APPLICATION FOR REVISION OF THE JUDGMENT OF 23 MAY 2008
IN THE CASE CONCERNING SOVEREIGNTY OVER
PEDRA BRANCA/PULAU BATU PUTEH, MIDDLE ROCKS AND
SOUTH LEDGE (MALAYSIA/SINGAPORE) (MALAYSIA v. SINGAPORE)

ADDITIONAL WRITTEN OBSERVATIONS
AND DOCUMENTATION OF
MALAYSIA

ANNEXURES
(Volume 1: Annexures A – C)

11 December 2017
Annexure A

Additional newspaper clippings concerning the Labuan Haji incident:


“Kapal mengganggu di-laut Johor” [“Gunboat intrusion in the Johore waters”], *Berita Harian*, 26 February 1958 (with translation);

“Tengku mahu laporan fasal kapal meriam” [“Tengku wants report on gunboat”],
*Berita Harian*, 27 February 1958 (with translation).
KUALA LUMPUR, Wed,—The Prime Minister, Tengku Abdul Rahman, is calling for a full report on the incident in Johore territorial waters yesterday in which an Indonesian gunboat harassed a K.P.M. ship.

He told the Straits Times today: “We are very much concerned about this incident.

“This is the first time I’ve heard that Indonesian gunboats had come into Johore waters.”

The K.P.M ship, the 250-ton Labuan Hadji, left Singapore yesterday morning for South Siam.

The Indonesian gunboat harassed it off Horsburgh lighthouse, 35 miles northeast of Singapore, but disappeared when the Dutch master of the ship signalled Singapore for help.
KAPAL MENGANGGU DI-LAUT JOHOR

Berita Harian, 26 February 1958, Page 1

Kapal itu, Labuan Hadji berat 250 ton, yang telah berlayar dari Singapura pada sabah, pagi sedang meneruskan pelayaran-nya ka-Siam Selatan.

Suatu perutusan dari kapal itu pada tengah hari berkata bahawa sa-buah kapal meriam Indonesia sedang mengganggu-nya dekat dengan Rumah Api Horsburgh, 35 batu distimor laut Singapura. Ia minta bantuan.

Suatu perutusan yang terkemudian berkata bahawa kapal meriam itu telah ghaib.

Angkatan Laut Belanda hari ini mendsahirkan bahawa satu pasokan orang2 Indonesia yang bersenjata di atas sa-buah kapal daftaran Belanda telah menembak sa-
buah kapal perang pembinasan Belanda yang telah menahan-nya di-Selat Macassar pada hari Khamis sudah.


Nampak pergi

Sa-buah kapal terbang Sunderland dan sa-buah kapal launch Angkatan Laut Malaya telah menjawab rayuan minta bantuan yang di-hantar dengan radio oleh kapal Labuan Haji itu.

Sa-orang juruchakap Angkatan Laut malam ini berkata bahawa di-masa kapal terbang Sunderland itu tiba di-tempat berlaku kejadian itu, kapal meriam Indonesia itu sudah pun pergi dan kapal Labuan Haji itu dinampak belayar dengan tidak di-ganggu menuju ka-utara.

Dia berkata lagi: "Sejakt dari itu tidak-lah ada apa2 kejadian lagi yang di-berita-kan."
GUNBOAT INTRUSION IN THE JOHORE WATERS

Singapore, Tuesday — An Indonesian gunboat today has intruded a ship Koninklijke Paketvaart-Maatschappij (K.P.M) in the Johor territorial waters but the gunboat had disappeared after the ship’s captain had sent a message to Singapore for help.

The ship, Labuan Hadji weighing 250 tons, which sailed from Singapore in the morning was continuing its voyage to southern Siam.

A message from the ship at midday said that an Indonesian gunboat was intruding him near the Horsburgh Lighthouse 35 mile northeast of Singapore. He had asked for help.

The latest message stated that the gunboat had disappeared.

The Dutch Navy today disclosed that a team of Indonesians who were armed on a Dutch registered ship had fired a Dutch destroyer warship which had held them back in the Strait of Macassar last Thursday.

A Reuter news from The Hague said that the Indonesian men were stripped of their arms and the ship, Kasimbar weighing 2,180 tonnes, was taken to Manokwari, Netherlands New Guinea.

The ship waved the Netherlands flag. The Navy said that the ship Kasimbar is one of the K.P.M ships which was "illegally seized" by the Government of Indonesia. The ship’s captain is an Indonesian.

Seen sailed away

A Sunderland aeroplane and a launch boat of the Malayan Navy had responded to the appeal for help sent by radio by the Labuan Hadji.

A Navy spokesman said tonight that when the Sunderland aeroplane arrived at the site where the incident occurred, the Indonesian gunboat had already gone and the said Labuan Haji ship was seen sailing off without being intruded heading north.

He added: "Since then there has not been any other incidents being reported"
Tengku mahu laporan fasal kapal meriam

PERDANA Menteri, Tengku Abdul Rahman, akan meminta satu penyata penoh berkenaan dengan kejadian di-laut jajahan Johor pada hari 'Thalatha' sudah dalam mana sa-buah kapal meriam Indonesia telah mengganggu sa-buah kapal K.P.M.

Kelmarin dia telah mema-alumkan kapada Berita Hari-an: "Kami sangat2 terharu berkenaan dengan kejadian ini.

"Ini-lah mula kali-nya saya mendengar yang kapal meriam Indonesia telah masok ka-luat Johor."

Kapal K.P.M. itu—Labuan Hadji berat 250 ton—telah belayar dari Singapura pada pagi hari 'Thalatha' menuju ka-Siam Selatan.

Kapal meriam Indonesia itu telah mengganggu-nya dekat dengan Rumah Api Horsburgh, 35 batu di-Timor laut Singapura.

Kapal meriam itu telah ghaib apa bila kapitan kapal itu, sa-orang Belanda, mengutus ka-Singapura meminta bantuan.
Tunku wants report on gunboat

The Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman will ask for a complete statement regarding the incident in the Johore territorial waters on Tuesday where an Indonesian gunboat had violated the Koninklijke Paketvaart-Maatschappij (KPM) ship.

Last night he had informed Berita Harian: "We are deeply perturbed by this incident."

"This is the first time I heard that an Indonesian gunboat had entered the Johor waters."

The KPM ship - Labuan Hadji weighing 250 tons - sailed from Singapore on Tuesday morning heading towards South Siam.

The Indonesian gunboat had violated it near the Horsburgh Lighthouse, 35 miles northeast of Singapore.

The gunboat had disappeared when the ship's captain, a Dutchman, had sent a message to Singapore for help.
Annexure B

File DEFE 69/539:
“Naval Operations in the Malacca and Singapore Straits, 1964–66”.
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Date</th>
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<td>Date opened</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>SECURED</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>SECOND REVIEW</td>
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**SUBJECT**

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE MALACCA & SINGAPORE STRAITS 1964-66

**NORTH 22/6 PART III**

**DELETION**

69/539

**SECRET**

**ATTENTION IS DRAWN TO THE NOTES ON THE INSIDE FLAP**

**ENTER NOTES OF RELATED FILES ON PAGE 2 OF THIS JACKET**

**THIS FILE MUST BE CIRCULATED UNDER COVER, AND KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY WHEN NOT IN USE**

**DIVISION**

DNTUP

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PAP R

Ministry of Defence

**POSAL or PA Action**

See note on file flap

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This file may be downgraded to:

on Return for Review

* ON (insert DATE)

Certifying Officer

Appointment and Branch

Date
DND has placed opposite the Commander Far East Fleet's report on operations against Indonesian confrontation.

It is the intention to distill the information contained and to include it in the current rewrite of the Fighting Instructions Vols 1 and 2.

Other copies have been distributed as follows:

- BM Plans, BHC, DMS Int(N), CEN(N), BMSW(N), DSW(N), RNAN, DMTC(N), DNS, ACNS(O), ACNS(P), ACNS(W), DS5.
- DOA(EN), AGSA(OA), DOAB, CO(RH).
- RN Tactical School.
- Sec DCNS for Naval Historical Section.

DNTWP will co-ordinate remarks and the docket has been marked immediate due to the tight schedule for the production of the Fighting Instructions.

For Director of Naval Tactical and Weapons Policy
15th December 1966

Handwritten note:
"Noted with interest.

H. T. Finding
For R.G.W(01) 16/67."
Noted. Preliminary reference to possible development of homing for this type of operation.

For DGA (N)
23rd January 1967

Noted. R. Quin
14. II. 67. For D.C. Ships

Noted. Wallace Townsman
16/2/67

Noted. R. Higg
17. 2. 67.

DGHM
DNTWP

Noted. Copies of COMPEF's report have been sent to HM Ships DRYAD, VERNON, EXCELLENT, MERCURY and the NBDL School for information and any modification of training necessary in advance of the incorporation of this information into the Fighting Instructions.

J. Bick
For Director General of Naval Training
(WHI: 9000; Ext. 1198)

N. S. W
25 March 67
NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE MALACCA AND SINGAPORE STRAITS 1964-1966

INTRODUCTION

1. When the Indonesian Government started its policy of confrontation against Malaysia active operations were confined to the Borneo States; these were - and have remained - largely military in character. Although Naval patrols had been maintained in the Kuching and Tawau areas for three years, they were mainly of a deterrent nature; there is little evidence that any seaborne incursions had been planned.

2. In August 1964 however the Indonesians expanded the area of active confrontation to West Malaysia. As there is no direct land bridge between Indonesia and the Malayan peninsula all incursions had to be made by sea or air. Only once attempt at an airborne operation was made, and this was so clearly a political and military failure that it was not repeated. A large number of various types of seaborne incursions were however mounted, so that the Navy - in contrast to its subsidiary role in Borneo - became the most active partner in the combined efforts by all services to deter and destroy such incursions. It is the aim of this paper to give an account of the Naval operations directed to this end.

THE THREAT

3. The Indonesians maintained a total of about 40,000 armed men in Sumatra and the Borneo Islands. Approximately three-quarters of these were regular garrison troops employed on home defence and internal security duties and they had no connection with confrontation activities.

4. The remaining 10,000 formed part of SIAGA command, the overall command organization for carrying out confrontation. Two infantry brigades were stationed along the North East coast of Sumatra, and one amphibious landing brigade in the Rhos. It is thought that these troops were unlikely to be used in fact, but were useful in that their presence as an overt military threat was a valuable political weapon. They were also available for immediate counter attack against Malaysia, should Indonesia be attacked.

5. In addition there were about 1,000 men organized into various units known collectively as Special Forces. These consisted of Indonesian "volunteers" (Sukacelawanan), Malaysian traitors previously exfiltrated, and regular troops seconded to Special Forces.

6. These forces were stationed in the Rhos and islands off the Sunatran coast (see map Annex A). Their command and control structure changed several times from 1964 to 1966, but they finally wound up as subordinate units to the SIAGA brigade in whose area they were based.

7. It was these Special Forces who carried out the confrontation operations, which are discussed in more detail below. It has been a feature of all Indonesian activity in West Malaysia that the regular armed services have very seldom been engaged: the army only to the extent that seconded troops were employed in Special Forces; the Air Force only for the one abortive operation, and the Navy only for occasional patrols to confront our own ships. Customs launches (BT boats) were however used sometimes to escort and support craft on incursion operations.
Rare appearance of Indonesian Navy. One of three PT vessels which harassed HMS PUNCHESTON 10th February 1965. Both turrets were trained on HMS PUNCHESTON.

Types of Incursion Operations

6. Indonesian operations may be broadly divided into two categories:

   a. Infiltration

      Those consisted of sections of about 12 men in a kampit or other vessel (often a captured Malaysian fishing craft) coming across the Malacca or Singapore Straits, hoping to land undetected on the coast of Malaysia. The landings were generally timed for just before dawn. The party then hoped to strike inland and set up a base deep in the jungle, such as the Communist terrorists had done ten years earlier. One of the favourite objectives was a mountain, Gunong Blumat in Johore. The Indonesians apparently considered that they would be able to carry out guerrilla operations from a camp in this area, and that air re-supply and reinforcement would be feasible.

   b. Sabotage

      Saboteurs came in smaller numbers. They were generally in plain clothes and often had no arms other than the explosives or bombs, which were to be placed at key points, power stations, oil storage depots etc. There were also psychological saboteurs, whose duty it was to stir up hatred between the Malayan and Chinese, Singapore was of course the prime target for Sabotage operations, but a number of incidents also occurred in Malaya, particularly near Kuala Lumpur and Malacca.

9. Both types of operation were invariably mounted by night, as far as is
known not one infiltration or sabotage attempt was made by day. In general the enemy appeared to prefer moonlit nights to moonlit ones, though this was probably an erroneous tactic.

10. There was also a threat to security posed by armed Indonesian craft pillaging barter trade craft and Malaysian fishing boats. This was however not directly related to, or in support of, confrontation. It has not therefore been treated in the main body of the paper, but a brief description of the problem is set out in Annex C.

11. Looked at in an objective light it must be admitted that the Indonesian campaign was badly conducted. Their intelligence was poor, their training limited, most of the operations half-hearted in execution, and there was a general lack of that resolute overall direction that is essential if a campaign of this nature is to succeed. The paragraphs that follow contain an account of their operations and their shortcomings.

Indonesian Aim

12. The campaign of incursions into West Malaysia and Singapore was in support of the overall aim of confrontation policy which was, of course, the disintegration of Malaysia into its constituent parts. It is clear that the Indonesian authorities were considerably influenced by their own success in the West Irian campaign, and they were perhaps too ready to draw an unjustified parallel between the history of events there and the situation in Malaysia. In any event the Indonesians believed that by applying military, economic and political pressure to Malaysia it would fall without the necessity for a full-scale war. The campaign of incursions into West Malaysia was part of that pressure.

Indonesian Intelligence

13. It would appear that the Indonesians were to some extent victims of their own propaganda. Having told the world so often that the peoples of the Malay Peninsula and Northern Borneo had no desire for Malaysia, they eventually believed it themselves. Certainly the personnel who took part in the incursions were briefed that the local people of the kampong of Malaya would assist them. While it is true that a number of Malaysians - particularly Chinese - did betray their own country in one way or another, the great majority of the population proved themselves to be unservingly loyal. In many cases it was largely due to information received from members of the public that these Indonesians who succeeded in landing were so quickly rounded up.

Conduct of Indonesian Operations

14. In the early stages of the campaign the enemy effort was largely concentrated on infiltration operations against South West Johore. Because at that time our own Naval patrols were few, badly organised and lacking intelligence, the greater part of these infiltration attempts were successful in landing on the Malaysian coast. They were however fairly quickly brought to action by the military, and none succeeded in remaining an effective fighting unit for more than a few days.

15. When it became obvious that the infiltrations were not only unsuccessful militarily, but were also tending to rally the Malaysians together, the Indonesian effort turned towards sabotage.

16. During the early months of 1965 a large number of sabotage attempts were made, particularly against Singapore. In most cases very little significant damage was done, indeed some of the bombs were exploded on the beach. However, the morale effect on the population of the island was marked, and it became
necessary to station a large number of Naval patrol ships in the Singapore Strait. This had an almost immediate effect, and the number of incidents dropped off sharply.

17. It is of interest to note that there was at no time any attempt by the Indonesians deliberately to attack Naval ships, although this could have been done with possibly disastrous effects. The bulk of the patrol ships were CMS or other wooden-hulled vessels, and it is only too easy to imagine the effect on one of them of a night attack by three or four self-propelled and armed with infantry-type rocket launchers. On a few occasions shore guns based on the Indonesian islands in the Singapore Strait fired at Naval patrol ships, but no hits were scored.

The end of an Indonesian operation. Prisoners and wounded on board HMS PISCERON.

18. In fact, the enemy operations were nearly all carried out in an irresolute and unco-ordinated manner, with inadequate preparation and training. It must be admitted that this largely contributed to the success of our own counter-invasion operations.

LIMITATIONS OF NAVAL SECURITY FORCES

19. Before considering the way in which our own counter-invasion operations were conducted, it is necessary to describe some of the limitations that were placed upon them, either by political directive or force of circumstances.

Defensive Policy

20. It was the considered policy of the Commonwealth Governments involved that our forces should resist all incursions, but that no form of counter attack was to be permitted, for fear of escalation: this meant that the bases from which incursions were launched would be immune from attack; indeed, our forces were not even permitted to enter water claimed by Indonesia as their territorial sea (there was one small exception to this rule which will be described later). As this chain involved a twelve-mile stretch of water seaward of straight
base lines, it considerably reduced the area in which maritime security forces could operate (see map Annex A and comment Annex B).

Command and Control

21. The security forces involved were those of Britain, Malaysia, Australia, and New Zealand. Although the British were the predominant partners in this alliance it was of over-riding political importance that the anti-confrontation operations should not be able to be depicted as a British imperialist-colonialist war against Indonesia. For this reason the role of overseas Commonwealth forces had to be played down, while that of Malaysian forces had to be emphasised. This led to a situation in which – although the British were in fact in control of operations – it was necessary to portray to the outside world – particularly Afro-Asiatic opinion – that Malaysia was conducting her own defence, with some slight assistance from allies. In these circumstances the efficiency of the military command and control arrangements was bound to suffer.

Fishing Vessels

22. It has already been explained that the Indonesian incursions were made by means of kumpits or other small craft. In the Malacca and Singapore Straits it is normal for large numbers of fishing craft to operate, both by day and night. In the South Malacca Strait there are over two thousand registered off-shore fishing craft, besides many other small sampans, koleks, etc.

23. It was a considerable problem for Naval patrols to operate effectively in areas where their radar screens were liable to be saturated by fishing fleets, and it was one that was never satisfactorily resolved. Coastal curfews could and were imposed at times of great threat, but they only extended to the limit of Malaysian territorial waters, which – unlike that of Indonesia – was of three miles only measured from the low-water mark.

Types of Our Ships

24. The details of our own forces are given in a later section, but it should be here emphasised that very few of the ships employed were designed for the work of anti-incursion patrolling. In general their greatest defect was their lack of speed and lack of a detecting device with adequate range.

Command and Control

25. The political implications of the command and control problem have been touched upon in paragraph 21. While it was necessary that Malaysia should be seen to have considerable representation in the command structure, it was also necessary that the structure should be effective. The arrangements that were eventually agreed upon proved adequate to the task, although it must be conceded that at no time were they severely tested.

26. Responsibility for the overall conduct of operations was vested in a Combined Operations Committee, which functioned through a permanent staff known as CPSCO. Under this were three co-ordinating headquarters, responsible for the conduct of land, air and sea operations. The authority for the latter was Commander Far East Fleet. In this capacity he was responsible for the deployment of all Naval and Police vessels assigned to anti-confrontation duties, and for assigned maritime air effort.

27. There was no special headquarters available from which CPSCO could exercise this new responsibility, so a number of changes were made within the existing staff and headquarters structure. The Far East Fleet Operations
Room was in effect divided into two sections, one of which continued to operate the Fleet as before, while the other concentrated on the maritime co-ordinator function. A number of extra plotting and communication facilities were provided for this new section, which was staffed by one Lieutenant Commander, one Lieutenant (SD) and one AS (Nav, Tec.). A large scale wall map of the Malacca and Singapore Straits was displayed in the Operations Room, and the coastline divided into designated areas for ease of ordering patrols. These arrangements proved to be satisfactory.

28. On the question of local command and control at sea, it was agreed that where ships of different Navies were operating together, the senior officer present - regardless of nationality - would be OIC. In practice this meant that it was nearly always a British Officer who was in charge, but no difficulties were experienced when this was not the case.

29. The forces available to COFWE for his task were elements from three Navies and two Air Forces. The following paragraphs indicate the approximate numbers on patrol per night (as stated in paragraph 9 there was no significant threat by day).

30. For East Plact. Two frigates and about six OME/OME. OMEs were normally only employed in the Singapore Straits.

31. Royal Malaysian Navy. During the period 1964-66 the RMN was in the process of expansion but its average strength was one EACH Class Frigate and some 25 smaller vessels, vapor fast patrol craft, OME, and some other miscellaneous types. Of these about six vessels per night were available for patrol in the West Malaysian area.

32. Marine Police. The Malaysian and Singapore Marine Police forces possess a large number of various types of launches. The largest and newest of these are the off-shore craft, known as PA craft. These are of 20M size, with an outboard and radar, and a top speed of about 24 knots. They have proved to be very satisfactory vessels and much more reliable in operation than the equivalent RMN fast patrol craft. At present Malaysia has six craft and Singapore none, but it is understood that some are being built for Singapore.

33. All other types of police launches are classified as inshore patrol craft. They have jurisdiction only within the Malaysian/Singapore territorial sea (three miles from low water mark) and they are of limited range and based on specific ports from which they cannot be easily re-deployed.

34. On average the number of police vessels available for patrol each night was as follows:

- 2 offshore patrol craft (Malaysian)
- 20 inshore patrol craft (Malaysian)
- 12 inshore patrol craft (Singapore)

35. RAF LRF aircraft. Shackletons based at Changi were employed on an average of five nights per week to fly patrols as required by COFWE. In general the aircraft was tasked for the area of the South Malacca Straits with an on-task time of six hours.

36. RMAF maritime air patrol. RMAF Doves based on Kuala Lumpur flew visual recce at East Light in the North Malacca Strait. Aircraft availability was low and only about five patrols a month were flown.

37. Dawn Beach recce patrols. RAP Pioneers were used on occasions to fly beach recce patrols in areas where it was possible that Indonesians would land.
7.

Summary of Forces Available

38. The following average totals were thus available to CONF at the end of each night for patrolling the coast of Malaya:

- 2 Frigates
- 6 CES/SUB
- 6 RMM vessels
- 34 Patrol craft
- 1 LRP aircraft

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

39. The total length of the coastline of the Malayan peninsula is over 1000 miles. With only some 50 vessels available for patrol each night there could be no question of erecting a "water-tight" barrier round the country. From the first it was decided that patrols must be concentrated in the most threatened areas, even though this would mean leaving long stretches of coast-line largely unprotected.

Intelligence

40. It therefore became of vital importance to establish accurately which were the most threatened areas, and great efforts were made to gather and collate all the available intelligence. This was by no means an easy task.

41. Although intelligence derived from British sources could of course be readily obtained, this was not the case with Malayan or Singaporean information. Each state runs its own secret service, whose operations are quite separate and concealed from those of the next state. In addition the Malayan Intelligence Service were aware that we, the British did not always make all our material available to them, so that there was a natural tendency to reciprocate in the same way.

42. Similar difficulties were experienced in connection with obtaining information derived from the interrogation of captured Indonesians. These interrogations were carried out by the Special Branch, who often tended to be reluctant to release the material obtained thereby. Furthermore, as the interrogators were always army or police officers, they very often failed to extract from the prisoners information of considerable naval significance.

43. These problems were eventually overcome to a large extent. A Naval Intelligence Officer was employed full time on duties connected with interrogation, and gradually liaison and mutual confidence improved. However, even so the end there lingered the suspicion that nobody had access to all the information that was available in Malaya about the Indonesians, and that in some cases intelligence was being garnered for its own sake, rather than to be used to.

44. However, a reasonably accurate picture of the Indonesian dispositions and intentions was built up, maintained and presented to the Operational Staff. Areas of threat were established, and it is interesting to note that they changed little during the two years of operations.

Threatened Areas

45. As the location of the Indonesian bases became known, it became clear that the main areas of threat were:

- a. South Malacca Straits
- b. Singapore
- c. S.E. Johore.

/46......
46. The particular problems associated with these areas are considered in
the following paragraphs.

South Malacca Strait

47. The major Indonesian bases in this area were those at Sinaboi, Makrah,
Kenbong and Selat Panjang. Each was targeted for a particular stretch of
Malaysian coastline opposite to it. When intelligence indicated that a
particular base was likely to be about to launch an operation, a patrol group
would be forced to patrol against that base. The OTC of the patrol group
would be informed of the number of ships assigned to him and given all the
available intelligence. He would then set up patrol lines across the most
likely approach routes. The area in which he could effectively operate was
limited by:
a. Malaysian coastline
b. Target area for the base
c. I.C.W.

48. This shown diagramatically:

49. Within this operating area the OTC was free to dispose his forces as
he thought best, taking into account the following factors:

a. Presence of merchant shipping
b. Presence of fishing craft
c. Weather

50. This was the standard method of organizing patrols in the Malacca Strait.
Patrol groups always consisted of between three and six ships.

51. Detriment patrols. When intelligence indicated that two bases were likely
to launch incursions, a different method would be used against the second base,
if there were insufficient ships to form two patrol groups. COMPY was given
disposition to authorize a frigate to enter ICT for the purpose of shadowing
and reconnaissance, providing that it did not approach closer than three miles.
to the Indonesian coastline.

52. A frigate would thus be employed in close patrol off the base, without making any attempt to conceal its presence. By this means it was hoped to deter any incursion attempts. The frigate was not, in fact, allowed to take any positive action while within 100 miles of the coast. Unfortunately, some ships did not know this.

53. In this way an effective form of patrol could be carried out without using as many ships as for the standard method.

54. Submarines. On three occasions submarines were used in an advanced warning role. When intelligence was received of an impending incursion from a particular base, a submarine was stationed to carry out a night periscope and radar watch some four miles to seaward of the base. Unfortunately on each occasion a submarine was used, the predicted incursion failed to materialise, but the mechanics of the operation worked well, and it is considered that the concept is a sound one.

Singapore Strait

55. There were particular problems associated with patrolling in the Singapore Strait. Singapore provided a large number of excellent targets for sabotage, all of them only a few miles from Indonesian territory. The Singapore Straits are narrow, full of navigational hazards and heavily used by merchant shipping.

56. The Indonesians therefore concentrated a good deal of their effort on sabotage operations against Singapore, to the extent that early in 1965 it was found necessary to devote a large proportion of Naval patrol effort to defend it. At one period twelve ships were deployed for this duty each night.

57. A considerable organisation was built up to defend Singapore. This was based on the formation of three lines of defence:

   a. Naval offshore patrols,
   b. Police inshore patrols,
   c. Shore lookouts, constables, etc.

58. In addition a chain of four Naval shore radar stations was established to improve the cover of the ship-borne naval radar. ROP and Army anti-aircraft radar stations also made reports of surface contacts when such were observed.

59. Some anti-sampen booms were also laid by the Fleet Boom Defence Depot. These were in effect, "floating fences" which could not be penetrated by an outboard-motor-driven sampan. These were constructed from light anti-Torpedo netting suspended from a jackstay, which was attached to 96 gallon floats, as shown in the photograph.
60. Overall co-ordination of all these forces was achieved through a local
maritime operations centre situated in the Singapore Police Headquarters.
This operations room (known as "Coastguard") had direct command and control
over the police inshore patrols, the radar stations and other forces, but the
Naval ships retained under their own COEs, who were responsible direct to
COMFAR. A good information link with Coastguard on UHF was however maintained.

61. Once this organisation had been built up, it began to show results. By
the middle of 1965, very few infiltration attempts were succeeding in reaching
Singapore. Our most successful night was perhaps that of 25/26 June, when the
Indonesians launched a co-ordinated attack by four sampans, each with a
different objective. Three of these were intercepted, and the occupants
killed or captured, and the fourth returned to its base, having failed to
penetrate to its objective. Regrettably one midshipman was killed and seven
ratings wounded during the actions on this night.

South East Johore

62. The Pengurang peninsula of S.E. Johore was considered by the Indonesians
to be a most suitable landing area for infiltrators, because it is very
sparsely inhabited, covered in swamp or jungle, and there are no roads
connecting it to the rest of Malaya.

63. The Indonesians targeted for this area were a company of the police
BRIMOB, who were specially trained for operations of this nature. The first
attack came during a three-week period in March 1965, when approximately 100
attempted to cross. They came in sampans each containing two boatmen and
about 11 troops.

64. A total of 35 were either killed or captured at sea by the Naval patrols
and the remainder succeeded in landing, where they caused a great deal of
trouble to the military before they were eliminated.

65. It was during these operations that some of the fiercest sea fighting
of the whole campaign took place. The BRIMOB sampans were well handled and
they fought back against the CMS with vigour and determination right to the
end. In one case a CMS had to retire temporarily from action as it had run
out of ready use ammunition.
66. In these engagements the enemy used mortars and armalite rifles, and it is considered that we were particularly fortunate that no serious casualties were suffered by our ships.

**Use of Helicopters**

67. Patrolling frigates equipped with helicopters found them to be of great value both in Singapore and Malacca Straits. Although they could not be employed to any great effect at night, the Whips proved to be invaluable for dusk and dawn patrols. The great success achieved by HMS AJAX on 24th December 1964, was largely due to the extended cover provided by her helicopter. Seven boatloads of infiltrators were arrested by HMS AJAX alone on that occasion.

**TECHNIQUE OF PATROLLING**

**Patrol Groups**

68. The boats used by the enemy for incursions were nearly all long low and narrow, thus being difficult to detect at night. Although trials with other forms of equipment were carried out, it was established that radar remained the best form of detecting device at night. Even so the average maximum detection range was found to be only a little over two miles.

69. Under these circumstances it is obvious that one ship can patrol only a relatively short line. In fact this was found to be between two and four miles. It was therefore necessary to maintain ships in groups of three or four in order to provide a reasonable spread of patrol effort across the likely lines of approach of Indonesian craft.

**Patrol Speed**

70. Scientific investigation had shown that it was more efficient to patrol at the maximum practicable speed, thereby increasing the effectiveness of the radar. Although CMS are very noisy at high speeds, this theory was borne out in practice. However, when the area to be covered was relatively small, and there were more than four ships available to patrol it, (conditions that seldom obtained unfortunately) a most efficient form of patrol could be set up by patrolling in the conventional manner with the main body, and having one ship at anchor or drifting in the middle of the area. The Commanding Officer of this ship was then able to concentrate all his attention on the radar; spurious contacts, fishing stakes etc., could be more quickly evaluated as such, and the course and speed of any intruder craft readily appraised. The stationary ship could thus be used to vector the other patrol vessels on to suspicious contacts.

**Use of Radar**

71. It has already been stated that radar was found to be the best night detection device. It was also proved that its effectiveness was very sharply degraded if the set was not carefully tuned to maximum efficiency. A number of officers and operators did not at first appreciate this, whereas a set slightly off-tune would still detect a 15,000 ton tanker at a reasonable range, it would almost certainly not detect a 15 foot sampan at all.

72. Furthermore, the most perfectly tuned set is only of value if it is watched by an alert operator. At best the number of contacts from a sampan is likely to be small, and it is all too easy for the operator to miss them unless he is continuously vigilant.

73. The final link in the chain is of course the OOW. He must not disregard
any contacts reported to him, unless he can positively identify them as of no interest. In one case where this was not done, a small floating radar contact was not investigated by the 001. It subsequently transpired that this was a sma'pan containing 15 Indonesian infiltrators who then succeeded in landing on the coast of 35 Johore. It took two battalions and six weeks before they were eliminated.

Illumination

74. Once a contact has been detected there remains the problem of identifying it, and if necessary firing at it. For these purposes light is required, and it is of course required to the effective range of the weapons carried. In order to achieve this as far as possible it was found necessary to fit all patrol ships with 2 inch RFL, arm 2 inch mortars with illuminating bombs, and incus flares. Searchlights and signalling projectors were found to be a most dangerous form of illumination, as they could and did provide an excellent point of aim for enemy fire.

75. The arm 2 inch mortars were eventually discarded as they were found to be dangerous for shipboard firing. Incus flares were used instead for short range illumination.

76. Infra Red. Trials with Infra Red equipment were carried out in 1965, full details of which are contained in GWMF 2078 F.E.F/Policy/Part II dated 22nd November 1965. The IR searchlight has proved to be a most valuable classification device, particularly as it does not disclose the presence of own ship. The most suitable equipment was found to be the Philips US 1900 lamp and US 1500 binocular; this combination gave an average classification range of 650 yards. Four CMS were fitted with this equipment in June and July 1966.

Fighting

77. Although various types of warships were employed on patrol duties, the most numerous were CMS, and they took part in nearly all the actions that were fought during the course of the campaign. From this a fund of experience has been built up which was not previously available. It is thought that CMS may well have to carry out a similar role in the future, and for this reason a brief account of the changes necessary to make a CMS into a fairly efficient small gunboat is given at Annex B.

Alertness

78. Like all patrolling anywhere in the world, there were many periods of inactivity. Night after night the ships would be maintaining their patrols and nothing would happen. Insensibly there was a tendency for precautions to be eased, vigilance to be relaxed. It was at this very stage that many small ships suddenly found themselves in the middle of a battle. Several commanding officers who experienced this have commented on the effect on their ships companies of the intensely sudden transition from, perhaps, routinely approaching their ninety-ninth ammen for investigation to suddenly being shot at. It is possible the hardest task of leadership under these conditions to maintain an efficient standard of training and alertness at all times throughout the patrol.

CONCLUSION

79. Despite the various difficulties and limitations with which the Naval forces were faced, it may be said that their operations were successful in catching and deterring Indonesian incursion attempts. However, in drawing
lessons for the future it must be borne in mind that the enemy operated at a low level of intensity and often at a low level of efficiency. In particular no deliberate attacks were made against ships on patrol. As has been mentioned, the wooden-hulled minesweepers could be particularly vulnerable to certain forms of attack from small craft. Had the Indonesians adopted only a slightly more aggressive policy the result might have been very different.

80. A summary of those lessons learnt which it is thought might have applications in the future has been included as Annex B.

List of Annexes

A. Map of operational area.
B. Lessons learnt.
C. The Barter Trade.
D. Legal aspects of patrolling.
E. Specimen Debrief Case.
F. Copy of "Orders for ships patrolling in Defence of Western Malaysia Seaboard (Second Edition)" (MAPPOS II).
G. Copy of "Incident Reports from ships patrolling in defence of Western Malaysia Seaboard" (MAPPOS II, Part II).
H. Copies of relevant FOs.
ANNEX B.

LESSONS LEARNED

Type of Patrol Vessel

1. None of the RAN ships employed on patrol duties were designed for the work. Although it is unlikely that specifically-designed patrol ships will be built, it is desirable to know what the requirements for such vessels are, so that they can as far as possible be built into future HCM or coastal forces craft.

2. As a result of experience in the campaign it is suggested that a patrol craft should be:
   a. mechanically reliable
   b. fast, (at least 25 kts)
   c. low silhouette
   d. silent
   e. good detection device (5 miles against small sampans)
   f. non-self-disclosing classification device (infra-red or similar)
   g. good all-round short range fire-power. Illumination ability to match.

Type of Patrol

3. Experience suggests that patrols should be carried out in accordance with the following principles:
   a. Patrol as close to enemy base as circumstances allow.
   b. Keep patrol lines short, detection ranges in practice to be much shorter than theoretical ones.
   c. Concentrate forces in areas of threat. Do not spread effort thinly over large areas.

Maintenance of effort over a long period

4. The ships of the Tasharo Flotilla were employed almost exclusively on patrolling in West or East Malaysia for over two years. Availability of ships for patrol averaged 60%. In the early stages of the campaign the upper limit to the numbers that could be maintained on patrol was set by the number serviceable. A large number of various types of breakdown was experienced, in addition to those ships undergoing planned maintenance.

5. For the last six months however, it became clear that the strain of patrolling was wearing down Commanding Officers and ships' companies, so that the limit to what was available was being set by considerations of man maintenance rather than material maintenance. Experience of this campaign suggests that in a protracted period of patrolling activity each ship should be:
   a. never employed for longer than 10 days consecutively on patrol, after which a minimum of two nights in harbour is required.
   b. apart from the rests from patrol provided by
Routine planned maintenance periods, ships should be given some form of break from patrolling at least once every three months. Even if this break can be no more exciting than taking part in an exercise, the change of employment has a very positive effect on morale.

Limitations of Naval Security Forces.

6. The limitations listed in paragraphs 19 to 24 of the main paper were generally supportable, and it is agreed that they were in the main unavoidable. However, it is considered that one limitation - the abolition of which would have greatly enhanced the efficiency of patrols - could reasonably have been dispensed with.

7. This is the rule that required all patrolling to be done outside IC7, (except in the special circumstances, deterrent patrolling, see paragraph 51 of main paper). This rule was introduced as it was feared that regular patrolling inside IC7 might cause unnecessary provocation to the Indonesians. There is no evidence to suggest that this would have been the case. Deterrent patrols were often carried out by frigates who were already in sight of Indonesian authorities on many occasions, and they were also frequently observed by Indonesian warships.

8. No protest about the presence of our ships in IC7 was ever received; it is therefore considered that we placed upon ourselves a heavy and unnecessary handicap by denying IC7 to the great majority of Naval patrol ships.

Adapting CMS to patrol Gunboat.

9. The following action needs to be taken to make a CMS into a more efficient gunboat:--

   a. Fit RFL and short-range illuminating flares.
   b. Fit as much armour protection as possible for bridge and weather deck personnel.
   c. Fit "boxchaser" machine guns to mounting secured on top of bull ring.
   d. Fit machine guns to mountings on bulwarks each side abreast n/s winch, also broad mounting port and starboard side aft.
   e. Fit machine guns on bridge wings with maximum arc of fire.
   f. Fit infra-red classification outfit.
   g. Fit infra-red weapon sights to a selection of the armament.
   h. Provide extra ready use magazines for all small arms. A satisfactory organisation for replenishing magazines in action, is also required.

Operating Technique

10. Enemy craft are liable to be nearly as fast as patrolling ship, and to
give a very small radar echo. Radar must be very well tuned and very alertly watched. Whenever possible all contacts however fleeting should be investigated. Voice communication between ships in patrol group must be fast and accurate and it was found to be best if the CO or OC himself speaks on it.

Communications

11. The many different ships, craft and shore authorities posed a major problem of compatibility. Communication between RN and RHN ships was in general satisfactory but the lack of flexibility in some of the RHN equipment and the lack of a common high-grade crypto system complicated matters.

12. Greatest difficulties were experienced in maintaining communication between Naval ships and police craft or police/raider units ashore. The police and army used VHF equipment in different bands; the police in the Malacca Straits used a different band to the police in the Singapore Straits, and, although Naval ships were issued with VHF equipment for communication with the army and the police in the Malacca Straits satisfactory communication could never be relied upon. This was in part due to:

a. Army dispositions changing at short notice.

b. Poor range of Service VHF portables, combined with irregularity of requirement to communicate.

c. Poor watch kept by police stations and craft.

d. Fye VHF portables did not provide the ranges at times required by the escorts.

Security on Voice Circuits

13. The requirement to use VHF for co-ordination of patrols and conduct of operations resulted in considerable amounts of information being made available which could have been intercepted and used to advantage by a more determined enemy.

Prisoner Handling

14. It was learnt that it was difficult to predict the behaviour of infiltrators or saboteurs who were intercepted. Some would surrender as soon as the first contact was made, while others would fight back to the very end, even though their sampan might be on fire and sinking. Yet others would appear to surrender, come alongside the patrol vessel, and then start to lob grenades up on to the upper deck. Another Indonesian who surrendered came on board the capturing ship with his hands above his head and a hand grenade held between his knees.

15. As a result of these experiences explicit instructions were given to Commanding Officers to take no chances whatever, and that all suspicious persons were to be treated as hostile. A routine was devised in which the prisoners were brought on board one by one under guard, searched, stripped, blindfolded and bound or handcuffed.
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Recommended method for temporarily securing suspect Indonesian

Handline boats suspected of containing bombs

16. Some of the bombs brought over by saboteurs had already had their time
fuses act, and others were equipped with booby trap devices. This made it
dangerous for suspicious boats to be searched by Naval boarding parties. In
one case a sampan exploded while alongside a CMS causing casualties and damage.

Damage to HMS WOOLASTON 26th June 1965 (see paragraph 16 above). The
ship was rendered non-operational for 6 weeks. At that time HMS
WOOLASTON was the subject of an experimental camouflage paint scheme.
This was not successful, and work continued.
17. In consequence instructions were given that if any craft was suspected of carrying bombs or explosives, it was not to be brought alongside for search, but was to be told to lie off, and the occupants ordered to swim to the ship. The craft was then to be sunk by gunfire. Since then there were no further casualties from booby traps or bombs, but the new order was somewhat cumbersome to execute. Some sampan crews were most reluctant to swim, even when a line was thrown to them, and even when "encouraged" by small arms fire directed close to them. Some large sampans proved particularly difficult to sink, and one or two Commanding Officers resorted to attempting to ram. This proved a mistaken policy, more likely to damage own ship than the sampan. A technique of sinking by the use of scare charges was subsequently evolved, which proved to be satisfactory.

Alertness

18. As stated in paragraph 78 of the main paper, one of the main problems of Commanding Officers was to maintain the standard of alertness through periods of inactivity. It was found to be most important not to keep a ship continuously on patrol for more than about ten days. Above this period staleness is likely to set in, despite all the measures to counter it that may be taken on board.

Rules of Engagement

19. The rules were somewhat complex and not exactly the same for FNF and RNM ships. An outline summary is however as follows:

   a. Ships may patrol in MEW/STW and on the high seas, but are not to enter ICW without specific authority.

   b. Small craft may be stopped and searched. Any Indonesian craft in MTW is to be arrested, using such force as may be necessary. Indonesian craft on the high seas (outside ICW), if considered to be a threat to security, are to be arrested. Minimum force necessary to be used.

   c. Indonesian Naval and Government vessels are not to be interfered with on high seas, but are to be ejected if found in MTW/STW.

   d. Fire may be opened in self-defence on any Indonesian vessel that fires upon any of own ships, Indonesian ships and craft, or any vessels entitled to British protection.

20. In general these rules were found to be satisfactory, were understood by Commanding Officers, and there were no incidents of them being misinterpreted. The question of when and whether opening fire was justified was one of the biggest worries facing Commanding Officers. The principle of setting the rules in fairly broad terms, as was done, and trusting to the discretion of the Commanding Officer was considered to be correct, but it required that the ship must be kept constantly well tuned to the higher Command's mind at each development of the situation. This was achieved by careful verbal briefing by the Local Operations Officer before each patrol.

Standing Orders

21. It was found necessary to issue standing orders to Naval ships on patrol. These were issued jointly by the RNM and COMFTR, to cover all Naval ships engaged in anti-incursion patrols. The orders were known as MIPOS: extracts from......
22. A special series of general signals (MALPOS GENERAL) was established to promulgate urgent amendments to MALPOS and other information or orders of an immediate nature.

23. A "Debrief Aide Memoire" form was produced, for ships to complete whilst on patrol (see Annex E). This was required in original only, and could be completed in pencil. It was appreciated that CO's might not have time or opportunity to fill in all the details requested, particularly the Suspicious Contact Data Report on page 4 of the form.

24. A large number of completed aide-memoires were received from patrol ships, and it was clear that considerable efforts had been made to make the reports accurate and comprehensive. They were of great value, both to the Operational and Scientific Staff. All criticisms and recommendations were carefully investigated by the Fleet Staff; where a recommendation was not implemented, or a criticism shown to be invalid, the reporting ship was so informed. Great importance was attached to the maintenance of this dialogue between CONFRP staff and Commanding Officers of patrol ships.

25. Rules of engagement applicable to FRT ships only were promulgated in FOTIs Part IV (Annex H).

Hovercraft

26. A hovercraft was made available for a trial in the role of a patrolling vehicle. Regrettably it was removed for another task after only four nights trial patrolling in the Singapore Strait, so that no firm assessment of its potentialities could be made. However, it does appear that, despite the disadvantages of noise and vulnerability, the hovercraft - if further developed - could be of great value as a patrol vessel because of its high speed. The current American trials of hovercraft in Vietnam should prove to be of great interest.
1. Barter trade has been a feature of life in the Malacca and Singapore Straits for many years. Indonesian small craft from Sumatra and the Rhio Islands would cross the Straits bringing with them primary goods such as rubber, charcoal, copra, nutmeg, seaweed and crocodile skin. These would be traded either for cash, food, clothing or other manufactured goods. Although a certain amount of the trade was conducted through the minor ports of SW Malaysia, Singapore was the main centre for it.

2. Because of the obvious risks of infiltration and sabotage that could be carried out under cover of the trade, it was prohibited in August 1964, and no Indonesian small craft were thereafter permitted to enter Malaysian Territorial Waters (MTW).

3. As a result of the separation of Singapore from Malaysia in August 1965, Singapore became very anxious to increase its trade with other countries. In consequence political pressures for the resumption of the trade developed in Singapore, and also in Malaysia. Both Governments were aware of the risks to security inherent in a resumption, and various schemes were discussed in order to find a method by which trade could be conducted while reducing the risks to a minimum.

4. Eventually it was decided that trade should be conducted through merchant ships which were to be anchored to seaward of MTW/STW. Indonesian barter craft would be permitted to approach the ships by day to carry out trade, but they would not be allowed to trade by night nor to enter MTW/STW at any time.

5. The first ship to operate under this scheme started to trade to the south west of Singapore in early January 1966. It first it had very little success, but by the end of February trade had picked up, and as many as seventy boats were visiting the ship every day. The scheme was steadily enlarged until there were ten ships operating in four cross off the coast of Malaysia and Singapore.
Section D
LEGAL ASPECTS OF PATROLLING

Action on the High Sea

1. The major legal problem in the conduct of operations was to provide authority for ships to detain, and if necessary fire at, suspect craft on the high seas. This was overcome as shown in paragraph 2.

2. The inter-operation of S. 73(6) of the Internal Security Act, 1960; the Visiting Forces Act, 1960 and the Visiting Forces (Internal Security Act, 1960) Order 1960, authorised the personnel of HM Ships on patrol in Singapore and Malaysian territorial waters to stop, detain and arrest any person who failed to satisfy them as to his identity or his purpose in being found there, or who is suspected of having acted, or being about to act, in any manner which is prejudicial to the security of Malaysia or Singapore, in so doing such force may be used as is necessary, including the use of lethal weapons. The effect of POTI 4104, paragraph 3, was to extend this right onto the high seas, but not into those areas which are within the limits of Indonesian Claimed Waters. The legal support for this extension is a proposition concerning the right of self defence set out in paragraph 337, page 290, Columbus "International Law of the Sea" (1962), which is strengthened by the principle that, since jurisdiction is concurrent with sovereignty and sovereignty depends on power to enforce law, if one can enforce one's law outside the confines of territorial waters, and needs to do so to defend the State, then such action is justifiable. It may be so that the Malaysians and Singaporeans are stretching their right a little in order to empower us to defend them adequately, but the existence of this de facto situation without complaint for some considerable time inevitably strengthened the juridical argument in its support.

Indonesian Territorial Sea

3. Indonesia claims a territorial sea extending 12 miles from straight base lines; whilst this claim is disputed by GB and without according any de jure recognition or even de facto recognition, ships of the FEF were ordered not to enter the additionally claimed waters except in special circumstances, such as for shadowing or reporting, and then only when so ordered by COMFEF, FEF ships were ordered never to enter recognised ITW.
6. There were three known cases of attempted sabotage through this trade. One bomb exploded on board one of the ships, one exploded in one of the barter trade craft, killing two Indonesians, and a third was discovered in a bale of rubber that had got as far as a factory in Singapore; it was defused before it could explode. The trade was however allowed to continue.

7. During the months of May and June the numbers of Indonesian craft taking part in the trade continued to increase, and not all of them followed the rules. They were subject to pillage by BT boats (Indonesian customs launch) on their return journeys and in order to evade this they took to making passage by night and remaining on the Malaysian/Singapore side of the Strait (and often inside MTW/STW) for as long as possible.

8. Although barter craft which entered Singapore waters were clearly breaking the law, the political situation at the time was such that the Singapore marine police were given instructions not to prosecute such offenders, but to escort them clear of STW and release them. As a result the barter craft tended more and more to come into STW, not only to avoid BT boats, but even to establish direct trading contacts with Singapore. In return the BT boats became bolder, and began entering STW also, to make sure of extracting their cut from the barter trade craft. Naturally enough the BT boats did not confine their depredations to Indonesian craft, but would also pillage any Malaysian or Singaporean fishing boat in the vicinity.

9. The whole effect of this was to make the task of Naval anti-incursion patrols very much harder. Not only were there a large number of Indonesian small craft to be investigated, both in and outside MTW/STW, but it became part of their duty to prevent the BT boat activities referred to above. As the BT boats were invariably faster than our own patrol ships, it became an almost impossible task.

10. Eventually it became necessary to inform the Malaysian and Singaporean Governments that patrolling under these conditions was not acceptable, and that Naval patrols would be withdrawn from areas in which barter trading was being conducted. This was in fact done in July 1966.
FAR EAST FLEET DEBRIEF AIDE-MEMOIRE

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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF INCIDENTS

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ORDERS FOR SHIPS PATROLLING IN DEFENCE OF WESTERN MALAYSIAN SEABOARD (SECOND EDITION) (MALPOS II)

This is an Accountable Publication

When not in use it is to be kept locked up in a steel safe or cupboard.
ORDERS FOR SHIPS PATROLLING IN DEFENCE OF WESTERN MALAYSIAN SEABOARD

(Short title: MALPOS II)

1. Orders for ships patrolling in defence of the Western Malaysian Seaboard (2nd edition) are forwarded herewith. They apply to R.N., R.A.N., R.N.Z.N. and R.M.N. ships employed on these duties, except where specifically indicated.

2. Ships are to return them to the issuing authority on leaving the area.

3. In these orders the description "R.N. ships" includes R.A.N. and R.N.Z.N. ships of the strategic reserve, and R.A.N. and R.N.Z.N. GMS.

4. Urgent amendment to these orders will be promulgated in the MALPOS GENERAL series of signals. Other amendments will be promulgated by letter.

(J. F. R. WEIR)
CAPTAIN.
R.M.N.

NAVAL OFFICER IN CHARGE, WEST MALAYSIA.

Commander,
Far East Fleet,

WEST

(F. B. F. BAYNE-NICHOLLS)
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ORDERS FOR SHIPS PATROLLING IN DEFENCE OF WESTERN MALAYSIAN SEABOARD

INTRODUCTION.

1. When Malaysia came into being in the Autumn of 1963, President Soekarno of Indonesia announced a policy of 'confrontation' and began a campaign to "crush Malaysia". In the first phase, action took the form of propaganda, sabotage and fostering racial strife, the latter particularly in the susceptible areas of Singapore. The struggle entered a new phase in August, 1964 with the landing of infiltrators on the mainland of West Malaysia by sea at Pontian, by air in September at Labis and by subsequent landings.

2. Since December, 1964, it has become clear that patrolling ships have to counter two main threats:

   (a) Infiltration.
   (b) Sabotage.

3. These threats are considered in detail in Annex ECHO (Intelligence), but in general it may be said that all Indonesian activity takes place at night. It is therefore the intention that patrolling vessels should constantly be alert and vigilant during the hours of darkness. By day ships may - subject to specific local orders - anchor in their patrol areas, replenish, or carry out exercises as scheduled in the weekly practice programme.

THE AIM.

4. The aim of Commonwealth forces is to prevent Indonesian forces from entering Malaysian Territorial Waters or landing on Malaysian Territory.

5. To achieve this aim the following action is being taken:

   (a) Naval and police vessels and maritime aircraft carry out patrols off the West Malaysian coast and Singapore coasts.
   (b) Night curfews on small craft are imposed in certain areas as necessary.
   (c) Barter trading is banned (see Annex D).
   (d) Investigations are being made into the feasibility of controlling the fishing craft in the Malacca Straits.
   (e) A coast-watching organisation is being set up.

AUTHORITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.

6. GFSCO  

   Responsible for overall coordination of all operations in West Malaysia.

\CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

Page 2

COMPEX

Responsible for overall coordination of all Maritime operations in West Malaysia.

HQ RMAF

Responsible for provision of Maritime Patrol Aircraft as requested by COMPEX (delegated by HQ RMAF to MAROPS CHENG).

KOR MARINES

Responsible for operation of R.M.N. ships on patrol and allocation to their areas, and provision of R.M.N. interpreters to H.M. Ships.

KOPOL MARINE

Responsible for allocation of marine police craft to patrol areas.

Hq RMAF

Responsible for provision of coast patrol aircraft. These aircraft have only limited capabilities.

COMMAND STRUCTURE.

7a. Overall Command.

The following diagram shows the chain of command for operations in West Malaysia. The diagram is not comprehensive, as it is drawn primarily to show the command structure for maritime operations.

![Command Structure Diagram]
(b). **Local Command and Control.**

(i) When no specific operation is in progress, naval patrol vessels are under the direct command of COTF or MALAYA as appropriate.

(ii) Should an incident develop the senior Officer present is authorised to take command and act as CO of all naval vessels in his own and adjoining areas. Police vessels should not normally be taken under command without prior permission.

(iii) When a specific operation is to be mounted, COTF will organise a patrol group for the purpose and will nominate the CO and ships to be placed under his command.

(iv) In the Singapore Straits special considerations apply. The organisation for the Singapore Straits patrol is laid down in Annex B, para 11.

(v) LRMF aircraft tasked for Malacca Straits patrol are always under the tactical command of the senior ship in the area assigned to the aircraft.

8. **Maritime Forces available.**

a. The number of patrolling ships and craft will vary with the state of the threat and other operational commitment. Daily Sitreps are signalled by COTF and include details of Maritime Aircraft patrols arranged by MAROPS Changi and HQ RMF.

   **NOTICE**

b. K.L. MALAYA will signal the necessary extracts of the Sitrep to R.M.N. Ships.

c. As a rough guide the following forces are the average numbers maintained on patrol in West Malaysia.

   2 Escorts (RN/RAN/RNZN/RMN)

   70 CMS (RN/RAN/R4Z-4)

   8 RAN Vessels (CMS, ESS or PC)

   4 Offshore RMP craft

   20 Inshore RMP craft

   1 LRMF Aircraft (2200GH to 0400GH)

   1 RMAF Aircraft (Dusk patrol)

   Police craft in harbour patrols in Penang, PSM and SP,
GENERAL PROBLEMS OF PATROLLING.

10. It will be appreciated that there can at present be no question of offensive action being taken against Indonesia, and our own forces are not permitted to enter Indonesian waters. In this situation our operations must be entirely defensive in character, and the initiative rests completely with the enemy. However, within these limitations Commanding Officers should make every effort to foster a vigorous and challenging outlook to the problems of patrolling. The state of mind of "a sentry on a beat" must at all costs be avoided. It must be made clear that the presence of a patrol vessel acting as a deterrent is not of itself enough. The intention must be to gain a clear moral ascendancy over the Indonesians. Tactics, courses and speed should be changed frequently, all personnel should maintain the utmost vigilance and alertness, in the knowledge that their aim is to capture and frustrate every Indonesian attempt that is undertaken.

110. Intelligence and Operational Experience.

a. R.N. Ships.

1. Before proceeding on patrol Commanding and/or Operations Officers should visit the MOOC and Naval Intelligence Offices for briefing.

2. While on patrol ship will be supplied with current intelligence by signal.

3. On return from patrol Commanding and/or Operations Officers should visit the MOOC for debriefing. See paras 12 to 15 for written reports required.

b. R.M.N. Ships.

Commanding Officers should visit SO(o), NCWWM for briefing on up to date intelligence prior to sailing. On return, a call should be made on the Captain, NCWWM and SO(o) for debriefing.

12. Comments and suggestions for improving the efficiency of patrols will be welcomed and should be addressed to the Fleet Operations Officer or Captain, NCWWM, as appropriate.

13. Commanding Officers should forward written reports of any incidents to COMFEP (R.M.N. Craft to R. NCWWM who is requested to forward copies to COMFEP). Reports should be brief and written in the third person and should include comments on any lessons learnt during the incident. Such reports will be promulgated in Annex L to NAIFOS.

14. In this way experience gained by individual ships will be shared by all.

Suspicious Contact Data Report (SCDR)

15. In order that patrol vessels may be employed in the most efficient manner it is necessary to collect information about the ranges at which suspicious craft are detected, and the "time lost from patrol" used up in searching them. To this end all patrol ships are to render SCDR as shown in Annex M, figure 3.
16. It is fully appreciated that it may not be possible to complete the form on every occasion, but it is requested that as many as possible be completed and forwarded, in order that accurate data may be compiled. Report forms should be forwarded to the Commander, Far East Fleet on completion of each patrol.

Interpreters.

17. a. R.N. Ships engaged on patrol are to carry a Malaysian interpreter and should signal request to K.D. MALAYA at least 48 hours before sailing. Joining instructions should be included. K.D. MALAYA will supply a R.N. rating. He is to be returned to MALAYA as soon as possible after completing the patrol.

b. To ease the Chinese language problem, when no L.R.F.'s are borne, ships are to request for "bi-lingual interpreters if available".

c. When 48 hours notice cannot be given the request for an interpreter is to be made to COMPOFF giving reasons for the short notice.

Arrest of Craft.

18. a. Power of Arrest. Provisions of this paragraph apply to R.N. ships only. Ships may arrest any craft on suspicion as shown in Annex B to P.O.T.I. 4104. The following vessels may not be arrested in the high seas:

(1) Naval vessels.
(2) Police or customs vessels.
(This includes BT boats)

b. Barter Traders (See Annex D.). R.N. vessels have no power to arrest Barter Traders as such. All boats professing to be Barter Traders are to be dealt with under P.O.T.I. 4104 paragraph 5(a); this will allow H.M. Ships to stop, search and arrest without warrant.

19. Arrested personnel should be transferred to the custody of the Royal Malaysian Police. For ships patrolling in the Singapore Strait, request for a police craft may be made direct to Coastguard Operations Room, Pearl's Hill. In the Malacca Straits or East Coast ships should contact the nearest police launch on patrol in their area. (See Annex H., para 1 and 2). If unable to do so ship should signal to COMPOFF or NOICOM as appropriate. (For further details see Annex A).

20. Commanding Officers should bear in mind that it is most undesirable for them to leave their assigned patrol areas by night in order to hand over arrested personnel to the police. Consideration should be given to the following:

(a) Arranging for police craft to come out to the ship's patrol area for the hand over.

(b) Retaining arrested personnel onboard and towing the boat until daylight.

(c) Sending the arrested boat in to the nearest police station in charge of a prize crew.

Entry into Indonesian claimed waters......
Entry into Indonesian claimed waters

24. (a) R.N. Ships. Patrolling ships are to patrol so as to keep outside Indonesian claimed waters as shown on the tracings (See Annex E. para 8). In the Singapore Straits ships are to keep north of the median and middle lines as shown. Ships exercising by day are however permitted to use area Xray Xray. Any variation from this policy will be signalled.

(b) R.M.N. Ships. Kef. 702 will issue appropriate orders to R.M.N. Ships.

STATES OF READINESS IN WESTERN MALAYSIA

22. Plan Cameron. The following is a summary of the States of Readiness covered by this plan:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COLOUR</th>
<th>MEANING</th>
<th>ACTION REQUIRED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WHITE</td>
<td>In force throughout period of confrontation against Malaysia.</td>
<td>Collation of intelligence and general surveillance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YELLOW</td>
<td>Specific threat(s) against particular areas of West Malaysia.</td>
<td>Reconnaissance intensified in areas concerned. Forces and reserves required brought to appropriate states of readiness. CMF DEOF redeploys and reinforces patrols as appropriate and establish Task Organisation if required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLUE</td>
<td>Confirmed indications that a landing is imminent in West Malaysia.</td>
<td>CMF DEOF assigns forces for surface action against sea-borne infiltrations and re-deploys forces as necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RED</td>
<td>Indonesian guerrilla forces or infiltrators in strength have been detected within Malaysian air space, territorial waters or detected on West Malaysian territory.</td>
<td>OPSCCO (Kuala Lumpur) coordinates allocation of forces to the area or areas in which landings have occurred or infiltrators have been detected.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. (i) Codeword may be qualified by a named area or state.
(ii) A colour may be ordered without the previous colours being in force.

STATE OF READINESS OF H.M. SHIPS

23. Ammunition and Missiles on board. The following ammunition and missile readiness is to be maintained by all ships at sea or in Singapore:

/Seaslug. ......
Seaslug. Blast deflector plates may be removed.

Seacat. A proportion of outfit to be primed and kept in R.U. stowage.

Medium Range Guns. Fifty percent of H.E. outfit to be fused V.T.

Close Range Guns. R.U. Lockers to be full.

Note: N.M. and E.R. 0209 (1) and (2) are in abeyance.

24. **Ship's Boats and Landing Parties**

   a. Ship's Landing Parties are not to be put ashore in any operational area on the coast of West Malaysia without prior permission from COMFED or the local Military Commander.

   b. If permission is obtained locally COMFED is to be informed.

   c. In order to avoid the danger of own troops on land engaging naval vessels, no ship or boat is to approach within half a mile of the coastline in any operational area unless positive mutual identification of all friendly forces has been achieved.

   d. Army units are issued with C.M.R.T.

25. **Small Arms Practice**

   Ships on patrol requiring to carry out small arms practice by day are

   A. to ensure they are sufficiently far from the coast for the sound not to alert ground forces.

   B. to inform shore authorities of their intentions in advance.

26. **Telephone at Telok Ayer Basin**

   a. A telephone has been installed at Telok Ayer Basin for the use of R.M.N. Ships. All ships may use this telephone. The number is Singapore 93122.

   b. A secure stowage has been provided to look up the phone when not in use, and the key is to be lodged and drawn from the quartermaster K.D. SINGAPURA. Lodges and draws from the quartermaster, R.M.N. SINGAPURA.

   c. This telephone is for official calls only.
27 RAF Air/Sea Rescue Launches

These boats are being fitted with an all round red pulsating light, similar to a helicopter's Grines light.

28 Shore Radar Stations

Four Coastal Radar Stations are now in operation and details of these are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Station</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Landing Points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SAKRA</td>
<td>West extremity of PUSAKRA (Singapore Grid ref. 4115.B)</td>
<td>1. JETTY. Ship's boats only. North extremity of SAKRA (Singapore Grid ref. 4117.E 4215.A.) 2. BEACH on SE. Follow 500 yard path South West.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAPPLES</td>
<td>On RAPPLES Lighthouse.</td>
<td>On East side of RAPPLES Lighthouse is a jetty for ship's boats. Much affected by on/off currents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST. JOHNS</td>
<td>Southern extremity of PULAU SAKIJANG BENDERA on Tanjong Lokes. (77ft)</td>
<td>Small concrete jetty accessible at High Tide for ship's boats. Follow the path to South to position 1° 12' 9&quot; North, 103° 51' 45&quot; East. (marked on Chart 3837)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| BEDOK   | 01° 19' 5" N 103° 57' 9" B | (1) By road/rough track from Upper Changi Road down KOH SEK LIM Road.  
(2) From Seaward by ship's boat, as safe navigation permits. |

The stations are manned by RMN and are in our contact with Coastguard who filter contact reports and pass on information to ORs.

29. Fishing Vessels - Notes and Equipment

Claims for damage to nets and equipment caused by ships on patrol or exercising in the vicinity of fishing boats are occasionally received from local fishermen.

Commanding Officers should ensure that an entry is made in the Dock Log whenever possible and particularly if the possibility of a claim arising exists.
MALPOS II
ANNEX A
PREPARATION AND CONDUCT OF PATROLS

PREPARATIONS

1. The following notes are intended to be advisory:-

(a) The patrol areas are laid down in Annex B. The R.N. and R.M.N. weekly "Intentions for patrols" signal, orders which ships are to patrol the various areas, COMPEF’s daily sitrep gives patrol areas of all vessels at 0000H, gives a forecast of movements of ships, and indicates the air patrols intended. It is recommended that ships which are fitted to do so should keep a G.O.P. or State Board showing the above information, in addition to their L.O.P.’s.

(b) It is an advantage to have surveyed in daylight the area to be patrolled at night in order to mark on the chart the positions of radar echoes which may cause doubt, e.g. Kongs, rocks, buoys, etc.. The position of Kampong is worth noting as shore-side camp-fires have been known to cause confusion. The positions of beaches clear of reefs and rocks and suitable for landings, and river estuaries should be marked.

(c) When ships are permitted to anchor by day the places and times chosen should be varied. The presence of patrol craft has a beneficial effect on local morale.

(d) The assistance of an Interpreter is to be obtained from I.R.H(N LOTG-5). This can be arranged by signal giving as much warning as possible and joining instructions (see para 17 of main order). Commanding Officers and Boarding Officers should make the acquaintance of the Interpreter on joining.

(e) If time permits a survey of the area to be patrolled carried out before last light enables the identification of craft which may already be underway within the area.

(f) As a result of daylight encounters individual ships should note their detection ranges of various craft by radars, sonars, E.W., etc.. (See Annex II).

(g) Although ships should be domestically darkened against hostile encounters, navigation lights should be used when necessary to ensure the navigational safety of the ship.

(h) / ....
(h) Consideration should be given to the formation of a standing Boarding Party if practicable and comprising 1 Officer, 1 Petty Officer plus 4, and the Interpreter. Clear of night watches, they should be highly trained in the use of their weapons, the habits of infiltrators, the construction of the various craft, and the normal documentation. The Watch-on-Deck should provide the fire-cover and alongside securing arrangements including where appropriate scrambling nets, floodlights, etc.

(i) Consideration should be given to the handling of prisoners on deck, handcuffing, provision of sentries, etc. (See Appendix I).

CONDUCT OF THE PATROL

2. (a) On all occasions of passing through areas patrolled by other ships, Commanding Officers must ensure that their intentions are made known in plenty of time and must be ready to identify themselves. If it has not proved possible to warn the patrolling craft they should burn navigation lights.

(b) Ships fitted with helicopters should carry out dawn and dusk surveillance of their areas and adjacent beaches. Helicopters are not to be used in an offensive role.

(c) The chances of a radar detection under varying conditions are shown in Figs 1 and 1A in ANNEX M. (See also Appendix II).

(d) In order to increase positive radar detection of sampans etc., ships are to sink or pick up crates and other potential radar contacts by day in the Singapore Straits.

(e) Where the shape of the area permits careful consideration should be given to the method of its coverage; thus there is little point in being 20 miles off the shore at an hour before dawn. Known 'jumping-off' places and likely landing places should be borne in mind. Recent experience indicates that the infiltrators prefer river mouths and the hour before dawn, but the time of high water and the phase of the moon should also be borne in mind.

(f) For Patrols in Singapore and Malacca Straits, see also ANNEX B, Para 2 and 3.

(g) Navigation lights. See PREPARATIONS 1. (g).

(h) Frigates acting as OTC's are encouraged to use IFF whenever it will assist to clarify the surface picture. RN CMS's in the patrol group should be instructed to "Squawk" as required by the OTC. CMS's are fitted with basic RN X IFF transponders but cannot interrogate or display IFF responses and need to be informed whether or not their equipment is operating correctly. RN SDE's and all RN ships have no IFF facilities. Attention is invited to FUT 44.39.
INTERCEPTION

3. (a) When a detection has been made course and speed must be adjusted to ensure interception bearing in mind that the contact may increase speed.

(b) Identification may be assisted by carefully watching the suspicious vessels movements, lights (if any), hydrophone effect, etc.

(c) Once a contact is firmly held it may be advisable to dim or switch off navigation lights.

(d) Unless the intruder is using high speed it may be advisable to let the plot develop until there can be no question of its illegal conduct, but see also sub para (c) below.

(e) If the contact is to be illuminated by searchlight it must be remembered that the light forms an excellent target. It is as well to remain outside the range of Sten-gun fire until after the contact has been illuminated, but note that there have been reports of infiltrators armed with bazookas.

(f) It is important to keep 'gofers' off the upper deck. The Seizing Party should be mustered remote from the boarding position until the Watch-on-Deck have secured the craft along side.

(g) Whilst attention is focussed on identifying a contact and the process of getting it alongside etc., great care must be taken to ensure an all-round look-out for possible consorts.

(h) The circumstances in which fire may be opened are laid down in FLOTs Part IV. It is worth remembering that once fire has been opened with small-arms the noise level may rise to an extent to which it may be difficult to control.

(i) Ships with sufficient hands may be able to detail one as a sniper armed with a rifle.

(j) The Interpreter should be familiar with the use of the Loud Hailer or Megaphone. He should order the crew in the suspicious craft to cut their hands on the top of their heads during the initial inspection.

(k) Small patrol vessels may elect to go alongside the craft: beware of towed explosives and hand thrown grenades.

(l) Larger ships may have to order the craft to come alongside their scrambling nets. Close scrutiny should be maintained whilst the crew are propelling their vessel alongside lest anything should be ditched or guns prepared etc. It is not advisable to send the Seizing Party away in ship's boats.

/(m)..........................
(m) Indonesian sampans have been known to carry time bombs which may either have a preset time fuse or an ordinary initiating fuse; if the sampans are into action, therefore, the bombs may explode without warning. Further, the construction of the fuse is such that it may be activated by shock or contact with water. Explosives and suggested time bombs should therefore only be handled by experts. A time bomb with anti-personnel fittings was recovered in October 1966. It consisted of approximately six kilos high explosive, electric detonator and watch timer all contained in a crude wooden box measuring approximately 12 inches by 18 inches. Box not painted or varnished. Fitted with lid. Detonator circuit incorporated into box by means of spring and nail attachment. Should lid be lifted or box moved the bomb would explode.

(n) Boats suspected of carrying these devices should not be brought alongside. They should be ordered to stop a suitable distance away and the crew ordered to abandon the boat and swim to the intercepting craft; the boat should then be sunk by gunfire.

(o) If the suspicious craft has revealed itself as hostile it is important to remember that it may be one of a number in the vicinity, or part of a co-ordinated assault over a wider area. It is important that adjacent patrol craft should be warned, and that the Commander Far East Fleet and NOCCM be informed so that other ships and forces may be alerted. All incidents are to be reported by signal to ASC 1117.

(p) It is possible that an initial detection may resolve itself into more than one suspicious craft: in fact several proceeding loosely in company. This problem requires particularly careful consideration since each craft may contain upwards of 20 armed men. It is recommended that the first task is to get the group under control by steaming around it whilst illuminating and ordering the craft to gather together; curtain fire may be necessary to hasten the process and show firmness of intentions. Slower patrol craft may have to manoeuvre on a line at right angles to the intruders' path whilst disciplining the group. Once under control the leader or largest craft should be called alongside and the normal search and arrest procedure should be followed. It is appreciated that the whole action may take a considerable time. Adjacent patrol craft should be called to assist as necessary. Merchant ships should be warned to keep clear of the scene.

(q) Ordering "Approach Stations" may be a convenient method of bringing a ships' armament to an appropriate degree of readiness.

SEARCH AND ARREST (See also Main Order, paragraph 15 et seq.)

4. Having considered the risks stated in paragraphs 3(m) and 3(n) above, if a search of the craft is decided upon, then the following rules should be observed:

(a) Once the craft is secured alongside the Master/Owner should be ordered onboard the patrol vessel, searched for arms, and questioned by the Boarding Officer and Interpreter.
(b) The identity of the craft should be checked against the list of stolen craft.

(c) If it is decided to search the craft it may be desirable to take off the crew first: they should embark one at a time, be searched for arms and put under the supervision of an armed sentry.

(d) The search of the craft should include a bottom line search. However, all searches should be carried out with caution as intelligence sources indicate that Indonesians in the Malacca Straits may place boaty troops in sampans containing barker trade goods.

(e) If it is decided to release the craft and her crew Commanding Officers are advised to obtain a written or verbal indemnification against subsequent allegations of loss or damage.

(f) If it is decided to make an arrest it is advisable to replace boat’s crew by a prize crew.

(g) If it is decided to take the craft in tow care should be taken that the strain does not damage the craft. Slow speeds must be used, while towing, as the towed craft can be very easily swamped.

(h) No attempt at detailed interrogation of prisoners should be made. This is a specialised technique and amateur efforts may well jeopardise subsequent investigations (See appendix I).

(i) In the Singapore Strait a Police launch can be arranged to take over arrested craft, at any of the following points on request to Coast Guard:--

A. Angler Buoy B. Outer Shoal Buoy
C. Sebrock Beacon D. Ajax Shoal Buoy

(j) For East Fleet Ships which captures Indonesians who are required to be landed at the Naval Base are to land them at B.N.A.D. in order to attract minimum attention. Prisoners should, as far as possible, be kept out of sight during passage of the Johore Strait and until handed over to the police.

(k) If it is decided to sink the craft and the use of gunfire is impracticable because of the presence of shipping or land, demolition charges should be used. If time is available, charges should be placed as advised in paragraphs 415 and 416 of BR 1700 (Manual of Demolitions). If time is at a premium, two or more 1 lb smoke charges made up as in paragraphs 50 and 53 of Chapter 2 of BR 1836 (Demolition Drill Book) and accurately thrown into the bow or stern of the craft should be sufficient to ensure destruction. ON NO ACCOUNT SHOULD AN ATTEMPT BE MADE TO SINK THE CRAFT BY RAMMING.
Overall Principle

Any prisoners taken during Malaysian patrols will be of great value to the qualified interrogators ashore, and the success of the interrogators depends upon the mental state of the prisoners.

1. On being taken on board each prisoner must be completely stripped to be searched. Any item found on the prisoner (e.g., scraps of paper, cloth matches - anything) must be kept in a numbered bag, and the prisoner clearly marked with the same number in indelible ink. He may be given back the bare essentials of clothing on completion of the search. He should be kept separate from his fellows at all times and no talking allowed.

2. Throughout the time on board, the prisoners must be kept in a state of terror. The only food to be given to them should be bread and water, and they should be allowed no comfort at all. Prisoners should be blindfolded.

3. The prisoners should be kept in an enclosed space with more than one guard, and the guards must be firm, and correct in appearance etc.

Immediate Interrogation

Following the search the prisoners should be separately interrogated by an officer using the interpreter. The officer must put the questions to the prisoner, and the interpreter translate WORD FOR WORD.

E.G. Officer: How many boats were there with you?
Interpreter: How many boats were there with you?
(in Malay or Indonesian).

The interpreter must not use his own words, e.g., 'This man wants to know how many boats came with you?' and must be briefed carefully on this on his arrival at the beginning of the patrol.

Information received in this way must be signalled to the Operating Authority immediately where it can be assessed as true or false.

Final Disposal

The prisoners must be handed over to the proper authorities and they should be checked as they leave (and at intervals on board) that they have their correct numbers marked on them, and that the separate numbered bags of articles are handed over with them.

Conclusion

It is essential that the prisoners are handed over to the authorities ashore in the best possible condition for interrogation. They must have been severely dealt with, and have no idea where they are, where they are going or to whom they are going.
THE PRACTICAL USE OF RADAR TO DETECT SMALL CRAFT.

INTRODUCTION

1. The radar reflecting area of a kumpit or kotak is small so that the radar echoes received from these craft will be comparable with the unwanted echoes so often observed. To ensure a reasonable chance of detection, it is very important that the radar set be used with considerable finesse.

ATM

2. To define the best operating procedure when using a radar to detect small targets.

FACTORS

3. What follows is a simple discussion of the physical factors involved when detecting small targets with radar. This will provide a basis for understanding the different operating procedures. No apology is made for the rather basic nature of the discussion, since experience has shown that the principles involved are sometimes overlooked due to the pressures of a sustained patrol effort.

4. Noise. All things in nature are in a state of motion, and this applies right through the scale of sizes. In the case of a radio receiver, interest centres on the random thermal motion of the electrons in different parts of the circuit. Any random electronic motion constitutes a current which will generate small voltages at various points within the receiver. This becomes apparent in the final stages of an output amplifier, where a signal may be observed, even though there is no input. The larger the noise level in a receiver the greater the magnitude of the output when there is no input.

5. Condition for detection of a signal in the presence of noise. There is a precise condition that has to be satisfied if any small signal is to be detected by a receiver, but this is somewhat involved, depending on the noise level in the receiver and its frequency characteristics. It suffices here to recognise that there is a lower limit to the magnitude of any input that may be detected by a given receiver, and that in general, the greater the magnitude of the input relative to the noise level, the better the chance of detection. A corollary to this is that if the input signal is smaller than the noise level, then no amount of amplification will make it possible to detect it.

6. Sources of Noise in a Radar. The ambient noise in any radar receiver comes from two sources:

   a. Internal, namely the thermal noise within the receiver
b. External, where noise may be defined as the signal produced by all unwanted echoes.

7. The problem of operating a radar to detect a small target amounts to manipulating the controls in such a way that the signal from the target is optimised relative to unwanted signals arising from either internal or external noise.

**OPERATION OF THE RADAR**

8. The basic controls. Broadly speaking, the following characteristics of the radar may be varied:
   a. Frequency of receiver
   b. Receiver gain
   c. Display Brightness
   d. Range Scale
   e. Pulse length.

9. Need for Careful Tuning. The frequency of the receiver is generally pre-set. Nevertheless, remember that if the receiver is off-tune, then the amplitude of received signals will be reduced relative to the noise level within the receiver. For this reason always tune with the aid of the meter, manual tuning by 'experts' is usually bad. Incidentally, another factor which may degrade the received signal is the state of the silica gel drying agent in the aerial. If this is provided, make certain that it is dry, otherwise an unnecessary attenuation will be introduced.

10. **Receiver Gain and Display Brightness.** The basic controls are:
   a. Receiver Gain which determines the level of amplification throughout the receiver, and
   b. Display Brightness, which adjusts the brilliance of the display relative to the ambient lighting.

11. If there is no signal at the input to the receiver, increasing the brightness control will simply enhance the level of the display of the signals generated by the internal noise. If the gain control is set at too low a level, then small signals at the input cannot be amplified to the point where they produce traces on the display which may be distinguished from those due to ambient noise.

12. **Adjustment of Gain and Brightness.** The aim in setting up the receiver must be to ensure that signals just above noise level may be resolved. This means that the display produced by the noise must be just visible. If the brightness is arbitrarily set at some lower level, then marginal detection opportunities will be lost. The first step must be to adjust the brightness so that the scan is visible. If the gain is then set so that receiver noise is just visible, that is, when the face of the display has a fine speckled appearance over areas where there are no obvious echoes then signals just in excess of noise level may be resolved.
13. **Effect of Rough Seas.** If there is a rough sea, then the external noise level will be high because of reflections from the surface waves and a small target will not be resolved against this background. No control on the receiver can change this fact. Noise due to reflections from waves (sea clutter) generally extends over a small range. Some sets are provided with either a proportional gain control (swept gain) or a form of logarithmic amplification as an anti-clutter device. Both systems depend on suppressing the gain at small range, relative to that at high range. If the aim is to get detections at low ranges, then the use of these controls cannot be recommended, since the effect will be to impose an arbitrary cut-off which will suppress both the wanted signals as well as the external noise. There may be some advantage at intermediate ranges, where the existence of a small echo might be masked by a light overspill from the inner regions of intense clutter. Since clutter arises from reflections at wave concavities, when searching an area, it is better to search from up wind, so as to reduce the interference due to clutter on the display. The snag about this is that boats of small forefoot will be shielded by the waves, and will not give rise to such a large echo, but it is felt that on balance there will be a small advantage.

14. **Effect of Rain.** When it is raining the additional attenuation with increased range will lower the signal to noise ratio for distant targets. Operation of the anti-clutter device under these conditions will introduce a measure of amplification where it is needed, at the expense of enhancing the long range noise.

15. **Pulse Length.** The detection range for a kumpit or kotak is not expected to be more than three miles. Better discrimination at short ranges will be obtained by using short pulses.

**PRACTICAL HINTS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE PATROL**

16. **The Watch-Keeper.** The emphasis in operating the radar is to do everything to enhance the chances of detecting the fleeting contact. The last point in the detection chain is the watch-keeper. It is just as important to ensure that he is working under optimum conditions. Try to arrange that:

   a. The watch-keeper has short spells of 30 minutes.

   b. The watch-keeper is left on his own where possible - be careful of the distractions of a crowded Ops Room or Bridge.

17. **Visual Look Out.** It is clear from the foregoing that the radar is being used under marginal conditions because of the small target presented by the infiltrating boats. Do not overlook the contribution that may be made by the vigilant, well briefed visual look-out.

18. **Patrol Paths.** If committed to a patrol line remember the blind area which may be surprisingly large at close range, and dog-leg the course. Remember also that the chance of detection increases with increased patrol speed.
STANDARD COMBINED AREAS FOR PATROLS WESTERN MALAYSIA.

1. To provide a simple means of reference to the sea areas off the coast of Malaysia and Singapore (West Malaysia) to facilitate the rapid and flexible deployment of Naval and Air Forces on such patrol tasks as may from time to time be required, the waters adjacent to the coast of West Malaysia are divided into numbered areas, as shown in para 3(d) below.

(a) Numerical designation of Areas.

The basic designation of each area is by the numbers shown in sub para delta. These numbers are only to be used as the basis for reference to the alphabetical code letters promulgated periodically.

(b) Alphabetical designations of Areas.

To increase security, each numbered area is allocated one or two letters for operational use. Areas off West Malaysia are allocated single letters (e.g. A, B, C). Unlike the basic numbers, the actual distribution of letters will be random and will be changed at three monthly intervals or as required if compromised.

Letters and letter changes will be worked out by the NOICW and promulgated by him to:

- MINDEF KL
- ALL Naval Ships
- DOAMS
- COMNAVOR
- COMAIRBOR
- COMTFB

COMFDEF will in turn be responsible for promulgating this information to:

- CINC PAC
- HQ SMLP
- HQ FEHF
- All ships of Far East Fleet.

The complete alphabetical designation is classified CONFIDENTIAL. References to an individual area by its alphabetical designation are classified RESTRICTED. However, where extreme urgency is required it is permissible to send short unclassified signals e.g. "Proceed forthwith to Romeo".

(c) REFERENCE POSITIONS.

1. To facilitate plotting of positions by ships and LIMP aircraft the following reference positions are established.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PATROL AREA</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>DESIGNATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>White Rock Limit</td>
<td>TL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>05°30' North 100°30' East</td>
<td>IN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

/6 One...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PATROL AREA</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>DESIGNATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>One Patron Bank Lt.</td>
<td>AX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>292 CAPE RACHADO Lt. 27.5</td>
<td>TO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>258 CAPE RACHADO Lt. 24.8</td>
<td>PK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/8</td>
<td>CAPE RACHADO Lt.</td>
<td>CP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>163 CAPE RACHADO Lt. 12.5</td>
<td>JO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>262 P. UNDAN Lt. 20.3</td>
<td>ZR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>157 P. UNDAN Lt. 9.0</td>
<td>YU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>239 Tg. TOHOR Lt. 13.4</td>
<td>KR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/10</td>
<td>Tg. TOHOR Lt.</td>
<td>NG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>165 Tg. TOHOR Lt 15.5</td>
<td>BF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>277 P. PISANG Lt 15.7</td>
<td>PS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>167 P. PISANG Lt. 8.5</td>
<td>MT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All contact reports in the above patrol areas should be made relative to the nearest reference position. E.g. A contact obtained in area 6 would be reported as:

310 AX 8.

(ii) Reference positions in patrol areas not listed above are laid down in Annex B para 3 (d). Designators have not been allocated and positions are to be reported as e.g.:—900 St. Johns 6.

(iii) Standard Rendezvous positions in Malacca Straits are listed in Annex B para 12.

(iv) Aircraft use reference positions listed in Annex C para 5 (d).

(d) Singapore Straits

In the Singapore Straits, the Police Grid is in use. See para 5 below.

2. MALACCA STRAITS.

(a) By night, ships are to patrol the seaward limits of their assigned areas so as to be as clear as possible from interference from shipping and local craft, or on patrol lines established by the OTC to cover a known threatened area (see (c) below). When patrolling by day, ships should carry out a random patrol throughout their areas.

(b) When it is required to station ships more accurately than is possible by the designated SPP areas the following system will be used.

The line marking the seaward limit of each area will be divided into 3 equal sections, each of which will be referred to as North, centre, or south. Thus for area 8, there will be 3 patrol lines, 8 North, 8 centre, 8 south.
In signals these will be referred to by the current letter code i.e. TANGO NORTH, TANGO CENTRE, TANGO SOUTH.

(c) In certain circumstances, temporary patrol lines will be established by the Commander, Far East Fleet and promulgated by M.M.08 General Signal.

3. SINGAPORE STRAITS AND SOUTH EAST JOHORE

(a) In the Singapore Straits and South East Johore the following patrol lines have been permanently established.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area 12</th>
<th>Patrol line</th>
<th>36</th>
<th>3615A to 3612C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3615A to 3613A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3613D to 3912D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4011A to 4029A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4309A to 4609C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4709A to 4911D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Vicinity 4510</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Vicinity 4510</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Vicinity 4510</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Vicinity OUTER SHOLL BUOY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5614A to 0116D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>JSB to 0216C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area 13</th>
<th>Patrol line</th>
<th>54</th>
<th>5614D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>JSB to TG STAPA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>ANGLER BUOY to TG FUNGCHIN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>TG STAPA to 104.15 EAST</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>HORSBURGH to 215 HORSBURGH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>TG STAPA to TG AYAM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>TG AYAM to 265 HORSBURGH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>270 HORSBURGH 5.5 to 335 HORSBURGH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area 14</th>
<th>Patrol line</th>
<th>3.5</th>
<th>3.5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Vicinity 090 TG FUNGCHIN 2.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>055 FUNGCHIN 3.5 to 065 FUNGCHIN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>055 FUNGCHIN 7.0 to 060 FUNGCHIN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) If other patrol lines are temporarily required for a specific operation they will be promulgated by M.M.08 and P.O.108M to the ships concerned. No patrol lines other than those set out in (a) above will have permanent validity.
### Patrol Areas - West Malaysia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area No.</th>
<th>Co-ordinates</th>
<th>Reference Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>$05^\circ 42.7' N$; $100^\circ 21.6' E$ - $05^\circ 42.7' N$; $98^\circ 53.5' E$ - $06^\circ 30.6' N$; $100^\circ 06.0' E$</td>
<td>P. SAGANTANG $06^\circ 01.0' N$; $98^\circ 55.0' E$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>$05^\circ 42.7' N$; $100^\circ 21.6' E$ - $05^\circ 42.7' N$; $98^\circ 53.5' E$ - $25^\circ 36.0' N$; $100^\circ 06.0' E$</td>
<td>TG PIANDANG LT $05^\circ 05.0' N$; $100^\circ 25.0' E$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Tg. PIANDANG LT - $05^\circ 04.0' N$; $98^\circ 09.9' E$ - $05^\circ 42.7' N$; $98^\circ 53.5' E$ - Tg. PIANDANG LT</td>
<td>As for Area 2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Kuala Jarum Nan - $02^\circ 50.9' N$; $98^\circ 32.0' E$ - $05^\circ 57.2' N$; $98^\circ 38.6' E$ - $05^\circ 23.8' N$; $100^\circ 19.9' E$ - $03^\circ 54.2' N$; $100^\circ 42.7' E$</td>
<td>See para. 1(c)(i)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>$05^\circ 44.2' N$; $100^\circ 42.7' E$ - $03^\circ 23.8' N$; $100^\circ 19.9' E$ - $03^\circ 04.1' N$; $100^\circ 45.2' E$ - $03^\circ 20.6' N$; $100^\circ 05.6' E$</td>
<td>Tg. PIANDANG LT $02^\circ 24.0' E$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>$05^\circ 30.6' N$; $101^\circ 05.0' E$ - $03^\circ 04.1' N$; $100^\circ 45.2' E$ - $02^\circ 30.0' N$; $100^\circ 25.0' E$; $101^\circ 17.3' E$</td>
<td>ONE PATUM RANK LT $02^\circ 24.0' E$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>$02^\circ 50.1' N$; $101^\circ 12.5' E$ - $02^\circ 43.3' N$; $101^\circ 12.5' E$ - $02^\circ 50.1' N$; $101^\circ 12.5' E$ - $02^\circ 50.1' N$; $101^\circ 12.5' E$</td>
<td>Tg. TOHOR LT $02^\circ 24.0' E$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>$02^\circ 23.8' N$; $101^\circ 12.5' E$ - $02^\circ 43.3' N$; $101^\circ 12.5' E$ - $02^\circ 25.0' N$; $101^\circ 12.5' E$</td>
<td>Tg. TOHOR LT $02^\circ 24.0' E$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>$02^\circ 23.8' N$; $102^\circ 18.5' E$ - $01^\circ 55.8' N$; $102^\circ 33.5' E$ - $01^\circ 55.8' N$; $102^\circ 33.5' E$</td>
<td>Tg. TOHOR LT $02^\circ 24.0' E$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Tg. TOHOR LT - $01^\circ 42.0' N$; $102^\circ 33.5' E$ - $01^\circ 42.0' N$; $102^\circ 33.5' E$</td>
<td>Tg. TOHOR LT $02^\circ 24.0' E$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

01 42.9N 102 33.8E Sec Para 1(c)(i)
01 21.5N 103 00E
01 21.5N 103 15.0E
01 12.8N 103 32.8E
01 12.8N 103 30.5E

To PI1A1
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>CO-ORDINATES</th>
<th>REFERENCE POSITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Tg. Pial, 01° 12.6' N; 103° 30.5' E</td>
<td>Raffles Lit, 01° 09.6' N; 103° 44.5' E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Tg. Pial - 01° 12.6' N; 103° 30.5' E</td>
<td>ST. JOHN I.G. Lit, 01° 12.3' N; 103° 51.3' E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Tg. Datok, 01° 05.0' N; 103° 34.0' E</td>
<td>Tg. Batok, 01° 05.0' N; 103° 34.0' E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Tg. Datok, Tg. Brak, Coast to 01° 05.0' N; 103° 34.0' E</td>
<td>Tg. Sem, 01° 09.0' N; 103° 36.0' E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Tingarok Pt, 02° 34.0' N; 103° 32.0' E</td>
<td>Po. Tioman, (Gunong Kat Jong), 02° 46.0' N; 103° 09.5' E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Po. Syed Hassan, 03° 32.0' N; 104° 00.0' E</td>
<td>Tg. Penunjuk, 02° 19.5' N; 103° 23.5' E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Tg. Dungan, 05° 00.0' N; 103° 19.0' E</td>
<td>Tg. Panas Lt, 05° 12.9' N; 103° 16.0' E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Br. Bidong, 05° 52.0' N; 103° 19.0' E; 05° 30.0' N; 102° 28.0' E; 05° 15.0' E; 102° 01.0' E</td>
<td>Br. Rhu, 05° 49.8' N; 103° 37.0' E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>05° 52.0' N; 103° 19.0' E; 05° 30.0' N; 102° 28.0' E; 05° 15.0' E; 102° 01.0' E</td>
<td>05° 49.8' N; 103° 37.0' E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AREA NO.</td>
<td>CO-ORDINATES</td>
<td>REFERENCE POSITION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>06° 00.0' N; 105° 11.0' E - 06° 00.0' N; 106° 00.0' E - 05° 00.0' N; 104° 00.0' E</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>05° 00.0' N; 104° 00.0' E - 05° 00.0' N; 105° 00.0' E - 04° 00.0' N; 103° 00.0' E</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>04° 00.0' N; 103° 00.0' E - 04° 00.0' N; 104° 00.0' E - 03° 00.0' N; 102° 00.0' E</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>03° 00.0' N; 102° 00.0' E - 03° 00.0' N; 103° 00.0' E - 02° 00.0' N; 101° 00.0' E - 01° 00.0' N; 100° 00.0' E</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>02° 00.0' N; 101° 00.0' E - 02° 00.0' N; 102° 00.0' E - 01° 00.0' N; 100° 00.0' E</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

/ANNEX 'B'/
THE PARALLELOGRAM

4. A special area is allocated eastwards of Horsburgh Light as follows:

- S.W. corner - Horsburgh Light.
- South Edge - 470 degrees, 30 miles from Horsburgh Light.
- West Edge - 000 degrees, 30 miles from Horsburgh Light.

This area, if patrolled by a single ship at random at 15 knots, is computed to give a 50 percent chance of detection of a 15 knot infiltrator vessel for East Coast of Malaya and routed east of Horsburgh.

SINGAPORE STRAIT - POLICE GRID

5. (a) The Singapore Police use a grid system for reporting contacts in this area. This grid is required by R.N. Ships patrolling in the Singapore Strait and by all R.M.N. Ships. All ships should obtain copies from COMFIF or MALAYA before going on patrol. The grid is modified COMIF, with the mile square subdivided into four, lettered A, B, C, D.

(b) Example. St. John Island is 5113c.

(c) Coverage. This grid system is used in the Singapore Straits between KORUP and HORSBURGH LIGHT

SINGAPORE PORT RESTRICTED AREAS

6. In the waters South of Singapore Island. Restricted areas, night curfew areas and night fishing areas are in force. Details are given in Appendix One to this Annex.

CHINA ROCK RANGE ACTIVITY

7. (a) China Rock Range (Area M3) is active as follows:

- MONDAYS 1000 to 1600
- TUESDAYS to THURSDAYS 0845 to 1600
- FRIDAYS 0845 to 1500

(b) On TUESDAYS and THURSDAYS each week the China Rock Range is open for night firing practices from 1830 to 2200 and flares, etc., are likely to be sighted in this area at these times. Advance notice of such practices will normally be given in COMFIF daily sitrep.

(c) Ships are not to enter the area without COMFIF approval when the range is active.

(d) A detailed chartlet of the area is enclosed.

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CONFDEF DAILY SITREP.

9.a. CONFDEF co-ordinates the allocation of patrolling craft and publishes a Situation Report (SITREP) daily at 1200 GH giving the forecast situation at 2100 GH on that day, and any after information affecting the immediate future.

Daily Sitrep Format (all times GH).

Paragraph 1 Ships and craft patrolling each SAMP area
Paragraph 2 Harbour Police Patrols.
Paragraph 3 Details of LIMP patrols for next 24 hours i.e. Times on and off Task. Callsign and variations of standard patrols in Annex India paragraph 4.
Paragraph 4 LIMP Patrols and other information.

"(b) The short title "Patrol Sitrep" will be used as the address. Composition as follows:-

Originator: CONFDEF
Action: UK DEF KL (for Defence Advisor).
        CMF
        MINDEF KL
        IGCF MARINE
        CONFDEF
        PEF
        PAREL
        PFP
        PEAF
        KIOIC WM
        KD MALAYA
        RAF SELTER
        22 GCP
        MARES CHANGI
        MARES BUTTERWORTH
        28 RAE
        32 RGT ROD
        37 MAR SHIP ROD
        1 RECCE RGT FOR DICKSON
        PATROL SHIPS AS DETAILED.

MINDEF KUALA LUMPUR

INFO CONFDEF
HQ PAREL

"NOTE: When reporting incidents of tactical importance which take place on the coast of Johore, the J.C.C.C. JOHORE is to be included in the signal address in addition to AIG 1117.

Classification and Precedence of Reports.

Classification and precedence of sighting reports must depend on circumstances and state of political tension at the time. The normal initial sighting report should be made 'Unclassified' Operational Immediate to Action addresses and Priority to information addresses.

The precedence and classification of amplifying reports should be adjusted according to the urgency of the situation and the nature of the information.

CONFIDENTIAL
Example of sighting report

TO AIG 1117
FROM KONSUCH
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED

SIGHTING REPORT

3 Fishing boats 190C. Ranchado Lt 215 - 050 10
021030GCH

2. Boats have large crews and turned away on sighting. An investigating.

DTG

(b) Barter trader reports

(i) On encountering a Barter Trader RN ships are to send an Operational Immediate unclassified signal

AIG 1117

COMPEF info WINTER to RNTR, 190C OCS, giving details of the craft, number of crew, port, place, time and intentions. (See also para 314D for pain order and Annex K para 2.)

(ii) HMN Ships should act in accordance with Annex D.

(c) NIL Reports

Not required unless specifically ordered.

(d) Own position reports

(i) Patrol vessels on passage through Areas. There have been several incidents reported of patrol craft investigating each other as suspicious contacts. When a patrol vessel is transmitting an area assigned to another vessel, it is the responsibility of the former to keep the latter informed of the situation. In the Singapore Straits the OTC should also be informed.

(ii) Investigating contacts outside allocated area. When proceeding out of the allocated area to investigate suspicious contacts patrol craft must report own position and intention together with position, course and speed of contact to adjacent patrol craft and to the OTC, where applicable.

It is important that these reports are made immediately on local circuits (T23 or Police notes) as well as making a sighting report to AIG 1117 on C.O.H. If this is done the Senior Officer in the area can co-ordinate investigation, help to avoid confusion and thus avoid any friendly clashes.

(e) Reporting Intentions for following day (RN Ships only)

(i) By day patrolling ships: have freedom to replenish or anchor in their assigned areas, and their orders sometimes include instructions to disperse. Experience has shown that there is an operational need for COMPEF to know ship's positions by day.

(ii) Patrolling ships are to signal COMPEF at 1600GCH daily their intentions for the following day. The signal

 LOGGER

(f) Reporting availability (HMN Ships only).

(i) In order to plan patrols, OTC's in Malacca Straits need to know when HMN ships require to replenish and the period they expect to remain in the area.

iii. HMN Ships to report this into to the OTC on (only)

on change of OTC and on change of / (ii) HMN ships

CONFIDENTIAL
ORGANISATION OF SINGAPORE STRAITS PATROL

11. a. The Naval patrol vessels operating in the Singapore Straits are normally divided into two patrol groups:

(i) West Patrol Group
Consists of all RNW and RN vessels on patrol between TANJONG PTAI and THE SISTERS. The Senior ship will be designated OTC and is to act as SR RCS.

(ii) East Patrol Group
Consists of vessels on patrol between THE SISTERS and JSC. The Senior ship will be OTC and SR RCS.

(iii) On occasions when only a small number of ships are available for Singapore Straits Patrol, the East and West will be combined into one patrol group. When this is done the fact will be made clear in the signal ordering the patrols.

(iv) S.E. Johore Patrol Group
Consists of all RNW and RN vessels on patrol in the Singapore Straits East of JSC. The Senior ship will be OTC and SR RCS.

b. OTC's of groups are not to redeploy patrol vessels from their assigned area unless:

(i) Authority to do so is delegated to them.
(ii) An immediate threat develops.

c. All naval vessels are to report suspicious contacts to the SR RCS who alone will originate contact reports to AIG 1117 and to the Police/RMN Coastal Operations Room at BUKIT MENTARI.

"d. Duration of night patrols in the Singapore Straits and South East Johore is from 2000 GH to 0800 GH. The Senior OTC in the Singapore Straits is to ensure that two ships remain on patrol until relieved by assigned day patrol ships."

Patrol have been unable to establish communication with the OTC prior to commencement of the patrol.

b. If no orders have been received from the designated OTC ships are to proceed to a standard rendezvous position in their assigned area and are to remain in vicinity until communication is established with the OTC.

c. Standard rendezvous positions are to be as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>STANDARD RENDEZVOUS POSITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 A</td>
<td>167 PISING LT 8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 A</td>
<td>165 TOHOR LT 15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 A</td>
<td>157 UNDAN LT 9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 A</td>
<td>163 RACHADO LT 12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 A</td>
<td>292 RACHADO LT 27.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONTROL OF FISHING CRAFT

13. a. Regulations have been made which will require all fishing craft to carry a Pass on which will be shown details of the boat and its crew. The issue of the pass obviates the need for fishermen to take their identity cards to sea. The regulations cover fishing craft operating from the States of Malaysia only.

b. A copy of the pass is at Appendix II. The regulations authorise inspecting officers at arrest any person in the boat whose particulars are not shown on the pass, regardless of whether the boat is within or without Malaysian Territorial Waters.

c. The Malaysian Government has requested that spot checks be carried out on fishing craft from time to time, to assist in enforcing the regulations.
d. Ships should make occasional checks on Malaysian fishing craft by day. Checks should also be carried out at night on all craft that are not obviously fishing, provided that this does not conflict with the aim of the patrol.

e. RN ships should not arrest any Malaysian fishing craft whose pass is not in order, but should signal the relevant details by unclassified Priority signal to COMPFEF, info NOICWM, MINDEF NL NAVY, IGFOL.

f. RMN ships may arrest fishing craft whose passes are not in order, and should send them under a prize crew to the nearest port. Relevant details should be signalled to:

NOICWM
INFO MINDEF NAVY
COMPFEF
IGFOL

14. HOSTILE ACTION FROM INDONESIAN TERRITORY

a. In West Malaysian area if units of Far East Fleet are fired upon from Indonesian Territory, they are to withdraw out of enemy range and report incident to COMPFEF by operational immediate classified Signal.

b. On no account is fire to be returned unless essential to ensure a safe withdrawal.

"15. ANTI-INFILTRATION BOAT BOOMS

Unlit anti-infiltration boat booms (short title WABBO) have been laid as follows:-

(a) WABBO 1. South East coast Singapore Island. Position from 133° SIGLAR OBELISK 0.8 miles to 088 SIGLAR OBELISK 3.8 miles.

(b) WABBO 2. Western Roads. Position from 059 PULAU JONG BEACON 2.8 miles to 067 PULAU JONG BEACON 1.1 miles.

(c) WABBO 3. Not yet (December, 1965) laid. Intended position Western Roads. Position from Beacon South East PULAU SEGAIN to PULAU SEGAIN via PULAU SEGAIN, PULAU SAMHAI and PULAU HOSTU.

16. SIGHTING OF A FIRE

"Attention of RN Ships is is drawn to FOTI 4432 paragraph 12."

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(a) Police patrols cover the approaches to the Port of Singapore from Tg TURIAN in the west to Tg SENGKONG (P. TINANG) in the east.

(b) Patrols are patrolled as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PATROL DESIGNATION</th>
<th>GRID LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>5719B TO 3815D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>364B TO 341B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>4011A TO 4409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>4409 TO 471B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>4814A TO 5142A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>5112B TO 5315B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>5A15C TO 5716B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>5315B TO 5217A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>5915C TO 0121D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>0022C TO 0225A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Following Police patrol lines are established:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PATROL</th>
<th>FROM LOCATION</th>
<th>TO LOCATION</th>
<th>DAY COVERAGE/NIGHT COVERAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FOXTROT I</td>
<td>3917 A</td>
<td>3924 A</td>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOXTROT II</td>
<td>3616 A</td>
<td>3813 B</td>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOXTROT III</td>
<td>3914 C</td>
<td>4211 D</td>
<td>Customs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOXTROT IV</td>
<td>4409 B</td>
<td>4712 D</td>
<td>Customs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOXTROT V</td>
<td>4712 D</td>
<td>5112 A</td>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOXTROT VI</td>
<td>5112 A</td>
<td>5315 B</td>
<td>Customs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOXTROT VII</td>
<td>5315 C</td>
<td>5716 B</td>
<td>Marine Dept.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOXTROT VIII</td>
<td>5315 B</td>
<td>5817 A</td>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOXTROT IX</td>
<td>5918 C</td>
<td>0121 D</td>
<td>Customs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOXTROT X</td>
<td>0022 C</td>
<td>0225 A</td>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANGO I</td>
<td>Around Pulau Bukom</td>
<td>Marine Dept.</td>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANGO II</td>
<td>4616 C</td>
<td>4715 D</td>
<td>NIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANGO III</td>
<td>5117 D</td>
<td>5317 C</td>
<td>Marine Dept.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANGO IV</td>
<td>5317 C</td>
<td>5517 A</td>
<td>NIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANGO V</td>
<td>5518 A</td>
<td>5920 C</td>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANGO VI</td>
<td>5623 D</td>
<td>5524 A</td>
<td>NIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WALTZ I</td>
<td>4616 B (STATIC)</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WALTZ II</td>
<td>4517 A (STATIC)</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Police launches are instructed not to leave their patrol lines unless:

(i) ordered to do so by Coastguard
(ii) investigating or intercepting a sighting
(iii) in emergency
(iv) relieved.

(b) In the event of radio failure, police launches fire red or white light signals as follows:

(i) 1 white - small craft sighted. Investigating.
(ii) 3 whites - craft is hostile.
(iii) 1 or more red - require immediate assistance.
APPENDIX ONE TO ANNEX B

Port of Singapore - Restricted Area for vessels under 100 net tons

Date: With effect from 1900 hours on 29th January, 1965.

Details:

1. With the exception of vessels detailed at para. 2, no vessel of under 100 net tons shall enter the area bounded by lines joining the following positions:

Outer Limit:

(i) Beacon 28 (4°14'43"N 103°37'40"E) S.E.
(ii) 4°19'43"N 103°36'24"E

(iii) Sultan Shoal Lighthouse (1°06'05"N 103°38'54"E)
(iv) Raffles Lighthouse (1°06'36"N 103°41'26"E) along Port Limit to 1°54'59"N 103°54'19"E

(v) Thence in a 060° direction to

(vi) 1°17'19"N 104°01'57"E

(vii) Thence in a direction 310° to Si Mata Ikan Light, (1°32'00"N 103°54'15"E)

Inner Limit:

(i) 1°32'05"N 103°36'35"E
(ii) 1°35'28"N 103°37'46"E
(iii) 1°35'12"N 103°39'32"E
(iv) 1°30'49"N 103°44'40"E
(v) Sembawang Penang Air Flash Red Lt. Beacon (1°33'23"N 103°51'14"E)

(vi) Outer Shoal Buoy (1°45'40"N 103°53'45"E)

(vii) 1°18'04"N 103°53'45"E
tthence in a direction 310° to Te. Bedok,
(1°19'44"N 103°58'06"E)

(2) This restriction shall not apply to:

(a) vessels under 100 net tons arriving from a port outside Malaysia (other than vessels having on board Indonesian personnel or cargo originating from Indonesia) provided such vessels enter off Peak Inland and proceed direct to the Immigration Anchorage;

/ (b) ............
(b) vessels under 100 net tons proceeding to a port outside Malaysia and having on board a Port Clearance from Singapore;

c) vessels under 100 net tons proceeding to or returning from any port in Malaysia and having on board a Port Clearance from the Port of departure;

d) vessels under 100 net tons owned by the Government or a Statutory Board; and

e) vessels under 100 net tons having on board a pass issued by the Officer Commanding, Port Authority Police.

Mariners are reminded that Malaysian territorial waters surrounding the States of Malaya and the State of Singapore are a SECURITY AND CONTROL AREA and that all vessels must stop when ordered to do so by a security patrol.

Charts affected: 3833, 2405, 1995, 3836 and 3837.

Restricted and Prohibited Areas - Singapore
Territorial Waters.

The Shipping and Fishing Community is advised that new night curfew arrangements for boats under 100 tons, sails and outboard motors will come into force at 1900 hours (7 p.m.) Friday 29.1.65. Three areas where night fishing will be permitted have been designated. Boats must enter the areas before 1900 hours (7 p.m.) and remain in the area until 0530 hours (5.30 a.m.).

Night movement of boats under 100 tons, sails and outboard motors in all other parts of the territorial waters of Singapore between Tg. Changi and Tg. Kampire continues to be prohibited.

The prohibited day and night area for all vessels under 100 tons will with effect from 1900 hours (7 p.m.) 29.1.65 be extended to the East to a point off Tg. Mata Ikan and to the West off Sultan Shoal Lighthouse.

Any vessel under 100 tons wanting to pass through the area by day or night must be in possession of a permit issued by the O.C. Port Authority or in possession of a Port Clearance. Passes are normally only issued for day-light passage through the prohibited area.

A plan showing:-

(a) the night fishing areas and

(b) the night curfew area for boats under 100 tons, sails and outboard motors, and

(c) the prohibited zones for all vessels under 100 tons during day and night,

is attached herewith.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Fishing Areas in Absence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>126</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pengerang to Punggai 1600 - 0600 G.H.

Punggai to Bukoh 24 Hr.
NOTE: The night curfew arrangements described above are reviewed each month by Singapore Authorities and re-imposed as necessary. Correctly (FEB 66) there is no change to fishing areas other than that the fishing areas are in Singapore.
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ANNEX B. APPENDIX II

FORM B

KEMENTERIAN PERTANIAN, MALAYSIA
(Ministry of Defence, Malaysia)
SURAT KEBENARAN PELAYAN DAN ANAK2 PERAHU
(FISHING CRAFT AND CREW PASS)

Sah bagi tempoh................................
(Valid for the period)

56 inches
Gambar Perahu
(Photograph of Craft)

34 inches
Pos Ked
(Postcard)

Nombor Daftar:......................
(Registered Number):

Nombor Lesen:......................
(Licence Number):

Anak2 Perahu:......................
(Crew):

Nama:......................
(name)

Umur:......................
(Age)

Nombor Kad Pengenalan:........
(Identity Card No.)

Nama:......................
(name)

Umur:......................
(Age)

Nombor Kad Pengenalan:........
(Identity Card No.)

Nama:......................
(name)

Umur:......................
(Age)

Nombor Kad Pengenalan:........
(Identity Card No.)

Pihak Berkuasa Yang Mengetuarkan
(Issuing Authority)

Pendahuluan untuk menggunakan surat kebenaran ini ada di-muka sa-belah
(Instructions for the use of this pass are on the reverse)
Reverse of Form 2.

Share2 bagi menempaikan Surat Kebenaran ini
(Instructions for use of this Pass)

1. Apabila Surat Kebenaran ini di-keluarkan, ada-ala satu keadaan jika pergi keluar ke-laut dengan tiada membawa-nya. Tanpa pura perahu akan di-luahkan lesen-nya.

(When this Pass is issued it is an offence to proceed to sea without it. The owner of the craft is liable to forfeiture of his licence).


(When this Pass is in force it is an offence under the Essential (Fishing Craft and Crew Pass) Regulation 1965 to take a National Registration Identity Card to sea).


(When any member of the crew is not present on board or an additional member of the crew is enrolled a Certificate of Change in Crew is to be obtained from the Issuing Authority).


(It is an offence to proceed to sea with persons on board the craft for which this Pass is issued whose names are not on this Pass or a valid Certificate of Change in Crew which is to be kept with this pass.)


(The loss of this Pass is to be reported immediately to the nearest Police Station and the Issuing Authority.)

6. Surat Kebenaran ini hendaklah di-tongkodan jika di-minta oleh:

This pass is to be shown on demand to:

a. Sebarang Anggota Pesokan Keselamatan
   (Any member of the Security Forces).

b. Sebarang Pegawai Kostan
   (Any officer of Customs).

c. Sebarang "Hawal Perikanan Laut
   (Any Maritime Fisheries Officer).

d. Sebarang Timbalan Pegawai Perikanan Laut
   (Any Deputy Maritime Fisheries Officer).

e. Sebarang Pegawai Imigresen
   (Any Immigration Officer).

f. Sebarang Pegawai Jabatan Laut
   (Any officer of the Marine Department).

7. Surat Kebenaran ini hendaklah di-serahkan belakangan kepada Pekah Berkwasa yang mengeluarkannya sa-lehal satu Surat Kebenaran baharu untuk tempoh yang berikut-nya di-keluarkan.

(This Pass is to be surrendered to the Issuing Authority when a new Pass for the next period is issued).
THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF PATROLLING.

1. The provision of this Annex apply to R.N. ships only. The relevant orders for R.M.N. ships are contained in S.O.I.'s.

2. Indonesian Territorial Waters and additional waters to which they have laid claim are defined in PGTI 4012 paragraph 32 et seq., and are shown on the tracings (see Annex B para 8). The policy of H.M.G. towards these claims is also contained in the same PGTI.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN WITH INDONESIAN NAVAL AND GOVERNMENT VESSELS

3. It should be noted that all craft commissioned in the service of a Government are entitled to the same immunity as warships and hence bona fide customs vessels, BT boats, etc., must be treated in the same way as warships.

4. Patrolling ships encountering INDONESIAN Naval and Government vessels report them as in PGTI 4125 and act in accordance with the following instructions:

(a) On the high seas.

Indonesian Naval and Government vessels are to be regarded as immune from any direct action except when interfering with a ship entitled to British protection. Nevertheless, contact is to be held whilst the Indonesian vessel is passing through the patrolling vessel's assigned area.

(b) In Malaysian territorial sea.

The vessel is to be closed and required to explain her presence. Unless she can justify innocent passage, she should be required to leave. If her Commanding Officer refuses to do so, action is to be taken to eject her, by force, if necessary. Instructions issued must be firm and force is only to be used in the following circumstances:

either (i) All appeals to reason have failed and H.M. Ship's intention to open fire is clearly indicated.

or (ii) The Indonesian vessel clearly shows hostile intent.

5. There is no Indonesian Naval ensign as such. All Indonesian Naval, Government and Merchant ships fly the Indonesian National flag.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN WITH NON-GOVERNMENT CRAFT.

6. The instructions contained in PGTI 4104 are to be followed.

OPENING FIRE.

7. The policy governing the conditions under which fire may be opened are contained in PGTI 4102 and 4104.

8. USE OF TEAR GAS.

Ships which carry tear gas are not under any circumstances to use such gas when dealing with infiltrators or saboteurs.

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1. **Summary of Past Events**

   a. At the onset of confrontation, Indonesia used barter trade craft plying between Indonesia and Malaysia to transport infiltrators and their arms and ammunition to Singapore and Malaya. It was soon realised that this traffic could not be stopped while barter trade between the two countries continued. In consequence, on 13th August, 1964, all barter trade between Malaysia and Indonesia was declared illegal by:

   (1) Creating an Import Ban on all Indonesian goods brought into Malaysian Territorial Waters (MTW's) by craft of under 200 NRT whether Malaysian or Indonesian. (This also applies now to MTW though at this time, by reason of the Mutual Defence Pact, all waters retained their original designation).

   (2) Cancelling all entry permits for Indonesians.

b. Subsequent to (1) and (2) above, MTW was declared a controlled area. Indonesians are not permitted to enter MTW and will be apprehended and charged under the Internal Security Act if they do so.

c. Upon implementation of the above restrictions, intensive patrolling by MNF ships, police patrol craft and Malaysian Government craft was carried out. At first, numerous barter trade craft were turned away and persistent offenders arrested until barter trading was virtually suppressed. However, a small number of barter craft, either through ignorance of the ban or a determination to flout it, occasionally attempted to enter MTW.

d. Towards the end of 1965 and early in 1966, both the Malaysian and Singapore Governments decided to resume barter trading with Indonesia to the limited and controlled extent described in paragraphs 2 and 3 below.

2. **Current Situation (April, 1966)**

   a. **Singapore Government Scheme**

      (1) An area of high seas exists in the triangle bounded by the following positions:

      \[
      \begin{align*}
      & 01^\circ 12.6' \text{ North} & 103^\circ 31.9' \text{ East} \\
      & 01^\circ 46.8' \text{ North} & 103^\circ 35.6' \text{ East} \\
      & 01^\circ 13.0' \text{ North} & 103^\circ 35.9' \text{ East} \\
      \end{align*}
      \]

      This triangle is clear of:

      - Malaysian territorial waters to the North
      - Singaporean territorial waters to the east
      - Indonesian claimed waters to the South.

      Tracing of chart 2403 held by Far East Fleet ships is to be amended accordingly.

   

   (2)
1. **Summary of Past Events**

   a. At the onset of confrontation, Indonesia used barter trade craft plying between Indonesia and Malaysia to transport infiltrators and their arms and ammunition to Singapore and Malaya. It was soon realised that this traffic could not be stopped while barter trade between the two countries continued. In consequence, on 13th August, 1964 all barter trade between Malaysia and Indonesia was declared illegal by:

      (1) Creating an Import Ban on all Indonesian goods brought into Malaysian Territorial Waters ¶ (MTW's) by craft of under 200 NRT whether Malaysian or Indonesian ¶ (This also applies now to SW though at this time, by reason of the Mutual Defence Pact, all waters retained their original designation).

      (2) Cancelling all entry permits for Indonesians.

   b. Subsequent to (1) and (2) above, MTW was declared a controlled area. Indonesians are not permitted to enter MTW and will be apprehended and charged under the Internal Security Act if they do so.

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2. **Current Situation (April, 1966)**

   a. **Singapore Government Scheme**

      (1) An area of high seas exists in the triangle bounded by the following positions:

      \[
      \begin{align*}
      \text{01}^\circ \ 12.6' \text{ North} & \quad \text{103}^\circ \ 31.9' \text{ East} \\
      \text{01}^\circ \ 14.6' \text{ North} & \quad \text{103}^\circ \ 35.6' \text{ East} \\
      \text{01}^\circ \ 13.0' \text{ North} & \quad \text{103}^\circ \ 35.9' \text{ East}
      \end{align*}
      \]

      This triangle is clear of:

      - Malaysian territorial waters to the North
      - Singaporean territorial waters to the east
      - Indonesian claimed waters to the South.

      Tracing of chart 2403 held by Far East Fleet ships is to be amended accordingly.
b. Craft which attempt to approach the barter trade positions outside the hours authorised in 3.a. above are to be treated as follows:

(1) OUTSIDE NW/SW. Inform craft of authorised barter trading hours and instruct them to return to Indonesian claimed waters until those hours.

(2) INSIDE NW/SW. If the Commanding Officer of the intercepting ship considers the craft to be a genuine barter trader or fishing boat, the craft should be arrested and turned over to the police. If, by virtue of suspicious behaviour on the part of the intercepted craft, the Commanding Officer of the intercepting ship considers the craft to be other than a genuine barter trader or fishing boat, the crew of the craft should be ordered to swim to the ship and the craft sunk by gunfire or scorch charges (Page A3 paragraph 3 (M) and (N) is relevant).

c. All barter trade craft are required to be clear from alongside barter trade ships by 1800 GH daily. Any craft not clear by 1800 GH are to be reported by signal to:

(a) Singapore Scheme - Coastguard INFO AIG 1117
(b) Malaysian Scheme - COPEPE Info AIG 1117

d. No craft are permitted to ply between the Malaysian and/or Singapore shore and licensed barter trade ships except by daylight under police escort.

e. No barter trade craft are permitted to proceed from the barter trade ships into NW or SW. Any craft found doing so is to be treated in accordance with paragraph b.(2) above.

4. In the event of non-compliance with the restrictions laid down in paragraph 2.b.(3) above, Commanding Officers are to:

(a) Signal COPEPE INFO AIG 1117 stating nature of lack of compliance.
(b) Inform the master of the offending ship that a report is being made.

5. In the event of Commanding Officers encountering ships conducting barter trade out of the permitted areas or in a permitted area but without an import licence, a report is to be signalled to COPEPE INFO AIG 1117 and the ship is to be warned that Indonesian craft attempting to approach her will be treated as a threat to security of Malaysia and Singapore and may be sunk. Such craft are then to be treated in accordance with paragraph 3.b. above.
ANNEX E - INTELLIGENCE

MALPOS II

STRENGTH.

1. The Indonesian Navy (ALRI) has approximately 30,000 personnel and some 200 vessels, most of which were supplied by the USSR. The main combatant units are:

   1. Sverdlov class cruiser.
   7. Skory class destroyers.
   2. Imam Bonjol class destroyer escorts (Italian built)
   8. Alfa class destroyer escorts.
   12. 'W' class submarines.
   1. Don class submarine depot ship.
   13. Atrek class submarine depot ship.
   16. Kronstadt class large submarine chasers.
   12. Komar class FTO.
   7. Jaguar class PT boats.
   14. P8 Class PT boats.
   5. T.43 class fleet minesweepers.
   2. Halmahera class attack transports.
   1. Multatuli class headquarters ship.
   6. "511" class L.S.T.

DEPLOYMENT.

2. (a) Most ALRI ships are based on Java (Surabaya and Tanjung Priok). In the Riau/Malacca Strait Area there are approximately 40 B.T. Boats which are primarily custom anti-smuggling patrol craft but are frequently used in Infiltration Operations (e.g. transfer of personnel and arms between bases; capture of Malaysian fishing jukung; transferring infiltrators into boats on the high seas). B.T. Boats are 20 feet long and armed with a 20 mm gun. The B.T. 400 series have a top speed of about 31 knots and are all equipped with surface warning radar. The 300 series are capable of about 25 knots and some of them have no radar.

   (b) Other units which appear in the area from time to time, but are not based there, are Kronstadt class F.C., T.43 class L.S.T, P6 class PT and W class submarines. However, the Regular Indonesian Navy have up to early 1965 taken very little part in infiltration or sabotage operations in the West Malaysia area.

THE THREAT.

3. As stated above, the ALRI has taken little part in operations in West Malaysia, and there is at present (Aug 65) no sign of any intention to do so. The main threats which patrolling ships have to counter are:

   (a) Infiltration.
   (b) Sabotage.

4. These threats are considered in detail in the following paragraphs, but in general it may be said that all Indonesian seaborne activity against West Malaysia takes place at night.

5. Apart from the initial air drop at LABIS in September, 1964, there has been little activity by the Indonesian Air Force (ALRI) in support of anti-West Malaysia operations.
CONFIDENTIAL

INFLTRATORS.

6. (a) Bases. Bases for infiltration of West Malaysia extend from Berakas (N.E. corner of Paulau Bintan) to Medan. The principal bases with their lettered designations and target areas are shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Target Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Z</td>
<td>Tanjung Pinang (Paulau Bintan)</td>
<td>Johore River to Jason Bay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Palau Sambu</td>
<td>Singapore Island.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Tanjung Salai (Karimn)</td>
<td>Muar to Pontian Kechil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Salat Panjang (Palau Tebingtinggi)</td>
<td>Muar/Malacca Area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>Hujang (Paulau Rusa)</td>
<td>Cape Rachado.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>Long and Pasir</td>
<td>Port Dickson to Pangkor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SUNGAI KIMBONG (Bengkalis)</td>
<td>Muar/Satu Patat.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See map enclosed with this annex as Appendix I.

(b) Aims. The aim of infiltrators is to carry out the "Crush Malaysia" policy. To attain this it is considered that they will try to land undetected in West Malaysia and set up jungle camps as bases for:

(i) enlisting popular support for Indonesia.
(ii) carrying out guerrilla warfare operations against the Malaysian Government.

FORCES AVAILABLE FOR INFILTRATION.

7. The forces allocated to and deployed for "I" Operations currently [AUG 1965] number about 900. Most of these are "volunteers" i.e., they are not regular troops and the only training they have had is in jungle survival the use of small arms and some very misleading political indoctrination. (Most captured infiltrators arrived expecting to be welcomed as liberators by a disdiant, down-trodden local population).

8. There are, however, regular army, marine and police troops available and these have been used to stiffen the determination of the volunteers.

9. Despite the large number of troops available, infiltration attempts by sea so far have been made by small groups of four to thirty men in small boats. The largest scale recent attempt was that intercepted by H.M.S. AJAX on Christmas Eve, 1964, when 22 men in 7 prahans were captured and a further 28 escaped in the B.T. boat which had brought the whole force to the rendezvous with the prahans.

10. Except in the unlikely event of Indonesia deliberately risking retaliation, the size of infiltration attempts will not increase but their frequency almost certainly will.

11. There is a possibility that Indonesian submarines could be used for landing small parties of infiltrators, particularly on the East Coast of West Malaysia.

/12. ........
12. Parties of infiltrators who have successfully landed may attempt to withdraw to Indonesia. Patrolling vessels should bear this in mind.

LIKELY LANDING PLACES FOR INFLICTORS.

13. Previous infiltrations indicate that the selection of landing places is influenced by the following factors:
   (a) Local knowledge of Malaysian Volunteers.
   (b) Degree of support expected from local inhabitants.
   (c) Access to jungle areas suitable for setting up bases.
   (d) Likelihood of detection.
   (e) Topography (Normally the mouth of a river is selected)

14. The mouths of the following rivers are assessed as high probability areas; landings have already been made or attempted at those marked with an asterisk.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>River</th>
<th>Approx. Co-Ordinates of Mouth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sekong</td>
<td>2° 35 North 10° 43 East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinan</td>
<td>2° 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenaiya</td>
<td>2° 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raya</td>
<td>2° 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linggi</td>
<td>2° 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kesang</td>
<td>2° 03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serang Bayan</td>
<td>1° 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanglang</td>
<td>1° 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayer Baloi</td>
<td>1° 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jokocr</td>
<td>1° 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selili Keobil</td>
<td>1° 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalo</td>
<td>2° 02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenggaroh</td>
<td>2° 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jemalang</td>
<td>2° 23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VESSELS AND TECHNIQUES LIKELY TO BE USED FOR INFILTRATION.

15. Most infiltrators cross at night in unlit fishing boats, many of them stolen from Malaysian fishermen. Their speed is normally about 5 - 8 knots but some are fitted with powerful outboard motors enabling them to escape at high speed if intercepted.

16. Their navigation is primitive; whenever possible they like to run in on a lighthouse, then follow the coastline, close inshore, to their landing area. The routes between bases and lighthouses in likely landing areas therefore require particular attention.

17. The technique employed on 24th December of ferrying troops on a B.T. Boat for part of the crossing and then transferring to their fishing boats might well be used again in the wider sections of Malacca Strait.

18. The behaviour of intercepted boats has varied. Some have made no attempt to escape and others have been quickly discouraged by the use of illuminants and/or warning shots. More determined ones have attacked with small arms and hand grenades. Ships closing suspicious small craft should always be prepared for this form of attack.

19. Reports have been received that infiltrators may wear knives or pistols under their clothing at the back of the neck. Boarding and search parties should be warned accordingly.
20. Some captured infiltrators have been in possession of a card purporting to be an identity card of the "Indonesian National Army". The card has crossed rifles on the cover, and underneath the words "TANDATANGAN TENTARA NASIONAL INDONESIA". If any cards of this nature are found in a boat, the occupants should be arrested.

21. Indonesia is known to be building 30 foot hard-chine launches powered by two 100 H.P. outboard motors and capable of carrying 30 men. These are probably intended to carry infiltrators across Malacca Strait but they are not yet in the area.

SABOTAGE

22. A number of Indonesian have been trained for sabotage or hit-and-run raids, rather than for infiltration. Targets for sabotage are likely to be ships at anchor, power stations and other key points. Saboteurs may be expected in smaller groups than infiltrators, and they may use any type of boat from high-speed outboards to rowing sampans.

23. It is believed that most saboteurs are based at KRAI and KAMBO, and that their training is not high. The night attack on the merchant vessel "OCEANIC PRIDE" on 6th January, 1965 was not a sophisticated affair. Two men in a rowing boat went alongside the ship, which was at anchor in Singapore Roads, and placed some explosive in a over-board discharge about three feet above the waterline. The saboteurs then attempted to paddle their way back to the Rhio Islands, but were intercepted and arrested by a patrolling ship.

24. The damaged caused to the Oceanic Pride by the explosion was superficial and the ship was repaired within three days.

25. In areas where sabotage is likely, patrolling vessels should be alert to detect craft returning to Indonesia, as well as those proceeding towards Malaysian waters.

DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE

R.H.N.A.N. and R.N.Z.N. Ships

26. The normal means of keeping ships informed are:

(a) F.E.W. (Far East Weekly Intelligence Reports).
(b) Weekly Intelligence Summaries.
(c) Intelligence Sentries (Signalled as necessary to ships concerned).
(d) Briefings. There is a Staff Officer (Intelligence) available in the Naval Base to brief ships. Commanding Officers are invited to make use of this facility (ext. 9761) before sailing for patrols.

R.H.N. Ships

27. Commanding Officers should contact SO (A)

28. Indonesian Saboteur boats attempting to reach Singapore

(A.L.2)

a. A group of small fishing boats will put to sea on the Indonesian side of the Median line. The saboteur boat will be in the middle of this group and will wait until a large ship goes by; it will then attempt to cross the Straits under cover of the ship's radar shadow.

b. Ships entering Western or Eastern Roads are particularly likely to be used in this way."
MALPOS II
ANNEX F
SEA AIR COOPERATION.

R.A.F. RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT.

1. (a) General.

The Strait of Malacca poses several problems for maritime air reconnaissance. The multiplicity of radar contacts caused by small craft, kelongs and flotsam combined with the difficulty of positively identifying small craft from the air, especially at night, make it impossible to achieve a secure search.

(b) Capabilities in Anti-Infiltration Role.

(i) ASV 21 Radar, designed for anti submarine use, can pick up small wooden craft at ranges up to 10 n.m. and larger vessels up to 60 n.m.

(ii) Usually 2 x 20 m.m. cannon are carried in the nose mounting. These are capable of harassing fire and are not sufficiently accurate to guarantee hitting a small target by day, and are likely to have only a psychological effect at night.

(iii) Flares are carried to illuminate contacts at night.

(iv) Sonobuoys are carried in the bomb bay for tracking submerged submarines.

(v) Cameras are carried to give a day/night photographic capability.

(c) Limitations.

(i) Aircraft are not allowed to enter airspace above Indonesian Territorial Waters without prior clearance from the Senior Air Staff Officer HQRAF.

(ii) Aircraft are not allowed to take offensive action without prior clearance from HQRAF.

(iii) It is difficult to select significant contacts from the very cluttered radar picture usually gained in the area.

(iv) Identification of small craft at night is difficult due to height restrictions, the intermittent nature of the illuminating flares, and the relatively short time available with a night closing speed.

(d) Method of Operation.

The aircraft will normally fly along the seaward limit of its assigned area, using its radar looking to the south west, so as to detect craft crossing the straits towards Malaya.

R.M.A.F.

2. DOVB aircraft stationed at Kuala Lumpur sometimes assist with patrols. They have to rely entirely on visual detection and identification and therefore can only operate by day.

/3. ....
STANDARD PATROLS.

3. (a) LRMF Aircraft.

MACPope Changi arranges for a Shackleton to patrol the Malacca Straits from Port Swettenham to Tg. Piai for about six hours every night between 2200 and 0400. The aircraft remains under the operational control of MAROFS Changi but will establish communications with ships and craft as necessary and is available for cooperation and investigation of contacts if required. The senior ship in the area may act as OTC, see Para 6. The aircraft will operate IFF throughout the patrol.

(b) R.M.A.F.

Several days each week Doves carry out dusk patrols of the area from Port Swettenham to the Seabird Islands, and to the westward as far as 12 miles off the coast of Sumatra.

DETAILS OF DAILY PATROLS.

4. Details of the night patrol giving times ON and OFF Task, Callsign and any variations to the patrol areas will be promulgated by Changi in FORM YELLOW and included in CONFESP's daily sitrep to R.M. Ships and will also be passed to R.M.N. craft concerned by RDF MARK NORDROM.

Details of R.M.A.F. patrols will be included in the sitrep.

TACTICAL COMMAND OF MARITIME AIRCRAFT.

5. LRMF aircraft are assigned patrol areas by CONFESP through MAROFS Changi. The senior ship in the area thus assigned may assume tactical command of the aircraft in the event of an incident, but is not to re-task it to a different area.

6. R.M.A.F. aircraft remain under tactical command of R.M.A.F. authorities at all times.

CONTACTS WITH UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT

7. (a) Incidents have occurred when patrolling Shackletons have obtained radar or visual contact with low-flying, unidentified aircraft at night in the Malacca Straits. Due to the time taken for a night fighter to be scrambled and arrive in the area, it has not been possible to intercept these intrusions.

(b) H.Q.F.E.A.F. has directed that crews of Shackletons during
JOINT AIR DEFENCE IN MALAYA

1. H.M. Ships and aircraft may be required to augment the Royal Air Force shore-based air defence organisation. The provisions of this annex do not apply to R.M. Ships, nor to R.N. C.M.S. or S.D.B.s.

2. Air Defence Organisation
   At present this organisation comprises:
   
   (a) The Air Defence Commander situated at the Air Defence Operations Centre (A.D.O.C. - Tel: No. 61170) Far East Air Force Headquarters, Changi. The A.D.O.C. is manned continuously.
   
   (b) Master Radar Station, Royal Air Force Bukit Gombak (Tel: No. 8295).
   
   (c) No. 114 Master Control and Reporting Unit, Royal Australian Air Force, Butterworth.
   
   (d) Mobile Reporting Post (Type UPS-1) at Terendak Barracks, Malacca.
   
   (e) Mobile Reporting Post (Type UPS-1) at Kuantan, Pahang.
   
   (f) The Air Defence Notification Centre at the Joint Air Traffic Control Centre, Paya Lebar. This unit provides notification of friendly and civil air movements.
   
3. Naval Participation
   H.M. Ships and A.E.W. Gunnet aircraft may be ordered by Commander, Far East Fleet to carry out any of the following tasks:
   
   (a) Extend the low air warning around Singapore, Butterworth, or along Maleayan Coast.
   
   (b) Provide long range air surveillance in the area.
   
   (c) Provide Airborne Early Warning along the Maleayan coast.
   
   (d) Control Royal Air Force and Naval fighters.

4. EXECUTION
   
   (a) On receipt of the Codeword "CUTTER LOW" ships are to carry out the task in paragraph 3(a). They are to set watch on Joint Raid Reporting Net and report all contacts to Bukit Gombak or Butterworth as appropriate.
   
   (b) On receipt of the Codeword "CUTTER", ships that are Air Defence Control Units, are to carry out the task in 3(b), and report as in (a).

   (c) / ....
(c) Ships on passage to or from Singapore are to set watch on the Joint Raid Reporting Net (JSRN) and carry out "CUTTER"/"CUTTER LOW" duties as follows:

(i) On arrival from the west at latitude 2° 30’N and call Bukit Gombak.

(ii) On arrival from the east at latitude 3°N and/or longitude 106°E and call Bukit Gombak.

(iii) On departure from Singapore the appropriate R.A.F. station is to be called and they are to report until either the position lines in (i) or (ii) above are reached or they are ordered to cease reporting.

5. Reporting Procedures

(a) Raid Reporting should be carried out in accordance with J.S.P.6, Chapter 5, Section 2 using the Georef Grid (Bukit Gombak position FB 4525).

(b) Units detecting a contact assign it a four figure octal track number. Blocks of these track numbers have been allocated to Naval units in Appendix 1 to Annex Alfa of FUTI 4434.

(c) If ships are not in touch with Bukit Gombak or Butterworth when unidentified or hostile aircraft are sighted or detected they should be reported by OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE unclassified signal as follows:

Action addressee: FIAFOC

Info. addressee:
- GEFOG
- MINDEF K.L. (for JOC)
- CINCPE
- COMFPE

D.I.G. KSS

Aircraft Sighting/Detection.

A. Time and Date
B. Position (Lat. and long., or GEOREF),
C. Flight Direction,
D. Height (Thousands of feet or High/Medium/Low),
E. Identity or number of engines and other identification features,
F. Jet or Piston,
G. Navigation or other lights displayed,
H. Suspicious manoeuvres,
J. Other information.

Sections on which no information is available should be omitted.
(a) Garmets use the following reference positions for reporting:

Cape Rachado  CHARLIE PAPA
Tanjong Tohor  NOVEMBER GOLF
Horsburgh Light  WHISKY MIKE

6. A.E.W. and Picket Stations

(a) A.E.W. STATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Call</th>
<th>Station</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LIMA</td>
<td>FULAU PISANG TO MALACCA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIKE</td>
<td>MALACCA TO PORT SWETTENHAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOVEMBER</td>
<td>PORT DICKSON TO KUALA SELANGOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSAN</td>
<td>PORT SWETTENHAM TO SEMBILIAN ISLANDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAPA</td>
<td>SEMBILIAN ISLANDS TO PENANG ISLANDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUEBEC</td>
<td>FULAU TIONGAN TO TANJONG GE LANG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) RADAR PICKET AND CARRIER STATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Call</th>
<th>CI</th>
<th>Station</th>
<th>Lat</th>
<th>Long</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIERRA</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>SW BATU PAHAT</td>
<td>0140 N</td>
<td>102 45 E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANGO</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>SW FULAU UNDAN LIGHT</td>
<td>0158 N</td>
<td>102 18 E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFORM</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>SW CAFE RACHADO</td>
<td>0220 N</td>
<td>101 48 E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHISKY</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>SW ONE PATTOM BAHK</td>
<td>0218 N</td>
<td>100 54 E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALFA</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>SW PENANG ISLAND</td>
<td>0320 N</td>
<td>100 30 E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRAVO</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>SW PENANG ISLAND</td>
<td>0430 N</td>
<td>99 30 E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHARLIE</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>EAST KUANTAN</td>
<td>0345 N</td>
<td>104 00 E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DELTA</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>EAST TRENGGANU</td>
<td>0520 N</td>
<td>102 00 E</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: To avoid confusion between these Air Defence Stations and other lettered surface patrol stations, ships are to be ordered to assume "Air Defence Station ............ "

7. Communications

(a) Joint Inter Controllers Net - JS 36 - HF Voice

Managed by Bukit Gambak and Butterworth and any naval Air Defence Control Units (Carrier or picket with control ability). Frequencies as in Pameco 2302.

Component JS 36/7 not yet available ashore.

Initial contact JS 36/11.

(b) / ......
7. Communications

(a) **JOINT INTERCONTROLLERS NET - JS 40 - HF VOICE**
1. Manned by Bukit Gombak and Butterworth and any naval Air Defence Control Units (Carrier or picket with control ability).
2. Component JS.40/1 not yet available ashore.
3. Initial contact JS.40/11.

(b) **JOINT RAID REPORTING NET - JS 37 - HF VOICE**
1. Manned by Bukit Gombak, Butterworth, Terendak Mobile Radar and all ships with an Air Defence Capability (i.e. Any naval ship taking part in cutter or cutter low).
2. Components JS 37/6 and 10 not yet available ashore.
3. Initial contact JS 37/7.
4. In event SSB failure, ships are to join R.A.F. circuit FPH 9.
   Channel L 2325 Kcs.
   R 4755 Kcs.
   A 8002 Kcs.

(c) **GROUND CONTROL INTERCEPTION - JS 48 - UHF VOICE**
2. This circuit is also used for Sea Air Co-operation (See Annex H).
3. Normal Channel JS 48/1, Alternate JS 48/3.
4. The L.R.M.P. Aircraft reports her position continuously on this circuit and can be used to relay raid reports if contact is lost on circuit JS 37.

(d) **Callsigns**
Air Defence callsigns are to be used by all ships when allocated an Air Defence Station (see paragraph 6(b)), if no station allocated Tactical callsigns are to be used.

**STANDING CALLSIGNS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BUKIT GOMBAK</th>
<th>F/CIRCUITS</th>
<th>GROUND - AIR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>114 MORU BUTTERWORTH</td>
<td>D C G</td>
<td>GOMBAK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TERENDAK MOBILE RADAR</td>
<td>D C K</td>
<td>BESAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>: SHIP ACTING AS ARROS</td>
<td>D C followed</td>
<td>GRANITE PUPPET</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(e) **Codes**
1. R.A.F. Stations on these nets hold Bis/02/10.
2. R.A.F. Stations and aircraft types are to be referred to by code names as promulgated to ships concerned.
Radio Communications

1. In addition to the communications in FREDO (RN) and MANVO (MMN), the following circuits are in use for ships and craft on patrol in West Malaysia.

Coastal Common Net (MM CW)

a. A combined RN/MMN CCN.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Times of Radiation</th>
<th>Callsign</th>
<th>Circuit Designator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2288 kc/s</td>
<td>1200Z - 2359Z</td>
<td>CYL</td>
<td>T 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4304 kc/s</td>
<td>0001Z - 1200Z</td>
<td>CYL</td>
<td>T 08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6330 kc/s</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>CYL</td>
<td>T 11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Patrolling craft may use this circuit as follows:

- Frigate and above: as required
- RN CMS: constant watch
- RNV Craft: DOP #
- Marine Police Offshore Craft: SOP #

(*Note: But dependent upon number and capabilities of operators borne)

c. Single and double operator periods are as follows, all times local:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOP</th>
<th>DOP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0100 #</td>
<td>0001 - 0200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0630 #</td>
<td>0500 - 0700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000 - 1030</td>
<td>1000 - 1100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1600 - 1900</td>
<td>1500 - 2300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*Note: Until receipt of ZKL or similar operating signal)

d. When on patrol with a Frigate or larger ship acting as OIC, Minosweeper and smaller craft about to transmit a classified message on CCN of immediate interest to the OIC are to request on 279.4 mcs, the Frigate to set watch on CCN using the designators in a. above. This enables the Frigate to read the message directly instead of waiting for it to be broadcast, which, in deteriorating conditions, could mean a delay of several hours. If the only common system between the Frigate and Minosweeper is BRITEX, then the procedure laid down in paragraph 13 should be employed.

2. RN/MMN Co-operation (RN/MMN Circuit T 23 279.4 kc/s, Voice)

a. All RN and MMN Ships and Craft on Patrol are to maintain constant loudspeaker watch on this circuit.
b. Police craft are unable to man this circuit, but the circuit is manned at Pears Hill Police Station, (Call sign "Coastguard") in Singapore. This enables signals to be relayed between Naval units and police craft operating in the Singapore Straits. A RON Liaison Officer is normally available at night and there are direct telephone lines to MOU Operations Room and NHQ Operations Room.

c. Sakra Radar Station also maintains watch on this circuit from 0600 GH until 1800 GH daily, as a link with the Coastguard for ships patrolling the Western end of the Singapore Straits.

d. LRMF Aircraft will co-operate with RON units on this circuit as required. 277.0 Mc/s is also available when more than one patrol group is established. The CTC of the patrol group guarding 277.0 must also guard 279.4.

3. Police Craft Communications

a. Royal Malaysian Police communications employ duplex VHF voice working.

b. All RM ships sailing for Malacca Straits Patrol or passing through the Malacca Straits Patrol areas, for visits to Penang or Fort Swettenham, are to draw a Pyle AM10P portable VHF radio from the Fleet Pool of Radio Equipment. (FALBO 2109 refers). On completion of patrol or visit they are to be returned to the ship holding centre without delay.

c. Channelisation of Pyle AM10P is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Channel</th>
<th>Transmit Frequency</th>
<th>Receive Frequency</th>
<th>Allocation to State Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>88.7 Mc/s</td>
<td>100 Mc/s</td>
<td>Negri Sembilan and Kedah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>88.6 Mc/s</td>
<td>99.9 Mc/s</td>
<td>Penang Island, Pahang and Johore Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>88.5 Mc/s</td>
<td>99.8 Mc/s</td>
<td>Klang Town, Perak, Terengganu and Johore North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>88.4 Mc/s</td>
<td>99.7 Mc/s</td>
<td>Selangor, Kelantan and Malacca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>88.3 Mc/s</td>
<td>99.6 Mc/s</td>
<td>Ipoh and Kuala Lumpur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>88.2 Mc/s</td>
<td>99.5 Mc/s</td>
<td>Penang Town</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. The following instructions and information are applicable to RM Ships using the Police VHF equipment:

(1) Constant loudspeaker watch is to be maintained on the appropriate channel.

(2) Being duplex, all transmissions are re-radiated automatically by a shore beacon, which also serves to enhance the ranges possible between ranges and nets.

(3) Constant watch is maintained by the Area Control Station Police District HQ's, Police Craft and police cars. (Local Police Stations are on a separate net).
(4) Callsigns for use on Police VHF nets are contained in Appendix I.

(5) Names of stations, numbers of craft and cars are used as callsigns.HM Ships are to use Scenery of Motion callsigns, as shown in Appendix I.

(6) The English language can be used to shore stations and offshore police craft only. Inshore Police Craft normally speak only Malay. It is therefore policy to employ the interpreter as operator on this net.

(7) Army Tactical HQ's are normally co-located with Police Districts; thus it should be possible to relay traffic for the army on this circuit.

e. A map showing Police district HQ's and their channellisation is shown in Appendix III.

f. Ploy MAGP portable radio sets are not compatible with the Singapore Police. Traffic for Singapore Police Authorities is to be relayed as in 2, 3 and 6 above.

4. Sea/Air Co-operation (LAMP Aircraft/RN Ships)

a. Used for Sea/Air co-operation between LAMP Aircraft and RN Ships on Patrol. It is also used between LAMP Aircraft, LAMP Aircraft, Air Sea Rescue Launches, and Bukit Gambak for Air Defence purposes.

   Primary - 250.8 mcs (RIF Circuit R12)
   Secondary - 259.2 mcs (RIF Circuit R33)

b. For Co-operation with RN units, the LAMP Aircraft will shift to Circuit 23.

c. RAP Radar Station at Terendak, callsign GEHITIE PUFFET, maintains watch on FAA 21 whenever LAMP Aircraft are airborne.

5. ROY/RWY/RN Co-operation (ROY Circuit T 12 - 6355 kcs - Voice)

a. Constant watch on this circuit, employing the use of the Upper Side Band (6836.5 kcs), is maintained by RN units for direct communication with KD Malaya.

b. When LAMP Aircraft are on patrol, this circuit is used for Sea/air co-operation by RN and RN Units using Double Side Band (6835 kcs), Voice.

6. Communication with Army Units

a. In the event of a requirement for direct communications with Army Units ashore, the following arrangements are currently effective:

   (1) 26 Brigade (Malacca Area)

   Circuit JS 23/5 (frequency 4726 kcs, CW) is available on request. Callsigns to be exchanged when circuits ordered to be opened.

   / (2)
(2) **Malaysian Brigades**

(a) Brigade Tactical HQ's are normally co-located with Police District HQ's. Messages can therefore be passed on Police VHF Net.

(b) Arrangements are in hand for Malaysian Brigades to have one station available to operate on Circuit T 12 (6835 kc/s, GN) with RN Ships (or 6836.5 (6835) HF SSB, Voice) with RN Ships. Due to equipment and operator limitations the only direct co-operation that can be achieved is on SSB Voice between RN Ships and the 2nd Federation Reconnaissance Regt. at Port Dickson.

b. **Cryptographic Systems**

A common system is available between RN Ships and 28 Brigade, and between RN Ship and Malaysian units at Battalion level. No other common codes are held.

7. **Communications with Air Sea Rescue Launches**

When employed in Singapore Straits on Air Defence Duties, these launches can be contacted on Circuit FNU 21 (250.8).

8. **Communications with ROT Launches**

When employed on patrol in the West Singapore Straits they can be contacted through "Coastguard" as they are linked, via the Sultan Shoal Light, to a Police Circuit.

9. **Air Defence Circuits**

Applicable to RN Ships only. Details can be found in Annex 'G'.

10. **Communications with Beach Reconnaissance Aircraft**

a. Aircraft engaged on beach reconnaissance are controlled by HQ 224 Group, callsign JBDG, on JS 37/3, 1010 kc/s. They keep constant watch on this circuit. Ships will be informed when their aircraft are scheduled to fly and escorts on patrol duties are to guard this circuit during the period of the beach reconnaissance.

b. The aircraft will report all sightings to HQ 224 Group and to the ships if it is of direct interest. Ships are not to divert the aircraft from its primary task, namely beach reconnaissance. Aircraft reports will be processed through the RNF Control Authority. The aircraft will be briefed on the location of ships.

c. A requirement for UHF communications may arise, when communications with escorts on HF is poor, or only Coastal Minions are in the area. The Aircraft is briefed that 279 kHz. No/s is kept by all units and if it has a report to make to the ships, and is unable to communicate on HF, it will call on this frequency. Ships on patrol on the East and West Coast of Malay are to maintain watch on JS 37/3 and/or 279 kHz during times of aircraft patrols.

d. Callsigns are in accordance with JSP 2 RNLS Supp. No. 2, Combined Scene of Action. Reconnaissance aircraft will use the callsign "JOYFUL".

/ 11.
11. Communications with Land Forces, South East Johore

a. Ships of the Far East Fleet on patrol off South East Johore are to communicate with deployed land forces on 470 Kc/s (Channel 1, Type 625).

b. Details of deployed forces, together with their location and call signs, will be signalled as a Malaya General with references to this paragraph.

c. Far East Fleet Ships are to use Naval Intra Force Tactical Call signs. If ships call signs are not known by land forces, Scene of Action call signs from Appendix 1 will be used.

d. The land forces Control Station maintains continuous watch, deployed platoons as follows:

- 1600 - 0700 GH (Continuous)
- 0800 - 1700 GH (Hourly schedules unless otherwise ordered)

e. Continuous watch is not required during the hours of darkness by Far East Fleet Ships, but they are to call control or nearest outstation on start of patrol and then as required. The OTC should attempt to contact shore stations twice during the night. During daylight hours, ships are to maintain listening watch when in vicinity of a known troop location.

12. Communications with Lighthouses

a. The Marine Department Offices at Port Swettenham and Malacca maintain a continuous listening watch on 82.9 mcs. Routine calls from lighthouses is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calling Lighthouse</th>
<th>Times</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Port Swettenham</td>
<td>One Pathom Bank Light and Pulau Angsa Light</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Malacca</td>
<td>Cape Rachado Light and Pulau Undan Light</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. The Marine Department Office, Fullerton Building, Singapore maintains listening watch on Marine Department/Immigration Net, from 0800 to 1800 daily. (Frequencies: Transmit 164.3 Kc/s Receive 158.8 Kc/s).

| (1) Singapore | Pulau Pisang Light and Horsburgh Light | 0800, 1000, 1200, 1400, 1600, 1800 |

(2) At night the net is manned by Coastguard, Pearls Hill. Lighthouses will call Coastguard in an emergency only.

c. Ships wishing to exchange information with lighthouses listed above, should signal details to CO/ELF who will telephone the appropriate office.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Telephone Numbers</th>
<th>Port Swettenham</th>
<th>Malacca</th>
<th>Singapore</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6616</td>
<td>3592</td>
<td>32091</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

/ d.
d. It must be borne in mind that it is normally not possible for Marine Department Officers to contact Lighthouses outside the routine times listed above.

CRYPTOGRAPHY

13. Common System between RN and MMD Units

a. At present the only High Grade common cryptographic system between RN and MMD Ships is BITTEX (RN 28/1 series). Use of this system should be kept to a minimum, due to the time delays which are involved.

b. Operational Messages of an urgent nature, between RN and MMD Ships should normally be unclassified or encoded in Naval and Maritime Air Tactical Code (BIS/02/36).

c. Use of national cryptographic systems on signals routed to RN Common, for MOCOM, are invariably quicker than direct routing to MOCOM using the common system in a. above.

14. Recognition

a. Combined Maritime Recognition Tables (CMRT) are to be used by all ships and aircraft employed in the defence of Singapore and Malaysia except Harbour Marine and Customs Craft.

b. The instructions for use of CMRT are contained within the cover. The Tables are monthly changing and the edition and line/date scramble in force are signalled by COMOD.

c. The procedure for Air co-operation with ships are also contained within the instructions. This procedure is to be used by aircraft to direct a ship towards a suspicious contact when ships and aircraft are not in radio contact.

d. Effectiveness of the system

It is vitally important for the system to work effectively.

To this end Commanding Officers MUST:

(1) Ensure CURRENT EXTRACTS of CMRT are at all times prominently displayed on the Bridge. The complete volume should not be used.

(2) Demand a high degree of vigilance from bridge personnel. A challenge is short and may be missed if a good lookout is not kept.

(3) Practice Challenge and Reply with KNOWN MILDLY SHIPS DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS ONLY.

(4) Ships experiencing failures in recognition practices are to report monthly by letter to the Commander Far East Fleet. Copy to Administrative Authority. MIL reports are not required.

e. Aircraft other than RAF Shackletons carry EXTRACTS ONLY of the Pyrotechnic Tables.
General Instructions and Information

15. Considerations by OTC

The OTC on ordering his patrols should consider the following:

a. Taking Broadcast Guard for his patrol group, and

b. Ensuring the Patrol Group is within UHF range of the OTC.

16. Reporting

Instructions for reporting are contained in Annex B, paragraph 10.
APPENDIX I TO ANNEX I

CALL SIGNS

1. SCENARIO OF ACTION CALL SIGNS FOR USE ON POLICE VHF COMMUNICATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Unit</th>
<th>Voice Call Sign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Warship (Frigate or above)</td>
<td>DLAP ZERO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warship (Corvette and Patrol Craft)</td>
<td>DLAP FIVE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Naval Officer present afloat</td>
<td>TLFF ONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police HQ</td>
<td>POLO + location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police craft</td>
<td>PAPA + side No.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB Police HQ wishing to call a warship without previous contact will call DLAP ZERO DLAP FIVE.

2. OFFSHORE POLICE CRAFT CALL SIGNS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Police Marine Craft Number</th>
<th>International Call Sign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FX 1</td>
<td>9 MP 37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FX 2</td>
<td>9 MP 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FX 3</td>
<td>9 MP 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FX 4.</td>
<td>9 MP 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FX 5</td>
<td>9 MP 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P 11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: P1 to P10 are permanently deployed in East Malaysia.


APPENDIX II TO ANNEX H

SHIPS AND AUTHORITIES CONCERNED WITH MALPOS

1. AIG 1120 (Address Group YMF) is allocated with the following addresses to COMYLF for the rapid dissemination of information to all authorities concerned with MALPOS:

ORIGINATOR - COMYLF.

ACTION ADDRESSES - IG POL MARINE
FRMLF
MARCHES CHINGI
NOIOWN
3 DIV RASC (LOC)
ALL DIGG ESCORTS SUBMARINES AND SINGAPORE BASED CRH AND SUBS OF FAR EAST FLEET, AND HAS MANDAN.
IG POL SINGAPORE
HID SINGAPORE

INFO ADDRESSES - FRMF
MINDER KL.(NAVY),
CDDOCH
MALFCC
28 RHE
OPSCO
SING BASE
SIM7
FOZIF
MAIFOS II

ANNEX I

CHECK OFF LIST FOR SHIPS AND CRAFT GOING ON PATROL

1. (a) Well prior to sailing:

(i) Signal for interpreter (R.N. ships only) 48 hours warning + joining instructions required.

(ii) Ensure 3 mile limit and Indonesian 12 mile limits are on large scale charts. Tracings available from Operations Room, N.H.Q., or Malay.

(b) Ensure following publications etc. are held on board:

(i) MALFOS - You are reading them now.

(ii) FOTTs Section 4 - (NEW SOAI s).

(iii) Combined Maritime Recognition Tables (CMRT).

(iv) Police Grid of Singapore Strait.

(v) Current allocation of SCAP area letters.

(vi) Current CMRT line/date scramble.

(vii) Current list of stolen fishing boats held by Indonesia (Annex E).

(viii) Current list of aircraft type codewords (R.N. ships only).


(c) Commanding Officers and/or Operations Officers of R.N. ships should visit the Naval Operations Centre and Naval Intelligence Office shortly before sailing to obtain the latest operational information. They should at the same time collect a De-Brief Aide Memoire (see 1-5 (x) above) which is to be completed as fully as possible during the initial period. The form is self-explanatory.
MALPOS II

ANNEX J

DETAILS OF PATROL CRAFT AVAILABLE

1. Royal Navy

(a) Frigates and Destroyers as detailed from the Far East Fleet. For details see latest Far East Fleet Bridge Card.

(b) Coastal Minesweepers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Pt No</th>
<th>International Callsigns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H.M.S. Houghton (MS 6)</td>
<td>M 1211</td>
<td>LWJN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.M.S. Woolaston</td>
<td>M 1194</td>
<td>GTXG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.M.S. Pincaston</td>
<td>M 1174</td>
<td>GTDL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.M.S. Fiskerton</td>
<td>M 1206</td>
<td>GTSZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.M.S. Wiltieston</td>
<td>M 1192</td>
<td>GTXD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.M.S. Maryton</td>
<td>M 1202</td>
<td>GYLN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.M.S. Dartington</td>
<td>M 1203</td>
<td>GTSX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.M.S. Chawton</td>
<td>M 1209</td>
<td>LXXM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ii) 11th Minesweeping Squadron (R.N./R.N.Z.N.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Pt No</th>
<th>International Callsigns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H.M.S. Picton (MS 11)</td>
<td>M.1170</td>
<td>HTXY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.M.S. Kilderton</td>
<td>M.1162</td>
<td>GRSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.M.S. Inverkipston</td>
<td>M.1159</td>
<td>GSQX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.M.S. Humberston</td>
<td>M.1147</td>
<td>GSRK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.M.S. Shetland</td>
<td>M.1181</td>
<td>GTSF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.M.S. Greatford (SDB)</td>
<td>P.3109</td>
<td>MQSB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.M.S. Tilford (SDB)</td>
<td>P.3125</td>
<td>MXXJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.M.S. Catterford (SDB)</td>
<td>P.3116</td>
<td>MQXJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.M.N.Z.S. Banyon</td>
<td>M.1178</td>
<td>ZJUP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.M.N.Z.S. Hickleton</td>
<td>M.1151</td>
<td>ZJMM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(iii) 16th Minesweeping Squadron (R.A.N.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Pt No</th>
<th>International Callsigns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H.M.A.S. Hawk (MS 16)</td>
<td>M 1139</td>
<td>VIMQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.M.A.S. Gull</td>
<td>M 1185</td>
<td>VIKM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.M.A.S. Talal</td>
<td>M 1152</td>
<td>VILM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.M.A.S. Shipe</td>
<td>M 1102</td>
<td>VILM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.M.A.S. Curlew</td>
<td>M 1121</td>
<td>VIMM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.M.A.S. Ibis</td>
<td>M 1183</td>
<td>VIMF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. /
2. Royal Malaysian Navy

(a) Frigate - Loch class conversion with helicopter platform.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Pt No</th>
<th>International Callsigns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>K.D. HANG TUAI</td>
<td>P 433</td>
<td>9 JMB</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Coastal Minesweepers

25th Minesweeping Squadron

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Pt No</th>
<th>International Callsigns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>K.D. LEDANG (MS 25)</td>
<td>M 1143</td>
<td>9 LMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K.D. MAHAMIRU</td>
<td>M 1127</td>
<td>9 LMK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K.D. TUDAI</td>
<td>M 2610</td>
<td>9 MME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K.D. JERAI</td>
<td>M 1147</td>
<td>9 MNU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K.D. TAMAN</td>
<td>M 1148</td>
<td>9 NLJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K.D. KINABALU</td>
<td>M 1174</td>
<td>9 NVN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| (c) Inshore Minesweepers

24th Minesweeping Squadron

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Pt No</th>
<th>International Callsigns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>K.D. SRI JOCOR (MS 26)</td>
<td>M 2602</td>
<td>9 MNA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K.D. SRI PERLIS</td>
<td>M 2604</td>
<td>9 LMD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K.D. LANGKA SUKA</td>
<td>M 2606</td>
<td>9 MNB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K.D. TEMASEK</td>
<td>M 2612</td>
<td>9 MG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Patrol Craft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specification</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Length:</td>
<td>163'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beam:</td>
<td>16'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draught:</td>
<td>6'6&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masthead Height:</td>
<td>29'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speed:</td>
<td>21 Kts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armament:</td>
<td>2 x L70 Bofor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complement:</td>
<td>3 officers + 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radar:</td>
<td>Decca 707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications:</td>
<td>2 HF, 1 UHF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(i) 1st Patrol Craft Squadron

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Pt No</th>
<th>International Callsigns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>K.D. SRI PERAK (PCS 1)</td>
<td>P 3140</td>
<td>9 MNO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K.D. SRI KEDAH</td>
<td>P 3138</td>
<td>9 MMO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K.D. SRI KELANTAN</td>
<td>P 3142</td>
<td>9 MNQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K.D. SRI TERUGANU</td>
<td>P 3143</td>
<td>9 MNR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K.D. SRI SELANGOR</td>
<td>P 3139</td>
<td>9 MNN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K.D. SRI PAKALANG</td>
<td>P 3141</td>
<td>9 MNP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(ii) 2nd Patrol Craft Squadron

- K.D. SRI SABAH: P 3144, 9 MMW
- K.D. SRI SARAWAK: P 3145, 9 DNY
- K.D. SRI SELANGOR: P 3147, 9 MAH
- K.D. SRI NEGERI SEMBILAN: P 3146, 9 OMK

(e) Despatch Vessel:

K.D. MUTIARA

- Length: 100' 10"6" Meters
- Beam: 19' 6" Meters
- Draught: 6' 6" Meters
- Masthead Ht.: 30' Meters
- Max Speed: 12 Kts.
- Armament: 1 x 20 mm Oerlikon
- Complement: 2 officers + 17
- Communications: 2 HF, 1 UHF
- Radar: Decca 383

(f) RMVVA Seaward Defence Craft:

K.D. PAHANG

- Length: 117' Meters
- Beam: 20' 6" Meters
- Draught: 7' 6" Meters
- Masthead Ht., Radar Aerial: 28' Meters
- Speed: 14 Kts.
- Armament: 1 x 40/60 Bofor
- Complement: 2 officers + 19
- Radar: Deco 4.5
- Communications: 1 x 619, 1 x 691

(g) K.D. TANJONG MERANG (ex Yacht of Director of Marine)

- Length: 75' Meters
- Beam: 18' Meters
- Draught: 6' Meters
- Masthead Ht.: about 25' Meters
- Speed: 11 Kts.
- Armament: 1 single Oerlikon
- Complement: 2 officers + 11
- Radar: Deco 303
- Communications: 1 x 410, 1 x 443R

(h) L.C.T.

- Length: 52' Meters
- Beam: 19' Meters
- Draught: 6' Meters
- Speed: 11 Kts.
- Armament: 1 x 40/60 Bofor
- Complement: 2 officers + 17
- Communications: 2 HF, 1 UHF

3. RM Police Craft / ...
## Off Shore Craft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>FX</th>
<th>PA</th>
<th>PB</th>
<th>PC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Numbers:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45-50</td>
<td>25-36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beam</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draught</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5'6&quot;</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Max. Speed      | 12 | 27 | 19  | 14 | 3 Malay-
|                 |    |    |     |    | sian 25 |
| Communications  | 1 x HF | 1 x HF | 1 x VHF | 1 x VHF | 1 x VHF |
|                 | 1 x VHF | 1 x VHF | 1 x VHF | 1 x VHF | 1 x VHF |
| Radar           | Decca 303 | Hughes 14/9 | Hughes 17 | Kelvin 17 | - |
| Armament        | 1 single Oerlikon | 2 single Oerlikon | Small arms | Small arms | Small arms |
| Complement      | 1 officer | 1 officer | 7 | 7 | 5 |

### Notes:
1. 19 Marine Department launches with Police personnel embarked are also employed on patrol duties. All are approximately 42 feet in length, speed 9 kts, some of which have VHF radio. None has radar.

2. All Police and Marine Craft have jurisdiction within Malaysian Territorial Waters only, and they are not empowered to effect arrest or search on the high seas. Inshore craft normally patrol in Malaysian Territorial Waters only. Off-shore craft patrol further out to sea. They may track, shadow and report suspicious vessels on the high seas but cannot detain them until they enter Malaysian Territorial Waters.

a. Off-shore craft

Off-shore police craft are operated directly by HQ MARINE, Kuala Lumpur. They are more flexible than the in-shore craft and can carry out similar patrols to inshore Minesweepers and S.D.L.s.
b. In shore craft

Operational control of inshore police craft is delegated to Local Police District Commanders. These craft cannot normally be deployed to areas other than that in which they are based.

4. R.A.S.C. Launches

(a) POWER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>River Class fast launch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colour</td>
<td>Grey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speed</td>
<td>12 knots Twin Screw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length</td>
<td>45 ft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draught</td>
<td>3 - 4 ft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew</td>
<td>Officer or S.N.C.O. plus 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armament</td>
<td>2 Bren guns and personal arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radar</td>
<td>NIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>Police VHF set - unreliable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) MINORU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Fast launch (Senior Officer's Barge)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colour</td>
<td>Blue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speed</td>
<td>16 knots Triple Screw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length</td>
<td>48 ft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draught</td>
<td>3 - 4 ft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armament</td>
<td>2 Bren guns and personal arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radar</td>
<td>NIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>Police VHF set - to Sultan Shoal Light for relay on Police circuit.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: One R.A.S.C. launch is normally on patrol each night from 1800 - 0730 in the area enclosed by Sultan Shoal, Tg. Teritip and Tg. Piai.

5. Air Sea Rescue Launches

These launches do not carry out patrols but are sometimes employed on Air Defence Duties. When on the station they remain tied up to Ajax Shoal Buoy and Jelore Shoal Buoy.

They can be contacted on circuit FAU 21 if required.

6. Royal Engineers Patrol Craft

Army assault boats are used for patrolling the approaches to SUNGEI BERIH, on the North West coast of Singapore island. The aim of these patrols is to protect the seaward approaches to R.A.F. TEYAN. Patrols are carried out at night at irregular intervals. The nickname for these patrols is MUDFISH.
1. There are mainly two types of Indonesian boats operating in the Singapore Straits, the high speed craft and the sailing boat. The former is favoured by the 'big time' smugglers and for the landing of agents and the latter is normally the straight forward barter boat although Indonesia has taken advantage of their seeming innocence to land infiltrators.

**Speed Boats.**

2. These are between 15 and 20 feet in length normally powered by two Evinrude of Johnson 40 H.P. engines giving up to 30 knots depending on the weather. There is no particular shape to these boats, some have been reported as long and narrow and others as short and beamy. The normal crew is two or sometimes three. Judging by the reports they seem to favour the short dash between Padang and St. John's and the Raffles Light and Temple areas.

**Sailing Boats.**

3. These operate from all along the coast of Indonesia facing Malaysia and from such further afield. They vary in size from 15 to 50 feet. They are invariably rough, locally made boats which leak badly and are rather fragile which can make towing them a tricky operation for fear of pulling the mast out or ripping away the foredeck. Their sailing rig could be described as a loose footed gaff rig, they sail quite well but their sails are normally in a very bad state of repair. The majority of them also have a low powered outboard motor.

**General Appearance.**

4. They fall into three main races, Malay, Javanese and Chinese (Hokkien), there is also a sprinkling of Celebes Islanders. With the exception of the Chinese which are in the minority, the Indonesian barter boat men are invariably dirty and scruffy normally dressed in sarongs and shirt. Normally they appear under fed and in a low state of physical fitness. The speed boats, in the main, are operated by the Chinese. It is uncommon to find any one of them who can understand a word of English let alone speak it. It is difficult even for a Malaysian to understand their language; their brand of Malay is considerably different.

**Documents.**

5. All members of the crew should carry an Identity Card. (See Appendix II). The card can be buff or blue in colour similar in size to a U.K. Driving Licence, folded in half with a photograph on one side and facing it the man's personal details, all written in Indonesian. It should be stamped with the Indonesian crest, two eagles' heads facing in the opposite directions above a striped shield from which wings and legs protrude, all contained in a circular border which contains the name of the office where the card was issued. The card is normally contained in a plastic wallet which has written across it in large letters, "WARU PERMACUK" meaning 'Identity Card'. The Along name of this card is 'Tingi'. If they hear this word they will know what is required.
The owner of the boat should have in his possession the boat's licence and log book. The licence is normally a blue covered document roughly foolscap size containing the boat's particulars, again all in Indonesian and stamped with the Indonesian crest. The boat's log can be a stiff backed exercise book and simply contains Indonesian port arrival and sailing certification. Each entry is stamped with the name of the port or lansung. This book may also contain a photograph and details of the owner.

MALAYSIAN CRAFT.

6. These consist mainly of fishing boats and small before trading boats. They are almost entirely run by the Chinese although some of the Johore fishing boats do have Malay crews. All boats have to be licenced and have their state distinguishing letters painted on the box. Singapore BMF, SM, SM, or SMF; BMF, SMF, and JBF; BMF and JBF are the usual ones. All are motor driven. They must all have a boat's licence on board, this is written in Malay and English except some of those held by Johore boats. It has often been considered that an occasional boat has dealings with the Indonesians, either at sea or in Indonesia. The conditions for this sort of intrigue would seem to be rather more favourable in the Horsborough Light area.

Malaysian Boatsmen.

7. (c) They should all be in possession of their Identity Cards (See Appendix III). These are 4" by 2½" in size, contained inside a plastic sealed envelope. In the centre of the card is the owner's photograph and on either side his thumb print. They come in three different colours, blue for Federal Citizen, red for non-Citizen (mainly Chinese) and brown. They are also green cards for certain Europeans. Each card has a number along the top, underneath which is printed 'KAD PENGESAN' and underneath the photograph 'PENGGUNA TAMAN SELANG'. On the reverse side is written the personal particulars.

Distinguishing Letters for Small Craft and Fishing Boats - West Malaysia.

The following are details of distinguishing letters for small craft and fishing boats registered in Malaya and Singapore:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>FISHING CRAFT</th>
<th>CARGO BOATS</th>
<th>PASSENGER BOATS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perlis</td>
<td>PSF</td>
<td>Ps. C</td>
<td>Ps. P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kedah</td>
<td>KP</td>
<td>KC</td>
<td>KP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penang</td>
<td>GT, MP, BK, NT</td>
<td>PC</td>
<td>PP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perak</td>
<td>PR-F</td>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>PEP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selangor</td>
<td>SLF</td>
<td>SLC</td>
<td>SLP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negri Sembilan</td>
<td>NF</td>
<td>NSG</td>
<td>NSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malacca</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>MC</td>
<td>MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johore</td>
<td>BMF, BMF, (POP, JBF)</td>
<td>TBC, BCM, BPC</td>
<td>(JBF, BMF, KBF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>SMF, ST (SF, SFX)</td>
<td>SC</td>
<td>SF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pahang</td>
<td>PAF</td>
<td>PHG.C</td>
<td>PHG. P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Fishing Craft</td>
<td>Cargo Boats</td>
<td>Passenger Boats</td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trengganu</td>
<td>TF</td>
<td>TC</td>
<td>TP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kelantan</td>
<td>KMF</td>
<td>IC</td>
<td>KMF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Fishing Craft and Cargo Press. The Ministry of Defence Kuala Lumpur has decided to issue these Press (Forms 2) in a different colour each time. Thus, from 1st November 1965 all Forms 2 will be issued with red lettering, and any form pertaining to be issued after this date, but still printed with green lettering, is invalid.
9. Many fishing boats have one number on the hull and a different one on the canopy. The former is the boat number, and the latter the licence number, which changes from year to year. The number on the hull—the boat number—is, therefore, the number which should be quoted in signals or correspondence when identifying fishing craft.

8. West Malaysian Fishing Boats vary in length from 10ft to 60ft, the smaller boats below 20ft use sails, or outboard motors, those from 25ft to 60ft are diesel powered with a fish hold forward and a canopy aft. They normally carry a crew of 2 to 4 (except Pangkor boats) and fly clan identification flags by day, and by night a bright white light and a smaller, weaker light at the end of the net or line. Confrontation has forced these boats not to display these lights all times but when a vessel is heading towards them a light is usually shown and if the vessel is inadvertently heading for their nets the light will be flashed on and off.

Habits.

10. Most fishing fleets that fish in International and Malaysian Territorial waters leave for the fishing grounds at about 1600. By 1830 they reach the fishing grounds and cast their nets. Throughout the night they remain in the area, recovering nets and lines by 0700 the following morning and returning to harbour. There are a few boats that prefer to fish in Indonesian claimed waters, these boats stay out for about 6 days, and usually go out twice a month, within periods to coincide with the rising of the new and full moon. There is all year round fishing in Indonesian claimed waters, International and Malaysian Territorial waters but the monsoons do have an effect on the catch in International and Malaysian Territorial waters.

Methods.

11. Most forms of line and net fishing are employed, largely confined to specific areas. Generally, ring net fishing on the N.W. coast, drift and line, in the Southern Malacca Strait, and seine net on the east coast are most prevalent.

Fishing Areas.

12. (a) Malaysian Territorial and International Waters.

(1) Pulau Pinang - Kukup.
(2) Off Malacca Coast.
(3) One fathoms bank in North Banks Patch.
(4) Off Pu Pangkor.

These are the General fishing areas of the Fleets, who largely keep together in an approximate area of 10 square miles with the occasional boat operating alone.

(b) Fishing areas in Indonesian Claimed Waters.

(1) Waters surrounding the coast of Pu Rongga; Pu Bengkalis and Pu Roepat.
(2) Rob Roy Bank.
(3) South Sands.
(4) Aruan Bilunden Group.

Disposition of Fleets.

(a) Pangkor. Sailed here are the larger boats operating around Pu Pangkor, Serbilan Islands, extending as far North as Penang. Purse seine are used, with up to 12-20 men in each boat. Trawling is prevalent but at the present time, illegal.

/Craft: .......
Disposition of Fleets (continued).

Craft: length: 50'–60'
      inboard engine.
      beam: 12'
      Distinguishing letters: PX-F.

(b) Pa Ketan. (Port Swettenham)

By far the largest fleet operates from here, numbering about 1000 boats. They operate in groups around one fathen Bank and
Arush Bilandun (AROA II LANDS) Group areas. Drift nets are used
almost exclusively. These nets are usually small and several
used joined together reaching a total length of up to ½ mile.
The top of the net is usually ten feet below the surface.
Coloured spherical floats are used at intervals of about every
30 ft. Craft are either:

(1) Sail: length: 50'
      sail crew 2 or 3.
      beam: 6'
      Distinguishing letters: SLF.

(2) Powered: length 30'
      inboard engine.
      beam: 6'
      crew: 2–3
      Distinguishing letters: SLF.

(c) Tanjong Sepat.

These operate mainly in Malaysian territorial waters between Cape
Rachado and Tg. Klu, sometimes Port Dickson is used as base. They
are also found in the One Fathen Bank area. Drift nets are used
almost exclusively.

Craft: length: 30'
      inboard engine.
      beam: 6'
      crew: 2–3
      Distinguishing letters: SLF.

(d) Malacca, Muar and Batu Pahat.

About 500 boats operate from these bases: they keep together with
an occasional one that strays. Principal forms of fishing are
drift nets and kelongs.

Craft: length: 30'
      inboard engine.
      beam: 6'
      crew: 2–3
      Distinguishing letters: SLF.

(e) Pontian and Kulap.

The fleet here consists of approximately 70 boats. Principal types
of fishing are drift net and small seine nets inshore. Static kelongs
are in abundance in the area, about the 5 to 6 fathen line. Boats are
similar to (d) above in appearance. Distinguishing letters – BMF, BPS,
PCF, JBF.

(f) Singapore Strait.

There are two types of fishing boats, large ones with diesel engines
that go out deep sea, and small sampans, driven by outboards, that
operate scattered around the island. The majority of the latter fish
between Raffles Light and Tg. Patai. Nearly all of these craft use
line fishing, including lotungs – drifting lines suspended from floats,
but occasional nets can be encountered. There are many kelongs on or
about the 6 fm. line.

(f) Continued..
(f) Continued.

**Craft:**

1. **40'-50'**
   - **Beam:** 15'
   - **Crew:** 4-6
   - **Inboard engine**
   - **Distinguishing letters:** CMF, SME, SP and SFA.

2. **10'-15'**
   - **Beam:** 3-4
   - **Sail, oars or outboard**
   - **Crew:** 1-2

(g) **East Coast - Johore.**

The fleet is based at Mersing, and employs purse seiners and lines. A number of bamboo fishing stakes, one anchored to the bottom, are used in pairs. The second stake drifts and the stakes are joined by up to 100 fathoms of set lines. The boats are about 30' in length, similar in appearance to Malacca boats. **Distinguishing letters:** BEF, BFR, POP, JEF.

(h) **East Coast - Kuantan.**

Fishing stakes (moored to the bottom) are prevalent in the area, some with set lines, others with palm fronds (Unjangs) secured beneath the surface. These fronds provide shade for fish, which are then caught with seine-like nets which are drifted down on to the stakes. **Distinguishing letters:** PAP.

(i) **East Coast - Trengganu.**

The fleet is based in Kuil, Trengganu and Kota Bahru. Seine, nets, drift nets and line fishing are all used. Some of these boats operate well off the coast. Some set lines are also prevalent.

1. **Powered.**
   - **Length:** 40'-50'
   - **Beam:** 10'-12'
   - **Inboard engine**
   - **Crew:** 8-10
   - **Distinguishing letters:** TF.

2. **Sail.**
   - **Length:** 40'-50'
   - **Beam:** 10'-12'
   - **Sail crew:** 9-10
   - **Distinguishing letters:** TF.

(j) **Squid Fishing.**

In shallow water (3 fathoms) in both Singapore Strait and on the east coast, small boats fish for squid by night. The method is to attract the squid by a bright magnesium lamp, then scooping them up with nets.
FISHING GROUNDS IN MALACCA STRAIT

LEGEND

FISHING GROUNDS

INDONESIAN CLAIMED WATERS ————

MALAYSIAN TERRITORIAL WATERS ————

CONFIDENTIAL

Pangkor

Fg Gd

North Sands

P. Svecetenhorn

P. Karimun

P. Pjasang

Majadca

Muar

Batu Pahat

Pulau Rupat

Robiroy Bank

Puloat

Aroo Island

CONFIDENTIAL
(a) Sailing Craft

1. LAMBO Sloop and LAMBO Ketch.

Both types of vessel will be seen on the East Coast of Malaya yearly in the months of October and early November. They come from the Celebes and make for Singapore along the S. Coast of Borneo, up to the Anambas, then due West to the Pahang coast, coasting down to Singapore. They are unlikely to be powered. Crew will be from 5 - 10, and are unlikely to be in possession of any identity documents or Ships papers.
(b) Motor driven craft

1. KUMPIT type
   May be up to 75 ft in length (MFV size) and weight up to 70 tons.

2. KOZAK type
   Approximately 20 to 30 ft in length.
2. Chinese timber TONKANG

These timber tonkangs generally coast from Thailand carrying timber often as a high deck cargo. Speed slow.

3. Malayan Prahu Bugis

MALAYA
THE MALAYAN PRAHU BUGIS

The Malayan Prahu Bugis is very common round Singapore and South Malaya and should not be confused with vessels coming from the Celebes.
The document shown below is a copy of a pass which has been issued by Indonesian authorities to some Malaysian fishermen. This gives the Malaysian fishing craft permission to enter Indonesian Claimed Waters. Any boat in which a copy of this pass is found should be arrested and handed over to the police, as the pass is prima facie evidence of collusion with the enemy.

2. Underneath is shown a typewritten copy of this pass showing clearly the wording used.

---

**SURAT KETERANGAN**

NAMA

ALAMAT

PEKERJA MANFAAT

BAHWA ORANG 1st ADALAM PERTUGAS KERISUS KAMI DALAM MENDALMALKAN KERJA ANDBEH LA KERANGKAN SAMPAH IKAN DAN DINGANG.

MERAAP BANTUAN DAN PERINGATAN SA PENGEM NA DARI PATROLI PATROLI LALU REPUBLIK INDONESIA.

CONFIDENTIAL
Appendix III to Annex H

Specimen of Malaysian Identity Card

Name: Lucy Valerine Cristy

Date of Birth: 14/11/1949

Sex: Female

Place of Birth: Kuala Lumpur

Identity No: 9549764

This specimen is not to be reproduced or used for any purpose without authority of the Government of Malaysia.
## Crew List

**Name of ship**: S 35/1989

**Agents**

**Date of arrival**: 24 7 64

**Date of proposed departure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Chinese characters (if applicable)</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Seaman’s Certificate of Nationality and 1 entity and/or Seaman’s Identity Book</th>
<th>Duties on board</th>
<th>Port where engaged</th>
<th>Date of engagement</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>LANDJENG S/O HANZAH</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>HANAPIN S/O MEDANG</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>DYHASTANG S/O HALING</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>MOHD ANIR S/O RAEK</td>
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<tr>
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</table>

**Note**: This form is to be used for crew only.

**Owners or charterers**: KHAJAH EKOK

**Last port of call**: KHAJAH EKOK

**Next port of call**: KHAJAH EKOK

**Court of Appeal Entry**: 11-24-76

**Date of Appeal**: 18-2-76

**Signature**: [Signature]

**Date**: 24/4/76

**Confidential**
The fishing vessels listed below have been reported stolen during 1963/1964, 1964/1965 and up to 1st April 1966. Additions to and deletions from the list will be advised as they become known.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
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### APPENDIX V.A. TO ANNEX K.
### STOLEN FISHING CREW PASSES.

The fishing crew passes listed below have been reported stolen during 1966 and up to last April 1966. Additions to and deletions from the list will be advised as they become known.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PASS NO.</th>
<th>BOAT NO.</th>
<th>DATE ISSUED</th>
<th>VALID UNTIL</th>
<th>CREW LISTED</th>
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<td>18918</td>
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<td>30 Nov 66</td>
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APPENDIX VI TO ANNEX K
SPECIMEN RESTRICTED AREA PERMIT - SINGAPORE.

PENJAMAN FELABAHAN SINGAPURA
PORT OF SINGAPORE AUTHORITY


The holder of this Permit is permitted to pass through the restricted area for vessels under 100 tons net declared under Notice to Mariners No. 39 of 1964.

Name: ________________________________
Card Pengenal
Identity Card No: ______________________
Address: ______________________________

Kenamaan Kapal
Description of boat: ______________________

K bangsawan
Nationality: ______________________________

Pembawa Surat Izinan ini hendak-leh membawa Card Pengenalnya pada tiap masa apabila melalui hasaran Pembatasan ini.

The holder of this Permit must carry his Identity Card at all times when passing through the restricted area.

PENJAMAN SINGAPURA
SURAT IZINAN
KAWASAN PEMBATASAN

PORT OF SINGAPORE
RESTRICTED AREA PERMIT

CONFIDENTIAL

MALPOS II

ANNEX M

SOME KINEMATICAL ASPECTS OF PATROLLING.

1. It is assumed that it is desired to patrol a rectangular zone. There are plainly many ways in which this may be done, ranging from sophisticated variants on the cross over patrol to the relatively simple straight line to and fro patrol. The proper choice of the pattern for maximum chance of detection depends upon the inter-relationship between the several variables involved, particularly the speed ratio, and the effective radar range. For the range of conditions expected from present intelligence, the simple to and fro line patrol will give the best result.

2. No patrol scheme can ensure a 100% chance of detection, especially bearing in mind the loss of patrol time that will occur in investigating suspicious contacts etc. The curves in figure 1 show how the probability of detection will vary as the speed ratio, length of patrol line and radar range change. Figure 2 gives a quick way of determining the ratio of radar range to the length of the patrol line. It is seen that the chance of detection is very sensitive to radar range. The moral of this is that every care should be taken to ensure that the ships radar is working at maximum efficiency during the course of a patrol. This involves paying careful attention to the method of setting up the system, especially under adverse conditions. This has not always been done in the past.

3. It is important that conclusions based on purely kinematical considerations should be monitored in the light of practical experience. To this end patrol ships are to record the outcome of their patrol activity on the pro-forma shown in figure 3 (S.G.D.R.). Supplies of these forms will be available from the Operations Room, R.N. H.Q. at any time prior to the patrol. Information accumulated from records of this type will ensure that ships are employed to full advantage.
ANNEX II
LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF SHIPS ON PATROL.

Scope.

1. The provisions of this Annex apply to R.M. ships only. Arrangements for logistic support of R.M.N. vessels are made separately by

Fuel.

2. H.M.S. HANXMAN and Escorts.

(a) An R.F.A. tanker is sent out to refuel patrol ships at intervals of three or four days.

(b) CMS and SDB's.

(i) Malacca Straits. Ship will replenish from the R.F.A. tanker as for 2(a) above, or from H.M.S. HANXMAN.

(ii) Singapore Straits. Ship should return to the Naval Base by day as required to replenish.

(iii) East Coast. Individual arrangements will be made when required.

Provisions and Naval Stores.

3. Ships on patrol in the Malacca Straits will be provided with provisions and stores, as opportunity offers, by means of the tanker as at 2(a) above.

4. Urgent stores can be supplied from the Naval Base by road to Port Dickson or other ports on the West coast of Malaya.

5. Escorts in the Singapore Straits or East coast will be supplied by R.A.S. as in the W.P.P. C.M.S. will replenish with stores as in 2(b) above.

Mail.

6. Mail will be delivered to all ships on patrol as often as possible by relieving vessels and R.F.A.'s. Where necessary mail will be despatched by rail to Port Dickson, and by road to Batu Pahat, for collection by ship's boats. Ships will be informed by signal when, and by what means mail is being despatched to them.

7. Unless ships have any special requirements there is normally no necessity to make signals requesting for mail, as every effort is made by the B.F.M.O. to deliver mail to ships as often as possible.
FLEET OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL INSTRUCTIONS

PART IV - SECTION 4

APPENDIX 2

TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS RELATING TO INDOONESIAN CLAIMED WATERS

I. The following instructions on the policy to be adopted in Indonesian-dominated waters, during the present period of tension with Indonesia are to be followed in lieu of those in Section 'C' of this order.

II. The instructions are designed to reduce to a minimum the possibility of exacerbating the present strained relations and avoid unnecessary incidents, during the routine movement of British warships and merchant ships. They are not relevant to specific operations which may be ordered from time to time.

General Policy

5. Disputes between H.M. Ships and Indonesian vessels could be limited to argument over the extent of Indonesian territorial sea limits or over the arrest of British protected shipping; or they could involve actual interference, or attempt to interfere, with the freedom of lawful passage by H.M. Ships or British-protected vessels (for definition compare paras. 13 and 15 of Section 'C' of this order).

4. In any of these circumstances, H.M. Ships are to behave with firmness and restraint. In general, incidents are to be avoided unless provoked (as set out below) has been initiated by the Indonesian vessels, and H.M. Ships should use all measures short of force until left with no other alternative. Any incident is to be reported immediately to C.O.R.Q. Ind. (Navy) and C.E.E.R. by the code signal "Firesign".

5. If the dispute is confined to argument over the extent of Indonesian territorial sea limits, H.M. Ships should follow the policy in paragraphs 13 and 15 below, unless the Indonesians interfere forcibly, or threaten to interfere forcibly, with the lawful passage of H.M. Ships, or challenge the H.M. Ships vessels aboard legally to maintain their course. In the last resort, they should withdraw from the disputed area if the only alternative is the use of force by either side.

6. If, however, Indonesian vessels use or threaten actual and wrongful violence against British-protected shipping, either within recognised Indonesian territorial sea limits (see para. 11), in disputed waters, or on the high seas, and if H.M. Ships are left with no other alternative, they should use the minimum amount of force necessary to provide protection.

7. Whatever the circumstances, H.M. Ships are not to open fire on an Indonesian vessel unless:

   a. all appeals to reason and other means of persuasion have failed;

   b. H.M. Ships intention to open fire has been clearly indicated;

   c. action is essential in self-defence or to counter a direct and serious danger to British shipping;

   d. it has been established beyond doubt that the vessel under attack is entitled to British protection;

SECRET

0. / ....
and c. the Indonesian vessel has opened fire first.

Zone outside Indonesian Territorial Sea (as defined in paragraph 11 below)

8. The Indonesian Government claimed in Regulation No. 8 of 1962 the right to prohibit stopping, anchoring and/or hovering without justifiable cause on the high seas adjacent to the Indonesian territorial sea, "adjacent" being interpreted by the Indonesian Assistant for Shipping as meaning within a distance of 100 nautical miles outside the territorial sea. (Para. 32(c) of Section B of this order refers).

9. H.M. Government have refused to accept this claim, and regard this area outside the Indonesian territorial sea as high seas, for which the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas identifies an international right of free navigation. Interference by Indonesian warships with British-protected shipping in this area (except in cases of hot pursuit) is therefore illegal, and when all other means have failed, H.M. Ships are authorised to use the minimum amount of force necessary to prevent an arrest or to provide protection subject to the reservations in paragraph 7 above.

Claimed Internal Sea

10. H.M.G. similarly are unable to accept the Indonesian Government's claim to control an internal water area large areas of the high seas such as the Java Sea, Sonda Sea, Molucca Sea, the Strait of Macassar and internationaused Straits giving access to these waters. In these areas, waters beyond a 12 mile territorial sea (as shown in outline on the charts referred to in paragraph 7 of F.O. 4102) should be regarded as high seas, and action may be taken as in paragraph 9.

Claimed Territorial Sea

11. H.M.G. have recognised only a 3 mile Indonesian territorial sea, but have accepted that the territorial sea should be drawn from straight base lines justifiable under the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea. Nevertheless, they cannot accept and do not recognise that Indonesia can legally enclose her entire archipelago by a straight base line system. During the present period of tension, waters within 12 miles of base lines drawn round the Indonesian coast using the Indonesian method of drawing base lines (except as is not out in para. 10 above) should be treated as the Indonesian territorial sea, for all purposes including the occurrence of hot-pursuit.

12. If Indonesian warships attempt to arrest or otherwise interfere with British-protected shipping between 3 and 12 miles, and if assistance in both sought and available, H.M. Ship is to intervene and invite the C.O. of the Indonesian vessel to join him, and if necessary visit the merchant ship for joint investigation.

13. Whether the Indonesian allegations are well-founded or not, the C.O. of H.M. Ship should:

a. attempt to establish an agreement on the precise geographical position of the incident;

b. state that H.M.G. have not accepted the Indonesian Government's claim to a 12 mile territorial sea and that the facts of the incident are being reported to H.M.G.
12. Use every reasonable means to persuade the Indonesians to release the British-protected vessel and allow the incident to be settled through diplomatic channels.

If this fails, he should in the last resort allow the British-protected ship to be arrested under protest, except that he should protect it against use of force by the Indonesian vessel. The above action should also be taken when a British-protected ship has been subjected to hot pursuit on the high seas which commenced from within Indonesian territorial sea, as defined in para. 11 above.

13. If, however, a British-protected ship has been fired upon before an H.M. Ship arrives, action should at once be taken to protect her from further violence, force being used if inevitable, but subject to the reservations in paragraph 7.

14. British-protected ships have been warned to avoid the Indonesian claimed 12 miles territorial sea (except as set out in paragraph 10 above) and to keep to established sea routes through the area during the present period of tension.

Indonesian inland waters and ports

15. H.M. Ships should intervene within the three mile territorial sea limit on behalf of British-protected shipping only if wrongful and actual violence has occurred and if all other measures have failed. Your action is to be confined to the protection of shipping unless other instructions are issued by the Ministry of Defence.

16. For the purposes of handling incidents the Straits giving access to Indonesian claimed "Inland Sea" are to be treated as High Seas.

Naval Aircraft

17. Naval aircraft are not to fly over Indonesian 12 mile territorial sea as defined in paragraph 11 above.
PART IV - SECTION 1

4.104. **INDONESIAN CONFRONTATION - ACTION TO COUNTER INFILTRATION BY SEA**

1. The aim of H.M. Ships on anti-infiltration duty is to prevent the landing in Malaysia of Indonesian troops and agents, and arms, munitions and supplies for them. H.M. Ships engaged on this duty are to be guided by the following paragraphs, which do not detract from their right to defend themselves at all times.

**ACTION TO BE TAKEN WITH NON NAVAL CRAFT.**

**On the High Seas.**

2. Any craft whose identity is not clearly established may be boarded and her ship's papers inspected.

3. If the situation and conduct of any craft gives rise to grave suspicion that she is an immediate threat to the security of Malaysia or Brunei, she is to be arrested and sent into the nearest convenient port of those states or as ordered. Minimum force only is to be used, and fire should be opened only as a last resort.

**In Malaysian Territorial Waters.**

4. The Malaysian Government has declared that all her territorial sea is a Security Area under a proclamation issued under the authority of the Internal Security Act of Malaysia, 1960.

5. H.M. Ships may stop, search and arrest, without warrant any craft or person whom they suspect of being concerned in any of the following offences:

   a. Unauthorised possession of arms, ammunition or explosive.

   b. Consorting with persons in unauthorised possession of arms, ammunition or explosives.

   c. Carrying supplies for Indonesian troops or agents.

6. Such force may be used as the circumstances require, including opening fire. Craft or persons arrested are to be taken to the nearest convenient port in Malaysia or as ordered.

7. H.M. Ships acting under paras. 5 and 6 above may exercise "hot pursuit" (See F.O.T.I. 4.102, paras. 15 and 16) into international waters, but not into areas claimed by Indonesia as territorial waters, i.e. those within 12 n.m. of straight base lines drawn round the coast, or in the Indonesian side of median lines where these apply e.g. in the Singapore Strait.

**In Brunei Territorial Waters.**

8. H.M. Ships may stop, search and arrest, without a warrant, any craft or person whom they suspect of threatening the security of Brunei or Malaysia, using such force as the circumstances may require, including opening fire. Hot pursuit may be exercised as in para. 7 above. Craft or persons arrested are to be taken into the nearest convenient port in Brunei.

FLEET OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL INSTRUCTIONS

PART IV - SECTION 1

4164. (Continued)

ACTION TO BE TAKEN WITH INDONESIAN NAVAL AND GOVERNMENT VESSELS.

9. H.M. Ships encountering INDONESIAN Naval or GOVERNMENT vessels on the High Seas are to report them in accordance with F.O.T.I. 4125. Unless specifically engaged on anti-infiltration duty they should not take any further action.

10. When engaged on anti-infiltration duty, H.M. Ships are to be guided by the following principles:

a. ON THE HIGH SEAS.
   Indonesian Naval vessels are to be regarded as immune from any direct action except when interfering with a ship entitled to British protection, in which case minimum of force to make the vessel desist in to be used. Nevertheless, contact is to be held while the INDONESIAN VESSEL is passing through the patrolling vessels assigned area.

b. IN MALAYSIAN TERRITORIAL SEA.
   The vessel is to be closed and required to explain her presence. Unless she can justify innocent passage, she should be required to leave. If her Commanding Officer refuses to do so, action is to be taken to eject her, by force, if necessary. Instructions issued must be firm and force is only to be used in the following circumstances:

   (1) All appeals to reason have failed and H.M. Ship’s intention to open fire is clearly indicated.

   (2) The Indonesian vessel clearly shows hostile intent. Cease action when vessel has withdrawn outside Malaysian territorial waters.

c. IN BRUNEI TERRITORIAL SEA.
   As in b. above.

(11/66/2X)
FLEET OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL INSTRUCTIONS

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ANNEX A TO F.O.T.I. 140k

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR PATROLLING INDONESIAN-CLAIMED TERRORISMS

1. When specifically authorized by the Commander Far East Fleet in the Malacca and Singapore Straits, ships may patrol Indonesian-claimed territorial waters as defined in F.O.T.I. 4102, Appendix B, paragraph 11, last sentence, but they are not to enter Indonesia's internationally recognized territorial waters, i.e., within three miles of base lines drawn in accordance with F.O.T.I. 4102 paragraphs 5 to 9, or, if the straits are less than 6 miles across, south of the median line.

2. The purpose of the precept to current instructions set out in paragraph 1 above is to gain information on infiltrators and to deter them. No attempt is to be made to stop, search and arrest infiltrators in Indonesian claimed territorial waters.

3. If challenged by Indonesian warships, H.M. Ships are to inform the Indonesian that they are in waters which they consider to be high seas and if objections are made, say they will inform their authorities. Action by Indonesian Naval vessel(s) must not be provoked. If attacked the minimum force required to make the vessel(s) desist is to be used.
ANNEX B. TO F.O.T.I.L41C.
ACTION TO COUNTER INDONESIAN INFLTRATION BY SEA

ACTION TO BE TAKEN AGAINST NON-NAVAL CRAFT
ACTION TO BE TAKEN WITH INDONESIAN NAVAL & GOVERNMENT VESSELS

1. This annex summarises the action that may be taken in anti-infiltration operations. For convenience, the summary uses the following definitions of Malaysian Territorial Waters (MTWs), Indonesian claimed territorial waters (ICWs), Indonesian territorial waters (ITWs) in the context of anti-infiltration operations.

2. Chart overlays showing limiting lines of MTWs, ICWs and ITWs are available for:
   - Chart 1358 - Malacca Straits (One Fathom Bank to Singapore)
   - Chart 2403 - Singapore Strait

DEFINITIONS

MTWs (Shown by \ldots\ldots on chart overlays).

3. Inside the 3-mile limit as defined in FOT1 L412 paragraph 5 - 9 round the Malayan Peninsular (including Singapore) and round Sarawak and Sabah except where limited:
   (a) In Singapore Main Strait by the Median Line.
   (b) In the Tawau area vide FOT1 4102 Appendix II.

ICWs (Shown by \ldots\ldots on chart overlays)

4. Inside 12-mile limit claimed by Indonesia vide FOT1 4102 Appendix 5 paragraph 11 except where limited:
   (a) At the south end of Malacca Straits by the Western Approaches to Singapore Straits.
   (b) In Singapore main Strait by the Median line.
   (c) North East of the Rhio Islands by the Eastern approaches to Singapore Straits.
   (d) In the Tawau area vide FOT1 4102 Appendix II.

ITWs (Shown by \ldots\ldots on chart overlays)

5. Inside the 3-mile limit as defined in FOT1 4102 paragraphs 5 - 9 round all Indonesian Islands and Kalimantan except where limited:
   (a) In Singapore main Strait by the Median line.
   (b) In the Tawau area vide FOT1 4102 Appendix II.

High Seas

6. The area between MTWs and ICWs as defined above.

(\ldots\ldots Policy 0, Part XXVIII)
<table>
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<tr>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>TYPE OF PATROL</th>
<th>INVESTIGATION</th>
<th>ACTION</th>
<th>FINAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1.M.T.W.s | UNRESTRICTED | Stop, search & arrest any craft or person suspected of:  
a. being in unauthorised possession of arms, ammunition or explosives.  
b. conspiring with persons in unauthorised possession of etc.  
c. carrying supplies for Indonesian troops or agents. | Use force including opening or persons arrested to convey the circumstances nearest to exercise convenient hot pursuit as far as, but not into, ICW's. | Take craft Report presence of Indonesian naval vessel. Close and require vessel to explain her presence. Unless she can justify innocent passage, require her to leave. |
| 2.I.O.W.s | Only when specifically authorised | Stop, search and arrest not permitted. Object Applicable to Singapore Straits and Malacca Straits only. | Not permitted. | Object of patrol is to gain intelligence and deter infiltrators. If challenged say you are in waters you consider to be High Seas and if objections are made, say you will inform your authorities. |

FOTI 4104 para. 5.  
FOTI 4104 para. 5-7.  
FOTI 4104 para. 10(b).  
FOTI 4104 para. 15-16.  
FOTI 4125  
FOTI 4104 para. 6.  
FOTI 4104 para. 10(b).  

FOTI 4104 PARA. 10(b).
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<th>TYPE OF PATROL</th>
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<td>3.I.T.W.a</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.HIGH SEAS</td>
<td>UNRESTRICTED</td>
<td>Any Craft whose identity is not clearly established may be boarded and ships' papers inspected.</td>
<td>Use minimum force, and open fire only as last resort to effect arrest.</td>
<td>Take craft, keep vessel under surveillance while passing through nearest Malaysian port.</td>
<td>No action except when interfering with a ship entitled to British protection.</td>
<td></td>
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FOTI 4104, para. 2-3.  
FOTI 4104, para. 3.  
FOTI 4104, para. 3.  
FOTI 4104, para. 10(a).  
FOTI 4102 Appendix 5, para. 6.  

(A.L. 33)  
(F.P.C.H. 041)  
28th July, 1965  
No. 4104
Rules of Engagement

1. Aircraft encountering Indonesian or suspected Indonesian activity inside Malaysia or Singapore territorial waters or against Commonwealth shipping in international waters are to take action as follows:

   a. Report the incident stating at least "What, Where, When, Whither, Which" to:

      (1) A Naval Officer in Tactical Command or Commonwealth naval ship in the area (if communication can immediately be established).

      (2) The aircraft's ground control centre.

   b. Maintain visual or radar contact with the enemy.

   c. Open fire or release weapons or illuminants upon surface craft only:

      (1) When so ordered by the relevant ground control centre on the authority of Headquarters Far East Air Force.

      (2) When so ordered by a naval Officer in Tactical Command in the case of maritime or naval aircraft.

      (3) When deliberately fired on within Malaysian or Singapore waters by shipping identified as Indonesian.

Note 1

Shackletons on Operation HAINEYTH and Borneo reconnaissance patrols also have Headquarters Far East Air Force authority to illuminate targets at discretion of aircraft captain or an Officer in Tactical Command. Shackletons have also been authorised by Headquarters Far East Air Force to open fire (at Captain's discretion) on targets as and when instructed by an Officer in Tactical Command, in the event of an initial enemy attack. Fire may be aimed to warn, damage or sink enemy vessels in accordance with current rules of engagement for R.N. Ships, i.e. the aircraft is thus regarded as an extension of naval fire power.

Note 2

Aircraft are not deliberately to provoke surface craft into firing at them, and, unless over Malaysian or Singaporean Territorial waters, as provided in paragraph c.(3), are to evade rather than return the fire, unless otherwise authorised under paragraph c.(1) or (2).

Action by Operational Control Centres

2. The action by the aircraft's control authority receiving a report is to be as follows:
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Part IV - Section I

2. a. East Malaysia and Singapore

(1) C3I Stations, Operations Centres, I C Flights and Marine units with light aircraft

   (a) Pass telephone report to Far East Air Force Operations Centre.

   (b) Confirm by signal to SIG 1117.

(2) FFR/C

   (a) Pass telephone report to Headquarters Far East Command and Group Captain Operations, Headquarters Far East Air Force.

   (b) Confirm signal to SIG 1117 has been sent by originator.

b. East Malaysia. Reports are to be passed to Brigade Headquarters, Headquarters Director of Borneo Operations, Commander Naval Forces Borneo, Commander Land Forces Borneo and Commander Air Forces Borneo, in accordance with the Director of Borneo Operations standard procedure for operational reporting.
FLEET OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL INSTRUCTIONS

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ANNEX D. TO F.O.T.I. No. 4104.

INDONESIAN CONFRONTATION - USE OF FORCE

Reference:
A. FOTI 4104 - Anti-Infiltration Operations
B. FOTI 4102 - Appendix 5 - Protection of Merchant Shipping.
C. FOTI 4102 - Hot Pursuit

(For the purpose of this order the term Commonwealth embraces United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia only.)

1. It will be appreciated that in conditions short of open war any force used may have political consequences. In the present climate of Indonesian confrontation operations, the following principles based on FOTIs should be used for guidance by Commanding Officers when exercising their discretion to open fire.

Fire in Self-Defence

2. a. H.M. Ships may engage "in self-defence" the source of Indonesian fire if it is directed at:-

   (1) themselves
   (2) any Commonwealth warship, or merchant ship or craft, or aircraft
   (3) Commonwealth forces ashore.

b. The above applies whether Indonesian fire is coming from:-

   (1) Indonesian ships or craft
   (2) Indonesian aircraft
   (3) Indonesian shore guns or mortars.

c. Fire may only be returned "in self-defence" if it is essential to ensure the safety of the forces in paragraph 2.a. above.

   Only the minimum fire necessary is to be used and civilian targets are to be avoided as far as possible.

Fire to Effect Arrest

3. Fire may be opened in Malaysian Territorial Waters and on the High Seas outside Indonesian Claimed Waters (12 miles) when carrying out anti-infiltration duties in order to effect arrest. The minimum amount of fire to stop, search and arrest should be used.

Offensive Fire

4. Unprovoked fire, i.e. that not covered by firing in "Self-defence" or to "effect arrest" is not to be opened on Indonesian Territory or Indonesian ships, craft, or aircraft, unless specifically authorised.

/ Engagement....
No. 4104.

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PART IV - SECTION I

ANNEX B. To F.O.T.I. No. 4104. continued.

Engagement in Hot Pursuit

5. Ships and craft may be engaged in hot pursuit until they reach the limit of Indonesian Claimed Waters (12 miles). In the Singapore Strait, ships and craft may be pursued until they reach the median line, or mid-line between ITW and MTW, as appropriate.

Other Circumstances

6. The Commanding Officer may not open fire in other circumstances except in situations in which he deems it necessary in order to preserve the safety of his ship in which case the minimum force to achieve the desired effect should be used.

Fire from Co-operating Aircraft

7. When acting as OTC, fire from certain co-operating aircraft may be used as an extension of naval fire power in accordance with current policies.
4125. INDONESIAN VESSELS AND SUSPICIOUS CRAFT IN THE VICINITY OF MALAYSIA - REPORTING PROCEDURE.

1. Reports of sightings of Indonesian warships operating anywhere in the Malaysian area and of all suspect craft in the waters close to Malaysia are required in the form What, Where, When.

2. Texts of sighting reports should start with the words 'Sighting Report' and should include any amplifying details (e.g., information to assist identification if the exact type of ship is not known) after the body of the report as paragraph 1.

3. Sighting reports are to be addressed as follows:
   - Western Malaysia. To AIG 1117
   - Eastern Malaysia. To Sighting Units own operational Authority INFO, AIG 1118
   - (except West and East Brigade Areas) Sighting reports in West Brigade and East Brigade areas are to be made in accordance with instructions in MRSMOPS and TOMP respectively.
   - West and East Brigade.

4. Composition of AIG 1117, to which address group LZPI has been allocated, is:

   ACTION  | OPSCO  | INFO  | IGPOLOPS.
   ---------|--------|-------|----------
   MINDEF KL |        |       | IGPOLOPS.
   PEAFOC   |        |       | IGPOLOP MARINE
   COMFEP   |        |       | CINCPE
   ROCCHANGI |        |       |        
   HQ PARELF |        |       |        
   HQ PEAF  |        |       |        
   KD MALAYA|        |       |        

(b) The composition of AIG 1116, to which the address group OGYD has been allocated, is:

   MINDEF KL        | HQ PEAF
   CINC PE          | DOBOPS
   COMFEP           | COMMNAVOR
   HQ PARELF        | IGPOLOPS

(c) Sighting Reports in the Singapore Straits are to be unclassified.
5. OPSCO is the Operational Sub Committee of the National Operations Committee which has been established to coordinate action by the Anglo-Malaysian Joint Services and Police in combating confrontation in West Malaysia.

6. Classification and precedence of sighting reports must depend on circumstances and state of political tension at the time. Unless the tactical situation justifies an UNCLASSIFIED signal and a high precedence, reports should normally be of precedence "OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE" to Action Addressees, "PRIORITY" to Information Addressees and classified "RESTRICTED".

7. Reports in accordance with current CB 04/95 should continue to be made for sightings of Indonesian vessels which are not in the immediate vicinity of MALAYSIA, but signalled reports are not required if a Sighting Report is made in accordance with this order. Any useful additional information, photographs or sketches, however, should continue to be forwarded.
PART IV - SECTION 1

4130. H.M. SHIPS - STATES OF READINESS ENTERING AND LEAVING SINGAPORE NAVY BASE AND ON PASSAGE IN THE SINGAPORE AND MALACCA STRAITS

1. A potential danger exists to ships entering and leaving the Naval Base at Singapore and to ships on passage in the Singapore and Malacca Straits, from the threat posed by Indonesian Naval Forces.

2. Pre-emptive Indonesian action is most likely to take the form of mine laying and attack by surface forces. The most dangerous threat from surface forces is that of the Komar missile-firing fast patrol boat.

3. a. H.M. Ships entering and leaving the Naval Base at Singapore and transiting the Malacca Strait south of the one fathom bank (2° 53'S) or the Singapore Strait south of 1° 24'N and west of 104° 50'E are to assume the degrees of armament, aircraft and NECD readiness laid down in the succeeding paragraphs of this instruction.

   b. On entering or leaving Singapore Naval Base degrees of readiness are to be relaxed at or assumed, by the time of passing Changi buoy.

   c. Ships on Anti Infiltration Patrol are to be governed by MALPOS orders.

4. Surface Weapons Assume the third degree of anti-ship and anti-aircraft (counter-missile) readiness (A.T.P. 1 (A) Vol 1 - Arts. 1704, 1705)

   a. Ammunition

   (1) Medium range guns - 50% of H.E. outfit fused V.T. 20 rounds per gun in gunbays. Upper deck R.U. lockers full.

   (2) Close range guns - R.U. lockers are to be full.

   (3) Seacat - Minimum of four rounds to be primed and in R.U. stowage.

   (4) Seaslug - Blast deflector plates to be removed.

5. Aircraft

   a. Strike. Strike carriers having aircraft disembarked to R.A.F. Changi are to have two amend aircraft at Alert 5 at Changi. If no strike aircraft are disembarked this commitment will be met by the R.A.F. Carriers.
4130. Continued.

Carriers concerned are to make arrangements direct with HQBEAF, keeping the Fleet Commander informed, and giving as much notice as possible.

b. Rotary Wing

(1) A.S. Helicopters. When the Mark 11 (eleven) depth charge is available A.S. Helicopters are to be armed at condition 2, for use as strike aircraft against patrol craft, PT boats and the KOM-R fast patrol boat. Strike carriers and Commando ships with A.S. Helicopters are to maintain a minimum of two aircraft.

(2) Commando Helicopters. Commando ships are to maintain a minimum of two helicopters armed for strike at condition 2.

c. Reconnaissance Aircraft

(1) A Cheetah or Helicopter may be launched for reconnaissance purposes at the discretion of the Senior Officer or Commanding Officer, of a single unit. PEAFOC, BUKIT GOMBAK and the COMSIP are to be informed of launch time and intended search plan. Aircraft are to comply with FDI 1402 paragraph 16.

NOTE: 1. The above aircraft readiness states may be relaxed in special circumstances, but aircraft are not to be at less than 30 minutes notice by day and one hour by night.

2. The above aircraft may be flown on normal training missions.

6. A.I. Organisation

a. The A.I.O. is to be manned to satisfy the requirements of the armament and aircraft states.

b. Encom Policy. No restriction. Passive ECM is to be operating.

7. Degaussing. The D.C. is to be switched on.

8. NBCD. Ships are to be in state 3 condition Yankee.

(139 Policy 0, Part V)
Introduction

1. The comments below are based on Naval experience in Borneo during confrontation. They cannot be described accurately as lessons, because nothing particularly novel emerged. The enemy was inept at sea. Our forces were severely limited in what action they could take by restrictions which were partly political, but which were mainly designed with the object of avoiding escalation into a hotter war. This inability to make use of our own full military capability seems likely to continue to be part of the pattern of future emergencies. It is likely to affect the design and armament of our ships and aircraft, and their tactical employment. There is room for improvement in our methods of cooperating with the Army in day to day minor operations.

Joint Command

2. Joint Command arrangements worked well. In 1969 the separate Land Forces Commander was withdrawn and his function combined with that of the Director of Borneo Operations. Concurrently the Naval Force Commander became third in the line of succession. This improved not only his and therefore the Navy's status (something to consider after the Defence Review), but his knowledge of Army and Air Force problems thus giving him more opportunity to make a contribution and present a Naval point of view. Similarly the reorganization brought the three services closer together at staff level, although the more junior the officer the more 'single service' in approach he sometimes seemed.

Intelligence

3. Probably the most important factor in this campaign was good intelligence. This helped very small Naval forces to provide a high degree of protection to the Army's flanks and rear areas and to avoid 'wet hen' tactics.

Civil Administration

4. The system of war by committee brought the civil administration at all levels into a sphere of responsibility for military action and ensured that the military were fully aware of the administration problems. It also provided the Naval Force Commander with opportunity to draw attention to the total lack of security in the ports, where ships flying flags of convenience with Indonesian and Chinese crews arrived without warning and virtually no supervision. This resulted in the setting up of a Port Security organisation in Sarawak and Brunei although not without administrative opposition. Some improvement of the organisation in Sabah was also achieved. (A similar lack of security in ports existed in the Cyprus emergency.) Unless ports are properly controlled Naval patrols will be outflanked.

Naval Staff

5. The Naval Staff consisted of a Staff Officer Operations, who was also, after the reorganization and amalgamation of Director of Borneo Operations and Commander Land Forces Borneo, G2 Naval Operations and Intelligence to Director of Operations, and a Staff Communications Officer, who was also Naval member of the Joint Signal Committee (Borneo).
Because unlike the Army and Air Operations Staff they also had to deal with local Naval administration, their unclassified visitors sometimes caused security problems and distraction to other Staff Officers in the Joint Operations Centre. However the addition of another officer for administration only was not justified. The complement was adequate for the task and could have efficiently controlled a much larger Naval Force.

6. This economy in personnel however did make it difficult for officers to take any station leave, and was in contrast to the Army and R.A.F, who were complemented in sufficient numbers to allow many officers to take two periods of station leave in the year. The Joint Headquarters worked a seven day week with no mid-week half-day. Therefore the complementing policy of the other two services has something to commend it.

**Naval Air**

7. Even though Naval Air Operations were under the operational control of the Air Commander it is important that the Naval Commander retains personal single service responsibility as Senior Naval Officer present for ensuring that all is well with the operational performance, cooperation and administration of a disembarked Naval Air Commando helicopter detachment, when the Commando ship is absent. He must also ensure that the organisation for accepting and coordinating close air support from carrier borne aircraft is efficient. Experience in Borneo has shown that this widening of the Naval Commander's responsibility is welcomed by the Air Commander.

**Operations**

8. "Whiskey Calore" was the original plan for setting up Naval Patrols in Borneo. Some comments have been obtained from the first Naval Force Commander who was appointed in March, 1964.

a. The targets were too ambitious. The Naval Force Commander organisation was set up too late and therefore inherited the problems produced by this.

b. The original Naval Special parties for inshore patrol work in dockyard and local boats were too spread out along the coastline. They should have been concentrated at Kuching and Tawau.

c. It was fortunate that Hartland Point was in dock at the time and thus able to throw up men for the special parties.

d. We were slow in grasping the maintenance problem.

9. Looking back at the present time at the comment in paragraph 8. above it is evident that although patrolling the coastline away from Kuching bay and Tawau proved in the event largely unnecessary this was almost entirely due to Indonesian inefficiency and lack of patrols at sea, factors which were not expected. Furthermore the effectiveness of patrols off Tawau and Kuching did result in attempts by the enemy to by-pass them. The inshore Naval parties, which were latterly replaced by the Royal Malaysian Marine Police, helped to create confidence among law-abiding and loyal sections of the remote coastal community and to discourage subversives. These special parties, which were hurriedly formed, demonstrated the ability of the modern rating to turn his hand to an off-beat but interesting independent duty with success, enterprise and considerable improvisation, without which nothing would have been achieved.

**Tasks of Patrols**

10. The main tasks of Naval Patrols throughout confrontation were:

a. To deter incursions into Malaysian Territorial Waters by Indonesian warships.
b. To prevent infiltration by armed men in local trading boats behind the Army's flanks.

c. To provide Naval Gunfire Support.

d. To prevent piracy and coastal pillage.

(Note: of the above (c) and (e) were not included in plan "Whiskey Galeson").

11. These tasks were successfully completed:-

a. As far as is known no Indonesian warships entered Malaysian territorial waters throughout the emergency.

b. There was no positive evidence of any successful infiltration after January 1964. There is evidence that an incursion party which did set out for Tawau in June 1966 turned back as a result of Naval patrol activity.

c. Naval gunfire support was constantly available, occasionally called for, and demonstrated actively along the border in the Subatik/Wallace Bay area.

d. There was a marked reduction in piracy and pillage. A contributing factor to this was the more lucrative trade of smuggling duty free cigarettes to the Philippines, an occupation considered legal in Malaysian territorial waters and carried out by ostensible Sulu pirates. Smugglers together with Philippine Warships in pursuit and collaboration provided distractions to Naval patrols.

e. 99.6% of all stores and equipment for the Army in Sarawak came by sea. The Indonesians made no attempt to interfere with this line of communication.

Infiltration

12. Rather than using the sea for infiltration Indonesian military units, special forces and communist groups continually crossed the border by land. This although disappointing to Naval units was clearly a direct result of early successful interceptions at sea, together with the effort created by conscientious patrolling and boarding night after night throughout confrontation. Coupled with this must have been the knowledge of success by our ships in West Malaysia, where the only approach for Indonesian infiltrators was by sea or air. The very low radar coverage provided by only one CH3 deployed off Kuching could never have been appreciated by the enemy. This must reflect his lack of professional Naval knowledge. It is also true that whereas a party of infiltrators contacted by our forces in primary jungle may be able to disperse and escape, a party intercepted at sea becomes a total loss. The effectiveness of each CH3 and Patrol Craft deployed off Tawau was enhanced by the capability of the frigate or destroyer which was widely known to be deployed there as Overwatch. Comments on capabilities of CH3, Vosper Patrol Craft, destroyers and frigates are made in paragraphs 27 - 35 below.

Cooperation with Army

13. The effectiveness of Naval patrols coupled with close knowledge of military actions in the jungle led some Army units to believe that the shore was a sort of touch line with the rule of play at sea. Or at least that the role of the Navy was as a prophylactic or bonus. This attitude being dangerous one, some effort was devoted to dispel it. Similarly ships were initially not aware of the nature of Army operations. Professional knowledge of the others' service is not remarkable among officers at Battalion/Naval unit level and sometimes even at Brigade Headquarters.

/Although
Although this is unfortunate either way, in this type of campaign, where the Navy is in support, it is the Army that dictates the plan. Therefore it is most important that the Army planner is aware of the many diverse capabilities of those warships that are available to his area. Although Brigade Headquarters were given Naval advice by Resident Naval Officers, the very nature of Borneo operations, (Cyprus was the same), dictated that the majority of operations were mounted at battalion or company level often at short notice. It is important that Officers appointed as Resident Naval Officers have understanding of Naval operations and ship capabilities.

14. By personal visits to Brigade Headquarters, Battalion and company positions headway was made in advertising how the Navy can act in support of the Army. Ships were given an Army operational and intelligence brief on arrival in addition to the Naval brief. Exchange of officers and men was encouraged. Ships were included in the battalion radio net and encouraged to remind their opposite numbers ashore that they were available for cooperation. Joint exercises were carried out, many on the initiative of the Commanding Officer of the Guardship. However probably the only effective way to have brought home this point would have been to have changed sides and taken over the conduct of Indonesian Maritime Operations.

15. An example of failure to make use of the Navy was a company operation aimed to cordon off a village at dawn in which intelligence had indicated the presence of communist couriers. The village was at the entrance to a river and not easy to approach by land unobtrusively. No information of this operation was given to the CNS which was on patrol in the area.

16. There were however many examples of successful cooperation including the movement of Army units and Police Field Force by CNS and in one instance by a Royal Fleet Auxiliary oiler. On two occasions when a party of Indonesian infiltrators were being searched for by Army units ashore, possible sea escape routes were blocked by the CNS. Naval gunfire support was coordinated with operations ashore and employed on one occasion to bombard caves used by terrorists, which were inaccessible to Army artillery.

Tawau Assault Group

17. A successful example of cooperation was the somewhat inappropriately named Tawau Assault Group. This unit was formed in December, 1963 after a successful Indonesian infiltration and attack on a Malay infantry position at Kalabakan. The object of the Tawau Assault Group was to patrol the waterways through the mangrove swamps to the West of Wallace Bay, which provide a backdoor from Indonesia into the Tawau residency. A CNS can enter the larger waterways while the smallest can only be negotiated by an assault boat, or alternately at low water on foot. The group was commanded by a company commander from the British battalion in the Brigade area from a shore Headquarters and consisted of a number of Royal Malaysian Naval manned HM's (latterly replaced by mobile ICP's) from which the Army patrolled in pairs of assault boats.

18. Fire support was provided by Army artillery, although owing to the nature of the ground there were few hard standings for guns, therefore Naval gunfire support was provided by a CNS or Patrol Craft in close support assisted by an SDML, while the Guardship, a frigate or destroyer provided indirect fire. Also as part of the group two Boat Observation Posts were anchored on the sea border opposite the Indonesian town of Nunukan, which they closely surveyed through high powered binoculars. The CNS or Patrol Craft provided retributive close fire support when the Boat Observation Posts were engaged by Indonesian fire on a number of occasions.
19. The Tawau Assault Group was immediately successful. A number of the Indonesian incursion party finding their way home after the Kelabakon Raid were captured or killed. There is no evidence that the enemy ever tried to use this route again.

20. Company commanders acting as Senior Officer Tawau Assault Group reported on the high standard of inter-service and inter-Commonwealth cooperation within this unit. It was evident too that these Army officers had a good professional knowledge of the capability and employment of naval units under their operational control or in support. From time to time there were failures in communications. This was mainly because portable radios (Type M24) were handed over from ship to ship; naval operators were inexperienced in their use and maintenance and that sets were often off frequency. Naval units in support of the Army should be allocated their individual radio sets and the operators should be properly trained in their operation. Unless communications are reliable it is impossible to plan on coordinated fire from both Army artillery and ships guns at short notice.

Engagement Rules

21. The Engagement Rules varied considerably between all three services. These became absurd when the natural environment of each individual service merged. Thus in the Tawau Assault Group area an Indonesian aircraft crossing the border would be shot down immediately by our Air Force as soon as identified, but not by a ship unless attacking her. An Indonesian soldier on the Malayan side of the border would be shot at sight by our Army whether on land or water-borne. In contrast, with the object of avoiding escalation, our Naval units were governed by National rules of engagement on the high seas and in territorial waters. This involved requests to leave and only the use of minimum force if all else failed. This could have produced problems in confined waters. Furthermore Royal Malaysian naval orders were phrased differently to those in FOTI.

22. To achieve some clarification and to avoid Commanding Officers becoming involved in legal reasoning in action, the orders were simplified within this command so that small units such as ICs under the operational control of an Army commander obeyed Army Rules. CMS and Patrol Craft in support obeyed Naval rules. A simplified version of when enemy fire should be returned was provided for the "Piquet" ship in support of the Boat Observation Posts anchored under the guns of Kundak. Although none of this was entirely satisfactory, it left radar less confusion in the minds of Commanding Officers and at the same time provided a check against unnecessary escalation.

23. It was not always appreciated that the "pique" ship was anchored by necessity within range and registered on by the enemy artillery with little room for manoeuvre on getting underway. She could not afford to have shots fired close to her deliberately or otherwise by the enemy since one deliberate mistake might mean severe casualties or the loss of the ship. Similarly the deployment of a small warship such as an SMSI anchored in a confined waterway in a mangrove swamp on her own left her a sitting duck to a SBS type operation at night particularly as the noise of her generator drowned all water noises.

Insolore Reconnaissance

24. In 1964 the Royal Malaysian Marine Police received the Special Naval patrol set up by plans "Whiskey Galore". It became evident that in some remote areas police boat patrols were not effective mainly because of shortage and inexperience of crews. In October, 1965, because of an intelligence appreciation suggested the possibility of large scale infiltration planned by the Indonesians in Darvel Bay in the Tawau Residency, patrols were reorganised to allow a ship to patrol in this area.

/This........
This CMS was instructed to reconnoitre the coastline by boat and send a landing party to visit isolated coastal villages. This reconnaissance was combined with some civil and medical aid and provided an opportunity to junior officers to take charge of a small independent party. It achieved the object of making Naval presence apparent to the local people who in most cases were at the time unaware of its existence, and this provided a deterrent to infiltration and subversive action.

Marine Police

25. The Naval Force Commander was responsible for the coordination of Marine Police with Naval patrols. Visits to a number of police boats showed that their calibers were never fired and some were defective; also that many crews had little professional knowledge and would have made a poor showing against a determined Indonesian armed party at sea. With the agreement of the Commissioners of Police naval assistance was provided to improve firing and maintenance of weapons and communications and a form of workup organisation was started.

Patrol by IAR Aircraft

26. IAR aircraft, although employed on patrols off both Kuching and Tawau as a deterrent and show of force, were of more value off Tawau where a shipping plot would be provided for the Guardship before dusk. The small size of the IAR detachment resulted in some inflexibility, because to meet their training requirements the crews had to fly a certain number of hours. Therefore the flying effort could not be reduced or increased easily as the situation demanded. This was disappointing when intelligence indicated a suitable employment for which extra sorties were needed. Because of the constant change of crews very careful briefing was required to avoid mistakes in reporting local craft. Cooperation between ships and aircraft was generally good.

SHIP CAPABILITIES

Coastal Minesweepers

27. The CMS proved herself yet again to be a most satisfactory gunboat with all round capability. Although her draught prevented her from operating in as shallow water as the Patrol Crafts which draw 3 feet less, their propellers suffered less damage less frequently.

28. Her major defect in this role is the lack of a suitable ships boat capable of landing a small armed party at effective speed and able to beach and operate over sandbars and coral. The slow motor boat supplied is particularly useless. There is an urgent requirement to provide all ships likely to be operating on inshore and offshore patrols with a suitable boat, to allow for cooperation with the Army and to be able to reconnoitre inshore and up rivers.

29. In March 1956 the CMS in Borneo and the Guardship were issued by the Naval Force Commander with 16 foot Army aluminium assault boats, double hulls filled with polystyrene to provide flotation insurance. These boats designed for inland waters are unsatisfactory except in calm weather, but nevertheless in the prevailing sea states throughout most of the year proved their worth in Borneo. They can be stowed inboard or hoisted across the stern on the minesweeping davits, from where they can be sent away rapidly. Alternatively they can be towed astern at short stay or on the beam.

30. It had been hoped to give the commercial"Boston Whaler", which could be a promising seaways replacement, a trial under operational conditions in Borneo. It is disappointing that one of these boats could not be obtained in time for this to be done.

SECRET
31. Armament. The combination of a single 40/60 with Oerlikon and machine guns provided the CHS with a suitable set of clubs in her bag. In spite of being outgunned by nearly every Indonesian warship in Borneo, this armament was sufficient to act as an effective deterrent. Two 40/60 guns mountings fitted in some ships at the expense of Oerlikon provided too much overkill and overshoot for the many occasions when very close range fire only was required for technical or clear range reasons.

32. Vosper Patrol Craft. Vosper Patrol craft operated by the RMN were employed interchangeably with CHS. They were effective. Technical trouble from which they suffered stemmed from the fact that the RMN appeared to believe that they could economise on maintenance staff at an advanced base.

33. Almost every type of frigate and destroyer from four Commonwealth Navies acted at one time or another as Guardship at Tawau. This variety in capability affected each ship's employment in the role to some extent.

a. Speed. The principal deficiency in most ships was speed. This was not because of inability to make an interception, but because it was not possible to effect rapid deployment. For instance the requirement to provide Naval Gunfire support at short notice at one position would prevent the deployment of a frigate to investigate or prevent an incursion indicated by intelligence at another position at some distance because of the time involved on passage. Although Indonesian infiltrators did not use high speed craft, a number of the boats employed by Philippine cigarette smugglers by virtue of a bank of four or five 60 HP outboard motors, and sometimes an inboard engine as well developed high speeds in the neighbourhood of 30 knots. These boats being considered legal inside Malaysian Territorial waters rarely made any attempt to evade patrols. Had they done so, only a ship with an armed helicopter could have stopped them, and probably then only by day.

b. Radar. Those Guardships that mounted it provided the only Air Warning Radar on the Army's east flank except for a short period in 1966 when UPS 4 radar was deployed by the RAF for trial on a hill behind Tawau. The negative information on enemy air movements provided by the Guardship was of value to the Air Comander. Had the air war hotted up suddenly, the Guardships radar would have been invaluable, but such escalation would have changed the nature of confrontation and the forces deployed.

c. Ships Boats. The comments in paragraph 26 above on the CHS boat also apply to destroyers and frigates boats. The Guardship was also eventually issued with an assault boat.

d. Helicopter. Only two occasions occurred over the last year when Guardships were deployed with embarked helicopters. RM3 DIDO filled a short gap in the patrol cycle, and KD HANG TUAH embarked an RMAF Alouette during her patrol. No enemy activity occurred during those periods. Ship borne helicopters would have been invaluable for reconnaissance and interception against a more enterprising enemy.

e. Endurance. Although Type 12 frigates are very much tied to their tanker because of their short endurance this did not have any adverse effect because a resident RFA tanker was deployed at Tawau.
f. Technical support for small ships
Throughout confrontation the Guardship has provided technical support for CMS and RMM Patrol Craft. These little ships have been absent from one to two or sometimes even three months from the bases from which they are designed to operate at very short intervals. The Guardship's complement was designed with a view to maintaining herself with outside base support. Yet she has been required on top of this to provide a great deal of support for other ships. This can only have been effected at the expense of her own material efficiency. It is essential, if CMS and Patrol Craft are to be operated for long periods away from their base that the necessary base support is provided at the advance base, if only by ensuring that a frigate in support has the necessary personnel embarked in addition to those required for her own maintenance.

NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT

34. Naval Gunfire Support was used in two areas both different in geographical characteristics. They will be dealt with separately. The Forward Observation parties concerned in operational shoots did not make detailed analyses of the shoots at the time.

35. Tawau/Wallace Bay

a. General
This is an area on the Indonesia/Malaysia border in Eastern Sabah of mangrove swamp where movement of troops and supporting weapons was difficult. The Guardship deployed in the area was responsible for providing Naval Gunfire Support for the Brigade.

b. Illumination
This was used on occasions to aid patrols in the river complex and to light targets for field artillery. It was found to be satisfactory but was only used in small amounts due to ammunition expenditure limitations.

c. HE
This was not used operationally during the time phase under review. (September 65 - August 66)

d. Deterrent Value
Exercises were carried out at least once a week in the Tawau area using Naval Gunfire Support. As these were seen by the enemy to be effective they acted as considerable deterrent.

e. Comments
The marshy country in the Tawau area reduced the effectiveness of indirect fire support. The use of VT shells, however, overcame this problem. In general Naval guns, being of heavier calibre than Artillery field guns, would have been more effective.

f. CMS and PCs
Indirect fire using L 70's of the RMM PC SRI PERAK was tried out. The limitations were:

(i) Break up range of HE.
(ii) Flat trajectory.
(iii) Elevation setting.

g. Exercises in direct fire were carried out by CMS and PCs in conjunction with in some cases Artillery and the Guardship. On one occasion the CMS acting as Piqut ship off Nunukan, when engaged by shore batteries, coordinated the return fire by her own weapons with our artillery.

h. Spotting was carried out from air, shore and boat observation posts.
b. Operational Comments
   There was no ground follow-up. The comments are based on the experience of the Forward Observer, an Artillery officer.
   
   (i) The target area was effectively engaged by the ship.
   (ii) The enemy were engaged by weapons of a heavier calibre than they would have been used to up till that time.
   (iii) Areas of primary jungle that were engaged were observed to have had trees knocked down - the jungle canopy was penetrated.

37. General Comments
   The limitations of Field Artillery weapons in being able to pierce the jungle canopy are well known. Naval guns, as well as Artillery 5.5 inch, can pierce this canopy and in fact knock down large trees. The moral and physical effect on troops in the area must therefore be considerable. The advantage of NCS fire over Fighter Air Support was that politically it could be used. However, even if FAS support could have been used, the response time of NCS, normally two minutes, was much quicker than that of FAS.

38. Summary
   The procedures worked out between the Tawau Forward Observation party and successive Guardships ensured that Naval Gunfire Support if called for would have been responsive in speed and efficiency. This was of real deterrent value in the Tawau area. In the one case where Naval Gunfire Support was used in a fast brigade no direct comparison can be made with Ground Artillery as the target area was outside Field Artillery range, which in this particular case demonstrates a value of NCS. The heavier weapon normally mounted on ships gives added support to the ground forces even when supported by their own artillery weapons. In general the 4.5 inch gun is preferred by ground forces to any larger calibre.

39. Types of Shoots Fired Operationally
   a. Immediate Neutralization - Direct Action HE
   b. Illumination - VT
   c. Harrassing Fire - Direct Action HE

Ship Design

No difficulties were produced by one turret ships although obviously it was sometimes a little difficult for them to bombard in a narrow channel with the tide the wrong way. One turret ships provided good illumination for their own fall of shot by using one gun for starshell.
40. **Appreciation of Signals**

The import of Naval operational signals is not always understood by Army and RAF officers acting as Duty Officer in a Joint Operations Room. This is particularly the case where action is required although in the signal the Headquarters is only an information addresser. There is "built-in" reluctance among Army and RAF officers to call anyone at night, which it is important to appreciate from the outset when setting up a Joint Operations Headquarters with Naval responsibility.

b. **Equipment Variety**

The variety of communication fits provided by the gradual change over to COMINT/ICS required a series of different radio organisations for different ships particularly for air raid reporting. Thus the communications organisation changed with the Guardship which sometimes made for confusion ashore.

c. **Compatibility of Equipment**

Lack of compatibility of equipment with the Army, Army Air Corps and Marine Police provided the main problem in communications, which were nearly all ultimately resolved by local organisation. Ships liable to operate with the Army should be issued with compatible radios and the operators trained in their use.

d. **Cryptography**

Considerable problems arose because the only compatible machine system with Malaysian forces was PORTEX, which ships found slow and unreliable. The effectiveness of the equipment deteriorated when transferred from ship to ship.

e. **Callsigns**

Callsigns were a problem until Naval intra-Force callsigns were introduced for use with the Malaysians.

f. **Orders**

Ships sometimes failed to read their communication orders before operating in Borneo waters, and then blamed other services when things went wrong before checking their own organisation.

g. **Routing**

Careful routing of signals to a variety of addressers served by different systems was essential. Instructions to acknowledge were necessary on important action signals.

h. **Joint Communications Unit Borneo**

Naval Radio Operators worked alongside Army and RAF operators at the Joint Communication Centres in Labuan and Kuching. Although in a minority, they proved to be better qualified than the other services for employment within a joint concern, by virtue of the fact that they have a crypto qualification.

i. **Discipline**

Discipline in the initial stages on setting up the unit became a problem because of differing service regulations. To overcome this all operators were placed under the Army Discipline Act.
J. **Discipline (Cont)**

It is important that an officer from each service is at hand to advise on single service regulations in a Joint Unit and that the ratings themselves are instructed in the differences. It was noticeable that the less disciplined Naval ratings took advantage of what at first seemed to them a less stringent scale of punishment for offences such as leave breaking and absence from place of duty.

**COMMANDO SHIP**

41. The Commando Ship has been employed on several occasions to change over units in Borneo. She has brought battalions to and from their permanent bases in the Far East and repositioned battalions in Borneo. This employment of HMS ALBION and BUDWORTH, although not their primary function, has considerable advantages over other forms of rota-ment. The battalions can embark almost direct from their barracks and disembark close to the positions they are to take in the front line. Minimum port and transit facilities are required at either end. Battalions can bring most of their equipment with them in the move and helicopters and light aircraft can also be transported without having to be crated.

42. Although no requirement for the Commando Ship in her primary role in the assault has arisen, her availability has had considerable effect on contingency planning. The availability of a Commando Ship in the Far East Fleet has allowed the Army considerable flexibility and therefore saving in manpower. The wide range of tasks and other areas in which she has had to operate has however precluded fuller use in Borneo.

43. **RMN Ships Capability**

RMN ships showed a high standard of capability and smartness. The proportion of errors made by any of these ships was very low, and certainly no greater than those made by RN, RAN, and RMN ships in this command. There was still a fair proportion of non Malaysian officers in command of RMN Ships.

44. **Civil Aid**

A number of civil aid building projects carried out by Guardships over the last six months of confrontation, together with medical aid provided for remote communities, undoubtedly extended Naval influence and added sources of local intelligence without increasing the number of ships involved. This made Naval presence apparent in an agreeable manner to people when it was designed to protect, and who otherwise might have been unaware of its existence. These, together with the assault boat reconnaissance carried out by CMS, provided experience for Junior officers and gave ships companies a better understanding of the background to the reasons for our presence in East Malaysia.

45. **Records**

Existing records on Naval events in Borneo are sparse. It is important that a proper war diary is kept from the outset of an Emergency.

46. **Visitors**

There have been a remarkable number of inessential visitors to Borneo. The navy however has a satisfactory record in that Naval visitors have come for good reason, and their numbers have been small. In a Joint Headquarters the damage created by the free-flying locust has to be borne equally and more so by the small Naval staff, because briefings are a joint responsibility.
47. Public Relations

Ideally the Naval Public Relations Officer should be stationed at the Naval Headquarters although for several reasons this was not practicable in Borneo.

(R.D. Macdonald)
Captain, Royal Navy
Commander Naval Forces Borneo

Annex: A. Historical Record of Naval Events in Borneo.

Copy to:
The Commander British Forces in Borneo.
HISTORICAL RECORD OF NAVAL EVENTS IN BORNEO

1962

8th to 13th December

Brunei revolt.

1963

March

Regular Naval patrols commenced off Sarawak and Sabah. Permanent Guardship at Tawau.

April

First Indonesian backed aggression on land against East Malaysia.

September

1st seaborne incursion into Pulau in Sarawak. Mixed party of Indonesians and Sarawak Chinese in one Kotak.

29th December

Kalabakan raid.

Tawau Assault Group formed. This resulted in successes against raiders returning to Indonesia.

Force level by end of year: Kuching 2 CMS, Tawau 1 DD/FF, 4 CMS/PC, 2 SDML

1964

January

2nd Seaborne incursion into Pulau in Sarawak. Kotak intercepted by HMS PUNCHESTON on way out. This resulted in mopping up of entire party.

January

Naval special patrols established to assist the Marine Police with inshore and river patrols.

22 February

Indonesian boat containing explosives with 7 KKO and volunteers who said they were on anti-smuggling patrol intercepted and captured by police boat off Tinagat, near Tawau.

March

First time guided missiles used in Borneo by 815 NAS when 8 SS311 missiles were fired against enemy positions in West Brigade in support of land operations.

16 March

COMM/

HQ established with headquarters in Brunei.

1 June

COMM/

HQ moved to Joint Headquarters in Labuan with Force Commanders.

6 June

Naval personnel relieved by Marine Police for inshore coastal patrols off Sabah.

21 June

Arrangements for stricter control of barter traders in Tawau completed.

Force level by end of June: Kuching 5 CMS, Tawau 1 DD/FF, 4 CMS/PC, 2 SDML
2 CMS withdrawn from Kuching for operations in West Malaysia.

After a period when the Indonesians frequently fired at Security Force ships and craft on the sea border opposite Nunukan, HMS LYNX was hit aft by an MLA3 shell and suffered slight damage. In self defence LYNX returned fire with her 40/60, silencing the enemy fire.

Joint Hovercraft Trials Unit operating 2 SRN 5’s in Borneo.

Marine Police assumed responsibility for inshore patrols off Sarawak.

Port Emergency Committee set up in Sabah.

1 CMS withdrawn from Kuching area for operations in East Malaysia.

ICM’s and ICP’s arrived from Australia for RMN, replacing HID’s in Tawau Assault Group.

3 Indonesians (2 KKO and 1 guide) in small waterlogged fishing boat landed near Tawau and were arrested.

Amalgamation of Director of Borneo Operations and Commander Land Forces Borneo. Naval Force Commander became third in succession in command.

First searching of Merchant Ships by Port Emergency Committee in Sabah.

Rejang River Force formed to counter seaward threat to security in Rejang River delta.

3 ship bombardment as a demonstration on East Sebatik Island border area by HMS DEVONSHIRE, HMS DURBESS and HMS TIRMANIKI.

Series of firings towards Boat Observation Post from Nunukan. On 5th HMS HAWK and artillery returned fire silencing batteries.

HMS CHICHESTER carried out operational firings into Gunong Gadang area of Sarawak in conjunction with Army anti terrorist sweep.

Royal Brunei Malay Regiment marine craft section set up with 3 patrol craft.

Port Emergency Committee set up in Sarawak.
1966 (Cont)

July

Searching of Merchant ships by Port Emergency Committee in Sarawak commenced.

26 July

KD SRI SARAWAK fired on from Nunukan, returning fire silencing shore batteries.

11th August

Ratification of Bangkok treaty

14th August

1 CMS withdrawn from Tawau.

20th August

1 CMS withdrawn from Tawau.

3rd September

RH CMS relieved by RMM CMS at Kuching.

6th September

Guardship withdrawn from East Malaysia
CONVIVABOR handed over responsibility to Naval Officer-in-Charge East Malaysia (RMN).

20th September

CONVIVABOR appointment lapse and Naval Headquarters closed down.

6-10th October

Withdrawal of Naval Air Commando Squadron and operation by 845 Squadron, HMS BUDWARK to backload army heavy equipment.

Note: Compiled from only records held by the Commander, Naval Forces, Borneo and is therefore not a comprehensive record of events.
Annexure C

File WO 268/802:

“Indonesian Offensive Against West Malaysia (Excluding Piracies and Undetected Infiltrations)".
**CONFIDENTIAL**

**INDONESIAN OFFENSIVE AGAINST WEST MALAYA**
*(excluding Sea Piracies and Undetected Infiltrations)*

**PERIOD 17TH AUGUST 1964 - 31ST DECEMBER 1964**

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<th>NUMBERS INVOLVED</th>
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<td>(f)</td>
<td>(g)</td>
<td>(h)</td>
<td>(i)</td>
<td>(j)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>17 Aug 1964</td>
<td>WEST JOKOR - PONTAI - KUKUP - BENUP (LIVER)</td>
<td>Landing</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>108(c)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>75(b)(c)</td>
<td>2K(d)</td>
<td>2V(c)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(a) 4 known to have escaped (b) Includes 3 on 22 Mar 65 (c) Excludes 1 on 17 May 1955 (Serial 51) (d) Malaysian Army Men - estb base.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>27 Aug</td>
<td>SINGAPORE SEABOR/ MONK area</td>
<td>Seaborne rocket and &amp; attack</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1K(e)</td>
<td>Bomb thrown from motor boat at group of oil storage tanks on P. SIEBAROK. KD 5TH PLAR engaged boat which escaped. (a) Chinese. Men - probably sabotage/terrorists</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2 Sep</td>
<td>JOHOR - LANSIS area (LILAC)</td>
<td>Paradorp</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>96(a)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(a) 2 unlocated (b) 1 British Army Officer, 2 GOR, 1 HOR, 1 Malaysian Army (c) Malaysian Army Men - estb base.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 A</td>
<td>24 Sep</td>
<td>MALACCA - KEBERAK camp area</td>
<td>Bomb explosion</td>
<td>27(a)</td>
<td>27(a)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Bomb exploded under contractor's Vehicle. No cas. (a) Believed Chinese exfiltrators. Men - Sabotage/terrorists</td>
</tr>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>(a)</th>
<th>(b)</th>
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<tr>
<td>4 B.</td>
<td>29 Sep</td>
<td>PALACCA - Capitol Cabaret area</td>
<td>Grenade</td>
<td>27(a)</td>
<td>27(a)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2n(b)</td>
<td>2 grenades thrown into compound</td>
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<tr>
<td>(5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>explosion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(a) Believed Chinese exfiltrators</td>
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<td>(b) One male Indian, one male Chinese</td>
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<td>Man - Sabotage/terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 C.</td>
<td>6 Oct</td>
<td>PALACCA Motor Supply Co.</td>
<td>Grenade</td>
<td>27(a)</td>
<td>27(a)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 grenade thrown and exploded.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>explosion</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No casualties.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(a) Believed Chinese exfiltrators, probably same group as in serials 4 A and 4 B.</td>
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<td>Man - Sabotage/terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>29 Oct</td>
<td>EAST JORGE-KEHILI area, (FLOK)</td>
<td>Landing</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>52(a)</td>
<td>21 Nov</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>50 captured by 30 Oct. Remander on 21 Nov.</td>
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<td>(7)</td>
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<td>Man - estb base.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>6 Nov</td>
<td>EAST JORGE-SEKIL Keelil area, (HUMA HARKA 1)</td>
<td>Landing</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10(a)</td>
<td>3(b)</td>
<td>1(c)</td>
<td>24 Nov</td>
<td>13(d)</td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>6 escaped</td>
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<tr>
<td>(8)</td>
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<td>(b)</td>
<td>24 Nov in a boat at Sg. Tg. SALAU by 3 RM.</td>
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<td>(c)</td>
<td>18 Nov</td>
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<td>Pte 2 SIR</td>
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<td>Man - estb base.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>14 Nov</td>
<td>SINGAPORE-JURONG area</td>
<td>Landing</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3(a)</td>
<td>7(b)</td>
<td>16 Nov</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>By HMS FISKERTON on 16 Nov whilst enroute to P.3BANOK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(b) On 16 Nov in JURONG/PASIR L.B.R area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Interception</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Man - Sabotage/terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1 Dec</td>
<td>SINGAPORE-DADOK area</td>
<td>Sea</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6(b)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1 Dec</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>KD SIR PADANG intercepted sampan, exchange of fire.</td>
</tr>
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<td>Interception</td>
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<td>(b) 1 Body recovered, 5 missing presumed drowned.</td>
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<td>(a)</td>
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<td>Man - Sabotage/terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 (11)</td>
<td>6 Dec</td>
<td>SINGAPoRE</td>
<td>Raffles</td>
<td>Sea Interception</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6 Dec</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 (12)</td>
<td>9 Dec</td>
<td>WEST JOHOR-</td>
<td>Semerah area</td>
<td>Landing</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9 Jan</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>11 (13)</td>
<td>9 Dec</td>
<td>WEST JOHOR-</td>
<td>KUKUP area</td>
<td>Landing</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9 Dec</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 (14)</td>
<td>13 Dec</td>
<td>SINGAPoRE-</td>
<td>Raffles</td>
<td>Sea Interception</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4(a)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13 Dec</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 (15)</td>
<td>15 Dec</td>
<td>SINGAPoRE-</td>
<td>P.S.KIJAN</td>
<td>Attempted landing</td>
<td>6/7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15 Dec</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>14 (16)</td>
<td>22 Dec</td>
<td>WEST JOHOR-</td>
<td>KUKUP area</td>
<td>Landing</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3(a)</td>
<td>25(b)</td>
<td>9 Jan</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**INDEX C II\**

**SP.1E.237/85**

**DATED 1ST NOVEMBER, 1965**

-MHS TEAL intercepted sampan which attempted to escape. TEAL opened fire. Sampan stopped, occupants arrested. Man - claim to have broken down and drifted into Malaysian water.

-Boat found 9 Dec, 2 infiltrators captured 10 Dec, 3 captured 11 Dec. Second boat containing 5 believed to have returned to base. Man - sabotage/terrorism

-7 captured by P.F.F. 9 Dec, remaining 8 probably did not land but returned to base. Man - sabotage/terrorism

-HMS TEAL contacted two boats. One escaped. Exchange of fire with second boat. (a) Includes 2 missing presumed drowned. Man - claimed strayed off course.

-Speed boat approached P.S.EKLIJU. P.LIPAH, exchanged fire with sentry and withdrew. Man - Probably Sabotage/terrorism.

-(a) By Malaysian Army 24 Dec (b) 11 on 25 Dec, 13 on 27 Dec, 1 on 29 Dec. Man - Sabotage/terrorism. 5th base.
<table>
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<th>(l)</th>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>24 Dec</td>
<td>Selangor - area 35 miles</td>
<td>Sea Interception</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9 Jan</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>26 Dec</td>
<td>East Johor - Sedihi</td>
<td>Landing</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9 Jan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>28 Dec</td>
<td>Singapore - Jurong area</td>
<td>Landing</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>29 Dec</td>
<td>-</td>
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**TOTAL as at 31 Dec 1964.**

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<td>510+</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>K 6</td>
<td>K 1</td>
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<td>W 2</td>
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<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>PL. CO. (OP NICELAND)</td>
<td>INCIDENT</td>
<td>NUMBERS INVOLVED</td>
<td>ALLIED CASUALTIES</td>
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<tr>
<td>18 (20)</td>
<td>4 Jan</td>
<td>SING. FORO.- ST. JOHN'S area</td>
<td>Sea Interception</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>19 (21)</td>
<td>6 Jan</td>
<td>SING. FORO. eastern anchorage area</td>
<td>Sabotage-merchant ship SS OCA. NIC PRIDE (Liberia)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 (22)</td>
<td>7 Jan</td>
<td>WEST FORO.- SG. BUKIT KECIL area (PAPER CLIP)</td>
<td>Landing/Sea interception</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 (23)</td>
<td>9 Jan</td>
<td>S.I.L. CO. - 12 n WEST of TER. INDIA.</td>
<td>Sea Interception</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>-</td>
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</table>

**Confidential**

Indo.lassian offensive against west Malaysia.

(Excluding sea iracacies and undetected infiltrations)


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INCIDENT</th>
<th>NUMBERS INVOLVED</th>
<th>ALLIED CASUALTIES</th>
<th>MILITARY</th>
<th>CIVILIAN</th>
<th>RAIL. No.</th>
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**Annex C to**

H.Q. 2/15/3

DATED 1ST NOVEMBER, 1965

**0050 GH.**

**WBS WILKES/TON**

intercepted sampan. 4 occupants arrested.

**Non** - Sabotage/subversion.

**0430 GH.**

**OCA. NIC PRIDE**

reported damaged by explosion. No cas.

**0610 GH.**

**WBS WILKES/TON**

intercepted sampan. Captured 1 Indo.

(a) Missing presumed drowned.

**Non** - Sabotage/terrorism

**Malaysian Forces captured 5 Indo. sampan on 9 Jan and 4 Indo. on 9 Jan. KD PAGILDA intercepted sampan on 9 Jan, arrested 4 Indo. Remaining 11 Indo. escaped by sea.

**Non** - estb base.

**0100 GH.**

**KD SRI PERAK**

intercepted pirated tug. Exchange of fire, tug sunk. A second boat escaped.

(a) Missing presumed drowned.

6 bodies recovered from sea.

(b) Malaysian crew of tug.

**Non** - estb base.
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<td>(g)</td>
<td>(h)</td>
<td>(i)</td>
<td>(j)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>15 Jan</td>
<td>SINGAPORE-PASIR PANJANG area</td>
<td>Sea Interception</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>75 Jan</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>1 Feb</td>
<td>PURAK-NATUN area</td>
<td>Landing</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>1K(a)</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>11 Feb</td>
<td>WEST JOHORS-KOKUP area</td>
<td>Sea Interception</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11 Feb</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>12 Feb</td>
<td>WEST JOHORS-POLIERK area, (IRON ROD)</td>
<td>Landing/Sea Interception</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13 Feb</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>22 Feb</td>
<td>PURAK-PANJOR area, (HRICK ALL)</td>
<td>Landing</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4(a)</td>
<td>27 Feb</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Notes:**
- 0010 GH. NSW NANYTON intercepted sampan containing 2 Indons. Both arrested. (Men - Subversion).
- Police intercepted 2 infiltrators who escaped. (a) Policeman. (b) Recce.
- 0150 GH. KD SHI KADAH intercepted sampan containing 10 Indons. All captured. Second boat escaped. (Men - Raid).
- PTF contacted infiltrators 242315 GH Feb, 1 captured. 242005 GH Feb 1 killed. 250500 GH Feb 1 killed 1 captured. 262340 GH Feb 1 captured. 271930 GH Feb 1 captured. (a) Including infiltrator involved in killing Policeman 1 Feb (Serial 23). (Men - Sabotage).
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) | (f) | (g) | (h) | (i) | (j) |
| 27  | 23 Feb | MALACCA - 9 n. SOUTH OF CAPE RACKADO | Sen Interception | 9 | - | - | 9 | 23 Feb | - |
| 26  | 25/25 Feb | EAST JUKORE - TO PUTANGL1 and TO PUNJ..DG2 area (OK TREZ 1) | Landing | 44 | 44 | 23(a) | 21 | 26 Mar | 10K(b) |
|      |          |                              |                              |       |       |       |       |         |     |
| 29  | 27 Feb | SINGAPORE - EAST COAST Rd area | Bomb Explosion | ? | ? | - | - | - | - |
| 30  | 10 Mar | SINGAPORE - CHEMIN Rd area | Bomb Explosion | 2 | 2 | - | 23(a) | 13 Mar | - |
|      |          |                              |                              |       |       |       |       |         |     |
| 31  | 10 Mar | SINGAPORE - TAMPALANG area | Landing | 3 | 3 | - | 2 | - | - |

**ANNEX C TO**

EQFL 2451/5

**DATED 1ST NOVEMBER, 1965**

2205 G1. HMS TAH intercepted sampan containing 9 Indians. All captured. Two other boats in area escaped. Non - catb base/sabotage.

- Landing by 3 boats. 1 Boat recovered 25 Feb.
  (a) 251207 G1. Har HMS LULLINGTON intercepted stolen sampan containing 2. 1 killed body recovered 31 Mar. 1 missing presumed drowned. Believed attempting escape. (b) Malayan Army. Non - catb base.


- 15-7 G1. Explosion atback of house. Extensive damage to building and nearby cars.
  (a) Captured 13 Mar off P. SABOK. Boat seized whilst attempting escape.
  (b) 2 Chinese (male) 1 Malay (male)
  Non - Sabotage/terrorisn.

- 20 Mar Police arrested 2 Indians. 1 Indian escaped. Non - rocco
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(a)</th>
<th>(b)</th>
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<th>(i)</th>
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<th>(k)</th>
<th>(l)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - LONG KES R5 area</td>
<td>Bomb explosion</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>EAST JOKORS - TG SLING area (OAK TREE II)</td>
<td>Landing</td>
<td>77+</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4(a)</td>
<td>11 day</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>EAST JOKORS - TG PUNGGAI area (OAK TREE III)</td>
<td>Sea Interception</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8(a)</td>
<td>19(b)</td>
<td>25 day</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - KAYON Rd area</td>
<td>Bomb explosion</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3(a)</td>
<td>25 day</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>36</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>BALACCA - CORONATION Park area</td>
<td>Bomb explosion</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>(d)</td>
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<tr>
<td>27 Mar</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - ST. LAWRENCE Rd area</td>
<td>Bomb explosion</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2019 GH bomb exploded damaging water main. No cas. Sen - Sabotage/terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Mar</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - ST. JOHN area</td>
<td>Sea Interception</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30 Mar</td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>CoJo GH HMS INVERARMISTON intercepted sampan containing 3 Indons. Exchanged of fire. (a) INVERARMISTON midshipman killed accidentally by premature explosion of an illuminating mortar bomb. Not included in cas. figures. Sen - Possibly infiltrators.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTALS for Period 1st January, 1965 - 31st March, 1965**

- 259\+ 115 71 122 | - | 10 K 6 W | 6 K 32 W |

**TOTALS for Period 17th August, 1964 - 31st December, 1964**

- 510\+ 340 72 286 | - | 6 K 6 W | 1 K 2 W |

**TOTALS for Period 17th August, 1964 - 31st March, 1965**

- 769\+ 455 143 408 | - | 16 K 12 W | 7 K 34 W |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. (A)</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place (or Nickname)</th>
<th>Incident</th>
<th>Placed or Found</th>
<th>Actually Landed</th>
<th>Enemy Killed</th>
<th>Enemy Captured/Surrendered</th>
<th>Allied Casualties</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>59 (41)</td>
<td>1 Apr</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - NORTH BRIDGE Rd area</td>
<td>Bomb explosion</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2746 GH - Bomb exploded outside ODEON Cinema. 4 cars damaged. No casualties. Intention - Sabotage/terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 (42)</td>
<td>2 Apr</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - ALTAM Rd area</td>
<td>Explosive recovered</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0750 GH. 120 lb. explosive, 6 hand grenades and timing device recovered near sea wall, 61 HAYLOR Rd. Disarmed by expert. Intention - Sabotage/terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 (43)</td>
<td>2 Apr</td>
<td>SELANGOR - KUALA LUMPUR area</td>
<td>Bomb explosion</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1V(a) 2136 GH. Bomb exploded under night train KL - PONAK at Kg KL1111. Coach damaged. (a) Malay (male) slight injuries Intention - Sabotage/terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42 (44)</td>
<td>7 Apr</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - St JOHNS Lighthouse area</td>
<td>Sea Interception</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2132 GH. B6B MARTAN intercepted seaplane containing 1 Indon. Intention - Possible rescue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43 (45)</td>
<td>8 Apr</td>
<td>SELANGOR - KUALA LUMPUR area</td>
<td>Bomb explosion</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0050 GH. Explosion near ALA building. AHANG Rd. No damage or cas. Intention - Sabotage/terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>(e)</td>
<td>(f)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>9 Apr</td>
<td>SINGAPORE -MOUNT NATT</td>
<td>Bomb</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>14 Apr</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - KATONG PARK</td>
<td>Landing/S</td>
<td>Sea</td>
<td>Interception</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>16 Apr</td>
<td>SINGAPORE -MOUNT NATT</td>
<td>Explosives</td>
<td>Recovered</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47 A</td>
<td>17 Apr</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - ST JOHN/ SINGAPAR/ SISTERS ISL</td>
<td>Sea</td>
<td>Interception</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18 Apr</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ANNEX C TO**

**AGIL 215/75**

**DATED 1ST NOVEMBER, 1965**

2356 GH. Bomb exploded 70 yds from SOUTHERN beach. No damage or cas.

IAN - Sabotage/terrorist.

2410 GH. Police intercepted 3 Indons landing from a boat. 2 Indons arrested. 1 Indon escaped in boat. Two bombs recovered. 2205 GH. Man intercepted off KATONG PARK containing 2 Indons. All arrested. 2239 GH. Bomb on beach exploded whilst being examined. Houses in area damaged.

(a) 1 British Army officer, 1 British Army NCO.
(b) Police

Men - Sabotage/terrorist.

1700 GH. Two boxes containing explosives recovered on beach at SOUTHERN end of island. Destroyed by expert. No damage or cas.

Men - Sabotage/terrorist.

4 Boats attempted infiltration. 1 intercepted by H-3 INVAJRISTON at 2115 GH. 3 Indons captured. 1 intercepted by Police off SINGAPAR, 3 Indons captured. 1 intercepted by Police off SISTERS ISL, 2 Indons captured. 1 boat containing 5 Indons turned back and escaped.

IAN - Sabotage/terrorist.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Casualties</th>
<th>Result</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27 Apr</td>
<td>Bomb explosion</td>
<td>KUALA LUMPUR area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2170 HR. Explosion</td>
<td>Occurred at 31 km. No damage or loss.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Apr</td>
<td>Bomb explosion</td>
<td>KUALA LUMPUR area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2245 HR. Explosion</td>
<td>Occurred near diesel oil storage tank. Tank supports slightly damaged. No loss.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 May</td>
<td>Landing/Sea interception</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - CHINJU area</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 May</td>
<td>Landing/Sea interception</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - TILKOK area</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 May</td>
<td>Landing/Sea interception</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - Raffles area</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4 May</td>
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<td>5 May</td>
<td>Landing/Sea interception</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - KOTA TINGGI area</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5 May</td>
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<td>6 May</td>
<td>Landing/Sea interception</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - Raffles area</td>
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<td>6 May</td>
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<td>7 May</td>
<td>Landing/Sea interception</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - KOTA TINGGI area</td>
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<td>7 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 May</td>
<td>Landing/Sea interception</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 May</td>
<td>Landing/Sea interception</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - KOTA TINGGI area</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>9 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 May</td>
<td>Landing/Sea interception</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - Raffles area</td>
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<tr>
<td>11 May</td>
<td>Landing/Sea interception</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - KOTA TINGGI area</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 May</td>
<td>Landing/Sea interception</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - Raffles area</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 May</td>
<td>Landing/Sea interception</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - KOTA TINGGI area</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>14 May</td>
<td>Landing/Sea interception</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - Raffles area</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 May</td>
<td>Landing/Sea interception</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - KOTA TINGGI area</td>
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<td>15 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 May</td>
<td>Landing/Sea interception</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - Raffles area</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>17 May</td>
<td>Landing/Sea interception</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - KOTA TINGGI area</td>
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<td>20 May</td>
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<td>22 May</td>
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<tr>
<td>23 May</td>
<td>Landing/Sea interception</td>
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<td>29 May</td>
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<td>30 May</td>
<td>Landing/Sea interception</td>
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<td>30 May</td>
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<td>31 May</td>
<td>Landing/Sea interception</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - KOTA TINGGI area</td>
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<td>31 May</td>
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</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
<table>
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<th>(f)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>17 May</td>
<td>WEST JOWE KIOGF area</td>
<td>Sea interception</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1(a)</td>
<td>17 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>20 May</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - HILANG LAMTI area</td>
<td>Bomb explosion</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>24 May</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - KUALA LUMPUR area</td>
<td>Bomb explosion</td>
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<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>54</td>
<td>26 May</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - St JOHNS ISLAND area</td>
<td>Sea interception</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2(a)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25 May</td>
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<td>Bomb explosion</td>
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<td>56</td>
<td>26 May</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - HILANG NATT area</td>
<td>Sea interception</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ANNEX C TO**

**FILE 2121/3**

**DATED 1ST NOVEMBER, 1963**

1700 G.H. HMS WILKINSON intercepted sampan containing 1 Indon.
(a) Survivor of OP LIVER attempting escape (Serial 1)

2309 G.H. Past sampan attacked French ship "TOUCAN" whilst underway off SISTERS BUOY.
4 hand grenades thrown. 1 exploded. Slight damage. No cas. Sampan escaped.

2235 G.H. Explosion occurred at 52 ft KL - KIONG Rd, at bridge over Sg. LAKHUT. Slight damage. No cas.

2200 G.H. KD SRI PANANG intercepted sampan containing 3 Indons. 1 Indon captured.
(c) Bodies recovered on 29 and 30 May.

2225 G.H. Explosion occurred at junction LOHLLI Rd/SMCKETEDOS Rd, at bridge. Slight damage, no cas.

2350 G.H. Sampan sighted by Coast Guard, 270205 G.H. Sampan recovered. Contained explosives and 3 hand grenades. No occupants.

**Men - Probably sabotage/terrorism.**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Result</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27 May</td>
<td>Explosive recovery</td>
<td>S.LAKSOR - KLANG Rd area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>57 (64) 1515 GH Police Patrol located two bombs under bridge at Gdn Old KLANG Rd. Dismantled by expert. Hsm - Sabotage/terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 May</td>
<td>Landing</td>
<td>EAST JOCORI - SEJIL BALDI area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6/6 12 Jun</td>
<td></td>
<td>58 (64) 06:00 GH. Two boats discovered (a) 3/6/79 GH by RFR (b) 01/06/79 GH Jun, 15 by PFF (c) 01/07/70 GH Jun, 1 by marine police (b) 01/15/79 GH Jun, 1 surrendered (b) 07/14/79 GH Jun, 1 by RFR (b) 10/15/79 GH Jun, 5 surrendered (b) 12/01/79 GH Jun, 3 by PFF (c) 06/20/70 GH Kalian Hall during contact with Indians. Hsm - esth base.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 May</td>
<td>Landing</td>
<td>EAST JOCORI - SEJIL BALDI area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6/6 12 Jun</td>
<td></td>
<td>99 (63) 1000 GH. Boat discovered (a) 11/08/75 GH Jun by 2 HFR (b) 05/09/70 GH Jun 2 by 2 HFR (b) 11/06/75 GH Jun 2 by 2 HFR (c) 01/02/70 GH Jun elderly KLLAY male kidnapped by Indians. 06/09/70 GH. Found Murdered Hsm - esth base.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Jun</td>
<td>Bomb explosion</td>
<td>KULINOCU JLLAR KULINOB area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>60 (63) 20:45 GH. Explosion occurred under a mango tree near 3% as. Julian SERRDIWAL. No damage or cas. Hsm - Sabotage/terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Jun</td>
<td>Bomb explosion</td>
<td>A.MILKOR - KLANG Rd area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>61 (65) 01/04 GH. Explosion occurred in area 62 as K.L/KLANG Rd. No damage or cas. Hsm - sabotage/terrorism.</td>
</tr>
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<td>(a)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
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<td>62</td>
<td>20 Jun</td>
<td>MALACCA HELALKA PINDAH area</td>
<td>Bomb explosion</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
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<td>67</td>
<td>24 Jun</td>
<td>SINGAPORE P. SEREMBA ST. JORDAN ISLAND area</td>
<td>Sea Interception</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7(a)</td>
<td>9(b)</td>
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<td>64</td>
<td>25 Jun</td>
<td>SINGAPORE ST. JORDAN ISLAND area</td>
<td>Sea Interception</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5(a)</td>
<td>1(b)</td>
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**Annex C to**

**UGSC.2151/5**

**Dated 1st November, 1965**

- 2330 GI. Explosion occurred area HELALKA PINDAH, ALOR GAMBARR. No damage or casualties.
- Men - Sabotage/terrorism.

- 0025 GI. HNS ILARYTON intercepted sampan off P. SEREMBA. Exchange of fire. 0040 GI. HNS TILFORD intercepted two sampans off ST. JORDAN ISLAND. Fourth sampan escaped containing 10 Indonesians.
  - (a) 5 by HNS ILARYTON (Missing presumed drowned)
  - (b) 2 by HNS TILFORD (Missing presumed drowned)
  - (c) 5 by HNS ILARYTON
  - (d) 4 by HNS TILFORD
- Men - Sabotage/terrorism.

- 0845 GI. KD TAMSUK intercepted sampan, opened fire but lost contact. HNS COOLLINGTON contended and captured sampan which contained 1 wounded. Indonesian whilst bringing aboard sampan exploded alongside.
  - (a) 2 missing presumed drowned
  - (b) Wounded Indonesian died in hospital.
- 261400 GI. Picked up by British merchant ship COWARDS.
- (a) RN Kidnapping
- (d) 5 RN ratings, 2 Chinese LA ratings, 1 RN (interpreter)
- Men - Sabotage/terrorism.
|   |   |   |   | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) | (f) | (g) | (h) | (i) | (j) | (k) | (l) |
|---|---|---|---|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| 65 | 23 Jun | SINGAPORE - KRAJAN area | Bomb explosion | ? | ? | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 2330 GH Explosion occurred on reclaimed land. No damage or casualties. Men - Sabotage/terrorism. |

**TOTALS for Period 1st April 1965 - 30th June 1965**

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**TOTALS for Period 17th August 1964 - 31st March 1965**

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**TOTALS for Period 17th August 1964 - 30th June 1965**

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<td>474</td>
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<td>38W</td>
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<td>No. (c)</td>
<td>Date (d)</td>
<td>Place (e)</td>
<td>Incident (f)</td>
<td>Personnel Involved (g)</td>
<td>Killed (h)</td>
<td>Captured (i)</td>
<td>Elimination Complete (j)</td>
<td>Remarks (n)</td>
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<tr>
<td>66 (70)</td>
<td>2 Jul</td>
<td>JALACCA - CENTRAL MARKET</td>
<td>Explosive recovered</td>
<td>1 (h)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Two primed time bombs containing 16 slabs of T.N.T recovered by police. Man - Sabotage/terrorism.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>67 (71)</td>
<td>6 Jul</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - ST. JOHN'S ISLAND</td>
<td>Sea Interception</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2(a)</td>
<td>6 Jul</td>
<td>0045 GH. Canoe with two occupants approached KD SMS KALANTAN and threw 2 hand grenades. KALANTAN opened fire. Canoe capsized and sank. (a) No bodies recovered, presumed killed/drowned Man - Sabotage/terrorism.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>56 (72)</td>
<td>6 Jul</td>
<td>JALACCA - KG. HULU area</td>
<td>Explosive recovered</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Unprimed time bomb containing 3.5 lbs explosives recovered. Man - Sabotage/terrorism.</td>
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<tr>
<td>60 (73)</td>
<td>7 Jul</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - ROBINSON Rd</td>
<td>Explosive recovered</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0642 GH. Package containing 8 hand grenades recovered from car park adjacent to C.I.D. building Man - Sabotage/terrorism.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Result</td>
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<td>70</td>
<td>7 Jul</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - RIVER VALI YARD</td>
<td>Explosives recovered</td>
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<td>71</td>
<td>7 Jul</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - HATTON CIRCUS</td>
<td>Explosives recovered</td>
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<td>72</td>
<td>7 Jul</td>
<td>JUHORE - BATU PAHAT</td>
<td>Bomb explosion</td>
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<td>73</td>
<td>8 Jul</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - ST. JOHN'S ISLAND area</td>
<td>Sea Interception</td>
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<td>74</td>
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<td>MALACCA</td>
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<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>18 Jul</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - ST. JOHN'S ISLAND area</td>
<td>Sea Interception</td>
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<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>23 Jul</td>
<td>MALACCA - KS JAVA area</td>
<td>Explosives recovered</td>
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</table>

25046 GH. Package containing 7 hand grenades recovered from telephone booth, ST. NICHOLAS FLATS.

2356 GH. Package containing 7 hand grenades recovered from telephone booth.

Approx 2645 GH. Explosion occurred on river bank opposite market at JLN SHAWKHAN.

Approx 2332 GH. Oil tanker SS CALAX KARACHI picked up TNI Sgt IT TANRIN a/o IHAMCOD.

6 lb time bomb intercepted. (Bo)

82146 GH. HRS HAWK intercepted sampan containing 5 Indonesians. Captured 2.

190605 GH. Sampan recovered containing 1 body.

6 lb time bomb recovered, (Bo)

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<td>76</td>
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<td>Explosives recovered</td>
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<td>Approx 1910 GH. Bicycle with 4½ lb time bomb discovered outside bldg. Failed to explode due to incorrect assembly. Mean - Sabotage/terrorism.</td>
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<td>79</td>
<td>4 Aug</td>
<td>MALACCA</td>
<td>Explosives recovered</td>
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<td>2 lb time bomb intercepted. Mean - Sabotage/terrorism.</td>
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<td>80</td>
<td>10 Aug</td>
<td>MALACCA PENGKALAN Ruby area</td>
<td>Explosives recovered</td>
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<td>6 lb time bomb intercepted. Mean - Sabotage/terrorism.</td>
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<td>14 Aug</td>
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<td>2 lb explosives recovered. Mean - Sabotage/terrorism.</td>
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<td>82</td>
<td>16 Aug</td>
<td>MALACCA SADALIN Fly at CELEKKAU</td>
<td>Explosives recovered</td>
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<td>2200 GH. 6 lb time bomb recovered. Mean - Sabotage/terrorism.</td>
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<td>83</td>
<td>18 Aug</td>
<td>SELANGOR F. KENAI area</td>
<td>Explosives recovered</td>
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<td>0650 GH. 12 lb time bomb discovered placed on railway track. Mean - Sabotage/terrorism.</td>
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<td>84</td>
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<td>SELANGOR - P.K.PN. area</td>
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<td>1500 GH. 2 Hand grenades recovered. Mean - Sabotage/terrorism.</td>
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<td>85</td>
<td>22 Aug</td>
<td>MALACCA - SS. LURIN area</td>
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<td>60 lb. TMT recovered. Mean - Sabotage/terrorism.</td>
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ANNEX C TO
HCPL 2354/5
DATED 1ST NOVEMBER, 1965
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<td>HAlLgga - Garden City area</td>
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<td>SIngapore - P. Extending area</td>
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**Note:** Confidential information.
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<td>7 Sep</td>
<td>Singapore - LIGHT</td>
<td>Sea Interception</td>
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<td>Malacca</td>
<td>Explosives recovered</td>
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<td>Surrender</td>
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<td>S. Labuan - T/STR KUALA LUMPUR area</td>
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SINGAPORE - Missing supplied to SINGAP area.

Con Interception

1. Serial number in brackets indicates total number of incidents since 17th August 1964.
<p>| SERIAL | DATE | PLACE (OP NICHOLDS) | INCIDENT | NUMBERS INVOLVED | KILLED | WOUNDED | CAPTURED | CAPTURED/ | MILITARY | CIVILIAN | REMARKS |
|--------|------|-------------------|----------|----------------|------|---------|----------| SURVIVED | (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) | (f) | (g) | (h) | (i) | (j) | (k) | (l) | (m) |
| 101    | 7 Oct | SINGAPORE - BLK 15 LANDMARK, SINGAPORE | Bomb explosion | ? | ? | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1115 GH. Explosion occurred at public utilities external transformer. Slight damage no. cases. | Subtype/terrorist. |
| 102    | 7 Oct | SINGAPORE - 75 m. changi rd. | Explosives recovered | ? | ? | - | - | - | - | - | - | Approx 1400 GH. Grenade with timing device recovered from public telephone box. Subtype/terrorist. |
| 103    | 7 Oct | SINGAPORE - Bridge nr. 89 KIAH, LUDH CINAK KIAH, DICKSON RD. | Explosives and explosive devices recovered | ? | ? | - | - | - | - | - | - | Approx 2200 GH. 6 lb. bomb with timing device and 3 types of subversive pamphlets recovered. Subtype/terrorist/subversion. |
| 104    | 7 Oct | SINGAPORE - TAPENES RD, LORONG TUCK BOCK, KAMPONG AREA. | Bomb explosion | ? | ? | - | - | - | - | - | - | Between 2350 GH and 2357 GH. Explosion occurred near sewage pipelines. Slight damage to concrete support and pipelines. No casualties. | Subtype/terrorist. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>(f)</th>
<th>(g)</th>
<th>(h)</th>
<th>(i)</th>
<th>(j)</th>
<th>(k)</th>
<th>(l)</th>
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<tr>
<td>105</td>
<td>7 Oct</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - TALIBAH Rd, LORONG TUCK ROCK Kampong area</td>
<td>Bomb explosion</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>7 Oct</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - TALIBAH Rd, LORONG TUCK ROCK Kampong area</td>
<td>Bomb explosion</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>107</td>
<td>11 Oct</td>
<td>P.TUK - LAU EK CHING St, IPOH</td>
<td>Bomb explosion</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>14 Oct</td>
<td>P.TUK - KOTA Rl. TALIBAH</td>
<td>Bomb explosion</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>14 Oct</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - ST JOHN'S ISLAND area</td>
<td>Sea interception</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1(a)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14 Oct</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>22 Oct</td>
<td>S.LANGOR - P KITAM area</td>
<td>Explosives recovered</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**APPENDIX A TO**

**KPLU 2157/5**

**DATED 5TH JANUARY 1966**

Between 2350 GH and 2357 GH, explosion occurred near sewage pipelines approx 60 ft from serial 104. Slight damage to concrete support. No cas. Hsn - Sabotage/terrorism.

Between 2350 GH and 2357 GH, explosion occurred near sewage pipelines, approx 58 ft from serial 105. Main sewage pipe broken. No cas. Hsn - Sabotage/terrorism.


0413 GH. HSN FISKERTON intercepted car propelled sampan which she sank. (a) Missing presumed drowned Hsn - Sabotage/terrorism.

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<tr>
<th>(a)</th>
<th>(b)</th>
<th>(c)</th>
<th>(d)</th>
<th>(e)</th>
<th>(f)</th>
<th>(g)</th>
<th>(h)</th>
<th>(i)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>111 (115)</td>
<td>26 Oct</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - SELANGOR ISLAND area</td>
<td>Sea Interception</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112 (116)</td>
<td>29 Oct</td>
<td>MALACCA - 44th bn BE BUKIT - Blang BE area</td>
<td>Explosives recovered</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>113 (117)</td>
<td>29 Oct</td>
<td>MALACCA - JALAN AYER MALAIK area</td>
<td>Explosives recovered</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>114 (118)</td>
<td>30 Oct</td>
<td>SINGAPORE - RAPID ISLAND area</td>
<td>Sea Interception</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>30 Oct</td>
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<tr>
<td>115 (119)</td>
<td>10 Nov</td>
<td>PERAK - 362 nm TAMAH / BIDOR RD</td>
<td>Bomb explosion</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**CONFIDENTIAL**

- 0250 hr. Custom boat intercepted sampan containing one Indon who had deserted from KKO forces in P. Baling. 
  - Detention.
- 0250 hr. Police recovered time bomb contained in Biscuit tin. 
  - Detonation.
- 2050 hr. Police discovered time bomb contained in Biscuit tin, located in front of Yok Bn High School. Approx 12 lbs TNT. 
  - Sabotage/terrorist.
- 0115 hr. MALAIDINTERCEPTED sampan; one Indon arrested. Sampan sunk. 
  - 4000 Int.
- 2040 hr. Explosion occurred at bridge (VX 107235). Bridge and nearby house damaged. Estimated 10-20 lbs TNT used. 
  - Detonation.
  - Sabotage/terrorist.
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<tr>
<th>(a)</th>
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<tr>
<td>116</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>10 Nov</td>
<td>PUKAI - SIDOR area</td>
<td>Bomb explosion</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>117</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>14 Nov</td>
<td>S.LAMONG - KUALA LUMPUR area</td>
<td>Explosives recovered</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>118</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>14 Nov</td>
<td>MALACCA - Town area</td>
<td>Explosives recovered</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>119</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>14 Nov</td>
<td>S.LAMONG - SINGAPORE area</td>
<td>Bomb explosion</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>23 Nov</td>
<td>MALACCA - TAHUN DAR Corp</td>
<td>Bomb explosion</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**AMEND A TO**

**W/C 21/5175**

**DATED 5TH JANUARY 1966**

2046 GH. Explosion occurred at bridge (WK 129142). Bridge damaged. Later pipeline destroyed. Estimated 10 lbs TNT used. No casualties.

**MIN - Sabotage/terrorism.**

2046 GH. Bomb containing 16 lbs explosives and two hand grenades recovered (WK 465375). All contained in wooden box and booby trapped.

**MIN - Sabotage/terrorism.**

2020 GH. Time bomb with timing device recovered (GL 166668). No casualties.

**MIN - Sabotage/terrorism.**

2020 GH. Explosion heard in vicinity of KTING TAM Mine SINGAPUR. Site of explosion near dry bridge (WK 515387). Estimated 10 - 20 lbs TNT. No casualties.

**MIN - Sabotage/terrorism.**

215 GH. Bomb exploded outside fence. No casualties. Estimated 20 lbs TNT used.

**MIN - Sabotage/terrorism.**