215
119
DECLARATION OF JUDGE AD HOC BROWER
Colombia’s first preliminary objection — The Pact of Bogotá — Interpretation
of Article LVI of the Pact of Bogotá — Guidance from travaux préparatoires —
The principle of effet utile — Articles LVIII and LIX of the Pact of Bogotá.
1. While I am one of the seven Members of the Court who have issued
a joint dissenting opinion vigorously opposing the Judgment’s conclusion,
reached only with the casting vote of the President due to the even,

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112
DECLARATION OF JUDGE ROBINSON
As set out in joint dissent, Colombia’s third preliminary objection should be
upheld — Declaration elaborates on a particular point of concern — The majority’s
interpretation results in the application of law in a way that overrides an elementary
principle of the Law of Treaties — Rights and obligations under a treaty apply
only in relation to other States parties unless also part of customary international
law — Application of a treaty between a State party and a non‑State party

204
108
DECLARATION OF JUDGE BHANDARI
1. In the present case, I have joined Vice‑President Yusuf, as well as
Judges Cançado Trindade, Xue, Gaja and Robinson in issuing a joint dissenting
opinion that concludes the Court ought to have allowed Colombia’s
third preliminary objection in the instant case, in so far as Nicaragua’s
continental shelf claim is clearly barred by res judicata. The rationales
underpinning that conclusion are fully canvassed in that joint dissenting
opinion and therefore I shall not reference them herein.

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106
DECLARATION OF JUDGE GAJA
Under “the definition of the continental shelf set out in Article 76,
paragraph 1, of UNCLOS [which] forms part of customary international
law” (Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), p. 666, para. 118), a coastal State’s entitlement
to an extended continental shelf does not depend on an assessment
by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). Thus,
the basis of a claim concerning the delimitation of an extended continental

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91
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE DONOGHUE
Scope and meaning of dispositive subparagraph (3) of the 2012 Judgment —
Res judicata.
I. Introduction and Summary
1. In its third preliminary objection in this case, Colombia invoked the
doctrine of res judicata, contending that the Judgment in Territorial and
Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia) (hereinafter the “Nicaragua v.
Colombia I ” or the “2012 Judgment” (I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), p. 624))
renders the claims in Nicaragua’s present Application inadmissible.

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81
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE GREENWOOD
Nature of res judicata in international law — What creates a res judicata —
Effects — Scope of the 2012 Judgment — Nature of Nicaragua’s claim in relation
to submission I (3) — Silence of the 2012 Judgment regarding Nicaragua’s claims
to a continental shelf more than 200 nautical miles from the mainland coasts of
both Nicaragua and Colombia — Absence of any ruling by the Court on the merits
of that claim — Whether Nicaragua’s claim to a continental shelf overlapping with

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67
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE OWADA
table of contents
Paragraphs
I. Res Judicata 1-32
A. The definition and scope of res judicata 1‑9
B. The background of the Court’s decision in its 2012 Judgment
on the reformulated claim of Nicaragua 10‑16
C. What the Court has decided in fact in its 2012 Judgment 17‑31
(i) The reasoning contained in Part IV of the Judgment 18‑24
(ii) The structure of the 2012 Judgment 25‑29
(iii) The burden of proof 30‑31
D. Conclusion 32

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45
JOINT DISSENTING OPINION OF VICE‑PRESIDENT YUSUF,
JUDGES CANÇADO TRINDADE,
XUE, GAJA, BHANDARI,
ROBINSON AND JUDGE AD HOC BROWER
Regret that the Court was evenly split on res judicata — Court should have
upheld Colombia’s third preliminary objection and rejected Nicaragua’s requests
as inadmissible — Res judicata is reflected in Articles 59 and 60 of the Statute of
the Court — Its main elements are identity of parties, identity of cause, and

74
75
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE AD HOC CARON
Disagreement with dismissal by the Court of Colombia’s second preliminary
objection — Requirement that there be a “dispute” as a general limitation to the
contentious jurisdiction of the Court — Specific requirement for a “dispute” under
the Pact of Bogotá — Meaning of “dispute” — Unprecedented character of the
present case — Contention by Colombia that there is no dispute between the Parties
resting on the allegation that no “claim” was made by Nicaragua that was

70
71
DECLARATION OF JUDGE BHANDARI
1. In the present case, I have voted with the majority in respect of the
first, second, third and fourth preliminary objections raised by Colombia
1. However, with the greatest of respect to my learned colleagues, I
cannot join them in rejecting Colombia’s fifth preliminary objection 2,
which contends that the present case brought by Nicaragua is, in effect,
an improper attempt by Nicaragua to have this Court enforce one of its