APPLICATION INSTITUTING PROCEEDINGS

AND

REQUEST FOR PROVISIONAL MEASURES

REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

v.

REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN

VOLUME II

ANNEXES

16 September 2021
APPLICATION INSTITUTING PROCEEDINGS

AND

REQUEST FOR PROVISIONAL MEASURES

REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

v.

REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN

VOLUME II

ANNEXES

16 September 2021
CERTIFICATION

The Agent of the Republic of Armenia certifies that the documents listed below and annexed to the Republic of Armenia’s Application and Request for Provisional Measures are true and accurate copies of the originals of these documents or excerpts thereof.

LIST OF ANNEXES


Annex 3  Tofik Veliyev et al., History of Azerbaijan, 10 (Casioglu 2009) (certified translation from Russian)

Annex 4  “Azerbaijani authorities deny Richard Kirakosyan a visa, declaring him a persona non grata,” Panorama (19 March 2012) (certified translation from Russian)

Annex 5  “Female passionarity and desire to participate in the ‘fight against the Armenians’ has risen dramatically in Azerbaijan,” Panorama (27 March 2014) (certified translation from Russian)


Annex 7  “Moscow demands that Baku stop discriminating against Russians with Armenian last names,” Tass (5 July 2017) (certified translation from Russian)

Annex 8  Kanal 1, Transcript of video “URGENT. Lots of enemies have been captured. Watch what they were forced to say. The latest news from the frontline,” YouTube (22 October 2020), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ftHHS7gUSu0 (certified translation from Azerbaijani)

Annex 9  Naira Bulghadaryan, “According to preliminary conclusions, the death of the elderly captive was caused by brain trauma: Investigative Committee,” Radio Liberty (5 November 2020) (certified translation from Armenian)
Annex 10  Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan (11 November 2020)


Annex 12  “President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev addressed the nation,” Azertac (25 November 2020) (certified translation from Azerbaijani)


Annex 14  Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia (8 December 2020)

Annex 15  Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan (22 December 2020)


Annex 18  Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia (15 January 2021)

Annex 19  Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan (22 January 2021)

Annex 20  Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia (17 February 2021)

Annex 21  Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan (24 February 2021)

Annex 22  Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia (1 March 2021)


Annex 29  Delegation of the Republic of Armenia, Proposed Draft Agenda for 6-7 April 2021 Meeting (2 April 2021)


Annex 35  Photo of Mannequins from “President Aliyev inaugurates Military Trophy Park in Baku [UPDATE],” AzerNews (12 April 2021)


Annex 51  *Letter from* Ricardo Guilherme Filho, Director of Legal Affairs, Universal Postal Union, *to* Hakob Arshakyan, Minister of High-Tech Industry, Republic of Armenia, No. 4700(DL.PHIL)01.21 (1 June 2021)


Annex 56  Olga Prosvirova, “‘They beat me, they humiliate me, but I’m fine.’ Reports from Armenian servicemen returning from Azerbaijani prisons,” *BBC* (7 July 2021) (certified translation from Russian)


Annex 1

The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

Svante E. Cornell

Department of East European Studies

Report no. 46, Department of East European Studies,
Uppsala University, 1999

Contents

Introduction 1
1 History and Roots of the Conflict 3
2 Escalation: 1988-91 12
3 War: 1992-94 29
4 Russia: the Dishonest Broker? 43
5 Turkey: Azerbaijan’s Only Ally 58
6 Iran: In the Pitfalls of History 80
7 The United States: From Neglect to Commitment 95
8 Mediation and The Search for Solutions 115
9 Nagorno-Karabakh in Eurasian Geopolitics 142
10 Conclusions 149
11 Bibliography (Abridged) 153
movement’s rise was the Karabakh issue, but unfortunately not in a more conciliatory way than in Armenia. In fact, among the population, an increasing anger and frustration was growing against the both the Karabakh Armenians, for their secessionism, but also against the republic’s government, which was considered too soft on the issue, and seen as subservient to Moscow and ready to sell out Karabakh. 102 Although the APF originally was formed as a movement for the promotion of democratization, pluralism and human rights, it drew its popularity from an increasingly rigid stand on the Karabakh question. 103 The historian Abülfez Elçibey was elected chairman of the APF in its founding session. Thus a scene began to be set where the overwhelming majority of political forces in both republics had adopted a non-conciliatory approach to the conflict—this being valid both for the respective governments and their oppositions. In the end of June, a strike paralyzed Stepanakert and tensions escalated throughout July. 104

In another development that month, Armenia started an embargo against Nakhjivan, and the newly formed APF answered by setting up an embargo against the whole of Armenia, which was badly hit by this development as over two thirds of Armenia’s goods came through Azerbaijan. 105 Thus Armenia’s decision to try to isolate Nakhjivan seems to have been, to say the least, less than carefully examined.

Meanwhile the situation on the ground in Karabakh, was deteriorating. In August the Armenian members of the suspended Karabakh Soviet, led by representatives of the Dashnak party, set up a National Council, and reaffirmed their aim of unification with Armenia. From the second half of 1989 onwards, skirmishes and shoot-outs between armed bands became the rule rather than the exception, and the Soviet army’s attempts to calm the situation by setting up checkpoints and searching cars and villages for arms were largely futile. Moreover, the army outposts were frequently attacked by paramilitaries and thus large amounts of weapons gradually came into the hands of the militias on both sides. This aspect was very important for the unpredictability of the conflict: Arms were in overflow in the region, as in the entire Caucasus. This fact contributed to making the conflict uncontrollable as the monopolization of the use of force was no longer possible.

Then, on 28 November, the Soviet direct command was abolished, as if Moscow accepted its failure and left Nagorno Karabakh to its destiny. 106 Thus the Oblast was returned to Azeri control, and a military rule was initiated. Answering to this development, the Armenian Supreme Soviet on 1 December, 1989, took the historical decision to promulgate the incorporation of Nagorno Karabakh into the Armenian republic. The declaration stated as follows:

1. The Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet recognizes the fact of the self-determination of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Province, a fact established by the Feb. 20, 1988 and July 12, 1988 decisions of sessions of the Nagorno-Karabakh Province Soviet, as well as by the Aug. 16, 1989

102 See Audrey L. Altstadt, “Azerbaijan’s Struggle Towards Democracy”, in Dawisha and Parrott, op. cit. [100], pp. 120-122.
105 See Pravda, September 22, 1989, and Saroyan, op. cit. [82], p. 25.
As a result a union of the two entities was a legal fact, and translated into practice as a joint budget for the two entities was decided in the beginning of January.

In January 1990, the main scene of action moved to Azerbaijan. On the 11th, Armenian villages in the Khanlar and Geranboy/Shaumian districts were cleansed of Armenians. For the first time, heavy weaponry such as helicopters and armed personnel carriers were used here; Baku, however, was to be the scene of the world’s attention the next weeks. On the 11th, the APF organized a rally in protest of the government’s inactivity, and on the 13th and 14th, Azeri refugees from Armenia started a pogrom on Armenians, leading to the death of at least 88 people. The Soviet militia, present en masse as it was in Baku, repeated its actions in Sumgait and did what it would do in most cases of ethnic strife—nothing. The APF condemned the riots, denounced the republican leadership and Moscow for not intervening and argued it did so to justify an invasion of Baku, as it was afraid of the APF coming to power in Azerbaijan. These allegations were proven true less than a week later, as over 29'000 Soviet troops rolled into Baku on January 20. In the chaos that followed the intervention and in the brutal suppression of the resistance in the city, casualties rose first to 83, then to over a hundred according to official sources, and to over 500 and even thousands according to the APF. Meanwhile a state of emergency was proclaimed in Karabakh, and thousands of troops dispatched there as well. On 26 January, soviet defence minister Dmitri Yazov conceded in a press conference that ‘the military occupation of Azerbaijan’s capital was designed to prevent the Azerbaijan Popular Front from seizing power from the Communist Party’.

In this chaotic condition, the leaders of the popular fronts of the Baltic republics succeeded in arranging a meeting between their Azerbaijani and Armenian counterparts, that is the APF and the

---

109 The Christian Science Monitor, 19 January 1990; Izvestiya, 16 January 1990 gives a figure of 56 dead. Over 200 wounded were also reported; Arif Yusunov cites a figure of at least 88. Yunusov, Statistics of the Karabakh War, p. 6.
ANM, in Riga on 3 February. 114 Although neither of the movements were in possession of political power at the moment, they would be the main actors in the domestic sphere of their respective republics before long. Thus the meeting taking place was by itself a success; however its outcome was less successful. In fact it set a precedent, in a way, for the attitude of the parties towards the conflict: The Armenians invoked the principle of peoples’ right to self-determination, and the Azeris defended the principle of territorial integrity. 115 The meeting ended there, with both parties only announcing their own point of view without leaving any room for compromise.

By April, Armenia’s protests against the military rule in Karabakh became more vocal, and the Armenian leadership blamed the Soviet military of enflaming the conflict, as they allegedly cooperated with Azeri OMON (Interior Ministry special forces) forces in setting up ‘checkpoints’ in Karabakh controlling passports and residence permits, and searching for arms. Hence shortly before the late May celebrations of Armenia’s declaration of independence in 1918, Armenian militants sought to get hold of weapons from army depots in Yerevan, leading to 22 dead. 116 These events occurred shortly after Armenian officials decided to include Nagorno-Karabakh in the upcoming Armenian elections. 117 In this case, the Armenian leadership went against the Soviet central government, rejecting a decree from Moscow ordering armed nationalist groups to surrender arms. 118

Simultaneously paramilitary formations grew in number and strength on both sides, as the parties seemed to turn to build up for a military solution of the conflict. Again the Armenians were more active than the Azeris, who seemed to rely more upon the Soviet central government for a solution despite the Baku events of January, and a considerable, and according to HRW ‘increasingly open’ flow of arms from mainland Armenia to Karabakh was reported. 119 Observers have noted how planes loaded with military equipment, coming from Beirut, landed in Yerevan and how the materiel was subsequently transported to Karabakh. 120 In this environment of heavily armed paramilitary forces, the escalation of the armed conflict became irreversible.

In August, Armenian paramilitary forces attacked eight Azerbaijani villages in the Kazakh district in Northwestern Azerbaijan; Soviet military supported the Azerbaijani self-defence forces, leading to deaths of over a dozen people on each side. Meanwhile, in the Khanlar district, Azerbaijani OMON forces attempted to assert control over Armenian-populated villages, leading to clashes that left over a dozen dead. 121

115 Yérasimos, “Caucase: Le Retour de la Russie”, op. cit. [58], p. 69.
117 The Times, 28 May 1990.
121 Yunusov, Statistics of the Karabakh War, p. 7.
Sporadic clashes became frequent by the first months of 1991, with an ever-increasing organization of paramilitary forces on the Armenian side, whereas Azerbaijan still relied on the support of Moscow. Interestingly, the main area of these sporadic clashes was not the NKAO itself but the Khanlar and Geranboy/Shaumian raions between the NKAO’s northern border and Ganje. According to Azerbaijani interior ministry sources, there had been a notable increase of illegal Armenian migration to these districts in order to artificially alter the composition of the local population.

In response to this development, a joint Soviet and Azerbaijani military and police operation directed from Moscow was initiated in these areas during the Spring and Summer of 1991. The purpose of the operation was ostensibly to carry out identity controls, but in reality led to the clearing of up to 24 Armenian-populated villages on the northern periphery of the NKAO: reports talked of ‘search-and-destroy’ operations, with the aim of eradicating paramilitary forces. Interior ministry sources claimed to have confiscated substantial numbers of small arms from both Armenians and Azeris. The operation, entitled Operation Ring, was evidently carried out in a very harsh way, with systematic violations of Human Rights. After the conclusion of the operation, the Armenians that had been evicted took to arms to return to their villages leading to increasing clashes, and the number of casualties began to rise sharply. By June 1991, the casualties of the conflict were estimated at 816.

On 2 September 1991, the resuscitated Karabakh Soviet, renamed the ‘Karabakh National Council’, proclaimed the independent republic of Nagorno Karabakh over the territory of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and the Geranboy/Shaumian district of the Azerbaijani republic. This move took place following the declarations of independence of most Soviet union republics after the failed August coup against Gorbachev. Obviously, Nagorno-Karabakh, like Chechnia to the North, thought it could jump on the wagon of independence in this totally new atmosphere that was created by the specter of the Soviet Union’s de facto dissolution.

During Autumn, Azerbaijani forces moved to counter Nagorno Karabakh’s declaration of independence, and Armenians respond by establishing armed control over key villages. This led to a flare-up of armed conflict in a situation when the Soviet army was in a state of confusion regarding its future. However, a temporary pause was due to the mediation attempts by Boris Yeltsin and Nursultan Nazarbayev on 20-23 September, which produced an agreement to further talks between the republican leaderships, and a cease-fire a few days later. However, this did not mean a stop to fighting, as the republican governments had very much lost control over the armed units which had been proliferating for over two years in both republics. Before the ink on the agreement’s paper had dried, in the words of Thomas Goltz, Azeri villages in Karabakh had been the target of renewed violence. As the Azerbaijani government realized the military force

122 The Economist, 16 May 1991.
123 Human Rights Watch/ Helsinki, Azerbajan: Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, p. 4.
124 See discussion in Vaserman and Ginat, “National, Territorial or Religious Conflict?”, op. cit. [35], p. 355.
behind the Karabakh Armenians, it proceeded to nationalize all military hardware in the republic and to recall all Azeri conscripts from the Soviet army. Furthermore, as a direct answer to the declaration of independence, the Azeri parliament on 26 November abolished the autonomous status of Nagorno Karabakh, dividing its territory among the surrounding districts. Naturally, this move has more of a theoretical political importance than a real value, since the military control of the region was rapidly slipping out of Baku’s hands. On 8 December, a referendum was organized in Karabakh to confirm the secession, and not surprisingly, 99% of the cast votes were in favour, especially since the Azeri population boycotted the referendum. Simultaneously the Soviet troops were withdrawn from the region, which left the parties in direct confrontation, without any buffer between them.

As the Soviet Union ceased to exist, all leverage or even calming effect that Moscow might have had on the belligerents was removed. Especially for the Azeris, this was an unexpected and unwanted development. Whereas the Armenians had prepared themselves to solve the problems by themselves and with arms, the Azeris had been expecting Moscow to solve the conflict on their terms. Thus the rapid dissolution of the Soviet Union was a catastrophe for Azerbaijan, whose military preparation was incomparable to that of the Armenians. With an unorganized and badly motivated army, the Armenians seemed poised to resolve the issue in their favour. However, the issue can be raised whether the declaration of independence of Karabakh implied a division between Stepanakert and Yerevan. The declaration apparently points at a divergence of policy—whereas at an earlier stage the concurrent aim of Armenia and the Karabakh Armenians had been union of the two entities, that is reunification under Yerevan’s authority, the Karabakh Armenians seem to have changed their mind and now advocated an independent state.

However the picture of a division between Stepanakert and Yerevan does not fully comply with reality. To a certain extent it may be a diplomatic trick to reduce Yerevan’s responsibility and accountability for the actions of the Karabakh Armenians: in peace negotiations during 1993-96, Armenia has constantly argued that it is not strictly speaking a party to the conflict although it supports the right to self-determination of their ethnic kin in Karabakh. Consequently, the Armenian government is not responsible for the actions of the Karabakh Armenians and cannot speak for them, nor impose any policy on them, except by friendly advice. The exchange of government officials between the two capitals throughout the war—culminating in Karabakh’s President becoming Armenia’s President in 1998—seems to lend credence to this point. Moreover, Karabakh can be said to control Armenia to a much higher extent than the opposite; this circumstance is noted by several Armenian observers. 129

The Mirroring Nationalisms

There is one point that strikes the observer of the Armenian-Azeri conflict. That is the lack of interaction and dialogue between the leaderships of the two republics even at a very early stage of the dispute. Indeed, there seems to have been no-one in a power position, in any of the republics, at any time, that was interested in a dialogue and a peaceful resolution of the conflict through compromise. This is particularly interesting for two reasons: The first is that this has been an effective solution to other comparable conflicts; the second is that the two republics were for all

---

129 Personal communication to author from several sources; eg. Manvel Sargsian, senior analyst at the Armenian Center of National and International Studies and former representative of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, January 1999.
practical purposes part of the same country, a factor which should have worked against the escalation of the conflict. As Ted R. Gurr has noted,

Negotiated regional autonomy has proved to be an effective antidote for ethnonational wars of succession in Western and Third World states ... In several of these instances, ... settlements were rejected by factions that continued to fight, but the intensity of the conflict nonetheless declined markedly.\(^\text{130}\)

This clearly does not apply to the case of Nagorno Karabakh. The reason for this is simple: There was no readiness nor a will for compromise on either side. The events and the escalation of tensions, rather than bringing an insight that a peaceful solution must be found to avoid bloodshed, only served to antagonize the parties and lock them into their respective extreme positions. This is all the more remarkable as the Armenians and Azerbaijanis had a great advantage over parties to other conflicts: The institutions for commencing a dialogue and a discussion, and eventually negotiating a compromise, were present at all levels in the form of the Soviet Union. Leaders of the two republics met frequently at union-level meetings, which under all circumstances provided a framework for a dialogue; also most Azeris and Armenians could communicate through the Russian language. Nevertheless, the leaders of the communist times were unable to take advantage of the existing opportunities to reach a peaceful settlement to the conflict, something that seems to have been possible well into 1990, at the very least.

The inability of the communist leaders to provide constructive thinking might be explained by their belonging to a petrified and stagnant institution, which coloured their mind and enhanced their narrow-mindedness. This would be a plausible explanation if the statement was valid only for the Communists in the two republics. Unfortunately, this was not the case.

For as the opposition movements grew starting from the late 1980s, they invariably and with few exceptions took a nationalist overtone. The first non-communist leaders of both Armenia and Azerbaijan, Levon Ter-Petrosyan and Abülfez Elçibey were products of the popular fronts of their respective republics, which both had nationalist orientations and were in fact strongly related to the Karabakh dispute. This was the case especially in Armenia, where the ANM actually grew out of the Karabakh committee: in Armenia, a government was formed whose political origin was nothing else than an organization founded for the very purpose of advancing the conflict in Karabakh.

Thus it is truly amazing how the opposition movements grew strong without even once approaching to one another, trying to surpass their governments by mutually attempting to solve the conflict. Contrary to the developments in many other parts of the Soviet Union and particularly in the Baltic states, the Azeri Popular Front and the Armenian National Movement were as much responses to one another as parallel developments. The period from 1985 to the present has often been labeled as a period of nationalist revival in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In Azerbaijan and Armenia, this argument can be drawn one step further: It indeed seems appropriate to say that the Azeri and Armenian nationalism are actually mirrors of each other—they emerged as responses to one another and owe their whole existence to one another. As Yerasimos notes,

If the Georgian nationalism positions itself in the middle, between that of Russia and those of the smaller peoples within Georgia, thus creating a hierarchy, (which does not prevent—quite the opposite—the alliance of extremes), the Armenian and Azeri Nationalisms send back each other’s images like a deforming mirror, as if they can exist only by opposition to one another.131

The analogy of the deforming mirrors is indeed well found. For the popularity, and thus the existence, of the two movements was deeply related to the achievement of a victory in the Karabakh dispute. This is only proven by the fact that Ter-Petrosyan until recently had been sitting quite calmly in his chair, despite the economic crisis, embargoes and isolation of his country whereas Elçibey was ousted from power due to the debacle in Karabakh that he presided over.

Mark Saroyan, in an interesting article coined the term ‘Karabakh Syndrome’. Although in his article from 1990 he exclusively uses the term for Azerbaijani politics, it seems that this term would also be useful to explain the general situation both in Azerbaijan and Armenia. By the word syndrome, we refer to something with medical connotations, something pathological. And indeed, the form in which the mirroring nationalisms developed, one could say, is nothing less than pathological, as are the atrocities committed during all stages of the conflict. Indeed, in the case of this conflict, one can claim that pogroms and localized ethnic unrest led to the escalation of political conflict—which gives the conflict a mass-led character, as compared to the elite-led conflicts in Moldova and former Yugoslavia, as Stuart Kaufman has found in his research on the post-Communist conflicts.132 In the case of Azerbaijan, the pogroms of Sumgait and Baku especially, whether initiated by the Russian authorities or not, are pathological enough but become intelligible—although never justified—by the role of the Azeri refugees from Armenia, who themselves had recently suffered harassment, humiliation and atrocities. The fact that these refugees were the ones to initiate the pogroms follows the logic of ethnic conflicts. In the case of militants among the Armenians in Karabakh as well as in Armenia, however, the pathological strait is all the more present since the atrocities were carried out on a more systematic, although less explosive basis. In Azerbaijan, the pogroms were incidents of anger and frustration, which does not excuse them but shows them to be incidental occurrences rather than systematic policy. The Karabakh Armenians, on the other hand, seem to have taken the example of the notorious Bosnian Serbs in their systematic ethnic cleansing of the Azeris in Karabakh and later its surrounding regions, using all known practices ranging from mass murder to all forms of intimidation designed to create fear. This was especially clear during the first months of February 1992 when the small Azeri town of Khojaly was overrun by Karabakh forces, supported by the

131 Yérasimos, “Caucase: Le Retour de la Russie”, op. cit. [58], p. 65. (Translation from French is my own).

366th CIS infantry regiment. The town was all but destroyed, thousands of people were killed and the rest of the population was forced to flee over the mountains to seek refuge. This event was the first instance of atrocities committed against Azeris to reach the headlines of the world media, whereas anti-Armenian events in Baku and other areas in Azerbaijan had done so in numerous instances. The ‘syndrome’ of mirroring nationalism was not to be stopped. And this was because no one was there, no one was strong enough to make sense prevail.
Annex 2

THE CAUCASUS: FROZEN CONFLICTS AND CLOSED BORDERS

HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

JUNE 18, 2008

Serial No. 110–200

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs


U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGON : 2008
43–066PDF
strong signal must be sent to Azerbaijan, or any other country that threatens to go to war against a U.S. ally, and zeroing out their military funding does just that. Why would we continue to fund a military eager to go to war with our ally Armenia?

Another example of the U.S. not abiding by its own policy is the illegal blockade of Armenia by Turkey and Azerbaijan. Since instituting the blockade, Turkey has hindered Armenia’s economy with its economic blockade. In fact, the State Department has estimated that the blockade has increased Armenia’s transportation costs by 30–35%.

As Armenia continues to suffer under the oppressive acts of its neighbors the United States has done little to help. Year after year the Administration proposes to reduce Armenia’s economic assistance, yet year after year Armenia struggles to compete in the global economy. In talks with Turkey does the Administration discuss the illegal blockade of Armenia and the negative impact it has on the country as a whole? I fear that the answer is no.

It is a well known that economic ties between two countries foster a better relationship. The relationship between Turkey and Armenia is severely damaged at best and I strongly believe that increased international support for normalizing economic relations between the two countries would solve more than economic issues.

In closing, I want to reiterate that the Administration needs to be engaged in bringing Turkey to the table with Armenia. You need to hold Azerbaijan accountable and you need to be involved in fostering cooperation between all countries in the region. This is the essence of U.S. policy.

Between now and January 20, 2009 I sincerely hope the Administration will take the opportunity to confront these issues head on. I look forward to working with the Administration on these issues. The next six months will be important not only for the region but also for setting the stage for the next Administration in 2009.

Once again, thank you Chairman Berman and Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen for allowing me to be a part of such an important hearing on the Caucasus region.

ATTACHMENT A—AZERBAIJANI RHETORIC

QUOTE SHEET

President İlham Aliyev speaking in reference to the Karabakh conflict and Armenia:

- According to the President, in the course of the following months, things should be made clear as to the continuation of the talks. “We hope that the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan will be reestablished, because everything should be within certain limits, and the Azerbaijani Army is the strongest in the region and is able to liberate its lands”, (April 18, 2008)

- In 2008, speaking a day after Azeri forces failed to capture an Armenian position along the Line of Contact, leaving 8 Azeris dead: “We are buying military equipment, aircraft, ammunition, to be ready to liberate our territories. Our military budget has reached $1.3 billion [a year] and will continue to grow. . . . Force is the decisive factor [in the world].” (Regnum, March 5, 2008)

- In 2008: The capital of Armenia “Travan [Yerevan] was a gift to the Armenians in 1918. This was a great mistake. The Iravan khanate was Azerbaijani land, the Armenians were guests here.” Following that statement, head of Azeri Parliament Oktay Asadov promised to establish a commission to find out who is to blame for the “mistake.” (Trend, January 17, February 1, 2008)

- In 2007: “The war is in not yet over, only its first stage has been completed. We are buildup our army and economy and must be ready to use all means necessary to liberate our lands from occupation. And we are nearing that day. . . . We are ready for a military operation at any moment.” (Kavkazskiy Uzel, July 2, 2007)

- In 2006, “Our policies must be aggressive. We must attack. We must step up an information and economic attack while strengthening our military potential. We must increase pressure on Armenia. We must be ready for war.” (AFP, October 2, 2006)

- In 2005: “At any moment we must be able to liberate our territories by military means. To achieve this we have everything.” (AFP, July 25, 2005)

- In 2004: “Azerbaijan will soon become economically strong, and militarily superior. We cannot react positively to those calling us to compromise.” (Zerkalo, July 23, 2004)
Defense Minister Safar Abiyev in reference to war with Armenia:

- In 2007: “Chance of war is close to 100 percent” (RIA Novosti and AP, 11/26/07).
- In 2005, through spokesman Ramiz Melikov “When our hopes [for a favorable settlement] drop below 5 percent . . . we will launch war.” (Zerkalo, March 17, 2005)
- In 2004, through spokesman Ramiz Melikov: “Within the next 25 years there will be no state of Armenia in the South Caucasus. These people . . . have no right to live in this region. Modern Armenia was built on historical Azerbajani lands. I think that in 25–30 years its territory will again come under Azerbaijan’s jurisdiction.” (RFE/RL, August 4, 2004)
- In 2002, asked if the Azeri army is “ready to go to [the Armenian capital] Yerevan,” Abiyev replied: “We can go even farther.” (Azerbaijan News Service via BBC Monitoring, March 22, 2002)
- In 2001 “The Armenian state was created on occupied Azeri lands.” (Azerbaijan News Service, December 7, 2001)

Baku Mayor Hajibala Abutalybov on Armenians;

- In 2005, at a meeting with a municipal delegation from Bavaria, Germany “Our goal is the complete elimination of Armenians. You, Nazis, already eliminated the Jews in the 1930s and 40s, right? You should be able to understand us.” (Realny Azerbaijan, February 17, 2006)

Written Responses from the Honorable Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, to Questions Submitted for the Record by the Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida

The North Caucasus
(Territory Within the Russian Federation)

Question:
Do the international terrorist group Al Qaeda and its affiliates and similar organizations consider the North Caucasus, a part of Russia, to be an important region in their global efforts?

Response:
In the first Chechen war (1994-1996) and the early years of the second Chechen war (2000-2005), there is evidence that international terrorist organizations, like Al Qaeda and its affiliates, considered the region to be an important area in their global efforts. There are indications that this importance has declined in recent years. Al Qaeda and its affiliates now appear to be more interested in participating in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Question:
Please comment on the current situation in the North Caucasus region of Russia. There appears to be a brewing Islamist insurgency in Dagestan and other parts of that region. How do alleged links that Al Qaeda has with the Islamist insurgents in parts of the North Caucasus affect US relations with the Russian Government? For example, are we disregarding the tactics Russia may wish to use in dealing with that threat—even if the tactics it chooses (such as brutal repression of the population) may ultimately prove to be counter-productive?

Response:
We are following the situation in the North Caucasus region closely. The level of violence, including kidnappings and killings by both government and anti-government forces, declined in Chechnya in 2007, but there has been a steady level of violence in 2008. At the same time, violence has increased in the neighboring republics of Dagestan and Ingushetia.

The United States Government condemns terrorism, and we work together with the Government of Russia to combat international terrorism through fora such as our bilateral Counter Terrorism Working Group.

The human rights situation in the North Caucasus remains poor and is an issue of concern for the U.S. Government. Our counterterrorism cooperation with Russia does not diminish our concerns about its human rights practices. We remain deeply concerned about the human rights violations committed by the Russian government in the North Caucasus and agree that these can be counterproductive. We have
Annex 3

Tofik Veliyev et al., *History of Azerbaijan, 10* (Casioglu 2009)
(certified translation from Russian)
STATE OF NEW YORK 

COUNTY OF NEW YORK 

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that the attached translation is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a true and accurate translation from Russian into English of the attached excerpt from History of Azerbaijan.

Ethan Ly, Managing Editor
Lionbridge

Sworn to and subscribed before me

JEFFREY AARON CURETON
NOTARY PUBLIC-STATE OF NEW YORK
No. 01CU618973
Qualified in New York County
My Commission Expires 09-23-2023
HISTORY OF AZERBAIJAN

Textbook for schools

Approved by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Azerbaijan
(Order No. 1138 dated December 11, 2000)

Under the general editorship of Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor Tofik Veliyev

CASI OGLU
2009
CHRONOLOGY

February 6–9, 1905  Massacre of Azerbaijanis in Baku, committed by Armenians with encouragement from the ruling elite of Russia
February 26, 1905  Restoration of the Caucasian governorship
November 25, 1905  Creation of the Baku Council of Workers’ Deputies

§45. Ethnic massacre policy pursued by the tsarist regime in Azerbaijan

_Ethnic massacre policy pursued by the Russian Empire in 1905–1906_  The authorities drafted a plan of action to provoke an ethnic massacre in Azerbaijan. The implementation of this plan was entrusted to Nakashidze, the Governor of Baku.

In the ethnic massacre organized by the tsarist regime in Azerbaijan in 1905–1906, the Dashnaks were just the visible part of the iceberg. In reality, this massacre was a campaign prepared and implemented at the level of the state. It was drafted by the tsar and his high-ranking officials in the South Caucasus.

_Armenians as the perpetrators of the ethnic massacre policy_  A decisive role in the implementation of the government’s ethnic massacre policy was played by the Dashnaks and Armenian criminals. In 1905–1906, 500 crimes were recorded as having been committed by Armenian criminals and terrorists against Muslims. Despite the fact that the Armenians had taken up arms in advance, knew how to use weapons and were experienced in military matters, it was they who incurred more losses in the fighting, often fled the battlefield and suffered defeat.

The Armenians hit on the idea of gaining autonomy in the South Caucasus as well. The idea had been dreamt up by the ultra-nationalist writer, Artsurini. Following Artsurini’s death, his inglorious successors returned to this idea several times at various points. To achieve their dirty goals, they relied most of all on support from Russia.

? What was the aim of the Russian ruling elite in organizing the ethnic massacre?

? What goal were the Armenians pursuing in coming out with the delusion of creating the state of “Armenia”, which had never existed in history?
The wily and corrupt Armenians deceived them by concluding an armistice in one district and orchestrating a massacre in another. Our eternal enemies, the Armenian nationalists, tightened their ranks using Armenian volunteer fighters invited from Iran and the Ottoman Empire. Notwithstanding that, the Armenians’ losses were more tangible. The main reason for this was the bravery and heroism of the Azerbaijani youth. The legendary gachgas especially distinguished themselves in the battles with the Armenians.

Armenians’ atrocities in Baku, Nakhichevan, Irevan, Tiflis and Zangezur In early February 1905, on the eve of the ethnic massacre in Baku, the Armenians zealously spread the view that the Muslims were bloodthirsty and savage. They used all their resources and the dirtiest of methods to banish the Azerbaijaniis from their homes. On 2 February, on the instructions of the Armenian committee, an Azerbaijani named Agarza was killed. The police closed their eyes to this. Soon afterwards, a second crime was committed. An Armenian soldier, who was escorting a Muslim prisoner for questioning, shot him along the way. These murders were committed according to a pre-prepared plan, and were the first sparks for the start of the mass slaughter. That same day, an Armenian and a Russian were killed. Fierce fighting broke out between Armenians and Azerbaijaniis. Buildings were destroyed and citizens’ property was looted. The Governor, despite having sufficient resources, was in no hurry to stop the slaughter. As a result of the ethnic violence that continued in Baku from February 6–10, the number of those killed exceeded 1,000.

For their defeat in Baku, the Armenians decided to take revenge on the Azerbaijaniis in Nakhichevan. They subjected the Muslims [...]
ИСТОРИЯ
АЗЕРБАЙДЖАНА
10
Учебник для общеобразовательных школ

Утвержден Министерством Образования
Азербайджанской Республики

Под общей редакцией доктора исторических наук,
профессора Тофика Велиева

ÇASIYÖGLU
2009
ХРОНОЛОГИЯ

6–9 февраля 1905 г. — Геноцид азербайджанцев в Баку, совершенный армянами с поощрения правящих кругов России.
26 февраля 1905 г. — Восстановление Кавказского наместничества.

§ 45. Политика национальной резни, проводимая царизмом в Азербайджане

Политика национальной резни, проводимая Российской империей в 1905-1906 гг.

Власти были подготовлены план мероприятий для проведения национальной резни в Азербайджане. Осуществление этого плана было возложено на Бакинского губернатора Накапидахье.

В национальной резне, организованной царизмом в Азербайджане в 1905-1906 годах, дашнаки были лишь видимой частью айсберга. В действительности же, это резня была акцией, подготовленной и осуществленной на государственном уровне. Она была подготовлена царем и его высокопоставленными чиновниками, находящимися на Южном Кавказе.

Армяне как исполнители политики национальной резни В реализации правительственноной политики национальной резни решающую роль играли партии Дашнакцутюн и армянские бандиты. В 1905-1906 годах была зарегистрирована 500 преступлений, совершенных армянскими бандитами и террористами против мусульман. Несмотря на то, что армяне заранее вооружились, умели пользоваться оружием и имели опыт в военном деле, именно они несли в боях большее потерь, часто убегали с поля боя и терпели поражение.

Армяне загорели идеей получения автономии и на Южном Кавказе. Автором идеи являлся ультра — националист, писатель Арцрунин. После смерти Арцрунин, его бессаляые преемники в разные периоды несколько раз возвращались к этой идее. Для достижение своих грязных целей они больше всего надеялись на поддержку России.
Хитрые и продажные армяне обманывали их, заключая перемирие в одном уезде, устраивая резню в другом. Наши извечные врачи армянские националисты укрепляли свои ряды за счет армян-добровольцев, приглашенных из Ирана и Османской империи. Несмотря на это, потери армян были более ощутимыми. Основной причиной этого были храбрость и героизм азербайджанской молодежи. В боях с армянами особо отличались легендарные гачаги.

В начале февраля 1905 года, накануне национальной резни в Баку, армяне усердно распространяли мнение о кровожадности и дикости мусульман. Они использовали все средства и самые грызные методы для изгнания азербайджанцев из их родных очагов. 2 февраля по указанию армянского комитета был убит азербайджанец по имени Агарева. Полиция закрыла глаза на этот факт. Вскоре было совершено второе преступление. Солдат-армянин, конвоировавший заключенного-мусульманина на допрос, по дороге застрелил его. Эти убийства были совершены по заранее подготовленному плану и стали первыми искрами для начала массовой резни. В тот же день были убиты один армянин и один русский. Начались ожесточенные бои между армянами и азербайджанцами. Разрушились дома, разграблялось имущество граждан. Губернатор, располагавший достаточными силами, не торопился прекратить резню. В результате погромов родопожжкающихся в Баку с 6 по 10 февраля – с числа убитых превысило тысячи человек.

За поражение в Баку армяне решили отомстить азербайджанцам в Нахчыване. Они подвергли мусульманские
Annex 4

“Azerbaijani authorities deny Richard Kirakosyan a visa, declaring him a persona non grata,” *Panorama* (19 March 2012) (certified translation from Russian)
STATE OF NEW YORK

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

SS

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that the attached translation is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a true and accurate translation from Russian into English of the attached article titled “Azerbaijani authorities deny Richard Kirakosyan a visa, declaring him a persona non grata.”

Lynda Green, Senior Managing Editor
Lionbridge

Sworn to and subscribed before me

JEFFREY AARON CURETON
NOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF NEW YORK
No. 01CU6168789
Qualified in New York County
My Commission Expires 09-23-2023

259 W 30th Street, 1st Floor New York, NY 10001 +1.212.631.7432
Azerbaijani authorities deny Richard Kirakosyan a visa, declaring him a persona non grata

Richard Kirakosyan, Director of the Regional Studies Center, was denied an Azerbaijani visa to attend an international conference held in Baku. Communicating on his Facebook page with the Finnish party in charge of organizing Kirakosyan’s visit to the event, Kirakosyan wrote that the Azerbaijani official authorities explained the reason for the visa denial. It turned out that the choice of the Armenian expert is “unacceptable.” The Azerbaijani government authorities declined to further comment on why R. Kirakosyan’s visit to Baku is “undesirable.” Yet, after the incident gained publicity online and bearing in mind that Kirakosyan is an American citizen, the Azerbaijani party hurried to explain that they had made their own choice of an Armenian expert whom they want to see in Baku. That expert is Asbed Kotchikian, a professor from Bentley University. However, there is no information that A. Kotchikian was granted an Azerbaijani visa, either.
Власти Азербайджана отказали Ричарду Киракосяну в выдаче визы и объявили его «нежелательной» персоной

Директору Центра региональных исследований Ричарду Киракосяну отказали в выдаче азербайджанской визы для участия в международной конференции в Баку. Как сообщил сам Р. Киракосян на своей странице в Facebook, финской стороне, ответственной за организацию визита Р. Киракосяна на данное мероприятие, официальные структуры Азербайджана объявили причину отказа в визе. Оказалось, что кандидатура армянского эксперта «неприемлема». Госструктуры Азербайджана воздержались от дальнейших разъяснений ситуации вокруг «нежелательности» визита Р. Киракосяна в Баку.

Однако после того, как в интернете данный инцидент вызвал широкий резонанс, учитывая наличие у Киракосяна американского гражданства, азербайджанская сторона поспешила оправдаться, мол, они сами выбрали эксперта от армянской стороны, которого хотят видеть на конференции у себя в Баку. Им стал Асбет Котчичян - преподаватель университета Бентли. Однако также нет информации о получении азербайджанской визы А. Котчикиным.
Annex 5

“Female passionarity and desire to participate in the ‘fight against the Armenians’ has risen dramatically in Azerbaijan,” *Panorama* (27 March 2014) (certified translation from Russian)
STATE OF NEW YORK

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that the attached translation is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a true and accurate translation from Russian into English of the attached article titled “Female passionarity and desire to participate in the “fight against the Armenians” has risen dramatically in Azerbaijan.”

Lynda Green, Senior Managing Editor
Lionbridge

Sworn to and subscribed before me

JEFFREY AARON CURETON
NOTARY PUBLIC - STATE OF NEW YORK
No. 01CU6168799
Qualified in New York County
My Commission Expires 09-23-2023
Female passionarity and desire to participate in the “fight against the Armenians” has risen dramatically in Azerbaijan

Panorama.am publishes excerpts from “Armenophobia in Azerbaijan,” a book by A. Adibekyan and A. Elibegova

Chapter 16. Women in the formation of Armenophobia

For social and cultural reasons, the woman—mother, educator, teacher—plays the primary role in the process of educating generations.

In Azeri society, women have historically been the keepers of the traditions which, in the household and family setting, continue to cultivate values (such is the case, by the way, in all countries of the East). How the members of society turn out is largely dependent on the education and spiritual and moral potential of the woman and her activity as an educator. It is primarily under her influence that a person takes shape conforming to moral requirements, culture, world view and behavior.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has altered the perception of the world and the system of values of Azeri society. There has been a dramatic rise in female passionarity and desire to take part in the “fight against the Armenians.” Moreover, this is specifically about the ethnic unit rather than the citizens of Armenia or those who are personally responsible for people’s ostensible or actual suffering.

“I would rather go to war than wait another 20 years,” said 34-year-old Shafag Ismailova, a sniper student and refugee. “War is bad for everyone. But sometimes the situation requires it.”

Generally speaking, the instilment of xenophobia through the lips of women takes place according to the classic scenario adopted by the official ideology, the only difference being that in its female embodiment it is more emotional in nature and stands at the very sources of personality formation.

Eludzha Amaly. Explanations for little Fidan

Little Fidan asked out of the blue:

…

– Then why do we call them (Armenians) “mundar” (dirty, filthy)?

Her age, 4 years, didn’t allow me to gather my thoughts and answer correctly. Given her age, I chose my words carefully and said:

– You see, little one, when a person has a filthy and vile heart, it spreads to the entire body through the blood. And however much they wash their hands and face, they don’t get clean. For not all kinds of dirt can be washed off with water.

The woman’s influence on future generations is shaped by the laying of the foundation of the child’s socialization and social adaptation.

Umm el Banin: On holidays we would play our favorite game—Armenian massacre. Whipped up by racism, we would lose our head and sacrifice Tamara to our hostility and hatred handed down from
our ancestors. First we would accuse her for no good reason of killing Tatars and would happily shoot her multiple times. We would revel in the sight of her blood, and then, in order to kill her in the customary way, we would resurrect her, bind her hands and feet, throw her to the ground, cut off her tongue and head to start with to show our hatred for her Armenian body, and cut out her heart and internal organs and throw them to the dogs. After that, as our wild fury cooled down and there was not a shred of the poor girl left, we would begin to dance around her body like wild men, swinging our wooden swords. As soon as anyone walked by, we would immediately raise Tamara to her feet with her tongue dry from fear, grab her by the hand and whirl her around the garden, singing children’s songs. It never occurred to her to complain about us because then we would poke fun at her as a tattletale, traitor and dirty Armenian, and she would lose us. However much we insulted, humiliated and permanently killed her, she could no longer live without our friendship.

In the new Azeri society with its distorted value system, children are brought up according to the new philosophy of patriotism embodied in the dictum “if you love your Homeland, hate Armenians.” The foundations of socialization are laid in early childhood, beginning with the shaping of attitudes to your peers, and the perception and awareness of self.

**Sevindzh Parvana. Off-the-cuff (on the fly) interview**
(Nursery rhyme in the form of a dialog. For children 5–12 years)

– Don’t cry, dear daughter. Let Armenian infants cry
– Mama, and where are they, the Armenian infants?
– In the pit of hell
– And why let them cry? Don’t you pity them?
– No I don’t. Let a snake bite them if I’m lying
– Infaaaants???

…
– Mama, I want to play with Armenian children, eheheh…
…
– No, eh, no... I want to [play] with Armenian children
– You can’t dear daughter. They are far away from us
– How far? In hell?
– Yes, in hell
…
– So where are the children themselves? Mama, may I play with them?
– No, dear daughter. They are bad children. We can’t go to them. They will take away your toys and break them
– What, don’t they have their own toys?
– They do. But they will want your toys. That’s why they’re bad, yes
– And I’ll give them [to them], let them play. Later they’ll return [them]
– They won’t. They won’t want to. They don’t return what they take
– Then I won’t give them [to them]

_Baku. 2009_
Socialization includes the process of laying the foundation of the mindsets, precepts, and guidance that shape the program for all of later life.

**G. Ibragimova.** I will tell my son the whole truth, I’ll not hide anything. I’ll say “sonny, learn to distinguish good from bad. And remember that each nationality has good and bad; but Armenians are the only nationality in the world that has no good, or there are only a few of them. Speaking to a person that he did not like, A.S. Pushkin, the great poet loved by the whole world, would berate them with the words “You are an Armenian!”

And the main, third admonition will be this:

“My son, hear and remember, Armenians are our blood enemies. Don’t leave the enemy unavenged! If you meet an Armenian even in the most civilized country in the world, treat him like a creature that drank the blood of your people! Don’t ever forgive the enemy! If you do, may the bread of your Homeland, your father’s blood, and your mother’s milk be cursed for you!!!”

Amazingly, the author of these lines quite sincerely considers herself a concerned and tolerant person.

<…>you call me a chauvinist, accuse me of offending the whole Armenian people. A writer who accuses an entire people only diminishes herself. A concerned person will never allow herself to accuse an entire people. In my compositions I am only calling on the children of my people to be vigilant and stay away from Armenians.

The next stage of the formation of Armenophobia in Azerbaijan is influence on young people based on the natural fears already embedded in childhood. The main message: “Armenians are taking our places,” “they bewitch our men,” “Armenians are ugly and rowdy.” In other words, classic demonization and dehumanization of Armenians.

Chinara Vyugar: <…>a mother once used to finance Armenians, and now she was marrying off her daughter, and fearfully crying her heart out, said—God forbid her fiancé should find out. <…>I was horrified and thought how many people do we have in Azerbaijan whose courageous blood has mixed with base blood ... <…> Ramil Safarov hacked an Armenian officer to death with an axe. The people supported him at first and then forgot. When Eynulla Fatullayev was in prison, those who were worried about him numbered much more than those who cared about Ramil Safarov, who murdered the Armenian lackey. <…> So, for example, all the property of ex-Baku mayor Rafael Allakverdiev went to the Armenian woman and whatever is left will go to her surviving daughter? <…> in school, the subject of Azeri language and literature is taught by two female teachers of Armenian origin. They say that the principal of the above-mentioned school is also of Armenian origin, and although it has been written about in the newspapers and online, we can’t do anything about it. We only know that the school is indeed being destroyed because of the principal’s point of view. In the massage parlors near the “May 28” subway station, many hostesses are also of Armenian origin. These Armenian women are getting Azeri women involved in fornication.<…> We hear a lot about Armenian women. The daughter of an Armenian senator leads a dissolute life. The daughter of the Armenian singer Cher has had a sex change, and that’s not all. Armenians living in Azerbaijan have plastic surgery done on their noses. Plastic surgeons circumcise Armenian noses and turn [them] into Muslims. Nor does the Armenian constitution ban prostitution. Actually,
women of that nationality are prostitutes, and the men are “glamour boys.”
The MNB [Ministry of National Security] should set up a separate agency to investigate the population for the presence of Armenian blood. For example, parents who want to marry off their daughters or sons could contact that agency to find out whether there are blood ties with Armenians among the future relatives. And maybe then we will be able to cleanse our blood from mixing with foul Armenian blood.

A statement by the singer Zeinab Khanlarova, a People’s Artist of Azerbaijan and Armenia, commenting on the barbaric ethnically-motivated murder by Ramil Safarov, is an eloquent example of dehumanization—a frank expression of contempt and willingness to support and commit atrocities.

“He (Ramil Safarov) is a hero not only of Azerbaijan, but of the whole world. Monuments should be erected to him. Not every man could have done what he did. There are two heroes: one is Mr. Ilham Aliyev and the other is Ramil Safarov. If I were in Ramil’s place, I would have done the same thing. He took the life of an Armenian and did the right thing.”

Along with all the foregoing, the status of the woman, mother and authoritative member of the community is used to marginalize association with Armenians:

**People’s Artist of Azerbaijan Nazperi Dosteliyeva:** I can’t bring myself to call people who carry on friendly correspondence with enemies devoid of humanity Azeris. I don’t know who they are. But as a citizen of my homeland, as a mother, and, most importantly, as a People’s Artist of Azerbaijan, I will not forgive these people.”

**Khalida Bayramova, Chair of the Sabail District Commission for the Protection of the Rights and Affairs of Minors:** “Maybe steps should be taken for the sake of future peace, but I’m against friendship with the Armenians because someone who was once a betrayer will never become a friend, and should unequivocally be considered an enemy. What the Armenians did in Azerbaijan cannot be forgotten, plus they feel only enmity for us. There is a concept called “pathological hatred” and that’s the hatred I have for Armenians. For an Azeri or a Turk, there can be no such thing as a good Armenian. Maybe it’s not right, but that’s what I think!”

**Subject material:**
- Esoterica and conspiracy theories hold a special place in the process of proving the harmful role of Armenians in Azerbaijan
- In modern Azeri society evil is the Armenians and good is those who fight against them
- From the standpoint of Azeri public figures, the outside world underestimates and misunderstands “the true essence of Armenians”
- The restoration of Armenian architectural monuments in Azerbaijan was carried out with a view of destroying the traces of Armenians
- The mythologization of genocides is a product of the culture of modern Azeri society and a manifestation of covert aggression
В Азербайджане резко возросла женская пассионарность и стремление принять участие в «борьбе с армянами»

Panorama.am публикует выдержки из книги А. Адибекян и А. Элибеговой «Армянофобия в Азербайджане».

Глава 16. Женщины в формировании армянофобии

В силу социокультурных особенностей основную роль в рамках воспитательного процесса поколений осуществляют женщины – мать, воспитатель, педагог.

В азербайджанском обществе женщины исторически являются хранителями традиций, которые в бытовых и семейных условиях продолжают культивировать ценности (впрочем, такая картина характерна для всех стран Востока). То, какими будут члены общества, во многом обусловлено степенью образованности, духовного, нравственного потенциала женщины и ее воспитательной деятельности. В первую очередь под ее воздействием формируется человек, соответствующий нравственным требованиям, культуре, мировоззрению и поведению.

Нагорно-карабахский конфликт внес свои коррективы в мировосприятие и систему ценностей азербайджанского общества. Резко возросла женская пассионарность и стремление принять участие в «борьбе с армянами». Причем речь идет именно об этнической единице, а не гражданах Армении или тех, кто несет персональную ответственность за мнимые или реальные страдания людей.

«Я лучше пойду на войну, чем ждать еще 20 лет», – сказала 34-летняя Шафаг Исмаилова, учащаяся снайперских курсов, беженка. «Война – это плохо для всех. Но иногда ситуация ее требует».

В целом насаждение ксенофобии устами женщин происходит по классическому сценарию, принятому на вооружение официальной идеологией, с той лишь разницей, что в женском исполнении это носит более эмоциональный характер и стоит у самых истоков формирования личности.

Элджа Аталь. Пояснения для маленькой Фидан

Маленькая Фидан вдруг спросила:

– Ее возраст, 4 года, не позволял мне собраться с мыслями и правильно ответить.

– Ведь вода не всюду грязь смывает.

Воздействие женщины на будущее поколения формируется посредством закладывания основ социализации и социальной адаптации ребенка.

Умм эль Банин: В праздничные дни мы играли в нашу любимую игру – армянскую резню.

Возбужденные от расизма, мы теряли голову и приносили Тамару в жертву нашей вражде и
ненависти, передавшейся нам от предков. Сначала мы ее бесосновательно обвиняли в убийстве татар и с удовольствием несколько раз расстреливали ее. Мы упивались видом ее крови, а потом, чтобы убить ее обцепрятным способом, вновь воскрешали, связывали ей руки и ноги, бросали на землю, отрезали ей сначала язык, голову, чтобы показать нашу ненависть к ее армянскому телу, выбрасывали сердце и внутренние органы и бросали собакам. После того, как наша дикая ярость остыла, и от бедной девочки не оставалось ни куска, мы начали танцевать вокруг ее тела, как дикари, взмахивая нашими деревянными мечами. Как только поблизости кто-то проходил, мы сразу поднимали на ноги Тамару, с отсеченным от страха языком, хватали ее за руку и крутились по саду, распевая детские песенки. Она даже не думала жаловаться на нас, потому что потом мы ее дразнили бы стукачкой, предателем и грызной армянкой, и она бы лишилась нас. Сколько бы мы ни оскорбляли, унижали и перманентно ни убивали ее, она больше не могла жить без дружбы с нами.

В новом азербайджанском обществе с его искаженной системой ценностей дети получают воспитание согласно новой философии патриотизма, воплощенного в тезисе «любишь Родину – ненавидь армян».

Основы социализации закладываются в раннем детстве, начиная с формирования отношений со сверстниками, восприятия и осознания собственного Я.

Севиндж Павана. Беседа на ходу (мимоходом)
(Рассказ-стишок в виде диалога. Для детей 5-12 лет)
– Не плачь, доченька. Пусть плачут армянские младенцы
– Мама, а где они, армянские младенцы?
– На самом дне ада
– А почему пусть плачут? Разве не жалко?
– Нет, не жалко. Пусть змея ужалит их, если лгу
– Младенцевеевеев???
...
– Мама, я хочу играть с армянскими детьми, эээ...
...
– Нет, э, нет... я хочу с армянскими детьми
– Нельзя доченька. Они далеко от нас
– Как далеко? В аду?
– Да, в аду
...
– Тогда где сами дети? Мама, можно я поиграю с ними?
– Нет, доченька. Они плохие дети. Мы не можем пойти к ним. Они отберут твои игрушки и разломают
– А что, у них нет своих игрушек?
– Есть. Но они захотят твои игрушки. Поэтому и плохие, да
– А я дам, пусть поиграют. Потом вернут
– Не вернут. Не захотят. Они не возвращают то, что берут
– Тогда не дам
Баку. 2009 г
Социализация включает в себя процесс закладывания установок, заветов и наставлений, формирующих программу на всю дальнейшую жизнь.

Г. Ибрагимова. Я скажу сыну всю правду, ничего не скрою. Скажу, что «сынок, научись различать хорошее от плохого. И помни, что в каждой нации есть хорошие и плохие, армяне же единственная нация в мире, не имеющая хороших, или же их единицы. Любимый всем миром великий поэт А.С. Пушкин, обращаясь к непонравившемуся ему человеку, ругался словами «Ты – армянин».

А главное, третье наставление, будет следующее: «Сын мой, услышь и запомни, армяне наши кровные враги. Не оставляй врага неотомщенным. Если встретишь армянина даже в самой цивилизованной стране мира, отнесись к нему как к созданию, выпившему кровь твоего народа. Никогда не прощай врага. Если простишь, пусть будут прокляты для тебя хлеб Родины, Отцовская кровь, и Материнское молоко.»

Удивительно, но автор этих строк совершенно искренне считает себя со знательным и толерантным человеком.

<...> вы меня называете шовинисткой, обвиняете в оскорблении всего армянского народа. Писатель, обвиняющий весь народ, всего лишь принуждает себя. Сознательный человек никогда не позволит себе обвинать весь народ. Я в своих произведениях всего лишь признаю детей моего народа быть бдительными и держаться подальше от армян.

Следующий этап формирования армянофобии в Азербайджане – воздействие на молодежь, основанное на естественных страхах, заложенных уже в детстве. Основной посыл: «армяне занимают наши места», «околодовывают наших мужчин», «армяне уродливы и беспутны».

Иными словами, классическая форма демонизации и дегуманизации армян.

Чинара Вюгар: <...> мать в свое время финансировала армян, и сейчас она выдавала свою дочь замуж, при этом с опаской распивая слезами, говорила – не дай бог жене узнает.

<...> я пришла в ужас и подумала, сколько же у нас в Азербайджане людей, чья мужественная кровь смешалась с собачьей кровью... <...> Рамиль Сафаров зарубил топором армянского офицера. Вначале народ его поддержал, а потом забыл. Когда Эйнулла Фатуллаев находился в заключении, тех, у кого болела душа за него, было гораздо больше, чем за убившего армянского холопа Рамиля Сафарова. <...> Так, к примеру, все имущество экс-мэра Баку Рафаэля Аллахвердияева перешло армянской женщине и то, что осталось должно перейти оставшейся от нее дочери? <...> в школе предме тазербайджанский язык и литература ведут две учительницы, армяки по происхождению. Говорят, что директор в вышеупомянутой школе тоже по происхождению армянин, и , хотя в газетах и в интернете об этом написано, мы ничего не можем с этим сделать. Мы знаем только то, что, в самом деле, из-за позиции директора школа уничтожается. В массажных салонах, которые находятся около станции метро «28 мая», многие хозяйки также являются армянками по происхождению. Эти армянки вешают азербайджанок в разгаре. <...> Мы много слов слышал об армянских женщинах. Дочь армянского сенатора ведет распутную жизнь. Дочь армянской певицы Шер поменяла пол, и это ещё не все.

Живущие в Азербайджане армяне делают пластические операции на носы. Пластические хирурги делают обрезание на армянских носах и превращают в мусульман. Армянская конституция тоже не запрещает проституцию. На самом деле, женщина этой
национальности — проститутка, а мужчины — «красавцы».
В структуре МНБ необходимо создать отдельную структуру, которая занималась бы
расследованием среди населения на наличие армянской крови. К примеру, родители,
которые хотят женить или выдать замуж своих детей, могли бы обратиться в эту
структуру с запросом, есть ли среди будущих родственников кровные связи с армянами. И
может тогда мы сможем очистить нашу кровь от смешения с поганой армянской кровью.
Красноречивым примером декуманизации — открытого выражения презрения и готовности
поддерживать и совершать зверства — является заявление народной артистки Азербайджана
и Армении, певицы Зейнаб Ханларовой, комментирующей зверское убийство на этнической
почве Рамилем Сафаровым.

«Он (Рамиль Сафаров) — герой не только Азербайджана, но и всего мира. Необходимо
возводить ему памятники. Не каждому мужчине под силу совершить то, что сделал он.
Есть два героя: один господин Илхам Алиев и другой — Рамил Сафаров. Если бы я была
на месте Рамиля, сделала бы то же самое. Отнял жизнь у армянина, правильно и сделал»
Наряду со всем вышеуказанным статус женщины, матери и авторитетного члена
сообщества используется в целях маргинализации общения с армянами:

Народная артистка Азербайджана Назлери Досталиева: У меня язык не повернется
назвать азербайджанцами лиц, находящихся в дружеской переписке с врагами, которым
чужда человечность. Я не знаю, кто они. Но как граждanka своей родины, как мать и, самое
главное, как народная артистка Азербайджана, я не прошу этих людей».

Председатель Комиссии по защите прав и делам несовершеннолетних Сабаильского
района Баку Халида Байрамова: «Может быть, ради будущего мира следует делать
какие-то шаги, но я против дружбы с армянами, потому что однажды предавший никогда
не станет другом, и его однозначно следует считать врагом. То, что сделали армяне в
Азербайджане, невозможно забыть, да и они к нам испытывают исключительно вражеские
чувства. Существует понятие «патологическая ненависть» — так вот, у меня к армянам
именно такая ненависть. Не может быть хорошего армянина для азербайджанца или
турка. Может это неправильно, но я так считаю».

Материалы по теме:
Эзотерика и теории заговора занимают особое место в процессе доказательства
вредительской роли армян в Азербайджане
В современном азербайджанском обществе зло — армяне, а добро — те, кто ведет с ними
борьбу
С точки зрения азербайджанских деятелей, внешний мир недооценивает и недопонимает
«истинную сущность армян»
В Азербайджане реставрация армянских памятников архитектуры проводилась с расчетом
полного уничтожения следов армян
Мифологизация геноцидов является продуктом культуры современного азербайджанского
общества и проявлением скрытой агрессии
Annex 6

Elvin Yusifli, “The Challenges of Grant and NGO Laws in Azerbaijan’s Civil Society: Prospects For A Viable Path Forward,” ISSICEU Policy Brief, Khazar University Baku (December 2016)
THE CHALLENGES OF GRANT AND NGO LAWS IN AZERBAIJAN'S CIVIL SOCIETY: PROSPECTS FOR A VIABLE PATH FORWARD

Elvin Yusifli

The policy brief analyses the implications of the in 2013-2015 revised legislation governing the activities of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Azerbaijan. These changes subjected many aspects of the NGOs’ operations to bureaucratic fiats and significantly reduced the relative freedom they had previously. The EU should put efforts into reversing the restrictions. To improve its leverage in Azerbaijan the EU should capitalize on the momentum for policy reforms prompted by Azerbaijan’s deepening economic woes.

INTRODUCTION

Azerbaijan’s civil society underwent dramatic tribulations over the last three years. Hastily amended NGO and grant regulations radically reshaped the operational space for local and international civil society organizations (CSOs). This was followed by a purge initiated by the government against its critics—journalists, human rights activists and advocacy groups.

Through a series of legislative changes made from 2013 to 2015, the government tightened its control over the local and international NGOs and the foreign funding of non-governmental activities in Azerbaijan. The new legislation introduced, inter alia, a new set of rules for registering the NGOs’ grant agreements financed from abroad (including sub-grant agreements and service contracts), obtaining the right as a foreign donor to give a grant in Azerbaijan and submitting information about the donations received by the
NGOs. The new rules apply to all NGOs operating in Azerbaijan, including the foreign NGOs’ branch or representation (hereinafter “local branch”).

Altogether, there were 26 amendments, which imposed additional responsibilities on the NGOs and harshened the penalties for their failure to comply with the need of new requirements. Together, these changes subjected many aspects of the NGOs’ operations to bureaucratic drags and significantly reduced the relative freedom they had previously enjoyed.

THE RULES ON GRANTS

The harshest among the amendments involve the NGOs’ access to foreign grants. The complex rules require both the foreign donor and the local NGO to go through a number of procedures to register their grant agreement.

The government’s overhaul of the grant regulations proved to be a long process. The Cabinet of Ministers approved the new rules of registering grants more than a year after the previous rules were abolished. In the meantime, the registration of new grant agreements was put on hold. As will be further discussed later, the work on the rules dealing with foreign donors is still unfinished. As a result, many grant agreements remain unresolved to this day.

The new rules include two separate procedures: one for foreign donors, who must obtain the right to give a grant in Azerbaijan, and the other for the local NGO, which must register the grant. Only after the NGO receives a notification from the Ministry of Justice confirming the registration can it engage in grant-related activities.

The NGOs may face heavy fines for failing to comply with the new grant rules. For example, an NGO may be required to pay up to 3,800 euros for the failure to submit the new grant agreement to the Ministry of Justice for registration in a timely manner. The NGO may be fined up to 8,200 euros if it receives funds without registering the grant agreement. In addition to the NGOs, officials and natural persons involved in these violations are separately fined.

THE FOREIGN DONOR MUST OBTAIN THE RIGHT TO GIVE A GRANT IN AZERBAIJAN

Under the existing regulations, the foreign donor financing an NGO operating in Azerbaijan is required to apply to the Ministry of Finance to obtain the right to provide a grant. If the donor in question is a foreign NGO, then it is additionally required to sign an agreement with the Ministry of Justice to establish their local branch. In other words, only the foreign NGOs that have formally registered their local presence may give a grant to their local counterparts in Azerbaijan.

The amended Law on Grants states
that foreign institutions must obtain an authorization (hereinafter “donor’s permit”) for each grant they plan to provide in the territory of Azerbaijan. In order to obtain a donor’s permit, the foreign donor must submit a financial and economic justification for that grant. After having consulted other relevant state agencies, the Ministry of Finance decides whether the proposed grant qualifies as financially and economically expedient.

The rules fail to create a clear set of criteria which the Ministry of Finance would be required to use when evaluating grants. The rules thus allow the agency considerable latitude in judging a grant’s merits. Further limiting the chances of a successful application, the rules stipulate that the ministry shall consider the grant proposal as financially or economically not expedient if “the government is addressing the needs in the area of the grants.” Judging by the statements of the officials, this rule could imply that a grant may not be registered on the grounds that the state spends enough through development programs or public grants in the area of concern to the grant. For instance, Ali Huseynli, a member of parliament who has authored the amendments in question, sees no need for foreign donors’ involvement in areas such as legal reforms, anti-corruption policies, public services currently performed under ASAN service centers (a one-stop-shop for public services), etc. Mr. Huseynli argues that the government allocates sufficient resources for nonprofit activities in these areas and that there is no need for additional grants from abroad.

Needless to say, this obscure provision gives the government almost limitless flexibility in altering out politically unwelcome grants on the questionable grounds of the state’s involvement in areas of relevance to public policy. This provision raises the stakes for civil society by curtailing the ability of the NGOs and donors to attend to the problems on a need basis that is informed by the real concerns of the society. This stipulation may well give a glimpse of the role the country’s NGO community will be expected to play in the future.

The donor’s permit requirement applies to all organizations based abroad, including international organizations, foreign governments and public organizations as well as the locally registered branches of foreign legal entities. The latter also include the branches of the foreign NGOs which have signed the agreement with the government (the agreement with the Ministry of Justice mentioned earlier).

By 2016, the government realized that the new rules on donor’s permits were not a viable path forward. The growing backlash from international organizations and initiatives such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and Open Government Partnership, of which Azerbaijan is a member, forced the government into rethinking the framework of the new rules. In October 2016, President Aliyev signed a decree introducing the “single window” principle into the procedures of Azerbaijan’s foreign grant making. This step was taken just before the Astana Board meeting of EITI, during which the question about the suspension of Azerbaijan’s membership in the Initiative was high on the agenda. Since the decree is
a directive rather than a blueprint by itself, any attempt to predict the scope of its likely impact is guesswork but one can presume from the wording and the statements of the officials that it shall revise the cumbersome guidelines for the donor’s legislation to facilitate the process of grant issuance. In particular, the Ministry of Justice will now be a liaison between the NGOs and the other regulatory bodies which will deal with the registration of foreign grants.

THE FOREIGN NGOS MUST SIGN A SEPARATE AGREEMENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT TO BE ABLE TO FUND THEIR LOCAL COUNTERPARTS

A seemingly obscure clause of clarification inserted into Law on Grants has redefined the scope of the international, non-governmental donors’ funding of the local NGOs. The passage states that nonprofit organizations working in Azerbaijan may receive grants only from those international NGOs that have signed the agreement with the government. The agreement mentioned here is the one that the foreign NGOs are required to sign with the Ministry of Justice to establish their local branch.

Obviously, one of the challenges is the infeasibility of the idea that every international NGO interested in doing a project in Azerbaijan would be willing to set up a local office. However, even if that was the case, there is no guarantee that their readiness to sign the agreement would be reciprocated by the government. The central problem is the extensive discretionary powers that have been granted to state authorities in picking and choosing which foreign NGOs may work in Azerbaijan. The terms for their eligibility to operate a local branch are restrictive, and the success of any such intentions by the foreign NGOs depends on the goodwill of the government.

The Cabinet of Ministers approved Rules on Negotiating and Signing the Agreement, which require that the NGO in question must justify the need for its work and explain its value to Azerbaijani society in its application to the Ministry of Justice. Furthermore, the organization, if it succeeds in registering its branch in Azerbaijan, must satisfy a number of broadly defined conditions during its term of operation; the organization must “respect the national-moral values of Azerbaijani people,” “not (to) engage in political and religious propaganda,” etc. Amendments to the Law on NGOs, which evidently aim to limit the scope of the NGOs’ activities in the country, limit the number of the foreign NGOs’ branches in Azerbaijan to one.

Moreover, the deputy manager(s) of the foreign NGOs’ branch, along with the NGOs founded by foreigners (or stateless persons) and other foreign legal entities, must be Azeri nationals. Although the officials offer a patriotic line of reasoning for the inclusion of the latter provision into the law, it was presumably meant to keep better control of these organizations. If the organization for which the Azeri nationals work falls from grace with the government, they would be in
a more vulnerable position than foreigners and could be held accountable.

It had long been on the government’s agenda to establish a degree of control over the international NGOs operating in Azerbaijan. As the country entered a period of spontaneous protests in the post-Arab Spring fervor, more and more voices from within the government attributed this rise of discontent to attempts from abroad to destabilize politics in the country. The foreign NGOs working in Azerbaijan, such as the National Democratic Institute which for a while enjoyed relative freedom in its day-to-day operations, were increasingly targeted and denounced for allegedly being the lead instigators of the unrest. It was in this context that the prerequisite of the agreement to operate a local branch was made into law in 2011. A series of steps undertaken by the government to fill the loopholes from 2011 to 2013 gave way to a complete overhaul of the entire NGO/grant legislation after 2013.

THE NGOS MUST REGISTER THE INFORMATION ABOUT DONATIONS THEY RECEIVE WITH THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE

As is the case with grants, the NGOs can use donated funds only after receiving the notification from the ministry confirming their registration. The amount of the donation and the name of the person who made the donation must be presented to the ministry for registration. The recipient must submit the same information separately to the Ministry of Finance. As is the case with grants, the foreign NGOs may donate to local NGOs if they have signed the agreement with the government. Thus, the guidelines for all types of funding from abroad, including donations and service contracts, have been made difficult under the current legislation.

THE NGOS MAY FACE DISPROPORTIONATE PENALTIES FOR VIOLATING THE LAW

The amendments passed into law on December 17, 2013, also increased the financial and administrative penalties for the NGOs, and these penalties are disproportionately higher compared to sanctions for similar violations done by commercial organizations. These penalties pose a significant challenge to the NGOs because many of them fail to effectively deal with the growing complexity of the rules and regulations, and the loopholes in the laws make them susceptible to sanctions of various kinds by the state authorities. In addition to hefty fines, some of which were mentioned earlier, the amended Law on NGOs now contains more grounds for
closing down an organization for the period of one year upon the Ministry of Justice’s request to the court.

Previously, an NGO could be suspended for two reasons: first, if the Ministry of Justice had warned it more than twice a year (in writing) to address the shortcomings and, second, if the NGO “obstructed the elimination of the situation that has resulted in an emergency.”

With regard to the first reason, it should be added that the complexity of the rules governing the NGOs’ internal policies and procedures allows the ministry to find deficiencies in their operations on a regular basis. In other words, the NGOs are constantly a hair’s breadth away from being suspended. Regarding the second reason, it has presumably been included in the law as a punitive measure against the possibility of an NGO taking an active role in antigovernment activities. Now, an NGO may also be shut down if its executive body is found to have violated the rights of its members. Past experience shows that people affiliated with these organizations could face pressure from law enforcement agencies to implicate the NGOs in wrongdoing.

THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE WILL BE ABLE TO CONDUCT INSPECTIONS OF THE NGOS’ ACTIVITIES

Through another change to the Law on NGO, the Ministry of Justice has been granted the right to investigate the compatibility of an NGO’s activities with its statutes and the national law. The procedures for these investigations are laid down in the rules adopted by the ministerial collegium on December 28, 2015. There are concerns that the Ministry of Justice has strayed beyond the law’s scope by broadly formulating the grounds for launching an investigation and the procedures for conducting it. For example, one of the vaguely worded, yet potentially consequential provisions of the decision stipulates that the ministry may decide to probe into whether an NGO complies with relevant normative legal acts relevant to its activity. The wide array of gray areas in Azerbaijan’s laws enables the ministry officials to cite this provision to conduct their investigations on a whim.

The inspections look into such questions as whether an NGO’s operations conform to the organization’s statutes and comply with the respective legislation, and the inspections also extend to issues related to the NGO’s financial and administrative management. For instance, the inspections will ensure that the NGO’s revenues are spent in agreement with the organization’s goals, its annual financial reports are properly submitted to Ministry of Finance, it complies with the grant and accounting rules and its financial and economic activities are duly conducted.

These rules subordinate NGOs to onsite inspections (planned and random) that could last from 30 to 60 days. The ministry also instructs the NGOs to keep a separate record of the authorized copies of all internal documents for the ministerial inspections.
These rules serve as a quintessential example of regulatory overreach, and they risk curtailing the independence of NGOs in many, often unpredictable, ways. The investigations could be used as an instrument of applying pressure to them.

FROM PAPER TO PRACTICE

After the first round of amendments was passed by parliament in late 2013, the Ministry of Justice essentially suspended the procedures for registering NGOs. The failure of the efforts by a group of CSOs to dissuade the president’s office from signing these amendments into law and the subsequent approval of the amendments in February 2014 reinforced the growing anticipation of the government’s tightened grip over the NGOs. This anticipation was soon proven right when a letter from the Central Bank to commercial banks allegedly banning the transfer of funds to the bank accounts of the NGOs which had not registered with the Ministry of Justice was leaked to the internet.

Specifically, the letter’s instructions required the NGOs to submit an official notification confirming the legality of grant agreement from the Ministry of Justice to the commercial bank under which the banking transactions were performed. In practice, the injunction of the Central Bank led to a blanket refusal by commercial banks to perform any financial transactions for the NGOs, including the organizations which operated under previously registered grant agreements. In a clear breach of the law, the new regulations were retrospectively applied to this last category of organizations, too. The NGOs were asked to re-register their grants and present the new notification about the confirmation of the registry to the banks. Around the same time, the government’s tight control of the NGOs’ activities in the regions of Azerbaijan was taken to the next level as it became an unofficial requirement that the NGOs receive an official authorization from the presidential administration before they could undertake any action in the regions. In practice, the local executive authorities of many regions simply denied permission for a wide array of NGO-performed activities, bringing the day-to-day activities of NGOs to a near halt. To this day, NGOs face insurmountable barriers to their basic operations outside of Baku.

In a parallel development, businesses began to distance themselves from the NGOs, with which they had a history of cooperation. For instance, hotels refused to host the NGO-organized events and, to this day, continue to remain indisposed to associate with the NGOs. There are fewer venues willing to serve the NGOs, especially the organizations which are engaged in politically sensitive areas. However, economic challenges and the somewhat softened political context have slightly changed the attitudes of businesses in the capital.

While, at a general level, a wide variety of non-profit organizations saw their operations affected, it was a band of local and international organizations that were in the center of the political and judicial sanctions. The toughening of the laws
was accompanied by an unprecedented crackdown on the vocal representatives of the third sector. This crackdown included the representatives’ arrests on criminal charges and the subsequent crippling sanctions on the NGOs with which they were affiliated. Democracy activists, lawyers, journalists, politicians and religious activists, whose common denominator is their critical stance on the government’s policies, were put behind bars for what appeared to be politically motivated charges. The government has adamantly maintained that the regulations were not politically motivated and instead pointed to the problems of accountability and transparency in some Western-funded NGOs as the rationale for introducing the amendments. The government has also justified the punitive actions taken against the civil society activists on the basis of charges ranging from tax evasion, malfeasance and abuse of power to espionage and the unauthorized disclosure of state secrets.

The Civil Society Platform, a nascent civic initiative founded in February 2016 by a group of civic activists, researched the effects that the criminal investigations had on Azerbaijan’s NGOs. The study found that criminal cases launched against NGOs had not been closed, and the substantial financial penalties imposed on these organizations were still in effect. According to the report, a group of local NGOs were fined over 1 million AZN in total (about 500,000 euros at current exchange rates) in the aftermath of the investigation. The amount of financial penalties imposed on the international NGOs (as well as private institutions such as Chemonics International) together added up to over 3 million AZN (over 1.5 million euros). The study found that, in all instances, the penalties were justified by the failure of these organizations to register their grants with the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of Taxes considered the received funds as income rather than grants and subsequently claimed the recipients had failed to pay the 18% tax on these funds.

THE CIVIL SOCIETY’S DAY OF RECKONING

The measures made it harder, inter alia, for the NGOs to receive foreign grants and further tightened the regulations. The measures caught both the local NGOs and their international partners by surprise. This was not because the measures had been deemed implausible but rather because they seemed redundant in a society in which the political domain had already been strictly under the control of the state. While the government’s change of heart regarding the NGOs was a shock for many observers, it was not at all a secret that the country’s politics had taken a new course after a set of international and domestic developments had aggravated the government’s understanding of perceived threats to the political status quo.

The reverberations of the Arab Spring were felt in the upsurge of social-media-driven campaigns against human rights abuses, political repressions, corruption and other issues of social importance. The protests
against corruption and unemployment which emerged in Azerbaijan's regions were widely covered on such platforms as Facebook, Twitter, etc. The government's PR campaign abroad faced challenges, which cast a shadow on such high-profile pet projects as Eurovision and the European Games, from within the civil society. Perhaps the last straw was the monitoring of the activities of a local NGO which had called into question the legitimacy of the presidential elections held in the fall of 2013. Two activists from that same organization were later put behind bars, but now they are both free.

It soon came to the government's attention that some of these civic initiatives were funded through the projects financed by the international NGOs and quasi-state bodies. This fueled the narrative—or rather, the conspiracy theory—among the government's ideologues that there had been a concerted effort by Western governments, namely the US, and Azerbaijan's local critics to change the political status quo in Azerbaijan. Cherry-picking the anecdotal evidence of financial mismanagement, the law enforcement agencies scrambled to string together a conspiratorial narrative about the use of foreign grants for political activities, but lacking substantial proof, they instead brought charges of tax evasion and abuse of power against the NGO representatives.

It is because of these underlying political motives that the government's attempts to justify the stricter measures by citing the need for transparency failed to impress the civil society activists and Western governments. Additionally, the scale of the changes was disproportionate to the stated objective of increasing transparency and accountability in the NGOs. In fact, soon after the government amended the law on the NGOs in February 2014, it imposed a blanket ban on the registration of foreign grants while it followed through with a series of punitive actions against the country's leading critical voices in the NGOs and changed the rules regulating the NGOs' operations. Needless to say, the transparency argument was met with skepticism by the civic activists, who pointed to the thick cobweb of rules already in place that had subjected the NGOs to close scrutiny by tax and financial authorities. The transparency argument was built on the claim that some of the local NGOs had spent their foreign grants on unrelated purposes or had evaded their taxes. This obscure claim was not fully corroborated in the course of the far-reaching investigations, and eventually, the government and the individuals accused of tax evasion reached a settlement regarding the alleged tax debt.

**ACTIONS RESEMBLE A SHIFT OF PARADIGM FOR THE AZERBAIJANI GOVERNMENT**

The sudden outburst of anti-NGO/anti-liberalism discourse represented a paradigm shift for the government of Azerbaijan, which had always tried to project a semblance of democratic legitimacy to its Western audience. Azerbaijan's growing frustration...
with the criticism from Western institutions and their local partners from among the NGOs, dovetailed well into the already prevalent anti-liberal discourse among the political elite. The key assumption of the balanced foreign policy—which boiled down to an aspiration to integrate with Western institutions while avoiding taking a side in the geopolitical rivalries between the West and Azerbaijan’s neighbors, in particular, Russia—was jettisoned as the political realities of Azerbaijan increasingly resonated with a similar trend in Russian politics. The argument of national sovereignty essentially asking the Western governments not to interfere with the political developments inside Azerbaijan featured ever strongly in the Azerbaijan’s discussions with the Western governments and strained the already tense relations between them, which led to a temporary shift in the country’s foreign policy in favor of Russia.

To be clear, the amendments to Azerbaijan’s laws on NGOs/grants were not an aberration in the country’s steadily declining democratic and human rights credentials over the past decade. Azerbaijan’s authoritarian model of government has always presented challenges to the feasibility of a functional civil society. While the NGOs and civic activists were not systematically targeted in the earlier years, the public’s exercise of the right to the freedom of association was hampered in numerous ways, not the least of which was through the burdensome procedures for the NGOs’ registration and operation (as evidenced by the ECHR’s decisions). The prevailing sentiment among the opposition and civil society activists was to the effect that the changing of the rules for the civil society was another nail in the coffin of freedoms and rule of law in Azerbaijan. They believed the dissolution of “the last bastion of public space” would happen sooner or later as the government’s threshold for political tolerance continued to drop over the years.

As the country deepened its entrenchment in consolidated authoritarianism during the last decade, the last vestiges of Azerbaijan’s democratic institutions were dealt a fatal blow. In this generally bleak context, the NGOs became a somewhat “neutral” venue for former critics or opponents of the ruling regime to advocate for policy changes. As the boundaries of the political society shrank, the civil society became, of necessity, the sole platform that posed an ideological challenge to the political discourse. Coincidentally, the blurring of the boundaries between the political and civil spaces urged the government to resort to radical solutions in the name of political stability.

The NGOs had remained below the radar of the government as long as they stayed out of activities perceived as political. In the past, repressive measures had usually been reserved for the political opponents of the ruling regime who contested the country’s political status quo. As the limits of the political space narrowed, the line between politics and civic engagement became blurred. The key claim against these NGOs was that the NGOs funded by Western organizations had collaborated with the opposition and pursued a radical political agenda in the form of regime change in Azerbaijan. This line of reasoning manifested
itself quite clearly in the statements and interviews of senior officials. As a result, the introduction of anti-NGO measures along similar lines to those targeting the political opposition was warranted from the government’s perspective by the changing dynamics in Azerbaijan’s domestic affairs.

Analyses of the government’s political discourse indicates that the government was driven by a strong impulse to extend its control of the political space to the civil society, which it had reason to assume had become politicized. The uneasy juxtaposition of the illiberal doctrine of state authority with the liberal concept of civil society proved too fragile to be sustained under the pressure of the rapidly changing domestic and international dynamics. Having achieved a fairly solid grip over the political space, the government set out to neutralize a more versatile group of potential “troublemakers”: civic activists funded by Western donor organizations who effectively challenged the state discourse about democracy, public policy and corruption through social media at home and in collaboration with a global network of “partisan” human rights organizations abroad. It is this latter group of international NGOs that received the harshest treatment during the course of the crackdown.

It is therefore important to refute the claims that the stricter rules were primarily motivated by the urge to make the civil society organizations (CSOs) more transparent and accountable. The context of these changes strongly suggests that it was a strategic move that had long been in the making. It was not the policy, per se, but rather its operationalization through changes to the law and the subsequent prosecution of civic activists that was mishandled and gave rise to the impression in the West and among local CSOs of overreaction on the government’s part. In fact, it was quite possibly the next logical step in the consolidation of political power. Regime interests and the ideological lenses through which they are interpreted leave little room for a more lenient approach to alternative power groups. However, this is not to deny the likely impact of dramatic developments in the region and in domestic politics that might have had led to a high-handed use of power in relation to the NGOs.

THE RECENT SOFTENING AND PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE

There has been a growing realization inside the government that the anti-NGO measures have caused unnecessary damage to Azerbaijan’s reputation abroad. The cost of this reputational harm is mainly understood in terms of the implications for the country’s economy. For instance, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), of which Azerbaijan is a member, downgraded the country’s membership in April 2015. This came as a response to the worsening conditions for the civil society in Azerbaijan. In the latest board meeting of the EITI in Astana, Azerbaijan was given four
months (until the next meeting in March 2017) to upgrade its regulations regarding the civil society or potentially face the suspension of its status in the initiative. As Financial Times reports, this has put billions of dollars in loans from the World Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) for the Southern Gas Corridor project, bringing gas from the Caspian region to Europe, at risk. The project has strategic importance for Azerbaijan’s economic development.

Moreover, three years later, the CSOs are still fighting to gain a modicum of breathing space amid the Gordian’s knot of regulations. The government might have underestimated the backlash from within the ranks of the civil society regarding the tightened control. The reason for the NGOs’ perseverance is the fact that they remain the last bastion of civic participation in the country. If the NGOs are effectively brought under the control of the government, civil society’s last hopes for some degree of control over the state institutions will have been squandered.

That is why even if some of the victims of the crackdown left the country, the majority of the activists, lawyers and journalists stayed and pushed for the policy change. For instance, civic groups like the OGP Platform for Dialog between Government and Civil Society and the Civil Society Platform have advocated for changes to the NGO/grant rules. There is a consensus among Azeri NGOs (both pro-government and independent groups) that the restrictive provisions should be reversed, although this has not translated into effective cooperation to collectively advocate for the overhaul. The key obstacle to cooperation is the difference of opinion as to how accommodating the NGOs should be to the government’s political agenda.

The government has not shied away from proclaiming that the NGOs should throw in their lot with the Azerbaijani government and not their Western donors. These contesting political agendas have created fault lines in Azerbaijan’s civil society.

The softening of the government’s overall attitude to the NGOs in recent months has raised the public’s expectations for the relaxation of rules on foreign grants. However, there is also general skepticism that there will be radical improvement of the situation anytime soon. This is because the rhetoric of change is influenced more by external than domestic considerations. There is strong temptation on the part of the government to maintain the environment of uncertainty when it comes to civic activities, especially in view of the uncharted territories the country’s economy has entered in recent years.

The civil society can be a double-edged sword in these uncertain times. On the one hand, it may help the government to bring a modicum of openness to an otherwise closed political system. As a bridge between the society and state authorities, the CSOs may help the government to feel the pulse of the public’s sentiments. On the other hand, as an effective force of grassroots mobilization, the NGOs may prove to be a challenging adversary to the government’s monopolistic presence in the communities if the government fails in its commitment.
to long-postponed public sector reforms. These reforms are necessary to improve the quality of the public services, combat corruption and restore trust in the political institutions. At the risk of pointing out the obvious, it should be added that if the government strengthens the institutions, the civil society may prove to be a blessing in the process, but if it plans the opposite, then the civil society may become a curse in the long run. Put differently, the NGOs could help in the process of translating the reform-driven agenda into effective policy change in the face of resistance from various groups within the government, including local executive authorities. But if the government turns a deaf ear to the calls from the society, including the NGOs, to seriously address economic and social problems, the latter could take a more proactive role in challenging the failing government policies. The government will have to navigate through these conflicting needs and interests in the new reality.

THE EU’S LIKELY ROLE IN CHARTING A NEW COURSE FOR AZERBAIJAN’S CIVIL SOCIETY

There is little disagreement over the benefits of a vibrant civil society since it would lead to closer relations between the EU and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan’s NGO community, despite its contesting of political agendas and institutional laws, serves as the conduit for a transfer of ideas and practices closely identified with good governance into Azerbaijan’s context. The roots of important public policy reforms could be traced back to effective state-civil society partnerships often supported by various institutions of the EU and its member states. The NGOs also represent a bridge between the EU and Azerbaijan, helping the former to better articulate its core message about the importance of such norms and values as good governance, human rights and democracy to Azerbaijani society. Therefore, the success of the EU’s engagement with Azerbaijan, to a significant degree, depends on Azerbaijan’s ability to uphold civil liberties.

In view of the fact that (a) the advocacy of good governance—including democracy, rule of law and successful market economies—remains the backbone of the EU’s regional clout, and (b) the political stability in Azerbaijan strongly depends on its successful adoption of these principles and values, Azerbaijan’s NGO community represents the key domestic constituency advocating for the norms of good governance, so the EU should bolster its efforts to strategically engage the country’s civil society. The engagement should be responsive in the short term to the challenges brought about by the restrictive regulations and should be proactive in the long term in changing the government’s attitude to the role of the civil society in policy and decision-making.
IN THE SHORT TERM, THE EU SHOULD ADVOCATE FOR:

- Simplifying the existing NGO/grant regulations: These include the requirement of (a) the foreign donors to receive authorization for each grant and justify the grant on economic-financial grounds and (b) the foreign NGOs to have a local branch to be able to give the grant.

- Limiting the discretionary power of the Ministry of Justice over the NGOs: This means that the loopholes in the legislation governing the NGOs’ activities should be addressed to reduce this regulatory body’s excessive meddling in the NGOs’ internal policies and operations. Also, the procedures for registering an NGO should be eased.

- Eliminating bureaucratic barriers to the NGOs’ operations outside of Baku in the regions of Azerbaijan: Currently, it is very difficult, if not impossible, for the NGOs to conduct any activities out of the capital city. This is due to the fact that heads of local authorities in many regions view any kind of independent civic activism in a negative light. This is partly because they understand their responsibility to maintain political order as limiting community organizing and grassroots engagement. On the other side, local authorities want to avoid closer scrutiny of the problems in their operations, because corruption and myriad other problems are rampant in local administration. The government should respect the right of the citizens to work together to address social and economic problems in the regions outside of Baku.

- Encouraging the European business community to respect human rights: In the heat of the crackdown, many businesses, including internationally co-owned and operated banks, hotels, etc., refused to cooperate with the NGOs. The refusal was usually justified by clumsy excuses and violated the national law. It is important that European businesses set the trend by being open to cooperation with the civil society and showing civil society’s positive contribution to social progress.

IN THE LONG TERM, THE EU SHOULD AIM FOR:

- Strengthening civil society’s engagement in policy making and the oversight of state institutions: As a key piece of legislation, the law on public participation has laid down the framework for such involvement. The institutions of civil society should be given a chance to meaningfully contribute to the decision-making of state agencies and local governments.

- Improving its strategic communication with the civil society to better respond to the challenges the civil society faces: The EU’s institutions should build wider bridges with various non-state actors in Azerbaijan and extend their local partnerships beyond their project partners. There should be some soul-searching about why the EU
could not predict and take preemptive action against the drastic anti-NGO measures. Moreover, a trilateral platform in which the government, civil society and EU representatives could discuss issues of mutual concern could go a long way toward smoothing the communication among these actors.

- Developing a more sophisticated and consistent approach to supporting human rights and democracy in Azerbaijan: The EU’s institutions should treat the problems of the civil society within the broader context of Azerbaijan’s deteriorating democratic credentials. This requires that the EU bolster its efforts to improve the government of Azerbaijan’s observance of its commitments under the European Convention on Human Rights.

Elvin Yusif, Khazar University Baku, Azerbaijan
elvinyusif@gmail.com
Annex 7

“Moscow demands that Baku stop discriminating against Russians with Armenian last names,” Tass (5 July 2017) (certified translation from Russian)
STATE OF NEW YORK

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that the attached translation is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a true and accurate translation from Russian into English of the attached article titled “Moscow demands that Baku stop discriminating against Russians with Armenian last names.”

Lynda Green, Senior Managing Editor
Lionbridge

Sworn to and subscribed before me

Jeffery Aaron Cureton
Notary Public State of New York
No. 01CU6169789
Qualified in New York County
My Commission Expires 09-23-2023

259 W 30th Street, 1st Floor New York, NY 10001 +1.212.631.7432
Moscow demands that Baku stop discriminating against Russians with Armenian last names

The Russian diplomatic service was “compelled to acknowledge that Russian citizens arriving in Azerbaijan do in fact experience ethnic discrimination”

© Gennady Khamelyanin/TASS
Moscow, July 5. /TASS/. Russia demands an end to discrimination against RF citizens with Armenian last names arriving in Azerbaijan.

“It has to be acknowledged that Russian citizens arriving in Azerbaijan do in fact experience ethnic discrimination,” the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in connection with reports of a number of similar instances.

“We continue to demand an end to the outrageous discriminatory practice that is incompatible with friendly relations between two countries,” the Russian diplomatic service said. “We are certainly going to draw conclusions from the current situation.”
As RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted, since the beginning of this year, 25 RF citizens were denied entry into Azerbaijan. They were detained for several hours, in a number of cases without food, water and medical attention, and then sent back at their own expense. The grounds given for this were their Armenian last names, but there were also instances “when persons with Russian last names, first names and patronymics were interrogated to uncover ‘Armenian ancestors.’”

RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that on multiple occasions, including in diplomatic notes, a demand had been made for an end to this practice, but no coherent or satisfactory response had been received. “A reply diplomatic note from the Azeri Ministry of Foreign Affairs says that ‘to prevent undesired excesses, Azerbaijan has to apply appropriate regulations to certain persons,’” the Ministry noted.
Москва требует от Баку прекратить дискриминацию россиян с армянскими фамилиями

В российском дипведомстве были "вынуждены констатировать, что прибывающие в Азербайджан российские граждане действительно дискриминируются по этническому принципу"

Здание МИД РФ

© Геннадий Хамельянин/ТАСС
МОСКВА, 5 июля. /ТАСС/. Россия требует прекращения дискриминации прибывающих в Азербайджан граждан РФ с армянскими фамилиями.

"Вынуждены констатировать, что прибывающие в Азербайджан российские граждане действительно дискриминируются по этническому принципу", - указали в МИД РФ в связи с сообщениями о ряде подобных случаев.

"Продолжаем требовать прекращения возмутительной дискриминационной практики, несовместимой с дружественными отношениями между двумя странами, - сказали в российском дипведомстве. - Разумеется, будем делать выводы из сложившейся ситуации".
Как отметили в МИД РФ, с начала текущего года 25 гражданам РФ было отказано во въезде в Азербайджан. Их задерживали на несколько часов, в ряде случаев без еды, воды и медпомощи, а затем высылали за собственный счет. В качестве основания при этом назывались их армянские фамилии, но были и случаи, "когда лиц с русскими фамилиями, именами и отчествами допрашивали на предмет выявления "армянских предков".

В МИД РФ указали, что неоднократно, в том числе в официальных нотных обращениях, требовали прекращения этой практики, но не получили внятного и удовлетворительного ответа. "В ответной ноте азербайджанского МИД говорится, что "для предотвращения нежелательных эксцессов Азербайджан вынужден применять соответствующие регуляции по отношению к ряду лиц", - отметили в министерстве.
Annex 8

Kanal 1, Transcript of video “URGENT. Lots of enemies have been captured. Watch what they were forced to say. The latest news from the frontline,” YouTube (22 October 2020), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ftHHS7gUSu0 (certified translation from Azerbaijani)
STATE OF NEW YORK

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that the attached translation is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a true and accurate translation from Azerbaijani into English of the attached transcription.

Lynda Green, Senior Managing Editor
Lionbridge

Sworn to and subscribed before me

JEFFREY AARON CURETON
NOTARY PUBLIC-STATE OF NEW YORK
No. 01CU0169789
Qualified in New York County
My Commission Expires 09-23-2023

259 W 30th Street, 1st Floor New York, NY 10001 +1.212.631.7432
Title of Clip [file name/no.]: TƏCILİ. Bir topa düşmən əşir götürüldü. Baxın onlara nə dedizirdilər. Cəhədən son xəsarələr. [URGENT. Lots of enemies have been captured. Watch what they were forced to say. The latest news from the frontline.]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Stamp [00:00]</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Transcription [Azerbaijani]</th>
<th>Translation [English]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[00:06]</td>
<td>Narrator</td>
<td>Cəhədən gərgin döyüşlər gedir.</td>
<td>Intense fighting is continuing in the frontline.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[00:08]</td>
<td>Narrator</td>
<td>Ordumuz hər keçən saat irəliləyir.</td>
<td>Our army moves forward every hour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[00:11]</td>
<td>Narrator</td>
<td>Ali baş komandan İlham Əliyevin omrini ilə düşmən mahv edilir.</td>
<td>The enemy is being annihilated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[00:15]</td>
<td>Narrator</td>
<td>Növbəti şad xəsar. Daha doğrusu, möhtəşəm bir görününü sızlərə taqdim edirik.</td>
<td>Another good news. More accurately, we are presenting you a spectacular view.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[00:21]</td>
<td>Narrator</td>
<td>Ordumuz bir topa düşmən hərbiçisinə əşir götürüb.</td>
<td>Our army has taken a bunch enemy soldiers hostage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[00:25]</td>
<td>Narrator</td>
<td>Baxın bax bunlara. Üzlərinə baxın.</td>
<td>Look at these. Look at their faces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[00:29]</td>
<td>Narrator</td>
<td>Bu gün onlar ordumuzun qarşısında bax bəla acızdirlər.</td>
<td>Today they are so helpless in front our army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[00:34]</td>
<td>Narrator</td>
<td>Dizləri əsilir.</td>
<td>Their knees are shaking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[00:35]</td>
<td>Narrator</td>
<td>Və onlar bir-bir “Qarabağ Azərbaycandır” dedirdirir.</td>
<td>And each of them is forced to say “Karabagh is Azerbaijan.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[00:38]</td>
<td>Narrator</td>
<td>Yaşasin Azərbaycan ordusu!</td>
<td>Long live the army of Azerbaijan!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[00:40]</td>
<td>Narrator</td>
<td>Qarabağ Azərbaycandır!</td>
<td>Karabagh is Azerbaijan!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[00:42]</td>
<td>Narrator</td>
<td>On son videolari izləmək üçün kanala abunə olun.</td>
<td>Subscribe to the channel to view the latest videos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[00:49]</td>
<td>Azerbaijani</td>
<td>Pərvətərəjim po əcheredi. Bəb</td>
<td>Everybody repeats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Stamp</td>
<td>Speaker</td>
<td>Transcription [Azerbajani]</td>
<td>Translation [English]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[00:00]</td>
<td>soldier</td>
<td>громче.</td>
<td>one by one. Everybody loudly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[00:51]</td>
<td>Azerbaijani officer</td>
<td>Qarabağ Azərbaycan</td>
<td>Karabagh is Azerbaijan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[00:53]</td>
<td>Armenian soldier</td>
<td>Qarabağ Azərbaycan</td>
<td>Karabagh is Azerbaijan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[00:55]</td>
<td>Armenian soldier</td>
<td>Qarabağ Azərbaycan</td>
<td>Karabagh is Azerbaijan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[00:56]</td>
<td>Armenian soldier</td>
<td>Qarabağ Azərbaycan</td>
<td>Karabagh is Azerbaijan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[00:57]</td>
<td>Azerbaijani soldier</td>
<td>ты тоже</td>
<td>You too</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[00:58]</td>
<td>Armenian soldier</td>
<td>Qarabağ Azərbaycan</td>
<td>Karabagh is Azerbaijan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[00:59]</td>
<td>Armenian soldier</td>
<td>Qarabağ Azərbaycan</td>
<td>Karabagh is Azerbaijan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[01:01]</td>
<td>Armenian soldier</td>
<td>Qarabağ Azərbaycan</td>
<td>Karabagh is Azerbaijan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[01:02]</td>
<td>Armenian soldier</td>
<td>Qarabağ Azərbaycan</td>
<td>Karabagh is Azerbaijan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[01:03]</td>
<td>Armenian soldier</td>
<td>Qarabağ Azərbaycan</td>
<td>Karabagh is Azerbaijan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[01:05]</td>
<td>Azerbaijani officer</td>
<td>Söndür.</td>
<td>Turn it off.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[01:05]</td>
<td>Azerbaijani soldier</td>
<td>Komandir azərbaycan dilini qəsəng bilir.</td>
<td>Commander, he speaks Azerbaijani very well.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[01:07]</td>
<td>Azerbaijani officer</td>
<td>Bilirən azərbaycan dilini?</td>
<td>Do you know Azerbaijani?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[01:09]</td>
<td>Armenian soldier</td>
<td>Çro?</td>
<td>What?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[01:10]</td>
<td>Azerbaijani officer</td>
<td>Azərbaycan dilini bilirən?</td>
<td>Do you know Azerbaijani?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 9

Naira Bulghadaryan, “According to preliminary conclusions, the death of the elderly captive was caused by brain trauma: Investigative Committee,” Radio Liberty (5 November 2020) (certified translation from Armenian)
STATE OF NEW YORK

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that the attached translation is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a true and accurate translation from Armenian into English of the attached Radio Liberty article, dated November 5, 2020.

Ethan Ly, Managing Editor
Lionbridge

Sworn to and subscribed before me

[Signature]

Jeffrey Aaron Cureton
Notary Public-State of New York
No. 01CU6189789
Qualified in New York County
My Commission Expires 09-23-2023
According to preliminary conclusions, the death of the elderly captive was caused by brain trauma: Investigative Committee

November 5, 2020
Naira Bulghadaryan

According to preliminary conclusions, the death of 84-year-old Misha Melkumyan in Azerbaijani captivity was caused by brain trauma, Radio Liberty has learned from the Investigative Committee. Melkumyan’s body was recently transferred to Armenia through the efforts of the International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC].

A criminal case was filed with the Investigative Committee in connection with Misha Melkumyan’s death, based on various clauses of Article 390 of the Criminal Code [of the Republic of Armenia], specifically the murder, torture and inhuman treatment of a person who is not directly involved in hostilities.

Another 85-year-old prisoner, Evgenia Babayan, was recently returned to Armenia from Azeri captivity. Melkumyan could not be transferred to Armenia at that time. Zara Amatuni, the head of communication programs at the Armenia office of ICRC, said that the elderly man’s trip was medically disadvised at that time. Amatuni stated that an agreement was reached at the time that Melkumyan could be returned when his health condition permitted, but she added that the old man was later pronounced dead.
Արագործության ծրագրի լրացուցչությունը, նորինքին նախատեսված, պահպանելու համար անչափաթեթությունը հատկացնում է.

Ամսաթիվ 05, 2020
Նախագահ Նարինջանով

Արդարանքի տվյալներսի մեջ 84-ակի Բերդու Ստեփանյանի միջնակարգ կուրսային կրթության ծրագրին, որոնք նախատեսվածն են հաջողականության տեսանկյունից, ռումինիայի ազգային գրադարանի «Յուպերոֆակ» գրանմերից է համարվում: Ստեփանյանի հետ սեփական հայրական համար թույլատրվող ծրագրի, որը նախագահ Նարինջանովի համար պահպանվող տեսանկյունից.

Ամսաթիվի միջնակարգ կրթության ծրագրի հետ սպանությունը կարող է զարգանալ որոշ կետերով: Շտամբի թույլատրվող ծրագրի 390-կարգ հունիսին հատկացվող համար: Այս ծրագրի գրանմերից էլ կարող կարողանել նախագահ Նարինջանովի կյանքում ստեղծված ծրագրի, որի նպատակները նախագահ Նարինջանովի ցուցակում են. Համարվում է, որ ծրագրի համար բերված է բազմաթիվ թույլատրվող ծրագրի, որոնք նախագահ Նարինջանովի հետ սպանություն կարող են միավորվել և համարվել ՀՀ Մինիստրության որևէ նպատական ծրագրի հետ: Այս ծրագրի համար որևէ նպատական սենյակ, որպեսզի նախագահ Նարինջանովի միջնակարգ կրթության ծրագրի համար բերված իրավունք կարող է իրականացվել.
Annex 10

*Letter from* the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia *to* the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan (11 November 2020)
Annex not publicly available
Annex 11

Letter from Masis Mayilian, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Artsakh, to Audrey Azoulay, Director-General of UNESCO, No. 04/1249/2020 (19 November 2020)
Your Excellency,

As a result of the military aggression of Azerbaijan launched against the Republic of Artsakh on September 27 with full support of Turkey and Turkish-backed mercenaries, part of the territory of Artsakh, with numerous cultural monuments of Armenian heritage, fell under the military occupation of Azerbaijan. Unfortunately, there have already been cases of desecration and vandalism against cultural monuments of the Armenian heritage.

In particular, videos and photos have been posted on the Internet showing inscriptions in Azerbaijani language on the walls of the Church of the Holy Savior in the city of Shushi (Pic. 1), some of the sculptures that make up an integral part of the Church have been destroyed (Pic. 2), and religious artifacts located directly in the Church have been damaged (Pic. 3). (See Annex 1).

We consider it necessary to remind that on October 8, 2020, during the period of active hostilities, the Azerbaijani armed forces twice deliberately attacked the Church from an unmanned aerial vehicle. The attack caused serious damage to the Church. Moreover, during the second strike, several journalists who were inside the Church to document the consequences of the first strike were seriously injured. (See Annex 2).

It is extremely worrying that systematic denial of the existence of Armenian historical and cultural heritage and its destruction have long become the norm in Azerbaijan and are part of the state policy of inciting hatred and xenophobia towards Armenians. (See Annex 3). Taking into account the threat of destruction of cultural monuments of the Armenian heritage located in the territories came under military control of Azerbaijan, we kindly ask you to take effective measures to ensure the protection of Armenian historical and religious monuments and to guarantee the implementation by Azerbaijan of its obligations to preserve the cultural heritage of other peoples.

Sincerely,

MASIS MAYILIAN

HER EXCELLENCY AUDREY AZOULAY
DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF UNESCO
Annex 2

Effects of the first strike

Effects of the second strike
Arakel Village, Hadrut region, Artsakh. Surb Astvatatzin (Holy Virgin) Church of early XX century. The church was destroyed by the Azerbaijani Army during the occupation of the village in 1991-93.
Baku, Azerbaijan. Surb Astvatzatzin (Holy Virgin) Church and caravanserai adjoining it from the west. In 1990s on the decision of the municipal authorities of Baku the Church and the second and third floors of its belfry were destroyed. The first floor was spared only to be “cut out” into a fire temple.
Gyulistan village, Shahumyan region, Artsakh. Surb Astvatatzin (Holy Virgin). After occupation of the village by the Azerbaijani Army the church was blown up.
Nij village, Qabala (Kutkashe) region, Azerbaijan. St. Yeghishe (Elisha) Church and two inscriptions carved on its southern entrance tympanum in commemoration of its thorough restoration carried out by the efforts of Priest Astvatatzatur Jodanians in the 1840s (Photo of 1985). The inscriptions were completely scraped away during restoration work in the early 2000s.
Ganja (Gandzak) city. St. Hovhannes (St. John the Baptist) Church. Inscriptions of 1633 and 1643 were deliberately scraped away in 2007. The Church was turned into a chamber music hall.
Azat (Suluk) village, Shahumyan region, Artsakh. Surb Hovhannes (John) Church. After occupation of the village by the Azerbaijani Army the church was blown up.

Bridge of Lalazar, Kashatagh region, Artsakh. The double-span bridge was built over the river Vorotan in 1867 by means of Simeon Lalazar. The building inscription of the bridge in Armenian was deliberately scraped.
Tzar village, Shahumyan region, Artsakh. Fragments of St. Sargis Church and Mother Church of the village, destroyed in the 1950s, were used as building materials for the construction of a local Azerbaijani school.
Badamly (Otzop) village, Nakhijevan. The monastery of St. Astvatsatsin (Holy Virgin) with a dome church (photo: 1980s). It was marked on the map of the USSR Armed Forces General Headquarter. The monastery was destroyed to its foundations, as evidenced by satellite image (Google Earth, 2016) of the site of the monastery.
Nakhijevan city. St. Gevorg (George) Church marked on the map of the USSR Armed Forces General Headquarter (1976). According to the satellite image of Google Earth of 2008 the church does not exist anymore.
Agulis village, Nakhijevan. St. Tovma (Thomas the Apostle) Monastery (photo of 1900-1910s) marked on the map of the USSR Armed Forces General Headquarter (1976). In the late 1990s, the monastery was completely destroyed, and in its place a mosque was built, as evidenced by satellite image Google Earth of 2011 and 2016.
Old Jugha, Nakhijevan  The historic cemetery with nearly 3,000 medieval khachkars (crosstones).
The destruction of the medieval khachkars (crosstones) of the Jugha cemetery started in the Soviet period. They were broken to pieces and used as building material. The destruction of khachkars (crosstones) continued in 1998 with renewed vigor and was completed in 2005. In 2006 the territory of the cemetery was turned into a military shooting range.

Annex 12

“President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev addressed the nation,” *Azertac* (25 November 2020) (certified translation from Azerbaijani)
STATE OF NEW YORK

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that the attached translation is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a true and accurate translation from Azerbaijan into English of the attached article titled “President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev addressed the nation.”

[Signature]
Ethan Ly, Managing Editor
Lionbridge

Sworn to and subscribed before me

[Signature]
JEFFREY AARON CURETON
NOTARY PUBLIC-STATE OF NEW YORK
No. 01C05169789
Qualified in New York County
My Commission Expires 09-23-2023
President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev addressed the nation
25.11.2020 [12:02]
A·A-

Baku, November 25, AZƏRTAC

President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev has addressed the nation. AZƏRTAC presents the address.

Address of President Ilham Aliyev to the nation

- Dear fellow countrymen. Kalbajar district has been liberated from occupation today. I heartily congratulate all the people of Azerbaijan on this occasion.

Dear people of Kalbajar, my warmest congratulations! Your native district has been liberated from occupation. The people of Azerbaijan have been looking forward to this day for years. Kalbajar district was occupied on April 2, 1993. Innocent people were savagely expelled from their ancestral lands. The historical sites and nature of Kalbajar have been severely damaged.

The occupation of Kalbajar district was a great tragedy. The occupation of each district was a great tragedy. After the occupation of Shusha and Lachin districts in May 1992, the occupation of Kalbajar also created a geographical link between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Everyone knows that the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region did not have a border with the Republic of Armenia. Armenia was separated from Nagorno-Karabakh by Lachin district and the Lachin corridor. The occupation of Lachin, Shusha and then Kalbajar districts created a geographical connection between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh over a large area, and this was the enemy’s goal. After the occupation of Kalbajar, it is possible to say that communication was established between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh in many ways. First of all, weapons, equipment and manpower were sent there from Armenia. At the same time, it provided great advantages for Armenia’s subsequent policy of occupation.

The occupation of Kalbajar district is the direct responsibility of the then ruling Popular Front of Azerbaijan. In general, the main culprit in the occupation of our lands is the Popular Front of Azerbaijan. Because if they had not come to power
illegally in 1992, if they had not staged a coup, perhaps our lands would not have been occupied. Of course, it is very difficult to go back in history and say what could and could not have happened. But in any case, they have played a direct role in the occupation of our lands, and they bear this responsibility. Because in the spring of 1992, the struggle for power reached its peak. There were internal conflicts in Azerbaijan, chaos, crisis, a political crisis, and the struggle for power led to very serious consequences. Armenia continued to take advantage of this to occupy our lands. After the occupation of Shusha and Lachin, the situation reached a critical level. Taking advantage of this, the Popular Front of Azerbaijan came to power as a result of a coup. But what happened after that? After that, they focused all their efforts on strengthening the weakened government, organizing persecutions in our country, applying censorship and taking other anti-democratic steps. Our lands were under occupation, our civilian population was expelled from their ancestral lands, but the Popular Front of Azerbaijan and its leadership had only one goal—to fill their pockets, appoint their relatives and prolong the life of their government. The occupation of Kalbajar was the result of these ugly steps. It could not have been otherwise. The younger generation may not remember this, but they should know who was leading Azerbaijan at that time, people of what knowledge and what skills were leading Azerbaijan. Those people had no experience. Those people—the people who were represented in the government at the time, the people who held high positions—had never led a single department, not a single small enterprise. How could they run the country, especially in a crisis? But their yearning for power, their greed, their appetite and avarice led to this situation in Azerbaijan. Look who governed Azerbaijan at the time?! The speaker of parliament was a junior researcher, in fact, a failed researcher. The secretary of state was a careerist from the Komsomol who had betrayed his leader at a later stage, set his eyes for his post, rejoiced in his death more than anyone else, and lived his entire life under the control of foreign circles. What kind of management would you expect from them? What kind of patriotism would you expect from them? What professionalism would you expect? The minister of foreign affairs was a random person who couldn’t speak any foreign language, a physics teacher, someone who had no idea at all what foreign relations are, what international norms and principles are. He simply walked around like a tourist and said what he wanted to say. The minister of defense was a math teacher. Can a math teacher be a defense minister? It was this math teacher who handed Shusha over to the enemy. He said that if Shusha was lost, he would shoot himself in the head. It is still hanging around here and there. We have returned Shusha, we did! You sold it, traitors. The minister of internal affairs—there were widespread robberies, journalists were getting arrested, beaten up and thrown into the trunks of cars during live broadcasts. Such were
the leaders of the Popular Front of Azerbaijan. The prime minister was a junior researcher on scientific communism. Look at these contrasts. The man responsible for advancing the country’s economy on the principles of a market economy was a junior researcher on scientific communism. What kind of governance, what kind of reforms, what kind of defense could you expect? Our grief and tragedy is that random people came to power, usurped power and took our country into the abyss.

If Heydar Aliyev had not come to power at the request of the people in 1993, Azerbaijan would not only have lost the remaining lands but also would have lost its statehood in general. They started a civil war to maintain their weakened government. They took our own soldiers prisoner. They bombed Ganja. Let no one forget that! Those unaware should know this, the younger generation should know who caused us this trouble. Who is to blame for this tragedy? Who is to blame for the plight of a million people? The government of the Popular Front of Azerbaijan at that time. In fact, if we were to draw comparisons now, their collective image is like that of Pashinyan—incompetent, not knowledgeable, weak-willed, cowardly, deserter, inexperienced in management, influenced by foreign circles, ruled by them and destroying their own country. Look, they are all like Pashinyan. Those who do not know them should look at Pashinyan if they want to get an idea about them. Let them look at his steps and see the image of the then Popular Front of Azerbaijan and the country’s leadership.

Kalbajar is our ancient land. It is the land of ancient Azerbaijan. Kalbajar is one of our largest districts in terms of territory. The historical sites of Kalbajar are our great asset. Both mosques and churches are our historical treasures. The people of Azerbaijan know this well, and the whole world should know that churches in Kalbajar belong to the ancient state of Caucasian Albania. There are many historical documents confirming this. This is no secret. Armenian “historians” and fraudsters have simply Armenianized ancient Albanian churches, added their own inscriptions on them and appropriated these churches. Suffice it to look at history and anyone can see that in the 1830s, Tsarist Russia abolished the Albanian Church, gave all the property of the Albanian Church to the Armenian Gregorian Church, and Armenian priests and their patrons began to appropriate these churches. Their main task was to erase the history of Caucasian Albania. But we did not allow that to happen. Azerbaijan has a broad scientific base on this issue. There are research works available. These works are and should be shared not only with the scientific community but also with the world community as a whole. Caucasian Albania was a great state. Gabala was its capital. Historical sites and churches
belonging to Caucasian Albania are our historical and cultural heritage. We are protecting these churches. I have visited these churches many times—in the city of Shaki, in Gabala district, the Udi church. As you know, during the war, on the initiative of the Heydar Aliyev Foundation, the repairs of the ancient Udi Caucasian Albanian Church in Nij settlement was completed and this church was opened. We are protecting these churches as our cultural heritage. Therefore, no one should be worried. These churches will continue to be protected by the state. Azerbaijan’s policy on multiculturalism and inter-religious relations is praised by the whole world and world leaders. Let certain Western circles who want to express their concern look at our destroyed mosques, the Aghdam, Shusha, Zangilan, Jabrayil, Fuzuli and other mosques. These mosques have either been destroyed or desecrated—pigs were kept in them. Why isn’t this causing concern? Why has no one raised this issue for 30 years except for us? I have repeatedly raised this issue from international forums and in contacts with my foreign colleagues. Why wasn’t anyone worried about that? Why didn’t anyone want to send an international delegation on this issue? The Azerbaijani people want answers to these questions. We know the answer. Therefore, I want to say again that those who want to interfere in our work or to accuse us of something should first of all look in the mirror.

Kalbajar district has fascinating nature and diverse cultural heritage. Several of our large rivers originate in Kalbajar district. The largest of them is the Tartar River, which is 200 kilometers long. There are also the Bazarchay and Khachinchay. Their length is about 200 kilometers. These rivers feed a large area. But the hated enemy deprived us of these opportunities because the Tartar River flows into the Sarsang water reservoir built on the initiative of great leader Heydar Aliyev in the 1970s. The Sarsang water reservoir was built to provide irrigation to 6–7 districts of the Aran zone of Karabakh at the time. At that time, after the construction of the Sarsang water reservoir, 100,000 hectares of land that had never been irrigated started receiving water. Aghdam, Goranboy, Yevlakh, Barda, Tartar and other districts were irrigated from there. The hated enemy cut off water supply. It cut off water supply in the summer and released it in the winter, thus flooding the lands. There was also environmental terror against us. Armenia is a terrorist state, and there are many signs of this terror. There are signs of the destruction of our historical sites, the genocide against our civilian population, deforestation, changing the course of our rivers and other signs. The water of the Tartar River, which originated from Kalbajar, was first collected in the Sarsang water reservoir and then in the Sugovushan water reservoir, thus serving the interests of the occupier, whereas we did not get water at all. After we took over the Sugovushan settlement, water supply was resumed and is now expected to provide water to 100,000 hectares.
There are large forest areas in Kalbajar district. There are 24,000 hectares of forest in Kalbajar district. This is our great asset. The hated enemy cut down, looted and sold these trees. Look at the ugly things they have been doing in recent days, burning forests to create an environmental catastrophe. These thieves cut down forests and take them to Armenia for sale. They burn down houses they did not build. They entered the houses of the people of Kalbajar, broke into them and lived there. They burn down schools and kill pets they can’t take with them. See who we were facing, what savages we were facing! I repeat, and I will say this every time, that our victory is not only a victory over the Armenian state. We have also destroyed Armenian fascism.

We will restore Kalbajar, let no one have any doubts about that, and life will return there. Agriculture will develop in Kalbajar, especially livestock breeding. We have large pastures there. Kalbajar has ample natural resources. The enemy has brutally exploited these resources. In Soviet times, Istisu water, which was popular throughout the Soviet Union, was produced in Kalbajar. Istisu is under our control again now. It used to be a big resort. The hated enemy has destroyed everything. There are images of that and everyone can see them. We will restore all of that, we will rebuild Kalbajar, the villages, the city of Kalbajar. I have ordered to prepare a master plan for the reconstruction of the city—not only in the city of Kalbajar but also in all other cities, and life will return there.

In Kalbajar, the hated enemy committed another crime and conducted illegal settlement. People from Armenia and foreign countries have settled there illegally. This is a war crime, a war crime under the Geneva Convention. We will hold the enemy accountable. They will answer for all the war crimes, for all this destruction. When I was in Aghdam, I could not find a single safe building. The same applies to Fuzuli and Jabrayil. They have destroyed everything, as if a savage tribe had passed through.

But, for our part, we will build and create. We will revive these cities and districts. We have major plans on the restoration of these lands. These plans are already being implemented, infrastructure projects are being implemented. The construction of a new road to Shusha has already begun. In Soviet times, there was one road to Shusha—from Aghdam to Khankandi and from there to Shusha. We are now building a new road from Fuzuli district. This road will pass through a part of Khojavand district. I have ordered to do this as soon as possible. However, this is a huge task; there was no road there before and a new road is being built through forests. There are ravines, hills and the terrain is very difficult. But we will do it. We will restore the railways. In particular, preliminary instructions have already been given in connection with the
restoration of the railway to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. Tangible steps have already been taken to restore the Barda-Aghdam railway. This road is a must for the restoration of Aghdam district and for the comfort of the people who will live there in the future. So all this work will be carried out in a planned manner and the people of Azerbaijan will be regularly updated about the work to be done. We must do all the work in a planned manner. I want to say again: first of all, all the damage will be calculated with the participation of international experts. Then lawsuits will be filed. Then comes the reconstruction of our cities and villages on the basis of master plans. The necessary measures related to agriculture, other infrastructure projects, water and electricity will be taken. Then come roads. When we drove the enemy out of Shusha, it destroyed the water line feeding the city. There is no water in Shusha now. This is what the enemy is like.

When our soldiers saw that the Armenian population of one village of Aghdam district could not leave on time, they created conditions for them to leave. No one insulted them. But the hated enemy is burning our forests, burning our houses, destroying water lines. Do they think that this will stop us? We have drawn water lines everywhere—to remote mountains, to mountain villages. We will restore them all, all of them. Relevant instructions have already been given, and I am confident that we will do it in time.

The enemy gave Kalbajar another ugly name. They had made maps of the “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.” Where are those maps? They are all gone. Those maps are just pieces of paper. The whole territory of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region, Shusha, as well as seven surrounding districts, were included in the “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.” These maps were published, included in textbooks and displayed at exhibitions. They presented these maps as “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.” What is left of those maps now? Nothing! Azerbaijan has taken the necessary steps to restore its territorial integrity.

I want to return to the period of negotiations. At that time, I was repeatedly told that the conflict should be resolved only peacefully. I can say that all international organizations, the leaders of all superpowers I was in contact with have repeatedly said that there is no military solution to the conflict. These statements are also available in the media. What was I saying? I said there was one! I said that if necessary we would liberate our lands by military means. I said that war is never ruled out. During the talks, it was repeatedly proposed at various stages that the Azerbaijani side renounce the path of war. I never agreed to that. Then they started accusing me, saying that Ilham Aliyev wanted to start a war. I said that I wanted to resolve the issue peacefully, but I want to
resolve it. What did Armenia want? To maintain the status quo and make it eternal. They believed that if they had achieved this in 26–27 years, then they would continue to do so. They believed that their patrons would always defend them, stand behind them and fight for them. They generally think that the whole world owes them something. They want to rule their country with this harmful and sick mentality that someone must come and help them. What are you capable of doing? If you always cling to someone’s skirt and hope for some privileges, then what are you capable of doing? This mentality has led their society in the wrong direction. Today, they are dissatisfied with everyone. Even today, people are making claims about why no one is defending us. Who should anyone protect you? You are an independent country—if it is possible to say so at all—so live as an independent country. This is first. Second, you have invaded someone else’s land. You have left a million people homeless. You have destroyed all buildings, houses and cities. You have acted like a savage. Justice is not on your side, international law is not on your side, historical truth is not on your side. But they thought that they would keep these lands under occupation forever. They believed that time would pass and generations would change, the Azerbaijani people would forget this and come to terms with this situation. They were wrong. We never intended to put up with this situation. As President, I have been doing my best over the years to ensure that the Nagorno-Karabakh issue is always on the agenda, it is always at the center of the agenda. Let the feelings of patriotism, national pride and solidarity rise to a higher level within the country. And this issue should always be on the agenda at the international level. Let everyone know what the truth is, let everyone know who is the aggressor and who is the victim, and we have achieved this. Everyone in the world knows that now. If we pay attention to the foreign media during the Patriotic War, we will see that, of course, biased, Islamophobic, anti-Azerbaijani, pro-Armenian articles and reports prevail. However, at the same time, unlike earlier times, many objective and truthful reports and articles were published. I can say that we have won the information war. We have won the war on the battlefield, we have won the war in the information space, we have won the war in the political arena. The results of the war were as I was saying. From the first days, I said that this issue must be resolved through military and political means. I said that we can stop the military solution at any time and we are ready to do that. But on one condition—Pashinyan must personally say when he will leave our lands. He must make a commitment and provide a timetable. It must be stated when they will leave our lands. As soon as that happens, I will stop the offensive operation. He has already been punished. At that time, when he put forward seven conditions to us, I said: I have only one condition. I throw your seven conditions in the trash: get out of our land. Go out on your own. If he had listened to me, he would not have fallen into this
disgraceful situation. The results of the war just as I said. We liberated Jabrayil, Fuzuli, Zangilan, Gubadli, Murovdağ, Sugovushan, Hadrut, most of Khojavand district and Shusha by military means. We broke the enemy’s back on the battlefield. One day after the liberation of Shusha, when we liberated more than 70 villages, the enemy knelt down and signed an act of capitulation. I still do not know where he signed it. They are hiding it. They will probably tell us one day. Pashinyan, where did you sign this act of capitulation? He was forced to accept our conditions.

The war showed again who is who. Armenia is a defeated country. Azerbaijan is a victorious country. Kalbajar is ours! Karabakh is Azerbaijan!
Azərbaycan Prezidenti İlham Əliyev xalqa müraciət edib
25.11.2020 [12:02]

Bəzi, 25 noyabr, AZƏRTAC

Azərbaycan Respublikasının Prezidenti İlham Əliyev xalqa müraciət edib. AZƏRTAC müraciəti təqdim edir.

**Prezident İlham Əliyevin xalqa müraciəti**


Kelbecer rayonunun işğal altında düşməsi o vaxt hakimiyyətdə olmuş Azerbaycan Xalq Cəhəsinin birbaşa məsuliyyətidir. Bütövlük də torpaqlarımızın işğal altında düşməsininə qəzəl günahkar Azerbaycan Xalq
Annex 12


Annex 12


Annex 12


Annex 12


Müharibə bir daha göstərdi kim kimdir. Ermenistan məğlub edilmiş ölkədir. Aserbaycan zərər çəlmiş ölkədir. Qəlbəcər bizimdir! Qarabağ Azerbaycandır!
Annex 13

Annex not publicly available
Annex 14

*Letter from* the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan *to* the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia (8 December 2020)
Annex not publicly available
Annex 15

Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan (22 December 2020)
Annex not publicly available
Annex 16

Annex not publicly available
Annex 17

B. Rustambekov, “Azerbaijan starts calculating damage inflicted by Armenia in Karabakh – Aliyev,” Interfax (13 January 2021) (certified translation from Russian)
STATE OF NEW YORK  
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that the attached translation is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a true and accurate translation from Russian into English of the attached article titled “Azerbaijan starts calculating damage inflicted by Armenia in Karabaskh – Aliyev.”

Lynda Green, Senior Managing Editor
Lionbridge

Sworn to and subscribed before me

259 W 30th Street, 1st Floor New York, NY 10001  +1.212.631.7432
Azerbaijan starts calculating damage inflicted by Armenia in Karabakh – Aliyev

Engaging in the Nagorny Karabakh conflict negotiations, Armenia only pursued one objective – to make the process infinite, said Ilham Aliyev, President of Azerbaijan.

“It can be said that the 30-year negotiation process produced no results. There were only negotiations, only visits, only declarations, but there were no results. And this gave the aggressor (Armenia – IF) an opportunity to try and change the historical, cultural, and religious origin of the occupied territories (Nagorny Karabakh and 7 occupied areas around it – IF). During the negotiations, Armenia only pursued one objective, that is, to make the negotiation process infinite, and that's what ultimately happened,” Aliyev said in Baku on Wednesday when receiving Salim bin Mohammed Al-Malik, Director General of the Islamic World Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ICESCO).
“The illegal settlements policy is a war crime, and they were quite candid about that during the last period of occupation. They brought people of Armenian origin from different parts of the world and settled them on Azerbaijan’s historical territories, including the town of Shusha. They changed the names of our towns and villages, and they even changed the origin of Christian religious monuments. They changed the sources of the religious legacy of ancient Udines who had worshipped Christianity. They turned churches of ancient Caucasus Albania into Armenian churches. Therefore, they committed many criminal actions,” said the head of state.

Aliyev stated that the damage assessment process has already started. “The damage assessment process has already started in Azerbaijan. Engaging renowned international companies, a comprehensive assessment of physical, cultural, moral, and environmental damage will be made, in order to take Armenia to international courts,” emphasized the head of state.

The President added that Azerbaijan has already started work on restoring the liberated territories. “Infrastructure projects, city planning and most of the important elements of reconstruction are already under way. We have allocated capital funds to carry out these works,” said the head of state.

B. Rustambekov
Азербайджан начал подсчет ущерба, нанесенного Арменией в Карабахе - Алиев

Армения в переговорах по нагорно-карабахскому конфликту преследовала лишь одну цель - сделать переговорный процесс бесконечным, заявил президент Азербайджана Ильхам Алиев.

«Можно сказать, что 30-летний переговорный процесс не дал никаких результатов. Были только переговоры, только визиты, только заявления, но не было результатов. А это позволяло агрессору (Армении – ИФ) пытаться изменить историческое, культурное и религиозное происхождение оккупированных территорий (Нагорный Карабах и 7 оккупированных районов вокруг него – ИФ). Армения в переговорах преследовала лишь одну цель - сделать переговорный процесс бесконечным и бесполезным, что и в конечном итоге произошло», - сказал Алиев в среду в Баку, принимая главу Организации исламского мира образования, науки и культуры (ICESCO) Салима бин Мухаммед аль-Малики.
«Политика незаконных поселений - это военное преступление, и они в последний период оккупации не скрывали этого. Они из разных уголков мира привезли людей армянского происхождения и расселили их на исторических территориях Азербайджана, включая город Шуша. Они изменили названия наших городов и сел, и даже изменили происхождение христианских религиозных памятников. Они изменили истоки религиозного наследия древних удинов, поклонявшихся христианству. Они превратили церкви древней Кавказской Албании в армянские церкви. Таким образом, они совершили множество преступных действий», - сказал глава государства.

Алиев сообщил, что уже начался процесс оценки ущерба. «В Азербайджане уже начался процесс оценки ущерба. С помощью известных международных компаний будет проведена всесторонняя оценка материального, культурного, морального и экологического ущерба, что позволит привлечь Армению к международным судам», - подчеркнул глава государства.

Президент добавил, что Азербайджан уже начал работы по восстановлению освобожденных территорий. «Инфраструктурные проекты, планирование городов и большинство важных элементов реконструкции уже реализуются. В этом году на эти работы мы предусмотрели капитальные средства», - сказал глава государства.

Б.Рустамбеков
Annex 18

*Letter from* the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan *to* the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia (15 January 2021)
Annex not publicly available
Annex 19

Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan (22 January 2021)
Annex not publicly available
Annex 20

Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia (17 February 2021)
Annex not publicly available
Annex 21

*Letter from* the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia *to* the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan (24 February 2021)
Annex not publicly available
Annex 22

Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia (1 March 2021)
Annex not publicly available
Annex 23

Annex not publicly available
Annex 24

Annex not publicly available
Annex 25

Annex not publicly available
Annex 26

Annex not publicly available
Annex 27

Annex not publicly available
Annex 28

Annex not publicly available
Annex 29

Annex not publicly available
Annex 30

Annex not publicly available
Annex 31

Annex not publicly available
Annex 32

Annex not publicly available
Annex 33

Annex not publicly available
Annex 34

Annex not publicly available
Annex 35

Photo of Mannequins from “President Aliyev inaugurates Military Trophy Park in Baku [UPDATE],” AzerNews (12 April 2021)
Annex 36

Annex not publicly available
Annex 37

Annex not publicly available
Annex 38

Annex not publicly available
Annex 39

Annex not publicly available
Annex 40

Annex not publicly available
Annex 41

Annex 42

Annex not publicly available
Annex 43

Annex not publicly available
Annex 44

Annex not publicly available
Annex 45

Annex not publicly available
Annex 46

*Dated 30 April 2021 (7 May 2021)*
Annex not publicly available
Annex 47

Dear Mrs. Director-General,

I am writing to share with you our grave concerns regarding the recent actions carried out by Azerbaijan at the Holy Savior Ghazanchetsots Cathedral of Shushi in the Republic of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh).

During the large-scale military aggression against Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) launched on September 27, 2020, among other war crimes, Azerbaijan deliberately targeted by precise striking drones the Holy Savior Ghazanchetsots Cathedral. The attack destroyed one of the two domes of the Cathedral, constituting a blatant violation of the Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. Moreover, many photos and videos circulating on the internet are showing that Ghazanchetsots Cathedral has been vandalized and the second dome damaged by the Azerbaijani forces during peacetime, long after the cessation of hostilities.

Recently Azerbaijan, under the veil of “reconstruction works” removed the dome of the Cathedral, trying to change the historical and architectural integrity of the monument and alter its Armenian identity before the UNESCO expert assessment mission to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone is dispatched.

We have ample reason to believe that Azerbaijan is deliberately blocking the entry of UNESCO experts to the Armenian cultural heritage sites to hide its committed war crimes of cultural heritage destruction aimed at annihilating the evidence of Armenian’s long, indigenous connection to this land. This concern is credible enough, given the multiple precedents of Azerbaijan’s intentional destruction of the Armenian cultural heritage. The
most recent example is the complete demolition of the Armenian Holy Mother of God Church (Zoravor Surb Astvatsatsin Church) near the town of Mekhakavan (Jebrail), as documented by the BBC. The Azerbaijani side confirmed the deliberate and pre-planned nature of the full destruction of this church.

Moreover, the danger faced by the Armenian monuments is not limited to destruction; Azerbaijan is actively implementing the policy of misappropriation and falsification of historical facts by referring to the Armenian cultural heritage sites and places of worship in Artsakh as “Caucasian Albanian”.

This barbaric policy of cultural destruction on the territories under the military control of Azerbaijan is deplorable. Cultural heritage is the shared wealth of all humanity, regardless of its religious, ethnic, or historical background, and the civilized international community should consolidate its efforts to prevent any further occurrence of intentional destruction of the Armenian cultural heritage sites.

We highly appreciate the important role UNESCO plays in the protection of cultural heritage and hope that you will call for refraining from any attempts of destroying and misappropriating Armenian cultural heritage sites. We are convinced, Madam Director-General, that your timely actions, including the public condemnation of these heinous acts, will allow us to protect our cultural heritage and preserve it for future generations.

Please accept, Madam Director-General, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

YAHRAM DUMANYAN

/Acting Minister/
Annex 48

Annex not publicly available
Annex 49

Dated 22 May 2021 (28 May 2021)
Annex not publicly available
Annex 50

Annex not publicly available
Annex 51

*Letter from* Ricardo Guilherme Filho, Director of Legal Affairs, Universal Postal Union, *to* Hakob Arshakyan, Minister of High-Tech Industry, Republic of Armenia, No. 4700(DL.PHIL)01.21 (1 June 2021)
Reference: 4700(DL.PHIL.)01.21
Subject: Postage stamp issues

Excellency,

In your letter of 21 January 2021, you asked the UPU (through its International Bureau) to intervene with regard to the following postage stamps issued by the designated operator of Azerbaijan:

– A stamp issue on the theme “Victory in the Karabakh War”, issued on 10 December 2020; and

In that respect, and following a more detailed study of the aforementioned postage stamp issues, the International Bureau has determined that they are not in line with article 6,5,4 of the Universal Postal Convention ("Convention") and paragraph 8 of UPU Istanbul Congress recommendation C 13/2016 on the "Philatelic Code of Ethics for the use of Union member countries", insofar as they feature themes that are contrary to the aforementioned provision of the Convention.

Consequently, the International Bureau will not be registering those postage stamp issues in the UPU’s WADP Numbering System (WNS) database, and will also kindly invite the Republic of Azerbaijan to withdraw the postage stamp issues referred to above, due to the reasons outlined herein.

Nevertheless, I must note that, in accordance with the relevant obligations currently set forth in article 06-002 of the Regulations to the Convention, the International Bureau is still legally required to act as an intermediary for the notification, exchange and distribution of such postage stamp issues to other UPU member countries.

In the light of the foregoing elements, I may take this opportunity to remind the Republic of Armenia that UPU member countries are always entitled to submit proposals to amend the Acts of the Union, including as appropriate any proposals aimed at fostering due implementation and observance of the Convention provisions applicable to postage stamps.

In that regard and as per its statutory attributions, the International Bureau remains at the disposal of the Republic of Armenia (as well as other UPU member countries) for any secretariat assistance that may be deemed necessary in the context of the potential development of such proposals.
With the above considerations in mind, the UPU, through its International Bureau, shall remain attentive to the need to ensure that the postage stamp issues it receives from UPU member countries are in conformity with the Acts of the Union, and will continue to work closely with the international philatelic community with a view to supporting the promotion of philately.

Let me close by assuring you of my commitment to further strengthening cooperation with the Republic of Armenia.

Yours sincerely,

Ricardo Guilherme Filho
Director of Legal Affairs
(For the Director General)
Annex 52

Annex not publicly available
Annex 53


*Dated 3 June 2021 (11 June 2021)*
Annex not publicly available
Annex 54

Annex not publicly available
Annex 55

Dated 22 June 2021 (2 July 2021)
Annex not publicly available
Annex 56

Olga Prosvirova, “‘They beat me, they humiliate me, but I’m fine.’ Reports from Armenian servicemen returning from Azerbaijani prisons,” *BBC* (7 July 2021) (certified translation from Russian)
STATE OF NEW YORK  
COUNTY OF NEW YORK  

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that the attached translation is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a true and accurate translation from Russian into English of the attached BBC News article, dated July 7, 2021.

Lynda Green, Senior Managing Editor  
Lionbridge

Sworn to and subscribed before me  
this 13th day of September, 2021.

Ethan Win L.T.  
Notary Public-State of New York  
No. 01LY623700  
Qualified in New York County  
My Commission Expires 04-27-2023
“They beat me, they humiliate me, but I’m fine.”
Reports from Armenian servicemen returning from Azerbaijani prisons

Olga Prosvirova
BBC
July 7, 2021

Terrorists or prisoners of war? Armenian servicemen in Azerbaijani captivity

The war in Nagorno-Karabakh is over, but several dozen or even hundred — no one knows for sure — Armenian servicemen have already spent several months behind bars in Baku. Their letters home say that they’re fine, but those who have had the good fortune to come back, talk of constant beatings and inhumane treatment. The servicemen’s relatives are asking for just one thing — that their husbands, sons and brothers be returned to their homeland. But the situation is far from straightforward — the Azerbaijani don’t consider those detained to be prisoners of war, accusing them of various crimes allegedly committed after the signing of the ceasefire agreement.

“I only have two sons — and that’s it”

“Hello, my beloved and dear family. I got your letters and was very glad that all is well with you. Everything is ok with me, my darlings. Papa-djan, my precious, don’t lose heart. Your son feels fine. Take care of yourself,
look after your health. Mama-djan, my beloved, precious mommy, take care of yourself, don’t despair for a second and don’t worry too much.”

The letter, on a neatly lined side of A4 was written in Armenian on May 25, 2021. The sender was Sedrak Sogomonyan. The “mailing address” and “telephone number” fields are blank — the sender is behind bars. The recipient is Samvel Sogomonyan.

The top of the page contains a logo — seven sketched little men holding hands. And a caption in Russian: “Red Cross. Restoring family ties.”

“Papa-djan, you must go to our church, light a candle, my dear,” Sedrak asks at the end of his letter.

His mother, Termine, lights a candle for her son every day and says a prayer in the Holy Virgin Mary church in the small village of Lanjik, 35 kilometers from Gyumri.

26-year-old Sedrak Sogomonyan was at home when Armenia and Azerbaijan signed the ceasefire declaration. He was helping his father with everyday life — there’s always work to be done in the village.

“And then he got a call — there was a shift change at the post. There at the border, each side looks after its own territory,” says Sedrak’s father, Samvel. “They wanted to take my younger son as well, but I wrote a letter saying that they couldn’t take two of them from home at the same time. I only have two sons — and that’s it. So they left one, and took the older one.”

The father last spoke to his son on the phone at around 4 p.m. in the evening of December 13. Sedrak said that he was being replaced and that he would soon be home. After that, the line went dead.

“We found out the next morning that our son had been taken captive. The Azerbaijanis had surrounded them. They said, ‘Guys, lay down your arms and come out, we’ll hand you over to the Russians who are nearby.’ But they didn’t hand them over, they deceived them,” Samvel Sogomonyan says.
Sedrak Sogomonyan and the other servicemen had been stationed in the village of Hintaqlar (Khin Takher) in the Hadrut district of Nagorno Karabakh. Telephone communications are often on the blink there, the terrain is difficult. By the end of the war, the village found itself virtually on the front line.

Under the agreement, a new demarcation line was supposed to run along the actual front line in this area, and Russian peacekeepers were supposed to come into the territory controlled by the Armenians. But at the time the agreement was signed and over the next few days, there was quite a lot of confusion. The Russian peacekeepers marked on their maps that the village had fallen to Azerbaijan, and took up stations 15 kilometers from Hintaqlar. The Azerbaijanis thought the same. The Armenians, on the other hand, carried on changing over their fighters at the post close to the village.

In the unrecognized Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, the events of December 12 are described as follows: the Armenian servicemen were stationed at Hintaqlar when Azerbaijanis arrived at the village and stated that the territory was theirs. The Armenians disagreed. Gunfire started to be exchanged.

The Armenian ombudsman, Arman Tatoyan, was unable to answer the direct question of who actually controlled this territory at that point in time: “I think that this territory was controlled by Armenia, but I need to double check.”
Azerbaijan calls what happened a counter-terrorism operation carried out in an area under its control.

After what happened, the Russian peacekeepers quickly adjusted their maps — adding that very same village of Hintaglar (Khinkhendi) to the zone of their responsibility.

- **Lachin: life under the surveillance of the Russian peacekeepers**

These days, Baku calls those detained members of an “armed group consisting of Armenian citizens.” Having quickly opened and investigated a criminal case, Azerbaijani investigators decided that the Armenians had “unlawfully crossed over the state border, having blown things up, set fires and committed other acts of terrorism.”

No one in Baku would answer the BBC’s question of how many Armenian citizens had been detained on similar charges.

“Allow me to draw your attention to the fact that the Armenian side still hasn’t performed its obligations under international humanitarian law, or its obligations under the trilateral declarations,” Leyla Abdullayeva, the official representative of Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, responded. She is referring to the fact that Armenia failed to provide Baku with minefield maps of the territories that passed into Azerbaijani hands.
Beatings according to a schedule

It would appear that the story of Sedrak and his fellow officers isn’t unique.

“The problem is that we don’t know how many prisoners of war there are in Azerbaijan,” Armenia’s ombudsman Arman Tatoyan says. “Just imagine the depth of suffering of the families of the prisoners of war, and of the relatives of those who have gone missing. After all, some people are still hoping that their sons and brothers [are alive and] are being held captive in Azerbaijan. But no one knows the exact figures. According to my personal estimates, it’s at least 300.”

These are mostly servicemen, although there are civilians too, Tatoyan believes. According to information from both sides, there are no Azerbaijani prisoners of war in Armenia.

All over the world, the Armenian diaspora are holding pickets demanding the release of the prisoners

The fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh went on for a month and a half. Areas gradually fell under the control of the Azerbaijani forces. Some people refused to leave or were unable to do so for health reasons – mainly elderly people.

In March, Human Rights Watch human rights advocates described cases of the civilian population being captured and tortured in areas that had come under the control of Baku. At least two of those captured died whilst in Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan maintains that these and other claims are untrue.

“Claims that the detained Armenians are being humiliated are completely unfounded,” Leyla Abdullayeva, the official representative of Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told the BBC. “Azerbaijan has fully satisfied all requests concerning the wellbeing of these people. We are allowing them to see representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross, as well as the human rights commissioner, we are providing documents on the state of health of all those Armenian citizens who have been detained. In addition, photos of detainees who recently returned to Armenia show their physical wellbeing.”
Annex 56

9/13/21 6:14 PM  “They beat me, they humiliate me, but I’m fine.” Reports from Armenian servicemen returning from Azerbaijani prisons – BBC ...

- **How Azerbaijan and Armenia are spreading conspiracy theories on the Karabakh conflict**

Over 30 years of confrontation in Karabakh, two fully-fledged wars and numerous local flare-ups, both sides have more than once provided opportunities to accuse one another of various types of crimes, intensifying their mutual hatred. In the past — especially after the first war, which was won by the Armenians — Azerbaijani refugees and the official authorities in Baku had written and claimed much about the ill treatment of prisoners and the civilian population, such as the massacre of the civilian population of the village of Khojaly.

These days, Armenian soldiers returning to their homeland talk of the ill treatment of the Armenian servicemen held by Azerbaijan. Akop Ovannisyan — a thin young man with a broad smile on his face — asks us straight away not to give his real name, and warns: “If anything I say can harm the guys that are there, I'd prefer not to say anything…”

Akop and his fellow officers found themselves surrounded on October 2 last year, in the Sugovushan area (the Armenians call the village Mataghis) — more than a month before the peace agreement was signed between the Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, as mediated by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

They couldn’t escape those who had surrounded them — and 20 days later, the servicemen were taken captive.

- **“A son is for the motherland”: why Karabakh is dearer than lives for Azerbaijan**

“We were convinced that we would be lined up and murdered. If that were to happen, we each had a grenade to blow ourselves up,” Akop recalls. “But we couldn’t die as heroes. When we were taken captive, we were even surprised that they didn’t do anything to us. On the contrary — they gave us water and treated us to cigarettes. But when they brought us to Baku, as soon as we got out of the vehicle they started beating us.”

Sugovushan in early March 2021 — already under Azerbaijani control

At first, Akop found himself at a military police station in the Azerbaijani capital.
“The cell was big. It had bunks in it, but we were handcuffed to the radiator — I was handcuffed the whole time. At first, there was one other prisoner in the cell, but he was soon taken away and I was left on my own. The beatings went on for four days — every two hours, as if according to a schedule. I wasn’t able to go to the toilet. I didn’t eat or drink for three days, so 90% of that need disappeared.”

On the fifth day, Akop was transferred to a division of Azerbaijan’s State Security Service. The beatings continued.

“We were questioned every day and beaten again, but this time more forcefully than in the military police. And on October 29, we were transported for 40 minutes to a prison — and were especially fiercely beaten all the way.”

During interrogations, the investigators were interested in the location of tanks and also in the location of the bunker of Arayik Harutyunyan — the President of the unrecognized Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh.

“But they did actually realize who I was and who Arayik Harutyunyan was … how was I to know! The investigators said to us: “We’re going to put you on trial and jail you for 25 years.” We asked: “For what? We’re just prisoners of war.”

Back in the fall, videos showing ill treatment of Armenian servicemen captured during the military operations started to leak onto the Internet. The human rights organization Human Rights Watch viewed all these videos, condemning what was happening and calling on Baku to comply with international conventions.

“There can be no justification for violence and humiliation in the treatment of prisoners of war,” says Hugh Williamson, the director of Human Rights Watch for Europe and Central Asia. “International humanitarian law does not allow any exceptions to the obligation to protect prisoners of war against ill-treatment, and the authorities of Azerbaijan must put an immediate stop to this.”

The human rights advocates also noted that some of the people depicted on the videos had subsequently written to their relatives, saying that they were being treated well.

“I suddenly didn’t care”

Upon hearing of the letter from Sedrak Sogomonyan, in which the servicemen says that he is fine, Akop nods: “It’s impossible to send out any sign from there. We were told that if we wrote anything superfluous, the letter wouldn’t reach its destination. After all, the Red Cross doesn’t immediately collect the letters, they are first read by the Azerbaijani top brass, amongst whom are people who have good command of Armenian. So you try to write just that everything’s fine, I’m coming home. That was what I wrote, too.”

Akop Ovannisyan tells his story calmly, with a constant modest smile on his face, but he sometimes clasps his hands nervously.

“I know it’s strange, but I smiled the whole time there, too, even when I was being beaten. If I’d paused to think and actually realized where I was, I would have remained there, perished. There were six of us in the cell, and we would smile. And we’re smiling now, too. There, I was strong, because I was hoping to return home, to see the members of my family. We were constantly telling ourselves that we would survive. Thank God that what we were afraid of didn’t happen. They didn’t do what we thought they might do to us,” says the returnee prisoner of war.
Karina Sarkisyan can't smile. Large tears run down her brightly made-up face. Before the start of our conversation, she asks if she can light a cigarette, carefully flicks the ash and wipes away her tears with her hand. She is sitting on a sofa in the office of her lawyers, who are drafting a complaint to the European Court of Human Rights. Lots of people know her name, but she asks that it not be printed — she doesn’t want her story to be recalled by the Armenian media. At one time, people were talking about her story outside Armenia as well.

A few months ago, Karina became the heroine of a video that went viral on social media, which yet again set the parties to the conflict at loggerheads with one another.

In the video, a woman wrapped in a blanket is standing on a doorstep when two servicemen approach her: “We are Azerbaijani soldiers, we’ve come to our motherland.” “Welcome home,” the Armenian woman responds.

In Yerevan, people immediately labelled the video as fake, doubting even that the heroine from the clip existed at all. But later on it was discovered that she was a real person.

“When I was taken captive, I was told: we need to get it across to your people that we have you,” the woman says. “But you need to read this text, saying ‘Welcome home’. They found some kind of shed, they found a blanket there and attached it to me. I was barely able to stand up. They gave me valerian drops to take. Although I suspect that they weren’t valerian drops, because I suddenly didn’t care. I just didn’t care.”

On October 7, Azerbaijan claimed that it had “evacuated from the area of combat operations a store assistant in one of the villages liberated by Azerbaijani servicemen in Karabakh.” But Karina hadn’t been an assistant from the local store.

Not long before that, she had arrived in Jabrayil along with a group of Armenian servicemen. Before the first war, the city had been the center of one of the seven Azerbaijani regions, but in 1993 the Azerbaijani population was forced to leave the area, and effectively all that was left here were ruins and the battlefield positions of the Armenian forces. In the fall of last year, fierce fighting broke out over these areas, until on October 4 Ilham Aliyev announced that the city had been taken by the Azerbaijanis. The capture of Jabrayil became a watershed moment in the military conflict and gave Baku a significant advantage.
Jabrayil in December 2020

When Karina Sarkisyan — who calls herself a nurse — arrived in Jabrayil on October 2, the battle was in full swing.

“I’m a military person, this was my third war. When I arrived, there were a lot of wounded people, and a lot of dead bodies. And we had to administer first aid, so that the guys could be sent on to hospital. And while I was there, I managed to get pneumonia. And when the time came for me to leave, I realized that I simply couldn’t go up into the mountains because of my weight, my swelling and my illness.” Sarkisyan was left alone.

Humiliation, interrogation and a “press conference”

Karina Sarkisyan spent three days surrounded. She then made it out onto the road — a more or less flat road — and walked on ahead. After a few kilometers, around the bend of a mountain trail, she heard voices. Azerbaijani. The woman hid in a ravine, and they didn’t notice her. She knew that three kilometers from the ravine was an Armenian hospital. Through the gullies, bypassing the Azerbaijani servicemen, she made it to the right building. But it was already empty. The area had come under the control of the Azerbaijani forces.

Not far from the former hospital was an abandoned store. Just two small premises: one with a counter, the other a storeroom. Karina hid in the storeroom. Servicemen came into the store a few times, taking tea, coffee, cigarettes, biscuits and water.
“But I evidently fell asleep at some point. And they realized from my snoring that there was someone in the storeroom. At first, they beat me with a mop. Then, when I said that I was surrendering, they pulled me out, grabbed hold of my hair and started dragging me back and forth, ripping my clothes, touching me up. And I was kicked 800 meters in a semi-naked state. You can’t even imagine: when all these stinking hands are reaching towards you, and you can’t do anything,” the woman recounts.

Then along came the “chief” — Ibrahim. Karina can’t remember his rank or his surname. He forbade the servicemen from touching the woman. It was after that that the notorious video was recorded, in which Karina welcomes home the Azerbaijani servicemen.

The woman wasn’t wearing a military uniform, and Ibrahim believed that she was a local resident. Karina was taken to Baku, put in hospital for assessment, and the marks from her beatings were even recorded. Some women from an Azerbaijani committee for human rights came to visit Karina in hospital. The prisoner was put in a car, taken around the city, shown the embankment, and fed kutaby and baklava in a local café.

“And then they said I had to speak at a press conference. They gave me a text that I had to read out. In this text, I accused Armenia of aggression and every possible sin. And at the end I had to say that we didn’t want any war, and that it was all to do with Pashinyan who’d given the order to round up the men and send them off to war,” she continues.

After the press conference, Karina was taken back to the hospital. In the evening of that same day, the Azerbaijanis found out that the woman wasn’t simply a civilian. It was then that Karina was taken to a pre-trial detention facility, and the interrogation started.

At one of the interrogation sessions, the woman refused to admit being acquainted with a representative of the Armenian special services. “For that, I was struck across the face. I took it calmly, I didn’t scream, because I knew that our guys were in the neighboring cells.”

The cell where Karina was being held was four by four meters. Two beds. On the very first day, the bed collapsed under the woman’s weight and she spent several nights sleeping on the floor. They fed her, but “you couldn’t call it food.”

Her cellmate was an elderly Armenian woman who flinched at any rustle, and thought they had come to kill her whenever the door opened. The old woman got lucky — she was handed over to Yerevan much sooner. Karina says that when they took the old woman away, she felt free: “I found it very difficult to be with her. You’re already wound up. And next to you is someone who’s constantly going: ‘Oh dear! You’re trying to drive these thoughts away, but you’re constantly being reminded of them.”
Karina was handed over to Armenia in December. She was met in her home village by Pushok – the only living being in her family home. Recalling her beloved cat, Karina smiles for the first time.

**In exchange for maps and confessions**

In February, Nikol Pashinyan said that Azerbaijan had returned 69 prisoners of war and captured civilians to Yerevan. At the same time, Ilham Aliyev announced that there were no more prisoners of war in Azerbaijan.

“According to our information, on November 20, following the end of the military operations, a group of over 60 people were dispatched from the Shirak region of Armenia, the city of Gyumri and its surrounding areas. It’s not clear how this group passed through the Lachin Corridor [protected by Russian peacekeepers — BBC] and how it ended up in territories controlled by the Azerbaijani army. [...] It turned out that this was a group that was attacking both our servicemen and civilians. Four of our servicemen and one civilian were killed as a result of these provocations and acts of terrorism,” Aliyev claimed.

![Trials of detained Armenians continue in Baku](image)

Court hearings continued throughout June in Baku in the cases of people whom Azerbaijan calls terrorists and whom Armenia calls prisoners of war. Armenian ombudsman Arman Tatoyan insists that although the servicemen were detained after the signing of the triilateral declaration, the conflict in Karabakh remains unfinished under international norms. Accordingly, Armenia will consider its citizens to be prisoners of war. In Baku, people believe the active phase of the most recent conflict to be complete and also cite the fact that international law recognizes Nagorno-Karabakh as Azerbaijani territory.

International organizations try to avoid the term “prisoners of war” in respect of those who didn’t end up in the “all-for-all” exchange after the signing of the agreement, but acknowledge that there are servicemen being imprisoned in Azerbaijan.

In mid-June, 15 servicemen were lucky enough to return to their homeland. On the border between Azerbaijan and Georgia, Baku handed people over to Yerevan, and Yerevan handed over maps of the minefields in Nagorno-Karabakh.
These maps show the location of around 100,000 mines in the Agdam district, which is currently controlled by Azerbaijan. Back in the winter, the Azerbaijani National Agency for Mine Clearance (ANAMC) was complaining about the lack of such maps. Without knowing the location of the mines, one person can clear only 25 square meters of territory per day. The clearing of the Agdam district alone would take Azerbaijan more than 10 years.

In early July, Baku handed over another 15 prisoners to Yerevan “as a humane gesture.” This time, they exchanged the prisoners for maps showing the location of mines in the Fizulin and Zangilan districts.

Former prisoners and their relatives believe the exchange of people for information on mines to be an unfair but inevitable means of resolving the problem.

“Well, let’s say we keep hold of these minefield maps. And a hundred people a day end up dying there. What do we get from that?” Akop Ovannisyan reflects. “So if, in exchange for the maps, we can get people back ... And in addition, if you don’t give back the maps, does that mean you’re expecting a resumption of the military operations? I don’t think that’s possible in the near future.”

“It’s very mean-spirited [for Azerbaijan’s part],” Karina Sarkisyan believes. “But if, in that way, we can save people’s lives, then I agree. I approve one hundred percent.”

“It’s a business: ‘Give us the maps, give us the maps’. The Azerbaijanis love business. These maps, these mined roads ... I can’t say, it’s not my decision. It’s the top brass that are deciding,” sighs Samvel Sogomonyan.

Armenia, which lost the war, doesn’t have a lot of options for negotiating with Baku.

Former Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan was so incensed by Pashinyan’s words about the Armenians forgiving the authorities for their fellow citizens being held in detention for several months that he publicly stated: “Does Pashinyan have any understanding at all of the condition of these people? Let him exchange his little Ashot [his son - BBC] for 20-25 people being held in Azerbaijan.”
Pashinyan supported the populist debate and agreed to exchange his son for all the Armenian prisoners. And Ashot Pashinyan himself claimed that he was “always ready.”

- “I was ready to be branded a traitor, but to resolve the matter”: former Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan on Karabakh and Pashinyan

These claims cut no ice whatsoever with Samvel Sogomonyan, awaiting the return of his son. He refuses to discuss them.

During the first few months after the end of the war, the exchange of prisoners took place through mediation by Russia.

Naira Zograbyan, who sat in the previous Armenian parliament, said at the end of June that she had met with Samed Seyidov, the head of the Azerbaijani delegation in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

“Seyidov said that Azerbaijan was ready to discuss the issue of the return of the “terrorists,” if Armenia would agree to sign a peace treaty. In other words, to acknowledge in writing the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, including its ownership of 75% of Artsakh. In that case, they’re ready, as a “goodwill gesture,” to consider the issue of returning our guys,” Zograbyan claimed after the meeting.

Azerbaijan lost actual control over Nagorno-Karabakh and seven of its adjacent regions, predominantly inhabited by Azerbaijani, in 1994 following the first war. None of the UN member states recognized the Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh and the new de facto border. Following the 2020 war, Azerbaijan returned the seven regions and a part of Nagorno-Karabakh.

“It’s bad”

A dusty gravel road leads through the village of Lanjik to Sedrak Sogomonyan’s house. A small dog is scampering about right at the gate — it won’t allow us to take a single step, but a minute later it calms down in the forty-degree heat and lies down in the shade.
The plot contains a couple of trees, a pen for chickens — with a cock singing out his arias from time to time. Bath towels are drying on the branches. A white rabbit runs around on the grass.

Samvel leads us into the house — a single-story stone building with an impressive front door. Along the way he keeps repeating: “I don’t know what to do. It’s bad...”

There are three of them at home: Samvel, his daughter-in-law — his younger son’s wife — and his grandchild. The prisoner Sedrak didn’t have his own family.

His wife Termine, as is usual in the mornings, has gone to church — to pray for the return of her eldest son. Their youngest son is at work — he is the only breadwinner in the family.

At one time, Samvel was in construction: “I built this house from its foundations up!” Since the disappearance of his son, Samvel has a new job — he spends all his time on meetings with officials, human rights advocates, lawyers — anyone who, in his view, can help at least somehow. He has also met with Pashinyan, but didn’t hear anything concrete from the Prime Minister.

“The parents of all those being held captive still aren’t working anywhere. We’re going to Yerevan and meeting people there. We’re looking for the words that will get the prisoners of war back. We don’t have time to work,” he explains.

Samvel has taken out several loans to make ends meet at least somehow, but he hasn’t been able to repay the money. The banks started refusing him further loans. His youngest son doesn’t bring in a lot of money: “Well, my grandson’s a year old — well, at least he’ll buy him milk.” Right then, the grandson wakes up — little Samvel, named after his grandfather. Straight away, he runs into Samvel Senior’s arms. They play, sitting at the table. Samvel smiles for the first time: “My only joy these days.”
An icon hangs on the wall. Sedrak’s photo has been placed in the same frame. In the photo, Sedrak is wearing a red T-shirt, with his Armenian army jacket over the top and a drill cap on his head.

“I was in hospital the other day – I’ve got problems with my stomach. My wife is in hospital all the time as well – sometimes with her blood pressure, sometimes her heart starts acting up. Every day is bad. We don’t know what to do. We can’t sleep at night. In the daytimes, we want to do something, but it’s as if our arms are broken. We look at his photos and cry,” he reveals.

Samvel drinks his coffee, puts on his black cap and goes out into the yard. He’s off again to his new job – looking for those officials who know the answer to his question of when his son will return home.

“It’s bad,” he repeats again.
"Бьют, издеваются, но у меня все хорошо". Что рассказывают вернувшиеся из азербайджанских тюрем армянские военные

Ольга Просвирёва
Би-би-си
7 июля 2021

Война в Нагорном Карабахе закончилась, но несколько десятков или даже сотен — точно никто не знает — армянских военнослужащих уже несколько месяцев находятся за решёткой в Баку. Они пишут домой, что с ними все хорошо, но те, кому посчастливилось вернуться, рассказывают о постоянных издевательствах и нечеловеческом обращении. Родные военных просят только одного — вернуть мужей, сыновей и братьев на родину. Но ситуация неочевидная — в Азербайджане задержанных не считают военнопленными, обвиняя в различных преступлениях, якобы совершенных уже после подписания соглашения о прекращении огня.

"У меня всего два сына — больше нет"
"Здравствуй, моя любимая и дорогая семья. Письма получил и очень обрадовался, что у вас все хорошо. У меня все хорошо. Папа джан, драгоценный мой, не падай духом. Твой сын чувствует себя хорошо. Береги себя, следи за своим здоровьем. Мама джан, любимая моя, драгоценная мамочка, береги себя, ни на секунду не отчаивайся и слишком не переживай." 


В верхней части листа — эмблема — семь схематично нарисованных человечков держатся за руки. И подпись по-русски: "Красный Крест. Восстановление семейных связей".

"Папа джан, прошу, сходи в нашу церковь обязательно, поставь свечку, дорогой", — просит под конец письма Седрак.

Его мать Термине ставит свечу за сына каждый день и читает молитву в церкви Святой Богородицы маленького села Ланджик, в 35 километрах от Гюмри.

Самвел Согомонян каждый день видится с другими отцами, чьи дети находятся в заключении в Баку.

26-летний Седрак Согомонян был дома, когда Армения и Азербайджан подписали заявление о прекращении огня. Помогал отцу с бытом — в селе всегда найдется работа.

"А потом позвонили — пересменка на посту. Там на границе каждый смотрит за своей территорией, — говорит отец Седрака, Самвел. — Младшего сына тоже хотели забрать, но я письмо написал, что нельзя двоих одновременно забирать из дома. У меня всего два сына — больше нет. Так они одного оставили, а старшего забрали".

В последний раз отец с сыном поговорили по телефону около 16 часов вечера 13 декабря. Седрак рассказал, что его смеяют и он скоро вернется домой. После этого связь пропала.
“Бьют, издеваются, но у меня все хорошо”. Что рассказывают вернувшиеся из азербайджанских тюрем армянские во…

“Уже утром узнали, что сын попал в плен. Азербайджанцы их окружили. Сказали: ребята, оружие сложите и выходите, мы вас сдадим русским, которые неподалеку стоят. Но их не передали, обманули”, - рассказывает Самвел Согомонян.

Седрак Согомонян и другие военные стояли в селе Хингаглар (Хин Тахер) в Гадрутском районе Нагорного Карабаха. Телефонная связь там часто барахлит, местность — труднопроходимая. К окончанию войны село находилось практически на линии фронта.

По договору на этом участке новая линия разграничения должна была пройти по фактической линии фронта, а на контролируемую армянами территорию должны были войти российские миротворцы. Но в момент подписания соглашения и в последующие несколько дней было довольно много неразберихи. Российские миротворцы на своих картах отметили — село отошло Азербайджану, и встали в 15 километрах от Хингаглара. Так же считали азербайджанцы. Армяне же продолжали сменять своих бойцов на посту близ села.

В непризнанной Нагорно-Карабахской республике события 12 декабря описывают так: армянские военные стояли в Хингагларе, когда к селу подошли азербайджанцы и указали, что территория принадлежит им. Армяне не согласились. Началась перестрелка.

На прямой вопрос, кто фактически контролировал эту территорию в тот момент, не смог ответить сейчас и армянский омбудсмен Арман Татоян: "Мне кажется, что эта территория контролировалась Арменией, но я должен перепроверить".
Азербайджан называет произошедшее антитеррористической операцией, проведенной в своей зоне контроля.

Российские миротворцы после произошедшего быстро поправили свою карту — они добавили в свою зону ответственности то самое село Хинтаглар (Хин Тахер).

- Лачин: жизнь под надзором российских миротворцев

Теперь Баку называет задержанных членами "вооруженной группировки, состоящей из граждан Армении". Быстро возбудив и расследовав уголовное дело, азербайджанские следователи решили, что армяне "незаконно пересекли государственную границу, совершили взрывы, пожары и другие террористические акты".

На вопрос Би-би-си, сколько граждан Армении задержаны по аналогичным обвинениям, в Баку не ответили.

"Позвольте обратить ваше внимание на то, что армянская сторона до сих пор не выполняет свои обязательства по международному гуманитарному праву, а также свои обязательства по трехсторонним заявлениям", — ответила официальный представитель МИД Азербайджана Лейла Абдуллаева. Она имеет в виду тот факт, что Армения не предоставила Баку карты минных полей на перешедших Азербайджану территориях.

https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-57739392
Побои по графику

История Седрака и его сослуживцев, судя по всему, не уникальная.

"Проблема в том, что мы не знаем, сколько военнопленных находится в Азербайджане, — говорит омбудсмен Армении Арман Татоян. — Только представьте глубину страданий семей военнопленных, а также родственников тех, кто пропал без вести. Ведь некоторые люди до сих пор надеются, что их сыновья и братья [живы и] находятся в плену в Азербайджане. Но точных цифр никто не знает. По моим личным подсчетам, там минимум 300 человек".

В основном это военные, но есть и гражданские, считает Татоян. В Армении азербайджанских военнопленных, по данным обеих сторон, нет.

По всему миру армянская диаспора проводит пикеты с требованием освободить пленных

Полтора месяца продолжались бои в Нагорном Карабахе. Территории постепенно переходили под контроль азербайджанских сил. Кто-то отказывался уезжать или не мог этого сделать по состоянию здоровья – в основном, это были люди старшего возраста.

Правозащитники Human Rights Watch в марте описывали случаи захвата и пыток гражданского населения на территориях, перешедших под контроль Баку. Как минимум двое захваченных умерли, находясь в Азербайджане.

Азербайджан утверждает, что эти и другие утверждения не соответствуют действительности.

"Утверждения, что над задержанными армянами издеваются, абсолютно безосновательны, — заявила Би-би-си официальный представитель МИД Азербайджана Лейла Абдуллаева. — Азербайджан полностью удовлетворил все просьбы, касающиеся благополучия этих людей. Мы допускаем к ним представителей Международного комитета Красного Креста, а также уполномоченного по правам человека,
“Были, издавались, но у меня всё хорошо”. Что рассказывают вернувшиеся из азербайджанских тюрем армянские воев… предоставляем документы о состоянии здоровья всех задержанных граждан Армении. Кроме того, фото недавно вернувшихся в Армению задержанных свидетельствуют об их физическом благополучии”.

- Как Азербайджан и Армения распространяют теории заговора о карабахском конфликте

За 30 лет противостояния в Карабахе, две полноценные войны и множество локальных обострений обе стороны не раз давали повод обвинять друг друга в разного рода преступлениях, усиливая взаимную ненависть. В прошлом — особенно после выигранной армянами первой войны — о жестоком обращении с пленными и гражданским населением много писали и заявляли азербайджанские беженцы и официальные власти в Баку. Например, о массовом убийстве гражданского населения поселка Ходжали.

Сейчас о жестоком обращении с удерживаемыми Азербайджаном армянскими военнослужащими рассказывают вернувшиеся на родину армянские солдаты. Акоп Ованисян — худенький парень с широкой улыбкой на лице — сразу просит не называть своего настоящего имени и предупреждает: "Если чем-то сказанным я могу навредить находящимся там парням, я бы предпочел не говорить..."

Акоп с сослуживцами попал в окружение 2 октября прошлого года в районе Суговушана (армяне называют поселок Матагис) — больше чем за месяц до подписания мирного соглашения между премьер-министром Армении Николом Пашиняном и президентом Азербайджана Ильхамом Алиевым при посредничестве российского президента Владимира Путина.

Выйти из окружения не удалось — спустя 20 дней военнослужащих взяли в плен.

- "Сын — он для родины": почему для Азербайджана Карабах дороге жизнью

"Мы были уверены, что нас построят и убьют. На этот случай у нас было по гранате, чтобы взорваться, — вспоминает Акоп. — Но мы не смогли умереть по-геройски. Когда нас брали в плен, мы даже удивились, что ничего с нами не сделали. Наоборот — дали воды, угостили сигаретами. Но когда нас привезли в Баку, там прямо на выходе из машины нас начали избивать."

Сначала Акоп оказался в отделении военной полиции в азербайджанской столице.

https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-57739392
"Камера была большая. Там стояли нары, но нас приковали наручниками к батарее — я был прикован все время. Поначалу в камере был еще один заключенный, но вскоре его увезли, и я остался один. Побой продолжались четыре дня — каждые два часа, будто по графику. В туалет сходить не было возможности. Я не ел и не пил три дня, так что на 90% эта необходимость отпала".

На пять сутки Акопа перевели в отделение Службы государственной безопасности Азербайджана. Избиения продолжились.

"Каждый день нас допрашивали и снова били, но уже сильнее, чем в военной полиции. А 29 октября нас 40 минут транспортировали в тюрьму — и всю дорогу били особенно жестоко".

На допросах следователей интересовалось расположение танков и отдельно — местонахождение бункера Араика Арутюняна — президента непризнанной Нагорно-Карабахской республики.

"Но в целом они понимали: где я, а где Араик Арутюнян... откуда мне знать? Следователи нам говорили: "Мы будем вас судить и посадим на 25 лет". Мы спрашивали: "За что? Мы просто военнопленные".

Еще осенью отдельные видео с жестоким обращением с армянскими военнослужащими, захваченными в период боевых действий, начали утекать в интернет. Правозащитная организация Human Rights Watch посмотрела все эти видео, осудив происходящее и призвав Баку соблюдать международные конвенции.

"Насилие и унижения в обращении с военнопленными не может быть оправданием, — говорит Хью Уильямсон, директор Human Rights Watch по Европе и Центральной Азии. — Международное гуманитарное право не допускает никаких исключений из обязательства ограждать военнопленных от ненадлежащего обращения, и власти Азербайджана должны немедленно положить этому конец".

Правозащитники также заметили, что некоторые люди, попавшие на видео, впоследствии писали своим родственникам, что с ними хорошо обращаются.

"Мне вдруг стало пофиг"

Услышав про письмо Седрака Согомоняна, в котором военный рассказывает, что у него все хорошо, Акоп кашляет головой: "Оттуда невозможно никакой знак отправить. Нам говорили, что если будет написано что-то лишнее, письмо не дойдет. Письма же не сразу Красный Крест забирает, сначала их читает азербайджанское начальство, а среди них есть люди, хорошо владеющие армянским. Поэтому стараешься писать только: все хорошо, вернусь домой. И я так же писал".

Акоп Ованнисян рассказывает свою историю спокойно, с неизменной скромной улыбкой на лице, но иногда нервно сжимает руки.

"Я знаю, это странно, но я и там все время улыбался, даже когда меня избивали. Если бы я задумался и по-настоящему понял, где я, мог там бы и остаться, сгинуть. В камере нас было шестеро человек, и мы улыбались. И сейчас тоже улыбаешься. Там был сильным, потому что наделялся вернуться домой, увидеть членов семьи. Мы постоянно говорили себе: мы выдержим. Слава богу, то, чего мы опасались, не случилось. То, что мы думали, что они могли с нами сделать, — этого они не сделали..." - говорит вернувшийся военнопленный.

Карина Саркисян улыбаться не может. По ее ярко накрашенному лицу текут крупные слезы. Перед началом разговора она просит закурить, аккуратно смахивает попел, вытирает слезы рукой. Она сидит на диване в кабинете своих адвокатов, которые составляют жалобу в Европейский суд по правам человека. Ее настоящее имя многим известно, но она просит его не воспроизводить — не хочет, чтобы ее историю снова вспомнили армянские СМИ. В свое время ее история обсуждалась и за пределами Армении.
Несколько месяцев назад Карина стала героиней разошедшегося в соцсетях видео, которое в очередной раз поссорило стороны конфликта.

На видео женщина, закутанная в одеяло, стоит на пороге дома, когда к ней приближаются двое военных: “Мы азербайджанские солдаты, пришли на свою родину”. “Добро пожаловать к себе домой”, — отвечает армянка.

В Ереване видео немедленно назвали подставным, сомневались даже, что героиня ролика в принципе существует. Но позже выяснилось, что это реальный человек.

“Когда меня взяли в плен, мне сказали: надо сообщить вашим, что ты у нас, — рассказывает женщина. — Но надо прочитать этот текст: "Добро пожаловать к себе домой". Они нашли какой-то сарай, там нашли одеяло, нацепили на меня. Я уже еле-еле стояла. Они дали мне валерьянки выпить. Хотя я подозреваю, что это не валерьянка была, потому что мне вдруг стало пофиг. Просто пофиг”.

7 октября Азербайджан заявил, что “эвакуировал из зоны боевых действий продавщицу магазина в одном из сел, освобожденных азербайджанскими военными в Карабахе”. Но продавщице местного магазина Карина не была.

Незадолго до этого вместе с группой армянских военнослужащих она приехала в Джебраил. До первой войны городок был центром одного из семи азербайджанских районов, но в 1993 году азербайджанское население было вынуждено покинуть район, и фактически здесь остались лишь руины и боевые позиции армянских сил. Осенью прошлого года за эти места шли ожесточенные бои, пока 4 октября Ильхам Алиев не объявил, что город взят азербайджанцами. Взятие Джебраила стало переломным моментом в военном конфликте и дало значительное преимущество Баку.
Когда Карина Саркисян — она называет себя медсестрой — 2 октября приехала в Джебраил, бои шли полным ходом.

"Я военный человек, для меня это третья война. Когда я приехала, там было очень много раненых, очень много трупов. И надо было оказывать первую помощь, чтобы потом переправить ребят в госпиталь. Там же я умудрилась заболеть воспалением легких. И когда пришло время отходить, я поняла, что из-за своего большого веса, отеков и болезни просто не могу идти в гору". Саркисян осталась одна.

Издевательства, допросы и "пресс-конференция"

Трое суток Карина Саркисян провела в окружении. Потом выбрались на дорогу — более-менее ровную - и пошла вперед. Через несколько километров за поворотом горной тропы услышала голоса. Азербайджанцы. Женщина спряталась в овраге, и ее не заметили. Она знала, что в трех километрах от оврага располагается армянский госпиталь. По ложбинам, минуя азербайджанских военных, она добералась до нужного здания. Но там уже было пусто. Территория перешла под контроль азербайджанских сил.

Недалеко от бывшего госпиталя стоял заброшенный магазин. Всего два небольших помещения: одно — с прилавками, другое — подсобка. Карина укрылась в подсобке. Несколько раз в магазин заходили военные, забирали чай, кофе, сигареты, печенье и воду.
"Но в какой-то момент я, видимо, уснула. И они по моему храпу поняли, что в подсобке кто-то есть. Меня сначала шваброй побили. Потом, когда я сказала, что сдаюсь, они вытащили меня, схватили за волосы, начали таскать туда-сюда, рвать на мне одежду, лапать меня. И в полуголом состоянии меня метров 800 пинали. Вы себе не представляете: когда к тебе тянутся все эти воинские руки, и ты не можешь ничего сделать", - рассказывает женщина.

Потом пришел "главный" — Ибрагим. Звания и фамилии Карина не помнит. Он запретил военным трогать женщину. После этого и было записано знаменитое видео, на котором Карина приветствует азербайджанских военных у себя дома.

Военной формы на женщине не было, и Ибрагим поверил, что она местная жительница. Карину доставили в Баку, положили в больницу на обследование, даже зафиксировали следы побоев. В больницу навестили Карину приехали какие-то женщины из азербайджанского правозащитного комитета. Пленную посадили в машину, прокатили по городу, показали набережную, накормили кутабами и пахлавой в местном кафе.

"А потом они сказали, что нужно выступить на пресс-конференции. Они дали мне текст, который нужно было прочитать. В этом тексте я обвиняла Армению в агрессии и во всех возможных грехах. А в конце должна была сказать, что мы никакой войны не хотим, а это все Пашиян дал приказ собрать мужчин и отправиться на войну", - продолжает она.

После пресс-конференции Карину доставили обратно в больницу. Вечером того же дня азербайджанцы выяснили, что женщина — не просто миная жительница. С того момента Карину перевели в СИЗО. Начались допросы.

На одном из допросов женщина отказалась признаваться, что знакома с одним из представителей армянских спецслужб. "За это я получила оплеухи. Я их спокойно приняла, не закричала, потому что знала, что в соседних камерах сидят наши ребята".

Камера, где держали Карину, — четыре на четыре метра. Две кровати. В первый же день кровать под весом женщины провалилось, и несколько суток она спала на полу. Кормили, но "едой это назвать нельзя".

Соседкой по камере была пожилая армянская женщина, которая вздрагивала от любого шороха, а когда открывалась дверь, думала, что ее пришли убивать. Старушке повезло — ее отдали Еревану намного раньше. Карина говорит, что когда бабушку увезли, она почувствовала свободу: "С ней мне было очень трудно. И так ты на нервах сидишь. А тут еще рядом с той-то все время: "Ой-ой-ой!" Ты пытаешься эту мысль отогнать, а тебе постоянно об этом напоминают".

https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-57739392
В декабре Карину передали Армении. В родной деревне ее встретил Пушок — единственное живое существо в семейном доме. Вспомнив о любимом коте, Карина впервые улыбается.

В обмен на карты и признание

В феврале Никол Пашинян рассказывал, что Азербайджан вернул в Ереван 69 военнопленных и захваченных гражданских лиц. Тогда же Ильхам Алиев тогда заявил, что больше военнопленных на территории Азербайджана нет.

"По нашей информации, уже после окончания боевых действий, 20 ноября из Ширакской области Армении, города Гюмри и окрестностей была отправлена группа более 60 человек. Непонятно, как эта группа прошла через Лачинский коридор [его охраняют российские миротворцы — би-би-си] и как попала на территории, контролируемые азербайджанской армией. [...] Оказалось, что это группа, которая нападает как на наших военнослужащих, так и на мирных жителей. В результате этих провокаций и террористических актов погибли четверо наших военнослужащих и одно гражданское лицо; — утверждал Алиев.

| В Баку продолжаются суды над задержанными армянами

Весь июнь в Баку продолжались судебные заседания по делам людей, которых Азербайджан называет террористами, а Армения — военнопленными. Армянский обвиняемый Арман Татоян настаивает: хотя военнослужащих задержали после подписания трехстороннего заявления, конфликт в Карабахе по международным нормам носит статус незавершенного. Соответственно, Армения будет считать своих граждан военнопленными. В Баку считают активную фазу последнего конфликта законченной, а также ссылаются на то, что международное право признает Нагорный Карабах территорией Азербайджана.

Международные организации стараются избегать термина "военнопленные" применительно к тем, кто не попал под обмен "всех на всех" после подписания соглашения, но признают, что в заключении в Азербайджане находятся и военнослужащие.

В середине июня 15 военнослужащим повезло вернуться на родину. На границе между Азербайджаном и Грузией Баку передал Еревану людей, а Ереван — карты минных полей в Нагорном Карабахе.
На этих картах — местоположение около 100 тысяч мин в Агдамском районе, который теперь контролируется Азербайджаном. Еще зимой Азербайджанское национальное агентство по разминированию (AHAMA) жаловалось на отсутствие этих карт. Не зная расположения мин, один человек может обезвредить только 25 квадратных метров территории за день. На разминирование только в одном Агдамском районе у Азербайджана ушло бы больше 10 лет.

В начале июля Баку "в качестве гуманного шага" передал Еревану еще 15 пленных. На этот раз обменяли на карты минных полей в Физулинском и Зангильском районах.

Обмен людей на информацию о минах бывшим пленникам и их родственникам кажется нечестным, но неизбежным путем решения проблемы.

"Ну, предположим, эти карты минных полей останутся у нас. И там будут умирать по сто человек в день. Что мы с этого получим? — размышляет Акоп Ованисян. — Так что если в обмен на карты можно вернуть людей... А кроме того, если ты не отдаешь карты, значит, ожидаешь возобновления боевых действий? Не думаю, что это возможно в ближайшем будущем".

"Это очень подло [со стороны Азербайджана], — считает Карина Саркисян. — Но если этим можно спасти жизнь людей, я согласна. Я одобряю на сто процентов".

"Это бизнес: "Дайте карты, дайте карты". Азербайджанцы любят бизнес. Эти карты, эти разминированные дороги... я не могу сказать, это не мое решение. Это решают большие шишки", — вздыхает Самвел Согоян.

У проигравшей войну Армении не так много вариантов на переговорах с Баку.

Бывший президент Армении Серж Саргсян был так возмущен словами Пашиняна о том, что армяне простят властям несколько месяцев нахождения сограждан в заключении, что публично заявил: "Пашинян понимает вообще, в каком состоянии находятся эти люди? Пусть своего Ашотика [сына — Бу-бу-чу] обменяет на 20-25 человек, удерживаемых в Азербайджане".

https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-57739392
Пашинян попустительскую дискуссию поддержал и согласился обменять своего сына на всех армянских пленных. Да и Ашот Пашинян заявил, что "всегда был готов".

- "Я готов был носить клеймо предателя, но решить вопрос": экс-президент Армении Серж Саргсян о Карабахе и Пашиняне

Самвел Согомонян, который ждет возвращения своего сына, эти заявления никак не трогают. Обсуждать он их отказывается.

Наира Зограбян, заседавшая в прошлом составе армянского парламента, в конце июня рассказала, что встречалась с руководителем азербайджанской делегации в Парламентской ассамблеи Совета Европы Самедом Сеидовым.

"Сеидов сказал, что Азербайджан готов обсудить вопрос возвращения "террористов", если Армения согласится подписать мирный договор. То есть в письменном виде признать территориальную целостность Азербайджана, в том числе принадлежность ему 75% Арцаха. Тогда они в качестве "жеста доброй воли" готовы рассмотреть вопрос возвращения наших ребят", — заявила после встречи Зограбян.

Азербайджан потерял фактический контроль над Нагорным Карабахом и семьей прилегающими районами, преимущественно населенными азербайджанцами, в 1994 году по результатам первой войны. Армянский Нагорный Карабах и новую де-факто границу не признала ни одна страна-член ООН. После войны 2020 года Азербайджан вернул семь районов и часть Нагорного Карабаха.

"Плохо"

Неасфальтированная пыльная дорога ведет через деревню Ланджик к дому Седрака Согомоняна. Прямо у калитки носится маленькая собака — не дает и шагу ступить, но через минуту успокаивается на сорокоградусной жаре и ложится в тени.
На участке — пара деревьев, загон для кур — петух периодически выдает свои арии. На веревках сушатся банные полотенцы. По траве бегает белый кролик.

Самвел ведет к дому — каменному одноэтажному строению с внушительной входной дверью. По дороге постоянно приговаривает: "Не знаю, что делать. Плохо…"

Дома их трое: он, его невестка — жена младшего сына — и внук. У пленного Седрака своей семьи не было.

Жена Термине, как обычно по утрам, ушла в церковь — молиться за возвращение старшего сына. Младший на работе — он единственный кормилец в семье.


"До сих пор родители каждого, кто находится в плену, нигде не работают. То в Ереван ездим, там с кем-то встречаемся. Ищем слова, чтобы вернуть военнопленных. Времени у нас нет, чтобы работать", — объясняет он.

Сам Самвел несколько раз брал кредиты, чтобы хоть как-то сводить концы с концами, но вернуть деньги не смог. Банки начали отказывать в кредитах. Младший сын денег приносит немного. "Ну, вот внуку годик — ну, хоть молока купит". В это время проситяется внуку — маленький Самвел, названный в честь деда. Сразу идет на руки к Самвелу-старшему. Они играют, сидя за столом. Самвел впервые улыбается: "Единственная моя отрада сейчас".

https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-57739392
На стене висит икона. В ту же рамку вставлен портрет Седрака. На фото Седрак в красной футболке, сверху — китель армянской армии, на голове — уставная кепка.

"Я на дне в больнице был — у меня проблемы с желудком. Жена тоже все время в больнице — то давление, то сердце прихватит. Плохо вообще каждый день. Не можем понять, что делать. Ночью спать не можем. Днем хотим что-то сделать, а как будто рука сломана. Смотрим его фотки и плачем", - делится он.

Самвел пьет кофе, надевает черную кепку, выходит во двор. Он снова идет на свою новую работу — искать тех чиновников, которые знают ответ на его вопрос: когда сын вернется домой.

"Плохо", — снова повторяет он.

**Темы**

| Карабахский конфликт | Азербайджан | Права человека | Армения |

**Читайте также**

**Конфликт в Карабахе: Азербайджан и Армения разменили пленных на карты минных полей**

13 июня 2021

**Лачин: жизнь под надзором российских миротворцев**

2 марта 2021

**Как Азербайджан и Армения распространяют теории заговора о карабахском конфликте**
Annex 57

Annex not publicly available
Annex 58

Annex not publicly available
Annex 59

Annex not publicly available
Annex 60

Annex not publicly available
Annex 61

Annex not publicly available
Annex 62

STATE OF NEW YORK  
)  
)  
COUNTY OF NEW YORK  
)  

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that the attached translation is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a true and accurate translation from Azerbaijani into English of the attached Excerpt from Population of Azerbaijan, published by the State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

[Signature]
Ethan Ly, Managing Editor
Lionbridge

Sworn to and subscribed before me

[Signature]
JEFFREY AARON CURETON
NOTARY PUBLIC-STATE OF NEW YORK
No. 01CU6159789
Qualified in New York County
My Commission Expires 08-23-2023
Population

Year: 2020
Reference should be made to the State Statistics Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan when using the statistical data in publishing and print works.
1.5. Population by ethnic groups\(^1\)

*(by population census)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of population</td>
<td>6026.5</td>
<td>7021.2</td>
<td>7953.4</td>
<td>8922.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

including:

- **Azerbaijanians**: 4708.8, 5805.0, 7205.5, 8172.8, 78.1, 82.7, 90.6, 91.6
- **Lezgins**: 158.1, 171.4, 178.0, 180.3, 2.6, 2.4, 2.2, 2.0
- **Armenians**: 475.5, 390.5, 120.7, 120.3, 7.9, 5.6, 1.5, 1.3
- **Russians**: 475.3, 392.3, 141.7, 119.3, 7.9, 5.6, 1.8, 1.3
- **Talyshs**: …, 21.2, 76.8, 112.0, …, 0.3, 1.0, 1.3
- **Avars**: 36.0, 44.1, 50.9, 49.8, 0.6, 0.6, 0.6, 0.6
- **Turks**: 7.9, 17.7, 43.4, 38.0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 0.4
- **Tatars**: 31.4, 28.6, 30.0, 25.9, 0.5, 0.4, 0.4, 0.3
- **Tats**: 8.9, 10.2, 10.9, 25.2, 0.14, 0.14, 0.13, 0.3
- **Ukrainians**: 26.4, 32.3, 29.0, 21.5, 0.4, 0.5, 0.4, 0.3
- **Sakhurs**: 8.5, 13.3, 15.9, 12.3, 0.1, 0.2, 0.2, 0.1
- **Georgians**: 11.4, 14.2, 14.9, 9.9, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.1
- **Jews**: 35.5, 30.8, 8.9, 9.1, 0.6, 0.4, 0.1, 0.1
- **Kurds**: 5.7, 12.2, 13.1, 6.1, 0.1, 0.2, 0.2, 0.1
- **Kryzes**: …, …, …, 4.4, …, …, …, 0.04
- **Udins**: 5.8, 6.1, 4.1, 3.8, 0.1, 0.1, 0.05, 0.04
- **Khynalygs**: …, …, …, 2.2, …, …, …, 0.02
- **Other nationalities**: 31.3, 31.3, 9.6, 9.5, 0.66, 0.46, 0.12, 0.1

\(^1\) In this and the following table—all the participants determined their ethnicities and mother tongues themselves. Children’s ethnicities and mother tongues were written as told by their parents.
Íhali

AZƏRBAYCANIN ÊHALİSİ
POPULATION OF AZERBAIJAN

2020-ci il
Nəşrlərdə və çap işlərinə statistik məlumatlardan istifada edərkən Azərbaycan Respublikasının Dövlət Statistika Komitəsinə istinad edilməlidir.
### 1.5. Əhalinin milli tərkibi

*(Əhalinin siyahiyəalanınları üzrə)*

**Population by ethnic groups**

*(by population census)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Əhalinin sayı-cəmi</td>
<td>6026,5</td>
<td>7021,2</td>
<td>7953,4</td>
<td>8922,4</td>
<td>100,0</td>
<td>100,0</td>
<td>100,0</td>
<td>100,0</td>
<td>Number of population - total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o cumładan:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>of which:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>azərbaycanlılar</td>
<td>4708,8</td>
<td>5805,0</td>
<td>7205,5</td>
<td>8172,8</td>
<td>78,1</td>
<td>82,7</td>
<td>90,6</td>
<td>91,6</td>
<td>azerbaijanians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ləzgicər</td>
<td>158,1</td>
<td>171,4</td>
<td>178,0</td>
<td>180,3</td>
<td>2,6</td>
<td>2,4</td>
<td>2,2</td>
<td>2,0</td>
<td>lezgis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ermənilər</td>
<td>475,5</td>
<td>390,5</td>
<td>120,7</td>
<td>120,3</td>
<td>7,9</td>
<td>5,6</td>
<td>1,5</td>
<td>1,3</td>
<td>armenians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ruslar</td>
<td>475,3</td>
<td>392,3</td>
<td>141,7</td>
<td>119,3</td>
<td>7,9</td>
<td>5,6</td>
<td>1,8</td>
<td>1,3</td>
<td>russians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tatars</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>21,2</td>
<td>76,8</td>
<td>112,0</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>1,0</td>
<td>1,3</td>
<td>talyshs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>avarlar</td>
<td>36,0</td>
<td>44,1</td>
<td>50,9</td>
<td>49,8</td>
<td>0,6</td>
<td>0,6</td>
<td>0,6</td>
<td>0,6</td>
<td>avars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>türkler</td>
<td>7,9</td>
<td>17,7</td>
<td>43,4</td>
<td>38,0</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>0,4</td>
<td>turkishs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tatlar</td>
<td>31,4</td>
<td>28,6</td>
<td>30,0</td>
<td>25,9</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>0,4</td>
<td>0,4</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>tatarians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tatlar</td>
<td>8,9</td>
<td>10,2</td>
<td>10,9</td>
<td>25,2</td>
<td>0,14</td>
<td>0,14</td>
<td>0,13</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>tatars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ukraynalılar</td>
<td>26,4</td>
<td>32,3</td>
<td>29,0</td>
<td>21,5</td>
<td>0,4</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>0,4</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>ukrainians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>saxurlar</td>
<td>8,5</td>
<td>13,3</td>
<td>15,9</td>
<td>12,3</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>sakurks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gürcülər</td>
<td>11,4</td>
<td>14,2</td>
<td>14,9</td>
<td>9,9</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>georgians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yoğudular</td>
<td>35,5</td>
<td>30,8</td>
<td>8,9</td>
<td>9,1</td>
<td>0,6</td>
<td>0,4</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>jews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kürdər</td>
<td>5,7</td>
<td>12,2</td>
<td>13,1</td>
<td>6,1</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>kurd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qızılər</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>qyzs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>udlar</td>
<td>5,8</td>
<td>6,1</td>
<td>4,1</td>
<td>3,8</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0,05</td>
<td>0,04</td>
<td>udis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xınalıqlar</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>xinaylys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dəqər millətlər</td>
<td>31,3</td>
<td>31,3</td>
<td>9,6</td>
<td>9,5</td>
<td>0,66</td>
<td>0,46</td>
<td>0,12</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>other nationalities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1) Bu və sousraktə cədvəldə siyahiyəalanın zamanı sorgulan hər bir şəxə milliyəyyini və ana dilini özünə məxsus etmişdır.

Uşaqların milliyəyi və ana dilin valideyərinin dediklərinə osason yazmışdır.

2) *In this and following table - everybody determined nationality themself. Information on children are obtained from the parents.*