south-west. In the early evening the SMM heard 120 explosions assessed as impacts of MLRS rounds 6km north-west.

On 31 January, positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) the SMM heard almost 2,250 undetermined explosions 1-5km east and east-south-east and almost 200 explosions assessed as impacts of MLRS rounds 3.4-4km east-south-east. On 31 January, the SMM camera in Avdiivka recorded 53 undetermined explosions all 2-4km south-east.

On 31 January, positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 65-80 explosions assessed as outgoing MLRS fire in four distinct salvos 8-10km south and some of their impacts 8-12km west-south-west, and 621 undetermined explosions, 119 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds, 40 explosions assessed as impacts, five explosions assessed as impacts of automatic grenade launcher, all at distances 3-12km north, north-east, south-east, south, south-west, west and north-west.

Positioned in government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk) the SMM heard between 500 and 600 undetermined explosions and uncountable bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 3-15km east-north-east.

Positioned south-east of government-controlled Lomakyne (15km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM heard 30 explosions assessed as artillery fire 2km north-east. Positioned 1km north of government-controlled Pyshchevyk (25km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 14 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds and 14 subsequent impact explosions and bursts of small-arms fire 2-5km east.

Positioned to the east of Mariupol and 5km west of government-controlled Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM heard 25 undetermined explosions 5-10km east. Positioned in Lebedynske the SMM heard ten explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds 3-4km east-north-east and as many explosions assessed as their impacts 3km north; bursts of small-arms fire 3-4km north-north-east; four outgoing explosions of automatic-grenade-launcher-fire; five explosions assessed as outgoing mortar (120mm) rounds 2-3km north and five explosions assessed as 120mm mortar round impacts 5-6km north-east. Positioned 2km south-east of Lebedynske the SMM heard five explosions.
assessed as outgoing mortar (120mm) rounds 4-5km north-east, and five explosions assessed as their impacts 6-7km north.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations including over 730 explosions, compared with 48 explosions in the previous reporting period.

Positioned in government-controlled Staryi Aiadar (20km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM heard 318 undetermined explosions, assessed as mortar (82mm and 120mm) and automatic grenade launcher (AGS-17) fire 3-5km north-west. Positioned in government-controlled Lopaskyne (23km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard more than 100 undetermined explosions, 15-20km west-south-west. Positioned in government-controlled Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM heard 100 undetermined explosions 10-15km south and south-west. Positioned in government-controlled Novaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM heard 23 undetermined explosions: five assessed as artillery (122mm) fire 2-3km south-east, 11 assessed as artillery (152mm) fire 5-7km and seven undetermined 5-7km north-west. Positioned in government-controlled Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard 18 undetermined explosions 5-7km east.

Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Zhovte (17km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM heard 60 undetermined explosions 15-30km west-south-west. Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Pionerske (19km east of Luhansk) the SMM heard 57 undetermined explosions, 20km west-south-west of its position. Positioned near “LPR”-controlled Karpaty (35km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions 10-15km east and south-east (assessed as live-fire training). Positioned on the “LPR”-controlled side of the bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) the SMM heard five undetermined explosions 20-30km west.

On 29 January the SMM camera in Zolote recorded two explosions assessed as artillery fire 10-20km south, three explosions assessed as artillery fire 10-20km south-south-west. On 30 January, the camera recorded four explosions assessed as artillery fire 5-15km south-south-west, three undetermined explosions assessed as artillery fire 10-20km south-south-east and two undetermined explosions assessed as artillery fire 5-15km south-south-east.

The SMM continued to follow up on reports of civilian casualties. Medical staff at hospital no. 1 in “DPR”-controlled Makiivka (12km north-east of Donetsk) gave an update on the condition of a 29-year-old man who was admitted on 30 January with multiple shrapnel injuries to the anterior thorax. (SMM Daily Report, 31 January.) They said he had been moved to specialist unit in the Kalinina hospital in Donetsk for surgery. Medical staff also said that a 50-year-old man had been transferred from hospital no. 5 with bruises on his head, caused when he was knocked over by the blast wave of an explosion. According to medical staff, the man had been released.

Medical staff at hospital no. 24 in Donetsk city told the SMM that a 48-year-old man had been admitted on 30 January and had been released following treatment for shrapnel wounds to his hand. Medical staff said he had told them he had been injured in Staromykhailivka.

The SMM monitored the humanitarian situation in Avdiivka following reports that utilities had been cut by shelling. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) told the SMM at the Avdiivka Coke Factory that it had
lost power when shells had cut the remaining power lines. The SMM confirmed that the factory was not operational and had no water supply. According to the officer, this resulted in heating being cut to civilians in Avdiivka. He said they had been unable to locate the area where the power line was cut and that repair workers would in any case not be able to reach the area, due to the security situation. Workers at the Donetsk water filtration station told the SMM that the station was without power as a result of the shelling.

In Avdiivka the SMM saw five heating tents (provided by humanitarian organizations) set up for civilians by the State Emergency Service. Food, tea and medicine were being provided. Some civilians in the tent said that they were short of bread. The SMM heard generators and saw civilians charging mobile phones. An employee of the State Emergency Service told the SMM that there were six mobile kitchens and generators available in the city.

Civil-military administration staff in Avdiivka told the SMM that town’s main problem was lack of electricity. According to a member of the administration, much of the population has moved to the old town, where there are homes with private heating. According to him, the administration had been distributing medicine and food, and various government departments and NGOs were supplying information directly to civilians, in the absence of working telecommunications coverage. He said schoolchildren were staying at home due to lack of heating in schools and that the town’s hospital was operating on a generator and had water. The interlocutor said the administration had been gathering vulnerable people, including hospital patients, to be evacuated from the area on a voluntary basis. Many have already been moved, he said. He also said the administration has the capacity to evacuate 16,000 people to adjacent areas. According to him about three days before, the remaining population had been 22-25,000 people.

The SMM observed **shelling damage in residential areas.** In government-controlled Troitske (69km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM observed impact sites and damage to houses. Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC who accompanied the SMM and residents said the shelling had taken place on 29 January. The SMM saw three fresh impact sites, all within 50-200m of houses. One crater was about 50m from a house, which had damage to the south-facing wall and roof. The owner said she had been home during the shelling together with her two sons, and that no one had been injured. In Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk) the SMM saw a fresh crater assessed as caused by a mortar (120mm) round about 200m from a house, but could not assess the direction of fire. A resident told the SMM the crater was caused on the night of 30 January.

The SMM continued to **monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas** of Stanysia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrovsk (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The SMM’s access to all three areas remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

Positioned 2km east of government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions, bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun (or 30mm cannon) fire to the east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On the early morning of 30 January the SMM camera in Stanysia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) recorded one flash assessed as small-arms fire, assessed as inside the
disengagement area at a location consistent with a Ukrainian Armed Forces position at the north end of the railway.

On 31 January the “LPR”-controlled side of the bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska the SMM observed “LPR” members checking the area for mines. The SMM followed on foot 100m behind the “LPR” members from the Prince Ihor monument north towards the summer cottage area. The SMM travelled by vehicle on the unpaved road leading west from the Prince Ihor monument, leading to a summer cottage area north-west of the monument. The SMM was able to drive on some of the paths in this area. On paths next to the cottages west of the Prince Ihor Monument the SMM observed around 70 mine signs warning of suspected mines/UXO. The SMM travelled on all side roads/paths leading towards the “LPR”-controlled side of Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and noted that the immediate surroundings of the “LPR” checkpoint were cleared or marked and were drivable or passable for the SMM.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, in government-controlled areas the SMM observed: three MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in a convoy of seven military trucks travelling east, north-west of Memryk (33km north-west of Donetsk); two self-propelled howitzers (2S3, Akatsiya 152mm) heading south near government-controlled Novoookhtyrka (55km north-west of Luhansk); four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) heading east near Novoookhtyrka; one stationary anti-tank gun (MT-12) west of Novoaidar; two tanks (T-64) moving towards Avdiivka from the north of the town and one tank (T-64) travelling away from the contact line in Avdiivka; two tanks (T-64) moving from Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk) in the direction of Avdiivka and two tanks (T-72) travelling east towards Karlivka (25km north-west of Donetsk). Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed an MLRS near Spirne (96km north of Donetsk) and one possible MLRS (BM-21) near government-controlled Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk).

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, the SMM observed a truck carrying a covered artillery piece travelling east towards “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata. Aerial imagery revealed a number of weapons in violation of the respective lines: 42 MLRS at a known training area near “LPR”-controlled Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansky) on 29 January and 20 towed howitzers at a known training area near “LPR”-controlled Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansky) on 28 January.

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas the SMM saw four tanks (T-64) manoeuvring in tactical formation at a known training area near “LPR”-controlled Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansky). Also beyond withdrawal lines, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed at least 38 tanks near “DPR”-controlled Manuilivka (65km east of Donetsk), five tanks at a known training area near Buhaivka on 28 January, and 15 towed howitzers at a known training area near Miusynsk on 30 January. The imagery also revealed the presence of 66 armoured vehicles and 122 military trucks at the training site near Miusynsk.

In government-controlled areas the SMM observed a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa, 120mm) near Novoookhtyrka. Aerial imagery available revealed about 12 tanks near government-controlled Spirne.
The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed three MLRS (BM-21), one of which was loaded; two self-propelled mortars (2S9, 120mm), two towed howitzers (D-30, 122mm), four self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and saw that 18 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were missing, four for the first time.

The SMM observed **armoured combat vehicles, anti-aircraft weapons[2]** and **military aircraft in the security zone.** In government-controlled areas the SMM saw: one infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1) next to a house in Stanytsia Luhanska; one armoured personnel carrier (BTR) in Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk). Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed three armoured vehicles near Syzey (23km north-east of Luhansk), five armoured-vehicles near Pavlopil (26km north-east of Mariupol), three probable armoured vehicles near government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), one armoured vehicle west of government-controlled Katerinivka (64km west of Luhansk) and four armoured vehicles south of government-controlled Troitske (69km west of Donetsk). Near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk) the SMM saw two airborne military helicopters.

In areas not under government control, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed three armoured vehicles near “DPR”-controlled Styla (34km south of Donetsk), five armoured vehicles parked next to a road near “DPR”-controlled Olenevka (23km south-west of Donetsk), one armoured vehicle east of “DPR”-controlled Vuhlehirsk (49km north-east of Donetsk), one armoured vehicle north-east of Novooleksandrivka and one covered armoured combat vehicle (MTLB) close to an “LPR”-controlled checkpoint nearby.

The SMM visited **border areas currently not under control of the Government.** At the pedestrian border crossing point near Krasnodarskyi-1 (58km south-east of Luhansk) the SMM saw, over the course of 45 minutes, 11 people (seven men and four women, aged between 40 and 60 years old) enter Ukraine. At the pedestrian border crossing point near Krasnodarskyi-2 (59km south-east of Luhansk) for 35 minutes the SMM saw two women (aged about 70 years-old) enter Ukraine, before crossing back carrying shopping.

**In Kyiv the SMM monitored a protest in support of Emil Kurbединov, a Crimean Tatar lawyer,** who organizers (Krym SOS) said had been arrested in Crimea on 26 January having been accused of extremism. A Ukrainian Member of Parliament and a leader of the Crimean Mejlis, addressing a crowd of about 75 people, spoke against what they said was persecution of defence lawyers in Crimea. Representatives of two international organizations also addressed the crowd.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate*

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for
this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance.

Denial of access:

- The SMM could not travel on the road between government-controlled Bohdanivka (41 km south-west of Donetsk) and Viktorivka (42 km south-west of Donetsk) as Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC said they could not assist in ensuring security for the SMM as they did not control the road. Mines were visible on the road. The Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC said they did not know when mines would be removed.
- The SMM could not travel west from Petrivske (41 km south of Donetsk) due to a lack of security guarantees.
- A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and that, with the exception of the main road, the SMM’s safety could not be guaranteed in the surrounding areas due to the possible presence of mines and/or UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
- Armed “LPR” members on the south side of the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area (58 km west of Luhansk) told the SMM that they could not guarantee the SMM’s safety in adjacent fields and side roads due to the possible presence of mines and/or UXO. The SMM also observed mine signs in the area. The SMM was unable to proceed and informed the JCCC.
- Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied the SMM from travelling between government-controlled Popasna (69 km west of Luhansk) and government-controlled Katerynivka (64 km west of Luhansk). The SMM informed the JCCC.
- The SMM could not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20 km north of Luhansk) as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said no demining had taken place. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- Armed “DPR” members stopped the SMM on the eastern side of Yasnyuvata and denied access to the city.
- Ukrainian Armed Forces denied the SMM access to a military compound near Shevchenko (59 km south of Donetsk).
- Ukrainian Armed Forces denied the SMM access to a weapons holding area.

Conditional access:

- An armed “DPR” member escorted the SMM while it retrieved video data from the SMM camera in Petrivske. The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.
[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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Annex 344

OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information Received as of 19:30 (1 February 2017)
This report is for the general public and the media.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared to the previous reporting period, but the overall situation remained highly tense. It observed the use of multiple-launch-rocket systems in Horlivka and Kruta Balka. While the majority of violations were again recorded in the wider area of Avdiivka-Yasynuvata, the SMM recorded hundreds of explosions in different areas of the contact line. The SMM and the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) facilitated a local ceasefire allowing repairs to power lines supplying the Donetsk water filtration station and to restore electricity to the town of Avdiivka. The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines and on the move on both sides of the contact line. The SMM monitored the humanitarian situation in Avdiivka and Yasynuvata, it followed up on reports of civilian casualties and saw damage caused by shelling on both sides of the contact line. The Mission continued monitoring the three disengagement areas in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske but its access remained restricted.* The Mission monitored the continuing blockade of a railway track near Hirske. In Kyiv the SMM monitored a funeral ceremony for seven Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers reportedly killed in Avdiivka.

The SMM noted a decrease in ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region, still including, however, about 5,600 explosions.[1] Many ceasefire violations were again observed in the areas of Avdiivka and Yasynuvata.

During the night of 31 January-1 February, while in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard 994 undetermined explosions 8-12km north-north-west and 49 undetermined explosions 6-8km north-north-east.

On the night of 31 January-1 February, the SMM camera at the “DPR”-controlled Oktiabr mine (9km north-west of Donetsk) recorded 795 undetermined explosions, 21 explosions assessed as impacts, 21 illumination flares and an exchange of fire including 279 undetermined projectiles in flight (160 south-east to north-west and 119 north-west to south-east), all 4-10km north-east of the camera’s location.

Positioned at the Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM heard 99 undetermined explosions west-south-west, west, and north-west, and 27 undetermined explosions north and north-east.

On the evening of 31 January, the SMM camera in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded three undetermined explosions, one explosion assessed as an impact, six
illumination flares and five undetermined projectiles (three from south-east to north-west and two from north-west to south-east), all 4-6km south-east from the camera’s location. The following afternoon, the same camera recorded 17 undetermined explosions 3-5km south-east of the camera’s location.

Positioned in Avdiivka on 1 February, the SMM heard 97 undetermined explosions 3-5km south-south-east and 63 undetermined explosions 5-7km south-west.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 1,060 undetermined explosions 2-5km north-west and north-north-west, 202 undetermined explosions 0.5-5km west, and 879 undetermined explosions 2-6km south-south-west, south-west, and west-south-west. The majority of explosions were heard between 07:30-10:15 with the amount reducing towards the afternoon.

Positioned at the Donetsk Water Filtration Station, about 4km west of Yasynuvata, the SMM heard 94 undetermined explosions 2-3km west and south-west and 28 explosions 2-3km south-south-east. Over about 30 minutes, positioned 5.4km south-east of Yasynuvata, the SMM heard 88 undetermined explosions 2-3km west. Positioned 2.6km east of Yasynuvata, the Mission heard 31 undetermined explosions 1-5km west.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Kruta Balka (16km north of Donetsk) on 1 February, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 2-3km north-west, 74 undetermined explosions and two undetermined explosions assessed as rocket-propelled-grenade fire 2-6km south-west, two explosions assessed as impacts of multiple-launch-rocket-system (MLRS; BM-21 Grad, 122mm) salvos 8-9km north-north-west, three explosions assessed as tank rounds 1-6km west and south-west, nine explosions assessed as recoilless gun (SPG-9, 73mm) rounds 2-3km west, and 12 explosions assessed as mortar rounds (seven 82mm and five 120mm, two outgoing, two impacts, and eight undetermined) 1-5km south-west, west and north-west.

On 31 January while in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 41 undetermined explosions 10km north-west, 168 undetermined explosions and 117 explosions assessed as mortar rounds (95 impacts and 22 outgoing) 4-15km south-west and south-south-west, 20 explosions assessed as outgoing MLRS rockets 3-5km north-west and 20 explosions assessed as outgoing MLRS (BM-21 Grad) fire 3-5km south-west, and four explosions assessed as outgoing recoilless gun rounds (SPG-9, 73mm) 4-5km south-south-west. On 1 February, the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions, five explosions assessed as recoilless gun (SPG-9) (73mm) rounds, six outgoing rocket-propelled-grenade rounds, and one explosion assessed as an impact of an 82mm mortar round, all 2-4km north-west and south-west.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations than in the previous reporting period, including 280 explosions.

During the night of 31 January-1 February, while in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 100 explosions assessed as mortar and artillery rounds 5-10km north, north-west and 50 explosions assessed as artillery rounds 5-10km north-west of its position.

Positioned in government-controlled Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk) on 1 February, the SMM heard 15 explosions assessed as mortar rounds (120mm) 10-15km west.
The SMM continued to follow up on reports of civilian casualties. At a hospital in government-controlled Kurakhove (40km west of Donetsk), a doctor told the SMM that a 55-year-old woman had been admitted at 16:30 on 31 January with shrapnel injuries. The woman told the SMM that she was leaving her house when she suddenly felt pain in her head and had fallen down.

The SMM followed up on a report of a civilian casualty who had allegedly had fingers on both hands amputated as a result of injuries from mishandling explosives. Medical staff at a hospital in “DPR”-controlled Yenakiieve (47km north-east of Donetsk) told the SMM that there was no record of the individual at the hospital.

At the morgue in “DPR”-controlled Makiivka, staff told the SMM that a 77-year-old woman had died from shrapnel wounds to her head and from internal injuries. Staff said she was killed when her apartment was shelled in Makiivka.

The SMM observed shelling damage in residential areas. In government-controlled Trokhizbenka, Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC led the SMM to a school, where the Mission observed fresh damage inside and outside the building, including fresh holes on west-facing and south-facing walls inside and outside on the ground floor, one destroyed west-facing window (covered with a wooden plank) and five broken south-facing windows on the same floor. The SMM assessed that the damage was caused by a 120mm mortar round fired from a westerly or south-westerly direction. Elsewhere in Trokhizbenka three residents showed the SMM three impacts in three yards, all of which were 5-10m away from the nearest house. They told the SMM that shelling had taken place on 31 January at about 20:00. The SMM assessed the impacts to have been caused by 82mm mortars.

In “LPR”-controlled Sokilnyky (38km north-west of Luhansk) at a checkpoint the SMM observed four fresh impacts and a 120mm mortar tail-fin protruding from the ground on the side of the road. The SMM assessed the impacts as being caused by 120mm mortar rounds fired from a north-north-westerly direction.

In “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol), a Russian Federation Armed Forces officer of the JCCC led the SMM to a house with collapsed roof and walls. The SMM assessed that the damage was caused by a 120mm mortar shell fired from a westerly direction. In “DPR”-controlled Azov (formerly Dzerzhynske, 25km east-north-east of Mariupol), a Russian Federation Armed Forces officer of the JCCC led the SMM to a fresh impact site, located about 30m from the nearest house. The SMM observed holes and two broken windows on the western wall of the house. The resident of the house told the SMM that shelling had taken place on the evening of 31 January. The SMM assessed that the damage was caused by a 120mm mortar shell fired from a westerly direction. In “DPR”-controlled Uzhivka (formerly Leninske, 24km east-north-east of Mariupol), Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC led the SMM to two houses on the same street, which had all the windows broken and holes on the outer walls, facing west. The residents of one of the houses told the SMM that shelling had taken place on the evening of 31 January. The SMM observed an impact 30m away, near a house that appeared to be occupied by “DPR” members, with three military-type trucks parked outside. The SMM assessed the damage to the houses and the impact to have been caused by a 152mm artillery round fired from a westerly direction. The SMM observed an impact site 100m west of the Yasynuvata observation point. The SMM assessed the impact as caused by MLRS (BM-21) fire from a north-
westerly direction. According to an armed “DPR” member the impact happened on evening of 31 January.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The SMM’s access to all three areas remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the night of 30-31 January, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded two shots assessed as small-arms fire (assessed as outside the disengagement area) 330m south-west of the camera, followed by an explosion assessed as the impact of a mortar round 800m south-east of the camera, and one shot of small-arms fire (assessed as inside the disengagement area) 750m south-east of the camera. This was followed by four shots of small-arms fire (all assessed as outside the disengagement area) 130-330m south-west and south-south-west of the camera, and a tracer round in flight from north to south (assessed as outside the disengagement area) 180m south of the camera.

While in Zolote the SMM heard seven shots of small-arms-fire and five undetermined explosions 3-5km south-east of its position (assessed as outside of the disengagement area).

While in Stanytsia Luhanska the SMM heard two undetermined explosions assessed as artillery rounds 15-20km west of its position (assessed as outside of the disengagement area).

The SMM observed that the situation in the Petrivske area was calm.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, in government-controlled areas the SMM observed: two MLRS (BM-21) moving east on the M04 road in Netailove (22km north-west of Donetsk), two MLRS (BM-21) accompanied by a truck with a covered cargo-bay travelling north on the H-20 road 3km south-east of Volnovakha (53km south of Donetsk), four tanks (T-64) parked behind a building in Avdiivka. In non-government-controlled areas the SMM observed: two military-type trucks, each towing an artillery piece of an unknown type, with the barrel covered, heading south towards Makiivka, and a military truck towing an artillery piece moving south near Yasynuvata. Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 31 January of six towed artillery pieces with their support truck and two tanks near Yasynuvata, and three towed artillery pieces near “DPR”-controlled Yakovlivka (10km north of Donetsk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas the SMM saw 31 stationary tanks near government-controlled Zaliznianske (79km north of Donetsk), eight tanks in a field 10km north of Bakhmut, a military truck towing a self-propelled howitzer (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) heading south 7km north-west of government-controlled Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk), one towed howitzer (2A65/Msta-B, 152mm) on road M03 near Pryvillia (government-controlled, 81km north of Donetsk) moving toward Bakhmut, a military-type truck towing an artillery piece, exiting from the Makiivka train/bus station access road heading east, and three military-type trucks with flatbed
trailers transporting three tanks (two T-64, one T-72) in the southern edge of Khartsyzk (“DPR“-controlled, 26km east of Donetsk) moving west.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines not controlled by the Government, the SMM observed six MLRS (BM-21), 15 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), two towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), two mortars (PM-38, 120mm) and four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm). In areas controlled by the government the SMM saw nine self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) and observed that six towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm) continued to be missing, as previously noted.

The SMM revisited a Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage site, whose location corresponded with the relevant withdrawal lines and noted that the site continued to be abandoned, with 18 tanks (seven T-72 and 11 T-64) and two mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) missing.

Despite the joint statement of 1 February by members of the Trilateral Contact Group the SMM received no information in relation to withdrawal of weapons from the area between Donetsk Airport, Avdiivka and Yasinuvata.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] and combat aircraft in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM saw two helicopters (Mi-8) with Ukrainian Armed Forces insignia near Toretsk (formerly Dzerzhynsk, 43km north-west of Donetsk) flying north-west. In non-government-controlled areas the SMM saw one multi-purpose armoured tracked vehicle MTLB near Kadiivka and one minelayer “PMZ-4“ in “LPR-controlled Irmino (54km west of Luhansk) towed by a military truck (Ural) with two containers (one open) full of TM-62M anti-tank mines, travelling north-west in the direction of “LPR“-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk).

South of government-controlled Shchastia bridge (20km north of Luhansk) the SMM observed an “LPR“ demining team working 300m south of the northernmost “LPR“ position. The SMM was unable to observe the extent of any clearance.

On 31 January, near “LPR“-controlled Komisarivka (18km south-east of Luhansk) the SMM observed 47 military-type covered trucks heading south on the M04 road escorted by “LPR“ members. In the morning of 31 January, the SMM saw a convoy of 11 military-type trucks (one Ural, ten Kamaz) heading north-east near “LPR“-controlled Bile (22km south-west of Luhansk). Later, the SMM observed the same convoy heading south-east near “LPR“-controlled Vesela Tarasivka (17km west of Luhansk). In the afternoon of 31 January the SMM observed a convoy of 16 military-type covered transport trucks heading south in Luhansk city.

The SMM monitored the situation of civilians living near the contact line. In order to restore electricity to the Donetsk water filtration station, as well as heating and electricity to the town of Avdiivka, the SMM worked together with Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces Representatives of the JCCC to facilitate the reestablishment of the ceasefire in the area around the Donetsk water filtration station. At the station, both sides of the JCCC confirmed that an agreement on a local ceasefire had been made and informed the SMM that repair crews had been given the green light to advance toward affected sections of the power lines. The SMM also communicated with a senior “DPR“ member via videoconference, encouraging the armed formations in areas not controlled...
by the Government to support the joint efforts of the SMM and the JCCC. Towards the end of the afternoon the SMM heard the intensity of explosions increase again and the JCCC representatives told the Mission that repair work had been discontinued.

While in Avdiivka the SMM observed a 12kw mobile generator supplying power to the city administration building and lorries carrying humanitarian aid and boxes being distributed at the emergency services tent facility where hundreds of civilians were seen queuing for hot meals and using the warming tents. When the SMM left the city in the late afternoon, it noted that most of the city and the surrounding area were unlit.

The SMM observed that the **blockade of a railway track** in government-controlled Hirske (63km west of Luhansk) remained unchanged (see SMM Daily Report 27 January 2017.) The railroad tracks were still blocked with wooden barriers and a train was still standing on the tracks.

In **Kyiv**, the SMM observed **a funeral ceremony for seven members of the 72nd Separate Mechanised Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces** at Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) who were reportedly killed in Avdiivka on 29 January. The SMM saw around 1,500 people (30-50 years old, 70 per cent male) gathered near the monument, including nearly 200 men in military uniform, and a limited police presence. The SMM saw seven coffins carried toward the monument, where bystanders laid flowers, and heard speakers address the crowd as well as the performance of a religious ceremony.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate*

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance.

Denial of access:

- A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and that, with the exception of the main road, the SMM’s safety could not be guaranteed in the surrounding areas due to the possible presence of mines and/or UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
An armed “LPR” member told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the Zolote disengagement area. Due to the danger of mines the SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.

Due to the lack of security guarantees and possible threat from mines, the SMM could not travel west from “DPR”-controlled Petrovskoe. The SMM informed the JCCC.

At a checkpoint the road between government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) and Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk) Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel told the SMM that the area is mined. The SMM informed the JCCC.

The SMM could not cross the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said there were still mines on the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.

In “LPR”-controlled Khryashevskoe (22km east of Luhansk), the SMM saw anti-tank barricade across the road with signs “mines” on it. The JCCC was informed.

Conditional access:

- In “DPR”-controlled Dmytrivka (85km east of Donetsk), at a weapons storage site an unarmed guard allowed only two SMM monitors to enter the site.

Delay:

- An armed “DPR” member stopped the SMM at a checkpoint 2.6km east of Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) and denied onward passage, saying no one was allowed into the city due to ongoing shelling. After 45 minutes the SMM was able to enter Yasynuvata. The SMM heard explosions 1-7km, south and west.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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Spot Report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine: Casualties, damage to civilian infrastructure registered in Donetsk region following fighting

KYIV 3 February 2017

On 3 February the SMM followed up on reports of casualties following fighting in Donetsk region. Medical staff at a hospital in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) informed the SMM about two civilian fatalities and two other persons who had suffered shrapnel injuries. According to them, a 25-year-old man had died as a result of an explosion from shelling at a school in Avdiivka and a 47-year-old female employee of the Avdiivka coke factory had died in the operating room due to injuries received after an explosion from shelling. They said that a 48-year-old commander of the State Emergency Services and a British journalist had been injured; adding that the commander was in critical condition, while the journalist had been transferred to a hospital in Dnipro for further care. A member of the regional administration in Dnipro told the SMM that a foreign journalist wounded in Avdiivka on 2 February had been brought to hospital in Dnipro and had undergone surgery.

The SMM observed shelling damage to three residential buildings at the intersection of Vorobiova and Molodizhna Streets in Avdiivka. The SMM saw a large hole in the third floor wall of one of the buildings and an impact near the road. The SMM assessed the latter as caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from a south-easterly direction. Several windows were blown out and the exterior walls of the buildings were damaged. According to residents, the damage had occurred at around 20:30 on 2 February.

In Kalininskyi district of Donetsk city, the SMM observed a fresh impact next to a roundabout assessed as caused by a single multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS; likely Smerch or Uragan) rocket fired from a direction ranging from west to north. Its blast wave had shattered windows and damaged doors and gates in a radius of 170m. A shop about 10m south-east of the roundabout and very close to the impact site had been destroyed. About 70m from the impact site a car had also been destroyed and a metal gate of a house had been ripped open by overpressure, indicating an explosion.

An SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a five-storey dormitory building, about 30m south of the impact, whose roof had been completely ripped off and all windows shattered. About 170m north-west of the impact, the gates of a car wash had been blown in, while a gas station behind the car wash had sustained slight damages. The UAV spotted a “DPR” compound some 260m south-east of the impact site with two multi-purpose armoured tracked vehicles (MTLB) inside. The head of the dormitory where internally displaced persons reside said that two of them had been injured. At a morgue, staff said that the body of a dead man had been brought in together with partial remains of another person.

On Artema Street in Donetsk city the SMM observed two fresh impacts: one in the entry steps of a residential apartment building and another on the road 15-20m north of the building. The SMM assessed the impacts as caused by MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) rockets.
fired from a westerly direction. Half of the windows on the south-west-facing side of the building were destroyed. On Sobinova Street the SMM observed a fresh impact in the garden of a house assessed as caused by a single MLRS (BM-21) rocket. Two east-facing windows of the neighbouring house were shattered. At a school on the same street the SMM saw one fresh impact 10m from the school building assessed as caused by a single MLRS (BM-21) rocket. The north-facing windows and façade were shattered. The SMM could not determine the direction of fire.

On Kievskyi Avenue the SMM observed two impacts, one on the first and another on the fourth floor of two residential buildings, as well as shrapnel damage to nearby buildings. The SMM saw holes in the exterior west-facing walls of several apartments and broken windows. The SMM assessed one impact as caused by an MLRS (BM-21) rocket and the other by an artillery round at least 122mm, both fired from a north-westerly direction. According to local residents the above explosions in Donetsk city had occurred between 22:20 and 23:30 on 2 February.

The SMM is continuing to follow up on other reports of casualties.

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Annex 346

OSCE, Spot Report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine: Casualties, Damage to Civilian Infrastructure Registered in Donetsk Region Following Fighting (3 February 2017)
Spot Report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine: Casualties, damage to civilian infrastructure registered in Donetsk region following fighting

KYIV  3 February 2017

On 3 February the SMM followed up on reports of casualties following fighting in Donetsk region. Medical staff at a hospital in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) informed the SMM about two civilian fatalities and two other persons who had suffered shrapnel injuries. According to them, a 25-year-old man had died as a result of an explosion from shelling at a school in Avdiivka and a 47-year-old female employee of the Avdiivka coke factory had died in the operating room due to injuries received after an explosion from shelling. They said that a 48-year-old commander of the State Emergency Services and a British journalist had been injured; adding that the commander was in critical condition, while the journalist had been transferred to a hospital in Dnipro for further care. A member of the regional administration in Dnipro told the SMM that a foreign journalist wounded in Avdiivka on 2 February had been brought to hospital in Dnipro and had undergone surgery.

The SMM observed shelling damage to three residential buildings at the intersection of Vorobiova and Molodizhna Streets in Avdiivka. The SMM saw a large hole in the third floor wall of one of the buildings and an impact near the road. The SMM assessed the latter as caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from a south-easterly direction. Several windows were blown out and the exterior walls of the buildings were damaged. According to residents, the damage had occurred at around 20:30 on 2 February.

In Kalininskyi district of Donetsk city, the SMM observed a fresh impact next to a roundabout assessed as caused by a single multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS; likely Smerch or Uragan) rocket fired from a direction ranging from west to north. Its blast wave had shattered windows and damaged doors and gates in a radius of 170m. A shop about 10m south-east of the roundabout and very close to the impact site had been destroyed. About 70m from the impact site a car had also been destroyed and a metal gate of a house had been ripped open by overpressure, indicating an explosion.

An SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a five-storey dormitory building, about 30m south of the impact, whose roof had been completely ripped off and all windows shattered. About 170m north-west of the impact, the gates of a car wash had been blown in, while a gas station behind the car wash had sustained slight damages. The UAV spotted a “DPR” compound some 260m south-east of the impact site with two multi-purpose armoured tracked vehicles (MTLB) inside. The head of the dormitory where internally displaced persons reside said that two of them had been injured. At a morgue, staff said that the body of a dead man had been brought in together with partial remains of another person.

On Artema Street in Donetsk city the SMM observed two fresh impacts: one in the entry steps of a residential apartment building and another on the road 15-20m north of the building. The SMM assessed the impacts as caused by MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) rockets.
fired from a westerly direction. Half of the windows on the south-west-facing side of the building were destroyed. On Sobinova Street the SMM observed a fresh impact in the garden of a house assessed as caused by a single MLRS (BM-21) rocket. Two east-facing windows of the neighbouring house were shattered. At a school on the same street the SMM saw one fresh impact 10m from the school building assessed as caused by a single MLRS (BM-21) rocket. The north-facing windows and façade were shattered. The SMM could not determine the direction of fire.

On Kievskyi Avenue the SMM observed two impacts, one on the first and another on the fourth floor of two residential buildings, as well as shrapnel damage to nearby buildings. The SMM saw holes in the exterior west-facing walls of several apartments and broken windows. The SMM assessed one impact as caused by an MLRS (BM-21) rocket and the other by an artillery round at least 122mm, both fired from a north-westerly direction. According to local residents the above explosions in Donetsk city had occurred between 22:20 and 23:30 on 2 February.

The SMM is continuing to follow up on other reports of casualties.

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OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information Received as of 19:30 (5 February 2017)
Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 5 February 2018

KYIV 6 February 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared with the previous 24 hours and no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanitsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near the Petrivske disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three areas and elsewhere, including in Kreminets and Naberezhe.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Sievierodonetsk and Khrustalny. The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repair and maintenance works on essential civilian infrastructure near Shchastia, Artema, Kalykove, Mykhailivka-Almazna, and Sloviansk. The Mission visited five border areas not under government control. The SMM observed gatherings in Kharkiv and Odessa, and followed up on reports of an incident at the building where the Zakarpattia Hungarian Union is located in Uzhhorod.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1] including about 200 explosions compared with the previous 24 hours (290 explosions).

During the day on 5 February, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) recorded ten projectiles in flight from west to east 0.5-1.5km south.

During the day on 5 February, positioned at the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) for over three hours, the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions and 18 bursts and shots of small-arms fire, all 2-3km west and north-west.

During the evening on 4 February, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 34 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds (27 recorded 3-5km south and seven recorded 4-6km west), an explosion assessed as an impact of an artillery round as well as eight bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-6km at directions ranging from south to west. During the day, on 5 February, while at the same location, the SMM heard 30 explosions assessed as impacts of artillery rounds, all 4-7km south and south-west.

During the day on 5 February, positioned 1km north-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) for about one hour, the SMM heard 63 undetermined explosions, all at unknown distances at directions ranging from north-east to south-south-east.

During the day on 5 February, positioned in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions, two impact
explosions, and four explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds at unknown distances, as well as eight shots of small-arms fire, all at undetermined distances at directions ranging from north-east to south-west. Positioned at the same location, the SMM heard six shots of small-arms fire at unknown distances south-west assessed as live-fire training inside the security zone, in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training (exercises) in the security zone.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded no **ceasefire violations**; in the previous 24 hours the SMM had recorded ceasefire violations, including one explosion.

The SMM continued to **monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas** near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the **Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware** of 21 September 2016. The SMM's access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the day on 5 February, positioned in Petrivske (non-government-controlled), for one hour and twenty minutes, the SMM heard 45 undetermined explosions, all 1-3km north-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

In the eastern part of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), inside the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM observed a man in military-type attire carrying a helmet and assault rifle. The SMM spoke separately to four local residents who all told the SMM that Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel were living in the eastern part of the village again.

Positioned near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the **withdrawal of weapons** in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, in government-controlled areas the SMM saw 12 anti-tank guns (MT-12 *Rapira*, 100mm) near Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk). In non-government-controlled areas the SMM saw ten multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 *Grad*, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a mortar (2S9 *Nona-S*, 120mm) in Tyomofiievka (39km north-west of Donetsk) on 1 February.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas, the SMM observed seven self-propelled mortars (2S9) as present, and 31 tanks (T-64) as present for the first time. The SMM observed that 21 anti-tank guns (18 MT-12 and three D-48, 85mm), 13 self-propelled howitzers (six 2S1 *Gvozdika*, 122mm and seven 2S3 *Akatsiya*, 152mm), 34 tanks (T-64), two surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 *Oska*), six anti-tank guns (MT-12) and 12
mortars (six PM-120, 120mm and six 2B11 Sani, 120mm) continued to be missing; and 21 tanks (T-64), seven self-propelled howitzers (2S3) and three self-propelled mortars (2S9) were missing for the first time. The SMM noted that four areas continued to be abandoned with ten self-propelled howitzers (2S1), 18 towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm), and 23 mortars (nine PM-38, 120mm; 12 2B11; and two 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) continuing to be missing.

The SMM revisited a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region and noted that six towed howitzers (one 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and five D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), three self-propelled howitzers (2S1), and four MLRS (BM-21) continued to be missing. In government-controlled areas, the SMM observed an abandoned permanent storage site with 13 anti-tank guns (MT-12) continuing to be missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles, anti-aircraft guns[2] and an unmanned aerial vehicle in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, the SMM saw an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a truck near Orskhove (57km north-west of Luhansk), an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) just north of the disengagement area near Zolote, four IFVs (BMP-2) near Zolote, an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2) mounted on an armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB) near Novohnativka (40km south of Donetsk) and three IFVs (BMP-2) near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk).

Positioned in non-government-controlled Petrivske, the SMM heard and saw a mini-UAV flying at a distance of 100-500m from west to east, and then from east to west.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repair and maintenance works to the power plant in Schastia and to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). Near Kalynove (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM monitored and facilitated repair works to the Mykhailivka-Almazna power line which provides electricity to the western parts of the Luhansk region. The SMM also monitored and facilitated repair works on water wells located south-east of Slovianoserbsk (non-government-controlled, 28km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM visited five border areas not under government control. Positioned at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about half an hour, the SMM observed no traffic entering or exiting Ukraine.

At a border crossing point near Ulanysevsko (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about half an hour, the SMM observed no pedestrians and no vehicles exiting or entering Ukraine.

At a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for 45 minutes, the SMM saw about 50 pedestrians (20 men, 30 women) and a bus (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine.

At a border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) for about 25 minutes, the SMM observed two women entering Ukraine.

At a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansko, 65km south-east of Luhansk) for about one hour, the SMM saw ten cars (all with Ukrainian licence plates), a bus (with Russian Federation licence plates and around 30 passengers aboard) and four pedestrians (two men and two women) exiting Ukraine. The SMM also observed
19 cars (nine with Ukrainian and eight with Russian Federation licence plates and two with "LPR" plates) and five pedestrians (three men and two women) entering Ukraine.

The SMM monitored gatherings in front of the Polish Consulates in Kharkiv and Odessa. According to the organizers who are known to the SMM as Svoboda in Odessa and Svoboda and the National Corps in Kharkiv, participants (aged 20-60, 80 percent male, in both gatherings) were protesting the adoption on 1 February by the Polish Senate of the amendment to the Law on the Institute of National Remembrance. In Kharkiv, the SMM observed approximately 50 people, and several National Corps, Svoboda party and red-and-black flags as well as banners expressing criticism of the law. In Odessa, the SMM saw 30 participants in civilian clothing holding three Svoboda flags, two Right Sector flags and a Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists flag. During both gatherings, speakers addressed the crowd with messages critical of the law. Both events lasted about 30 minutes and ended without incidents.

The SMM followed up on media reports of an improvised incendiary weapon thrown at the building where the office of the Zakarpattia Hungarian Union is located in Uzhhorod (182km west of Ivano-Frankivsk) during the night of 3-4 February. The duty officer of the Zakarpattia regional police confirmed the incident to the SMM and stated that no one was hurt, but that one of the building's windows had been damaged. The officer said that an investigation was ongoing. The SMM will continue to follow up on the incident.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Kyiv, Lviv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate*

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the Government, citing orders to do so. (See, for example, SMM Daily Report 2 February 2018.) The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

- In Naberezhne (non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), two armed “DPR” members in military-style attire stopped an SMM patrol and ordered it to leave the village.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/370631
The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An “LPR” member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that he had no information regarding de-mining in the area during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]

The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that he had no information regarding demining activities over the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]

The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.[3]

Conditional access:

At a checkpoint on road H15 east of Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), on two occasions, a “DPR” member in military-type clothing stopped the SMM and demanded to check an SMM trailer. The SMM was allowed to proceed only after he inspected the trailer. (The Mission faced a similar restriction at the same checkpoint on 1 February (See SMM Daily Report 2 February 2018).

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. Two SMM cameras continue to be tested until the end of February 2018. Video streams to SMM cameras at the entry-exit checkpoints in Marinka, Maiorsk and Pyshchevyk were not operational during the entire reporting period. Video streams to SMM cameras at Donetsk Filtration Station, Oktiabr Mine, Prince Ihor monument, Zolote, and Stanytsia Luhanska were not operational until 5 February at 10:30.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.
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OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information Received as of 19:30 (6 February 2017)
Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 6 February 2017

KYIV  7 February 2017

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region compared with the previous 24-hour period. The SMM, in co-ordination with the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire around the Donetsk water filtration station which allowed repair to take place and pumping operations to resume, restoring supply to thousands in Donetsk region. The Mission observed damage caused by shelling in Pikuzy, Lobacheve, Pavlopil, Orlivske and Uzhivka. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides on the contact line. The SMM continued monitoring in the disengagement areas in Stanitsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrovskoe but its access remained restricted. The Mission followed up on the relocation of civilians from Avdiivka. The SMM visited one border area currently not under control of the Government.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, with about 550 explosions, compared with the previous 24-hour period.[1]

While in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre on the night of 5-6 February the SMM heard 130 undetermined explosions, 3-5km north-north-west.

On the night of 5 February the SMM camera at Oktiabr mine (9km north-west of Donetsk city centre) recorded 41 undetermined explosions 3-5km north-north-east and nine projectiles in flight from east to west. On 6 February the camera recorded 57 undetermined explosions 5-8km north-east, 118 projectiles in flight from south-east to north-west and 33 from north-west to south-east.

On the night of 5-6 February the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded exchanges that began with 45 tracer rounds in flight from west to east followed by 11 tracer rounds from east to west, all north-east of the camera. Thereafter, the SMM recorded 151 tracer rounds in flight from west to east and 131 from east to west, 14 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds and seven undetermined explosions, all north-east of the camera. On the evening of 6 February the camera recorded five explosions assessed as impacts of artillery rounds 10km north-north-west.

While in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) on the night of 5 February, the SMM heard 63 undetermined explosions, two explosions assessed as outgoing and two as incoming fire, two periods of uncountable overlapping bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 5-15km south-west and west.

While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) on the same night, the SMM heard 12 undetermined explosions 5-7km south-east and bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 2-3km south-east. On 6 February the SMM heard 88 undetermined explosions 4-7km south-east and bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 2-3km south-east.
On 6 February, positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) for about six hours the SMM heard four outgoing explosions assessed as artillery (152mm) rounds, one outgoing explosion assessed as an artillery (122mm) round, 11 explosions assessed as outgoing fire, five undetermined and 17 assessed as impacts, two assessed as mortar (120mm) round impacts and one assessed as an outgoing mortar (120mm) round; one explosion assessed as a mortar round impact (unknown calibre), two explosions assessed as outgoing mortar (82mm) rounds, four explosions assessed as impacts and seven bursts of automatic-grenade-launcher fire, and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 2-5km south-east, south and east.

Positioned to the east of “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) for about 2.5 hours, the SMM heard 46 undetermined explosions and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 3-10km south-west and west.

Positioned at the Donetsk water filtration station (15km north of Donetsk) for about two hours, the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions 2km south-west and bursts of heavy-machine-gun 1-2km south-east and 2-3km south-west.

Positioned in government-controlled Bohoivlenka (46km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM heard 23 undetermined explosions 1-3km east.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations compared with the previous 24-hour period, including 40 explosions. While in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard 28 undetermined explosions and small-arms fire 11-13km west.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrovskoe (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The SMM’s access to all three areas remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the night of 5 February the SMM camera in Petrovskoe recorded three projectiles in flight from south-east to north-west assessed as probable anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) rounds 2-4km south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area). A mini SMM unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted numerous fresh craters, including some assessed as caused by multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), about 2km east of government-controlled Bohoivlenka (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

While inside the disengagement area in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska the SMM heard three undetermined explosions at an unknown distance west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). Ukrainian Armed Forces and armed “LPR” members – on opposite sides of the bridge - said that there had been no ceasefire violations the night before.

The SMM noted a calm situation while present at the Zolote disengagement area.

The SMM observed shelling damage on both sides of the contact line. In Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, “DPR”-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM observed a number of fresh impact sites. The SMM saw a house with significant damage to its outer wall and interior, assessed as having been caused by a direct hit from an
artillery round (152mm) fired from a north-westerly direction. A neighbouring house had sustained broken windows, damage to the roof and minor damage to an east-facing wall. Another fresh impact site was observed about 30m from a house that the SMM assessed was caused by an artillery round (152mm) fired from a north-westerly direction. The SMM observed a fresh impact site in the middle of a road in the village that had caused minor shrapnel damage to a shop 50m away. Nearby, the SMM saw a fresh crater close to a shop which had sustained broken windows and shrapnel marks to its walls, and that power had been cut to the building. Residents were repairing the electricity power line. The SMM saw another impact site and damage to a house 30m away including shattered windows, damage to a wooden fence and shrapnel marks on the wall. The SMM assessed these three craters to have been caused by artillery (152mm) fired from a westerly direction. Residents told the SMM that the shelling had taken place late on 5 February and that no one was injured.

In government-controlled Lobacheve (17km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed four fresh craters close to a shop, which had sustained broken windows. The SMM saw a mortar tail fin nearby and assessed the craters to have been caused by mortar rounds (82mm) fired from a southerly direction. Residents told the SMM that there had been intense exchanges of fire on the night of 5 February.

In “LPR”-controlled Molodizhne (63km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM saw four fresh impact sites on both sides of a road about 6m from houses. The SMM assessed that they had been caused by mortar (82mm) rounds fired from a north-westerly direction. A resident (a woman about 55 years old) said she had been knocked to the ground by an explosion when the village had come under fire at about 11:00 on 5 February.

West of Kadiivka an SMM mini UAV spotted a fresh crater in a field, which the SMM assessed to have been caused by an artillery round (122 or 152mm) fired from a westerly direction.

Near “DPR”-controlled Uzhivka (formerly Leninske, 24km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM observed 15 fresh impacts sites in a field but could not approach them due to security concerns. In Uzhivka, armed “DPR” members showed the SMM a crater close to a house. The SMM could not determine the direction of fire.

Near government-controlled Orlivske (23km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM observed two fresh craters in a field and saw that power lines had been downed. In nearby government-controlled Pavlopil (26km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM saw a crater on a river bank and assessed that it was caused by a shell fired from an easterly direction, but could not determine the weapon type. A man in his sixties and two Ukrainian Armed Forces officers separately told the SMM of incoming shelling and an exchange of fire on the evening of 5 February. The SMM saw repair workers fixing the electricity line.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines the SMM observed the following in government-controlled areas: six towed howitzers (D-30, 122mm), two of which were attached to trucks, and 11 self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) near Bohoiavlenka. A mini SMM UAV spotted two multiple-launch-rocket-systems (MLRS; BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near government-controlled Asianove (85km south of Donetsk).
In violation of the respective withdrawal lines the SMM observed the following in non-government-controlled areas: one howitzer (D-20, 152mm) towed by a truck in Snizhne (72km east of Donetsk) travelling as far as “LPR”-controlled Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk) and one tank (T-64) travelling west in Teplychnoe (8km west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set down in the 16 October 2015. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed: 17 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm). The SMM continued to observe as missing 23 self-propelled howitzers (11 2S3 and 12 2S1).

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites in government-controlled areas, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines, and noted that a total of seven tanks were missing from one site, as previously noted.

Despite the joint statement of 1 February by members of the Trilateral Contact Group the SMM received no information in relation to withdrawal of weapons from the area between Donetsk airport, Avdiivka and Yasynuvata.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and anti-aircraft weapons[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed: eight stationary infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-1) being refuelled near Luhanske (59km north-east of Donetsk) and one APC travelling south near Nyzhnia Vilkova (27km north-east of Luhansk). Aerial imagery revealed one armoured vehicle near government-controlled Pisky (11km north-west of Donetsk) and two armoured vehicles near government-controlled Avdiivka, all on 3 February.

In areas not under government control the SMM observed: an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2) south of Stanitsia Luhanska bridge; three IFVs (BMP-1) in Khoroshe (36km west of Luhansk); an APC (BRDM-2D) near Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, 51km west of Luhansk); one multi-purpose tracked vehicle (MTLB) towed by a Ural truck driving west near Verhuliivka (61km west of Luhansk); two ACVs (one BMP-1 and one BTR) near Svitli (11km north of Luhansk) and two stationary IFVs (BMP-1) in Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk). Aerial imagery revealed five armoured vehicles near Kyivskyi district (5km north of Donetsk city centre).

The SMM observed three engineering minelayers (PMZ-4s) attached to Kamaz trucks and stationary in a compound near Holubivka.

North of “LPR”-controlled Oleksandrivsk (10km west of Luhansk) the SMM followed fresh tracks of heavy military-type vehicles on an unpaved road. The tracks led to an area which, based on the marks left on the ground and discarded boxes of ammunition, the SMM assessed had been a recent firing position for four howitzers (D-30,122mm).

The SMM observed new “LPR” positions between “LPR”-controlled Metallist (7km north Luhans) and government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk). About 2.5km south of Stanitsia Luhanska, the SMM observed nine armed “LPR” members building an observation post and digging a trench.

Near “LPR”-controlled Zhotye (17km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw at least 15 armed men in trucks and three trucks transporting ammunition boxes.
The SMM followed up on the recent reported evacuation of some civilians from Avdiivka. Officials in the mayor’s office in Avdiivka told the SMM that 314 people had recently been evacuated from the town on 3 and 4 February. The director of a sanatorium in government-controlled Sviatohirsk (117km north of Donetsk) told the SMM that 40 preschool and school-age children from Avdiivka had been accommodated and were attending classes there following their arrival from 3-5 February. The administrator of another sanatorium told the SMM that they had accommodated 146 people (including 73 children) from Avdiivka (up from 91 on 2 February).

The SMM, in co-ordination with the JCCC, contributed to localized cessation of fire, and so facilitated humanitarian efforts aimed at restoration of water, electricity and heating, including through repair of infrastructure in Avdiivka. The SMM observed that the power supply had been restored to the Donetsk water filtration station. Staff of the water supply company told the SMM that parts of the station, including pumps and the heating system, had been damaged as they were non-operational in freezing temperatures over the past week. In mid-afternoon, the SMM observed staff re-starting pumping operations. The station director told the SMM that some functions would resume on 7 February. The resumption of pumping operations will restore a potable water supply to several hundred thousand civilians in western and south-western areas of Donetsk, including Avdiivka, parts of Yasynuvata and Donetsk city and the settlements of “DPR”-controlled Kruta Balka (16km north of Donetsk), Vasylivka (20km north of Donetsk) and Betmanove (formerly Krasnyi Partizan, 23km north-east of Donetsk).

In “LPR”-controlled Donetskyi (50km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM continued to monitor repairs to a section of the Shepilovo-Sentianivka railway track that crosses the contact line.

The SMM visited one border area currently not under control of the Government. At the border crossing point in Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzans, 65km south-east of Luhansk), for about an hour, the SMM observed a total of 11 cars (Ukrainian licence plates) and one covered cargo truck queued to leave Ukraine. Three pedestrians crossed out of Ukraine in this period.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance.

Denial of access:

- Armed “LPR” members told the SMM that that they could not guarantee the safety of the Mission in fields and side roads in the Zolote disengagement area
(58km west of Luhansk) due to the possible presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). The SMM also observed mine signs in the area. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.

- A Ukrainian officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and that, with the exception of the main road, the SMM’s safety could not be guaranteed in the surrounding areas due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.

- The SMM was unable to travel west from “DPR”-controlled Petrivske due to the lack of security guarantees, the possible threat from mines and a road block on the road to Bohdanivka. The SMM informed the JCCC.

- Anti-tank obstacles on the road and the presence of a mine hazard sign prevented the SMM from travelling between government-controlled Katerynivka and government-controlled Popasna. Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel told the Mission that the area had not been demined and that further permission from their headquarters would be required for the SMM to pass. The SMM informed the JCCC.

- The SMM could not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said no demining had taken place and that mines remained on the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.

- Ukrainian Armed Forces denied the SMM entry to part of a weapons holding area.

- Armed “DPR” members denied the SMM entry to Sosnivske (35km north-east of Mariupol). The SMM informed the JCCC.

Conditional access:

- An armed “DPR” member stayed with the SMM while it retrieved video data from the SMM camera in Petrivske. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Other impediments:

- In Donetsk city a car with “DPR” plates being driven aggressively by a man gesturing at the SMM deliberately struck an SMM vehicle twice. No SMM members were injured. The SMM vehicle sustained minor damage.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
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OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information Received as of 19:30 (19 February 2017)
Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 19 February 2018

KYIV     20 February 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three areas and elsewhere.* The SMM visited five border areas outside of government control and was restricted in Luhansk region for the fourth day in five days.* The SMM observed continued interruption of mobile phone networks in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region. The Mission continued to facilitate and monitor repair work at a water pumping station in Artema. In Kharkiv region, the SMM followed up on media reports that commercial vehicles were unable to proceed after exiting Ukraine at the international border crossing point near Hoptivka. In Kyiv, the SMM continued to follow up on the incident at the Russia Centre for Science and Culture. In Kyiv and Odessa, the SMM monitored public gatherings.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including about 174 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 90 explosions).

On the evening and night of 18-19 February, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, a projectile in flight from east to west, five undetermined explosions, a projectile in flight from west to east and two undetermined explosions, followed by totals of 126 undetermined explosions and 211 projectiles (69 east to west, 140 west to east, one south to north and one undetermined), and an illumination flare in vertical flight, all 0.5-1.5km south.

On the evening and night of 18-19 February, the SMM camera at Oktiabr mine (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk city centre) recorded six undetermined explosions and a projectile in flight from west to east, all 2-3km north.

On 19 February, positioned at the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) for over four hours, the SMM heard nine undetermined explosions, 85 shots and around 100 bursts of small-arms fire, all 2-4km west. Positioned on the south-western edge of Yasynuvata later that day for one hour, the SMM heard 13 undetermined explosions, about 26 shots and about 20 bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-2km west-north-west and north-west.

On the evening of 18 February, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded five undetermined explosions 2-4km south-east.
On the evening of 18 February, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded an undetermined explosion 5-8km north.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 92 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (seven explosions).

During the evening of 18 February, while in Kadiivka (non-government-controlled, formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 45 undetermined explosions 12-15km west-south-west.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM's access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the day on 19 February, positioned about 1km west of government-controlled Zolote, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 5-6km south-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and 24 undetermined explosions and six bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 10-11km south-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 19 February, positioned near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM noted a calm situation.

On 16 February, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a probable armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-60) adjacent to a house in non-government-controlled Petrivske, about 400m outside the eastern edge of the disengagement area.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, in government-controlled areas, the SMM saw two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) about 800m north of Polkove (65km south of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In non-government-controlled areas, the SMM noted that two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) continued to be missing. The SMM also noted that three heavy weapons holding areas were abandoned and that 11 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and eight anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) were missing.

In government-controlled areas, the SMM observed three towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) and noted that five towed howitzers (2A36) continued to be missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft guns[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, the SMM saw an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BTR-4) near Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk).
In non-government-controlled areas, the SMM saw an APC (MT-LB) near Novolaspa (50km south of Donetsk). On 17 February, an SMM mini-UAV spotted eight IFVs (BMP-1), two APCs (MT-LB) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a truck near Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk). On 18 February, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-2) and two IFVs (BMP-variant) east of Piydenne (formerly Leninske, 40km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to observe the interruption of mobile phone networks in areas outside government control in Donetsk region. In a neighbourhood of Kyivskyi district (5km north of Donetsk city centre), a man (about 40 years old) told the SMM that both the Vodafone and Phoenix networks had not been working since January. Another man told the SMM that he had walked from a different neighbourhood to find a spot on Kyivskyi Avenue where the Vodafone signal had been available from nearby government-controlled areas. The SMM saw at least three other civilians walking in the same area, apparently for the same reason.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance works to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk).

The SMM visited five border areas not under government control.* While parked 50m from the first gate at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for about 45 minutes, the SMM saw ten civilian cars (eight with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates), a bus with Ukrainian licence plates and a sign in the window reading “Moscow-Luhansk” in Russian, and 50 pedestrians (about 30 men and 20 women) exiting Ukraine. The SMM observed eight cars (four with Ukrainian and four with Russian Federation licence plates) and 38 pedestrians (13 men and 25 women) entering Ukraine. After 30 minutes, an armed “LPR” member (35-year-old man), citing orders from another “LPR” member, told the SMM to leave the area.* (See SMM Daily Report 18 February.)

While at a border crossing point in Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw seven pedestrians (six women and one man) entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 11 cars (ten with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates) parked in the parking lot. Upon arrival at the border crossing point, an armed “LPR” member (35-year-old man), citing “instructions”, told the SMM first to observe from a 50m distance from the first gate and then told the SMM to leave the area altogether.*

While at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzanski, 65km south-east of Luhansk) for 40 minutes, the SMM saw 12 civilian cars (six with Ukrainian and six with Russian Federation licence plates) and a passenger bus (with Russian Federation licence plates) with 30 passengers on board and a sign reading “Sverdlovsk-Gukovo” in Russian language in the window, three empty cargo trucks and five pedestrians (two men and three women, all 25-50 years old) all exiting Ukraine. The SMM also observed a car with Ukrainian licence plates queuing to enter Ukraine. Upon arrival at the border crossing point, an “LPR” member (woman, 40 years old) asked the SMM for national passports and told the SMM to leave the area after the SMM did not comply.*

The SMM also monitored the Chervona Mohyla railway station in Voznesenivka and saw around 42 stationary railway wagons (two wagons filled with wood, content in 40 wagons not visible). Two armed “LPR” members (man and woman, 35-45 years old), citing “instructions”, told the SMM to leave the area immediately.*
The SMM monitored a pedestrian border crossing point near Ulianivske (61 km south-east of Donetsk) and observed two cars (with “DPR” plates) parked in a lot near the crossing point. The SMM did not see any pedestrians at the crossing point.

In Kharkiv region, the SMM followed up on media reports that commercial vehicles were unable to proceed after exiting Ukraine at the international border crossing point near Hoptivka (33km north of Kharkiv). At the border crossing point on 19 February for about 40 minutes, the Mission saw 103 cargo trucks, some with Ukrainian and some with Russian Federation licence plates, queuing to exit Ukraine in front of the border crossing area. The SMM saw seven cars and two trucks (mixed Ukrainian and Russian Federation licence plates) and 15 pedestrians (12 men and three women) enter Ukraine. A State Border Guard Service officer told the SMM that there were up to 50 trucks which were unable to proceed after exiting Ukraine inside the border crossing area. The officer said that the cargo trucks had been unable to proceed since 18:00 on 17 February and added that this situation affected only outbound cargo trucks, and not inbound cargo trucks and cars, or pedestrians travelling in either direction. A 30-year-old male driver of a cargo truck with Ukrainian licence plates queuing to exit Ukraine told the SMM that he was travelling from Kyiv to Belgorod and that he had been waiting in a queue since the morning hours of 17 February. On the afternoon of 19 February, a State Border Guard Service officer told the SMM by telephone that cargo trucks resumed exiting Ukraine at 15:00 that day.

The SMM continued to follow up on the incident at the building where the Russian Centre for Science and Culture, affiliated with Rossotrudnichestvo, is located at 2A Borysohlibska Street in Kyiv. (See SMM Daily Report 19 February 2018.) At 10:30 on 19 February, the Mission visited the centre and saw three wooden panels covering three large panes of windows, some of which had been broken. A man (about 35 years old), who was cleaning the façade of the building, told the SMM that the centre was closed that day. No law enforcement officers were nearby.

The SMM monitored a gathering in Kyiv to commemorate the fourth anniversary of the Maidan events. On 19 February, the SMM saw about 100 people (men and women of different age groups) walking along Heroiv Nebesnoi Sotni Alley, some of whom were holding flowers and photographs. The gathering ended peacefully.

In Odessa, the SMM monitored a gathering on Prymorskyi Boulevard, a pedestrian street, near the Duke Monument. The Mission saw about 250 people (mostly men, aged 20-60), some of them carrying the national flag of Ukraine and flags of political parties. The SMM heard speakers addressing the crowd and expressing opposition to certain political figures. There were four police officers and two National Guard officers, as well as two buses of police and National Guard parked about 100m away. The gathering ended without incidents.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate*

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for
this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government, citing orders to do so (see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

- Two armed “DPR” members stopped the SMM in non-government-controlled Michurine (61km south of Donetsk) and told the SMM to leave the area. After 26 minutes, the SMM departed.
- At the border crossing point in Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), an armed “LPR” member (man, 35 years old) told the SMM that it had to leave the area. After 15 minutes, the SMM left the area.
- At 10:20 at the border crossing point in Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansky, 65km south-east of Luhansk) an “LPR” member (woman, 40 years old) asked the SMM for national passports. The SMM did not comply. The “LPR” member told the SMM to leave the area, citing “instructions” that she had received stating that SMM patrol plans “must be approved with a stamp” and that SMM members should present national passports upon “LPR” members’ request. The SMM left at 10:50.
- At 11:00 at a railway station near Voznesenivka, two armed “LPR” members (man and woman, 35-45 years old) told the SMM to leave, citing “instructions” that the SMM “must have their patrol plans approved” by “LPR” members and that the SMM must present national passports. The SMM departed at 11:30.
- At 11:25 at the border crossing point in Sievernyi an armed “LPR” member (man, 35-40 years old) first told the SMM to observe from 50m from the first gate. He then added that the SMM should leave the area immediately based on “instructions” but did not clarify further. The SMM left the area at 11:50.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An “LPR” member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
- The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that he had no information regarding demining in the area during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.4
• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that he had no information regarding demining activities over the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.[3]

• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC on both occasions.4

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka and the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk were not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.
Annex 350

OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information Received as of 19:30 (26 February 2017)
Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 26 February 2017

KYIV 27 February 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region on both 25 and 26 February compared with 24 February. In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations on 25 February compared with 24 February and fewer on 26 February compared with both 24 and 25 February. The SMM followed up on reports of civilian casualties and shelling in Avdiivka, Yasynuvata, Betmanove, Popasna and Zolote. Firing and explosions occurred near the SMM in Katerynivka. The SMM observed weapons in violation of the respective withdrawal lines. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas in Stanytsia Luhanska, Petrivske and Zolote, but its access remained restricted.* Its freedom of movement was restricted further on both sides of the contact line. The Mission continued to note the presence of mines. It visited three border areas not under government control. It continued to monitor the blockade of railway tracks near Kryvyi Torets and Hirske. The SMM monitored public gatherings in Kherson and Kyiv.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations [1] including over 700 explosions on 25 February and over 200 explosions on 26 February compared with more than 1,200 explosions on 24 February in Donetsk region.

Within three hours before midnight on 24 February, while in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre the SMM heard 169 undetermined explosions of rounds from unknown weapon systems 3-10km north-west and north-north-west. On that same evening, within two hours, the SMM camera in Oktyabr mine recorded 42 undetermined explosions and six illumination flares 6-10km north-east. The following day positioned at the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre) for more than three hours, the SMM heard six undetermined explosions: four explosions 3-6km west and north-west and two explosions 4-10km north-east and north-north-east. In the evening, while in Donetsk city centre the SMM heard 37 undetermined explosions 5-7km north-north-west. On 26 February, positioned at the Donetsk railway station in under two hours, the SMM hear 14 undetermined explosions 3-8km east and north-north-east.

Before midnight of 24 February, the SMM camera in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded a total of 36 undetermined explosions, eight projectiles in flight from north-east to south-west, two projectiles in flight from south-west to north-east, and two illumination flares 4-6km east-south-east of its location. The following evening, the camera recorded a total of six undetermined explosions, and – in sequence: 40 projectiles in flight from west to east followed by three projectiles in flight from east to west. On 25 February, positioned in Avdiivka, the SMM heard 22 undetermined explosions 1-3km south and south-west. The following day, from the same position, the SMM heard five undetermined explosions 3-5km north-east. On 25 February, positioned east and south-east of “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata* (16km north-east of Donetsk) for about six hours, the SMM heard...
a total of 41 undetermined explosions, 3-7km south-west, west-south-west and west. On 26 February, positioned in Yasynuvata, the SMM heard 78 undetermined explosions and one explosion assessed as an outgoing round of an unknown weapon (see SMM follow-up of civilian casualties), 1-7km north, west-north-west, west-south-west and west.

On the evening of 24 February while in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), within two hours, the SMM heard 165 explosions (27 assessed as caused by outgoing multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS; BM-21 Grad, 122mm) rounds, 40 assessed as caused by outgoing artillery rounds 3-4km south-south-west and 48 such explosions 8-10km north-north-west, 16 as impacts of such rounds 8-10km north-north-west and 12 as impacts of such rounds 8-10km south-south-west and eight undetermined), 3-10km south-south-west and 8-10km north-north-west. On the same evening, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 71 explosions (52 assessed as caused by outgoing artillery rounds, one as an impact of such a round, three as impacts of 82mm mortar rounds, two as outgoing recoilless gun rounds and 13 undetermined) 7-10km south-west and 4-7km south-east.

On the night of 24-25 February the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded in sequence one undetermined explosion and nine tracer rounds in flight from west to east at an undetermined distance north and north-east. The following evening, the camera recorded in sequence 12 tracer rounds in flight from east to west, followed by three tracer rounds following the same trajectory, then five tracer rounds in flight from west to east and five such rounds in the opposite direction. On the evening of 24 February, while in government-controlled Volnovakha (53km south of Donetsk) in half an hour the SMM heard 16 undetermined explosions 8-10km south-south-east.

On 25 February, the SMM noted an increase of violence in the area of “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol), “DPR”-controlled Khreshchatytske (formerly Krasnoarmiiske, 33km north-east of Mariupol) and “DPR”-controlled Verkhnyoshyroikhail (formerly Oktiabr, 29km north-east of Mariupol). Positioned 1km north of government-controlled Pyshchevik (25km north-east of Mariupol), within an hour in the afternoon the SMM heard 42 undetermined explosions at an undetermined distance south-south-east and south-east. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Sosnovske (35km north-east of Mariupol), in eight minutes the SMM heard 30 undetermined explosions at an undetermined distance south-west. Positioned in Verkhnyoshyroikhail the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions 1-4km south and three undetermined explosions and uncountable shots of small-arms fire 1-2km south-west. Positioned 2km south of “DPR”-controlled Sakhalanka (24km north-east of Mariupol), within an hour in the morning, the SMM heard two explosions it assessed as outgoing mortar rounds 200m west and one explosion assessed as an impact of a mortar round 1km south. On 26 February, positioned in Pikuzy, the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions 2-6km south-west. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Zaichenko (26km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 19 undetermined explosions, 2-8km south-west and south-south-west.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations on 25 February, including over 200 explosions compared with some 150 explosions recorded on 24 February. On 26 February, the SMM recorded 80 explosions. The SMM recorded a total of 115 explosions assessed as caused by artillery rounds and 64 explosions assessed as caused by mortar rounds in the western and northern parts of Luhansk region on 25 and 26 February.
While in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk) on 25 February, the SMM heard 137 undetermined explosions (75 of which assessed as caused by artillery rounds of unknown calibre) 10km north-west and west. The following day, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 10km north-west. On 25 February, positioned in government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk), within 20 minutes after noon, the SMM heard 42 explosions (six of which assessed as caused by 152mm artillery rounds) 5-7km south-east. On the same day, within 15 minutes after noon, positioned in government-controlled Staryi Aidar (20km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions assessed as caused by artillery rounds 20km south-east. On 26 February, positioned in government-controlled areas of Zolote (60km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard a total of 49 explosions assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds 3-7km south-west and south-south-west, all assessed as occurring outside the disengagement area. On the same day, positioned in “LPR”-controlled Kalynove-Borschchuvate (61km west of Luhansk), in less than 20 minutes before noon, the SMM heard 17 undetermined explosions assessed as caused by artillery rounds of unknown calibre 7-10km west-north-west and six undetermined explosions 3-5km west-north-west.

The SMM followed up on reports of civilian casualties and shelling. On 24 February in government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) the SMM saw three fresh impacts around 50 meters from the road T-504 and a Ukrainian Armed Forces position. The SMM assessed that all impacts had been caused by 120mm mortar rounds fired from a south-easterly direction. The SMM was accompanied by Ukrainian officers of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), who said that no casualties had been reported.

In Avdiivka, on 25 February, the SMM saw a collapsed house and structural damage to a summer kitchen building on Chernyshevskoho Street. The SMM assessed that the house had been damaged by a shell of at least 122mm in calibre fired from direction ranging from east-south-east to south-south-east. The owners of the house told the SMM that nobody had been injured, the shelling had occurred on the evening of 24 February, and they had heard five more impacts in the area at the time their house had been hit. On Ostrovskoho Street, the SMM saw a fresh crater in soft soil 3m from a house. The SMM noted shrapnel damage to the north-east-facing wall of the house, damage to the roof and all the windows broken. The SMM assessed that the damage had been caused by a shell at least 122mm in calibre fired from directions ranging from east-south-east to south-south-east. The owners of the house told the SMM the shelling had occurred on the evening of 24 February. The SMM noted that Avdiivka and surrounding villages were without power supply as lights were out at shops and power generators were running. On 26 February, the SMM continued to note there was no power supply in Avdiivka.

In Yasynuvata, on 25 February, approximately 2km south-south-west from the checkpoint at the eastern entrance to the village*, the SMM saw shrapnel damage to trees in a wooded area, about five metres from a road. The SMM assessed that the damages had been caused by a 120mm mortar round fired from an unknown direction. Positioned in the area, within an hour before noon, the SMM heard 35 undetermined explosions of rounds from unknown weapon systems 3-5km west, south-west and west-south-west.

In “LPR”-controlled Zolote-5 (61km north-west of Luhansk), on 25 February, the SMM saw damage at three properties on Kutuzova Street. At the first the SMM saw a hole in the roof of a house and a crater in front of the same house. At the second, the SMM noted the top of a tree had been damaged in the backyard of a house, but the house itself was not damaged. At the third, the SMM saw the roof of the house had been damaged. The
SMM assessed that all the damage had been caused by automatic-grenade-launcher rounds fired from a northerly direction. Residents told the SMM that nobody had been injured and the shelling had occurred in the afternoon on 24 February.

On 26 February, in Betmanove (former Krasny Partizan, “DPR”-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM saw damage to three residential properties on 70-richchia Zhovtnia Street. At the first site, the SMM noted shrapnel damage to the walls and windows it assessed had been caused by a projectile at least 73mm in calibre fired from a north-north-easterly direction. The owner of one of the damaged houses told the SMM that his wife had suffered shrapnel wounds to her head and right thigh when she had run from the summer kitchen to the house to take their daughter to the basement, as the couple had heard several explosions near their house. He said that the shelling had occurred about 19:40 on 25 February; neighbours from the other houses damaged on the same street confirmed that time. On the opposite side of the street, the SMM saw an impact of the same type of projectile near a tree, and that the tree had been burnt. A car in the yard of the house had been hit with shrapnel, with its windows broken and there was shrapnel damage to the north-north-east-facing wall of the house. At a hospital in Yasynuvata, medical personnel confirmed the injuries the husband of the woman had described. The SMM met her, and she was stable according to medical staff but unable to walk due to the open wound in her right thigh. Positioned at the hospital, the SMM heard 39 undetermined explosions of rounds from unknown weapon systems as well as bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 3-5km west, west-north-west and west-south-west.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanitsya Luhanska, Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The SMM’s access there remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

The SMM noted a calm situation while present in and around the disengagement areas near Petrivske.

On 25 February, at a location – 400m south-west from the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint and 800m north-west of the railway track – in government-controlled Katerynivka, inside the Zolote disengagement area the SMM observed three men wearing military-style clothes, one wearing a balaclava (on 24 February at the same location, the SMM saw four men wearing military-style clothes without any visible unit badge, one of them with a pistol in his pocket, see SMM Daily Report 25 February 2017). Only the one wearing a balaclava, who was unarmed, approached the SMM. After approximately five seconds, the SMM heard small-arms fire from behind the civilian building where that man had come out of (single shots and bursts). The SMM’s interlocutor took cover behind the gate while the SMM took cover behind its vehicles, and then immediately left the scene. While reversing its vehicles, the SMM heard two explosions, one of which it saw impact 40-50m away, at the spot where the SMM cars had been parked. While going through the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint, located 300m north-east of the spot, the SMM saw personnel taking firing positions. The SMM left the area and waited at the northern exit of the checkpoint. In total, positioned inside the disengagement area the SMM saw one impact, heard five undetermined explosions, 100 rounds of small-arms fire, ten rounds of heavy-machine-gun fire and five rounds of automatic grenade launcher, all assessed as inside the disengagement area.

https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/302051
On 26 February, in the area between the Ukrainian Armed Forces forward-most position and the “LPR” forward-most position on the bridge to government-controlled Stanitsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw seven pieces of ammunition remnants at different locations on the side of the path. The SMM assessed five of these to be fragments of rocket-propelled grenades, but could not assess direction of fire or how fresh they were. One was located 20m north of the broken section of the bridge, the second 110m north of the broken section of the bridge, the third 200m north of that section, the fourth 80m north of it, and the fifth 100m north of it. Some were covered with snow but some were assessed by the SMM to have been there only since the last couple of days. The other two pieces were from unknown weapons (80m and 120m north of the broken section of the bridge) and the SMM was not able to determine the direction of fire or how long they had been present.

Despite the joint statement of 1 February by the Trilateral Contact Group and the consent reached on 15 February, the sides have not yet provided the baseline information requested by the SMM related to weapons to be withdrawn and locations of units and formations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines in areas not under government control, the SMM saw: on 25 February: one anti-tank gun (MT-12, Rapira, 100mm) towed by a truck moving west near Khreshchatytske; two anti-tank guided missile systems (9K111 Fagot, 120mm) each mounted on a stationary infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-1) in Vyshnevyi Dil (13km east of Luhansk); and one stationary tank positioned between civilian houses in Lyman (12km north-west of Luhansk); and on 26 February: two anti-tank guided missile systems (9K111) mounted on two stationary IFV (BMP-1) in Vyshnevyi Dil; one self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) on a flatbed trailer towed by a military-type truck, moving south-west near Kadiivka.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas the SMM saw one surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa, 210mm) near Kyrylivka (26km north-east of Mariupol), heading east.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In areas not controlled by the Government beyond respective withdrawal lines, the SMM saw on 25 February* two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) for the first time and noted three self-propelled howitzers (2S1) as missing, as previously observed.

On 25 February, the SMM revisited a “DPR” permanent storage site, noted four tanks (T-64) as missing and recorded an additional weapon.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft weapons [2] in the security zone. In non-government-controlled areas, the SMM saw: on 25 February: two stationary IFVs (BMP-1) south of Stanitsia Luhanska (outside the disengagement area); two IFVs (BMP) and two APCs (MTLB), all stationary near Vyshnevyi Dil; one stationary IFV (BMP-1) near Lyman (12km north-west of Luhansk); and on 26 February: at least four IFVs (BMP) stored within a disused building at a former industrial site in Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk), three IFVs (BMP-1) and an APC (MTLB) stationary and in concealed positions adjacent to houses and loaded with ammunition boxes, camouflage netting.
shovels and logs in Nova Marivka (64km south of Donetsk), three stationary IFVs (BMP-1) and two APCs (MTLB) in Vyshneviy Dil, one stationary IFV (BMP-1) in Mykolaivka (15km east of Luhansk), two stationary IFVs (BMP-1) 5km north-east of Luhansk city, two IFVs (BMP-1) stationary along the tree-line north of Lyman.

In government-controlled areas the SMM saw: on 24 February: one stationary APC (BRDM-2) at the entrance to Vrubivka (72km west of Luhansk) and 12 stationary IFVs (BMP-2) at the southern edge of Popasna (69km west of Luhansk); on 25 February: two APCs (a BRDM and a BTR-60) near Klynove (68km north-east of Donetsk) and eight stationary IFVs (BMP), a camouflaged anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2), a military engineering vehicle and three small boats near Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk); and on 26 February: one stationary IFV (BMP-2) in Kleban Byk (48km north of Donetsk) and one stationary reconnaissance armoured vehicle (BRDM-2) in Vrubivka.

The SMM noted the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). On 25 February, the SMM again saw four anti-tank mines laid across the western portion of the main road leading to the Shchastia bridge 1.5km north-east of “LPR”-controlled Lyman (12km north-west of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report 23 February 2017). The SMM noted for the first time that the mine hazard signs previously marking a minefield 3km west of government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), were no longer there. On 26 February, the SMM again saw the UXO near the bus stop 1km east of “LPR”-controlled Znamianka (36km north-west of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report 22 February 2017).

The SMM continued to monitor blockades at railway tracks, which cross the contact line (see SMM Daily Report 24 February 2017). On 26 February, at the Kryvyi Torets station in government-controlled Shcherbivinka (44km north of Donetsk) the SMM saw the blockade was still present (see SMM Daily Report 17 February 2017). At a bridge at the south-eastern outskirts of Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk) the SMM saw two 35-ton trucks full of coal moving from south-west to north-east. On both 25 and 26 February, the SMM noted that the railway tracks were still blocked with wooden barriers and barbed wire in Hirsko (63km west of Luhansk) and a train was still on the rails. At the government checkpoint near the road junction in government-controlled Karbonit (part of Zolote), the SMM saw seven unarmed men and a civilian vehicle parked nearby on 25 February, and on 26 February it saw four unarmed men and noted a calm situation in the area.

The SMM monitored three border areas currently outside government control. On 25 February, at the Ulianivske border crossing point (61km south-east of Donetsk), in one hour the SMM saw no vehicles or people leaving or entering Ukraine. At the Makariv Yar (formerly Parkhomenko, 28km east of Luhansk) border area, the SMM noted a calm situation, but an armed “LPR” member refused to engage in conversation with the SMM. At the Novoborovytsi pedestrian border crossing point (79km south of Luhansk), the SMM noted that it was unstaffed as observed on numerous occasions and in over an hour there saw three pedestrians (two middle-aged women and a girl) exit Ukraine.

On 26 February, the SMM monitored a public gathering in relation to events in Crimea at the Chonhar crossing point (163km south-east of Kherson) near the administrative boundary line with Crimea. A group of about 200-250 Crimean Tatars and local residents (men and women, different age groups) walked from the Crimean Tatar encampment to the crossing point, carrying Ukrainian, Crimean Tatar and Crimean Tatar battalion flags and chanting. Several speeches were held by the local authorities and Crimean Tatar
leaders. The SMM observed some 50 border guard officers present at the site. The event passed off peacefully.

In Kyiv the SMM monitored a public gathering on the same issue. About 250 people (mostly middle aged men) carrying banners and flags, mostly Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar, as they marched in central Kyiv and gathered at the Maidan square where several speeches were held. The event passed off peacefully.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate*

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance.

Denial of access:

- On both 25 and 26 February, in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area a Ukrainian officer of the JCCC told the SMM that, with the exception of the main road, its safety could not be guaranteed in the surrounding areas due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- On both 25 and 26 February, the possible presence of mines and UXO prevented the SMM from travelling further south-east into the Zolote disengagement area from government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk). The Mission informed the JCCC.
- On both 25 and 26 February, at an “LPR” checkpoint at the edge of the Zolote disengagement area armed men told the SMM that its safety could not be guaranteed in fields and side roads due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The Mission observed mine hazard signs in the area. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- On both 25 and 26 February, Ukrainian Armed Force personnel stopped the SMM from traveling from Katerynivka and government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), citing a lack of permission from their commander due to the area not having been demined. The Mission informed the JCCC.
- On both 25 and 26 February, the SMM could not travel across the bridge in Shchastia as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- On 25 February, an armed “DPR” member denied the SMM access to a weapons holding area, citing orders from his superior. The Mission informed the JCCC.
- On 25 February, armed men denied the SMM access to Yasynuvata on two occasions, citing security concerns. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- On 25 February, Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel prevented the SMM from proceeding further north from government-controlled Vodiane (19km north-
east of Mariupol) and told the SMM that in addition to the mines already present, new anti-tank mines had been laid on the road ahead. The Mission informed the JCCC.

- On 25 February, an armed man denied the SMM access to the village of Pikuzy. The Mission informed the JCCC.
- On 25 February, an armed man denied the SMM access to the village of Sosnivske. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- On 26 February, Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied the SMM access to a weapons holding area, for the eleventh consecutive time. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- On 26 February, Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint in the south-eastern part of government-controlled Nyzhnoteple (26km north of Luhansk).

Conditional access:

- Armed men only allowed the SMM access through a checkpoint north of Horlivka after noting down personal information and inspecting the trunks of the SMM vehicles. After 37 minutes the SMM was allowed to proceed. The Mission informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information Received as of 19:30 (5 March 2017)
Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 5 March 2017

KYIV  6 March 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region between the evenings of 3 and 4 March compared with the previous reporting period, and fewer ceasefire violations between the evenings of 4 and 5 March compared with the previous 24-hour period. In Luhansk region the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations between the evenings of 3 and 4 March compared with the previous reporting period, and fewer ceasefire violations the evenings of 4 and 5 March compared with the previous 24-hour period. It observed damage from shelling in Avdiivka, Popasna, Dachne, Oleksandrivka, Dokuchaievsk, Loskutivka, and Pikuzy. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas in Stanytsia Luhanska, Petrivske and Zolote, but its access remained restricted.* It recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas. The Mission, in co-ordination with the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), facilitated and monitored demining activities in areas of the Donetsk Water Filtration station. The Mission monitored the blockade of routes crossing the contact line in three locations. The SMM visited one border area currently not under the government control in Sievernij, and armed men prevented the SMM from proceeding to another border area currently not under the government control in Leonove.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[2] including about 640 explosions between the evenings of 3 and 4 March compared with the previous reporting period, and fewer ceasefire violations between the evenings of 4 and 5 March, including about 460 explosions, compared with the previous 24-hour period.

On the night of 3-4 March, while in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre the SMM heard 253 undetermined explosions 6-10km north-west. On the night of 4-5 March, while in the same location the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions 8-10km north-west. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Kalininskyi district in Donetsk city (2.5km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard on 5 March, eight-ten explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds 7-10km north. Positioned at the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre) the SMM heard 48 undetermined explosions 3-6km west and north-west.

During the day on 4 March, positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) for about seven hours, the SMM heard 16 undetermined explosions 1-3km east-south-east. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) for about seven hours, the SMM heard 25 undetermined explosions 2-5km at directions ranging from south-west to north-north-west. Positioned 600m east-south-east of “DPR”-controlled Kruta Balka (16km north of Donetsk) for four and half hours, the SMM heard 16 undetermined explosions 2-4km south-west. On 5 March, positioned in Avdiivka for more than four hours, the SMM heard, before 10:00, 17 undetermined explosions 7-10km south south-east, and, after 10:00, 33 undetermined explosions 1-2km south-east.
Positioned in Yasynuvata for more than three and half hours, the SMM heard 31 undetermined explosions 2-3km west.

On the evening of 3 March, while in "DPR"-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions 2-6km west and 14 undetermined explosions 10-12km south-west. During the day of 4 March, positioned at a "DPR" entry-exit checkpoint north of Horlivka, the SMM heard six explosions assessed as mortar rounds 2-4km north-north-west, and 41 undetermined explosions 2-4km at directions ranging from north-north-west to north-east. On the evening of 4 March, while in Horlivka the SMM heard 11 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds 3-5km south-west. On the early afternoon of 5 March, while in the same location, the SMM heard 30 undetermined explosions 9-10km south-west.

At 12:10 on 5 March, positioned in government-controlled Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard six explosions assessed as outgoing 82mm mortar rounds 3-4km south-east.

On the evening of 4 March, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east) the SMM heard 38 undetermined explosions 3-5km south-south-east and south. While in the same location the SMM heard, between 06:29 and 07:00 on 5 March, continuous overlapping undetermined explosions and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 3-5km south-south-east. After 10:00 on 5 March, while in Svitlodarsk the SMM heard one explosion assessed as the impact of artillery round 4-5km north-west, 23 explosions assessed as outgoing 73mm cannon of an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) 2.5km south-east, and 11 undetermined explosions 5-7km south, south-west and west.

During the day of 5 March, positioned in "DPR"-controlled Lozove (52km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard eight explosions assessed as 82mm outgoing mortar rounds 500m north-north-east.

Before midnight of 3-4 March, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded two tracer rounds in flight from south-west to north-east, followed by three undetermined explosions and in total 29 tracer rounds in flight (17 from west to east, three from south-west to north-east, five from south to north, three from east to west, and one from south-east to north-west), all at unknown distances to the north of the camera. After midnight of 3-4 March, the same camera recorded in sequence 17 tracer rounds in flight from west to east, two tracer rounds in flight from east to west, and one undetermined explosion, all at unknown distances to the north of the camera. On the evening of 4 March, the SMM camera recorded five projectiles in flight from east to south, followed by one projectile from south to north and in total 85 tracer rounds (58 from east to west, 14 from south-east to north-west, 13 from west to east), all at unknown distances to the north and north-north-east of the camera. After midnight of 4-5 March the same camera recorded in total 186 tracer rounds (two in flight from south-south-east to north-north-west, 64 from east-south-east to west-north-west, and 120 west-north-west to east-south-east), beginning with two tracer rounds from south-south-east to north-north-west. On the evening of 5 March the same camera recorded one explosion assessed as the impact of an 82mm mortar round, and five undetermined explosions, all 3km north-east.

During the day of 4 March, positioned in government-controlled Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM heard 118 explosions, most at unknown distances to the north-north-east, north-east, and east-north-east. Positioned 2km south-south-east of "DPR"-controlled Sakhanka (24km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM heard ten explosions
assessed as outgoing artillery rounds 2-3km east, 11 undetermined explosions at unknown distances to the north, eight explosions assessed as outgoing rounds from undetermined weapons, and nine explosions assessed as the impacts of rounds from undetermined weapons at unknown distances to the west-south-west. Positioned in government-controlled Sopny (16km east of Mariupol) the SMM heard 39 undetermined explosions 2-6km north-east.

On 5 March, positioned 3km north of government-controlled Aslanove (16km north of Mariupol), the SMM heard 34 undetermined explosions at undetermined distances to the east and south-east. Positioned in 3km north-north-east of government-controlled Hnutove (20km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 20 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds 7-8km south-east and south-west, 26 explosions assessed as the impacts of artillery rounds at an unknown distance east-south-east, ten explosions assessed as the impacts of mortar rounds at an unknown distance east-south-east, and ten explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds 8km south-east. Positioned in Hnutove the SMM heard 19 undetermined explosions at unknown distances to east, south-east, and south-west. Positioned in Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM heard two explosions assessed as outgoing 82mm mortar rounds 100-150m north-west.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violation between the evenings of 3 and 4 March, including about 520 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 480 explosions), and fewer ceasefire violations the evenings of 4 and 5 March, including about 110 explosions, compared with the previous 24-hour period.

On the evening of 3 March, while in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 276 undetermined explosions 10-15km west, 16 undetermined explosions 3-5km north-west, and seven undetermined explosions 20km north-west.

During the day of 4 March, positioned 5km north of “LPR”-controlled Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard 50 explosions assessed as artillery rounds, 80 explosions assessed as mortar rounds, and 150 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 5km north. Positioned in “LPR”-controlled parts of the Zolote disengagement area the SMM heard, within 25 minutes, 20 explosions assessed as 152mm artillery rounds, 20 explosions assessed as 122mm artillery rounds, 15 explosions assessed as 120mm mortar rounds, 122 bursts of heavy-machine-gun, 30mm cannon and small-arms fire, all 3-5km west-north-west. Positioned in government-controlled Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM heard five explosions assessed as the impacts of 120mm mortar rounds 8 km south-west. Positioned in government-controlled Kriakivka (38km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM heard three explosions assessed as the impacts of 120mm mortar rounds 3km south-west. Positioned in government-controlled Troitske (69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two explosions assessed as 82mm mortar rounds 1-1.5km south-east.

On 5 March, positioned in “LPR”-controlled Kalynove the SMM heard, between 09:00 and 09:20, 45 undetermined explosions, assessed as rounds from mortar and artillery (calibre unknown), and around 35 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 10-12km south-west. Positioned 2.5km south-east of government-controlled Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM heard, before 10:00, five explosions assessed as the impacts of 120mm mortar rounds 10km south, eight explosions assessed as the impacts of 152mm artillery rounds 5-7km south-east. Positioned at the same location at 10:17, the SMM heard one explosion assessed as an 82mm mortar round 2km south-east.
The SMM followed up on reports of *damage caused by shelling*. On 3 March on Pivnychna Street in government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) the SMM observed a fresh crater in the soil in front of a garage, and assessed it as having been caused by a round with calibre higher than 100mm. The SMM also observed damage to a house – located 6m north-east of the crater – with broken windows and a destroyed metal gate. A resident (a man aged 35) told the SMM that shelling had occurred on the night of 2 March.

On 3 March in Avdiivka the SMM observed seven impact sites. (See *SMM Daily Report 4 March 2017*). On Mendeliev Street 5, the SMM saw a hole in the south-east-facing wall of an apartment building and assessed it as caused by an artillery (122mm) or tank (125mm) round. The fifth floor and the roof of the building had also sustained damage, while several windows had been shattered. On Haharin Street 10 the SMM observed two fresh impact sites on the north and south-east side of a yard, respectively four and 20m from a kindergarten, as well as shattered windows of the kindergarten building and a nearby house. The Mission assessed the impacts as caused by artillery (122mm) or tank (125mm) rounds, fired from an easterly or east-south-easterly direction. On Haharin Street 8A the SMM observed a large hole in the east-facing wall of the fifth floor of an apartment building, assessed as caused by a round fired from an easterly or east-south-easterly direction. The Mission also observed broken windows and damage to a balcony of a nearby building. On Haharin Street 1 the SMM observed an impact in the eastern section of the roof of a five-story building. Large-size shrapnel fragments with copper bands on them were at the spot. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by 122mm artillery rounds fired from an east-south-easterly direction. On Mendeliev Street 3 the SMM observed a large hole on the east-south-east-facing wall of the fourth floor of a building and shattered windows. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by artillery (122mm) or tank (125mm) rounds fired from an east-south-easterly direction. On Komunalna Street 10 the SMM observed a large crater about 10-15m from the main entrance of School No.7, and assessed it as caused by a round fired from an east-south-easterly direction. The SMM also saw shrapnel damage to the school's walls, fence, and a broken window. On Molodizhna Street 17 the SMM saw an impact on the south-east facing corner of an abandoned house. Several residents separately told the SMM that the shelling had occurred on the afternoon of 2 March.

On 4 March, in “LPR”-controlled Dachne (47km west of Luhansk) the SMM observed a hole on the north-west facing side of the roof of a house on Yaltinska Street, and assessed it as having been caused by a round of the 30mm cannon of IFV (BMP-2) fired from a north-north-westerly direction. A resident (a man aged 55) said that early afternoon on 3 March he had heard shooting and subsequently shrapnel had damaged the roof.

On 4 March in “DPR”-controlled Oleksandrivka (20km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM observed a hole on the east-facing section of the roof of a shed, and damage to its windows, concrete blocks and wooden planks, and debris scattered across the yard at Shkilna Street 158. The Mission assessed the damage as having been caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from a westerly direction. Inside the shed, a Russian officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) showed the SMM an 82mm mortar tailfin, which appeared and smelt freshly exploded. The SMM also observed a small hole on a window and two fresh scars on the south-facing wall of a building next to the shed, where the Russian officer said he was living. The following day, on Shkilna Street 155, the SMM observed a fresh crater on the ground 3m from the fence of a house, and assessed it as caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from a south-westerly direction. The Mission
observed shrapnel damage to the fence and the south-facing wall of the house, as well as shattered windows. Four residents told the SMM the shelling had occurred on the evening of 3 March.

On 4 March in “DPR”-controlled Dokuchaievsk (30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM, accompanied by Russian officers of the JCCC, observed three fresh craters, one inside the compound of an electricity company and the other two 5-10m from the external fence in Heolohicheska Street. The SMM also saw shrapnel fragments on the ground, shattered windows and damage to the metal gate and the concrete fence of the compound. The Mission assessed two craters as having been caused by recoilless gun rounds (73mm) and the third crater by a recoilless gun round (73mm) or a mortar round (82mm), all fired from a south-westerly direction. The SMM also observed a fourth crater in front of an abandoned commercial building, and assessed it as having been caused by a recoilless gun round (73mm) fired from a south-westerly direction.

On 5 March in government-controlled Loskutivka (72km west of Luhansk) the SMM followed up on reports of shelling near a water pumping station. An employee of the station told the SMM that the shelling had occurred on 2 March, but the station had not been damaged and was functioning normally. An SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted five fresh impacts outside the station: one located 130m south-east, one located 130m east, and the other three 600m south-east of the station. The SMM assessed four of them having been caused by 152mm artillery rounds fired from a south-easterly direction. The SMM was not able to determine the weapon type and direction of fire of the fifth impact located 600m south-east of the station.

On 5 March in “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy, in the presence of an armed “DPR” member, the SMM observed three fresh craters in an area between uninhabited houses on 4 and 6 Akhmedov Street, about 10m away from either house, and minor shrapnel scoring on the walls of both buildings. The Mission assessed the craters as having been caused by artillery rounds (152mm in one case and 122mm in the other two), fired from a west-south-westerly direction. The SMM also saw a destroyed bathroom located in the yard of an uninhabited house on the same street.

The SMM continued to **monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas** of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the night of 2-3 March the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded three flares in vertical flight 1km south-east and 1.2km south of the camera (assessed as inside the disengagement area). On 3 March, the SMM saw Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel filling with sand newly established barriers (a frame with a metal net) of their forward position north of a broken part of bridge.

At 12:25 on 5 March, positioned in government-controlled Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 2-3km south-east (the SMM was not able to assess whether it had occurred inside the disengagement area).

On 5 March positioned in Petrivske the SMM heard 52 bursts of small-arms fire 2-3km south (assessed as outside disengagement area).

*https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/303021
The SMM continued to monitor the **withdrawal of weapons**, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.[3]

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM saw in non-government-controlled areas, on 4 March, four stationary self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) in Vesele (28km north-east of Mariupol).

In government-controlled areas the SMM observed in violation of the respective withdrawal lines, on 4 March, and on 5 March, two stationary surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa, 210mm): one in Rozivka (32km north of Donetsk) and another in Vershyna (63km north-east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside storage sites, the SMM observed one self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 12mm) on a flatbed trailer heading north in government-controlled Dachenske (49km north-west of Donetsk) on 4 March.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas beyond respective withdrawal lines, the SMM noted that one area continued to be abandoned with 18 anti-tank guns (MT-12) missing. In “DPR”-controlled areas beyond respective withdrawal lines, the SMM noted for the first time an area as abandoned with six self-propelled howitzers (2S1) missing.

The SMM revisited a Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent weapons storage site, whose location corresponded to the respective withdrawal lines, and noted all weapons previously observed as withdrawn to the site present.

The SMM observed **armoured combat vehicles and one anti-aircraft weapon** [4] **in the security zone.** In non-government-controlled areas, the SMM saw, on 4 March, one stationary armoured personnel carrier (APC; BTR) near Vesele (28km north-east of Mariupol); 12 IFVs (ten BMP-1 and two BMP-2) and two APCs (MTKB), all stationary near Stare (formerly Chervonyi Prapor, 58km west of Luhansk); one IFV (BMP) and one APC (MTLB), both stationary near Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk), and on 5 March, one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a military-type truck heading south in Donetsk city centre; three stationary IFVs (three BMP-1) south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (outside the disengagement area).

In government-controlled areas, the SMM saw, on 4 March, one stationary armoured combat vehicle mounted with a heavy machine-gun near Lebedynske; two stationary IFV (BMP-1) near Stanytsia Luhansk; four stationary IFVs (BMP) near Orinkhove-Donetsk (44km north-west of Luhansk); four stationary IFVs (BMP) near Popasna; two stationary IFVs (BMP) near Zolote (outside the disengagement area), and on 5 March, one IFV (BMP-2) heading west in Orinkhove-Donetsk.

On 5 March, the SMM observed fresh tracks of IFVs on a road, which continued from Yasynuvata through the Yasynuvata railway station towards the contact line. Russian officers of the JCCC in Yasynuvata told the SMM that they had heard the sounds of engines and movement of military equipment passing their observation post after midnight of 4-5 March.

The SMM **monitored and facilitated adherence to the ceasefire, co-ordinated by the JCCC, to enable demining and repair of essential infrastructure.** On 4 March, the SMM
observed a demining team from government-controlled Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk) clearing explosive devices on the western side of the highway H20 leading to the Donetsk Water Filtration station, and a demining team from Yasynuvata clearing on the eastern side of the road. At 13:00 the SMM observed both teams simultaneously entering the station and begin demining activities. Shortly later the SMM saw a bus with 30 employees of the station arrive at the station and start repair work.

On 4 March at an “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge to government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) the SMM saw “LPR” members collecting detonation wires. An “LPR” member, introducing himself as a member of a demining team, told the SMM that they had collected trip wires, detonators and mortar round tails on a road lane leading toward Shchastia bridge. At the same time the SMM noted that the four anti-tank mines in “LPR”-controlled areas south of Shchastia (see SMM Daily Report 1 March 2017) were still present. On 5 March in government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk) (outside the disengagement area) the SMM observed, for the first time, three mine hazards signs (red metal boards with signs labelled “Stop mines” in Russian) installed in front of houses close to the main road.

The SMM continued to monitor in three locations the blockades of routes that lead across the contact line from government-controlled areas. (See SMM Daily Report 4 March 2017). On 4 March, in Hirsko (63km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw that the railway tracks remained blocked by wooden logs and barbed wire, while the SMM noted that the train, which it had previously observed stationary on the tracks, was not present. Four men (aged between 50 and 60) told the SMM that earlier that day the train had been moved back. On 4 March in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk), the SMM saw several men wearing military-style clothes digging trenches around three military-style tents. On 5 March at the same location the SMM observed six military-style tents surrounded by trenches, barricades of sandbags, wooden obstacles, and barbed wire. The SMM also saw about 15 men wearing camouflage clothes standing around the area. At the blockade site in Shcherbynivka (44km north of Donetsk), the SMM noted a calm situation.

The SMM followed up on reports received from the Russian side of the JCCC that houses had been set on fire in government-controlled Bolotene (22km north-east of Luhansk) on the night of 3-4 March. On 4 March in the village the SMM note a calm situation. A group of residents (men in their thirties) told the SMM that on 3 March old grass had been set on fire in the area of a dried up marsh land north-west of the village. The SMM observed large burnt areas north-west of the village.

The SMM followed up on media reports that certain companies would be placed under “temporary administration” if not “registered” in non-government-controlled areas. On 3 March, staff of DETZ in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk told the SMM that a “DPR” member had already started working in the company office after receiving a separate room as a workplace.

The SMM visited one border area currently not controlled by the Government. On 4 March, at the Sievernyi border crossing point (50km south-east of Luhansk), in one hour, the SMM observed 12 pedestrians leaving Ukraine, and 40 pedestrians entering Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.
*Restrictions of SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate*

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance.

Denial of access:

- Both on 4 and 5 March, at the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, a Ukrainian officer of the JCCC told the SMM that its safety could not be guaranteed in the areas surrounding the main road due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM informed the JCCC.

- Both on 4 and 5 March, at an "LPR" checkpoint at the edge of the Zolote disengagement area, armed men told the SMM that its safety could not be guaranteed in the fields and side roads due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM informed the JCCC.

- On 5 March, the possible presence of mines and UXO prevented the SMM from travelling further south-east into the Zolote disengagement area from government-controlled Katerynivka.

- Both on 4 and 5 March, the SMM was unable to travel west from “DPR”-controlled Petrivske due to a lack of security guarantees and the possible presence of mines. The Mission informed the JCCC.

- On 5 March, the SMM was unable to travel east from government-controlled Bohdanivka due to the lack of security guarantees and the presence of anti-tank mines on the road. The SMM informed the JCCC.

- Both on 4 and 5 March, the SMM could not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20 km north of Luhansk) as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.

- On 4 and 5 March, the presence of anti-tank obstacles on the road prevented the SMM from traveling between Katerynivka and government-controlled Popasna. Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel told the SMM that permission to pass should be granted by higher Ukrainian Armed Forces authorities.

- On 4 March an armed man stopped the SMM and prevented the SMM from entering “LPR”-controlled Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk), stating he had been tasked to deny the SMM access to the village. The SMM informed the JCCC.
On 4 March in “DPR”-controlled Petrovskiy district (15 km south-west of Donetsk city centre), while the SMM was conducting an impact site assessment, accompanied by Russian officers of the JCCC, five armed “DPR” members approached the SMM and told the SMM to leave the area. Armed men escorted the SMM to another location.

On 5 March, in government-controlled Zoria (22 km north-east of Mariupol) Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied access to a compound. The SMM informed the JCCC.

On 5 March in “LPR”-controlled Khoroshe (36 km west of Luhansk) armed men denied access to a compound. The SMM informed the JCCC.

On 5 March, at a checkpoint 4 km north-west of a border crossing point in “LPR”-controlled Leonove (formerly Chervonyi Zhovten, 82 km south of Luhansk) two armed men prevented the SMM from proceeding further to the border crossing point, citing ongoing demining activities in the area. The Mission departed and informed the JCCC.

Other impediments:

On 5 March, while conducting an impact site assessment in the middle of Pikuzy the SMM heard two explosions assessed as outgoing 82 mm mortar rounds 100-150 m north-west. Due to security concerns the SMM had to leave the area.

On 5 March, in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58 km north-east of Donetsk) an armed man in a military-type truck with an “LPR” sign approached the SMM and told it to leave the area, citing security reasons. Subsequently he left and the SMM remained in its position.

[1] All times are in Eastern European Time.

[2] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[3] Despite the joint statement of 1 February by the Trilateral Contact Group and the consent reached on 15 February, the sides have not yet provided the baseline information requested by the SMM related to weapons to be withdrawn and locations of units and formations.

[4] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
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Annex 352

OSCE, Thematic Report: Restriction of SMM’s Freedom of Movement and Other Impediments to Fulfilment of Its Mandate (January to June 2017)
THEMATIC REPORT

Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement and other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

January to June 2017

September 2017
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Note: Locations referenced in this report are non-government-controlled unless otherwise specified.
Summary

The freedom of movement of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine is critical to the execution of its mandate and the fulfilment of its role as foreseen in the Minsk agreements. The mandate obliges the Mission to report on any restrictions of its freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of the mandate. In the first half of 2017, the SMM encountered about 480 such restrictions and impediments, of which over 75 per cent occurred in areas not controlled by the Government.

During the reporting period, the number of restrictions was similar to that recorded in the latter half of 2016, but it included a roughly 40 per cent increase in incidents involving violence or threats against or in the presence of the SMM. These included 13 incidents involving violence (compared with one from July to December 2016), all of which occurred in non-government-controlled areas.

The death of an SMM patrol member in the incident of 23 April near Pryshyb (an area outside government control) was the most serious consequence of the threats and dangers that the SMM faces in such an insecure environment. The incident also resulted in further restrictions to the Mission's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The removal of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) was implemented only on an incomplete and haphazard basis.

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1 The SMM's mandate was established by Permanent Council Decision No. 1117 of 21 March 2014. The Minsk agreements are those reached in the format of the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), including the Protocol and Memorandum (September 2014), the Package of Measures (12 February 2015) and its Addendum (29 September 2015) and the Framework Decision on Disengagement of Forces and Hardware of 21 September 2016.
2 Restrictions encountered on an almost-daily basis – due to mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and roadblocks, including at disengagement areas – are not included in the statistical data for this report.
3 For data from July to December 2016, see Annex 1. For January to June 2016, see SMM Thematic Report: Restrictions to SMM's freedom of movement and other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate.
4 See tables in Annexes 1 and 3.
5 Locations referenced in this report are non-government-controlled unless otherwise specified.
6 The number of restrictions of freedom of movement during the first half of 2017 would likely have been higher if the SMM's patrolling had not been reduced after 23 April.
7 As agreed to in the Memorandum and the TCG decision on mine action of 3 March 2016.
The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), with representatives from both Ukraine and the Russian Federation, was, in most cases, unable or unwilling to provide a robust, rapid response to violations of the Mission’s freedom of movement. Though its intervention was effective in some cases, it more often seemed to accept restrictions and impediments as the norm, particularly in non-government-controlled areas, and did not provide adequate rapid response or take preventive action.

Those responsible for restricting the SMM, whatever their intent, created reasons for continued mistrust between the sides – particularly to the extent that such restrictions prevented the Mission’s establishment of facts in relation to allegations – thereby undermining efforts to foster peace, stability and security.

Roles and responsibilities

The SMM

The Mission’s mandate stipulates that the SMM shall have safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. Unrestricted and unconditional access to all areas is essential for comprehensive SMM monitoring and reporting. The mandate also obliges the Mission to report on any restrictions of its freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate.

Forces and armed formations

The signatories of the Addendum and the Framework Decision agreed that the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations should ensure secure and safe access for the SMM and respond rapidly to violations reported by the Mission. They defined restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement and interference with the Mission’s means of remote observation as violations of the agreements.

The JCCC

The signatories of the Addendum also undertook to ensure effective monitoring and verification by the SMM and determined that the JCCC should contribute both to rapid
response to impediments to the Mission’s monitoring and verification, and to the safety of the Mission’s monitors.\textsuperscript{8}

**Types of restrictions**

The SMM categorized restrictions as: 1) denial of access; 2) conditional access; 3) delay; or 4) other impediments.\textsuperscript{9} About two thirds of all violations constituted denial of access, with the remainder divided roughly evenly between the other three categories.\textsuperscript{10}

The SMM’s freedom of movement was also restricted by ceasefire violations and a lack of security guarantees, which the Mission continued to request, including through the JCCC.\textsuperscript{11} On at least 12 occasions, shelling or shooting occurred within 300m of SMM patrols. Due to security concerns, including the threat of mines, UXO and other exploded devices (see p. 13), the SMM was unable to approach or cross the contact line in many places, including, for example, the villages of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove) and Shyrokyne, the area between Debaltseve and government-controlled Svitlodarsk, and the road between Zholobok and government-controlled Novotoshkivske.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.6\textwidth]{freedom_of_movement_restrictions_by_type.png}
\caption{Freedom of movement restrictions by type}
\end{figure}

**Overview of incidents**

The SMM faced restrictions on about 480 occasions, compared with about 490 in the previous six months. Of these, almost 120 occurred in government-controlled areas, and over 360 in areas not controlled by the Government (about 280 in Donetsk region and about 80 in Luhansk region).

\textsuperscript{8} In addition, in accordance with the TCG mine action decision of 3 March 2016, the JCCC is responsible for overall co-ordination of demining and compliance with the ceasefire during mine clearance.

\textsuperscript{9} For an outline of these categories, see [SMM Thematic report: Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement and other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate January to June 2016](https://www.osce.org/fom/454571).

\textsuperscript{10} See Annex 2.

\textsuperscript{11} See, for example, [SMM Daily Report 23 June 2017](https://www.osce.org/fom/454571).
The proportion of incidents involving denial of access increased from 62 per cent in the previous six months to 67 per cent. Out of 320 denials of access, 28 per cent occurred in government-controlled areas, and 72 per cent in areas not controlled by the Government.

Restrictions involving violence or threats

Many restrictions – the vast majority in non-government-controlled areas – involved violence or threats.\(^\text{12}\) Such cases increased from 17 (in the previous six months) to 24, with actual use of violence – most frequently small-arms fire assessed as warning shots – increasing from 1 to 13.\(^\text{13}\) Examples included:

- Men armed with assault rifles fired a burst at close range to an SMM patrol in Yasynuvata, advanced toward the SMM in a threatening manner, seized a mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), and, as they withdrew, fired another burst about 5m from an SMM vehicle behind which patrol members were taking cover.\(^\text{14}\)
- A man wearing military-style clothes on board a military-type truck near Dokuchaievsk threw a burning and smoking device in front of an SMM vehicle.\(^\text{15}\)
- An armed man with his face covered tried to open the door of an SMM vehicle on patrol in Yasynuvata and attempted to break the window with his gunstock, then pointed his assault rifle at the driver and front-seat passenger of the patrol’s second vehicle. As the vehicle was driving away, the armed man hit a window with his gunstock and then fired a burst into the air, followed by three shots assessed as targeting the patrol vehicle.\(^\text{16}\)
- A man in military-style uniform pointed an automatic rifle at an SMM patrol in Kalyne; as the SMM departed, it heard a rifle shot, assessed as coming from the direction of the man and two others with him.\(^\text{17}\)
- The driver of an unmarked car in Sakhanka opened his window, after which he and the other passengers (all in military-style clothes) shouted an insult toward the SMM; the driver then pointed an assault rifle into the air and shot twice.\(^\text{18}\)
- In Donetsk city a car with “DPR” plates driven by a man gesturing at the Mission struck an SMM vehicle twice.\(^\text{19}\)
- A man with an assault rifle at a checkpoint east of Sosnivske – a village the Mission had been unable to access six times since the beginning of the year – demanded that the SMM withdraw and then fired a shot into the air about 50m from the patrol.\(^\text{20}\)

In some cases, the intention may have been to prevent the SMM from observing weapons that should have been withdrawn according to the Minsk agreements:

- An armed man outside a compound in Kozatske – a village where the SMM had previously observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines, as well as tank tracks – gestured for the Mission to leave, then fired three shots from his assault rifle into the air and another six toward the ground. The SMM departed and, while leaving, heard another four shots and a burst of small-arms fire.\(^\text{21}\)

\(^{12}\) See tables in Annex 1 and Annex 3.
\(^{13}\) These figures exclude small-arms fire assessed as targeting SMM unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). See Remote observation section below.
\(^{14}\) SMM Spot Report 25 February 2017
\(^{15}\) SMM Spot Report 18 May 2017
\(^{16}\) SMM Spot Report 20 June 2017
\(^{17}\) SMM Spot Report 3 February 2017
\(^{18}\) SMM Spot Report 2 April 2017
\(^{19}\) SMM Daily Report 7 February 2017
\(^{20}\) SMM Daily Report 9 May 2017
\(^{21}\) SMM Spot Report 29 March 2017. The SMM was restricted in Kozatske ten other times.
The SMM heard five bursts of small-arms fire assessed as warning shots as it took up an observation position near Khreshchatytske (formerly Krasnoarmiiske) after seeing what it assessed to be two howitzers and a command vehicle.22 While observing a camouflaged tank in Pikuzy, the SMM heard 15-20 shots of small-arms fire assessed as warning shots 50-100m from the Mission's position.23

Weapons-related restrictions

Other restrictions, though not involving violence, may nevertheless also have been intended to prevent observation of weapons that should have been withdrawn according to the Minsk agreements. In some cases, the Mission itself had observed such weapons, while in others it was following up on allegations of weapons presence.

Two armed men at a checkpoint near Manuilivka stopped the SMM from proceeding toward Ternove, saying that training was ongoing in that area. Nine days earlier, the Mission had seen about 15 howitzers in the vicinity.24 Moreover, via patrols and aerial imagery, the SMM had observed groups of tanks (up to 55) in the area on three occasions since the beginning of the year.25

On four occasions in late March, the SMM could not travel along a road near Khrisachchivka due to newly placed obstacles, in an area where aerial imagery twice revealed the presence of a tank in violation of withdrawal lines.26

From February to April the SMM was repeatedly denied access to Veselohorivka, during which time it observed, in the area, four tanks and a howitzer in violation of withdrawal lines. Twice in March, a wooden utility pole blocked SMM access to a road leading to Veselohorivka.27

In the area between Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburh) and Markyne – where the Mission had previously observed tanks and encountered a freedom-of-movement restriction – a group of armed men in seven vehicles without licence plates (some of whom hid their faces behind balaclavas and hoods) blocked an SMM patrol, after which an armed man in a “police” vehicle escorted the SMM out of the area.28

Near government-controlled Novozvanivka, the SMM was denied access to a house used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces where equipment under a camouflage net was present.29

During February alone, in non-government-controlled parts of Luhansk region, the SMM was denied access while:

- Attempting to visit a suspected weapons site near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch);
- Following fresh tracks of heavy vehicles in snow near Zhovte;
- Patrolling near Kalynove on five occasions, including times when it was following tracks of heavy vehicles or following up on allegations of the presence of tanks;
- Observing tank tracks close to Lobacheve and attempting to return three days later;
- Following up on the presence of tanks near Oleksandrivsk; and
- Attempting to visit a military-type maintenance and repair facility, and a military-type base, in Luhansk city.30

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22 SMM Spot Report 4 March 2017
23 SMM Daily Report 13 February 2017
24 SMM Daily Reports 3 April 2017 and 12 April 2017
25 See, for example, SMM Daily Report 6 January 2017.
28 SMM Daily Reports of 31 March 2017, 1 April 2017, and 8 June 2017
29 SMM Daily Report 23 January 2017
Monitoring withdrawal of weapons

The Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations continued to hinder the SMM’s efforts to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, restricting the Mission’s movement on 126 occasions (compared to 121 times in the previous six months) when it attempted to access the following areas:

- Heavy weapons holding areas (38 occasions, including 30 denials of access);
- Permanent weapons storage sites (13 occasions, including 12 denials of access);
- Military-style compounds (70 occasions, including 58 denials of access); and
- Training areas (five occasions, all denials of access).

Examples included: A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier denied the SMM access to a compound, saying, “Today is not a day for visitors”. A person at a permanent weapons storage site in areas not controlled by the Government in Donetsk region demanded in a threatening and hostile manner that the SMM leave the site.31

The SMM faced fewer restrictions to monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of weapons in government-controlled areas (60 occasions) compared with the previous six months (83 occasions), and fewer than in areas not controlled by the Government (66 occasions, compared with 38 in the previous six months), despite the fact that over three times as many Mission visits were conducted to sites in government-controlled areas.

Passing through checkpoints

The SMM’s freedom of movement was restricted at checkpoints along the contact line on over 140 occasions (nearly half of which were denials of access). Of the denials of access, ten occurred in government-controlled areas and the rest in areas not controlled by the Government (about 50 in Donetsk region and six in Luhansk region).

On one occasion, a restriction involved violence: at a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokovske (formerly Oktiabr), an armed man told the Mission to pass, although it was waiting to assess the security situation after receiving information about ceasefire violations. The SMM travelled forward and stopped 20m west of the checkpoint, at which time it heard a shot of

31 SMM Daily Report 4 March 2017
small-arms fire 20m east, assessed as an attempt by the man to hasten the patrol’s departure.\textsuperscript{32}

This checkpoint was repeatedly difficult to pass. On another occasion, at the same checkpoint, armed men demanded that three SMM members exit their vehicle. They questioned the SMM members on how long they had been working for the Mission and asked one of them what her previous job had been.\textsuperscript{33} Another time, west of the checkpoint, four armed men angrily addressed the SMM and said they would shoot the next SMM patrol that entered the village.\textsuperscript{34}

Other checkpoints were also persistently difficult. From late May until late June, at a checkpoint in Kreminets, armed men restricted the Mission’s freedom of movement nine times, mostly through delays and conditions placed on the SMM.\textsuperscript{35}

The Mission was unable to regularly access several areas due to persistent impediments at checkpoints, including Staromykhailivka (in Kirovskyi district of Donetsk city), Trudivskyi area (in Petrovskyi district), Slavne (46km north-east of Donetsk), and government-controlled Taramchuk.

On over 30 occasions, armed persons at checkpoints searched SMM vehicles before allowing the Mission to proceed. At the Olenivka entry-exit checkpoint alone, armed men insisted on searching SMM vehicles about 20 times during the reporting period.

At other times, armed persons at checkpoints insisted on checking the national passports of Mission members, or they required patrols to reveal the nationalities or other personal information of SMM members:

\textsuperscript{32} SMM Daily Report 17 May 2017
\textsuperscript{33} SMM Daily Report 21 January 2017
\textsuperscript{34} SMM Daily Report 15 March 2017
\textsuperscript{35} See, for example, SMM Daily Reports 25 May 2017 and 26 June 2017.
At a checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel asked for the nationalities and passports of SMM patrol members. After 30 minutes the Mission was allowed to proceed.36

At a government checkpoint in Staryi Aidar, two visibly intoxicated soldiers spoke aggressively to the SMM, demanding personal information and that the patrol members get out of their cars.37

Near Debaltseve, armed men insulted the SMM with vulgar words and filmed the SMM, even opening the door to a Mission vehicle to film inside; they aggressively and repeatedly demanded to know the nationality of the SMM patrol members.38

One restriction at a checkpoint involved harassment, exacerbated by the possession of a weapon: On 5 May, a man armed with an assault rifle sexually harassed a female SMM member and threatened to stop the patrol from moving east from Petrivske toward Rozdolne until his demands were met. The SMM left the area via a different road.39

During May, the JCCC provided information to the SMM regarding instructions issued by the Ukrainian Armed Forces and given by those in control of the armed formations about interactions with the Mission, including at checkpoints. The said guidance by the armed formations indicated that SMM patrols would be refused access if they were not announced beforehand.40 In late June, the Russian representative to the JCCC informed the Mission that the guidance of the armed formations in areas not controlled by the Government in Donetsk region had been rescinded and new instructions drafted, but by the end of the reporting period the SMM had not received these.

Remote observation

Although the Package of Measures allows for the SMM to use all technical equipment necessary, including UAVs, attacks on and interference with the Mission’s use of technical equipment continued. On ten occasions, the SMM assessed that small-arms fire targeted its UAVs, roughly the same number of incidents as in the latter half of 2016. Examples included:

- While conducting a mini-UAV flight in government-controlled Aslanove, the SMM heard eight single shots of small-arms fire assessed as targeting the UAV.41
- The Mission, positioned in government-controlled Orikhove-Donetske, heard small-arms fire 2km west, assessed as targeting an SMM mid-range UAV.42
- While flying a UAV 200m west of an aerodrome on the outskirts of Luhansk city, the SMM heard bursts of small-arms fire 1km east. During the flight the UAV spotted weapons in violation of withdrawal lines, including multiple launch rocket systems, howitzers and tanks.43
- During a mini-UAV flight near Yasynuvata, the SMM heard small-arms fire, after which the UAV began drifting and spinning without responding to operator commands. The Mission performed a forced landing of the UAV and has since been unable to retrieve it, due to security concerns.44
- Near government-controlled Staryi Aidar, the Mission heard small-arms fire assessed as targeting an SMM UAV flying in the area.45

36 SMM Daily Report 23 February 2017
37 SMM Daily Report 24 April 2017
38 SMM Daily Report 27 January 2017
39 SMM Daily Report 6 May 2017
40 SMM Daily Report 13 May 2017
41 SMM Daily Report 22 March 2017
42 SMM Spot Report 27 March 2017
43 SMM Spot Report 6 April 2017
44 SMM Spot Report 4 March 2017
45 SMM Spot Report 11 April 2017
The Mission heard small-arms fire near its mini UAV during a flight near Zaichenko.46 A day later the SMM observed howitzers – in violation of withdrawal lines – close to the area where the Mission had heard small-arms fire.

Positioned north of the Zolote disengagement area, while flying a mini-UAV, the SMM heard 25 shots of small-arms fire 100m south-east. The Mission flew the UAV further west and recalled it, after which the SMM heard four more shots and 20 bursts of small-arms fire 100m south-west, assessed as targeting the UAV.47

Near government-controlled Zatyshe, the SMM heard small-arms fire assessed as targeting its mini-UAV.48

Six of the incidents involved UAV flights over government-controlled areas, and three over non-government-controlled areas,49 corresponding roughly with the division of total flights: about 380 in government-controlled and over 200 in non-government-controlled areas.

As noted above, on 24 February armed men in Yasynuvata stopped the SMM from launching a UAV and seized it. On another occasion, armed men used their vehicles to block the SMM for over half an hour after a patrol flew a mini-UAV near Amvrosivka, a town 18km from the Ukrainian-Russian Federation border. During the flight, the UAV spotted 45 military-type trucks in the area, about 500m from a railway station.50

Unknown persons also jammed the Mission’s UAVs on at least three occasions, one of which resulted in the loss of a mini-UAV near government-controlled Chernenko.51

The Mission’s use of static cameras was also restricted:

- On 14 March, an armed man ordered the Mission to leave the site of an SMM camera positioned in a tower near the Oktyabr mine in Donetsk city. When the Mission reached the tower’s ground floor, another armed man told the Mission members they would be “arrested”. The SMM was detained for 11 minutes, after which one of the armed men received a phone call and the SMM was allowed to depart.52
- On the evening of 19 March, the view of the SMM camera north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge was obscured by the intermittent use of a searchlight from non-government-controlled areas and a laser light source from government-controlled areas.53
- The Mission’s camera in Shyrokyne was turned off by an unknown person on 26 June, which resulted in no monitoring of the area until the SMM manually reconnected the camera almost 24 hours later.54
- On about 30 occasions, armed persons near the Petrivske disengagement area required that the SMM be escorted while accessing the Mission’s camera.

**Visiting border areas outside government control**

The SMM conducted almost 400 visits to border areas not controlled by the Government (over 100 in Donetsk region and almost 300 in Luhansk region). The SMM’s freedom of

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46 SMM Daily Report 8 June 2017
47 SMM Daily Report 10 June 2017
48 SMM Daily Report 27 June 2017
49 An additional incident occurred in an area between the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations.
50 SMM Daily Report 28 January 2017
51 SMM Daily Report 9 February 2017
52 SMM Daily Report 15 March 2017
53 SMM Daily Report 22 March 2017
54 Due to security restrictions following the 23 April incident, some other camera sites were not accessible by the Mission for data collection or repair and maintenance activities.
movement was restricted on 18 of these visits (4 in Donetsk and 14 in Luhansk). The rate of such restrictions was about 50 per cent lower than in the previous six months, when SMM freedom of movement was restricted 40 times.

In late June, armed men denied the SMM access to the Novoazovsk border area four times, as well as to the nearby town of Siedove. On one occasion, on a road leading to Boikivske from Novoazovsk, the Mission observed a convoy of 17 vehicles with people wearing military-style clothing, with most of the drivers wearing balaclavas. Other restrictions included:

- Armed men at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske said that according to new procedures they had to take photos of SMM members with their OSCE badges visible.
- At the Izvaryne border crossing point, the SMM was not permitted to travel beyond the vehicle barrier into the customs area leading to the border, reportedly due to orders from senior "LPR" members.
- Two armed persons stopped the SMM on a road near Diakove, asked for the purpose of the Mission’s visit and locations to be visited, wrote down patrol members’ names and other information, then escorted the Mission until it departed the area.

Despite a reduction since 2016 in the frequency of violations of this kind in these areas, the Mission continued to be able to conduct only short visits (generally no longer than one hour) due to lengthy travel times, exacerbated by poor road conditions, adverse weather conditions, and limited hours of daylight. Monitoring also continued to be hindered by the refusal of those in control of these areas to provide security guarantees that would enable

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55 The restrictions were ongoing as of mid-July. The Mission last entered Siedove on 25 April.
56 Aerial imagery subsequently revealed the presence of seven armoured combat vehicles in Boikivske. In Kalmiuske, further north, aerial imagery revealed the presence of 11 armoured combat vehicles and over 50 military-type trucks.
57 SMM Daily Report 1 April 2017
58 SMM Daily Report 21 June 2017
59 SMM Daily Report 10 April 2017
the SMM to open forward patrol bases in towns near these border areas, including Antratsyt, Sorokyne, Dovzhansk (formerly Sverdlovsk), Amvrosiivka, Novoazovsk and Boikivske.

As a result of such limitations – in addition to restrictions of freedom of movement – the scope of what the SMM was able to observe at the border remained constricted and could not be categorised as comprehensive, independent monitoring.

Border security remains a matter of national sovereignty and responsibility of States, and instrumental in preventing cross-border movement of persons, weapons and funds connected with criminal activities. By denying the Government access to about 400km of the border, those in control of these areas continued to interfere with this OSCE principle.

**Impediments to gathering information**

The SMM also encountered impediments to its obligation, under its mandate, to establish and report facts in response to specific incidents and reports of incidents, as well as to establish contact with members of the local population. For instance, civilians (mostly in areas not controlled by the Government) showed a marked reluctance to converse with the SMM, often citing an order from superiors or those in control as the reason, and at times expressing a fear of repercussions.

This was particularly the case when interacting with medical and hospital staff. The SMM continued to face difficulties corroborating reports of civilian casualties in its visits to hospitals in non-government-controlled areas, where staff often refused to provide the Mission with information concerning conflict-related deaths or injuries without the approval of those in control of these areas. The majority of refusals to share information were encountered at Hospital Number 2 in Horlivka, Kalinina Central Hospital in Donetsk city, Hospital Number 2 in Luhansk city and Luhansk Regional Hospital. On over 20 occasions (split evenly between Donetsk and Luhansk regions) the SMM could not confirm civilian casualties because medical staff were unwilling to share information.

Other restrictions to information occurred outside hospitals. In Sukhodilsk, a person at the building previously hosting the local administration refused to talk to the SMM without permission from those in control. A newspaper representative in Dovzhansk said she needed written permission from senior members of the so-called “LPR” to speak with the Mission. In Novosvitlivka, a woman told the SMM that she had been instructed not to give the SMM any information without permission from those in control in Luhansk city. On another occasion, while following up a report of a civilian casualty, a man in Zhovte told the SMM it needed to make an official request to “LPR” members to get information.

The SMM also faced occasional denials of access at centres for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in non-government-controlled areas. Staff at centres for IDPs in Donetsk city and Luhansk city repeatedly refused the SMM access to their buildings, saying that such access required approval by those in control of these areas.

**Disengagement areas**

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske on both sides of the contact line on a constant basis by patrolling and remote observation, as foreseen in the Framework Decision.

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60 OSCE Border Security and Management Concept
61 For example, on 22 June medical staff of Hospital Number 1 in Makiivka said they had been instructed not to communicate with the international community regarding civilian casualties (SMM Daily Report 23 June 2017).
62 SMM Daily Report 30 March 2017
63 SMM Daily Report 10 March 2017
The Mission’s access to these areas remained fully or partially restricted due to inaction of the sides in ensuring safe and secure access, and also due to the risk of mines and UXO.

Additional steps toward full implementation of the Framework Decision on disengagement, including demining, would considerably ease the movement of the SMM and that of other civilians across the contact line. For example, progress in disengagement in the Zolote-Pervomaisk area would make it possible for a crossing point to be re-opened. Disengagement in Stanytsia Luhanska would reduce the risk of civilians being caught up in exchanges of fire.

The deterioration of the wooden ramps at a broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge also posed both a civilian safety issue and an impediment to the SMM’s ability to monitor and move freely. On 21 June, the SMM assessed that a wooden support beam had broken almost entirely, causing the bridge to sag and creating instability when the beam bore weight. Over a dozen pedestrians fell or lost their footing. The Mission was unable to patrol this area until 23 June, after the ramp was repaired.

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64 SMM Daily Report 22 June 2017
Damage to Stanytsia Luhanska bridge wooden ramp observed on 21 June

**Mines, UXO and other explosive devices**

The threat from mines and UXO also persisted outside the disengagement areas. For example, the SMM was unable to proceed across the government-controlled Shchastia bridge due to the presence of anti-tank mines.\(^{65}\) The presence of anti-tank obstacles and mine hazards also prevented the SMM from travelling on the road between Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoints near the government-controlled settlements of Katerynivka and Popasna from both sides.\(^{66}\) The likely presence of mines and UXO prevented the Mission from patrolling to several other areas along the contact line, including critical routes such as the following:

- T0519 (Pikuzy to government-controlled Mariupol)
- M14 (Novoazovsk to Mariupol)
- H20 (Yasynuvata to government-controlled Kamianka)
- M03 (Debaltseve to Svitlodarsk)

Following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb caused by an explosive device, the Mission limited its patrolling to asphalt or concrete roads. This restriction affected the following operations:

- Visits and inspections of stored weapons at sites that were accessible only via unpaved roads or surfaces (approximately 75 per cent of designated sites)
- Vehicle-based ground patrolling activities within 15km of the contact line
- UAV flights requiring soft-surface launch or landing sites
- Camera maintenance and data retrieval activities requiring driving over unpaved surfaces

Other examples of mines, UXO and other explosive devices affecting SMM operations included:

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\(^{65}\) On 2 January, the SMM observed demining activities in a non-government-controlled area south-east of the bridge. As of mid-July, the section between the forward-most positions of the two sides remained possibly contaminated by mines and UXO.

\(^{66}\) In April the SMM observed demining activities along the road, but the Mission could not travel it due to patrolling restrictions following the incident of 23 April.
- An armed person told the SMM that an area near Veselohorivka where the Mission had regularly conducted monitoring had been mined two or three days previously.67
- Near a government checkpoint north of the Zolote disengagement area, along a road used by civilians, the SMM saw nylon strings connected to devices that appeared to be flare grenades.68
- While following fresh tracks assessed as possibly those of howitzers – in an area west of Luhansk city where an SMM mini-UAV had spotted four howitzers a few days earlier – the Mission observed for the first time a mine hazard sign.69
- In June, the SMM saw, for the first time, six anti-tank mines at a checkpoint north of Pervomaisk and 12 anti-tank mines at a position along a road the Mission uses to rotate personnel across the contact line west of the town.70

Despite agreements on the need for co-ordination of mine clearance by the JCCC and on who is responsible for removing the risk that these explosive devices pose, clearance was inadequate. Through reluctance to deliver on what has been agreed, the JCCC was not fully able to assist in ensuring SMM monitors’ safety and security.

**Unfounded allegations**

Unfounded allegations targeting the Mission have continued to emanate from media affiliated with groups in non-government-controlled areas, or directly from senior members of those groups themselves, most frequently claiming that the SMM reported inaccurately, but also challenging the SMM’s presence, claiming that the Mission violated its mandate and implying that the SMM’s safety was conditional on co-ordinating patrol plans in advance with those in control of these areas. Intentionally or otherwise, such statements served to undermine public confidence in the SMM, perhaps even emboldening hostility toward it. Their effect – the questioning of the SMM’s impartiality and objectiveness – potentially facilitated an environment in which the sides restricted the Mission’s movement (sometimes with violence or threats) with impunity, representing a considerable security risk for SMM teams in eastern Ukraine.

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67 SMM Daily Report 27 January 2017
68 SMM Daily Report 24 April 2017
69 SMM Daily Reports 30 May 2017 and 2 June 2017
70 SMM Daily Reports 3 June 2017 and 26 June 2017
Examples of allegations included:

- The SMM provided information to aid Ukrainian artillery targeting.71
- The SMM did not report tanks in government-controlled Avdiivka during a flare-up of violence in February.72
- The SMM “sabotaged” the disengagement process at Stanytsia Luhanska.
- The SMM deliberately avoided contact with members of “LPR” members.

In some cases where the SMM has established facts demonstrating freedom-of-movement restrictions involving violence or threats, members of armed groups have refused to accept the facts. Following an incident in Vesela Hora in which armed persons threatened to shoot SMM patrol members, not only did a senior member of the “LPR” member deny the facts, but other “LPR” members blamed the SMM for the incident. Similarly, following the shooting incident in Kozatske (see above), “DPR” members denied the established facts.

Effect of impediments on SMM’s support to efforts to improve humanitarian situation

Restrictions of the Mission’s freedom of movement affected its ability to support efforts to improve the situation of civilians living near the contact line. The foremost example was the SMM’s repeated efforts – in conjunction with the JCCC – to facilitate repairs and restore operations of the Donetsk Water Filtration Station, a source of water for hundreds of thousands of people on both sides of the contact line. The 24 February incident in Yasynuvata (see above) took place while the patrol was attempting to launch a UAV to monitor reported shelling of the filtration station. In March, armed persons at a checkpoint in Yasynuvata prevented the Mission from travelling toward the station, citing shelling in the area – the Mission, however, did not hear any shelling.73 A week later, the SMM and JCCC – along with staff of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine and four members of a “DPR” demining team – were outside the station when a bullet flew overhead, after which another shot was fired.74

In early March, denials of access in the area of government-controlled Nyzhnoteple made it impossible for the SMM to monitor and report on water facilities that allegedly required repair.75

Lack of access to other areas meant the Mission could not report on the difficult conditions facing civilians along the contact line, where humanitarian organizations have limited access and thus often rely on Mission reporting to inform their intervention. For example, after incidents in Pikuzy in February and early March – involving both small-arms fire and explosions near the SMM – the Mission did not visit the village again until 29 March due to security concerns.76 On another occasion, an armed man denied the Mission access to an area in Naberezhne where houses had reportedly been damaged by shelling.77 In April, an armed person prevented the SMM from talking to representatives of “Centre for Social Support and Administrative Services” near the entry-exit checkpoint in Kreminets.78

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71 This allegation, appearing in media in February, was again expressed in late May by a man in military-style clothing who claimed to be armed and was recording an SMM patrol north of Donetsk city on his mobile phone. See SMM Daily Report 29 May 2017.
72 The tanks were reported in SMM Daily Report 2 February 2017.
73 SMM Daily Report 13 March 2017
74 SMM Spot Report 18 March 2017
75 See, for example, SMM Daily Reports 3 March 2017 and 8 March 2017.
76 Even afterward, the SMM did not travel to certain areas of Pikuzy allegedly most affected by shelling. Two months later, for example, residents approached the Mission to report damages to houses on Kirova Street, but the SMM was unable to visit the sites. 77 SMM Daily Report 30 March 2017
78 SMM Daily Report 10 April 2017
Contribution of the JCCC

The SMM regularly requested that the JCCC assist in ensuring rapid response to impediments to the Mission’s monitoring and verification, as stipulated by the signatories of the Addendum and the Framework Decision. The Mission’s reporting continued to provide information whereupon the JCCC could and should act to respond to and remedy violations. In addition, the SMM JCCC liaison team maintained daily interaction with the JCCC headquarters in Soledar and co-ordinated between the JCCC and SMM patrols encountering these violations on the ground. Nearly every day, the SMM’s liaison team urged the JCCC to contribute to immediate resolution of impediments encountered by SMM patrols, in parallel with actions undertaken by patrol teams with the relevant JCCC personnel on the ground.

On about 40 occasions intervention by the JCCC made it possible for the SMM, though with some delay, to exercise its freedom of movement. The JCCC did not successfully intervene, however, in the majority of the nearly 500 cases of restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement. Moreover, the JCCC was not comprehensively able to co-ordinate demining work (as foreseen in the TCG mine action decision), particularly in and around the agreed disengagement areas, where the JCCC contributed little to the lifting of restrictions by co-ordinating clearance of mines and UXO.

The SMM repeatedly reminded the JCCC of its tasks assigned by the signatories to co-ordinate demining work, to provide rapid response to impediments to SMM monitoring and verification activities, and to assist in ensuring SMM monitors’ safety and security. Lack of mutual trust between the two sides of the JCCC seemed to hinder comprehensive co-ordination of those tasks. The JCCC’s Ukrainian and Russian Federation officers continued to work mostly in parallel, rather than jointly. The SMM sometimes noted that officers of the JCCC present when forces and formations imposed restrictions in the disengagement areas did nothing to contribute to remedying these violations. Instead they merely transferred information on the violations to their chain of command or to “DPR” and “LPR” members.79

For example, on 20 January, armed men in Pikuzy denied the SMM access to a road in the direction of Mariupol and refused to remove anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. The Russian representative to the JCCC, who was also present, said he could not facilitate the SMM’s freedom of movement.80 On 20 June, a similar situation occurred, when armed formations in non-government-controlled areas refused to provide security guarantees for the Mission to travel to Pikuzy, and the JCCC was unable to effectively intervene.81 The general lack of joint action to remedy restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement stood in contrast to the JCCC’s capacity for co-ordinating adherence to the ceasefire on many occasions to facilitate repairs of critical infrastructure.

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79 The SMM did note, however, several instances in which the Ukrainian representation to the JCCC informed the Mission regarding specific actions taken by the Ukrainian Armed Forces (including investigations and reprimands or removal of personnel) in response to incidents, particularly during May and June. It remained unclear, however, what, if any, concrete steps were taken.
80 SMM Daily Report 21 January 2017
81 SMM Daily Report 21 June 2017
Meeting at JCCC headquarters in Soledar

The Mission's security was also put at risk for a week in late June, when armed men securing the SMM's office in Donetsk city were withdrawn. The Mission then requested that the JCCC provide an around-the-clock presence at the office until further notice. The Russian representative to the JCCC replied that “DPR” members planned to reinstate security arrangements, which then occurred on 2 July, though the action was described as temporary.82

Conclusions

The SMM’s freedom of movement remained restricted despite the provisions of the SMM’s mandate and successive additional agreements reached within the TCG in Minsk obliging the sides to refrain from restricting the Mission’s freedom of movement. These restrictions and reluctance to remedy them indicate a lack of readiness to be monitored, as well as to take steps needed to increase trust, particularly with respect to verification of the withdrawal of weapons. In some cases during this reporting period the SMM assessed that there was an intention to hide violations of the ceasefire regime or the presence of weapons in violation of respective withdrawal lines.

The SMM encountered a similar number of restrictions of its freedom of movement compared with the second half of 2016, but noted a significant increase in incidents involving violence and threats against or in the proximity of the Mission in areas not controlled by the Government. Those in control of these areas were also responsible for over 75 per cent of total restrictions. There is an urgent need on the part of those who have committed to ensuring the Mission’s security to reverse this trend.

Freedom of movement remained a major impediment to the Mission’s efforts to monitor and verify the withdrawal of weapons. Overall, in this context, the SMM faced more restrictions in areas not controlled by the Government than in government-controlled areas. The most
problematic areas were around Donetsk city and the eastern bank of the Kalmius river in the southern Donetsk region.\textsuperscript{83}

The threat of mines and UXO, particularly in the disengagement areas, posed a significant challenge to SMM monitoring during the reporting period. Large portions of the disengagement areas remained inaccessible to the Mission. The Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations demonstrated a reluctance to remove mines, as they have committed to under successive TCG decisions.

Safe and secure access is explicitly provided for in the Mission’s mandate. It is also a measure of normalization, which the Mission is tasked to promote and is explicitly agreed on by the signatories of the Minsk agreements. Through adherence to the provisions regarding the SMM’s freedom of movement, a basis for building mutual confidence is meant to be created on both sides of the contact line. Those who restricted the SMM’s freedom of movement eroded that confidence.

Moreover, those who impeded the implementation of the Mission’s mandate also defied the consensus decisions of the 57 participating States of the OSCE and violated commitments undertaken in the various Minsk agreements. Declared intentions to deliver on these commitments ring hollow when not translated into concrete actions on the ground. Until genuine steps are taken to deal with those responsible and to remedy violations, the SMM’s execution of its mandate – and the safety of its monitors – will remain in jeopardy.

\textsuperscript{83} From May till late June, about 90 per cent of the violations in the southern Donetsk region took place in four areas: Markyne, Kozatske, Sosnivske and Siedove (including Novoazovsk in late June).
Annex 1: Restrictions and other impediments, July to December 2016

Summary

From July to December 2016 the SMM encountered almost 500 restrictions of its freedom of movement – nearly 30 per cent fewer than in the previous six months.\(^8^4\) About 70 per cent of these occurred in areas not controlled by the Government.\(^8^5\)

The decrease in the number of restrictions from the first half to the second half of 2016 was partly due to the fact that the SMM experienced fewer restrictions of its freedom of movement during its visits to border areas not under government control. In addition, in monitoring the three agreed disengagement areas, beginning in September, the Mission dedicated considerable resources. While the overall number of restrictions decreased, SMM efforts to monitor and verify withdrawal of weapons were hindered more frequently, particularly in government-controlled areas in November and December. Overall, December was the only month in 2016 when the SMM faced more restrictions of its freedom of movement in government-controlled areas than in areas not controlled by the Government.

Types of restrictions

Sixty-two per cent of all violations constituted denial of access, 18 per cent constituted conditional access, 12 per cent were delays, and eight per cent were other impediments.

\(^8^4\) SMM Thematic report: Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement and other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate January to June 2016

\(^8^5\) Restrictions due to mines and UXO – including in and around the three agreed disengagement areas – are not included in the statistical data for this annex.
Overview of incidents

The SMM faced restrictions on about 490 occasions, compared with about 700 in the previous six months. Of these, about 150 occurred in government-controlled areas and about 330 in areas not controlled by the Government (about 180 in Donetsk region and about 150 in Luhansk). In ten cases, including some incidents involving jamming of UAVs, the precise source was either unclear or in areas not under control of either side. Monthly rates of restrictions, particularly denials of access in areas not controlled by the Government, declined consistently during the reporting period.

The proportion of incidents involving denial of access increased from 56 per cent in the previous reporting period to 62 per cent. Out of about 300 denials of access, 36 per cent occurred in government-controlled areas and 64 per cent in areas not controlled by the Government.

Some restrictions involved threats or violence. On 29 July, for example, armed persons stopped the SMM south of Lukove, pointing their guns at Mission members and ordering them to leave the area. On 22 August a senior “DPR” member told the SMM that he would order an examination of the case. Less than three hours later, however, armed persons at the same checkpoint aggressively demanded to search the SMM vehicles while pointing a machine-gun at Mission members. On 19 September the same senior “DPR” member told the SMM that an investigation had been launched. However, no further information was ever provided. In this context of apparent impunity those responsible are likely to continue perpetrating violations.

This was one of 19 instances of threatening behaviour, which included three other incidents in which the SMM was threatened at gunpoint:

- At a Ukrainian Armed Forces position between government-controlled Lopaskyne and Lobacheve an armed man threatened an SMM monitor at gunpoint;
- Between Sorokyne (formerly Krasnodon) and Izvaryne, two men wearing camouflage uniforms pointed assault rifles at the SMM and shouted in an aggressive manner;
- Near Styla, as the SMM was confirming the presence of two anti-personnel mines attached to a tree, an armed person carrying an automatic rifle approached the patrol

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86 SMM Spot Report 29 July 2016
87 SMM Spot Report 23 August 2016
and said that he would detonate the mines the next time the OSCE came to look at them;

- Near Sosnivske, an armed man, from approximately 30m away, pointed his automatic rifle at an SMM patrol and gestured for the patrol to leave the area; and
- While on the first floor of a mine shaft tower at the Oktiabr mine, the site of an SMM camera, the Mission heard movement in the upper levels. After the SMM identified itself, patrol members heard the sound of a rifle being cocked and a man shouting "OSCE get out, or I will shoot!" (in Russian) from the tower's upper levels. The SMM left the area.88

On at least eight occasions shelling or shooting occurred near SMM patrols, which included one incident in which an SMM vehicle was struck by a bullet. Examples included:

- The SMM had to relocate its forward patrol base team in government-controlled Svitlodarsk to Kramatorsk, as outgoing artillery and mortar fire occurred near the base the previous night;
- The SMM had to evacuate its forward patrol base in Shchastia due to the proximity of mortar shelling;89
- In Zolote an SMM patrol heard a whistling sound near them, and bullets impacted in the patrol's vicinity;90
- While travelling toward the last Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint in Marinka before entering non-government-controlled areas, an SMM vehicle was struck by a bullet;91
- An IFV (BMP-2) firing a 30mm cannon blocked the road leading to Sakhanka, forcing the SMM to turn around; and
- Positioned at a checkpoint in Verkhnoshyroivske, the SMM saw and heard nearly 20 explosions in its proximity, and had to leave the area immediately.92

Passing through checkpoints

The SMM's freedom of movement was restricted at checkpoints along the contact line on almost 160 occasions (including over 80 denials of access). Of those, 27 occurred in government-controlled areas and over 130 in areas not controlled by the Government (over 75 in Donetsk and 55 in Luhansk).

At a checkpoint in non-government-controlled areas south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, armed men consistently denied the SMM access to the bridge from 1 to 26 July. This limited the SMM's monitoring of the aftermath of reported shelling incidents and of the situation of civilians in the area. The SMM also frequently encountered impediments at checkpoints in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region: Verkhnoshyroivske (11 times), Olenivka (ten times), and in Horlivka (ten times).

At checkpoints, armed individuals continued to restrict the SMM's freedom of movement in various ways: demanding to see the SMM's patrol plan and denying passage when the SMM refused to comply (24 occasions); searching SMM vehicles before allowing the SMM to proceed (14 occasions); or denying passage when the SMM refused to be escorted or allowing the SMM to proceed on condition of being escorted (nine occasions).

Visiting border areas outside government control

88 SMM Spot Report 8 October 2016
89 SMM Spot Report 31 August 2016
90 SMM Spot Report 16 October 2016
91 SMM Spot Report 28 October 2016
92 SMM Spot Report 10 November 2016
The SMM conducted 408 visits to border areas not controlled by the Government, including 226 visits to border crossing points (91 in Donetsk region and 135 in Luhansk region). Those in control of these areas restricted the SMM’s freedom of movement on 40 of these visits (ten in Donetsk and 30 in Luhansk). The rate of such restrictions, however, was lower than in the previous reporting period, when armed men restricted the SMM’s freedom of movement on 82 out of 253 visits to border areas.

For example, in September, the SMM was able to reach parts of the border in areas not controlled by the Government in Luhansk region for the first time for several months, after which it conducted several more visits to these areas without restriction. In late August on several occasions, “LPR” members at border crossing points and checkpoints told the SMM they had received instructions not to stop the SMM. In non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, all ten freedom of movement restrictions occurred when armed men denied access to document-checking stations at border crossing points. In November and December, the SMM faced just three restrictions of its freedom of movement (including two denials of access to document-checking stations) during its 122 visits to border areas not controlled by the Government.

A single freedom of movement restriction in government-controlled areas occurred at a checkpoint 1km from the Krasnoilsk border crossing point (Chernivtsi region) on 5 December, when border guard personnel denied the SMM access to the border.

Monitoring withdrawal of weapons

The Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations continued to hinder the SMM’s efforts to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, restricting the Mission’s movement on 121 occasions when it attempted to access the following areas:

- Heavy weapons holding areas (56 occasions, including 45 denials of access);
- Permanent weapons storage sites (five occasions, including three denials of access);
- Military-style compounds (55 occasions, including 47 denials of access); and
- Training areas (five occasions, including four denials of access).

These restrictions included the following:

- An unarmed guard denied the SMM access to a facility in Olkhovatka. At the same time, an SMM mini-UAV spotted the presence of military-type trucks and a command vehicle on the premises;
- The SMM heard 80 explosions and uncountable bursts, and assessed them as a live-fire exercise involving tanks, artillery and IFVs (BMP) at a training area in Uspenka (Luhansk region). The SMM attempted to visit the area, but armed persons denied access.

On some occasions restrictions were imposed when the SMM observed weapons in violation of respective withdrawal lines or outside designated storage sites:

- Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied the SMM access to a compound near Makedonivka where four multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 120mm) could be seen from outside the gate;

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93 On 1 September the SMM was able to reach the border area of Makariv Yar (formerly Parkhomenko) for the first time since 30 May. The SMM subsequently visited that area four times without restrictions, in contrast to the period from January to August 2016, when armed men there denied access 11 times. On 9 September the SMM was able to cross from Diakove toward the border area of Leonove (formerly Chervonyi Zhovten) with no restrictions for the first time since April 2015. The SMM subsequently reached the area three times – twice without restriction and once on condition of being escorted.
• Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied the SMM access to a compound in Khlibodarivka, after which the Mission saw six towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) being transported toward a nearby railroad line.94

In November and December the Ukrainian Armed Forces denied the SMM access to heavy weapons holding areas and military compounds on six occasions after the SMM refused to reveal the nationalities of patrol members. At two heavy weapons holding areas, soldiers allowed the SMM access only on the condition that no Russian nationals were in the patrol. During the reporting period the SMM faced more restrictions to monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of weapons in government-controlled areas (83 occasions) compared with the previous six months (31 occasions), and more than in areas not controlled by the Government (38 occasions, roughly evenly divided between Donetsk and Luhansk).

Remote observation

On five occasions SMM mini-UAVs were targeted with small-arms fire while flying – in all cases, no damage was sustained:

• On 25 July over Kalynove;
• On 25 July over Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov);95
• On 30 July over government-controlled Lobacheve;
• On 30 July over Debaltseve; and
• On 10 August over government-controlled Novobakhmutivka.96

On four other occasions, small-arms fire was heard when the SMM conducted mini-UAV flights.97 Violators jammed the Mission’s UAVs on 11 occasions (including three times over disengagement areas). On six occasions the SMM was prevented from launching a UAV – three times by “LPR” members and three times by the Ukrainian Armed Forces – sometimes with the perpetrators threatening to shoot the UAV down if it was launched.98

Restrictions to monitoring of withdrawal of weapons, by area

[ Diagram showing 69% Government-controlled areas and 31% Areas outside government control ]

94 SMM Daily Reports 5 September 2016 and 6 September 2016
95 SMM Spot Report 26 July 2016
96 SMM Daily Report 11 August 2016
97 In Novooleksandrivka on 21 August, near government-controlled Bohorodychne on 24 September, in government-controlled parts of Zolote-4 on 1 November, and in government-controlled Vyskryva on 18 November 2016.
98 In Kalynove on 15 July, in Molodizhne on 23 July, in government-controlled Trokhizbenka on 31 July, in government-controlled parts of Zolote on 19 August, and government-controlled Krymske on 4 November, and government-controlled Shchastia on 16 November.
The SMM’s static cameras were also damaged on both sides of the contact line:

- On 3 September the SMM observed that cables to the camera at the Oktyabr mine had been cut, equipment damaged, and other pieces of equipment stolen;
- On 18 September the SMM observed damage to its camera in Shyrokyne consistent with heavy-machine-gun or small-arms fire.

Camera observation was also hindered in disengagement areas:

- On the night of 30 November–1 December, a searchlight directed at the SMM camera north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge from a location consistent with an “LPR” position south of the bridge obscured the camera’s view;
- On 6 December, the SMM observed damage to the power supply box for the camera system in Petrivske, which the Mission assessed was the result of tampering.

Disengagement areas

The SMM monitored the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske on both sides of the contact line on a constant basis by means of patrolling and remote observation, as foreseen in the Framework Decision.

The Mission’s access to these areas remained fully or partially restricted due to inaction of the sides in ensuring safe and secure access, and also due to the risk of mines and UXO:

- In the disengagement area of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM observed no demining activities in most of the reporting period. The SMM’s access was limited almost exclusively to an official crossing route, where thousands of people crossed every day, while the sides kept their forward positions equipped and staffed, about 400m apart.
- In the disengagement area of Zolote some demining was conducted and new mine hazard signs were placed. In October the SMM was able to patrol, for the first time since April 2016, on a main road between Zolote and Pervomaisk through a section of the disengagement area, although the SMM did not have full access to the rest of the disengagement area.
- In the disengagement area of Petrivske, unlike the two abovementioned areas, the SMM was never able to use a route directly connecting both sides of the contact line, due to the presence of mines. Demining on the road connecting Petrivske and government-controlled Bohdanivka remains necessary for the SMM to conduct patrolling and observation in and near the disengagement area, as stipulated in the Framework Decision.

The threat persisted outside the disengagement areas, as well. For example, the SMM was unable to proceed across the Shchastia bridge from either side of the contact line due to the presence of anti-tank mines on both sides. The presence of anti-tank obstacles and mine hazards also prevented the SMM from travelling on the road between Ukrainian Armed

99 On 31 December, on the non-government-controlled side of the disengagement area, the SMM observed demining activities on a path leading to the railway bridge. On the same day a Russian Federation officer of the JCCC gave the SMM documents regarding demining in the area. The SMM has been unable to proceed the full length of paths leading to the railway bridge due to the remaining threat of mines and UXO.

100 On 29 December, the SMM observed demining activities on the path leading east from the main road (in non-government-controlled parts of the disengagement area). The SMM also received papers with general information on demining in the area. The SMM is unable to proceed the full length of the path due to the remaining threat of mines and UXO.

101 On 26 December the SMM had observed that members of “LPR” members had removed anti-tank mines from the east side (northbound) of the road leading to north. On 2 January 2017, however, the SMM observed anti-tank mines placed across the road in non-government-controlled areas.
Forces checkpoints near Katerynivka and Popasna from both sides. At a checkpoint in Zhovte, the SMM was unable to proceed to the Siverskyi Donets river due to the presence of improvised obstacles of tree branches and a mine hazard sign on a road.

**Persistent impediments**

The SMM was persistently denied access to several areas where the Mission had observed ceasefire violations or weapons in violation of respective withdrawal lines. As noted above, armed persons continuously prevented the SMM from crossing the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge for more than three weeks in July. On some occasions, the persons said that they had received instructions to do this, while on other occasions they refused to even speak to the SMM. This attitude to the SMM became particularly evident following an outbreak of fighting in the Svitlodarsk-Debaltseve area in June 2016.

In the first half of July, for instance, armed persons repeatedly prevented the SMM from talking to residents in Pikuzy, or from even stopping in the village.

SMM access to Yasynuvata was denied on four consecutive days from 28 August. At the same time, the SMM recorded one of the highest number of ceasefire violations in the area of Avdiivka-Yasynuvata- Donetsk airport for a single week – just before a renewed commitment to cease fire for the new school year took effect.

The SMM was denied access to much of the eastern bank of the Kalmius river, including the settlements of Sosnivske, Kaplany, and Mykolaivka. Restrictions occurred in non-government-controlled areas north-east of Mariupol almost 80 times.

Persistent denials of access also hindered SMM efforts to monitor and verify withdrawal of weapons. Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel prevented the SMM from entering one heavy weapons holding area on eight consecutive occasions, and the Mission was unable to access the area from 30 September. Armed persons denied the SMM access to a compound in Luhansk city three days in July.

During the period of September-December, the SMM conducted almost-daily patrols along several specific routes, including those referenced above (the Shchastia bridge and the Popasna-Katerynivka road), where the presence of anti-tank obstacles and mine hazards prevented the SMM from travelling. Although these regularly recurring restrictions were of a different nature than unanticipated incidents – which forced the Mission to adjust its patrol plans, and which sometimes even affected the security of SMM monitors – they nevertheless represented an obstacle to fulfilment of the Mission’s mandate. The SMM thus continued to urge the sides to take action to permit full access along these routes for SMM monitors and other civilians.

**Contribution of the JCCC**

On at least 20 occasions, intervention by the JCCC made it possible for the SMM, with some delay, to exercise its freedom of movement. On 12 September, for example, when a Ukrainian Armed Forces commander denied the SMM access to a permanent storage site, the Mission informed the JCCC and after 35 minutes the SMM was allowed to enter. On 14 October, when an armed man at a checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge denied the SMM access, the Mission informed the JCCC; after 15 minutes the same man let the SMM proceed. On 3 November, when armed men prevented the SMM from passing through a checkpoint in Verkhnoshyrokovske, the SMM was allowed to pass after 37 minutes, due to JCCC intervention.

The JCCC did not successfully intervene, however, in many other cases of violations of SMM freedom of movement. On 2 October, for example, Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel
denied the SMM access to a compound in government-controlled Aslanove. The SMM informed the relevant JCCC officer, who subsequently did not answer further telephone calls from the Mission. On 6 November, an armed man denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint in Staromykhailivka; despite the intervention of an accompanying Russian Federation officer of the JCCC, access was not granted.

Conclusion

From July to December the SMM encountered fewer restrictions of its freedom of movement compared with the first half of 2016 and noted a general trend of a decreasing number of restrictions since September, particularly in areas not controlled by the Government. This was partly due to fewer restrictions encountered at border areas not controlled by the Government. Freedom of movement remained a major impediment to the Mission’s efforts to monitor and verify the withdrawal of weapons, particularly in November and December. Overall, the SMM faced more restrictions in areas not controlled by the Government than in government-controlled areas during every month of 2016 but one: 68 per cent of the restrictions occurred in non-government-controlled areas.
Charts and maps (for Annex 1)

Restrictions and Other Impediments, 2016

By month and control

By month and category
### Violence and threats against or in the presence of the SMM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Summary of event</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29 July</td>
<td>Lukove</td>
<td>NGCA</td>
<td>Guns pointed at SMM.</td>
<td>Spot Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 July</td>
<td>Weapons storage site</td>
<td>NGCA</td>
<td>Rifle loaded during delay of SMM access.</td>
<td>Daily Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 August</td>
<td>Lobacheve</td>
<td>GCA</td>
<td>SMM threatened at gunpoint.</td>
<td>Spot Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 August</td>
<td>Zolote-5</td>
<td>NGCA</td>
<td>SMM threatened with “arrest”.</td>
<td>Daily Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 August</td>
<td>Sorokyne</td>
<td>NGCA</td>
<td>Rifles pointed at SMM.</td>
<td>Daily Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 August</td>
<td>Pokrovsk</td>
<td>GCA</td>
<td>Reckless driving near SMM vehicle.</td>
<td>Daily Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 August</td>
<td>Lukove</td>
<td>NGCA</td>
<td>Machine-gun pointed at SMM.</td>
<td>Spot Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 September</td>
<td>Styia</td>
<td>NGCA</td>
<td>Threat to detonate mines near SMM.</td>
<td>Daily Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 September</td>
<td>Sosnivske</td>
<td>NGCA</td>
<td>Rifle pointed at SMM.</td>
<td>Daily Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 September</td>
<td>Fashchivka</td>
<td>NGCA</td>
<td>Threat to detain SMM.</td>
<td>Daily Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 September</td>
<td>Staromykhailivka</td>
<td>NGCA</td>
<td>Threat to handcuff SMM in a cellar.</td>
<td>Daily Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 October</td>
<td>Oktiabr mine</td>
<td>NGCA</td>
<td>Rifle cocked, and threat to shoot SMM.</td>
<td>Spot Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 October</td>
<td>Weapons holding area</td>
<td>GCA</td>
<td>Rifle loaded during denial of SMM access.</td>
<td>Daily Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 October</td>
<td>Marinka / Oleksandrivka</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>SMM vehicle struck by a bullet.</td>
<td>Spot Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 December</td>
<td>Troitske</td>
<td>GCA</td>
<td>Threat to assault SMM.</td>
<td>Daily Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 December</td>
<td>Bairachky</td>
<td>NGCA</td>
<td>Yelling at SMM with finger on trigger of rifle.</td>
<td>Daily Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 December</td>
<td>Pikuzy</td>
<td>NGCA</td>
<td>SMM vehicle struck by hand and weapon pointed at it.</td>
<td>Daily Report</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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102 Incidents involving small-arms fire assessed as targeting SMM UAVs are not included.
103 Non-government-controlled area
104 Government-controlled area
Annex 2: Charts and maps

Restrictions and Other Impediments, 2017

By month and control

By month and category
Annex 3: Table of incidents involving violence and threats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Summary of event</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 January</td>
<td>Lopaskyne</td>
<td>GCA</td>
<td>Pistol raised into the air to scare off SMM.</td>
<td>Spot Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 February</td>
<td>Kalynove</td>
<td>NGCA</td>
<td>Rifle pointed at SMM. Shot fired near SMM.</td>
<td>Spot Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 February</td>
<td>Donetsk city</td>
<td>NGCA</td>
<td>Car strikes SMM vehicle twice.</td>
<td>Daily Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 February</td>
<td>Pikuzy</td>
<td>NGCA</td>
<td>Warning shots fired near SMM.</td>
<td>Daily Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 February</td>
<td>Yasynuvata</td>
<td>NGCA</td>
<td>Shots fired near SMM. Weapons pointed at SMM and UAV taken.</td>
<td>Spot Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 February</td>
<td>Pikuzy</td>
<td>NGCA</td>
<td>Warning shots fired near SMM.</td>
<td>Spot Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 March</td>
<td>Troitske</td>
<td>GCA</td>
<td>Threats to shoot SMM vehicle.</td>
<td>Daily Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 March</td>
<td>Khreshchatytske</td>
<td>NGCA</td>
<td>Warning shots fired near SMM.</td>
<td>Daily Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 March</td>
<td>Weapons storage site</td>
<td>NGCA</td>
<td>SMM ordered to leave area in a threatening manner.</td>
<td>Daily Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 March</td>
<td>Verkhnosyrokivske</td>
<td>NGCA</td>
<td>Threats to shoot the next SMM patrol.</td>
<td>Daily Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 March</td>
<td>Oktiabr mine</td>
<td>NGCA</td>
<td>Threat to “arrest” SMM. SMM detained for 11 minutes.</td>
<td>Daily Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 March</td>
<td>Petrovskyi district (Donetsk city)</td>
<td>NGCA</td>
<td>Round of rifle chambered near SMM.</td>
<td>Daily Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 March</td>
<td>Znamianka</td>
<td>NGCA</td>
<td>Warning shot fired near SMM.</td>
<td>Spot Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 March</td>
<td>Kozatske</td>
<td>NGCA</td>
<td>Warning shots fired near SMM.</td>
<td>Spot Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 April</td>
<td>Sakhanka</td>
<td>NGCA</td>
<td>Shots fired near SMM.</td>
<td>Spot Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 April</td>
<td>Orikhove-Donetsk</td>
<td>GCA</td>
<td>Threat to drag SMM members of certain nationality from vehicles if present on next patrol.</td>
<td>Daily Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 April</td>
<td>Staryi Aidar</td>
<td>GCA</td>
<td>Intoxicated soldiers demand SMM personal information and order SMM to exit vehicles.</td>
<td>Daily Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 May</td>
<td>Petrivske</td>
<td>NGCA</td>
<td>SMM patrol member sexually harassed.</td>
<td>Daily Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 May</td>
<td>Sosnivske</td>
<td>NGCA</td>
<td>Shot fired near SMM.</td>
<td>Daily Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 May</td>
<td>Verkhnozyrokivske</td>
<td>NGCA</td>
<td>Shots fired near SMM.</td>
<td>Daily Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 May</td>
<td>Bezimenne</td>
<td>NGCA</td>
<td>Stone and piece of metal waved during shouting at SMM.</td>
<td>Daily Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 May</td>
<td>Dokuchaievsk</td>
<td>NGCA</td>
<td>Smoke-generating device thrown close to SMM vehicle.</td>
<td>Spot Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 June</td>
<td>Yasynuvata</td>
<td>NGCA</td>
<td>SMM shot at and violently attacked.</td>
<td>Spot Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 June</td>
<td>Vesela Hora</td>
<td>NGCA</td>
<td>Threat to shoot SMM monitors.</td>
<td>Daily Report</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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105 Incidents involving small-arms fire assessed as targeting SMM UAVs are not included.
The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs, and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: forward patrol bases from which SMM staff has temporarily relocated since 27 September 2016 based on recommendations of security experts from participating States.)
Annex 353

OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information Received as of 19:30 (24 July 2017)
Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 23 July 2017

KYIV  
24 July 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

Between the evenings of 21 and 22 July the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 22 and 23 July the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region compared with the previous 24 hours. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas; it recorded ceasefire violations in the Zolote disengagement area. Its access remained restricted there and elsewhere, including in Staromykhailivka and again in Novoazovsk, where military-type vehicles were seen travelling from the Novoazovsk area towards the border with the Russian Federation and vice versa. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. It continued to observe fresh craters and recent excavations in the area of Kruta Balka and in Olenivka. The SMM visited four border areas not under government control in Luhansk and Donetsk regions. The Mission monitored a strike at a coal mine in Pryvillia and a public gathering near Kharkiv.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region between the evenings of 21 and 22 July, including a similar number of explosions (about 75), compared with the previous reporting period (about 70 explosions). It recorded more ceasefire violations, though a similar number of explosions (about 70), between the evenings of 22 and 23 July compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the evening of 21 July, while in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), in about one hour, the SMM heard six undetermined explosions and at least 18 shots and bursts of small-arms, heavy-machine-gun and anti-aircraft cannon (ZU-23, 23mm) fire 5-6km south and south-west. On the evening of 22 July, in about two hours, the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions 8-10km north-west and 11 bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire 5-8km west and south-west.

On the evening and night of 21-22 July, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), in about five hours, the SMM heard 66 undetermined explosions and about 70 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 5-9km south-east. On the evening of 22 July, in about two hours, the SMM heard about 40 undetermined explosions and about 60 bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-7km south-east.

On the evening and night of 21-22 July the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, two undetermined explosions, 74 tracer rounds in flight from east to west, one rocket-assisted projectile in flight from south-west to north-east, six tracer rounds in flight from east to west, three tracer rounds from west to east, followed by aggregated totals of 20 tracer rounds (11 from east to west and nine from

https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/331856
west to east), one undetermined explosion and four rocket-assisted projectiles in flight (three from east to west and one from south-east to north-west), all at unknown distances north and north-east. On the evening and night of 22-23 July, the same camera recorded, in sequence, three tracer rounds in flight from east to west, two undetermined explosions, eight tracer rounds in flight from east to west, two tracer rounds in flight from west to east, followed by aggregated totals of 250 tracer rounds in flight (169 from east to west and 81 from west to east), 15 rocket-assisted projectiles in flight (eight from east to west and seven from west to east) and five undetermined explosions, all at unknown distances north.

On 22 July, positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard five undetermined explosions and four bursts of small-arms fire 3-7km west and south-west. On 23 July, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions and 29 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 2-4km west, and two undetermined explosions 2-3km north.

On the evening of 21 July the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded one illumination flare in flight from east to west and one illumination flare in flight from west to east 3-4km east-south-east. On the evening and night of 22-23 July, the same camera recorded, in sequence, three explosions assessed as impacts, ten projectiles in flight from north to south, 16 projectiles in flight from south to north, two airbursts, two projectiles in vertical flight, two illumination flares in vertical flight, 27 projectiles in flight from south to north, ten projectiles in flight from north to south, two explosions assessed as impacts, two illumination flares in vertical flight and two projectiles in flight from west to east, all 4-5km east-south-east.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations between the evenings of 21 and 22 July, all in government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), including more explosions (about 70), compared with the previous reporting period (17 explosions). Between the evenings of 22 and 23 July, it recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including two explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the evening of 21 July, positioned in Popasna, in about one hour and a half the SMM heard about 60 explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds and recoilless-gun (SPG-9, 73mm) fire, about 90 shots of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) cannon (30mm) and automatic-grenade-launcher (type unknown) fire and about 1,200 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-4km south-east. On the night of 22-23 July, the SMM heard 29 shots of small-arms fire 3-5km north and one burst of small-arms fire 3km east.

On 23 July, positioned 1.5km north-west of government-controlled Troitske (69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 5-8km south-east.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanitsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41 km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 21 July, the SMM camera in government-controlled Zolote recorded one projectile in flight from south to north 3-5km south-east, assessed as inside the
disengagement area.

On 22 and 23 July, while in the disengagement areas near Zolote and Stanytsia Luhanska, and on 23 July while in government-controlled Bohdanivka (41 km south-west of Donetsk), west of the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation. The SMM remained unable to access its camera in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske due to security considerations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Memorandum, the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, in non-government controlled areas on 20 July, the SMM saw an “LPR” member carrying a rocket-propelled-grenade launcher (RPG-29, 105mm) at a checkpoint in Vesela Hora (17km north of Luhansk).

In government-controlled areas on 23 July, the SMM saw 22 stationary self-propelled howitzers (ten 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm and 12 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) loaded on four cargo trains facing north at a railway station in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north-east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, in government-controlled areas on 23 July, the SMM saw 19 stationary tanks (T-64) loaded on four cargo trains facing north at the same railway station in Bakhmut.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] in the security zone. On 22 July, in government-controlled areas, the SMM saw: two stationary armoured personnel carriers (APC) (MT-LB) in Myrna Dolyyna (67km north-west of Luhansk); ten IFVs (BMP-2) 1.5km north-east of Oleksandropolia (71km west of Luhansk); one APC (BRDM-2) and one IFV (BMP variant) 3km south-west of Komshuvakha (68km west of Luhansk) travelling north; two IFVs (BMP-2) in a dug out position at a checkpoint 3km north-east of Popasna; eight stationary IFVs (three BMP-2 and five BMP-1), five IFVs (BMP-1) travelling north-east, including one that was being towed by an armoured recovery vehicle, and one armoured recovery vehicle (BMP-1KSh) travelling south-west, in the southern outskirts of Popasna; and two stationary IFVs (BMP-2) near Zolote-2 (60km west of Luhansk). On 23 July, the SMM saw one IFV (BMP-2) travelling east and fresh tracks assessed as those of IFV (BMP variant) and APC (MT-LB) on road T-1316, in the western outskirts of Zolote.

On 22 July, the SMM saw multiple military-type vehicles travelling across a “DPR”-controlled checkpoint on road E-58 north of Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) while it was positioned there for about three hours due to a denial of access*. The SMM saw, in sequence: one APC (BTR-80) travelling in the direction of Novoazovsk; a convoy of four police-type cars, two black sport utility vehicles with flashing lights, nine vans and five military-type trucks (many of which had the inscription “T67” and appeared to be transporting men in military-style attire) travelling in the direction of the border with the Russian Federation; one empty military-type truck travelling in the direction of Novoazovsk; two black sport utility vehicles with flashing lights travelling in the direction of the border with the Russian Federation; five previously observed empty military-type trucks travelling in the direction of Novoazovsk; two empty military-type trucks travelling in the direction of the border with the Russian Federation; and two empty military-type trucks travelling in the direction of Novoazovsk.

https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/331856
The SMM continued to observe fresh craters and recent excavations. On 21 July in “DPR”-controlled Kruta Balka (16km north of Donetsk), an SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted: 15 fresh craters assessed as caused by mortar (82mm) rounds, one of which was 30m from a civilian property; two-three freshly dug trenches on the north-western outskirts of Vasynuvata and at least 20 fresh craters assessed as caused by mortar (82mm and 120mm) rounds; over one hundred fresh craters in a forested area and amongst agricultural fields 3-4km north of Kruta Balka, including those assessed as caused by mortar (82mm and 120mm) and the impacts of artillery (122mm and 152mm) rounds; three-four probable impact craters assessed as caused by mortar (82mm) rounds in the area of Donetsk Water Filtration Station and multiple newly dug trenches and bunkers, two of which were covered with camouflage netting, on both sides of road H-20, about 1km north of the Donetsk Water Filtration Station.

On 22 July, the SMM observed recent excavations – a mound of fresh earth and an excavator – 50m north of a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled in Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to monitor the situation of civilians living near the contact line. On 22 July, the SMM saw a group of about 50 people (mostly women in their fifties) form a human barrier across a road in government-controlled Nyzhnie (56km north-west of Luhansk) in order to prevent the SMM from travelling west towards government-controlled Toskivka (60km north-west of Luhansk). They told the SMM that they have been without gas for two months and that they will continue to block SMM vehicles from travelling in the area until gas has been restored to the surrounding villages. Following the conversation, the SMM was able to proceed. Earlier that day, while in Myrna Dolyna, the SMM spoke to four residents from nearby government-controlled Svitychne (54km north-west of Luhansk) who said that the area around Nyzhnie has been without gas since 6 June.

The SMM followed up on reports from residents that the central and eastern part of “LPR” controlled Zolote-5 (61km north-west of Luhansk) had been without water for ten days and on 23 July, the SMM checked a communal tap where residents have been previously seen filling up containers and saw that no water came out of it.

The SMM monitored border areas currently not under government control in Luhansk and Donetsk regions. On 22 July at the border crossing point in Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk), in about 45 minutes, the SMM saw 48 cars (ten with Russian Federation and 35 with Ukrainian licence plates, and two with “DPR” plates and one white plate with black numbers), one covered cargo truck (with a white plate with black numbers) and three passenger buses (two with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates) in a queue to exit Ukraine.

On 22 July at the Uspenka border crossing point (73km south-east of Donetsk), in about 45 minutes, the SMM observed 22 cars (seven with Russian Federation, 11 with Ukrainian and one with Georgian licence plates, and three with “DPR” plates) and seven covered cargo trucks (one with Russian Federation, five with Ukrainian and one with Belarusian licence plates) in a queue to exit Ukraine.

On 22 July, at the pedestrian border crossing point in Verkhnoharaasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) the SMM observed that it was unstaffed and, in about 50 minutes, the SMM saw 16 people exiting Ukraine and 18 people enter.
On 22 July, at the border crossing point in Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), in about one hour the SMM observed 14 cars (nine with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates, and two with “LPR” plates) in a queue to exit Ukraine and three cars (with Ukrainian licence plates) enter Ukraine. The SMM also saw six people (three men and three women in their twenties) exit Ukraine and seven people (three women in their forties and four teenage boys) enter Ukraine.

On 21 July, the SMM followed up on an ongoing miners’ protest in government-controlled Pryvillia (90km north-west of Luhansk) related to unpaid salaries. (See SMM Daily Report 17 July.) The SMM observed a gathering of around 50 people (mostly men, aged between 30 and 50) in front of a coal mine and heard a Member of Parliament assuring those gathered that assistance would be provided and asking for the miners to come out of the pit. Eight men (aged between 30 and 50) who introduced themselves as coal miners told the SMM said that 34 miners still remained in the pit and that they would not come out until their salaries had been paid.

On 22 July, in Popasna the SMM monitored a gathering of 200 people (men, women and children of mixed ages), including civil servants, police and Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel, and saw posters indicating that the event was to mark “the day of liberation” of Popasna. The gathering ended peacefully.

On 22 July, in the centre of Kolomak (90km south-west of Kharkiv), the SMM monitored a gathering to mark the inauguration of a monument dedicated to Ivan Mazepa, who had been elected as the Hetman of Zaporizhzhian Host 330 years ago. The SMM saw about 3,000 people (men and women of different ages), many of whom were wearing traditional Ukrainian clothes, as well as regional government officials and religious representatives attend the ceremony. Some participants were holding Cossack flags. About 230 police officers were present. The event ended peacefully.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations, including at the disengagement area near Petrivske.

Denial of access:

- On 22 July the SMM was again prevented from crossing a “DPR”-controlled checkpoint on road E-58 north of Novoazovsk – an area close to the border with the Russian Federation. (See SMM Daily Report 18 July.) Access was
denied by two armed “DPR” members who cited instructions from their superiors, and another armed “DPR” member in military attire with badges in Russian language reading “Regiment of the Special Forces” and “Novorossiya”. The Russian Federation chief of staff of the JCCC arrived at the checkpoint and the SMM waited for a total of three hours, during which time other civilian and military-type vehicles passed through the checkpoint, though the SMM was still denied access.

- On 23 July, three “DPR” members at a checkpoint in Staromykhailivka (15km west of Donetsk) stopped the SMM from proceeding and shouted that it must move back. The SMM left the checkpoint and informed the JCCC.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- On 22 and 23 July, a Ukrainian officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and that, with the exception of the main road, the SMM’s safety could not be guaranteed in the surrounding areas due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
- On 22 and 23 July, at a checkpoint on the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no de-mining had taken place over the previous 24 hours and that, due to the possible presence of mines and/or UXO, they could not guarantee the SMM’s safety. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
- On 22 and 23 July, armed “LPR” members positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area (3km north of Pervomaisk) told the SMM that they could not guarantee the safety of the Mission on side roads due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
- On 22 and 23 July, the SMM could not travel across the bridge in Shchastia as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- On 22 July, at a government-controlled checkpoint 2.5km north-west of Vodiane (19km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM was unable to proceed on road T-0519 between Mariupol and “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol) as the JCCC had still not co-ordinated the removal of mines and the sides had not cleared the route. The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
Contacts

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Annex 354

EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW
(VENICE COMMISSION)

OPINION

ON “WHETHER THE DECISION TAKEN BY THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA IN UKRAINE TO ORGANISE A REFERENDUM ON BECOMING A CONSTITUENT TERRITORY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION OR RESTORING CRIMEA’S 1992 CONSTITUTION IS COMPATIBLE WITH CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES”

adopted by the Venice Commission at its 98th Plenary Session (Venice, 21-22 March 2014)

on the basis of comments by

Mr Peter PACZOLAY (Honorary President, Hungary)
Ms Hanna SUCHOCKA (Member, Poland)
Mr Evgeni TANCHEV (Member, Bulgaria)
Mr Kaarlo TUORI (Member, Finland)
I. Introduction

1. By letter dated 7 March 2014 the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Mr Jagland, asked the Venice Commission to provide an opinion on "whether the decision taken by the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in Ukraine to organise a referendum on becoming a constituent territory of the Russian Federation or restoring Crimea’s 1992 Constitution is compatible with constitutional principles".

2. Mr Paczolay, Ms Suchocka, Mr Tanchev and Mr Tuori were appointed as rapporteurs for this opinion.

3. The present opinion was adopted by the Venice Commission at its 98th Plenary session in Venice on 21 March 2014.

4. On 6 March 2014 the Supreme Rada (Council) of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea adopted a Resolution “On the all-Crimean referendum”. According to the Resolution, the voters are given two options: 1) Do you support the reunification of the Crimea with Russia as a subject of the Russian Federation? 2) Do you support the restoration of the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea as of 1992 and the status of the Crimea as a part of Ukraine?" Article 3 of the Resolution provides that the option supported by the majority of the votes shall be deemed a direct expression of the will of the Crimean population.

5. On the ballot paper the two questions appear as alternatives, i.e. the voters are not asked to say yes or no to each question but they can either vote for the first or the second alternative.

6. The Resolution was passed on the basis of Articles 18.1.7 and 26.2.3 of the Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Article 18.1.7 provides that among the powers of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea is “calling and holding of republican (local) referendums upon matters coming under the terms of reference of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea”. In turn, according to Article 26.2.3 “passing of a resolution upon holding of a republican (local) referendum” belongs to the powers of the Supreme Rada. These provisions are based on Article 138.2 of the Constitution of Ukraine according to which the “organising and conducting local referendums is within the competence of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea”.

7. In order for the referendum to be constitutional and legal, it would be required that the issues put before the voters be issues which can be the object of a local referendum under the Constitutions of Ukraine and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. The Constitution of Ukraine enjoys supremacy over the Constitution of Crimea as an autonomous republic. Ukraine is a unitary state (Article 2.2 of the Constitution of Ukraine). According to Article 132 of the Constitution of Ukraine, “the territorial structure of Ukraine is based on the principles of unity and indivisibility of the state territory, the combination of centralisation and decentralisation in the exercise of state power, and the balanced socio-economic development of regions (…)”. Under Article 134 of the Constitution of Ukraine, “the Autonomous Republic of Crimea is an inseparable constituent part of Ukraine and decides on the issues ascribed to its competence within the limits of authority determined by the Constitution of Ukraine”. The Autonomous Republic of Crimea therefore enjoys autonomy only to the extent that powers were transferred to it by the Constitution of Ukraine.

8. Accordingly, Article 135 of the Constitution of Ukraine holds that, “regulatory legal acts of the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and decisions of the Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea shall not contradict the Constitution and laws of Ukraine and shall be adopted in accordance with and in pursuance of the Constitution of Ukraine, laws of Ukraine, acts of the President of Ukraine and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine”. A corresponding provision is included in Article 28 of the Constitution
of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea: “The statutory acts of the Supreme Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea upon any and all matters regarding the powers of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea shall conform to the Constitution of Ukraine and Ukrainian laws.” An act by an authority of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea which is contrary to the Constitution of Ukraine is therefore also contrary to the Constitution of Crimea.

II. Alternative 1: Unification with Russia

9. The first alternative proposed to the voters, which is for Crimea to join the Russian Federation, would imply secession from Ukraine. The question is whether the Constitution of Ukraine allows referendums on secession.

10. It is true that the Constitution of Ukraine, in particular Article 69, recognises referendums as an expression of the will of the people. This does, however, not mean that any referendum is automatically constitutional. On the contrary, there are numerous provisions of the Ukrainian Constitution which show very clearly that the secession of a part of the territory of the country cannot be the object of a local referendum.

11. The Constitution of Ukraine makes it very clear that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country are fundamental principles of the Ukrainian constitutional order. Article 1 of the Constitution refers to Ukraine as a sovereign country. Article 2 of the Constitution is worded as follows:

“The sovereignty of Ukraine extends throughout its entire territory.

Ukraine is a unitary state.

The territory of Ukraine within its present border is indivisible and inviolable.”

Already in its study on “Self-determination and secession in constitutional law” (CDL-INF(2000)002), the Venice Commission noted that “Affirmation of the indivisibility of the state plainly implies outlawing of secession…"

12. Article 2 of the Constitution of Ukraine shows that the indivisibility of the territory of Ukraine is one of the highest values of the Ukrainian Constitution and is an indication that a referendum on secession cannot be constitutional in Ukraine.

13. Chapter X of the Constitution of Ukraine pertaining to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea does not contradict but confirms this approach. Article 134 of the Constitution refers to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea as an “inseparable constituent part of Ukraine”. As regards referendums, Article 138.2 of the Constitution of Ukraine explicitly limits the competence of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea to “organising and conducting local referendums”. From the outset, issues of altering the territory of Ukraine cannot be decided by a local referendum. Article 73 of the Constitution of Ukraine explicitly provides:

“Issues of altering the territory of Ukraine are resolved exclusively by an All-Ukrainian referendum.”

14. Since Article 134 of the Constitution of Ukraine defines Crimea as an inseparable constituent part of Ukraine, the secession of Crimea would require amending the Constitution of Ukraine. Such a constitutional amendment is, however, prohibited by Article 157.1 of the Constitution of Ukraine which provides:
“The Constitution of Ukraine shall not be amended, if the amendments foresee the abolition or restriction of human and citizens’ rights and freedoms, or if they are oriented toward the liquidation of the independence or violation of the territorial indivisibility of Ukraine.”

15. It is therefore clear that the Ukrainian Constitution prohibits any local referendum which would alter the territory of Ukraine and that the decision to call a local referendum in Crimea is not covered by the authority devolved to the authorities of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea by virtue of Article 138 of the Ukrainian Constitution. This is confirmed by the judgment of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine of 14 March 2014 recognising the decision as unconstitutional. Since Article 28 of the Constitution of the Autonomous Republic limits the authority of the Supreme Soviet of the Autonomous Republic to matters within the authority of the Autonomous Republic under the Ukrainian Constitution, the decision also violates the Constitution of the Autonomous Republic.

16. The provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine pertinent to this opinion are part of the initial text of the Constitution adopted in 1996 and were never amended. The question whether the constitutional amendments adopted in 2004 are part of the Constitution or not is therefore not relevant for this opinion.

17. If the Constitution of Ukraine does not allow a referendum on secession, this does not in any way contradict European constitutional standards. Rather, it is typical for constitutions of Council of Europe member states not to allow secession. In its Report on “A general legal reference framework to facilitate the settlement of ethno-political conflicts in Europe” (CDL-Inf(2000)16 the Venice Commission noted:

“The principle of territorial integrity commands very widespread recognition - whether express or tacit - in constitutional law. On the other hand, constitutional law just as comprehensively rules out secession or the redrawing of borders. This should come as no surprise since that branch of law is the very foundation of the state, which might be deprived of one of its constituent parts if such possibilities were provided for.”

18. This does not mean that the notion of self-determination would be alien to European constitutional law. However, in its Report on “Self-determination and secession in constitutional law” quoted above, the Venice Commission concludes that self-determination is understood primarily as internal self-determination within the framework of the existing borders and not as external self-determination through secession.

19. The decision of the Ukrainian constituent power not to grant a right to secession can therefore not be criticised on the basis of European constitutional standards.

III. Alternative 2 – Return to the 1992 Constitution

20. According to the second alternative provided for in the referendum, a return to the 1992 Constitution of the Autonomous Republic, Crimea would remain part of Ukraine. The constitutional objections to the first alternative therefore do not apply. A consultative referendum on increasing the autonomy of Crimea would be possible as a local referendum within Crimea. However, since this second alternative is provided not as a separate question, but only as an alternative to secession, it cannot be regarded as valid on its own. In any case, such a referendum could not be regarded as binding. According to Article 135 of the Constitution of Ukraine, the Constitution of the Autonomous Republic has to be approved by the Verkhovna Rada. It could only be regarded as a consultative local referendum on the basis of Article 48.2 of the Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, which is worded as follows: “The Supreme Rada of the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea may, by a resolution of an advisory republican (local) referendum, make motions on alterations regarding the limitation of the status and powers of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the Supreme Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea determined by the Constitution of Ukraine and Ukrainian laws.” The compatibility of the 1992 Constitution with the Constitution of Ukraine, which was adopted in 1996, would then have to be ascertained.

IV. Compatibility of the referendum with European constitutional principles

21. While the first requirement for the validity of the referendum is that it may not contradict the provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine, this is by no means sufficient. It is also necessary that the referendum comply with basic democratic standards for the holding of referendums, such as those established by the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice on Referendums (CDL-AD(2007)008rev). In its Opinion on the Compatibility of the Existing Legislation in Montenegro concerning the organisation of referendums with applicable international standards (CDL-AD(2005)041), the Venice Commission noted (at 11):

“11. Any referendum must be organised in full conformity with internationally recognised standards. A consideration of these standards must begin with an examination of European standards. …
12. The internationally recognised fundamental principles of electoral law, as expressed for example in Article 3 of the First Protocol to the ECHR and Article 25 ICCPR, have to be respected, including universal, equal, free and secret suffrage. For a referendum to give full effect to these principles, it must be conducted in accordance with legislation and the administrative rules that ensure the following principles:
- the authorities must provide objective information;
- the public media have to be neutral, in particular in news coverage;
- the authorities must not influence the outcome of the vote by excessive, one-sided campaigning;
- the use of public funds by the authorities for campaigning purposes must be restricted.”

22. A number of circumstances make it appear questionable whether the referendum of 16 March 2014 could be held in compliance with international standards. Such circumstances are:

- Ukraine does not, at the moment, have a law regulating local referendums. It is therefore not clear according to which legal rules the referendum will be carried out.
- While the Venice Commission has not made a comprehensive assessment of the current situation in Crimea, the massive public presence of (para)military forces is not conducive to democratic decision making.
- Concerns have been expressed, including by the OSCE, with respect to the freedom of expression in Crimea.
- The period of only 10 days between the decision to call the referendum and the referendum itself is excessively short.
- On 11 March the Supreme Rada adopted a declaration on the independence of Crimea. This raises doubt with respect to the legal effects of the referendum and the neutrality of the authorities.

23. Moreover, the referendum question is not worded neutrally. It provides two alternatives: independence or return to the 1992 Constitution. It is not possible to directly express the wish to maintain the current Constitution. In addition, the reference to the 1992 Constitution is ambiguous. This text underwent major changes in September 1992, making it much clearer that the Autonomous Republic is part of Ukraine. Does the referendum refer to the
original text adopted in May or the revised text, as amended in September? The Code of Good Practice on Referendums requires (at I.3.1.c) that “c. The question put to the vote must be clear; it must not be misleading; it must not suggest an answer; electors must be informed of the effects of the referendum; voters must be able to answer the questions asked solely by yes, no or a blank vote.”

24. Holding a referendum which is unconstitutional in any case contradicts European standards. The Code of Good Practice on referendums provides in Part III.1 on the Rule of Law:

*The use of referendums must comply with the legal system as a whole, and especially the procedural rules. In particular, referendums cannot be held if the Constitution or a statute in conformity with the Constitution does not provide for them, for example where the text submitted to a referendum is a matter for Parliament’s exclusive jurisdiction.*

25. It must also be taken into account that the referendum concerns an issue of outstanding importance. In its opinion on Montenegro quoted above, the Venice Commission noted (at 24) that “the issue at stake is possibly the most important decision that a political community may take by democratic means: its independence. Hence, the matter requires the broadest possible commitment of the citizens to the resolution of the issue.” The Venice Commission recommended serious negotiations among all stakeholders to ensure the legitimacy and credibility of the referendum and such negotiations subsequently took place.

26. With respect to the referendum of 16 March 2014, the Venice Commission can only note that no negotiations aimed at a consensual solution took place before the referendum was called. Due to the multi-ethnic composition of the population of Crimea (Russian, Ukrainians, Tatars and others), such negotiations would have been particularly important.

**V. Conclusions**

27. The Constitution of Ukraine, like other constitutions of Council of Europe member states, provides for the indivisibility of the country and does not allow the holding of any local referendum on secession from Ukraine. This results in particular from Articles 1, 2, 73 and 157 of the Constitution. These provisions in conjunction with Chapter X of the Constitution show that this prohibition also applies to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the Constitution of Crimea does not allow the Supreme Soviet of Crimea to call such a referendum. Only a consultative referendum on increased autonomy could be permissible under the Ukrainian Constitution.

28. Moreover, circumstances in Crimea did not allow the holding of a referendum in line with European democratic standards. Any referendum on the status of a territory should have been preceded by serious negotiations among all stakeholders. Such negotiations did not take place.
Annex 355

DECISIONS

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING DECISION 2014/238/CFSP
of 28 April 2014
implementing Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 31(2) thereof,
Having regard to Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (1), and in particular Article 3(1) thereof,
Whereas:
(1) On 17 March 2014, the Council adopted Decision 2014/145/CFSP.
(2) In view of the gravity of the situation, the Council considers that additional persons should be added to the list of persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures as set out in the Annex to Decision 2014/145/CFSP.
(3) The Annex to Decision 2014/145/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The persons listed in the Annex to this Decision shall be added to the list set out in the Annex to Decision 2014/145/CFSP.

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Done at Brussels, 28 April 2014.

For the Council
The President
D. KOURKOULAS

(1) OJ L 78, 17.3.2014, p. 16.
## ANNEX

**List of persons, entities and bodies referred to in Article 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Identifying information</th>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>Date of listing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dmitry Nikolayevich KOZAK</td>
<td>Born 7.11.1958 in Kirovohrad, Ukrainian SSR</td>
<td>Deputy Prime Minister. Responsible for overseeing the integration of the annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation.</td>
<td>29.4.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oleg Yevgenyvich BELAVENTSEV</td>
<td>Born 15.9.1949 in Moscow</td>
<td>Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation into the so called 'Crimean Federal District'. Non-permanent member of the Russian Security Council. Responsible for the implementation of the constitutional prerogatives of the Russian Head of State on the territory of the annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea.</td>
<td>29.4.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oleg Genrikhovich SAVELYEV</td>
<td>Born 27.10.1965 in Leningrad</td>
<td>Minister for Crimean Affairs. Responsible for the integration of the annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation.</td>
<td>29.4.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergei Ivanovich MENYAILO</td>
<td>Born 22.8.1960 in Alagir, North-Ossetian Autonomous SSR, RSFSR</td>
<td>Acting governor of the Ukrainian annexed city of Sevastopol.</td>
<td>29.4.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olga Fedorovna KOVATIDI</td>
<td>Born 7.5.1962 in Simferopol, Ukrainian SSR</td>
<td>Member of the Russian Federation Council from the annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea.</td>
<td>29.4.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ludmila Ivanovna SHVETSOVA</td>
<td>Born 24.9.1949 in Alma-Ata, USSR</td>
<td>Deputy Chairman of State Duma, United Russia — Responsible for initiating legislation to integrate the annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation.</td>
<td>29.4.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igor Dmitrievich SERGUN</td>
<td>Born 28.3.1957</td>
<td>Director of GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate), Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Lieutenant-General. Responsible for the activity of GRU officers in Eastern Ukraine.</td>
<td>29.4.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Identifying information</td>
<td>Reasons</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>German Prokopiev</td>
<td></td>
<td>Active leader of the 'Lugansk Guard'. Took part in the seizure of the building of the Lugansk regional office of the Security Service, recorded a video address to President Putin and Russia from the occupied building. Close links with the 'Army of the South-East'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Valeriy Bolotov</td>
<td></td>
<td>One of the leaders of the separatist group 'Army of the South-East' which occupied the building of the Security Service in the Lugansk region. Retired officer. Before seizing the building he and other accomplices possessed arms apparently supplied illegally from Russia and from local criminal groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Andriy Purgin</td>
<td></td>
<td>Head of the 'Donetsk Republic', active participant and organiser of separatist actions, co-ordinator of actions of the 'Russian tourists' in Donetsk. Co-founder of a 'Civic Initiative of Donbass for the Eurasian Union'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Denys Pushylin</td>
<td>Born in Makiivka</td>
<td>One of the leaders of the Donetsk People's Republic. Participated in the seizure and occupation of the regional administration. Active spokesperson for the separatists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Tsyplakov Sergey Gennadevich</td>
<td></td>
<td>One of the leaders of ideologically radical organization People's Militia of Donbas. He took active part in the seizure of a number of state buildings in Donetsk region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Igor Strelkov (Ihor Strielkov)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Identified as staff of Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU). He was involved in incidents in Sloviansk. He is an assistant on security issues to Sergey Aksionov, self-proclaimed prime-minister of Crimea.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 356

REGULATIONS

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2015/240
of 9 February 2015
implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (1), and in particular Article 14(1) thereof,

Whereas:


(2) In view of the continued gravity of the situation on the ground in Ukraine, the Council considers that additional persons and entities should be added to the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures as set out in Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 269/2014.

(3) Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The persons and entities listed in the Annex to this Regulation shall be added to the list set out in Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 269/2014.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on 16 February 2015.

It shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 9 February 2015.

For the Council
The President
F. MOGHERINI

## List of persons and entities referred to in Article 1

### I. Persons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Identifying information</th>
<th>Statement of reasons</th>
<th>Date of Listing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 133. Pavel DREMOV aka Batya  
Павел ДРЕМОВ | Born in 1976, Stakhanov | Commander of the ‘First Cossack Regiment’, an armed separatist group involved in the fighting in eastern Ukraine. In this capacity, he has actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and to further destabilise Ukraine. | 16.2.2015 |
| 134. Alexey MILCHAKOV aka Fritz, Serbian  
Алексей МИЛЬЧАКОВ | Born in 1991, St. Petersburg | Commander of the ’Rusich’ unit, an armed separatist group involved in the fighting in eastern Ukraine. In this capacity, he has actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and to further destabilise Ukraine. | 16.2.2015 |
| 135. Arseny PAVLOV aka Motorola  
Арсений Сергеевич ПАВЛОВ (aka Моторола) | Born on 2.2.1983, Ukhta, Komi | Commander of the ‘Sparta Battalion’, an armed separatist group involved in the fighting in eastern Ukraine. In this capacity, he has actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and to further destabilise Ukraine. | 16.2.2015 |
| 136. Mikhail TOLSTYKH aka Givi  
Михаил Толстых | Born in 1980, Ilovaisk | Commander of the ‘Somali’ battalion, an armed separatist group involved in the fighting in eastern Ukraine. In this capacity, he has actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and to further destabilise Ukraine. | 16.2.2015 |
| 137. Eduard BASURIN so called ‘Deputy Commander’ of the Ministry of Defense of the so called ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’.  
Эдуард Басурин | So called ‘Deputy Commander’ of the Ministry of Defense of the so called ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and to further destabilise Ukraine. | 16.2.2015 |
<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Statement of reasons</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>138. Alexandr SHUBIN Александр Васильевич ШУБИН</td>
<td>So called 'Minister of Justice', of the illegal so called 'Luhansk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and to further destabilise the country.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>139. Sergey LITVIN Сергей Анатольевич ЛИТВИН</td>
<td>So called Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the so called 'Luhansk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and to further destabilise Ukraine.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>140. Sergey IGNATOV Сергей Юрьевич ИГНАТОВ</td>
<td>So called Commander in Chief of the People's Militia of the so called 'Luhansk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and to further destabilise the country.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141. Ekaterina FILIPPOVA Екатерина Владимировна ФИЛИППОВА</td>
<td>Born on 20.11.1988 in Krasnoarmeisk So called 'Minister of Justice' of the so called 'Donetsk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, she has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and to further destabilise Ukraine.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>142. Aleksandr TIMOFEEV Александр ТИМОФЕЕВ</td>
<td>Born on 27.1.1974 So called 'Minister of Budget' of the so called 'Donetsk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and to further destabilise the country.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>143. Evgeny MANUILOV Евгений Владимирович МАНИУЛОВ</td>
<td>So called 'Minister of Budget' of the so called 'Luhansk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and to further destabilise Ukraine.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name</td>
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</table>
| 144 | Viktor YATSENKO  
Виктор ЯЦЕНКО      | Born on 22.4.1985 in Kherson | So called 'Minister of Communications' of the so called 'Donetsk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and to further destabilise Ukraine. | 16.2.2015       |
| 145 | Olga BESEDINA  
Ольга Игоревна БЕСЕДИНА |                          | So called 'Minister of Economic Development and Trade' of the so called 'Luhansk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, she has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and to further destabilise Ukraine. | 16.2.2015       |
| 146 | Zaur ISMAILOV  
Заур Исмаилов   | Born in 1975, Krasny Luch, Voroshilovgrad Luhansk | So called 'Acting General Prosecutor' of the so called 'Luhansk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and to further destabilise Ukraine. | 16.2.2015       |
| 147 | Anatoly Ivanovich ANTONOV  
Анатолий Иванович Антонов | Born on 15.5.1955 in Omsk | Deputy Minister of Defence, and in that capacity, involved in supporting the deployment of Russian troops in Ukraine. According to the present Russian Ministry of Defence structure, in that capacity, he participates in shaping and implementing the policy of the Russian Government. These policies threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. | 16.2.2015       |
| 148 | Arkady Viktorovich BAKHIN  
Аркадий Викторович Бахин | Born on 8.5.1956 in Kaunas, Lithuania | First Deputy Minister of Defence, and in that capacity, involved in supporting the deployment of Russian troops in Ukraine. According to the present Russian Ministry of Defence structure, in that capacity, he participates in shaping and implementing the policy of the Russian Government. These policies threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. | 16.2.2015       |
<table>
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<th>Name</th>
<th>Identifying information</th>
<th>Statement of reasons</th>
<th>Date of Listing</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>149. Andrei Valeryevich KARTAPOLOV Андрей Валерьевич Картаполов</td>
<td>Born on 9.11.1963 in DDR</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Director of the Main Operations Department and deputy chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. In both capacities he is actively involved in shaping and implementing the military campaign of the Russian forces in Ukraine. According to the stated activities of the general staff, by exercising operational control over the armed forces, he is actively involved in shaping and implementing the Russian government policy threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150. Iosif (Joseph) Davydovich KOBZON Иосиф Давыдович Кобзон</td>
<td>Born on 11.9.1937 in Tchassov Yar, Ukraine</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Member of the State Duma. He visited the so-called Donetsk People's Republic and during his visit made statements supporting separatists. He was also appointed Honorary Consul of the so-called 'Donetsk People's Republic' in the Russian Federation. On 20 March 2014 he voted in favour of the draft Federal Constitutional Law 'on the acceptance into the Russian Federation of the Republic of Crimea and the formation within the Russian Federation of new federal subjects- the republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Status Sevastopol'.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151. Valery Fedorovich RASHKIN Валерий Фёдорович Рашкин</td>
<td>Born on 14.3.1955 in the Kaliningrad Oblast, USSR.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Ethnicity issues. He is the founder of the civil movement 'Krassnaya Moskva- Red Moscow -Patriotic Front Aid' which organised public demonstrations supporting separatists, thereby supporting policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. On 20 March 2014 he voted in favour of the draft Federal Constitutional Law 'on the acceptance into the Russian Federation of the Republic of Crimea and the formation within the Russian Federation of new federal subjects- the republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Status Sevastopol'.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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# II. Entities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Identifying information</th>
<th>Statement of reasons</th>
<th>Date of Listing</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cossack National Guard</td>
<td></td>
<td>Armed separatist group which has actively supported actions which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and to further destabilise Ukraine. Commanded by and therefore associated with a listed person Nikolay KOZITSYN.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sparta battalion</td>
<td></td>
<td>Armed separatist group which has actively supported actions which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and to further destabilise Ukraine. Commanded by and therefore associated with a listed person Arseny PAVLOV.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali battalion</td>
<td></td>
<td>Armed separatist group which has actively supported actions which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and to further destabilise Ukraine. Commanded by and therefore associated with a listed person Mikhail TOLSTYKH aka Givi.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zarya battalion</td>
<td></td>
<td>Armed separatist group which has actively supported actions which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and to further destabilise Ukraine.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prizrak brigade</td>
<td></td>
<td>Armed separatist which has actively supported actions which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and to further destabilise Ukraine. Commanded by and therefore associated with a listed person Oleksiy MOZGOVY.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oplot battalion</td>
<td>Social media:</td>
<td>Armed separatist group which has actively supported actions which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and to further destabilise Ukraine.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalmius battalion</td>
<td></td>
<td>Armed separatist group which has actively supported actions which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and to further destabilise Ukraine.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Identifying information</td>
<td>Statement of reasons</td>
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<tr>
<td>36.</td>
<td>Death battalion Батальон 'Смерть'</td>
<td></td>
<td>Armed separatist group which has actively supported actions which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and to further destabilise Ukraine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.</td>
<td>Public Movement 'NOVOROSSIYA' Движение Новороссия</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Public Movement 'Novorossiya'/New Russia' was established in November 2014 in Russia and is headed by Russian officer Igor Strelkov (identified as a staff member of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU)). According to its stated objectives, it aims at providing all-round, effective assistance to 'Novorossiya', including by helping militia fighting in Eastern Ukraine, thereby supporting policies undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Associated with a person listed for undermining the territorial integrity of Ukraine.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Annex 357

List of persons and entities under EU restrictive measures over the territorial integrity of Ukraine

List of Persons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Identifying information</th>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>Date of listing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1.   | Sergey Valeryevich AKSYONOVA, Sergei Valeriyevich AKSENNOB, Serhiy Valeriyovych AKSYONOVA (Сергей Валерьевич АКСЕНОВ, Сергей Валерийович АКСЮНОВ) | DOB: 26.11.1972 POB: Beltsy (Bălți), now Republic of Moldova  
Aksyonov was elected 'Prime Minister of Crimea' in the Crimean Verkhovna Rada on 27 February 2014 in the presence of pro-Russian gunmen. His 'election' was decreed unconstitutional by the acting Ukrainian President Oleksandr Turchynov on 1 March 2014. He actively lobbied for the 'referendum' of 16 March 2014 and was one of the co-signatories of the 'treaty on Crimea's accession to the Russian Federation' of 18 March 2014. On 9 April 2014, he was appointed acting 'Head' of the so-called 'Republic of Crimea' by President Putin. On 9 October 2014, he was formally 'elected' 'Head' of the so-called 'Republic of Crimea'. Aksyonov subsequently decreed that the offices of 'Head' and 'Prime Minister' be combined.  
Member of the Russia State Council. Since January 2017, member of the High Council of United Russia Party.  
For his involvement in the annexation process he has been awarded with Russian State order 'For Merit to the Fatherland' — first degree. | 17.3.2014 |

* The texts on this document are for information only. They have no official or legal status in the form they are published here. The official publication is available on EUR-Lex website.
<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Vladimir Andreevich Konstantinov</td>
<td>DOB: 19.11.1956 POB: Vladimirovka (a.k.a. Vladimirovca), Slobozia Region, Moldavian SSR (now Republic of Moldova) or Bogomol, Moldavian SSR</td>
<td>As speaker of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Konstantinov played a relevant role in the decisions taken by the ‘Supreme Council’ concerning the ‘referendum’ against territorial integrity of Ukraine and called on voters to cast their votes in favour of Crimean independence in the ‘referendum’ of 16 March 2014. He was one of the co-signatories of the ‘treaty on Crimea’s accession to the Russian Federation’ of 18 March 2014. Since 17 March 2014 ‘Chairman’ of the ‘State Council’ of the so-called ‘Republic of Crimea’.</td>
<td>17.3.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Владимир Андреевич КОНСТАНТИНОВ)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Volodymyr Andriyovych Konstantinov</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Володимир Андрійович КОНСТАНТИНОВ)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Rustam Ilmirovich Temirgaliev</td>
<td>DOB: 15.8.1976 POB: Ulan-Ude, Buryat ASSR (Russian SFSR)</td>
<td>As former Deputy Prime Minister of Crimea, Temirgaliev played a relevant role in the decisions taken by the 'Supreme Council' concerning the 'referendum' of 16 March 2014 against the territorial integrity of Ukraine. He lobbied actively for the integration of Crimea into the Russian Federation. On 11 June 2014 he resigned from his function as 'First Deputy Prime Minister' of the so-called 'Republic of Crimea'. Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies.</td>
<td>17.3.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Рустам Ильмирович ТЕМИРГАЛИЕВ)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rustam Ilmyrovych Temirgaliev</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Рустам Ильмирович ТЕМИРГАЛИЕВ)</td>
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</table>
| 4. Denis Valentinovich BEREZOVSKIY  
(Денис Валентинович БЕРЕЗОВСКИЙ)  
Denys Valentynovych BEREZOVSKYY  
(Денис Валентинович БЕРЕЗОВСКИЙ) | DOB: 15.7.1974  
POB: Kharkiv, Ukrainian SSR | Berezovskiy was appointed commander of the Ukrainian Navy on 1 March 2014 but thereafter swore an oath to the Crimean armed forces, thereby breaking his oath to the Ukrainian Navy.  
He was then appointed Deputy Commander of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation. | 17.3.2014 |
| 5. Aleksei Mikhailovich CHALIY  
(Алексей Михайлович ЧАЛИЙ)  
Oleksiy Mykhaylovych CHAL'YY (Олексій Михайлович ЧАЛІЙ) | DOB: 13.6.1961  
POB: Moscow or Sevastopol | Chaliy became 'People's Mayor of Sevastopol' by popular acclamation on 23 February 2014 and accepted this 'vote'. He actively campaigned for Sevastopol to become a separate entity of the Russian Federation following a referendum on 16 March 2014. He was one of the co-signatories of the 'treaty on Crimea's accession to the Russian Federation' of 18 March 2014. He was acting 'governor' of Sevastopol from 1 to 14 April 2014 and is a former 'elected' Chairman of the 'Legislative Assembly' of the City of Sevastopol. Member of the 'Legislative Assembly' of the City of Sevastopol.  
For his involvement in the annexation process he has been awarded with Russian State order 'For Merit to the Fatherland' — first degree. | 17.3.2014 |
<table>
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<tr>
<td>6. Pyotr Anatoliyovych ZIMA (Пётр Анатолиевич ЗИМА) Petro Anatoliyovych ZYMA (Петро Анатолійович ЗИМА)</td>
<td>DOB: 18.1.1970 POB: Artemivsk (Артемовск) (2016 renamed back to Bakhmut/Бахмут), Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine</td>
<td>Zima was appointed as the new head of the Crimean Security Service (SBU) on 3 March 2014 by ‘Prime Minister’ Aksyonov and accepted this appointment. He has given relevant information including a database to the Russian Intelligence Service (FSB). This included information on Euro-Maidan activists and human rights defenders of Crimea. He played a relevant role in preventing Ukraine’s authorities from controlling the territory of Crimea. On 11 March 2014 the formation of an independent Security Service of Crimea was proclaimed by former SBU officers of Crimea.</td>
<td>17.3.2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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7.*

| 8. Sergey Pavlovych TSEKOV (Сергей Павлович ЦЕКОВ) Serhiy Pavlovych TSEKOV (Сергій Павлович ЦЕКОВ) | DOB: 28.9.1953 or 28.8.1953 POB: Simferopol | As Vice Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea, Tsekov initiated, together with Sergey Aksyonov, the unlawful dismissal of the government of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC). He drew Vladimir Konstantinov into this endeavour, threatening him with dismissal. He publicly recognised that the MPs from Crimea were the initiators of inviting Russian soldiers to take over the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea. He was one of the first Crimean Leaders to ask in public for the annexation of Crimea to Russia. Member of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation from the so-called ‘Republic of Crimea’. | 17.3.2014 |

* The entry was deleted on 10 March 2016 following a delisting decision.
<table>
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</table>
On 1 March 2014 Ozerov, on behalf of the Security and Defence Committee of the Federation Council, publicly supported, in the Federation Council, the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine. | 17.3.2014       |
On 1 March 2014 Dzhabarov, on behalf of the International Affairs Committee of the Federation Council, publicly supported, in the Federation Council, the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine. | 17.3.2014       |
On 1 March 2014 Klishas publicly supported, in the Federation Council, the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine. In public statements Klishas sought to justify a Russian military intervention in Ukraine by claiming that 'the Ukrainian President supports the appeal of the Crimean authorities to the President of the Russian Federation on landing an all-encompassing assistance in defence of the citizens of Crimea'. | 17.3.2014       |
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<th>Identifying information</th>
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<th>Date of listing</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14. Aleksandr Borisovich TOTOONOVOV (Александр Борисович Тотоонов)</td>
<td>DOB: 3.4.1957 POB: Ordzhonikidze, North Ossetia</td>
<td>Member of the Committee of International Affairs of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation. On 1 March 2014 Totoonov publicly supported, in the Federation Council, the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine.</td>
<td>17.3.2014</td>
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<td>15.*</td>
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* The entry was deleted on 14 September 2017 following a delisting decision.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16. Sergei Mikhailovich MIRONOV (Сergeй Михайлович Миронов)</td>
<td>DOB: 14.2.1953 POB: Pushkin, Leningrad region</td>
<td>Member of the Council of the State Duma; Leader of Fair Russia faction in the Duma of the Russian Federation. Initiator of the bill allowing Russian Federation to admit in its composition, under the pretext of protection of Russian citizens, territories of a foreign country without the consent of that country or an international treaty.</td>
<td>17.3.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Identifying information</td>
<td>Reasons</td>
<td>Date of listing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aleksandr Viktorovich VITKO (Александр Викторович Витко)</td>
<td>DOB: 13.9.1961 POB: Vitebsk (Belarusian SSR)</td>
<td>Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral. Responsible for commanding Russian forces that have occupied Ukrainian sovereign territory.</td>
<td>17.3.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anatoliy Alekseevich SIDOROV (Анатолий Алексеевич Сидоров)</td>
<td>DOB: 2.7.1958 POB: Siva, Perm region, USSR</td>
<td>Former Commander, Russia's Western Military District, units of which are deployed in Crimea. He was responsible for part of the Russian military presence in Crimea which is undermining the sovereignty of the Ukraine and assisted the Crimean authorities in preventing public demonstrations against moves towards a referendum and incorporation into Russia. Since November 2015 Chief of the Joint Staff of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO).</td>
<td>17.3.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aleksandr Viktorovich GALKIN (Александр Викторович ГАЛКИН)</td>
<td>DOB: 22.3.1958 POB: Ordzhonikidze, North Ossetian ASSR</td>
<td>Former Commander of Russia's Southern Military District ('SMD'), the forces of which are in Crimea; the Black Sea Fleet comes under Galkin's command; much of the force movement into Crimea has come through the SMD. SMD forces are deployed in Crimea. He is responsible for part of the Russian military presence in Crimea which is undermining the sovereignty of Ukraine and assisted the Crimean authorities in preventing public demonstrations against moves towards a referendum and incorporation into Russia. Additionally the Black Sea Fleet falls within the District's control. Currently employed by the Central apparatus of the Russian Ministry of Defence. Aide to the Minister of Defence since 19 January 2017.</td>
<td>17.3.2014</td>
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<td>Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Дмитрий Олегович Рогозин)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Сергею Юрьевич Глазьев)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Valentina Ivanova MATVIYENKO</td>
<td>DOB: 7.4.1949, POB: Shepetovka, Khmelnitsky</td>
<td>Speaker of the Federation Council. On 1 March 2014, publicly supported, in the Federation Council, the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine.</td>
<td>21.3.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(born TYUTINA)</td>
<td>(Каменец-Подольский) region (Ukrainian SSR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Валентина Ивановна Матвиенко</td>
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<td>born Tютина)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dmitry Konstantinovich KISELYOV, Дмитрий Константинович Киселёв</td>
<td>DOB: 26.4.1954 POB: Moscow</td>
<td>Appointed by Presidential Decree on 9 December 2013 Head of the Russian Federal State news agency 'Rossiya Segodnya'. Central figure of the government propaganda supporting the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine.</td>
<td>21.3.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valery Vladimirovich KULIKOV, Валерий Владимирович Куликов</td>
<td>DOB: 1.9.1956 POB: Zaporozhye, (Ukrainian SSR)</td>
<td>Deputy-Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Rear Admiral. Responsible for commanding Russian forces that have occupied Ukrainian sovereign territory.</td>
<td>21.3.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vladislav Yuriyevich SURKOV, Владислав Юрьевич Сурков</td>
<td>DOB: 21.9.1964, POB: Solntsevo, Lipetsk region</td>
<td>Aide to the President of the Russian Federation. He was an organiser of the process in Crimea by which local Crimean communities were mobilised to stage actions undermining the Ukrainian authorities in Crimea.</td>
<td>21.3.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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<td>32.</td>
<td>Lt. Gen. Igor Nikolaevich (Mykolayovych) TURCHENYUK (Игорь Николаевич Турченюк)</td>
<td>The de facto Commander of Russian troops deployed on the ground in Crimea (whom Russia continues to refer to officially as ‘local self-defence militias’). Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District.</td>
<td>21.3.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.</td>
<td>Elena Borisovna MIZULINA (born DMITRIYEVA) (Елена Борисовна МИЗУЛИНА (born ДМИТРИЕВА))</td>
<td>Former Deputy in the State Duma. Originator and co-sponsor of recent legislative proposals in Russia that would have allowed regions of other countries to join Russia without their central authorities’ prior agreement. As of September 2015, a Member of the Federation Council from Omsk region.</td>
<td>21.3.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.</td>
<td>Dmitry Nikolaevich KOZAK (Дмитрий Николаевич Козак)</td>
<td>Deputy Prime Minister. Responsible for overseeing the integration of the annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation.</td>
<td>29.4.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35.</td>
<td>Oleg Yevgenyevich BELAVENTSEV (Олег Евгеньевич БЕЛАВЕНЦЕВ)</td>
<td>Former Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation into the so-called ‘Crimean Federal District’, Non-permanent member of the Russian Security Council. Responsible for the implementation of the constitutional prerogatives of the Russian Head of State on the territory of the annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Currently Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation into the North Caucasus Federal District.</td>
<td>29.4.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>38. Olga Fedorovna KOVITIDI (Ольга Фёдоровна Ковитиди)</td>
<td>DOB: 7.5.1962 POB: Simferopol, Ukrainian SSR</td>
<td>Member of the Russian Federation Council from the annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea.</td>
<td>29.4.2014</td>
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* The entry was deleted on 13 March 2015 following a delisting decision.
† The entry was deleted on 10 March 2016 following a delisting decision.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valery Vasilevich GERASIMOV</td>
<td>DOB: 8.9.1955, POB: Kazan</td>
<td>Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, First Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, General of the Army. Responsible for the massive deployment of Russian troops along the border with Ukraine and lack of de-escalation of the situation.</td>
<td>29.4.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Валерий Васильевич Герасимов)</td>
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<td>(Герман ПРОКОРИВ)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Herman PROKORIV</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Герман ПРОКОРИВ)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(a.k.a. Li Van Chol, Ли Ван Чоль)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>DOB: 26.1.1972</td>
<td>POB: Donetsk</td>
<td>Active participant and organiser of separatist actions, coordinator of actions of the 'Russian tourists' in Donetsk. Co-founder of a 'Civic Initiative of Donbass for the Eurasian Union'. Former 'First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers'. Until 4 September 2015 'Chairman' of the 'People's Council of the Donetsk People's Republic'. As of February 2017 deprived from his mandate of member of the 'People's Council of the Donetsk People's Republic' upon decision of the so-called 'People's Council'. Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Andrei Evgenevich PURGIN (Андрей Евгеньевич ПУРГИН)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Andriy Yevhenovych PURHIN (Андрій Євгенович ПУРГІН)</td>
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* The entry was deleted on 14 September 2017 following a delisting decision.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>46. Denys Volodymyrovych PUSHILIN (Денис Володимирович Пушилин), Denis Vladimirovich PUSHILIN (Денис Владимирович Пушилин)</td>
<td>DOB: 9.5.1981 or 9.5.1982 POB: Makiivka (Donetsk oblast)</td>
<td>One of the leaders of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. Participated in the seizure and occupation of the regional administration. Active spokesperson for the separatists. Until 4 September 2015 so-called Deputy Chairman of the 'People's Council' of the so-called 'Donetsk People's Republic'. Since 4 September 2015 'Chairman' of the 'People's Council of the Donetsk People's Republic'.</td>
<td>29.4.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47. Sergey Gennadevich TSYPLAKOV (Сергей Геннадьевич ЦЫПЛАКОВ), Serhiy Hennadiyovych TSYPLAKOV (Сергій Геннадійович ЦИПЛАКОВ)</td>
<td>DOB: 1.5.1983 POB: Khartsyzsk, Donetsk Oblast</td>
<td>One of the leaders of the ideologically radical organisation 'People's Militia of Donbas'. He took active part in the seizure of a number of State buildings in the Donetsk region. Member of the 'People's Council of the Donetsk People's Republic', Chair of the 'People's Council Committee on Information Policy and Information Technology'.</td>
<td>29.4.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>49. Vyacheslav Viktorovich VOLODIN (Вячеслав Викторович ВОЛОДИН)</td>
<td>DOB: 4.2.1964 POB: Alekseevka, Saratov region</td>
<td>Former First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration of Russia. Responsible for overseeing the political integration of the annexed Ukrainian region of Crimea into the Russian Federation. Currently Speaker of the State Duma of the Russian Federation since 5 October 2016.</td>
<td>12.5.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vladimir Nikolaevich PLIGIN (Плннмрил Николаевич ПЛИГИН)</td>
<td>DOB: 19.5.1960&lt;br&gt;POL: Ignatovo, Vologodsk Oblast, USSR..</td>
<td>Former member of the State Duma and former Chair of the Duma Constitutional Law Committee. Responsible for facilitating the adoption of legislation on the annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol into the Russian Federation.</td>
<td>12.5.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petr Grigorievich JAROSH (Петр Григорьевич ЯРОШ)</td>
<td>DOB: 30.1.1971&lt;br&gt;POL: Skvortsovo village, Simferopol region, Crimea</td>
<td>Former head of the Federal Migration Service office for Crimea. Responsible for the systematic and expedited issuance of Russian passports for the residents of Crimea.</td>
<td>12.5.2014</td>
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<td>54.</td>
<td>Viacheslav PONOMARIOV, Vyacheslav Volodymyrovich PONOMARYOV (Вячеслав Володимирович Пономарьов), Viacheslav Vladimirovich PONOMAREV (Вячеслав Владимирович Пономарёв)</td>
<td>Former self-declared ‘People's Mayor’ of Slaviansk (until 10 June 2014). Ponomariov called on Vladimir Putin to send in Russian troops to protect the city and later asked him to supply weapons. Ponomariov’s men were involved in kidnappings (they captured activist Irma Krat and Simon Ostrovsky, a reporter for Vice News, both were later released, they detained military observers under the OSCE Vienna Document). Remains active in supporting separatist actions and policies.</td>
<td>12.5.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>55.</td>
<td>Igor Nikolaevich BEZLER (a.k.a. Bes (devil)) (Ігор Ніколаїович БЕЗЛЕР), Ihor Mykolayovych BEZLER (Ігор Миколайович БЕЗЛЕР)</td>
<td>One of the leaders of the self-proclaimed militia of Horlivka. He took control of the Security Service of Ukraine's Office in Donetsk region building and afterwards seized the Ministry of Internal Affairs' district station in the town of Horlivka. He has links to Igor Strelkov/Girkin under whose command he was involved in the murder of the Peoples' Deputy of the Horlivka's Municipal Council Volodymyr Rybak.</td>
<td>12.5.2014</td>
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| 56.  | Igor Evgenevich KAKIDZYANOV  
(Ігорь Євгенович КАКІДЗЯНОВ),  
Igor Evgenevich KHAKIMZYANOV  
(Ігорь Євгенович ХАКІМЗЯНОВ)  
Ihor Yevhenovych KHAKIMZIANOV  
(Ігор Євгенович ХАКІМЗЯНОВ)  
(Iгор Євгенович КАКІДЗЯНОВ) | DOB: 25.7.1980  
POB: Makiivka  
(Donetsk oblast) | One of the leaders of armed forces of the self-proclaimed ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’. The aim of the forces is to ‘protect the people of the Donetsk People's Republic and territorial integrity of the republic’ according to Pushylin, one of the leaders of the ‘Donetsk People's Republic’. | 12.5.2014 |
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<tr>
<td>57. Oleg TSARIOV, Oleh Anatoliyovych TSAROV (Олег Анатолійович ЦАРЬОВ), Oleg Anatolevich TSARYOV (Олег Анатольевич ЦАРЕВ)</td>
<td>DOB: 2.6.1970 POB: Dnepropetrovsk</td>
<td>Former Member of the Rada, as such publicly called for the creation of the so-called ‘Federal Republic of Novorossiya’, composed of south-eastern Ukrainian regions. Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies. Former ‘Speaker’ of the so-called ‘Parliament of the Union of the People's Republics’ (‘Parliament of Novorossiya’). Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies.</td>
<td>12.5.2014</td>
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<td>60.</td>
<td>Natalia Vladimirovna POKLONSKAYA (Наталья Владимировна ПОКЛОНСКАЯ)</td>
<td>DOB: 18.3.1980 POB: Mikhailovka, Voroshilovgrad region, Ukrainian SSR or Yevpatoria, Ukrainian SSR Member of the State Duma, elected from the illegally annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Former Prosecutor of the so-called 'Republic of Crimea'. Actively implemented Russia's annexation of Crimea. Currently First Deputy Chairperson of the Committee for Security and countering corruption of the State Duma of the Russian Federation.</td>
<td>12.5.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>62. Aleksandr Yurevich BORODAI</td>
<td>DOB: 25.7.1972 POB: Moscow</td>
<td>Former so-called 'Prime Minister of the Donetsk People's Republic', as such responsible for the separatist ‘governmental’ activities of the so-called ‘government of the Donetsk People’s Republic’ (e.g. on 8 July 2014 stated 'our military is conducting a special operation against the Ukrainian “fascists”'), signatory of the Memorandum of Understanding on ‘Novorossiya union’. Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies; heads the ‘Union of Donbas volunteers’. Involved actively in recruitment and training of ‘volunteers' sent to fight in Donbas.</td>
<td>12.7.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63. Alexander KHODAKOVSKY, Oleksandr Serhiyovych KHODAKOVSKYY (KHODAKOVSKYI)</td>
<td>DOB: 18.12.1972 POB: Donetsk</td>
<td>Former so-called 'Minister of Security of the Donetsk People's Republic', as such responsible for the separatist security activities of the so-called 'government of the Donetsk People’s Republic'. Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies.</td>
<td>12.7.2014</td>
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<td>64. Alexandr Arkadiyevich KALYUSSKY</td>
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<td>(Александр Аркадьевич Калюсский)</td>
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<td>Oleksandr Arkadiyovych KALYUSSKIY</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Олександр Аркадійович Калюсський)</td>
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<td>DOB: 9.10.1975</td>
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<td>Former so-called 'de facto Deputy Prime Minister for Social Affairs of the Donetsk People's Republic'. Responsible for the separatist 'governmental' activities of the so-called 'government of the Donetsk People's Republic'.</td>
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<td>12.7.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>65. Alexander KHRYAKOV,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aleksandr Vitalievich KHRYAKOV</td>
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<td>(Александр Витальевич ХРЯКОВ),</td>
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<td>Oleksandr Vitaliyovych KHRYAKOV</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Олександр Віталійович ХРЯКОВ)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOB: 6.11.1958</td>
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<td>POB: Donetsk</td>
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<td>Former so-called 'Information and Mass Communications Minister’ of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. Currently a member of the so-called 'People's Council' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. Responsible for the pro-separatist propaganda activities of the so-called 'government' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. Continues active support to the separatist actions in Eastern Ukraine.</td>
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<tr>
<td>67. Vasyl Oleksandrovych NIKITIN (Василь Олександрович НІКІТИН), Vasilii Aleksandrovich NIKITIN (Васильй Александрович НІКІТИН)</td>
<td>DOB: 25.11.1971 POB: Shargun (Uzbekistan)</td>
<td>Former so-called ‘Vice Prime Minister of the Council of Ministers of the Lugansk People's Republic' (used to be the so-called 'Prime Minister of the Lugansk People's Republic', and former spokesman of the ‘Army of the South-East’). Responsible for the separatist ‘governmental’ activities of the so-called ‘government of the Lugansk People's Republic’. Responsible for the statement of the Army of the South-East that the Ukrainian presidential elections in the 'Lugansk People's Republic’ cannot take place due to the ‘new’ status of the region. Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies.</td>
<td>12.7.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>68. Aleksey Vyacheslavovich KARYAKIN (Алексей Вячеславович КАРЯКИН) Oleksiy Vyacheslavovych KARYAKIN (Олексій В’ячеславович КАРЯКІН)</td>
<td>DOB: 7.4.1980 or 7.4.1979 POB: Stakhanov, Lugansk region</td>
<td>Until 25 March 2016 so-called 'Supreme Council Chair of the Lugansk People's Republic'. Former member of the so-called 'People's Council of the Lugansk People's Republic'. Responsible for the separatist 'governmental' activities of the 'Supreme Council', responsible for asking the Russian Federation to recognise the independence of the 'Lugansk People's Republic'. Signatory of the Memorandum of Understanding on the 'Novorossiya union'. Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies.</td>
<td>12.7.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69. Yuriy Volodymyrovych IVAKIN (Юрій Володимирович Івакін), Iurii Vladimirovich IVAKIN (Юрий Владимирович Ивакин)</td>
<td>DOB: 13.8.1954 POB: Perevalsk (Lugansk oblast)</td>
<td>Former so-called 'Minister of Internal Affairs of the Lugansk People's Republic', as such responsible for the separatist 'governmental' activities of the so-called 'government of the Lugansk People's Republic'.</td>
<td>12.7.2014</td>
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| 70. Igor PLOTNITSKY, Igor Venediktovich PLOTNITSKI
(Игорь Венедиктович ПЛОТНИЦКИЙ) | DOB: 24.6.1964 or 25.6.1964 or 26.6.1964
POB: Lugansk (possibly in Kelmentsi, Chernivtsi oblast) | Former so-called 'Defence Minister' and currently so-called 'Head' of the 'Lugansk People’s Republic'. Responsible for the separatist 'governmental' activities of the so-called 'government of the Lugansk People’s Republic'. | 12.7.2014 |
| 71. Nikolay Ivanovich KOZITSYN
(Николай Иванович Козицын) | DOB: 20.6.1956 or 6.10.1956
POB: Djerzinsk, Donetsk region | Commander of Cossack forces. Responsible for commanding separatists in Eastern Ukraine fighting against the Ukrainian government forces. | 12.7.2014 |
| 72. * | | | |

* The entry was deleted on 14 September 2015 following a delisting decision.
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<th>Name</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| Mikhail Efimovich FRADKOV (Михаил Ефимович ФРАДКОВ) | DOB: 1.9.1950  
POB: Kurumoch, Kuibyshev region | Former permanent member of the Security Council of the Russian Federation; Former Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation. As a member of the Security Council, which provides advice on and coordinates national security affairs, he was involved in shaping the policy of the Russian Government threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. | 25.7.2014       |
| Nikolai Platonovich PATRUSHEV (Николай Платонович Патрушев) | DOB 11.7.1951  
POB: Leningrad (St Petersburg) | Permanent member and Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. As a member of the Security Council, which provides advice on and coordinates national security affairs, he was involved in shaping the policy of the Russian Government threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. | 25.7.2014       |
| Aleksandr Vasilievich BORTNIKOV (Александр Васильевич Бортников) | DOB: 15.11.1951  
POB: Perm | Permanent member of the Security Council of the Russian Federation; Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB). As a member of the Security Council, which provides advice on and coordinates national security affairs, he was involved in shaping the policy of the Russian Government threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. | 25.7.2014       |
| Rashid Gumarovich NURGALIEV (Рашид Гумарович Нургалиев) | DOB: 8.10.1956  
POB: Zhetikara, Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic | Permanent member and Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. As a member of the Security Council, which provides advice on and coordinates national security affairs, he was involved in shaping the policy of the Russian Government threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. | 25.7.2014       |
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<tr>
<td>25.7.2014</td>
<td>Commander of the Fifth Service of the FSB, Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. As a senior FSB officer (Colonel-General), he heads a service responsible for overseeing intelligence operations and international activity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.7.2014</td>
<td>Member of the State Duma. As a member of the Duma, he announced the inauguration of the ‘de facto embassy’ of the unrecognized, so-called ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ in Moscow, he contributes to undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.</td>
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<tr>
<td>25.7.2014</td>
<td>Currently Chairman of the Russian State Duma Committee on Physical Education, Sport and Youth Affairs.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boris Vyacheslavovich GRYZLOV (Борис Вячеславович Грызов)</td>
<td>15.12.1950</td>
<td>Vladivostok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergei Orestovich BESEDA (Сергей Орестович Безде)</td>
<td>17.5.1954</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mikhail Vladimirovich DECTYAREV (Михаил Владимирович Дектярев)</td>
<td>10.7.1981</td>
<td>Samara</td>
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<tr>
<td>80. Ramzan Akhmadovitch KADYROV (Рамзан Ахматович Кадыров)</td>
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<td>81. Alexander Nikolayevich TKACHYOV (Александр Николаевич Ткачёв)</td>
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<td>82. Pavel Yurievich GUBAREV (Павел Юрьевич ГУБАРЕВ) Pavel Yuriyovich GUBARIEV (HUBARIEV) (Павло Юрійович ГУБАРЄВ)</td>
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<td>83. Ekaterina Yurievna GUBAREVA (Екатерина Юрьевна ГУБАРЕВА), Kateryna Yuriyivna GUBARIEVA (HUBARIEVA) (Катерина Юріївна ГУБАРЄВА)</td>
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<td>84. Fyodor Dmitrievich BEREZIN (Фёдор Дмитриевич БЕРЕЗИН), Fedir Dmytrovych BEREZIN (Федір Дмитрович БЕРЕЗИН)</td>
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<tr>
<td>85. Valery Vladimirovich KAUROV (Валерий Владимирович КАУРОВ), Valeriy Volodymyrovych KAUROV (Валерій Володимирович КАУРОВ)</td>
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<td>86. Serhii Anatoliyovych ZDRILIUK a.k.a Abwehr (Сергей Анатольевич ЗДРИЛЮК) (Сергій Анатолійович ЗДРИЛЮК)</td>
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<tr>
<td>87. Vladimir ANTYUFYEV (a.k.a. Vladimir SHEVTSOV, Vladimir Iurievici ANTIUFEEV, Vladimir Gheorghievici ALEXANDROV, Vadim Gheorghievici SHEVTSOV) (Владимир АНТЮФЕЕВ)</td>
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<td>88. Alexey Alexeyevich GROMOV (Алексей Алексеевич Громов)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sergey Vadimovich ABISOV</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>92. Arkady Romanovich ROTENBERG, Arkadii Romanovich ROTENBERG (Аркадий Романович Ротенберг)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Konstantin Valerevich MALOFEEV (Константин Валерьевич МАЛОФЕЕВ)</td>
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</table>
| Yuriy Valentinovich KOVALCHUK             | DOB 25.7.1951 POB: Leningrad (St Petersburg) | Mr Kovalchuk is a long-time acquaintance of President Putin. He is a co-founder of the so-called Ozero Dacha, a co-operative society bringing together an influential group of individuals around President Putin.  
He is benefiting from his links with Russian decision-makers. He is the chairman and largest shareholder of Bank Rossiya, of which he owned around 38 % in 2013, and which is considered the personal bank of Senior Officials of the Russian Federation. Since the illegal annexation of Crimea, Bank Rossiya has opened branches across Crimea and Sevastopol, thereby consolidating their integration into the Russian Federation.  
Furthermore, Bank Rossiya has important stakes in the National Media Group which in turn controls television stations which actively support the Russian government's policies of destabilisation of Ukraine. | 30.7.2014       |
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nikolay Terentievich SHAMALOV (Николай Терентьевич Шамалов)</td>
<td>DOB: 24.1.1950 POB: Belarus</td>
<td>Mr Shamalov is a long-time acquaintance of President Putin. He is a co-founder of the so-called Ozero Dacha, a cooperative society bringing together an influential group of individuals around President Putin. He benefits from his links with Russian decision-makers. He is the second largest shareholder of Bank Rossiya, of which he owned around 10% in 2013, and which is considered the personal bank of Senior Officials of the Russian Federation. Since the illegal annexation of Crimea, Bank Rossiya has opened branches across Crimea and Sevastopol, thereby consolidating their integration into the Russian Federation. Furthermore, Bank Rossiya has important stakes in the National Media Group which, in turn, controls television stations which actively support the Russian government’s policies of destabilisation of Ukraine.</td>
<td>30.7.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander Vladimirovich ZAKHARCHENKO (Александр Владимирович ЗАХАРЧЕНКО) Oleksandr Volodymyrovych ZAKHARCHENKO (Олександр Володимирович ЗАХАРЧЕНКО)</td>
<td>DOB: 26.6.1976 POB: Donetsk</td>
<td>As of 7 August 2014, he replaced Alexander Borodai as the so-called ‘Prime Minister’ of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’. Currently so-called ‘Head’ of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’. In taking on and acting in this capacity, Zakharchenko has supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.</td>
<td>12.9.2014</td>
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<td>97. Vladimir Petrovich KONONO (a.k.a. ‘Tsar’) (Vladimir Petrovich KOHONO) Volodymyr Petrovych KONOVO (Vолодимир Петрович KOHONO)</td>
<td>DOB: 14.10.1974 POB: Gorsky</td>
<td>As of 14 August 2014, he replaced Igor Strelkov/Girkin, as the so-called ‘Defence minister’ of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’. He has reportedly commanded a division of separatist fighters in Donetsk since April 2014 and has promised to solve the strategic task of repelling Ukraine’s military aggression. Kononov has therefore supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.</td>
<td>12.9.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98. Miroslav Vladimirovich RUDEENKO (Миролслав Владимирович РУДЕНКО) Myroslav Volodymyrovych RUDEENKO (Мирослав Володимирович РУДЕНКО)</td>
<td>DOB: 21.1.1983 POB: Debaltsevo</td>
<td>Associated with the ‘Donbass People’s Militia’. He has, inter alia, stated that they will continue their fighting in the rest of the country. Rudenko has therefore supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Member of the so-called ‘People’s Council of the Donetsk People’s Republic’.</td>
<td>12.9.2014</td>
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* The entry was deleted on 13 March 2017 following a delisting decision.
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</table>
| 100. Andrey Yurevich PINCHUK (Андрей Юрьевич ПИНЧУК)  
Andriy Yuriyovych PINCHUK (Андрій Юрійович ПІНЧУК) | Possible date of birth: 27.12 1977 | Former ‘State security minister’ of the so-called ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’. Associated with Vladimir Antyufeyev, who is responsible for the separatist ‘governmental’ activities of the so-called ‘government of the Donetsk People’s Republic’. He has therefore supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies. Head of the ‘Union of Donbas volunteers’. | 12.9.2014 |
| 101. Oleg Vladimirovich BEREZA (Олег Владимирович Береза) | DOB: 1.3.1977 | Former so-called ‘Internal affairs minister’ of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’. Associated with Vladimir Antyufeyev, who is responsible for the separatist ‘governmental’ activities of the so-called ‘Government of the Donetsk People’s Republic’. He has therefore supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. | 12.9.2014 |
| 102. Andrei Nikolaevich RODKIN (Андрей Николаевич Родкин) | DOB: 23.9.1976  
POB: Moscow | Moscow Representative of the so-called ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’. In his statements he has, *inter alia*, talked about the militias’ readiness to conduct a guerrilla war and their seizure of weapon systems from the Ukrainian armed forces. He has therefore supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.  
One of the leaders of the “Union of Donbas volunteers”. | 12.9.2014 |
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<tr>
<td>103. Aleksandr Akimovich KARAMAN (Александр Акимович Карман), alias Aleksandr CARMAN (Александр Карман)</td>
<td>12.9.2014</td>
<td>Former so-called ‘Deputy Prime Minister for Social Issues’ of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’. Associated with Vladimir Antufiev, who was responsible for the separatist government’s activities of the so-called ‘Government of the Donetsk People’s Republic’. He has therefore supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.</td>
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<tr>
<td>104. Georgiy L’vovich MURADOV (Георгий Львович Мурadow)</td>
<td>12.9.2014</td>
<td>So-called ‘Deputy Prime Minister of Crimea’ and Plenipotentiary Representative of Crimea to President Putin. Muradow has played an important role in consolidating Russian institutional control over Crimea since the illegal annexation. He has therefore supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.</td>
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<td>105. Mikhail Sergeyevich SHEREMET (Михаил Сергеевич ШЕРЕМЕТ) Mykhaylo Serhiyovych SHEREMET (Михайло Сергійович ШЕРЕМЕТ)</td>
<td>DOB 23.5.1971 POB: Dzhankoy</td>
<td>Member of the State Duma, elected from the illegally annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Former so-called ‘First Deputy Prime Minister’ of Crimea. Sheremet played a key role in the organisation and implementation of the 16 March referendum in Crimea on unification with Russia. At the time of the referendum, Sheremet reportedly commanded the pro-Moscow ‘self-defence forces’ in Crimea. He has therefore supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Elected on 18 September 2016 as a Duma deputy from illegally annexed Crimean Peninsula.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107. Vladimir Volfovic ZHIRINOVSKY (Владимир Вольфович Жириновски)</td>
<td>DOB: 25.4.1946 POB: Alma-Ata, Kazakh SSR</td>
<td>Member of the Council of the State Duma; leader of the LDPR party. He actively supported the use of Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea. He has actively called for the split of Ukraine. He signed, on behalf of the LDPR party he chairs, an agreement with the so-called, 'Donetsk People's Republic'.</td>
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<td>Viktor Petrovich VODOLATSKY (Виктор Петрович Водолацкий)</td>
<td>DOB 19.8.1957 POB: Rostov region</td>
<td>Chairman ('ataman') of the Union of the Russian and Foreign Cossack Forces, and deputy of the State Duma. He supported the annexation of Crimea and admitted that Russian Cossacks were actively engaged in the Ukrainian conflict on the side of the Moscow-backed separatists. On 20 March 2014 he voted in favour of the draft Federal Constitutional Law 'on the acceptance into the Russian Federation of the Republic of Crimea and the formation within the Russian Federation of new federal subjects - the republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Status Sevastopol'.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aleksey Vasilevich NAUMETS (Алексей Васильевич Наумец)</td>
<td>DOB: 11.2.1968</td>
<td>Major-general of the Russian Army. He is the commander of the 76th airborne division which has been involved in the Russian military presence on the territory of Ukraine, notably during the illegal annexation of Crimea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergey Viktorovich CHEMEZOV (Серге́й Ви́кторович Чеме́зов)</td>
<td>DOB: 20.8.1952, POB: Cheremkhovo</td>
<td>Sergei Chemezov is one of President Putin's known close associates, both were KGB officers posted in Dresden and he is a member of the Supreme Council of 'United Russia'. He is benefiting from his links with the Russian President by being promoted to senior positions in State-controlled firms. He chairs the Rostec conglomerate, the leading Russian state-controlled defence and industrial manufacturing corporation. Further to a decision of the Russian government, Technopromexport, a subsidiary of Rostec, is planning to build energy plants in Crimea thereby supporting its integration into the Russian Federation. Furthermore, Rosoboronexport, a subsidiary of Rostec, has supported the integration of Crimean defence companies into Russia's defence industry, thereby consolidating the illegal annexation of Crimea into the Russian Federation.</td>
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| Alexander Mikhailovich BABAKOV  
(Александр Михайлович БАБАКОВ) | DOB: 8.2.1963  
POB: Chisinau | Former member of the State Duma. Former State Duma Deputy, Chair of the State Duma Commission on Legislative Provisions for Development of the Military-Industrial Complex of the Russian Federation. He is a prominent member of 'United Russia' and a businessman with heavy investments in Ukraine and in Crimea.  
On 20 March 2014 he voted in favour of the draft Federal Constitutional Law 'on the acceptance into the Russian Federation of the Republic of Crimea and the formation within the Russian Federation of new federal subjects — the Republic of Crimea and the City of federal status of Sevastopol'.  
Currently member of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation. | 12.9.2014 |
| Sergey Yurievich KOZYAKOV  
(Сергей Юрьевич КОЗЯКОВ)  
Serhiy Yuriyovych KOZYAKOV  
(Сергій Юрійович КОЗЯКОВ) | DOB: 29.9.1982  
or 23.9.1982 | In his former capacity as so-called 'Head of the Luhansk Central Election Commission' he was responsible for organising the so-called 'elections' of 2 November 2014 in the 'Luhansk People's Republic'. These 'elections' were in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal. In October 2015 he was appointed as so-called 'Minister of Justice' of the 'Luhansk People's Republic'.  
In taking on and acting in these capacities, and in organising the illegal 'elections', he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine. | 29.11.2014 |
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<tr>
<td>Oleg Konstantinovich AKIMOV (a.k.a. Oleh AKIMOV) (Олег Константинович АКИМОВ) Oleh Kostiantynovych AKIMOV (Олег Костянтинович АКИМОВ)</td>
<td>DOB: 15.9.1981 POB: Lugansk</td>
<td>Deputy of the ‘Lugansk Economic Union’ in the ‘National Council’ of the ‘Lugansk People's Republic’. Stood as a candidate in the so-called ‘elections’ of 2 November 2014 to the post of so-called ‘Head’ of the ‘Lugansk People's Republic’. These ‘elections’ were in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal. Since 2014 he is the ‘Head’ of the so-called ‘Federation of Trade Unions’ and a member of the so-called ‘People's Council’ of the ‘Lugansk People's Republic’. In taking on and acting in this capacity, and in participating formally as a candidate in the illegal ‘elections’, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine. Supports actively actions and policies undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.</td>
<td>29.11.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larisa Leonidovna AYRAPETYAN a.k.a. Larysa AYRAPETYAN, Larisa AYRAPETYAN or Larysa AYRAPETYAN (Лариса Леонидовна АЙРАПЕТЯН) (Лариса Леонідівна АЙРАПЕТЯН)</td>
<td>DOB: 21.2.1970</td>
<td>Former so-called ‘Health Minister’ of the so-called ‘Lugansk People’s Republic’. Stood as a candidate in the so-called ‘elections’ of 2 November 2014 to the post of the ‘Head’ of the so-called ‘Lugansk People’s Republic’. These ‘elections’ are in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal. In taking on and acting in this capacity, and in participating formally as a candidate in the illegal ‘elections’, she has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.</td>
<td>29.11.2014</td>
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<td>123. Yuriy Viktorovich SIVOKONENKO a.k.a. Yury SIVOKONENKO, Yury SIVOKONENKO, Yury SYVOKONENKO (Юрий Викторович СИВОКОНЕНКО)</td>
<td>DOB: 7.8.1957 POB: Stalino city (now Donetsk)</td>
<td>Member of the 'Parliament' of the so-called 'Donetsk People's Republic' and Chairman of the public association Union of Veterans of the Donbass Berkut and a member of the public movement 'Free Donbass'. Stood as a candidate in the so-called 'elections' of 2 November 2014 to the post of the Head of the so-called 'Donetsk People’s Republic'. These elections were in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal. In taking on and acting in this capacity, and in participating formally as a candidate in the illegal 'elections', he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.</td>
<td>29.11.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124. Aleksandr Igorevich KOFSMAN (a.k.a. Oleksandr KOFSMAN) (Александр Игоревич КОФМАН) (Олександр Ігорович КОФМАН)</td>
<td>DOB: 30.8.1977 POB: Makiivka (Donetsk oblast)</td>
<td>Former so-called ‘Foreign Minister’ and so-called ‘First deputy speaker’ of the 'Parliament' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. Stood as a candidate in the so-called illegal 'elections' of 2 November 2014 to the post of so-called 'Head' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. These elections were in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal. In taking part and acting in this capacity, and in participating formally as a candidate in the illegal 'elections', he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine. Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies.</td>
<td>29.11.2014</td>
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<td>Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ravil Zakarievich KHALIKOV</td>
<td>DOB: 23.2.1969</td>
<td>Former so-called 'First Deputy Prime Minister' and previous 'Prosecutor-General' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.</td>
<td>29.11.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Равиль Закарикович ХАЛИКОВ)</td>
<td>POB: Belozernoe village, Romodanovskiy rayon, USSR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ravil Zakariyovych KHALIKOV</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Равіль Закарійович ХАЛІКОВ)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dmitry Aleksandrovich SEMYONOVS</td>
<td>DOB: 3.2.1963</td>
<td>Former ‘Deputy Prime Minster for Finances’ of the so-called ‘Lugansk People’s Republic’. In taking on and acting in this capacity, has actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.</td>
<td>29.11.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Дмитрий Александрович СЕМЕНОВ)</td>
<td>POB: Moscow</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oleg Evgenievich BUKROV</td>
<td>DOB: 29.8.1969 or 1973</td>
<td>Former 'Defence Minister' of the so-called 'Lugansk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.</td>
<td>29.11.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Олег Євгенійович БУГРОВ)</td>
<td>POB: Sverdlovsk, Luhansk</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oleh Yevhenovych BUKROV</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Олег Євгенович БУГРОВ)</td>
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<td>Name</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| 128. Lesya Mikhaylovna LAPTEVA  
(Леся Михайлівна ЛАПТЕВА)  
Lesya Mykhaylivna LAPTIEVA  
(Леся Михайлівна ЛАПТІЄВА) | DOB: 11.3.1976  
POB: Dzhambul/Jambul  
(Kazakhstan), currently known as Taraz | Former ‘Minister of Education, Science, Culture and Religion’ of the so-called ‘Lugansk People’s Republic’.  
In taking on and acting in this capacity, she has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine. | 29.11.2014 |
| 129. Yevgeniy Edwardsovich MIKHAYLOV (a.k.a. Yevhen Edwardsovich MYCHAYLOV)  
(Євген Єдуардович МИХАЙЛОВ) | DOB: 17.3.1963  
POB: Arkhangelsk | Former so-called ‘Minister of the Council of Ministers’ (head of the administration for governmental affairs) of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’.  
In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine. | 29.11.2014 |
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<tr>
<td>130. Ihor Vladymirovych KOSTENOK (a.k.a. Igor Vladimirovich KOSTENOK) (Игорь Владимирович КОСТЕНОК)</td>
<td>DOB: 15.03.1961 POB: Vodyanske, Dobropillia Rayon, Donetsk oblast Водянское, Добропольский район Донецкой области</td>
<td>Former so-called 'Minister of Education' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine. Currently personal advisor to the PM of DNR.</td>
<td>29.11.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>131. Yevgeniy Vyacheslavovich ORLOV (a.k.a. Yevhen Vyacheslavovych ORLOV) (Евгений Вячеславович ОРЛОВ)</td>
<td>DOB: 10.5.1980 or 21.10.1983 POB: Snezhnoye, Donetsk region г. Снежное, Донецкой области</td>
<td>Member of the 'National Council' of the so-called 'Donetsk People's Republic'. Chairman of the public movement 'Free Donbass'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.</td>
<td>29.11.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>132. Vladyslav Mykolayovych DEYNEGO a.k.a. Vladyslav Nikolayevich DEYNEGO (Владислав Миколайович ДЕЙНЕГО) (Владислав Николаевич ДЕЙНЕГО)</td>
<td>DOB: 12.3.1964 POB: Romny, Sumy oblast Ромны, Сумская область</td>
<td>‘Deputy Head’ of the ‘People’s Council’ of the so-called ‘Lugansk People’s Republic’. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.</td>
<td>29.11.2014</td>
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<td>133.</td>
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<tr>
<td>134. Alexey Yurevich MILCHAKOV (a.k.a. Fritz, Serbian) (Алексей Юрьевич Мильчаков)</td>
<td>DOB: 30.4. 1991 POB: St. Petersburg</td>
<td>Commander of the ‘Rusich’ unit, an armed separatist group involved in the fighting in eastern Ukraine. In this capacity, he has actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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* The entry was deleted on 10 March 2016 following a delisting decision.
† The entry was deleted on 13 March 2017 following a delisting decision.
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<tr>
<td>Eduard Aleksandrovich BASURIN (Эдуард Александрович БАСУРИН)</td>
<td>27.6.1966</td>
<td>Donetsk</td>
<td>Spokesperson of the Ministry of Defence of the so-called 'Donetsk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine. Remains an active military commander in so-called 'DNR'.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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* The entry was deleted on 14 September 2017 following a delisting decision.
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<tr>
<td>138. Alexandr Vasilievich SHUBIN (Александр Васильевич ШУБИН)</td>
<td>DOB: 20.5.1972 or 30.5.1972 POB: Luhansk</td>
<td>Former so-called ‘Minister of Justice’, of the illegal so-called ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’. Chairman of the ‘Central Election Commission’ of the so-called ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’ since October 2015. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine. Currently Chairman of the so-called ‘Central Election Commission’ of the so-called ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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* The entry was deleted on 14 September 2017 following a delisting decision.
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<th>Name</th>
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</table>
| 140. Sergey Yurevich IGNATOV (a.k.a. KUZOVELY) (Сергей Юрьевич ИГНАТОВ (КУЗОВЛЕВ)) | DOB: 7.1.1967
POB: Michurinsk, Tambov oblast Мичуринск, Тамбовская область | So-called Commander in Chief of the People's Militia of the 'Luhansk People's Republic'.
In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine. | 16.2.2015 |
| 141. Ekaterina FILIPPOVA (Екатерина Владимировна ФИЛИППОВА) Kateryna Volodymyrivna FILIPPOVA (Катерина Володимирівна ФІЛІППОВА) | DOB: 20.1.1988
POB: Krasnoarmiisk | Former so-called 'Minister of Justice' of the so-called 'Donetsk People's Republic'.
In taking on and acting in this capacity, she has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.
Currently personal assistant to Alexander Vladimirovich Zakharchenko. | 16.2.2015 |
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<tr>
<td>142. Aleksandr Yurievich TIMOFEEV (Александр Юрьевич ТИМОФЕЕВ) Oleksandr Yuriyovych TYMOFEYEV (Олександр Юрійович ТИМОФЕЄВ)</td>
<td>DOB: 15.05.1971 POB: Nevinnomyssk, Stavropol Krai Невинномысск, Ставропольский край</td>
<td>So-called 'Minister of Finance and Taxes' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>143. Evgeny Vladimirovich MANUYLOV (Евгений Владимирович МАНОУЛОВ) Yevhen Volodymyrovych MANUYLOV (Євген Володимирович МАНОУЛОВ)</td>
<td>DOB: 5.1.1967 POB: Baranykivka, Bilovodska Raion, Luhansk region с. Баараниківка Біловодського району Луганської області</td>
<td>So-called 'Minister of Finance' of the so-called 'Lugansk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>144. Viktor Vyacheslavovich YATSENKO (Віктор В'ячеславович ЯЦЕНКО) Viktor Viacheslavovich YATSENKO (Віктор В'ячеславович ЯЦЕНКО)</td>
<td>DOB: 22.4.1985 POB: Kherson</td>
<td>So-called 'Minister of Communications' of the so-called 'Donetsk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>145. Olga Igoreva BESEDINA (Ольга Ігорівна БЕСЕДИНА) Olha Ihorivna BESEDINA (Ольга Ігорівна БЕСЕДИНА)</td>
<td>DOB: 10.12.1976 POB: Lugansk</td>
<td>Former so-called 'Minister of Economic Development and Trade' of the so-called 'Lugansk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, she has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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<td>146. Zaur Raufovich ISMAILOV (Заур Рафович ИСМАЙЛОВ) Zaur Raufovich ISMAYILOV (Заур Рафович ИСМАЙЛОВ)</td>
<td>DOB: 25.7.1978 (or 23.3.1975) POB: Krasny Luch, Voroshilovgrad, Lugansk region</td>
<td>So-called 'General Prosecutor' of the so-called 'Lugansk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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<td>147. Anatoly Ivanovich ANTONOV (Анатолий Иванович АНТОНОВ)</td>
<td>DOB 15.5.1955 POB: Omsk</td>
<td>Former Deputy Minister of Defence and, in that capacity, involved in supporting the deployment of Russian troops in Ukraine. According to the present Russian Ministry of Defence structure, in that capacity he participated in shaping and implementing the policy of the Russian Government. These policies threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. As of 28 December 2016, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>148. Arkady Viktorovich BAKHIN (Аркадий Викторович БАХИН)</td>
<td>DOB: 8.5.1956 POB: Kaunas, Lithuania</td>
<td>Former First Deputy Minister of Defence (until 17 November 2015) and was, in that capacity, involved in supporting the deployment of Russian troops in Ukraine. According to the present Russian Ministry of Defence structure, in that capacity he participates in shaping and implementing the policy of the Russian Government. These policies threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Currently employed by Rosatom.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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| 149. Andrei Valeryevich KARTAPOLOV (Андрей Валерьевич Карташов) | DOB: 9.11.1963  
POB: GDR (DDR) | Commander of the Western Military District since 10 November 2015. Former Director of the Main Operations Department and deputy chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Actively involved in shaping and implementing the military campaign of the Russian forces in Ukraine. According to the stated activities of the general staff, by exercising operational control over the armed forces, he is actively involved in shaping and implementing the Russian government policy threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. | 16.2.2015 |
| 150. Iosif (Joseph) Davydovich KOBZON (Иосиф Давыдович КОБЗОН) | DOB: 11.9.1937  
POB: Tchassov Yar, Ukraine | Member of the State Duma. He visited the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic and during his visit made statements supporting separatists. He was also appointed Honorary Consul of the so-called ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ in the Russian Federation. On 20 March 2014 he voted in favour of the draft Federal Constitutional Law ‘on the acceptance into the Russian Federation of the Republic of Crimea and the formation within the Russian Federation of new federal subjects — the republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Status Sevastopol’. Currently First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Culture. | 16.2.2015 |
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<tr>
<td>151. Valery Fedorovich RASHKIN (Валерий Фёдорович Рашкин)</td>
<td>DOB: 14.3.1955 POB: Zhilino, Kaliningrad region</td>
<td>First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Ethnicity issues. He is the founder of the civil movement 'Krassnaya Moskva - Red Moscow - Patriotic Front Aid' which organised public demonstrations supporting separatists, thereby supporting policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. On 20 March 2014 he voted in favour of the draft Federal Constitutional Law 'on the acceptance into the Russian Federation of the Republic of Crimea and the formation within the Russian Federation of new federal subjects - the republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Status Sevastopol'.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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<td>152. Ruslan Ismailovich BALBEK (Руслан Исмаилович БАЛЬБЕК)</td>
<td>DOB: 28.8.1977 POB: Bekabad, Uzbekistan SSR</td>
<td>Member of the State Duma, elected from the illegally annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Deputy Chairperson of the Duma Committee on ethnic affairs. In 2014 Balbek was appointed as a Deputy Chairperson of the Council of Ministers of the so-called 'Republic of Crimea' and worked in this capacity for the integration of the illegally annexed Crimean peninsula into the Russian Federation, for which he has been awarded with a medal 'For the Defence of Republic of Crimea'. He has supported the annexation of Crimea in public statements, including on his profile on the United Russia (Crimean branch) website and a press article published on NTV website on 3 July 2016.</td>
<td>09.11.2016</td>
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<tr>
<td>Konstantin Mikhailovich BAKHAREV (Константин Михайлович БАХАРЕВ)</td>
<td>DOB: 20.10.1972 POB: Simferopol Ukrainian SSR</td>
<td>Member of the State Duma, elected from the illegally annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Member of the Duma Committee on Financial Markets. In March 2014 Bakharev was appointed as a Deputy Chairperson of the State Council of the so-called ‘Republic of Crimea’, and in August 2014 as First Deputy Chairperson of that body. He has admitted his personal involvement in the events of 2014 that led to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol, which he has publicly supported, including in an interview published on gazetakrimea.ru website on 22 March 2016 and c-pravda.ru website on 23 August 2016. He has been awarded with the order ‘For loyalty to duty’ by the ‘authorities’ of ‘Republic of Crimea’.</td>
<td>09.11.2016</td>
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| 154. Dmitry Anatolievich BELIK (Дмитрий Анатольевич БЕЛИК) | DOB: 17.10.1969 POB: Kular Ust-Yansky District, Yakut Autonomous SSR | Member of the State Duma, elected from the illegally annexed city of Sevastopol.  
Member of the Duma Committee on Taxation.  
As a member of the Sevastopol municipal administration in February-March 2014 he supported the activities of the so-called ‘People's Mayor’ Alexei Chaly. He has publicly admitted his involvement in the events of 2014 that led to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol, which he has publicly defended, including on his personal website and in an interview published on 21 February 2016 on nation-news.ru website.  
For his involvement in the annexation process he has been awarded with Russian State order ‘For duties to the motherland’ — II degree. | 09.11.2016 |
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| 155. Andrei Dmitrievich KOZENKO (Андрей Дмитриевич КОЗЕНКО) | DOB: 3.8.1981 POB: Simferopol Ukrainian SSR | Member of the State Duma, elected from the illegally annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea.  
Member of Duma Committee on Financial Markets.  
In March 2014 Kozenko was appointed as a Deputy Chairperson of the State Council of the so-called ‘Republic of Crimea’. He has publicly admitted his involvement in the events of 2014 that led to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol, which he has publicly defended, including in an interview published on gazetacrimea.ru website on 12 March 2016. For his involvement in the annexation process he has been awarded with a medal ‘For the defence of Republic of Crimea’ by the local ‘authorities’. | 09.11.2016      |
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<tr>
<td>156. Svetlana Borisovna SAVCHENKO (Светлана Борисовна САВЧЕНКО)</td>
<td>DOB: 24.6.1965 POB: Belogorsk Ukrainian SSR</td>
<td>Member of the State Duma, elected from the illegally annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Member of the Duma Committee on Culture. She has been a member of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea since 2012 and as of March 2014 supported the integration of the illegally annexed Crimea and Sevastopol into the Russian Federation. In September 2014 Savchenko was elected to the State Council of the so-called ‘Republic of Crimea’. She has defended the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol on numerous occasions in public statements, including interviews published on c-pravda.ru website on 2 April 2016 and 20 August 2016. She has been awarded with Russian State order ‘For duties to the motherland’ — II degree in 2014 and with the order ‘For loyalty to duty’ by the “authorities” of ‘Republic of Crimea’ in 2015.</td>
<td>09.11.2016</td>
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| 157. | Pavel Valentinovich SHPEROV (Павел Валентинович ШПЕРОВ) | DOB: 4.7.1971 POB: Simferopol Ukrainian SSR | Member of the State Duma, elected from the illegally annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea.  
Member of the Duma Committee for CIS Affairs, Eurasian Integration and Relations with Compatriots.  
In September 2014 Shperov was elected to the State Council of the so-called ‘Republic of Crimea’.  
He has publicly admitted, including in an interview published on ldpr-rk.ru website on 3 September 2016, his role in the events of 2014 that led to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol and in particular his role in the organisation of the illegal referendum on the illegal annexation of the peninsula. | 09.11.2016      |
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<tr>
<td>158. Andrey Vladimirovich CHEREZOV (TSCHERESOW) Черезов, Андрей Владимирович</td>
<td>Vice-Minister for Energy of the Russian Federation. DOB: 12.10.1967 POB: Salair, Kemerovskaya Oblast</td>
<td>Shares responsibility for the decision to transfer gas turbines that had been delivered by Siemens Gas Turbine Technologies OOO to OAO VO Technopromexport, to be installed in Crimea. This decision contributes to establishing an independent power supply for Crimea and Sevastopol as a means of supporting their separation from Ukraine, and undermines the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.</td>
<td>04.08.2017</td>
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<tr>
<td>159. Evgeniy Petrovich GRABCHAK (Грабчак, Евгений Петрович)</td>
<td>Head of Department in the Energy Ministry of the Russian Federation. DOB: 18.7.1981, POB: Ust-Labinsk, Krasnodar Region</td>
<td>Responsible within the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation for the development of electro-energetic projects in Crimea. These projects contribute to establishing an independent power supply for Crimea and Sevastopol as a means of supporting their separation from Ukraine, and undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.</td>
<td>04.08.2017</td>
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<tr>
<td>160. Sergey Anatolevich TOPOR-GILKA</td>
<td>Director General of OAO 'VO TPE' until its insolvency, Director General of ООО ‘VO TPE’. DOB: 17.2.1970</td>
<td>In his capacity as Director General of ООО ‘VO TPE’, he led the negotiations with Siemens Gas Turbine Technologies ООО regarding the purchase and delivery of the gas turbines for a power plant in Taman, Krasnodar region, Russian Federation. He was responsible for the transfer of the gas turbines to Crimea. This contributes to establishing an independent power supply for Crimea and Sevastopol as a means of supporting their separation from Ukraine, and undermines the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.</td>
<td>04.08.2017</td>
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| 1. State Unitary Enterprise of the 'Republic of Crimea' 'Chernomorneftegaz' (formerly known as PJSC 'Chernomorneftegaz') | Prospekt Kirov 52, Simferopol, Crimea, 295000  
пр.Кирова 52, г. Симферополь, Крым, 295000  
Phone number:  
+7 (3652) 66-70-00  
+7 (3652) 66-78-00 | On 17.3.2014, the 'Parliament of Crimea' adopted a resolution declaring the appropriation of assets belonging to the Chernomorneftegaz enterprise on behalf of the 'Republic of Crimea'. The enterprise is thus effectively confiscated by the Crimean 'authorities'. Re-registered on 29.11.2014 as State Unitary Enterprise of the 'Republic of Crimea' 'Chernomorneftegaz' (Государственное унитарное предприятие Республики Крым 'Черноморнефтегаз'). Founder: The Ministry of Fuel and Energy of the Republic of Crimea (Министерство топлива и энергетики Республики Крым). | 12.5.2014       |
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<td>3. So-called 'Lugansk People's Republic'</td>
<td>Official website: <a href="http://lugansk-online.info">http://lugansk-online.info</a> Phone number: +38-099-160-74-14</td>
<td>The so-called 'Lugansk People's Republic' was established on 27 April 2014. Responsible for organising the illegal referendum on 11 May 2014. Declaration of independence on 12 May 2014. On 22 May 2014, the so-called 'People's Republics' of Donetsk and Lugansk created the so-called 'Federal State of Novorossiya'. This is in breach of Ukrainian constitutional law, and, as a consequence, of international law, thus undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. It is also involved in the recruitment to the separatist 'Army of Southeast' and other illegal armed separatist groups, thus undermining the stability or security of Ukraine.</td>
<td>25.7.2014</td>
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<td>4. So called 'Donetsk People's Republic' 'Донецкая народная республика' 'Donétskaya naródnaya respúblika'</td>
<td>Official information, including the Constitution of Donetsk People's Republic and the composition of the Supreme Council <a href="http://dnr-news.com/">http://dnr-news.com/</a> Social media: <a href="https://twitter.com/dnrpress">https://twitter.com/dnrpress</a> <a href="http://vk.com/dnrnews">http://vk.com/dnrnews</a></td>
<td>The so called 'Donetsk People's Republic' was declared on 7 April 2014. Responsible for organizing the illegal referendum on May 11 2014. Declaration of independence on May 12 2014. On 24 May 2014, the so called 'People's Republics' of Donetsk and Lugansk signed an agreement on the creation of the so called 'Federal State of Novorossiya'. This is in breach of Ukrainian constitutional law, and, as a consequence, of international law, thus undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. It is also involved in the recruitment to illegal armed separatist groups, thus threatening the stability or security of Ukraine.</td>
<td>25.7.2014</td>
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| 5.   | So-called 'Federal State of Novorossiya'  
'Федеративное государство Новороссия'  
'Federativnoye Gosudarstvo Novorossiya'  
Official press releases:  
http://novorossia.su/official  
http://frn2016.netdo.ru/  
https://www.novorosinform.org/  
| On 24 May 2014, the so-called 'People's Republics' of Donetsk and Lugansk signed an agreement on the creation of the unrecognized so-called 'Federal State of Novorossiya'.  
This is in breach of Ukrainian constitutional law, and, as a consequence, of international law, thus threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. | 25.7.2014 |
| 6.   | International Union of Public Associations 'Great Don Army'  
Международный Союз Общественных Объединений 'Всевелкое Войско Донское'  
Official website:  
http://xn--80aaaajfjszd7a3b0e.xn--p1ai/  
Phone number: +7-8-908-178-65-57  
Social media: Cossack National Guard  
http://vk.com/kazak_nac_guard  
Address: 346465 Russia, Rostov Region, October District, St Zlapavskaya, Str Shosseynaya 1  
Second address: Voroshilovskiy Prospekt 12/85-87/13, Rostov-on-Don  
| The 'Great Don army' established the 'Cossack National Guard', responsible for fighting against the Ukrainian government forces in Eastern Ukraine, thus undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine as well as threatening the stability or security of Ukraine.  
Associated with Mr Nikolay Kozitsyn, who is Commander of Cossack forces and responsible for commanding separatists in Eastern Ukraine fighting against the Ukrainian government forces. | 25.7.2014 |
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| 7. 'Sobol' 'Соболь' | Official web site: http://soboli.net  
Social media: http://vk.com/sobolipress  
Phone number: (0652) 60-23-93  
Email: SoboliPress@gmail.com  
Address: Crimea, Simferopol, str. Киев, 4 (area bus station 'Central'). | Radical paramilitary organisation, responsible for openly supporting using force to end Ukraine's control over Crimea, thus undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Responsible for training separatists to fight against the Ukrainian government forces in Eastern Ukraine, thus threatening the stability or security of Ukraine. | 25.7.2014 |
| 8. So called 'Lugansk Guard' 'Луганская гвардия' | Social media: http://vk.com/luguard  
http://vk.com/club68692201 | Self-defence militia of Lugansk, responsible for training separatists to fight against the Ukrainian government forces in Eastern Ukraine, thus threatening the stability or security of Ukraine.  
Associated with Mr. German PROPOKIV, active leader who is responsible for taking part in the seizure of the building of the Lugansk regional office of the Ukrainian Security Service and recorded a video address to President Putin and Russia from the occupied building. | 25.7.2014 |
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<tr>
<td>9. So called 'Army of the Southeast' 'Армии Юго-Востока'</td>
<td>Recruitment: <a href="http://lugansk-online.info/statements">http://lugansk-online.info/statements</a> Social media: <a href="http://vk.com/lugansksbu">http://vk.com/lugansksbu</a></td>
<td>Illegal armed separatist group which is considered to be one of the most important in Eastern Ukraine. Responsible for occupying the building of the Security Service in the Lugansk region. Retired officer. Associated with Mr. Valeriy BOLOTOV, listed as one of the leaders of the group. Associated with Mr. Vasyl NIKITIN, responsible for the separatist 'governmental' activities of the so called 'government of the People' s Republic of Luhansk'</td>
<td>25.7.2014</td>
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<td>10. So-called 'Donbas People's Militia' 'Народное ополчение Донбасса'</td>
<td>Social media: <a href="http://vk.com/polkdonbassa">http://vk.com/polkdonbassa</a> +38-099-445-63-78; +38-063-688-60-01; +38-067-145-14-99; +38-094-912-96-60; +38-062-213-26-60 Email: <a href="mailto:voenkom.dnr@mail.ru">voenkom.dnr@mail.ru</a> <a href="mailto:mobilisation@novorossia.co">mobilisation@novorossia.co</a> Telephone volunteers in Russia: +7 (926) 428-99-51 +7 (967) 171-27-09 or email <a href="mailto:novoross24@mail.ru">novoross24@mail.ru</a> Address: Donetsk. Prospect Zasyadko.13</td>
<td>Illegal armed separatist group responsible for fighting against the Ukrainian government forces in Eastern Ukraine, thus threatening the stability or security of Ukraine. Inter alia, the militant group seized control of several government buildings in Eastern Ukraine in early April 2014, thus undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. It is associated with Mr Pavel Gubarev, who is responsible for the taking over of the regional government building in Donetsk with pro-Russian forces and proclaiming himself the 'people's governor'.</td>
<td>25.7.2014</td>
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<td>‘Vostok battalion’</td>
<td>Social media: <a href="http://vk.com/patriotic_forces_of_donbas">http://vk.com/patriotic_forces_of_donbas</a></td>
<td>Illegal armed separatist group which is considered to be one of the most important in Eastern Ukraine. Responsible for fighting against the Ukrainian government forces in Eastern Ukraine, thus threatening the stability or security of Ukraine. Actively participated in the military operations resulting in the seizure of Donetsk Airport. Part of the so-called ‘1st Army Corps’ of the Armed Forces of ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’.</td>
<td>25.7.2014</td>
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<td>11. ‘Батальон Восток’</td>
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<td>13. State Unitary Enterprise of the City of Sevastopol, 'Sevastopol seaport' ГУП ГС 'Севастопольский морской порт' (formerly known as State enterprise 'Sevastopol commercial seaport' Государственное предприятие 'Севастопольский морской торговый порт' Gosudarstvennoye predpriyatiye 'Sevastopolski morskoy torgovy port')</td>
<td>Nakhimov Square 5, 299011) Sevastopol (пл. Нахимова, 5, г. Севастополь, 299011) Code: 1149204004707</td>
<td>The ownership of the entity was transferred contrary to the Ukrainian law. On 17.3.2014 the 'Parliament of Crimea' adopted a resolution No 1757-6/14 'On nationalization of some companies belonging to the Ukrainian ministries of infrastructure or agriculture' declaring the appropriation of assets belonging to the state enterprise 'Sevastopol commercial seaport' on behalf of the 'Republic of Crimea'. The enterprise is thus effectively confiscated by the Crimean 'authorities'. In terms of volume of trade, it is the biggest commercial seaport in Crimea. Re-registered on 6.6.2014 as State Unitary Enterprise of the City of Sevastopol 'Sevastopol seaport' (Государственное унитарное предприятие города Севастополя 'Севастопольский морской порт'). Founder: The Government of Sevastopol (Правительство Севастополя).</td>
<td>25.7.2014</td>
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| 15.  | State Unitary Enterprise of the 'Republic of Crimea' 'Universal-Avia'  
Государственное унитарное предприятие Республики Крым 'Универсал-Авиа'  
(formerly known as State enterprise Universal -Avia  
Государственное предприятие 'Универсал-Авиа'  
Gosudarstvenoye predpriatiye 'Universal-Avia') | Aeroflotskaya Street 5, 295024, Simferopol  
ул. Аэрофлотская, дом 5, 295024, г. Симферополь, | The ownership of the entity was transferred contrary to Ukrainian law. On 24.3.2014, the 'Presidium of the Parliament of Crimea' adopted a decision 'On State-owned Enterprise "Gosudarstvenoye predpriatiye Universal-Avia" ('О Государственном предприятии "Универсал-Авиа")' No 1794-6/14 declaring the appropriation of assets belonging to the state enterprise 'Universal-Avia' on behalf of the 'Republic of Crimea'. The enterprise is thus effectively confiscated by the Crimean 'authorities'. Re-registered on 15.1.2015 as State Unitary Enterprise of the 'Republic of Crimea' 'Universal-Avia' (Государственное унитарное предприятие Республики Крым 'Универсал-Авиа'). Founder: The Ministry of Transportation of the 'Republic of Crimea' (Министерство транспорта Республики Крым). | 25.7.2014 |
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<td>17. Crimean Republican Enterprise 'Azov distillery plant' Крымское республиканское предприятие 'Азовский ликёро-водочный завод' Azovskiy likerovodochny zavod</td>
<td>40 Zelenodorozhnaya str., 296178 Azovskoye, Jankovsky district (Джанкойский район, 296178 пгт. Азовское, ул. Железнодорожная, 40) code: 01271681</td>
<td>The ownership of the entity was transferred contrary to Ukrainian law. On 9 April 2014, the 'Presidium of the Parliament of Crimea' adopted a decision No 1991-6/14 'On the amendments to the Resolution of the State Council of the &quot;Republic of Crimea&quot;' of 26 March 2014 No 1836-6/14 'On nationalization of the property of enterprises, institutions and organizations of agro-industrial complex, located in the territory of the &quot;Republic of Crimea&quot;' declaring the appropriation of assets belonging to the 'Azovskiy likerovodochny zavod' on behalf of the 'Republic of Crimea'. The enterprise is thus effectively confiscated by the Crimean 'authorities'. Reportedly declared bankrupt. Managed by Sinergiya.</td>
<td>25.7.2014</td>
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<td>18.</td>
<td>Federal State Budgetary Enterprise 'Production-Agrarian Union &quot;Massandra&quot;' of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation 'Производственно-аграрное объединение &quot;Массандр&quot; Управления делами Президента Российской Федерации' (formerly known as State concern 'National Association of producers &quot;Massandra&quot;' Национальное производственно-аграрное объединение &quot;Массандр&quot;)</td>
<td>The ownership of the entity was transferred contrary to the Ukrainian law. On 9 April 2014, the 'Presidium of the Parliament of Crimea' adopted a decision No 1991-6/14 'On the amendments to the Resolution of the State Council of the &quot;Republic of Crimea&quot;' of 26 March 2014 No 1836-6/14 'On nationalization of the property of enterprises, institutions and organizations of agro-industrial complex, located in the territory of the &quot;Republic of Crimea&quot;' declaring the appropriation of assets belonging to the state concern 'National Association of producers &quot;Massandra&quot;' on behalf of the 'Republic of Crimea'. The enterprise is thus effectively confiscated by the Crimean 'authorities'. Re-registered on 1.8.2014 Federal State Budgetary Enterprise 'Производственное аграрное объединение &quot;Массандр&quot;' of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation (Федеральное государственное унитарное предприятие 'Производственно-аграрное объединение &quot;Массандр&quot; Управления делами Президента Российской Федерации'). Founder: The Administration of the President of the Russian Federation (Управление делами Президента Российской Федерации).</td>
<td>25.7.2014</td>
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<td>19. Federal state budget institution for science and research 'All-Russia national scientific research institute for wine growing and wine making &quot;Magarach&quot; Russian Academy of Sciences'</td>
<td>298600, Kirov Street 31 Yalta, Crimea 298600, Крым, г. Ялта, ул.Кирова, 31</td>
<td>The ownership of the entity was transferred contrary to the Ukrainian law. On 9 April 2014, the 'Presidium of the Parliament of Crimea' adopted a decision No 1991-6/14 'On the amendments to the Resolution of the State Council of the &quot;Republic of Crimea&quot;' of 26 March 2014 No 1836-6/14 'On nationalization of the property of enterprises, institutions and organizations of agro-industrial complex, located in the territory of the &quot;Republic of Crimea&quot; declaring the appropriation of assets belonging to the state enterprise 'Gosudarstvennye predpriyatiye Agrofirma &quot;Magarach&quot; natsionalnogo instituta vinograda i vina &quot;Magarach&quot;' on behalf of the 'Republic of Crimea'. The enterprise is thus effectively confiscated by the Crimean 'authorities'. Re-registered on 15 January 2015 as 'State Unitary Institution of the &quot;Republic of Crimea&quot; National Institute of Wine &quot;Magarach&quot;' (Государственное бюджетное учреждение Республики Крым 'Национальный научно-исследовательский институт винограда и вина &quot;Magarach&quot;)'. Founder: The Ministry of Agriculture of the 'Republic of Crimea' (Министерство сельского хозяйства</td>
<td>25.7.2014</td>
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<td>института винограда и вина 'Магарач' Gosudarstvenoye predpriatiye Agrofirma 'Magarach' nacionalnogo instituta vinograda i vina 'Magarach')</td>
<td>Республики Крым). On 7 February 2017, State Unitary Enterprise of the 'Republic of Crimea' 'National Institute of Wine &quot;Magarach&quot;' was transformed into Federal Budgetary scientific facility 'All-Russia scientific-research institute of viticulture and winemaking &quot;Magarach&quot;', Russian Academy of Sciences</td>
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<td>20.</td>
<td>State enterprise of the 'Republic of Crimea' Sparkling wine plant 'Novy Svet' Государственное унитарное предприятие Республики Крым 'Завод шампанских вин &quot;Новый Свет&quot;' Formerly known as State Unitary Enterprise of the 'Republic of Crimea' 'Factory of sparkling wine &quot;Novy Svet&quot;' (formerly known as State enterprise sparkling wine plant 'Novy Svet' Государственное предприятие Завод шампанских вин 'Новый свет' Gosudarstvennoe predpriyatiye Zavod shampanskykh vin 'Novy Svet')</td>
<td>The ownership of the entity was transferred contrary to Ukrainian law. On 9 April 2014, the 'Presidium of the Parliament of Crimea' adopted a decision No 1991 -6/14 'On the amendments to the Resolution of the State Council of the &quot;Republic of Crimea&quot;' of 26 March 2014 No 1836-6/14 'On nationalization of the property of enterprises, institutions and organizations of agro-industrial complex, located in the territory of the &quot;Republic of Crimea&quot; declaring the appropriation of assets belonging to the state enterprise &quot;Zavod shampanskykh vin Novy Svet&quot;' on behalf of the 'Republic of Crimea'. The enterprise is thus effectively confiscated by the Crimean 'authorities'. Re-registered on 4.1.2015 as State Unitary Enterprise of the 'Republic of Crimea' 'Factory of sparkling wine &quot;Novy Svet&quot;' (Государственное унитарное предприятие Республики Крым &quot;Завод шампанских вин &quot;Новый Свет&quot;''). Founder: The Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Crimea (Министерство сельского хозяйства Республики Крым).</td>
<td>25.7.2014</td>
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<td>21.</td>
<td>JOINT-STOCK COMPANY ALMAZ-ANTEY AIR AND SPACE DEFENCE CORPORATION  (a.k.a. CONCERN ALMAZ-ANTEY;    ALMAZ-ANTEY CORP; a.k.a. ALMAZ-ANTEY DEFENSE CORPORATION; a.k.a. ALMAZ-ANTEY JSC; Концерн ВКО «Алмаз – Антей»  )</td>
<td>41 ul.Vereiskaya, Moscow 121471, Russia; Website: almaz-antey.ru; Email Address <a href="mailto:antey@almaz-antey.ru">antey@almaz-antey.ru</a></td>
<td>Almaz-Antey is a Russian State-owned company. It manufactures anti-aircraft weaponry including surface-to-air missiles which it supplies to the Russian army. The Russian authorities have been providing heavy weaponry to separatists in Eastern Ukraine, contributing to the destabilisation of Ukraine. These weapons are used by the separatists, including for shooting down airplanes. As a State-owned company, Almaz-Antey therefore contributes to the destabilisation of Ukraine.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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</table>
| 22. **DOBROLET aka DOBROLYOT Добролет/Добролёт** | Airline code QD  
International Highway, House 31, building 1, 141411 Moscow  
141411, Москва г, Международное ш, дом 31, строение 1  
Website: www.dobrolet.com | Dobrolet is a subsidiary of a Russian state-owned airline. Since the illegal annexation of Crimea Dobrolet has so far exclusively operated flights between Moscow and Simferopol. It therefore facilitates the integration of the illegally annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation and undermines Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity. | 30.7.2014 |
| 23. **Russian National Commercial Bank (Российский национальный коммерческий банк)** | 295000, Simferopol, Naberezhnaja str named after 60th anniversary of USSR, 34  
295000, Симферополь, ул. Набережная имени 60-летия СССР, д. 34  
Website: http://www.mcb.ru | After the illegal annexation of Crimea, Russian National Commercial Bank (RNCB) became fully owned by the so-called 'Republic of Crimea'. In January 2016 became a property of Federal Agency for State Property Management, also known as Rosimushchestvo (Федеральное агентство по управлению государственным имуществом (Росимущество)). It has become the dominant player in the market, while it had no presence in Crimea before the annexation. By buying or taking over from branches of retreating banks operating in Crimea, RNCB supported materially and financially the actions of the Russian government to integrate Crimea into the Russian Federation, thus undermining Ukraine's territorial integrity. | 30.7.2014 |
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<tr>
<td>24. Donetsk Republic (Public organisation) Донецкая республика</td>
<td>Public &quot;organisation&quot; that presented candidates in the so called &quot;elections&quot; of the so called &quot;Donetsk People's Republic&quot; on 2 November 2014. These &quot;elections&quot; are in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal. In participating formally in the illegal &quot;elections&quot; it has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and to further destabilise Ukraine. Headed by Alexander ZAKHARCHENKO and founded by Andriy PURGIN.</td>
<td>29.11.2014</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Peace to Luhansk Region (Mir Luganschine) Мир Луганщине</td>
<td><a href="https://mir-lug.info/">https://mir-lug.info/</a></td>
<td>Public 'organisation' that presented candidates in the so-called 'elections' of the so-called 'Luhansk People's Republic' 2 November 2014. These 'elections' are in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal. In participating formally in the illegal 'elections' it has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and to further destabilise Ukraine. Headed by Igor PLOTNITSKY.</td>
<td>29.11.2014</td>
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<td>26.</td>
<td>Free Donbass (a.k.a. 'Free Donbas', 'Svobodny Donbass') Свободный Донбасс</td>
<td>Public 'organisation' that presented candidates in the so-called 'elections' of the so-called 'Donetsk People's Republic' 2 November 2014. These elections are in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal. In participating formally in the illegal 'elections' it has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and to further destabilise Ukraine.</td>
<td>29.11.2014</td>
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<td>27.</td>
<td>People's Union (Narodny Soyuz) Народный союз</td>
<td>Public &quot;organisation&quot; that presented candidates in the so called &quot;elections&quot; of the so called &quot;Luhansk People's Republic&quot; 2 November 2014. These elections are in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal. In participating formally in the illegal &quot;elections&quot; it has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and to further destabilise Ukraine.</td>
<td>29.11.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>28. Luhansk Economic Union (Luganskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz) Луганский ^экономический союз</td>
<td>&quot;Social organisation&quot; that presented candidates in the illegal so called &quot;elections&quot; of the so called &quot;Luhansk People's Republic&quot; 2 November 2014. Nominated a candidate, Oleg AKIMOV, to be &quot;Head&quot; of the so called &quot;Luhansk People's Republic&quot;. These &quot;elections&quot; are in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal. In participating formally in the illegal &quot;elections&quot; it has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and to further destabilise Ukraine.</td>
<td>29.11.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>29. Cossack National Guard Казачья Национальная Гвардия</td>
<td>Armed separatist group which has actively supported actions which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and further destabilise Ukraine. Commanded by and therefore associated with a listed person Nikolay KOZITSYN. Reportedly part of the so-called ‘2nd Army Corps’ of the ‘Lugansk People’s Republic’.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>30. Sparta battalion</td>
<td>Батальон 'Спарта'</td>
<td>Armed separatist group which has actively supported actions which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and further destabilise Ukraine. Part of the so-called '1st Army Corps' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Somali battalion</td>
<td>Батальон 'Сомали'</td>
<td>Armed separatist group which has actively supported actions which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and further destabilise Ukraine. Part of the so-called '1st Army Corps' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>32. Zarya battalion</td>
<td>Батальон 'Заря'</td>
<td>Armed separatist group which has actively supported actions which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and further destabilise Ukraine. Reportedly part of the so-called '2nd Army Corps' of the 'Lugansk People’s Republic'.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. Prizrak brigade</td>
<td>Бригада 'Призрак'</td>
<td>Armed separatist group which has actively supported actions which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and further destabilise Ukraine. Part of the so-called '1st Army Corps' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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<td>destabilise Ukraine.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Part of the so-called '2nd Army Corps' of the 'Lugansk People's Republic.'</td>
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<tr>
<td>34. Oplot battalion</td>
<td>Social media: <a href="http://vk.com/oplot_info">http://vk.com/oplot_info</a></td>
<td>Armed separatist group which has actively supported actions which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and further destabilise Ukraine. Reportedly part of the so-called ‘1st Army Corps’ of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>Батальон 'Оплот'</td>
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<tr>
<td>35. Kalmius battalion</td>
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<td>Armed separatist group which has actively supported actions which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and further destabilise Ukraine. Part of the so-called ‘1st Army Corps’ of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>Батальон 'Кальмийус'</td>
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<td>36. Death battalion</td>
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<td>Armed separatist group which has actively supported actions which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and further destabilise Ukraine. Part of the so-called ‘2nd Army Corps’ of the ‘Lugansk People’s Republic’.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>Батальон 'Смерть'</td>
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| 37. Movement 'Novorossiya' of Igor STRELKOV 
Движение 'Новороссия' Игоря СТРЕЛКОВА | http://novorossia.pro/ | The Movement 'Novorossiya'/'New Russia' was established in November 2014 in Russia and is headed by Russian officer Igor Strelkov/Girkin (identified as a staff member of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU)). According to its stated objectives, it aims at providing all-round, effective assistance to 'Novorossiya', including by helping militia fighting in Eastern Ukraine, thereby supporting policies undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Associated with a person listed for undermining the territorial integrity of Ukraine. | 16.2.2015 |
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<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>OAO ‘VO Technopromexport’ (OAO ‘VO TPE’)</td>
<td>Address: 119019, Moscow, Novyi Arbat str., 15, building 2&lt;br&gt;Registration date: 27.7.1992&lt;br&gt;State Registration Number: 1067746244026&lt;br&gt;Tax Registration Number: 7705713236</td>
<td>Contracting party with Siemens Gas Turbine Technologies OOO, OAO ‘VO TPE’ purchased gas turbines declared to be destined for a power plant in Taman, Krasnodar region, Russian Federation, and as the contractor was responsible for the transfer of the gas turbines to OOO ‘VO TPE’ which in turn transferred them to be installed in Crimea. This contributes to establishing an independent power supply for Crimea and Sevastopol as a means of supporting their separation from Ukraine, and undermines the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine</td>
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| 39.  | **OOO ‘VO Technopromexport’ (OOO ‘VO TPE’) AKA: Limited Liability Company ‘Foreign Economic Association’ ‘Technopromexport’**
| Address: 119019, Moscow, Novyi Arbat str., 15, building 2
| Registration date: 8.5.2014
| State Registration Number: 1147746527279
<p>| Tax Registration Number: 7704863782e | Current owner of the gas turbines originally supplied by Siemens Gas Turbine Technologies OOO to OAO ‘VO TPE’. OOO ‘VO TPE’ transferred the gas turbines to be installed in Crimea. This contributes to establishing an independent power supply for Crimea and Sevastopol as a means of supporting their separation from Ukraine, and undermines the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. | 04.08.2017 |</p>
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<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
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<td>40.</td>
<td>ZAO Interavtomatika (IA) AKA: ЗАО 'Интеравтоматика', CJSC 'Interavtomatika'</td>
<td>Address: 115280, Moscow, Avtozavodskaya st., 14, Registration Date: 31.1.1994 State Registration Number: 1037739044111 Tax Registration Number: 7725056162</td>
<td>Company specialised in control and communication systems for power plants, which has entered into contracts for projects concerning the building of the power plants and the installation of gas turbines in Sevastopol and in Simferopol. This contributes to establishing an independent power supply for Crimea and Sevastopol as a means of supporting their separation from Ukraine, and undermines the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.</td>
<td>04.08.2017</td>
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<td>41. 'State Unitary Enterprise of the Crimean Republic &quot;Crimean Sea Ports&quot;' ('Государственное унитарное предприятие Республики Крым &quot;Крымские морские порты&quot;)', including branches: - Feodosia Commercial Port, - Kerch Ferry, - Kerch Commercial Port.AO Interavtomatika (IA) AKA: ЗАО 'Интеравтоматика', CJSC 'Interavtomatika'</td>
<td>28 Kirova Street Kerch 298312 Crimea (298312, Республика Крым, город Керчь, ул. Кирова, дом 28)</td>
<td>The 'Parliament of Crimea' adopted Resolution No 1757-6/14 on 17 March 2014 'On nationalisation of some companies belonging to the Ukrainian Ministries of Infrastructure or Agriculture' and Resolution No 1865-6/14 on 26 March 2014 'On State-Owned Enterprise &quot;Crimean Sea Ports&quot;' ('О Государственном предприятии &quot;Крымские морские порты&quot;) declaring the appropriation of assets belonging to several State enterprises which were merged into the 'State Unitary Enterprise of the Crimean Republic &quot;Crimean Sea Ports&quot;' on behalf of the 'Republic of Crimea'. Those enterprises were thus effectively confiscated by the Crimean 'authorities' and the 'Crimean Sea Ports' has benefited from the illegal transfer of their ownership</td>
<td>14.09.2017</td>
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Annex 358

# List of persons and entities under EU restrictive measures over the territorial integrity of Ukraine

**List of Persons**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Identifying information</th>
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</table>
| 1.   | Sergey Valeryevich Aksyonov,  
Sergei Valerievich Aksenov (Сергей Валерьевич АКСЄНОВ),  
Serhiy Valeriyovych Aksyonov (Сергій Валерійович АКСЬОНОВ) | DOB: 26.11.1972  
POB: Beltsy (Балті), now Republic of Moldova | Aksyonov was elected 'Prime Minister of Crimea' in the Crimean Verkhovna Rada on 27 February 2014 in the presence of pro-Russian gunmen. His 'election' was decreed unconstitutional by the acting Ukrainian President Oleksandr Turchynov on 1 March 2014. He actively lobbied for the 'referendum' of 16 March 2014 and was one of the co-signatories of the 'treaty on Crimea's accession to the Russian Federation' of 18 March 2014. On 9 April 2014, he was appointed acting 'Head' of the so-called 'Republic of Crimea' by President Putin. On 9 October 2014, he was formally 'elected' 'Head' of the so-called 'Republic of Crimea'. Aksyonov subsequently decreed that the offices of 'Head' and 'Prime Minister' be combined.  
Member of the Russia State Council. Since January 2017, member of the High Council of United Russia Party.  
For his involvement in the annexation process he has been awarded with Russian State order 'For Merit to the Fatherland' — first degree. | 17.3.2014 |

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<tr>
<td>2. Vladimir Andreevich KONSTANTINOV (Владимир Андреевич КОНСТАНТИНОВ) Volodymyr Andriyovych KONSTANTINOV (Володимир Андрійович КОНСТАНТИНОВ)</td>
<td>DOB: 19.11.1956 POB: Vladimirovka (a.k.a. Vladimirovca), Slobozia Region, Moldavian SSR (now Republic of Moldova) or Bogomol, Moldavian SSR</td>
<td>As speaker of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Konstantinov played a relevant role in the decisions taken by the 'Supreme Council' concerning the ‘referendum’ against territorial integrity of Ukraine and called on voters to cast their votes in favour of Crimean independence in the ‘referendum’ of 16 March 2014. He was one of the co-signatories of the 'treaty on Crimea’s accession to the Russian Federation' of 18 March 2014. Since 17 March 2014 ‘Chairman’ of the ‘State Council’ of the so-called ‘Republic of Crimea’.</td>
<td>17.3.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Rustam Ilmirovich TEMIRGALIEV (Рустам Ильмирович ТЕМИРГАЛИЕВ) Rustam Ilmyrovych TEMIRHALIIEV (Рустам Ильмирович ТЕМИРГАЛИЄВ)</td>
<td>DOB: 15.8.1976 POB: Ulan-Ude, Buryat ASSR (Russian SFSR)</td>
<td>As former Deputy Prime Minister of Crimea, Temirgaliev played a relevant role in the decisions taken by the 'Supreme Council' concerning the 'referendum' of 16 March 2014 against the territorial integrity of Ukraine. He lobbied actively for the integration of Crimea into the Russian Federation. On 11 June 2014 he resigned from his function as 'First Deputy Prime Minister' of the so-called 'Republic of Crimea'. Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies.</td>
<td>17.3.2014</td>
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</table>
| Denis Valentinovich BEREZOVSKIY  
(Денис Валентинович БЕРЕЗОВСКИЙ)  
Denys Valentynovych BEREZOVSKYY  
(Денис Валентинович БЕРЕЗОВСЬКИЙ) | DOB: 15.7.1974  
POB: Kharkiv, Ukrainian SSR | Berezovskiy was appointed commander of the Ukrainian Navy on 1 March 2014 but thereafter swore an oath to the Crimean armed forces, thereby breaking his oath to the Ukrainian Navy.  
He was then appointed Deputy Commander of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation. | 17.3.2014 |
| Aleksei Mikhailovich CHALIY  
(Алексей Михайлович ЧАЛИЙ)  
Oleksiy Mykhaylovych CHALIYY  
(Олексій Михайлович ЧАЛИЙ) | DOB: 13.6.1961  
POB: Moscow or Sevastopol | Chaliy became 'People's Mayor of Sevastopol' by popular acclamation on 23 February 2014 and accepted this 'vote'. He actively campaigned for Sevastopol to become a separate entity of the Russian Federation following a referendum on 16 March 2014. He was one of the co-signatories of the 'treaty on Crimea's accession to the Russian Federation' of 18 March 2014. He was acting 'governor' of Sevastopol from 1 to 14 April 2014 and is a former 'elected' Chairman of the 'Legislative Assembly' of the City of Sevastopol. Member of the 'Legislative Assembly' of the City of Sevastopol.  
For his involvement in the annexation process he has been awarded with Russian State order 'For Merit to the Fatherland' — first degree. | 17.3.2014 |
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<tr>
<td>Pyotr Anatoliyovych ZIMA (Пётр Анатольевич ЗИМА)</td>
<td>DOB: 18.1.1970 POB: Artemivsk (Артемовск) (2016 renamed back to Bakhmut/Бахмут), Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine</td>
<td>Zima was appointed as the new head of the Crimean Security Service (SBU) on 3 March 2014 by ‘Prime Minister’ Aksyonov and accepted this appointment. He has given relevant information including a database to the Russian Intelligence Service (FSB). This included information on Euro-Maidan activists and human rights defenders of Crimea. He played a relevant role in preventing Ukraine’s authorities from controlling the territory of Crimea. On 11 March 2014 the formation of an independent Security Service of Crimea was proclaimed by former SBU officers of Crimea.</td>
<td>17.3.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergey Pavlovych TSEKOV (Сергей Павлович ЦЕКОВ)</td>
<td>DOB: 28.9.1953 or 28.8.1953 POB: Simferopol</td>
<td>As Vice Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea, Tsekov initiated, together with Sergey Aksyonov, the unlawful dismissal of the government of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC). He drew Vladimir Konstantinov into this endeavour, threatening him with dismissal. He publicly recognised that the MPs from Crimea were the initiators of inviting Russian soldiers to take over the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea. He was one of the first Crimean Leaders to ask in public for the annexation of Crimea to Russia. Member of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation from the so-called ‘Republic of Crimea’.</td>
<td>17.3.2014</td>
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* The entry was deleted on 10 March 2016 following a delisting decision.
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| 9.   | Viktor Alekseevich OZEROV (Виктор Алексеевич Озеров) | DOB: 5.1.1958  
POB: Abakan, Khakassia  
Chairman of the Security and Defence Committee of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation.  
On 1 March 2014 Ozerov, on behalf of the Security and Defence Committee of the Federation Council, publicly supported, in the Federation Council, the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine. | 17.3.2014 |
| 10.  | Vladimir Michailovich DZHABAROV (Владимир Михайлович Джабаров) | DOB: 29.9.1952  
First Deputy-Chairman of the International Affairs Committee of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation.  
On 1 March 2014 Dzhabarov, on behalf of the International Affairs Committee of the Federation Council, publicly supported, in the Federation Council, the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine. | 17.3.2014 |
| 11.  | Andrei Aleksandrovich KLISSHAS (Андрей Александрович Клишас) | DOB: 9.11.1972  
POB: Sverdlovsk  
Chairman of the Committee on Constitutional Law of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation.  
On 1 March 2014 Klishas publicly supported, in the Federation Council, the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine. In public statements Klishas sought to justify a Russian military intervention in Ukraine by claiming that 'the Ukrainian President supports the appeal of the Crimean authorities to the President of the Russian Federation on landing an all-encompassing assistance in defence of the citizens of Crimea'. | 17.3.2014 |
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<tr>
<td>Nikolai Ivanovich RYZHKOV</td>
<td>DOB: 28.9.1929 POB: Dyleevka, Donetsk region, Ukrainian SSR</td>
<td>Member of the Committee for federal issues, regional politics and the North of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation. On 1 March 2014 Ryzhkov publicly supported, in the Federation Council, the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine.</td>
<td>17.3.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aleksandr Borisovich TOTOONOV</td>
<td>DOB: 3.4.1957 POB: Ordzhonikidze, North Ossetia</td>
<td>Member of the Committee of International Affairs of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation. On 1 March 2014 Totoonov publicly supported, in the Federation Council, the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine.</td>
<td>17.3.2014</td>
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* The entry was deleted on 14 September 2017 following a delisting decision.
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<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sergei Mikhailovich MIRONOV</td>
<td>DOB: 14.2.1953</td>
<td>Member of the Council of the State Duma; Leader of Fair Russia faction in the Duma of the Russian Federation. Initiator of the bill allowing Russian Federation to admit in its composition, under the pretext of protection of Russian citizens, territories of a foreign country without the consent of that country or an international treaty.</td>
<td>17.3.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Сергей Михайлович Миронов)</td>
<td>POB: Pushkin, Leningrad region</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Сергей Владимирович ЖЕЛЕЗНЫЙ)</td>
<td>POB: St. Petersburg (former Leningrad)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Леонид Эдуардович СЛУЦКИЙ)</td>
<td>POB: Moscow</td>
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<tr>
<td>20. Anatoliy Alekseevich SIDOROV (Анатолий Алексеевич Сидоров)</td>
<td>DOB: 2.7.1958 POB: Siva, Perm region, USSR</td>
<td>Former Commander, Russia’s Western Military District, units of which are deployed in Crimea. He was responsible for part of the Russian military presence in Crimea which is undermining the sovereignty of the Ukraine and assisted the Crimean authorities in preventing public demonstrations against moves towards a referendum and incorporation into Russia. Since November 2015 Chief of the Joint Staff of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO).</td>
<td>17.3.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Aleksandr Viktorovich GALKIN (Александр Викторович ГАЛКИН)</td>
<td>DOB: 22.3.1958 POB: Ordzhonikidze, North Ossetian ASSR</td>
<td>Former Commander of Russia’s Southern Military District (‘SMD’), the forces of which are in Crimea; the Black Sea Fleet comes under Galkin’s command; much of the force movement into Crimea has come through the SMD. SMD forces are deployed in Crimea. He is responsible for part of the Russian military presence in Crimea which is undermining the sovereignty of Ukraine and assisted the Crimean authorities in preventing public demonstrations against moves towards a referendum and incorporation into Russia. Additionally the Black Sea Fleet falls within the District’s control. Currently employed by the Central apparatus of the Russian Ministry of Defence. Aide to the Minister of Defence since 19 January 2017.</td>
<td>17.3.2014</td>
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<td>POB: Zaporozhye, (Ukrainian SSR)</td>
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<td>POB: St Petersburg (former Leningrad)</td>
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<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Dmitry Konstantinovich KISELYOV, Dmitrii Konstantinovich KISELEV (Дмитрий Константинович Киселёв)</td>
<td>DOB: 26.4.1954 POB: Moscow</td>
<td>Appointed by Presidential Decree on 9 December 2013 Head of the Russian Federal State news agency 'Rossiya Segodnya'. Central figure of the government propaganda supporting the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Alexander Mihailovich NOSATOV (Александр Михайлович Носатов)</td>
<td>DOB: 27.3.1963 POB: Sevastopol, (Ukrainian SSR)</td>
<td>Former Deputy-Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Rear-Admiral. Responsible for commanding Russian forces that have occupied Ukrainian sovereign territory. Currently Vice-Admiral, Acting Commander of the Russian Baltic fleet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Valery Vladimirovich KULIKOV (Валерий Владимирович Куликов)</td>
<td>DOB: 1.9.1956 POB: Zaporozhye, (Ukrainian SSR)</td>
<td>Deputy-Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Rear Admiral. Responsible for commanding Russian forces that have occupied Ukrainian sovereign territory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Vladislav Yurievich SURKOV (Владислав Юрьевич Сурков)</td>
<td>DOB: 21.9.1964, POB: Solntsevo, Lipetsk region</td>
<td>Aide to the President of the Russian Federation. He was an organiser of the process in Crimea by which local Crimean communities were mobilised to stage actions undermining the Ukrainian authorities in Crimea.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lt. Gen. Igor Nikolaevich (Mykolayovich) TURCHENYUK (Игорь Николаевич Турченюк)</td>
<td>DOB: 5.12.1959 POB: Osh, Kyrgyz SSR</td>
<td>The de facto Commander of Russian troops deployed on the ground in Crimea (whom Russia continues to refer to officially as ‘local self-defence militias’). Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District.</td>
<td>21.3.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elena Borisovna MIZULINA (born DMITRIYEVA) (Елена Борисовна МИЗУЛИНА (born ДМИТРИЕВА))</td>
<td>DOB: 9.12.1954 POB: Bui, Kostroma region</td>
<td>Former Deputy in the State Duma. Originator and co-sponsor of recent legislative proposals in Russia that would have allowed regions of other countries to join Russia without their central authorities’ prior agreement. As of September 2015, a Member of the Federation Council from Omsk region.</td>
<td>21.3.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dmitry Nikolaevich KOZAK (Дмитрий Николаевич Козак)</td>
<td>DOB: 7.11.1958 POB: Bandurovo, Kirovograd region, Ukrainian SSR</td>
<td>Deputy Prime Minister. Responsible for overseeing the integration of the annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation.</td>
<td>29.4.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oleg Yevgenyvich BELAVENTSEV (Олег Евгеньевич БЕЛАВЕНЦЕВ)</td>
<td>DOB: 15.9.1949 POB: Moscow</td>
<td>Former Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation into the so-called ‘Crimean Federal District’, Non-permanent member of the Russian Security Council. Responsible for the implementation of the constitutional prerogatives of the Russian Head of State on the territory of the annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Currently Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation into the North Caucasus Federal District.</td>
<td>29.4.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Olga Fedorovna KOVITIDI</td>
<td>DOB: 7.5.1962, POB: Simferopol, Ukrainian SSR</td>
<td>Member of the Russian Federation Council from the annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea.</td>
<td>29.4.2014</td>
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* The entry was deleted on 13 March 2015 following a delisting decision.
† The entry was deleted on 10 March 2016 following a delisting decision.
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<tr>
<td>42. Valery Vasilevich GERASIMOV</td>
<td>DOB: 8.9.1955</td>
<td>First Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, General of the Army. Responsible for the massive deployment of Russian troops along the border with Ukraine and lack of de-escalation of the situation.</td>
<td>29.4.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Валерий Васильевич Герасимов)</td>
<td>POB: Kazan</td>
<td>Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Герман ПРОКОРИВ)</td>
<td>POB: Prague, Czech</td>
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<tr>
<td>(а.к.а. Li Van Chol, Ли Ван Чоль)</td>
<td>Republic</td>
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<td>44.</td>
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<td>45.</td>
<td>Andrei Evgenevich PURGIN (АНДРЕЙ ЕВГЕНЬЕВИЧ ПУРГИН)</td>
<td>Active participant and organiser of separatist actions, coordinator of actions of the 'Russian tourists' in Donetsk. Co-founder of a 'Civic Initiative of Donbass for the Eurasian Union'. Former 'First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers'. Until 4 September 2015 'Chairman' of the 'People's Council of the Donetsk People's Republic'. As of February 2017 deprived from his mandate of member of the 'People's Council of the Donetsk People's Republic' upon decision of the so-called 'People's Council'. Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies.</td>
<td>29.4.2014</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denys Volodymyrovych PUSHYLIN (Денис Володимирович Пушилін), Denis Vladimirovich PUSHILIN (Денис Владимирович Пушилин)</td>
<td>DOB: 9.5.1981 or 9.5.1982 POB: Makiivka (Donetsk oblast)</td>
<td>One of the leaders of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. Participated in the seizure and occupation of the regional administration. Active spokesperson for the separatists. Until 4 September 2015 so-called Deputy Chairman of the 'People's Council' of the so-called 'Donetsk People's Republic'. Since 4 September 2015 'Chairman' of the 'People's Council of the Donetsk People's Republic'.</td>
<td>29.4.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergey Gennadievich TSYPLAKOV (Сергеј Геннадиєвич ЦЫПЛАКОВ) Serhiy Hennadiyovych TSYPLAKOV (Сергій Геннадійович ЦИПЛАКОВ)</td>
<td>DOB: 1.5.1983 POB: Khartsyzsk, Donetsk Oblast</td>
<td>One of the leaders of the ideologically radical organisation 'People's Militia of Donbas'. He took active part in the seizure of a number of State buildings in the Donetsk region. Member of the 'People's Council of the Donetsk People's Republic', Chair of the 'People’s Council Committee on Information Policy and Information Technology'.</td>
<td>29.4.2014</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Игорь Всеволодович ГИРКИН)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(a.k.a. Igor STRELKOV Ihor STRIELKOV)</td>
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<tr>
<td>49. Vyacheslav Viktorovich VOLODIN</td>
<td>DOB: 4.2.1964 POB: Alekseevka, Saratov region</td>
<td>Former First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration of Russia. Responsible for overseeing the political integration of the annexed Ukrainian region of Crimea into the Russian Federation. Currently Speaker of the State Duma of the Russian Federation since 5 October 2016.</td>
<td>12.5.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Вячеслав Викторович ВОЛОДИН)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Владимир Анатольевич ШАМАНОВ)</td>
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</table>
| 51.  | Vladimir Nikolaevich PLIGIN (Владимир Николаевич ПЛИГИН) | DOB: 19.5.1960  
POB: Ignatovo, Vologodsk Oblast, USSR.. | Former member of the State Duma and former Chair of the Duma Constitutional Law Committee. Responsible for facilitating the adoption of legislation on the annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol into the Russian Federation. | 12.5.2014 |
| 52.  | Petr Grigorievich JAROSH (Петр Григорьевич ЯРОШ)  
Petro Hryhorovych JAROSH (IAROSH) (Петро Григорович ЯРОШ) | DOB: 30.1.1971  
POB: Skvortsovo village, Simferopol region, Crimea | Former head of the Federal Migration Service office for Crimea. Responsible for the systematic and expedited issuance of Russian passports for the residents of Crimea. | 12.5.2014 |
| 53.  | Oleg Grigorievich KOZYURA (Олег Григорьевич КОЗЮРА)  
POB: Simferopol, Crimea or Zaporizhia | Former Head of the Federal Migration Service office for Sevastopol. Responsible for the systematic and expedited issuance of Russian passports for the residents of Sevastopol. Currently assistant to Sevastopol Municipal Council Deputy Mikhail Chaly. | 12.5.2014 |
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<tr>
<td>54.</td>
<td>Viacheslav PONOMARIOV, Vyacheslav Volodymyrovich PONOMARYOV (Вячеслав Володимирович Пономарёв), Viacheslav Vladimirovich PONOMAREV (Вячеслав Владимирович Пономарёв)</td>
<td>Former self-declared ‘People’s Mayor’ of Slaviansk (until 10 June 2014). Ponomariov called on Vladimir Putin to send in Russian troops to protect the city and later asked him to supply weapons. Ponomariov’s men were involved in kidnappings (they captured activist Irma Krat and Simon Ostrovsky, a reporter for Vice News, both were later released, they detained military observers under the OSCE Vienna Document). Remains active in supporting separatist actions and policies.</td>
<td>12.5.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55.</td>
<td>Igor Nikolaevich BEZLER (а.к.а. Bes (devil)) (Игорь Николаевич БЕЗЛЕР) Ihor Mykolayovych BEZLER (Ігор Миколайович БЕЗЛЕР)</td>
<td>One of the leaders of the self-proclaimed militia of Horlivka. He took control of the Security Service of Ukraine's Office in Donetsk region building and afterwards seized the Ministry of Internal Affairs' district station in the town of Horlivka. He has links to Igor Strelkov/Girkin under whose command he was involved in the murder of the Peoples’ Deputy of the Horlivka's Municipal Council Volodymyr Rybak.</td>
<td>12.5.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>56. Igor Evgenevich KAKIDZYANOV (Игорь Евгеньевич КАКИДЗЯНОВ), Igor Evgenevich KHAKIMZYANOV (Игорь Евгеньевич ХАКИМЗЯНОВ) Ihor Yevhenovych KHAKIMZIANOV (КАКИМЗЯНОВ) (Игорь Євгенович ХАКИМЗЯНОВ)</td>
<td>DOB: 25.7.1980 POB: Makiivka (Donetsk oblast)</td>
<td>One of the leaders of armed forces of the self-proclaimed ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’. The aim of the forces is to ‘protect the people of the Donetsk People's Republic and territorial integrity of the republic’ according to Pushylin, one of the leaders of the ‘Donetsk People's Republic’.</td>
<td>12.5.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>57. Oleg TSARIOV, Oleh Anatoliyovych TSAROV (Олег Анатолійович ЦАРЬОВ), Oleg Anatolevich TSARYOV (Олег Анатольевич ЦАРЕВ)</td>
<td>DOB: 2.6.1970 POB: Dnipropetrovsk</td>
<td>Former Member of the Rada, as such publicly called for the creation of the so-called ‘Federal Republic of Novorossiya’, composed of south-eastern Ukrainian regions. Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies. Former ‘Speaker’ of the so-called ‘Parliament of the Union of the People's Republics’ (‘Parliament of Novorossiya’). Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies.</td>
<td>12.5.2014</td>
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<td>60.</td>
<td>Natalia Vladimirovna POKLONSKAYA (Наталия Владимировна ПОКЛОНСКАЯ)</td>
<td>Member of the State Duma, elected from the illegally annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Former Prosecutor of the so-called 'Republic of Crimea'. Actively implemented Russia's annexation of Crimea. Currently First Deputy Chairperson of the Committee for Security and countering corruption of the State Duma of the Russian Federation.</td>
<td>12.5.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>62.  Aleksandr Yurevich BORODAI (Александр Юрьевич БОРОДАЙ)</td>
<td>DOB: 25.7.1972 POB: Moscow</td>
<td>Former so-called 'Prime Minister of the Donetsk People's Republic', as such responsible for the separatist 'governmental’ activities of the so-called ‘government of the Donetsk People’s Republic’ (e.g. on 8 July 2014 stated 'our military is conducting a special operation against the Ukrainian “fascists’”), signatory of the Memorandum of Understanding on ‘Novorossiya union’. Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies; heads the ‘Union of Donbas volunteers’. Involved actively in recruitment and training of 'volunteers' sent to fight in Donbas.</td>
<td>12.7.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63.  Alexander KHODAKOVSKY, Oleksandr Serhiyovych KHODAKOVSKYY (KHODAKOVSKYI) (Олександр Сергійович ХОДАКОВСЬКИЙ), Aleksandr Sergeevich KHODAKOVSKII (Александр Сергеевич ХОДАКОВСКИЙ)</td>
<td>DOB: 18.12.1972 POB: Donetsk</td>
<td>Former so-called 'Minister of Security of the Donetsk People's Republic', as such responsible for the separatist security activities of the so-called 'government of the Donetsk People’s Republic'. Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies.</td>
<td>12.7.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Александр Аркадьевич Калюсский)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oleksandr Arkadiyovych KALYUSSKIY</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Олександр Аркадійович Калюський)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alexander KHRYAKOV, Vitalievich KHRYAKOV</td>
<td>DOB: 6.11.1958</td>
<td>Former so-called 'Information and Mass Communications Minister’ of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. Currently a member of the so-called 'People's Council' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. Responsible for the pro-separatist propaganda activities of the so-called 'government' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. Continues active support to the separatist actions in Eastern Ukraine.</td>
<td>12.7.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Александр Витальевич ХРЯКОВ)</td>
<td>POB: Donetsk</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oleksandr Vitaliyovych KHRYAKOV</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Олександр Віталійович ХРЯКОВ)</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vasyl Oleksandrovych NIKITIN (Василь Олександрівич НІКИТИН), Vasiliii Aleksandrovich NIKITIN (Васи́лій Алекса́ндрович НІКИТИН)</td>
<td>DOB: 25.11.1971 POB: Shargun (Uzbekistan)</td>
<td>Former so-called ‘Vice Prime Minister of the Council of Ministers of the Lugansk People's Republic' (used to be the so-called 'Prime Minister of the Lugansk People's Republic', and former spokesman of the ‘Army of the South-East’). Responsible for the separatist ‘governmental’ activities of the so-called ‘government of the Lugansk People's Republic’. Responsible for the statement of the Army of the South-East that the Ukrainian presidential elections in the 'Lugansk People's Republic' cannot take place due to the ‘new’ status of the region. Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies.</td>
<td>12.7.2014</td>
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<td>68. Aleksey Vyacheslavovich KARYAKIN (Алексей Вячеславович КАРЯКИН) Oleksiy Vyacheslavovych KARYAKIN (Олексій В’ячеславович КАРЯКІН)</td>
<td>DOB: 7.4.1980 or 7.4.1979 POB: Stakhanov, Lugansk region</td>
<td>Until 25 March 2016 so-called 'Supreme Council Chair of the Lugansk People's Republic'. Former member of the so-called 'People's Council of the Lugansk People's Republic'. Responsible for the separatist 'governmental' activities of the 'Supreme Council', responsible for asking the Russian Federation to recognise the independence of the 'Lugansk People's Republic'. Signatory of the Memorandum of Understanding on the 'Novorossiya union'. Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies.</td>
<td>12.7.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69. Yuriy Volodymyrovych IVAKIN (Юрій Володимирович Івакін), Iurii Vladimirovich IVAKIN (Юрий Владимирович Ивakin)</td>
<td>DOB: 13.8.1954 POB: Perevalsk (Lugansk oblast)</td>
<td>Former so-called 'Minister of Internal Affairs of the Lugansk People's Republic', as such responsible for the separatist 'governmental' activities of the so-called 'government of the Lugansk People's Republic'.</td>
<td>12.7.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>70.</td>
<td>Igor PLOTNITSKY, Igor Venediktovich PLOTNITSKII (Игорь Венедиктович ПЛОТНИЦКИЙ) Ihor (Igor) Venedytkovych PLOTNYTSKY (Ігор Венедиктович ПЛОТНИЦЬКИЙ)</td>
<td>DOB: 24.6.1964 or 25.6.1964 or 26.6.1964 POB: Lugansk (possibly in Kelmentsi, Chernivtsi oblast)</td>
<td>Former so-called 'Defence Minister' and currently so-called 'Head' of the 'Lugansk People’s Republic'. Responsible for the separatist 'governmental' activities of the so-called 'government of the Lugansk People’s Republic'.</td>
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* The entry was deleted on 14 September 2015 following a delisting decision.
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<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mikhail Efimovich FRADKOV (Михаил Ефимович ФРАДКОВ)</td>
<td>DOB: 1.9.1950, POB: Kurumoch, Kuibyshev region</td>
<td>Former permanent member of the Security Council of the Russian Federation; Former Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation. As a member of the Security Council, which provides advice on and coordinates national security affairs, he was involved in shaping the policy of the Russian Government threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.</td>
<td>25.7.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nikolai Platonovich PATRUSHEV (Николай Платонович Патрушев)</td>
<td>DOB 11.7.1951, POB: Leningrad (St Petersburg)</td>
<td>Permanent member and Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. As a member of the Security Council, which provides advice on and coordinates national security affairs, he was involved in shaping the policy of the Russian Government threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.</td>
<td>25.7.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aleksandr Vasilievich BORTNIKOV (Александр Васильевич Бортикинов)</td>
<td>DOB: 15.11.1951, POB: Perm</td>
<td>Permanent member of the Security Council of the Russian Federation; Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB). As a member of the Security Council, which provides advice on and coordinates national security affairs, he was involved in shaping the policy of the Russian Government threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.</td>
<td>25.7.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rashid Gumarovich NURGALIEV (Рашид Гумарович Нургалиев)</td>
<td>DOB: 8.10.1956, POB: Zhetikara, Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
<td>Permanent member and Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. As a member of the Security Council, which provides advice on and coordinates national security affairs, he was involved in shaping the policy of the Russian Government threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.</td>
<td>25.7.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boris Vyacheslavovich GRYZLOV (Борис Вячеславович ГРЫЗЛОВ)</td>
<td>DOB 15.12.1950 POB: Vladivostok</td>
<td>Former permanent member of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. As a member of the Security Council, which provides advice on and coordinates national security affairs, he was involved in shaping the policy of the Russian Government threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.</td>
<td>25.7.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergei Orestovich BESEDA (Сергей Орестович Беседа)</td>
<td>DOB: 17.5.1954</td>
<td>Commander of the Fifth Service of the FSB, Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. As a senior FSB officer (Colonel-General), he heads a service responsible for overseeing intelligence operations and international activity.</td>
<td>25.7.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mikhail Vladimirovich DEGTYAREV (Михаил Владимирович ДЕГТАРЕВ)</td>
<td>DOB 10.7.1981 POB: Kuibyshev (Samara)</td>
<td>Member of the State Duma. As a member of the Duma he announced the inauguration of the ‘de facto embassy’ of the unrecognised, so-called ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ in Moscow, he contributes to undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Currently Chairman of the Russian State Duma Committee on Physical Education, Sport and Youth Affairs.</td>
<td>25.7.2014</td>
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<td>80. Ramzan Akhmadovitch KADYROV (Рамзан Ахматович Кадыров)</td>
<td>DOB: 5.10.1976 POB: Tsentaroy.</td>
<td>President of the Republic of Chechnya. Kadyrov made statements in support of the illegal annexation of Crimea and in support of the armed insurgency in Ukraine. He stated <em>inter alia</em> on 14 June 2014 that he 'will do anything to help revive Crimea'. In that context, he was awarded the medal for 'the liberation of Crimea' by the Acting Head of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea for the support he provided to the unlawful annexation of Crimea. In addition, on 1 June 2014 he expressed his readiness to send 74 000 Chechen volunteers to Ukraine if requested to do so.</td>
<td>25.7.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>81. Alexander Nikolayevich TKACHYOY (Александр Николаевич Ткачёв)</td>
<td>DOB: 23.12.1960 POB: Vyselki, Krasnodar region</td>
<td>Former Governor of the Krasnodar Krai. He was awarded the medal 'for the liberation of Crimea' by the Acting head of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea for the support he provided to the unlawful annexation of Crimea. On that occasion, the Acting Head of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea said that Tkachyov was one of the first to express his support to the new 'leadership' of Crimea. Currently Minister of Agriculture of the Russian Federation (since 22 April 2015).</td>
<td>25.7.2014</td>
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</table>
| 82.  Pavel Yurievich GUBAREV  
(Павел Юрьевич ГУБАРЕВ)  
Pavlo Yuriyovich GUBARIEV  
(HUBARIEV)  
(Павло Юрійович ГУБАРЕВ) | DOB: 10.2.1983 (or 10.3.1983)  
POB: Siewierodonetsk | One of the self-described leaders of the 'People's Republic of Donetsk'. He requested Russian intervention in eastern Ukraine, including through the deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces. He was associated with Igor Strelkov/Girkin who is responsible for actions which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Gubarev was responsible for recruiting people for armed forces of separatists. 
Responsible for taking over the regional government building in Donetsk with pro-Russian forces and proclaimed himself the ‘People's governor’. Despite being arrested for threatening the territorial integrity of Ukraine, and subsequently released, he has continued to play a prominent role in separatist activities, thus undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. | 25.7.2014 |
| 83.  Ekaterina Yurievna GUBAREVA  
(Екатерина Юрьевна ГУБАРЕВА)  
Kateryna Yuriyivna GUBARIEVA (HUBARIEVA)  
(Катерина Юрiвна ГУБАРЕВА) | DOB: 5.7.1983 or 10.3.1983  
POB: Kakhovka (Kherson oblast) | In her capacity of former so-called 'Minister of Foreign Affairs' she was responsible for defending the so-called 'Donetsk People's Republic', thus undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. In taking on and acting in this capacity she has therefore supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Remains active in supporting separatist actions and policies. 
Member of the so-called 'People's Council' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. | 25.7.2014 |
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<tr>
<td>84. Fyodor Dmitrievich BEREZIN (Фёдор Дмитриевич БЕРЕЗИН), Fedir Dmytrovych BEREZIN (Федир Дмитрович БЕРЕЗИН)</td>
<td>DOB: 7.2.1960 POB: Donetsk</td>
<td>Former so-called ‘deputy defence minister’ of the so-called ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’. He is associated with Igor Strelkov/Girkin, who is responsible for actions which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. In taking on and acting in this capacity Berezin has therefore supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Remains active in supporting separatist actions and policies.</td>
<td>25.7.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>85. Valery Vladimirovich KAUROV (Валерий Владимирович КАУРОВ), Valeriy Volodymyrovych KAUROV (Валерій Володимирович КАУРОВ)</td>
<td>DOB: 2.4.1956 POB: Odessa</td>
<td>The self-described ‘president’ of the so-called ‘Republic of Novorossiya’ who has called on Russia to deploy troops to Ukraine. In taking on and acting in this capacity he has therefore supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Remains active in supporting separatist actions and policies.</td>
<td>25.7.2014</td>
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<td>86. Serhii Anatoliyovych ZDRILIK a.k.a Abwehr (Сергей Анатольевич ЗДРИЛЮК) (Серёж Anatoliiyovich ZDRIILYUK)</td>
<td>DOB: 23.6.1972 (or 23.7.1972) POB: Vinnytsia region</td>
<td>Senior aid to Igor Strelkov/Girkin who is responsible for actions which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. In taking on and acting in this capacity, Zdriiuk has therefore supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Remains active in supporting separatist actions and policies.</td>
<td>25.7.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>87. Vladimir ANTYUFEEV (a.k.a. Vladimir SHEVTSOV, Vladimir Iurievici ANTIUFEEV, Vladimir Gheorghievici ALEXANDROV, Vadim Gheorghievici SHEVTSOV) (Владимир ANTOFEEV)</td>
<td>DOB: 19.2. 1951 POB: Novosibirsk</td>
<td>Former 'Minister of State Security' in the separatist region of Transnistria. Former vice-prime minister of the 'Donetsk People's Republic', responsible for security and law enforcement. In his capacity, he was responsible for the separatist 'governmental' activities of the so-called 'government of the Donetsk People's Republic'. Remains active in supporting separatist actions and policies.</td>
<td>25.7.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>88. Alexey Alexeyevich GROMOV (Алексей Алексеевич Громов)</td>
<td>DOB: 31.5.1960 POB: Zagorsk (Sergiy Posad)</td>
<td>As first Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration, he is responsible for instructing Russian media outlets to take a line favourable with the separatists in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, therefore supporting the destabilisation of Eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea.</td>
<td>30.7.2014</td>
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<td>89. Oksana TCHIGRINA, Oksana Aleksandrovna CHIGRINA (CHYHRYNA) (Оксана Александровна ЧИГРИНА)</td>
<td>DOB: possibly 23.7.1981</td>
<td>Spokesperson of the so-called 'government' of the so-called 'Lugansk People's Republic' who made declarations justifying, inter alia, the shooting down of a Ukrainian military airplane, the taking of hostages, fighting activities by the illegal armed groups, which have as a consequence undermined the territorial integrity, sovereignty and unity of Ukraine. Remains an active employee of the Press Service of LNR.</td>
<td>30.7.2014</td>
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<td>90. Boris Alekseevich LITVINOV (Борис Алексеевич ЛИТВИНОВ) Boris Oleksiyovych LYTUVYNOV (Борис Олексійович ЛИТВІНОВ)</td>
<td>DOB: 13.1.1954 POB: Dzerzhynsk (Donetsk oblast)</td>
<td>Former member of the so-called 'People's Council' and former chairman of the so-called 'Supreme Council' of the so-called 'Donetsk People's Republic' who was at the source of policies and the organisation of the illegal 'referendum' leading to the proclamation of the so-called 'Donetsk People's Republic', which constituted a breach of the territorial integrity, sovereignty and unity of Ukraine. Remains active in supporting separatist actions and policies.</td>
<td>30.7.2014</td>
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<td>91.</td>
<td>Sergey Vadimovich ABISOV (Сергей Вадимович АБИСОВ) Sergiy (Serhiy) Vadymovych ABISOV (Сергій Вадимович АБІСОВ)</td>
<td>By accepting his appointment as so-called 'Minister of Interior of the Republic of Crimea' by the President of Russia (decrease No 301) on 5 May 2014 and by his actions as so-called 'Minister of Interior’ he has undermined the territorial integrity, sovereignty and unity of Ukraine</td>
<td>30.7.2014</td>
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<td>92. Arkady Romanovich ROTENBERG, Arkadii Romanovich ROTENBERG (Аркадий Романович Ротенберг)</td>
<td>DOB: 15.12.1951 POB: Leningrad (Saint Petersburg).</td>
<td>Mr Rotenberg is a long-time acquaintance of President Putin and his former judo sparring partner.  He developed his fortune during President Putin's tenure. His level of economic success is attributable to the influence of key decision makers favouring him, notably in the award of public contracts.  He has benefited from his close personal relationship with Russian decision-makers as he was awarded important contracts by the Russian State or by State-owned enterprises. His companies were, notably awarded several highly lucrative contracts for the preparations for the Sochi Olympic Games.  He is also the owner of the company Stroygazmontazh which has been awarded a State contract for the construction of a bridge from Russia to the illegally annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea, therefore consolidating its integration into the Russian Federation which in turn further undermines the territorial integrity of Ukraine.  He is the chairman of the board of directors of publishing house Prosvesheniye, which has notably implemented the project 'To the Children of Russia: Address - Crimea', a public relations campaign that was designed to persuade Crimean children that they are now Russian citizens living in Russia and thereby supporting the Russian Government's policy to integrate Crimea into Russia.</td>
<td>30.7.2014</td>
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<td>93. Konstantin Valerevich MALOFEEV (Константин Валерьевич МАЛОФЕЕВ)</td>
<td>DOB: 3.7.1974 POB: Puschino, Moscow region</td>
<td>Mr Malofeev is closely linked to Ukrainian separatists in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea. He is a former employer of Mr Borodai, former so-called ‘Prime Minister’ of the ‘Donetsk People's Republic’ and met with Mr Aksyonov, so-called ‘Prime Minister’ of the so-called ‘Republic of Crimea’, during the period of the Crimean annexation process. The Ukrainian Government has opened a criminal investigation into his alleged material and financial support to separatists. In addition, he gave a number of public statements supporting the annexation of Crimea and the incorporation of Ukraine into Russia and notably stated in June 2014 that ‘You can't incorporate the whole of Ukraine into Russia. The East (of Ukraine) maybe’. Therefore, Mr Malofeev is acting in support of the destabilisation of Eastern Ukraine.</td>
<td>30.7.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yuriy Valentinovich KOVALCHUK (Юрий Валентинович Ковальчук)</td>
<td>DOB 25.7.1951 POB: Leningrad (St Petersburg)</td>
<td>Mr Kovalchuk is a long-time acquaintance of President Putin. He is a co-founder of the so-called Ozero Dacha, a co-operative society bringing together an influential group of individuals around President Putin. He is benefiting from his links with Russian decision-makers. He is the chairman and largest shareholder of Bank Rossiya, of which he owned around 38 % in 2013, and which is considered the personal bank of Senior Officials of the Russian Federation. Since the illegal annexation of Crimea, Bank Rossiya has opened branches across Crimea and Sevastopol, thereby consolidating their integration into the Russian Federation. Furthermore, Bank Rossiya has important stakes in the National Media Group which in turn controls television stations which actively support the Russian government's policies of destabilisation of Ukraine.</td>
<td>30.7.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>95. Nikolay Terentievich SHAMALOV (Николай Терентьевич Шамалов)</td>
<td>DOB: 24.1.1950 POB: Belarus</td>
<td>Mr Shamalov is a long-time acquaintance of President Putin. He is a co-founder of the so-called Ozero Dacha, a cooperative society bringing together an influential group of individuals around President Putin. He benefits from his links with Russian decision-makers. He is the second largest shareholder of Bank Rossiya, of which he owned around 10% in 2013, and which is considered the personal bank of Senior Officials of the Russian Federation. Since the illegal annexation of Crimea, Bank Rossiya has opened branches across Crimea and Sevastopol, thereby consolidating their integration into the Russian Federation. Furthermore, Bank Rossiya has important stakes in the National Media Group which, in turn, controls television stations which actively support the Russian government’s policies of destabilisation of Ukraine.</td>
<td>30.7.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96. Alexander Vladimirovich ZAKHARCHENKO (Александр Владимирович ЗАХАРЧЕНКО) Oleksandr Volodymyrovych ZAKHARCHENKO (Олександр Володимирович ЗАХАРЧЕНКО)</td>
<td>DOB: 26.6.1976 POB: Donetsk</td>
<td>As of 7 August 2014, he replaced Alexander Borodai as the so-called ‘Prime Minister’ of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’. Currently so-called ‘Head’ of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’. In taking on and acting in this capacity, Zakharchenko has supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.</td>
<td>12.9.2014</td>
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<td>97.</td>
<td>Vladimir Petrovich KONONOVA (a.k.a. ‘Tsar’) (Владимир Петрович КОНОНОВ) Volodymyr Petrovych KONONOVA (Володимир Петрович КОНОНОВ)</td>
<td>DOB: 14.10.1974 POB: Gorsky As of 14 August 2014, he replaced Igor Strelkov/Girkin, as the so-called ‘Defence minister’ of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’. He has reportedly commanded a division of separatist fighters in Donetsk since April 2014 and has promised to solve the strategic task of repelling Ukraine’s military aggression. Kononov has therefore supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.</td>
<td>12.9.2014</td>
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<td>98.</td>
<td>Miroslav Vladimirovich RUDENKO (Миролав Владимирович РУДЕНКО) Myroslav Volodymyrovych RUDENKO (Миролав Володимирович РУДЕНКО)</td>
<td>DOB: 21.1.1983 POB: Debaltsevo Associated with the ‘Donbass People’s Militia’. He has, inter alia, stated that they will continue their fighting in the rest of the country. Rudenko has therefore supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Member of the so-called ‘People’s Council of the Donetsk People’s Republic’.</td>
<td>12.9.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>100. Andrey Yurevich PINCHUK</td>
<td>Possible date of birth: 27.12.1977</td>
<td>Former ‘State security minister’ of the so-called ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’. Associated with Vladimir Antyufeyev, who is responsible for the separatist ‘governmental’ activities of the so-called ‘government of the Donetsk People’s Republic’. He has therefore supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies. Head of the ‘Union of Donbas volunteers’.</td>
<td>12.9.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Andriy Yuriyovych PINCHUK</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Андрей Юрьевич ПИНЧУК)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Андрій Юрійович ПІНЧУК)</td>
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<tr>
<td>101. Oleg Vladimirovich BEREZA</td>
<td>DOB: 1.3.1977</td>
<td>Former so-called ‘Internal affairs minister’ of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’. Associated with Vladimir Antyufeyev, who is responsible for the separatist ‘governmental’ activities of the so-called ‘Government of the Donetsk People’s Republic’. He has therefore supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.</td>
<td>12.9.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Олег Владимирович Береза)</td>
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<tr>
<td>102. Andrei Nikolaevich RODKIN</td>
<td>DOB: 23.9.1976 POB: Moscow</td>
<td>Moscow Representative of the so-called ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’. In his statements he has, <em>inter alia</em>, talked about the militias’ readiness to conduct a guerrilla war and their seizure of weapon systems from the Ukrainian armed forces. He has therefore supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. One of the leaders of the “Union of Donbas volunteers”.</td>
<td>12.9.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Андрей Николаевич Родкин)</td>
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<tr>
<td>103. Aleksandr Akimovich KARAMAN (Александр Акимович КАРАМАН), Alexandru CARAMAN</td>
<td>DOB: 26.7.1956 POB Cioburciu, Slobozia district, now Republic of Moldova</td>
<td>Former so-called 'Deputy Prime Minister for Social Issues' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. Associated with Vladimir Antyufeyev, who was responsible for the separatist 'governmental' activities of the so-called 'Government of the Donetsk People's Republic'. He has therefore supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Protégé of Russia's Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin. Head of the Administration of the Council of Ministers of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'.</td>
<td>12.9.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104. Georgiy L'vovich MURADOV (Георгий Львович Мурадов)</td>
<td>DOB: 19.11.1954 POB: Kochmes, Komi ASSR</td>
<td>So-called 'Deputy Prime Minister' of Crimea and Plenipotentiary Representative of Crimea to President Putin. Muradov has played an important role in consolidating Russian institutional control over Crimea since the illegal annexation. He has therefore supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.</td>
<td>12.9.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>105</td>
<td>Mikhail Sergeevich</td>
<td>23.5.1971</td>
<td>Dzhankoy</td>
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<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>Yuri Leonidovich Vorobyov</td>
<td>2.2.1948</td>
<td>Krasnoyarsk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107</td>
<td>Vladimir Volfovich Zhirkovsky</td>
<td>25.4.1946</td>
<td>Alma-Ata, Kazakh SSR</td>
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<tr>
<td>111. Vladimir Stepanovich NIKITIN (Владимир Степанович НИКИТИН)</td>
<td>DOB 5.4.1948 POB: Opochka</td>
<td>Former member of the State Duma and former First Deputy Chairman of the Committee for CIS Affairs, Eurasian Integration and Relations with Compatriots of the State Duma. On 20 March 2014 he voted in favour of the draft Federal Constitutional Law 'on the acceptance into the Russian Federation of the Republic of Crimea and the formation within the Russian Federation of new federal subjects — the republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Status Sevastopol'.</td>
<td>12.9.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aleksey Vasilevich NAUMETS</td>
<td>DOB: 11.2.1968</td>
<td>Major-general of the Russian Army. He is the commander of the 76th airborne division which has been involved in the Russian military presence on the territory of Ukraine, notably during the illegal annexation of Crimea.</td>
<td>12.9.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sergey Viktorovich CHEMEZOV</td>
<td>DOB: 20.8.1952 POB: Cheremkhovo</td>
<td>Sergei Chemezov is one of President Putin's known close associates, both were KGB officers posted in Dresden and he is a member of the Supreme Council of 'United Russia'. He is benefiting from his links with the Russian President by being promoted to senior positions in State-controlled firms. He chairs the Rostec conglomerate, the leading Russian state-controlled defence and industrial manufacturing corporation. Further to a decision of the Russian government, Technopromexport, a subsidiary of Rostec, is planning to build energy plants in Crimea thereby supporting its integration into the Russian Federation. Furthermore, Rosoboronexport, a subsidiary of Rostec, has supported the integration of Crimean defence companies into Russia's defence industry, thereby consolidating the illegal annexation of Crimea into the Russian Federation.</td>
<td>12.9.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>120. Sergey Yuriyevich KOZYAKOV (Сергей Юрьевич КОЗЬЯКОВ)  Serhiy Yuriyovych KOZYAKOV (Сергій Юрійович КОЗЬЯКОВ)</td>
<td>DOB: 29.9.1982 or 23.9.1982</td>
<td>In his former capacity as so-called ‘Head of the Luhansk Central Election Commission’ he was responsible for organising the so-called ‘elections’ of 2 November 2014 in the ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’. These ‘elections’ were in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal. In October 2015 he was appointed as so-called ‘Minister of Justice’ of the ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’. In taking on and acting in these capacities, and in organising the illegal ‘elections’, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.</td>
<td>29.11.2014</td>
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</table>
| 121. Oleg Konstantinovich AKIMOV (a.k.a. Oleh AKIMOV)  
(Олег Константинович АКИМОВ)  
Oleh Kostiantynovych AKIMOV (Олег Костяниченко АКИМОВ) | DOB: 15.9.1981  
POB: Lugansk | Deputy of the ‘Lugansk Economic Union’ in the ‘National Council’ of the ‘Lugansk People's Republic’. Stood as a candidate in the so-called ‘elections’ of 2 November 2014 to the post of so-called ‘Head’ of the ‘Lugansk People's Republic’. These ‘elections’ were in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal. Since 2014 he is the ‘Head’ of the so-called ‘Federation of Trade Unions’ and a member of the so-called ‘People's Council’ of the ‘Lugansk People's Republic’.  
In taking on and acting in this capacity, and in participating formally as a candidate in the illegal ‘elections’, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.  
Supports actively actions and policies undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. | 29.11.2014 |
These ‘elections’ are in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal.  
In taking on and acting in this capacity, and in participating formally as a candidate in the illegal ‘elections’, she has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine. | 29.11.2014 |
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<tr>
<td>123. Yuriy Viktorovich SIVOKONENKO a.k.a. Yuriy SIVOKONENKO, Yury SIVOKONENKO, Yury SYVOKONENKO (Юрий Викторович СИВОКОНЕНКО)</td>
<td>DOB: 7.8.1957 POB: Stalino city (now Donetsk)</td>
<td>Member of the ‘Parliament’ of the so-called ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ and Chairman of the public association Union of Veterans of the Donbass Berkut and a member of the public movement ‘Free Donbass’. Stood as a candidate in the so-called ‘elections’ of 2 November 2014 to the post of the Head of the so-called ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’. These elections were in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal. In taking on and acting in this capacity, and in participating formally as a candidate in the illegal ‘elections’, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.</td>
<td>29.11.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>124. Aleksandr Igorevich KOFMAN (a.k.a. Oleksandr KOFMAN) (Александр Игоревич КОФМАН) (Олександр Ігорович КОФМАН)</td>
<td>DOB: 30.8.1977 POB: Makiivka (Donetsk oblast)</td>
<td>Former so-called ‘Foreign Minister’ and so-called ‘First deputy speaker’ of the 'Parliament' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. Stood as a candidate in the so-called illegal 'elections' of 2 November 2014 to the post of so-called 'Head' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. These elections were in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal. In taking part and acting in this capacity, and in participating formally as a candidate in the illegal 'elections', he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine. Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies.</td>
<td>29.11.2014</td>
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| Ravil Zakariyevich KHALIKOV (Равиль Закарийевич ХАЛИКОВ) | DOB: 23.2.1969
POB: Belozernoe village, Romodanovskiy rayon, USSR                                     | Former so-called 'First Deputy Prime Minister' and previous 'Prosecutor-General' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine. | 29.11.2014      |
| Dmitry Aleksandrovich SEMYONOVO (Дмитрий Александрович СЕМЕНОВ) | DOB: 3.2.1963
POB: Moscow                                                                               | Former ‘Deputy Prime Minster for Finances’ of the so-called ‘Lugansk People's Republic’. In taking on and acting in this capacity, has actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine. Remains active in financing LNR separatist structures. | 29.11.2014      |
| Oleg Evgenevich BUGROV (Олег Евгеньевич БУРОВ)  | DOB: 29.8.1969 or 1973
POB: Sverdlovsk, Luhansk                                                                 | Former 'Defence Minister' of the so-called 'Lugansk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine. | 29.11.2014      |
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| 128. Lesya Mikhaylovna LAPTEVA  
(Леся Михайлівна ЛАПТЕВА) | DOB: 11.3.1976  
POB: Dzhambul/Jambul (Kazakhstan), currently known as Taraz | Former ‘Minister of Education, Science, Culture and Religion’ of the so-called ‘Lugansk People’s Republic’.  
In taking on and acting in this capacity, she has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine. | 29.11.2014 |
| 129. Yevgeniy Eduardovich MIKHAYLOV (a.k.a. Yevhen Eduardovych MYCHAYLOV)  
(Євген Едуардович МІХАЙЛОВ) | DOB: 17.3.1963  
POB: Arkhangelsk | Former so-called ‘Minister of the Council of Ministers’ (head of the administration for governmental affairs) of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’.  
In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine. | 29.11.2014 |
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| 130. Ihor Vladymirovych KOSTENOK (a.k.a. Igor Vladimirovich KOSTENOK) (Ігорь Владимирович КОСТЕНОК) | DOB: 15.03.1961  
POB: Vodyanske, Dobropillia Rayon, Donetsk oblast, Донецьке, Добропільський район Донецької області | Former so-called 'Minister of Education' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'.  
In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.  
Currently personal advisor to the PM of DNR. | 29.11.2014 |
| 131. Yevgeniy Vyacheslavovich ORLOV (a.k.a. Yevhen Vyacheslavovych ORLOV) (Евгений Вячеславович ОРЛОВ) | DOB: 10.5.1980  
or 21.10.1983  
POB: Snezhnoye, Donetsk region, г. Сніжне, Донецької області | Member of the 'National Council' of the so-called 'Donetsk People's Republic'. Chairman of the public movement 'Free Donbass'.  
In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine. | 29.11.2014 |
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<tr>
<td>132. Vladyslav Mykolayovych DEYNEGO a.k.a. Vladislav Nikolayevich DEYNEGO (Владислав Миколайович ДЕЙНЕГО) (Владислав Николаевич ДЕЙНЕГО)</td>
<td>DOB: 12.3.1964 POB: Romny, Sumy oblast Ромны, Сумская область</td>
<td>'Deputy Head' of the 'People's Council' of the so-called 'Lugansk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.</td>
<td>29.11.2014</td>
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<td>134. Alexey Yurevich MILCHAKOV (a.k.a. Fritz, Serbian) (Алексей Юрьевич Мильчаков)</td>
<td>DOB: 30.4. 1991 POB: St. Petersburg</td>
<td>Commander of the 'Rusich' unit, an armed separatist group involved in the fighting in eastern Ukraine. In this capacity, he has actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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* The entry was deleted on 10 March 2016 following a delisting decision.
† The entry was deleted on 13 March 2017 following a delisting decision.
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<td>137. Eduard Aleksandrovich BASURIN (Эдуард Александрович БАСУРИН)</td>
<td>DOB: 27.6.1966 POB: Donetsk</td>
<td>Spokesperson of the Ministry of Defence of the so-called 'Donetsk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine. Remains an active military commander in so-called 'DNR'.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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<td>138. <strong>Alexandr Vasilievich SHUBIN</strong> (Александр Васильевич ШУБИН)</td>
<td>DOB: 20.5.1972 or 30.5.1972, POB: Luhansk</td>
<td>Former so-called 'Minister of Justice', of the illegal so-called ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’. Chairman of the ‘Central Election Commission’ of the so-called ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’ since October 2015. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine. Currently Chairman of the so-called ‘Central Election Commission’ of the so-called ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>140. Sergey Yurevich IGNATOV (a.k.a. KUZOVELY) (Сергей Юрьевич ИГНАТОВ (КУЗОВЛЕВ))</td>
<td>DOB: 7.1.1967&lt;br&gt;POB: Michurinsk, Tambov oblast (Мичуринск, Тамбовская область)</td>
<td>So-called Commander in Chief of the People's Militia of the 'Luhansk People's Republic'.&lt;br&gt;In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>141. Ekaterina FILIPPOVA (Екатерина Владимировна ФИЛИППОВА) Kateryna Volodymyrivna FILIPPOVA (Катерина Володимирівна ФІЛІППОВА)</td>
<td>DOB: 20.1.1988&lt;br&gt;POB: Krasnoarmiïsk</td>
<td>Former so-called 'Minister of Justice' of the so-called 'Donetsk People's Republic'.&lt;br&gt;In taking on and acting in this capacity, she has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.&lt;br&gt;Currently personal assistant to Alexander Vladimirovich Zakharchenko.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>142. Aleksandr Yurievich TIMOFEEV (Александр Юрьевич ТИМОФЕЕВ) Oleksandr Yuriyovych TYMOFEYEV (Олександр Юрійович ТІМОФЕЄВ)</td>
<td>DOB: 15.05.1971 POB: Nevinnomyssk, Stavropol Krai Невинномысск, Ставропольский край</td>
<td>So-called 'Minister of Finance and Taxes' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>143. Evgeny Vladimirovich MANUYLOV (Евгений Владимирович МАНУЙЛОВ) Yevhen Volodymyrovych MANUYLOV (Євген Володимирович МАНУЙЛОВ)</td>
<td>DOB: 5.1.1967 POB: Baranykivka, Bilovods Raion, Luhansk region с. Бараниковка Беловодского района Луганской области</td>
<td>So-called 'Minister of Finance' of the so-called 'Lugansk People's Republic'. In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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| Viktor Vyacheslavovich YATSENKO  
(Виктор Вячеславович ЯЦЕНКО)  
Viktor Viacheslavovych YATSENKO  
(Віктор В'ячеславович ЯЦЕНКО) | DOB: 22.4.1985  
POB: Kherson | So-called ‘Minister of Communications’ of the so-called ‘Donetsk People's Republic’.  
In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine. | 16.2.2015 |
| Olga Igoreva BESEDINA  
(Ольга Игоревна БЕСЕДИНА)  
Olia Ihorivna BESEDINA  
(Ольга Ігорівна БЕСЕДИНА) | DOB: 10.12.1976  
POB: Lugansk | Former so-called ‘Minister of Economic Development and Trade’ of the so-called ‘Lugansk People's Republic’.  
In taking on and acting in this capacity, she has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine. | 16.2.2015 |
| Zaur Raufovich ISMAILOV  
(Заур Рафович ИСМАИЛОВ)  
Zaur Raufovych ISMAYILOV  
(Заур Рафович ІСМАІЛОВ) | DOB: 25.7.1978  
(or 23.3.1975)  
POB: Krasny Luch, Voroshilovgrad, Lugansk region | So-called 'General Prosecutor' of the so-called 'Lugansk People's Republic'.  
In taking on and acting in this capacity, he has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine. | 16.2.2015 |
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<tr>
<td>147. Anatoly Ivanovich ANTONOV (Анатолий Иванович АНТОНОВ)</td>
<td>DOB 15.5.1955 POB: Omsk</td>
<td>Former Deputy Minister of Defence and, in that capacity, involved in supporting the deployment of Russian troops in Ukraine. According to the present Russian Ministry of Defence structure, in that capacity he participated in shaping and implementing the policy of the Russian Government. These policies threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. As of 28 December 2016, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>148. Arkady Viktorovich BAKHIN (Аркадий Викторович БАХИН)</td>
<td>DOB: 8.5.1956 POB: Kaunas, Lithuania</td>
<td>Former First Deputy Minister of Defence (until 17 November 2015) and was, in that capacity, involved in supporting the deployment of Russian troops in Ukraine. According to the present Russian Ministry of Defence structure, in that capacity he participates in shaping and implementing the policy of the Russian Government. These policies threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Currently employed by Rosatom.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>Andrei Valeryevich KARTAPOLOV (Андрей Валерьевич Картаполов)</td>
<td>DOB: 9.11.1963 POB: GDR (DDR)</td>
<td>Commander of the Western Military District since 10 November 2015. Former Director of the Main Operations Department and deputy chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Actively involved in shaping and implementing the military campaign of the Russian forces in Ukraine. According to the stated activities of the general staff, by exercising operational control over the armed forces, he is actively involved in shaping and implementing the Russian government policy threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iosif (Joseph) Davydovich KOBZON (Иосиф Давыдович КОБЗОН)</td>
<td>DOB: 11.9.1937 POB: Tchasso夫 Yar, Ukraine</td>
<td>Member of the State Duma. He visited the so-called Donetsk People's Republic and during his visit made statements supporting separatists. He was also appointed Honorary Consul of the so-called 'Donetsk People's Republic' in the Russian Federation. On 20 March 2014 he voted in favour of the draft Federal Constitutional Law 'on the acceptance into the Russian Federation of the Republic of Crimea and the formation within the Russian Federation of new federal subjects — the republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Status Sevastopol'. Currently First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Culture.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>Valery Fedorovich RASHKIN</td>
<td>DOB: 14.3.1955 POB: Zhilino, Kaliningrad region</td>
<td>First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Ethnicity issues. He is the founder of the civil movement 'Krassnaya Moskva - Red Moscow - Patriotic Front Aid' which organised public demonstrations supporting separatists, thereby supporting policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. On 20 March 2014 he voted in favour of the draft Federal Constitutional Law 'on the acceptance into the Russian Federation of the Republic of Crimea and the formation within the Russian Federation of new federal subjects - the republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Status Sevastopol'.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruslan Ismailovich BALBEK</td>
<td>DOB: 28.8.1977 POB: Bekabad, Uzbekistan SSR</td>
<td>Member of the State Duma, elected from the illegally annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Deputy Chairperson of the Duma Committee on ethnic affairs. In 2014 Balbek was appointed as a Deputy Chairperson of the Council of Ministers of the so-called 'Republic of Crimea' and worked in this capacity for the integration of the illegally annexed Crimea peninsula into the Russian Federation, for which he has been awarded with a medal 'For the Defence of Republic of Crimea'. He has supported the annexation of Crimea in public statements, including on his profile on the United Russia (Crimean branch) website and a press article published on NTV website on 3 July 2016.</td>
<td>09.11.2016</td>
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| 153. Константин Михайлович БАХАРЕВ (Константин Михайлович БАХАРЕВ) | DOB: 20.10.1972 POB: Simferopol Ukrainian SSR | Member of the State Duma, elected from the illegally annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea.  
Member of the Duma Committee on Financial Markets.  
In March 2014 Bakharev was appointed as a Deputy Chairperson of the State Council of the so-called ‘Republic of Crimea’, and in August 2014 as First Deputy Chairperson of that body. He has admitted his personal involvement in the events of 2014 that led to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol, which he has publicly supported, including in an interview published on gazetakrimea.ru website on 22 March 2016 and c-pravda.ru website on 23 August 2016. He has been awarded with the order ‘For loyalty to duty’ by the ‘authorities’ of ‘Republic of Crimea’. | 09.11.2016 |
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</table>
| Dmitry Anatolievich BELIK (Дмитрий Анатольевич БЕЛИК) | DOB: 17.10.1969 DOB: Kular Ust-Yansky District, Yakut Autonomous SSR | Member of the State Duma, elected from the illegally annexed city of Sevastopol. 
Member of the Duma Committee on Taxation. 
As a member of the Sevastopol municipal administration in February-March 2014 he supported the activities of the so-called 'People's Mayor' Alexei Chaly. He has publicly admitted his involvement in the events of 2014 that led to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol, which he has publicly defended, including on his personal website and in an interview published on 21 February 2016 on nation-news.ru website. 
For his involvement in the annexation process he has been awarded with Russian State order ‘For duties to the motherland’ — II degree. | 09.11.2016 |
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<tr>
<td>Andrei Dmytryevych KOZENKO (Андрей Дмитриевич КОЗЕНКО)</td>
<td>DOB: 3.8.1981, POB: Simferopol Ukrainian SSR</td>
<td>Member of the State Duma, elected from the illegally annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Member of Duma Committee on Financial Markets. In March 2014 Kozenko was appointed as a Deputy Chairperson of the State Council of the so-called ‘Republic of Crimea.’ He has publicly admitted his involvement in the events of 2014 that led to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol, which he has publicly defended, including in an interview published on gazeta.crimea.ru website on 12 March 2016. For his involvement in the annexation process he has been awarded with a medal. For the defence of Republic of Crimea by the local authorities.</td>
<td>09.11.2016</td>
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<tr>
<td>Svetlana Borisovna SAVCHENKO (Светлана Борисовна САВЧЕНКО)</td>
<td>DOB: 24.6.1965 POB: Belogorsk Ukrainian SSR</td>
<td>Member of the State Duma, elected from the illegally annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Member of the Duma Committee on Culture. She has been a member of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea since 2012 and as of March 2014 supported the integration of the illegally annexed Crimea and Sevastopol into the Russian Federation. In September 2014 Savchenko was elected to the State Council of the so-called ‘Republic of Crimea’. She has defended the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol on numerous occasions in public statements, including interviews published on c-pravda.ru website on 2 April 2016 and 20 August 2016. She has been awarded with Russian State order ‘For duties to the motherland’ — II degree in 2014 and with the order ‘For loyalty to duty’ by the “authorities” of ‘Republic of Crimea’ in 2015.</td>
<td>09.11.2016</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pavel Valentinovich SHPEROV (Павел Валентинович ШПЕРОВ)</td>
<td>DOB: 4.7.1971 POB: Simferopol Ukrainian SSR</td>
<td>Member of the State Duma, elected from the illegally annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Member of the Duma Committee for CIS Affairs, Eurasian Integration and Relations with Compatriots. In September 2014 Shperov was elected to the State Council of the so-called ‘Republic of Crimea’. He has publicly admitted, including in an interview published on ldpr-rk.ru website on 3 September 2016, his role in the events of 2014 that led to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol and in particular his role in the organisation of the illegal referendum on the illegal annexation of the peninsula.</td>
<td>09.11.2016</td>
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<td>158. Andrey Vladimirovich CHEREZOV (TSCHERESOW) Черезов, Андрей Владимирович</td>
<td>Vice-Minister for Energy of the Russian Federation. DOB: 12.10.1967 POB: Salair, Kemerovskaya Oblast</td>
<td>Shares responsibility for the decision to transfer gas turbines that had been delivered by Siemens Gas Turbine Technologies OOO to OAO VO Technopromexport, to be installed in Crimea. This decision contributes to establishing an independent power supply for Crimea and Sevastopol as a means of supporting their separation from Ukraine, and undermines the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.</td>
<td>04.08.2017</td>
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<tr>
<td>159. Evgeniy Petrovich GRABCHAK Грабчак, Евгений Петрович</td>
<td>Head of Department in the Energy Ministry of the Russian Federation. DOB: 18.7.1981 POB: Ust-Labinsk, Krasnodar Region</td>
<td>Responsible within the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation for the development of electro-energetic projects in Crimea. These projects contribute to establishing an independent power supply for Crimea and Sevastopol as a means of supporting their separation from Ukraine, and undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.</td>
<td>04.08.2017</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sergey Anatolevich TOPOR-GILKA</td>
<td>Director General of OAO ‘VO TPE’ until its insolvency, Director General of OOO ‘VO TPE’. DOB: 17.2.1970</td>
<td>In his capacity as Director General of OOO ‘VO TPE’, he led the negotiations with Siemens Gas Turbine Technologies OOO regarding the purchase and delivery of the gas turbines for a power plant in Taman, Krasnodar region, Russian Federation. He was responsible for the transfer of the gas turbines to Crimea. This contributes to establishing an independent power supply for Crimea and Sevastopol as a means of supporting their separation from Ukraine, and undermines the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.</td>
<td>04.08.2017</td>
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<tr>
<td>State Unitary Enterprise of the 'Republic of Crimea'</td>
<td>Prospect Kirov 52, Simferopol, Crimea, 295000</td>
<td>On 17.3.2014, the 'Parliament of Crimea' adopted a resolution declaring the appropriation of assets belonging to the Chernomorneftegaz enterprise on behalf of the 'Republic of Crimea'. The enterprise is thus effectively confiscated by the Crimean 'authorities'. Re-registered on 29.11.2014 as State Unitary Enterprise of the 'Republic of Crimea' 'Chernomorneftegaz' (Государственное унитарное предприятие Республики Крым 'Черноморнефтегаз'). Founder: The Ministry of Fuel and Energy of the Republic of Crimea (Министерство топлива и энергетики Республики Крым).</td>
<td>12.5.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>(formerly known as PJSC 'Chernomorneftegaz')</td>
<td>Phone number: +7 (3652) 66-70-00 +7 (3652) 66-78-00</td>
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| 3. So-called 'Lugansk People's Republic'  
'Луганская народная республика'  
'Luganskaya narodnaya respublika' | Official website: http://lugansk-online.info  
Phone number: +38-099-160-74-14 | The so-called 'Lugansk People's Republic' was established on 27 April 2014.  
Responsible for organising the illegal referendum on 11 May 2014. Declaration of independence on 12 May 2014.  
On 22 May 2014, the so-called 'People's Republics' of Donetsk and Lugansk created the so-called 'Federal State of Novorossiya'.  
This is in breach of Ukrainian constitutional law, and, as a consequence, of international law, thus undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.  
It is also involved in the recruitment to the separatist 'Army of Southeast' and other illegal armed separatist groups, thus undermining the stability or security of Ukraine. | 25.7.2014 |
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This is in breach of Ukrainian constitutional law, and, as a consequence, of international law, thus undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. It is also involved in the recruitment to illegal armed separatist groups, thus threatening the stability or security of Ukraine. | 25.7.2014 |
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| 5. So-called 'Federal State of Novorossiya'  
'Федеративное государство Новороссия'  
'Федеративное государство Новороссия' | Official press releases:  
http://novorossia.su/official  
http://frn2016.netdo.ru/  
https://www.novorosinform.org/ | On 24 May 2014, the so-called 'People's Republics' of Donetsk and Lugansk signed an agreement on the creation of the unrecognized so-called 'Federal State of Novorossiya'.  
This is in breach of Ukrainian constitutional law, and, as a consequence, of international law, thus threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. | 25.7.2014 |
| 6. International Union of Public Associations 'Great Don Army'  
Международный Союз Общественных Объединений 'Всевелое Войско Донское' | Official website:  
http://xn--80aaaajfjszd7a3b0e.xn--p1ai/  
Phone number:  
+7-8-908-178-65-57  
Social media: Cossack National Guard  
http://vk.com/kazak_nac_guard  
Address: 346465 Russia, Rostov Region, October District, St Zaplavskaya, Str Shosseynaya 1  
Second address: Voroshilovskiy Prospekt 12/85-87/13, Rostov-on-Don | The 'Great Don army' established the 'Cossack National Guard', responsible for fighting against the Ukrainian government forces in Eastern Ukraine, thus undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine as well as threatening the stability or security of Ukraine.  
Associated with Mr Nikolay Kozitsyn, who is Commander of Cossack forces and responsible for commanding separatists in Eastern Ukraine fighting against the Ukrainian government forces. | 25.7.2014 |
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<tr>
<td>7. 'Sobol' 'Соболь'</td>
<td>Official web site: <a href="http://soboli.net">http://soboli.net</a> Social media: <a href="http://vk.com/sobolipress">http://vk.com/sobolipress</a> Phone number: (0652) 60-23-93 Email: <a href="mailto:SoboliPress@gmail.com">SoboliPress@gmail.com</a> Address: Crimea, Simferopol, str. Киев, 4 (area bus station 'Central')</td>
<td>Radical paramilitary organisation, responsible for openly supporting using force to end Ukraine's control over Crimea, thus undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Responsible for training separatists to fight against the Ukrainian government forces in Eastern Ukraine, thus threatening the stability or security of Ukraine.</td>
<td>25.7.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. So called 'Lugansk Guard' 'Луганская гвардия'</td>
<td>Social media: <a href="https://vk.com/luguard">https://vk.com/luguard</a> <a href="http://vk.com/club68692201">http://vk.com/club68692201</a></td>
<td>Self-defence militia of Lugansk, responsible for training separatists to fight against the Ukrainian government forces in Eastern Ukraine, thus threatening the stability or security of Ukraine. Associated with Mr, German PROPOKIV, active leader who is responsible for taking part in the seizure of the building of the Lugans regional office of the Ukrainian Security Service and recorded a video address to President Putin and Russia from the occupied building.</td>
<td>25.7.2014</td>
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<td>9.</td>
<td>So called 'Army of the Southeast' 'Армии Юго-Востока'</td>
<td>Recruitment: <a href="http://lugansk-online.info/statements">http://lugansk-online.info/statements</a> Social media: <a href="http://vk.com/lugansksbu">http://vk.com/lugansksbu</a></td>
<td>Illegal armed separatist group which is considered to be one of the most important in Eastern Ukraine. Responsible for occupying the building of the Security Service in the Lugansk region. Retired officer. Associated with Mr. Valeriy BOLOTOV, listed as one of the leaders of the group. Associated with Mr. Vasyl NIKITIN, responsible for the separatist 'governmental' activities of the so called 'government of the People' s Republic of Luhansk'</td>
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<td>10.</td>
<td>So-called 'Donbas People's Militia' 'Народное ополчение Донбасса'</td>
<td>Social media: <a href="http://vk.com/polkdonbassa">http://vk.com/polkdonbassa</a> +38-099-445-63-78; +38-063-688-60-01; +38-067-145-14-99; +38-094-912-96-60; +38-062-213-26-60 Email: <a href="mailto:voenkom.dnr@mail.ru">voenkom.dnr@mail.ru</a> <a href="mailto:mobilisation@novorossia.co">mobilisation@novorossia.co</a> Telephone volunteers in Russia: +7 (926) 428-99-51 +7 (967) 171-27-09 or email <a href="mailto:novoross24@mail.ru">novoross24@mail.ru</a> Address: Donetsk. Prospect Zasyadko.13</td>
<td>Illegal armed separatist group responsible for fighting against the Ukrainian government forces in Eastern Ukraine, thus threatening the stability or security of Ukraine. Inter alia, the militant group seized control of several government buildings in Eastern Ukraine in early April 2014, thus undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. It is associated with Mr Pavel Gubarev, who is responsible for the taking over of the regional government building in Donetsk with pro-Russian forces and proclaiming himself the ‘people’s governor’.</td>
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| 11.  | ‘Vostok battalion’
     ‘Батальон Восток’ | Social media:
http://vk.com/patriotic_forces_of_donbas | Illegal armed separatist group which is considered to be one of the most important in Eastern Ukraine. Responsible for fighting against the Ukrainian government forces in Eastern Ukraine, thus threatening the stability or security of Ukraine. Actively participated in the military operations resulting in the seizure of Donetsk Airport. Part of the so-called ‘1st Army Corps’ of the Armed Forces of ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’. | 25.7.2014 |

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<td>13.</td>
<td>State Unitary Enterprise of the City of Sevastopol, 'Sevastopol seaport' ГУП ГС 'Севастопольский морской порт' (formerly known as State enterprise 'Sevastopol commercial seaport' Государственное предприятие 'Севастопольский морской торговый порт' Gosudarstvennoe predpriatiye 'Sevastopolskiy morskoy torgovyy port')</td>
<td>Nakhimov Square 5, 299011) Sevastopol (пл. Нахимова, 5, г. Севастополь, 299011) Code: 1149204004707</td>
<td>The ownership of the entity was transferred contrary to the Ukrainian law. On 17.3.2014 the 'Parliament of Crimea' adopted a resolution No 1757-6/14 'On nationalization of some companies belonging to the Ukrainian ministries of infrastructure or agriculture' declaring the appropriation of assets belonging to the state enterprise 'Sevastopol commercial seaport' on behalf of the 'Republic of Crimea'. The enterprise is thus effectively confiscated by the Crimean 'authorities'. In terms of volume of trade, it is the biggest commercial seaport in Crimea. Re-registered on 6.6.2014 as State Unitary Enterprise of the City of Sevastopol 'Sevastopol seaport' (Государственное унитарное предприятие города Севастополя 'Севастопольский морской порт'). Founder: The Government of Sevastopol (Правительство Севастополя).</td>
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<td>15. State Unitary Enterprise of the 'Republic of Crimea' 'Universal-Avia' Государственное унитарное предприятие Республики Крым 'Универсал-Авиа' (formerly known as State enterprise Universal -Avia Государственное предприятие 'Универсал-Авиа' Gosudarstvenoye predpriatiye 'Universal-Avia')</td>
<td>Aeroflotskaya Street 5, 295024, Simferopol ул. Аэрофлотская, дом 5, 295024, г. Симферополь,</td>
<td>The ownership of the entity was transferred contrary to Ukrainian law. On 24.3.2014, the 'Presidium of the Parliament of Crimea' adopted a decision 'On State-owned Enterprise &quot;Gosudarstvenoye predpriatiye Universal-Avia&quot; (О Государственном предприятии &quot;Универсал-Авиа&quot;)' No 1794-6/14 declaring the appropriation of assets belonging to the state enterprise 'Universal-Avia' on behalf of the 'Republic of Crimea'. The enterprise is thus effectively confiscated by the Crimean 'authorities'. Re-registered on 15.1.2015 as State Unitary Enterprise of the 'Republic of Crimea' 'Universal-Avia' (Государственное унитарное предприятие Республики Крым 'Универсал-Авиа'). Founder: The Ministry of Transportation of the 'Republic of Crimea' (Министерство транспорта Республики Крыма).</td>
<td>25.7.2014</td>
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<td>16. Federal State Budgetary Enterprise &quot;Sanatorium Nizhnyaya Oreanda&quot; of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation (formerly known as Resort 'Nizhnyaya Oreanda' Санаторий 'Нижняя Ореанда')</td>
<td>The ownership of the entity was transferred contrary to the Ukrainian law. On 21 March the 'Presidium of the Parliament of Crimea' adopted a decision 'On the questions of creation of the Association of sanatoria and resorts' No. 1767-6/14 declaring the appropriation of assets belonging to the resort 'Nizhnyaya Oreanda' on behalf of the 'Republic of Crimea'. The enterprise is thus effectively confiscated by the Crimean 'authorities'. Re-registered on 09.10.2014 as Federal State Budgetary Enterprise &quot;Sanatorium Nizhnyaya Oreanda&quot; of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation (ФЕДЕРАЛЬНОЕ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ БЮДЖЕТНОЕ УЧРЕЖДЕНИЕ «САНАТОРИЙ «НИЖНЯЯ ОРЕАНДА» УПРАВЛЕНИЯ ДЕЛАМИ ПРЕЗИДЕНТА РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ). Founder: The Administration of the President of the Russian Federation (УПРАВЛЕНИЯ ДЕЛАМИ ПРЕЗИДЕНТА РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ).</td>
<td>25.7.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crimean Republican Enterprise 'Azov distillery plant'</td>
<td>40 Zeleznodorozhnaya str., 296178 Azovskoye, Jankoysky district (Джанкойский район, 296178 пгт. Азовское, ул. Железнодорожная, 40) code: 01271681</td>
<td>The ownership of the entity was transferred contrary to Ukrainian law. On 9 April 2014, the 'Presidium of the Parliament of Crimea' adopted a decision No 1991-6/14 'On the amendments to the Resolution of the State Council of the &quot;Republic of Crimea&quot;' of 26 March 2014 No 1836-6/14 'On nationalization of the property of enterprises, institutions and organizations of agro-industrial complex, located in the territory of the &quot;Republic of Crimea&quot;' declaring the appropriation of assets belonging to the 'Azovskiy likerovodochny zavod' on behalf of the 'Republic of Crimea'. The enterprise is thus effectively confiscated by the Crimean 'authorities'. Reportedly declared bankrupt. Managed by Sinergiya.</td>
<td>25.7.2014</td>
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<td>Name</td>
<td>Identifying information</td>
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<tr>
<td>Federal State Budgetary Enterprise 'Production-Agrarian Union &quot;Massandra&quot;' of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation</td>
<td>298650, Crimea, Yalta, Massandra, str.Vinodela Egorova 9. 298650, Крым, г.Ялта, пгт. Массандрра, ул. Винодела Егорова, д. 9 Website: <a href="http://massandra.su">http://massandra.su</a></td>
<td>The ownership of the entity was transferred contrary to the Ukrainian law. On 9 April 2014, the 'Presidium of the Parliament of Crimea' adopted a decision No 1991-6/14 'On the amendments to the Resolution of the State Council of the &quot;Republic of Crimea&quot;' of 26 March 2014 No 1836-6/14 'On nationalization of the property of enterprises, institutions and organizations of agro-industrial complex, located in the territory of the &quot;Republic of Crimea&quot;' declaring the appropriation of assets belonging to the state concern 'National Association of producers &quot;Massandra&quot;’ on behalf of the 'Republic of Crimea’. The enterprise is thus effectively confiscated by the Crimean 'authorities'. Re-registered on 1.8.2014 Federal State Budgetary Enterprise 'Proizvodstvenno agrarnoye obyedinenye &quot;Massandra&quot;’ of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation (Федеральное государственное унитарное предприятие 'Производственно-аграрное объединение &quot;Массандрра&quot; Управления делами Президента Российской Федерации'). Founder: The Administration of the President of the Russian Federation (Управление делами Президента Российской Федерации).</td>
<td>25.7.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Federal state budget institution for science and research 'All-Russia national scientific research institute for wine growing and wine making &quot;Magarach&quot; Russian Academy of Sciences'</td>
<td>298600, Kirov Street 31 Yalta, Crimea 298600, Крым, г. Ялта, ул.Кирова, 31</td>
<td>The ownership of the entity was transferred contrary to the Ukrainian law. On 9 April 2014, the 'Presidium of the Parliament of Crimea' adopted a decision No 1991-6/14 'On the amendments to the Resolution of the State Council of the &quot;Republic of Crimea&quot;' of 26 March 2014 No 1836-6/14 'On nationalization of the property of enterprises, institutions and organizations of agro-industrial complex, located in the territory of the &quot;Republic of Crimea&quot; declaring the appropriation of assets belonging to the state enterprise 'Gosudarstvennye predpriyatiye Agrofirma &quot;Magarach&quot; nacionalnogo instituta vinograd i vina &quot;Magarach&quot;' on behalf of the 'Republic of Crimea'. The enterprise is thus effectively confiscated by the Crimean 'authorities'. Re-registered on 15 January 2015 as 'State Unitary Institution of the &quot;Republic of Crimea&quot; National Institute of Wine &quot;Magarach&quot;' (Государственное бюджетное учреждение Республики Крым 'Национальный научно-исследовательский институт винограда и вина &quot;Магарач&quot;)'. Founder: The Ministry of Agriculture of the 'Republic of Crimea' (Министерство сельского хозяйства</td>
<td>25.7.2014</td>
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<td>института винограда и вина 'Магарач' Gosudarstvennoe predpriatiye Agrofirma 'Magarach' natsionalnogo instituta vinograda i vina 'Magarach')</td>
<td>Республики Крым). On 7 February 2017, State Unitary Enterprise of the 'Republic of Crimea' 'National Institute of Wine &quot;Magarach&quot;' was transformed into Federal Budgetary scientific facility 'All-Russia scientific-research institute of viticulture and winemaking &quot;Magarach&quot;', Russian Academy of Sciences</td>
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<tr>
<td>20. State enterprise of the 'Republic of Crimea' Sparkling wine plant 'Novy Svet' Государственное унитарное предприятие Республики Крым 'Завод шампанских вин &quot;Новый Свет&quot;' Formerly known as State Unitary Enterprise of the 'Republic of Crimea' 'Factory of sparkling wine &quot;Novy Svet&quot;' (formerly known as State enterprise sparkling wine plant 'Novy Svet' Государственное предприятие Завод шампанских вин &quot;Новый свет&quot; Gosudarstvenoye predpriyatye Zavod shampanskykh vin 'Novy Svet')</td>
<td>298032, Crimea, Sudak, urban village Novy Svet, str.Shalapina 1. 298032, Крым, г.Судак, пгт. Новый Свет, ул. Шалапина, д.1</td>
<td>The ownership of the entity was transferred contrary to Ukrainian law. On 9 April 2014, the 'Presidium of the Parliament of Crimea' adopted a decision No 1991 -6/14 'On the amendments to the Resolution of the State Council of the &quot;Republic of Crimea&quot;' of 26 March 2014 No 1836-6/14 'On nationalization of the property of enterprises, institutions and organizations of agro-industrial complex, located in the territory of the &quot;Republic of Crimea&quot; declaring the appropriation of assets belonging to the state enterprise &quot;Zavod shampanskykh vin Novy Svet&quot; on behalf of the 'Republic of Crimea'. The enterprise is thus effectively confiscated by the Crimean 'authorities'. Re-registered on 4.1.2015 as State Unitary Enterprise of the 'Republic of Crimea' 'Factory of sparkling wine &quot;Novy Svet&quot;' (Государственное унитарное предприятие Республики Крым 'Завод шампанских вин &quot;Новый Свет&quot;'). Founder: The Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Crimea (Министерство сельского хозяйства Республики Крым).</td>
<td>25.7.2014</td>
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<td>21.</td>
<td><strong>JOINT- STOCK COMPANY ALMAZ-ANTEY AIR AND SPACE DEFENCE CORPORATION</strong>&lt;br&gt;Акционерное общество «Концерн воздушно-космической обо...&lt;br&gt;(a.k.a. CONCERN ALMAZ-ANTEY; ALMAZ-ANTEY CORP; a.k.a. ALMAZ-ANTEY DEFENSE CORPORATION; a.k.a. ALMAZ-ANTEY JSC; Концерн ВКО «Алмаз – Антей»)</td>
<td>Almaz-Antey is a Russian State-owned company. It manufactures anti-aircraft weaponry including...&lt;br&gt;These weapons are used by the separatists, including for shooting down airplanes. As a State-owned company, Almaz-Antey therefore contributes to the destabilisation of Ukraine.</td>
<td>30.7.2014</td>
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| 22. DOBROLET aka DOBROLYOT Добролёт/Добролёт | Airline code QD  
International Highway, House 31, building 1, 141411 Moscow  
141411, Москва г, Международное ш, дом 31, строение 1  
Website: www.dobrolet.com | Dobrolet is a subsidiary of a Russian state-owned airline. Since the illegal annexation of Crimea Dobrolet has so far exclusively operated flights between Moscow and Simferopol. It therefore facilitates the integration of the illegally annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation and undermines Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity. | 30.7.2014 |
| 23. Russian National Commercial Bank (Российский национальный коммерческий банк) | 295000, Simferopol, Naberezhnaja str named after 60th anniversary of USSR, 34  
295000, Симферополь, ул. Набережная имени 60-летия СССР, д. 34  
Website: http://www.mcb.ru | After the illegal annexation of Crimea, Russian National Commercial Bank (RNCB) became fully owned by the so-called 'Republic of Crimea'. In January 2016 became a property of Federal Agency for State Property Management, also known as Rosimushchestvo (Федеральное агентство по управлению государственным имуществом (Росимуществом)). It has become the dominant player in the market, while it had no presence in Crimea before the annexation. By buying or taking over from branches of retreating banks operating in Crimea, RNCB supported materially and financially the actions of the Russian government to integrate Crimea into the Russian Federation, thus undermining Ukraine's territorial integrity. | 30.7.2014 |
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<tr>
<td>24.  Donetsk Republic (Public organisation) Донецкая республика</td>
<td>Public &quot;organisation&quot; that presented candidates in the so called &quot;elections&quot; of the so called &quot;Donetsk People's Republic&quot; on 2 November 2014. These &quot;elections&quot; are in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal. In participating formally in the illegal &quot;elections&quot; it has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and to further destabilise Ukraine. Headed by Alexander ZAKHARCHENKO and founded by Andriy PURGIN.</td>
<td>29.11.2014</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.  Peace to Luhansk Region (Mir Luganschine) Мир Луганщине</td>
<td>Public 'organisation' that presented candidates in the so-called 'elections' of the so-called 'Luhansk People's Republic' 2 November 2014. These 'elections' are in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal. In participating formally in the illegal 'elections' it has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and to further destabilise Ukraine. Headed by Igor PLOTNITSKY.</td>
<td>29.11.2014</td>
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<td>Free Donbass (a.k.a. 'Free Donbas', 'Svobodny Donbass') Свободный Донбасс</td>
<td><a href="http://www.odsd.ru/">http://www.odsd.ru/</a></td>
<td>Public 'organisation' that presented candidates in the so-called 'elections' of the so-called 'Donetsk People's Republic' 2 November 2014. These elections are in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal. In participating formally in the illegal &quot;elections&quot; it has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and to further destabilise Ukraine.</td>
<td>29.11.2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People's Union (Narodny Soyuz) Народный союз</td>
<td></td>
<td>Public &quot;organisation&quot; that presented candidates in the so-called &quot;elections&quot; of the so-called &quot;Luhansk People's Republic&quot; 2 November 2014. These elections are in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal. In participating formally in the illegal &quot;elections&quot; it has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and to further destabilise Ukraine.</td>
<td>29.11.2014</td>
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| 28.  | Luhansk Economic Union  
(Luganskiy Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz)  
Луганский  
^экономический союз | "Social organisation" that presented candidates in the illegal so called "elections" of the so called "Luhansk People's Republic" 2 November 2014. Nominated a candidate, Oleg AKIMOV, to be "Head" of the so called "Luhansk People's Republic". These "elections" are in breach of Ukrainian law and therefore illegal. In participating formally in the illegal "elections" it has therefore actively supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and to further destabilise Ukraine. | 29.11.2014 |
| 29.  | Cossack National Guard  
Казачья Национальная  
Гвардия | Armed separatist group which has actively supported actions which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and further destabilise Ukraine. Commanded by and therefore associated with a listed person Nikolay KOZITSYN. Reportedly part of the so-called ‘2nd Army Corps’ of the ‘Lugansk People’s Republic’. | 16.2.2015 |
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<tr>
<td>30. Sparta battalion</td>
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<td>Armed separatist group which has actively supported actions which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and further destabilise Ukraine. Part of the so-called '1st Army Corps' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>31. Somali battalion</td>
<td></td>
<td>Armed separatist group which has actively supported actions which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and further destabilise Ukraine. Part of the so-called '1st Army Corps' of the 'Donetsk People's Republic'.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>32. Zarya battalion</td>
<td></td>
<td>Armed separatist group which has actively supported actions which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and further destabilise Ukraine. Reportedly part of the so-called '2nd Army Corps' of the 'Lugansk People’s Republic'.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>33. Priznak brigade</td>
<td></td>
<td>Armed separatist group which has actively supported actions which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and further destabilise Ukraine. Part of the so-called '1st Army Corps' of the 'Lugansk People’s Republic'.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>destabilise Ukraine.</td>
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<td>Part of the so-called ‘2nd Army Corps’ of the ‘Lugansk People’s Republic’</td>
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<td>34. Oplot battalion</td>
<td>Social media: <a href="http://vk.com/oplot_info">http://vk.com/oplot_info</a></td>
<td>Armed separatist group which has actively supported actions which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and further destabilise Ukraine. Reportedly part of the so-called ‘1st Army Corps’ of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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<td>35. Kalmius battalion</td>
<td></td>
<td>Armed separatist group which has actively supported actions which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and further destabilise Ukraine. Part of the so-called ‘1st Army Corps’ of the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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<td>36. Death battalion</td>
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<td>Armed separatist group which has actively supported actions which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and further destabilise Ukraine. Part of the so-called ‘2nd Army Corps’ of the ‘Lugansk People’s Republic’.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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<td>37. Movement 'Novorossiya' of Igor STRELKOV Движение 'Новороссия' Игоря СТРЕЛКОВА</td>
<td><a href="http://novorossia.pro/">http://novorossia.pro/</a></td>
<td>The Movement 'Novorossiya'/'New Russia' was established in November 2014 in Russia and is headed by Russian officer Igor Strelkov/Girkin (identified as a staff member of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU)). According to its stated objectives, it aims at providing all-round, effective assistance to 'Novorossiya', including by helping militia fighting in Eastern Ukraine, thereby supporting policies undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Associated with a person listed for undermining the territorial integrity of Ukraine.</td>
<td>16.2.2015</td>
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<td>OAO ‘VO Technopromexport’</td>
<td>Address: 119019, Moscow, Novyi Arbat str., 15, building 2</td>
<td>Contracting party with Siemens Gas Turbine Technologies OOO, OAO ‘VO TPE’ purchased gas turbines declared to be destined for a power plant in Taman, Krasnodar region, Russian Federation, and as the contractor was responsible for the transfer of the gas turbines to OOO ‘VO TPE’ which in turn transferred them to be installed in Crimea. This contributes to establishing an independent power supply for Crimea and Sevastopol as a means of supporting their separation from Ukraine, and undermines the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine</td>
<td>04.08.2017</td>
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| 39.  | Address: 119019, Moscow, Novyi Arbat str., 15, building 2  
Registration date: 8.5.2014  
State Registration Number: 1147746527279  
Tax Registration Number: 7704863782e | Current owner of the gas turbines originally supplied by Siemens Gas Turbine Technologies OOO to OAO 'VO TPE'. OOO 'VO TPE' transferred the gas turbines to be installed in Crimea. This contributes to establishing an independent power supply for Crimea and Sevastopol as a means of supporting their separation from Ukraine, and undermines the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. | 04.08.2017 |
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| 40. ZAO Interavtomatika (IA)  
AKA: ЗАО 'Интеравтоматика',  
CJSC 'Interavtomatika' | Address: 115280, Moscow, Avtozavodskaya st., 14,  
Registration Date: 31.1.1994  
State Registration Number: 1037739044111  
Tax Registration Number: 7725056162 | Company specialised in control and communication systems for power plants, which has entered into contracts for projects concerning the building of the power plants and the installation of gas turbines in Sevastopol and in Simferopol. This contributes to establishing an independent power supply for Crimea and Sevastopol as a means of supporting their separation from Ukraine, and undermines the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. | 04.08.2017 |
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<td>'State Unitary Enterprise of the Crimean Republic &quot;Crimean Sea Ports&quot;' ('Государственное унитарное предприятие Республики Крым &quot;Крымские морские порты&quot;'), including branches: Feodosia Commercial Port, Kerch Ferry, Kerch Commercial Port.AO Interavtomatika (IA) AKA: ЗАО 'Интеравтоматика', CJSC 'Interavtomatika'</td>
<td>28 Kirova Street Kerch 298312 Crimea (298312, Республика Крым, гор. Керчь, ул. Кирова, дом 28) The 'Parliament of Crimea' adopted Resolution No 1757-6/14 on 17 March 2014 'On nationalisation of some companies belonging to the Ukrainian Ministries of Infrastructure or Agriculture' and Resolution No 1865-6/14 on 26 March 2014 'On State-Owned Enterprise &quot;Crimean Sea Ports&quot;' (&quot;О Государственном предприятии &quot;Крымские морские порты&quot;) declaring the appropriation of assets belonging to several State enterprises which were merged into the 'State Unitary Enterprise of the Crimean Republic &quot;Crimean Sea Ports&quot;' on behalf of the 'Republic of Crimea'. Those enterprises were thus effectively confiscated by the Crimean 'authorities' and the 'Crimean Sea Ports' has benefited from the illegal transfer of their ownership</td>
<td>14.09.2017</td>
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